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PREAMBLE 

1.  Sources of military jurisdiction. 
The sources of  military jurisdiction  include the 
Constitution  and  international  law.  International 
law includes the law of war. 
2.  Exercise of military jurisdiction. 
(a)  Kinds. Military jurisdiction is exercised by: 
(1)  A government in the exercise of that branch 
of the municipal law which regulates its military es- 
tablishment. (Military law). 
(2)  A government temporarily governing the civil 
population within its territory or a portion of its ter- 
ritory through its military forces as necessity may 
require. (Martial law). 
(3)  A belligerent occupying enemy territory. 
(Military government). 
(4)  A government with respect to offenses against 
the law of war. 
(b)  Agencies. The agencies through which military 
jurisdiction is exercised include: 
(1)  Courts-martial for the trial of offenses against 
military law and, in the case of general courts-mar- 
tial, of persons who by the law of war are subject to 
trial by military tribunals. See Parts 11, 111, and IV 
of this Manual for rules governing courts-martial. 
(2) Military commissions and provost courts for 
the trial of cases within their respective  jurisdictions. 
Subject to any applicable rule of international law or 
to any regulations prescribed by the President or by 
other competent authority, military commissions 
and provost courts shall be guided by the appropri- 
ate principles of law and rules of procedures and evi- 
dence prescribed for courts-martial. 
(3) Courts of inquiry for the investigation of any 
matter referred to such court by competent author- 
ity. See Article 135. The Secretary concerned may 
prescribe regulations governing courts of inquiry. 
(4)  Nonjudicial punishment proceedings of a 
commander under Article 15. See Part V of this 
Manual. 
3.  Nature and purpose of military law. 
Military law consists of the statutes governing the 
military establishment and regulations issued there- 
under, the constitutional powers of the President 
and regulations issued thereunder, and the inherent 
authority of military commanders. Military law in- 
cludes jurisdiction exercised by courts-martial and 
the jurisdiction exercised by commanders with re- 
spect to nonjudicial  punishment. The purpose of 
military law is to promote justice, to assist in main- 
taining good order and discipline in the armed 
forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the 
military establishment, and thereby to strengthen 
the national security of the United States. 
4.  Structure and application of the Manual 
for Courts-Martial. 
The Manual for Courts-Martial shall consist of 
this Preamble, the Rules for Courts-Martial, the 
Military Rules of Evidence, the Punitive Articles, 
and Nonjudicial Punishment Procedures (Part I-V). 
This Manual shall be applied consistent with the 
purpose of military law. 
Discussion 
The  Department of Defense, in conjunction with the Depart- 
ment of Transportation, has published supplementary materials 
to accompany the Manual for Courts-Martial. These materials 
consist of a Discussion (accompanying the Preamble, the Rules 
for Courts-Martial, and the Punitive Articles), an Analysis, and 
various appendices. These supplementary materials do not consti- 
tute the official views of the Department of Defense, the Depart- 
ment of Transportation, the Department of Justice, the military 
departments, the United States Court of Military Appeals, or any 
other authority of the Government of the United States, and they 
do not constitute rules. Cf., for example, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1982). 
The supplementary materials do not create rights or responsibili- 
ties that are binding on any person, party, or other entity (includ- 
ing any authority of the Government of the United States whether 
or not included in the definition of "agency"  in 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)). 
Failure to comply with matter set forth in the supplementary 
materials does not, of itself, constitute error, although these 
materials may refer to requirements in the rules set forth in the 
Executive Order or established by  other legal authorities (for ex- 
ample, binding judicial precedents applicable to courts-martial) 
which are based on sources of authority independent of the sup- 
plementary materials. PART II 

RULES FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 

CHAPTER I. GENERAL PROVISIONS 

Rule 101.  Scope, title 
(a)  In general. These rules govern the procedures 
and punishments in all courts-martial and, when- 
ever expressly provided, preliminary, supplemen- 
tary, and appellate procedures and activities. 
(b)  Title. These rules may be known and cited as the 
Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.). 
Rule 102.  PU~DOS~  and ~0n~tr~~ti0n 
(a)  Purpose. These rules are intended to provide for 
the just determination of every proceeding relating 
to trial by court-martial. 
(b)  Construction. These rules shall be construed to 
secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in adminis- 
tration, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense 
and delay. 
Rule 103.  Definitions  and rules of 
construction 
The following definitions and rules of construc- 
tion apply throughout this Manual, unless otherwise 
expressly provided. 
(1)  "Article" refers to articles of the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice unless the context indicates oth- 
erwise. 
(2)  "Capital case" means a general court-martial to 
which a capital offense has been referred without an 
instruction that the case be treated as noncapital, 
and, in the case of a rehearing or new or other trial, 
for which offense death remains an authorized pun- 
ishment under R.C.M. 8  10(d). 
(3)  "Capital  offense"  means an offense for which 
death is an authorized punishment under the code 
and Part IV of this Manual or under the law of war. 
(4)  "Code"  refers to the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, unless the context indicates otherwise. 
Discussion 
The Uniform Code of Military Justice is set forth at Appen- 
dix 2. 
(5)  "Commander"  means a commissioned officer in 
command or an officer in charge except in Part V or 
unless the context indicates otherwise. 
(6)  "Convening  authority"  includes a commis- 
sioned officer in command for the time being and 
successors in command. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 504 concerning who may convene courts-mar- 
tial 
(7)  "Copy"  means an accurate reproduction, how- 
ever made. Whenever necessary and feasible, a copy 
may be made by handwriting. 
(8)  "Court-martial"  includes, depending on the 
context: 
(A)  The military judge and members of a general 
or special court-martial; 
(B)  The military judge when a session of a general 
or special court-martial is conducted without mem- 
bers under Article 39(a); 
(C)  The military judge when a request for trial by 
military judge  alone has been approved under 
R.C.M. 903; 
(D)  The members of a special court-martial when 
a military judge has not been detailed; or 
(E)  The summary court-martial officer. 
(9)  "Days."  When a period of time is expressed in a 
number of days, the period shall be in calendar days, 
unless otherwise specified. Unless otherwise speci- 
fied, the date on which the period begins shall not 
count, but the date on which the period ends shall 
count as one day. 
(10)  "Detail"  means to order a person to perform a 
specific temporary duty, unless the context indicates 
otherwise. 
(11)  "Explosive"  means gunpowders, powders used 
for blasting, all forms of high explosives, blasting  -
materials, fuzes (other than electrical circuit break- 
ers), detonators, and other detonating agents, 
smokeless powders, any explosive bomb, grenade, 
missile, or similar device, and any incendiary bomb 
or grenade, fire bomb, or similar device, and any R.C.M.  103(11) 
other compound, mixture, or device which is an ex- 
plosive within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 232(5) or 
844(j). 
(12)  "Firearm"  means any weapon which is de- 
signed to or may be readily converted to expel any 
projectile by the action of an explosive. 
(13)  "Joint"  in connection with military organiza- 
tion connotes activities, operations, organizations, 
and the like in which elements of more than one mil- 
itary service of the same nation participate. 
(14)  "Members."  The members of a court-martial 
are the voting members detailed by the convening 
authority. 
(15)  "Military judge"  means the presiding officer of 
a general or special court-martial detailed in accor- 
dance with Article 26. Except as otherwise expressly 
provided, in the context of a summary court-martial 
"military judge"  includes the summary court-mar- 
tial officer or in the context of a special court-martial 
without a military judge, the president. Unless oth- 
erwise indicated in the context, "the military judge" 
means the military judge detailed to the court-mar- 
tial to which charges in a case have been referred for 
trial. 
(16)  "Party."  Party, in the context of parties to a 
court-martial, means: 
(A) The accused and any defense or associate or 
assistant defense counsel and agents of the defense 
counsel when acting on behalf of the accused with 
respect to the court-martial in question; and 
(B)  Any trial or assistant trial counsel represent- 
ing the United States, and agents of the trial counsel 
when acting on behalf of  the trial counsel with re- 
spect to the court-martial in question. 
(17)  "Staff judge advocate" means a judge advocate 
so designated in Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps, 
and means the principal legal advisor of a command 
in the Navy and Coast Guard who is a judge advo- 
cate. 
(18)  "Sua  sponte"  means that the person involved 
acts on that person's initiative, without the need for 
a request, motion, or application. 
(19)  "War,  time of."  For purpose of  R.C.M. 
1004(c)(6) and of  implementing the applicable 
paragraphs of Parts IV and V of this Manual only, 
"time  of  war"  means a period of war declared by 
Congress or the factual determination by the Presi- 
dent that the existence of hostilities warrants a find- 
ing that a "time  of  war"  exists for purposes of 
R.C.M. 1004(c)(6) and Parts IV and V of this Man- 
ual. 
(20)  The definitions and rules of construction in 1 
U.S.C.  1 through 5 and in 10 U.S.C. $8 101 and 
801. 
Discussion 
1 U.S.C.  59 1 through 5, 10 U.S.C.  5  101, and  10 U.S.C. 9 
801 (Article 1)are set forth below. 
1  U.S.C. 9 1. Words denoting number, gender, and so forth. 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless 
the context indicates otherwise- 
words importing the singular include and apply to 
several persons, parties, or things; words importing the 
plural include the singular; 
words importing the masculine gender include the 
feminine as well; 
words used in the present tense include the future 
as well as the present; 
the words "insane"  and "insane person"  and "lu- 
natic" shall include every idiot, lunatic, insane person, 
and person non compos mentis; the words "person"  and 
"whoever"  include corporations, companies, associa- 
tions, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock com- 
panies, as well as individuals; 
"officer"  includes any person authorized by law to 
perform the duties of the office; 
"signature"  or "subscription"  includes a mark 
when the person making the same intended it as such; 
"oath"  includes affirmation, and "sworn"  includes 
affirmed; 
"writing"  includes printing and typewriting and 
reproductions of visual symbols by  photographing, 
multigraphing,  mimeographing, manifolding, or other- 
wise. 
5  2. "County"  as including "parish,"  and so forth. 
The word "county"  includes a parish, or any other 
equivalent subdivision of a State or Territory of the 
United States. 
5  3. "Vessel"  as including all means of water transportation. 
The word "vessel"  includes every description of 
watercraft or other artificial contrivance used or capa- 
ble of being used, as a means of transportation on water. 
9  4. "Vehicle"  as including all means of land transportation. 
The word "vehicle"  includes every description  of 
carriage or other artificial contrivance used or capable 
of being used, as a means of transportation on land. 
9  5. "Company"  or "association"  as including successors 
and assigns. 
The word "company"  or "association",  when used 
in reference to a corporation, shall be deemed to em- 
brace the words "successors and assigns of such com- 
pany or association",  in like manner as if  these last- 
named words, or words of similar import, were ex- 
pressed. 
10 U.S.C. 9 101. Definitions In addition to the definitions in sections 1-5 of title 1, the fol- 
lowing definitions apply in this title: 
(1) "United  States", in a geographic sense, means the 
States and the District of Columbia. 
(2) Except as provided in section 101(1) of title 32 for 
laws relating to the militia, the National Guard, the Army Na- 
tional Guard of the United States, and the Air National Guard of 
the United States, "Territory"  means any Territory organized af- 
ter this title is enacted, so long as it remains a Territory. 
(3) "Possessions"  includes the Virgin Islands, the Canal 
Zone, Guam, American Samoa, and the Guano islands, so long as 
they remain possessions, but does not include any Territory or 
Commonwealth. 
(4) "Armed forces" means the Army, Navy, Air Force, 
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. 
(5) "Department",  when used with respect to a military 
department, means the executive part of the department and all 
field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, ac- 
tivities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Sec- 
retary of the department. When used with respect to the Depart- 
ment of Defense, it means the executive part of the department, 
including the executive parts of the military departments, and all 
field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, ac- 
tivities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Sec- 
retary of Defense, including those of the military departments. 
(6) "Executive part of the department"  means the exec- 
utive part of the Department of the Army, Department of the 
Navy, or Department of the Air Force, as the case may be, at the 
seat of government. 
(7) "Military  departments" means the Department of 
the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of 
the Air Force. 
(8) "Secretary concerned" means- 
(A) the Secretary of the Army, with respect to mat- 
ters concerning the Army; 
(B) the Secretary of the Navy, with respect to mat- 
ters concerning the Navy, the Marine Corps, 
and the Coast Guard when it is operating as a 
service in the Navy; 
(C) the Secretary of the Air Force, with respect to 
matters concerning the Air Force; and 
(D) the Secretary of Transportation, with respect 
to matters concerning the Coast Guard when 
it is not operating as a service in the Navy. 
(9) "National Guard" means the Army National Guard 
and the Air National Guard. 
(10) "Army National Guard" means that part of the or- 
ganized militia of the several States and Territories, Puerto Rico, 
and the Canal Zone, and the District of Columbia, active and in- 
active, that- 
(A) is a land force; 
(B) is trained, and has its officers appointed, under 
the sixteenth clause of section 8, article 1, of 
the Constitution; 
(C) is organized, armed, and equipped wholly or 
partly at Federal expense; and 
(D) is federally recognized. 
R.C.M.  103(20) 
(1 1) "Army  National Guard of the United States" 
means the reserve component of the Army all of whose members 
are members of the Army National Guard. 
(12) "Air National Guard" means that part of the or- 
ganized militia of the several States and Territories, Puerto Rico, 
the Canal Zone, and the District of Columbia, active and inactive, 
that-
(A) is an air force; 
(B) is trained, and has its officers appointed, under 
the sixteenth clause of section 8, article 1, of 
the Constitution; 
(C) is organized, armed, and equipped wholly or 
partly at Federal expense; and 
(D) is federally recognized. 
(13) "Air National Guard of the United States" means 
the reserve component of the Air Force all of whose members are 
members of the Air National Guard. 
(14) "Officer"  means commissioned or warrant officer. 
(15) "Commissioned officer"  includes a commissioned 
warrant officer. 
(16) "Warrant  officer"  means a person  who holds a 
commission or warrant in a warrant officer grade. 
(17) "Enlisted member" means a person in an enlisted 
grade. 
(18) "Grade"  means a step or degree, in a graduated 
scale of office or military rank that is established and designated 
as a grade by law or regulation. 
(19) "Rank"  means the order of precedence among 
members of the armed forces. 
[Note: Definitions established in clauses (18) and (19) post-date 
the enactment of the code and, as a result, differ from usage of the 
same terms in the code and current and prior Manual provisions. 
See Articles l(5) and 25(d)(l); R.C.M.  1003(c)(2); paragraphs 
13c(l), 83c(2), and 84c, Part IV, MCM, 1984. MCM 1951 re- 
ferred to officer personnel by 'rank'  and enlisted personnel by 
"grade."  See paragraphs 4c,  16b, 126d, 126i, and  168, MCM, 
1951. "Rank"  as defined in 10 U.S.C.  9 101, clause (19) above, re- 
fers to the MCM, 1951 provision regarding "lineal precedence, 
numbers, and seniority."  Paragraph 126i, MCM, 1951; see also 
paragraph 126i, MCM, 1969 (Rev). Except where lineal position 
or seniority is clearly intended, rank, as commonly and tradition- 
ally used, and grade refer to the current definition of "grade."] 
(20) "Rating"  means the name (such as "boatswain's 
mate")  prescribed for members of an armed force in an occupa- 
tional field. "Rate"  means the name (such as "chief boatswain's 
mate")  prescribed for members in the same rating or other cate- 
gory who are in the same grade (such as chief petty officer or sea- 
man apprentice). 
[Note: The definitions in clauses (3), (15), (18)-(2 l), (23)-(30),  and 
(31)-(33) reflect the adoption of terminology which, though unde- 
fined in the source statutes restated in this title, represents the 
closest practicable approximation of the ways in  which the terms 
defined have been most commonly used. A choice has been made 
where established uses conflict.] 
(21) "Authorized  strength" means the largest number 
of members authorized to be in an armed force, a component, a 
branch, a grade, or any other category of the armed forces. 
(22) "Active duty" means full-time duty in the active 
military service of the United States. It includes full-time training R.C.M.  103(20) 
duty, annual training duty, and attendance, while in the active 
military service, at a school designated as a service school by law 
or by the Secretary of the military department concerned. 
(23) "Active duty for a period of more than 30 days" 
means active duty under a call or order that does not specify a pe- 
riod of 30 days or less. 
(24) "Active service" means service on active duty. 
(25) "Active status" means the status of a reserve com- 
missioned officer, other than a commissioned warrant officer, who 
is not in the inactive Army National Guard or inactive Air Na- 
tional Guard, on an inactive status list, or in the Retired Reserve. 
(26) "Supplies"  includes material, equipment, and 
stores of all kinds. 
(27) "Pay"  includes basic pay, special pay, retainer pay, 
incentive pay, retired pay, and equivalent pay, but does not in- 
clude allowances. 
(28) "Shall"  is used in an imperative sense. 
(29) "May"  is used in a permissive sense. The words 
"no person may. . ." mean that no person is required, authorized, 
or permitted to do the act prescribed. 
(30) "Includes"  means "includes but is not limited to." 
(31) "Inactive-duty training" means- 
(A) duty prescribed for Reserves by the Secretary 
concerned under section 206 of title 37 or any 
other provision of law; and 
(B) special additional duties authorized for 
Reserves by  an authority designated  by  the 
Secretary concerned and performed by them 
on a voluntary basis in connection with the 
prescribed training or maintenance activities 
of the units to which they are assigned. 
It includes those duties when performed by Reserves in their 
status as members of the National Guard. 
(32) "Spouse"  means husband or wife, as the case may 
be. 
(33) "Regular",  with respect to an enlistment, appoint- 
ment, grade, or office, means enlistment, appointment, grade, or 
office in a regular component of an armed force. 
(34) "Reserve",  with respect to an enlistment, appoint- 
ment, grade, or office, means enlistment, appointment, grade, or 
office held as a Reserve of an armed force. 
(35) "Original",  with respect to the appointment of a 
member of  the armed forces in a regular or reserve component, 
refers to his most recent appointment in the component that is 
neither a promotion nor a demotion. 
(36) Repealed. 
(37) "Active-duty list" means a single list for the Army, 
Navy, Air Force or Marine Corps (required to be maintained 
under section 620 of this title) which contains the names of all of- 
ficers of that armed force, other than officers described in section 
641 of this title, who are serving on active duty. 
(38) "Medical officer"  means an officer of the Medical 
Corps of the Army, an officer of the Medical Corps of the Navy, 
or an officer in the Air Force designated as a medical officer. 
(39) "Dental officer"  means an officer of the Dental 
Corps of the Army, an officer of the Dental Corps of the Navy, or 
an officer of the Air Force designated as a dental officer. 
(40) "General officer" means an officer of the Army, Air 
Force, or Marine Corps serving in or having the grade of general, 
lieutenant general, major general, or brigadier general. 
(41) "Flag  officer"  means an officer of the Navy or 
Coast Guard serving in or having the grade of admiral, vice admi- 
ral, rear admiral, or commodore. 
10 U.S.C. 8 801. Article 1. Definitions 

In this chapter: 

(1) "Judge Advocate General"  means,  severally, the 
Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and, 
except when the Coast Guard is operating as a service in the 
Navy, the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation. 
(2) The Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard 
when it is operating as a service in the Navy, shall be considered 
as one armed force. 
(3) "Commanding officer"  includes only commissioned 
officers. 
(4) "Officer  in charge"  means a member of the Navy, 
the Marine Corps, or the Coast Guard designated as such by ap- 
propriate authority. 
(5) "Superior commissioned officer" means a commis- 
sioned officer superior in rank or command. 
(6) "Cadet"  means a cadet of the United States Military 
Academy, the United States Air Force Academy, or the United 
States Coast Guard Academy. 
(7) "Midshipman"  means a midshipman of  the United 
States Naval Academy and any other midshipman on active duty 
in the naval service. 
(8) "Military"  refers to any or all of the armed forces. 
(9) "Accuser"  means a person who signs and swears to 
charges, any person who directs that charges nominally be signed 
and sworn to by another, and any other person who has an inter- 
est other than an official interest in the prosecution of the accused. 
(10) "Military judge"  means an official of a general or 
special court-martial detailed in accordance with section 826 of 
this title (article 26). [See also R.C.M. 103(15).] 
(11) "Law specialist" means a commissioned officer of 
the Coast Guard designated for special duty (law). 
(12) "Legal officer"  means any commissioned officer of 
the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard designated to perform 
legal duties for a command. 
(13) "Judge Advocate" means- 
(A) an officer of the Judge Advocate General's 
Corps of the Army or Navy; 
(B) an officer of the Air Force or the Marine Corps 
who is designated as a judge advocate; or 
(C) an officer of the Coast Guard who is designated 
as a law specialist. R.C.M. 105(b) 
Rule 104.  Unlawful command influence 
(a)  General prohibitions. 
(1)  Convening authorities and commanders. No 
convening authority or commander may censure, 
reprimand, or admonish a court-martial or other 
military tribunal or any member, military judge, or 
counsel thereof, with respect to the findings or sen- 
tence adjudged by the court-martial or tribunal, or 
with respect to any other exercise of the functions of 
the court-martial or tribunal or such persons in the 
conduct of the proceedings. 
(2)  All persons subject to the code. No person sub- 
ject to the code may attempt to coerce or, by any un- 
authorized means, influence the action of a court- 
martial or any other military tribunal or any mem- 
ber thereof, in reaching the findings or sentence in 
any case or the action of any convening, approving, 
or reviewing authority with respect to such author- 
ity's judicial acts. 
(3)  Exceptions. 
(A) Instructions. Subsections (a)(l) and (2) of 
the rule do not prohibit general instructional or in- 
formational courses in military justice  if  such 
courses are designed solely for the purpose of in- 
structing personnel of a command in the substantive 
and procedural aspects of courts-martial. 
(B)  Court-martial statements. Subsections 
(a)(l) and (2) of this rule do not prohibit statements 
and instructions given in open session by the mili- 
tary judge or counsel. 
(C)  Professional supervision.  Subsections (a)(l) 
and (2) of this rule do not prohibit action by the 
Judge Advocate General concerned under R.C.M. 
109. 
(D) Offense. Subsection (a)(l) and (2) of this 
rule do not prohibit appropriate action against a per- 
son for an offense committed while detailed as a mil- 
itary judge, counsel, or member of a court-martial, 
or while serving as individual counsel. 
(b)  Prohibitions concerning evaluations. 
(1)  Evaluation  of member or defense counsel. In 
the preparation of an effectiveness, fitness, or effi- 
ciency report or any other report or document used 
in whole or in part for the purpose of determining 
whether a member of the armed forces is qualified to 
be advanced in grade, or in determining the assign- 
ment or transfer of a member of the armed forces, or 
in determining whether a member of the armed 
forces should be retained on active duty, no person 
subject to the code may: 
(A) Consider or evaluate the performance of 
duty of any such person as a member of a court-mar- 
tial; or 
(B)  Give a less favorable rating or evaluation of 
any defense counsel because of the zeal with which 
such counsel represented any accused. 
(2)  Evaluation of military  judge. 
(A)  General courts-martial. Unless the general 
court-martial was convened by the President or the 
Secretary concerned, neither the convening author- 
ity nor any member of the convening authority's 
staff may prepare or review any report concerning 
the effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency of the military 
judge detailed to a general court-martial, which re- 
lates to the performance of duty as a military judge. 
(B)  Special courts-martial. The convening au- 
thority may not prepare or review any report con- 
cerning the effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency of a 
military judge detailed to a special court-martial 
which relates to the performance of duty as a mili- 
tary judge.  When the military judge  is normally 
rated or the military judge's  report is reviewed by 
the convening authority, the manner in which such 
military judge will be rated or evaluated upon the 
performance of duty as a military judge may be as 
prescribed in regulations of the Secretary concerned 
which shall ensure the absence of any command in- 
fluence in the rating or evaluation of the military 
judge's judicial performance. 
Discussion 
See paragraph 22 of Part IV concerning prosecuting viola- 
tions of Article 37 under Article 98. 
Rule 105.  Direct communications: convening 
authorities and staff judge advocates; among 
staff judge advocates 
(a)  Convening authorities and staffjudge advocates. 
Convening authorities shall at all times communi- 
cate directly with their staff judge advocates in mat- 
ters relating to the administration of military justice. 
(b) Among staffjudge advocates and with the Judge 
Advocate  General. The staff judge advocate of any 
command is entitled to communicate directly with 
the staff judge advocate of a superior or subordinate 
command, or with the Judge Advocate General. R.C.M. 105(b) 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 103(17) for a definition of staff judge advocate. 
Rule 106.  Delivery of military offenders to 
civilian authorities 
Under such regulations as the Secretary con- 
cerned may prescribe, a member of the armed forces 
accused of an offense against civilian authority may 
be delivered, upon request, to the civilian authority 
for trial. A member may be placed in restraint by 
military authorities for this purpose only upon re- 
ceipt of a duly issued warrant for the apprehension 
of the member or upon receipt of information estab- 
lishing probable cause that the member committed 
an offense, and upon reasonable belief that such re- 
straint is necessary. Such restraint may continue 
only for such time as is reasonably necessary to effect 
the delivery. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 11  13(d)(2)(A)(ii) for the effect of such delivery 
on the execution of a court-martial sentence. 
Rule 107.  Dismissed officer's right to request 
trial by court-martial 
If a commissioned officer of any armed force is 
dismissed by order of the President under 10 U.S.C. 
$ 1161(a)(3),  that officer may apply for trial by gen- 
eral court-martial within a reasonable time. 
Discussion 
See Article 4 for the procedures to be followed. See also Article 
75(c). 
Rule 108.  Rules of court 
The Judge Advocate General concerned and per- 
sons designated by the Judge Advocate General may 
make rules of court not inconsistent with these rules 
for the conduct of court-martial proceedings. Such 
rules shall be disseminated in accordance with pro- 
cedures prescribed by the Judge Advocate General 
concerned or a person to whom this authority has 
been delegated. Noncompliance with such proce- 
dures shall not affect the validity of any rule of court 
with respect to a party who has received actual and 
timely notice of the rule or who has not been 
prejudiced under Article 59 by the absence of such 
notice. Copies of all rules of court issued under this 
rule shall be forwarded to the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral concerned. 
Rule 109.  Professional supervision of 

military judges and counsel 

(a)  In general. Each Judge Advocate General is re- 
sponsible for the professional supervision and disci- 
pline of military trial and appellate military judges, 
judge advocates, and other lawyers who practice in 
proceedings governed by the code and this Manual. 
To discharge this responsibility  each Judge Advo- 
cate General may prescribe rules of professional 
conduct not inconsistent with this rule or this Man- 
ual. Rules of professional conduct promulgated pur- 
suant to this rule may include sanctions for viola- 
tions of such rules. Sanctions may include but are 
not limited to indefinite suspension from practice in 
courts-martial and in the Courts of Military Review. 
Such suspensions may only be imposed by the Judge 
Advocate General of the armed service of such 
courts. Prior to imposing any discipline under this 
rule, the subject of the proposed action must be pro- 
vided notice and an opportunity to be  heard. The 
Judge Advocate General concerned may upon good 
cause shown modify or revoke suspension. Proce- 
dures to investigate complaints against military trial 
judges and appellate military judges are contained in 
subsection (c) of this rule. 
(b) Action after suspension or disbarment. When a 
Judge Advocate General suspends a person from 
practice or the Court of Military Appeals disbars a 
person, any Judge Advocate General may suspend 
that person from practice upon written notice and 
opportunity to be heard in writing. 
(c)  Investigation of judges. 
(1)  In general.  These rules and procedures 
promulgated pursuant to Article 6a are established 
to investigate and dispose of charges, allegations, or 
information pertaining to the fitness of a military 
trial judge or appellate military judge to perform the 
duties of the judge's office. 
(2)  Policy.  Allegations of judicial misconduct or 
unfitness shall be investigated pursuant to the proce- 
dures of  this rule and appropriate action shall be taken. Judicial misconduct includes any act or omis- 
sion that may serve to demonstrate unfitness for fur- 
ther duty as a judge, including, but not limited to vi- 
olations of applicable ethical standards. 
Discussion 
The term "unfitness" should be construed broadly, includ- 
ing, for example, matters relating to the incompetence, impartial- 
ity, and misconduct of the judge. Erroneous decisions of a judge 
are not subject to investigation under this rule. Challenges to 
these decisions are more appropriately left to the appellate pro- 
cess. 
(3)  Complaints. Complaints concerning a mili- 
tary trial judge or appellate military judge will be 
forwarded to the Judge Advocate General of the ser- 
vice concerned or to a person designated by  the 
Judge Advocate General concerned to receive such 
complaints. 
Discussion 
Complaints need not be made in any specific form, but if pos- 
sible complaints should be made under oath. Complaints may be 
made by judges, lawyers, a party, court personnel, members of the 
general public or members of the military community. Reports in 
the news media relating to the conduct of a judge may also form 
the basis of a complaint. 
An individual designated to receive complaints under this 
subsection should have judicial experience. The chief trial judge 
of a service may be designated to receive complaints against mili- 
tary trial judges. 
(4) Initial action upon receipt of a complaint. 
Upon receipt, a complaint will be screened by  the 
Judge Advocate General concerned or by  the indi- 
vidual designated in subsection (c)(3) of this rule to 
receive complaints. An initial inquiry is necessary if 
the complaint, taken as true, would constitute judi- 
cial misconduct or unfitness for further service as a 
judge. Prior to the commencement of an initial in- 
quiry, the Judge Advocate General concerned shall 
be notified that a complaint has been filed and that 
an initial inquiry will be conducted. The Judge Ad- 
vocate General concerned may temporarily suspend 
the subject of a complaint from performing judicial 
duties pending the outcome of any inquiry or inves- 
tigation conducted pursuant to this rule. Such in- 
quiries or investigations shall be conducted with rea- 
sonable promptness. 
R.C.M.  109(~)(5)(D) 
Discussion 
Complaints under this subsection will be treated with confi- 
dentiality. Confidentiality protects the subject judge and the judi- 
ciary when a complaint is not substantiated. Confidentiality also 
encourages the reporting of allegations of judicial misconduct or 
unfitness and permits complaints to be screened with the full co- 
operation of others. 
Complaints containing allegations of criminality should be re- 
ferred to the appropriate criminal investigative agency in accor- 
dance with Appendix 3 of this Manual. 
(5) Initial inquiry. 
(A) In general. An initial inquiry is necessary 
to determine if the complaint is substantiated. A 
complaint is substantiated upon finding that it is 
more likely than not that the subject judge has en- 
gaged in judicial misconduct or is otherwise unfit for 
further service as a judge. 
(B) Responsibility to conduct initial  inquiry. 
The Judge Advocate General concerned, or the per- 
son designated to receive complaints under subsec- 
tion (c)(3) of this rule will conduct or order an initial 
inquiry. The individual designated to conduct the in- 
quiry should, if practicable, be senior to the subject 
of the complaint. If the subject of the complaint is a 
military trial  judge, the individual designated to  con- 
duct the initial inquiry should, if practicable, be a 
military trial judge or an individual with experience 
as a military trial judge.  If the subject of the com- 
plaint is an appellate military judge, the individual 
designated to conduct the inquiry should, if practi- 
cable, have experience as an appellate military judge. 
Discussion 
To avoid the type of conflict prohibited in Article 66(g), the 
Judge Advocate General's designee should not ordinarily be a 
member of the same Court of Military Review as the subject of 
the complaint. If practicable, a former appellate military judge 
should be designated. 
(C) Due process. During the initial inquiry, the 
subject of the complaint will,  at a minimum, be 
given notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
(D) Action following  the initial  inquiry. If the 
complaint is not substantiated pursuant to subsec- 
tion (c)(5)(A) of this rule, the complaint shall be dis- 
missed as unfounded. If the complaint is substanti- 
ated, minor professional disciplinary action may be 
taken or the complaint may be forwarded, with find- 
ings and recommendations, to the Judge Advocate R.C.M.  109(~)(5)(D) 
General concerned. Minor professional disciplinary 
action is defined as counselling or the issuance of an 
aral or written admonition or reprimand. The Judge 
Advocate General concerned will be notified prior to 
taking minor professional disciplinary action or dis- 
missing a complaint as unfounded. 
(6) Action by the Judge Advocate General. 
(A)  In general. The Judge Advocates General 
are responsible for the professional supervision and 
discipline of  military trial and appellate military 
judges under their jurisdiction. Upon receipt of find- 
ings and recommendations required by subsection 
(c)(5) of this rule the Judge Advocate General con- 
cerned will take appropriate action. 
(B) Appropriate actions. The Judge Advocate 
General concerned may dismiss the complaint, or- 
der an additional inquiry, appoint an ethics commis- 
sion to consider the complaint, refer the matter to 
another appropriate investigative agency or take ap- 
propriate professional disciplinary action pursuant 
to the rules of professional conduct prescribed by the 
Judge Advocate General under subsection (a) of this 
rule. Any decision of the Judge Advocate General, 
under this rule, is final and is not subject to appeal. 
Discussion 
The  discretionary reassignment of military trial  judges or ap- 
pellate military judges to meet the needs of the service is not pro- 
fessional disciplinary action. 
(C) Standard of pro05  Prior to taking profes- 
sional disciplinary action, other than minor discipli- 
nary action as defined in subsection (c)(5) of this 
rule, the Judge Advocate General concerned shall 
find, in writing, that the subject of the complaint en- 
gaged in judicial misconduct or is otherwise unfit for 
continued service as a military judge, and that such 
misconduct or unfitness is established by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
(D)  Due process. Prior to taking final action on 
the complaint, the Judge Advocate General con- 
cerned will ensure that the subject of  the complaint 
is, at a minimum, given notice and an opportunity to 
be heard. 
(7)  The Ethics, Commission. 
(A)  Membership. If appointed pursuant to sub- 
section (c)(6)(B) of this rule, an ethics commission 
shall consist of at least three members. 
If the subject of the complaint is a military trial 
judge, the commission should include one or more 
military trial judges or individuals with experience 
as a military trial judge. If the subject of  the com- 
plaint is an appellate military judge, the commission 
should include one or more individuals with experi- 
ence as an appellate military judge. Members of the 
commission should, if practicable, be senior to the 
subject of the complaint. 
(B)  Duties. The commission will perform those 
duties assigned by the Judge Advocate General con- 
cerned. Normally, the commission will provide an 
opinion as to whether the subject's acts or omissions 
constitute judicial  misconduct or unfitness. If the 
commission determines that the affected judge en- 
gaged in judicial misconduct or is unfit for continued 
judicial service, the commission may be required to 
recommend an appropriate disposition to The Judge 
Advocae General concerned. 
Discussion 
The Judge Advocate General concerned may appoint an ad 
hoc or a standing commission. 
(8) Rules of procedure. The Secretary of Defense 
or the Secretary of the service concerned may estab- 
lish additional procedures consistent with this rule 
and Article 6a. CHAPTER II. JURISDICTION 

Rule 201.  Jurisdiction in general 
(a)  Nature of courts-martial  jurisdiction. 
(1)  The jurisdiction of courts-martial is entirely 
penal or disciplinary. 
Discussion 
"Jurisdiction"  means the power to hear a case and to render 
a legally competent decision. A court-martial has no power to ad- 
judge civil remedies. For example, a court-martial may not ad- 
judge the payment of damages, collect private debts, order the re- 
turn of property, or order a criminal forfeiture of seized property. 
A summary court-martial appointed under 10 U.S.C. $8 4712 or 
9712 to dispose of the effects of a deceased person is not affected 
by these Rules or this Manual. 
(2)  The code applies in all places. 
Discussion 
Except insofar as required by  the Constitution, the code, or 
the Manual, jurisdiction of courts-martial does not depend on 
where the offense was committed. 
The code applies in all places (Article 5), but its application 
may be limited by  the service-connection doctrine. The location 
of an offense is often of major importance in the application of this 
doctrine. See R.C.M. 203 and discussion. Article 2(a)(ll) and 
(12) establishes court-martial jurisdiction only in certain places. 
See R.C.M. 202. 
(3)  The jurisdiction  of a court-martial with re- 
spect to offenses under the code is not affected by the 
place where the court-martial sits. The jurisdiction 
of a court-martial with respect to military govern- 
ment or the law of war is not affected by  the place 
where the court-martial sits except as otherwise ex- 
pressly required by this Manual or applicable rule of 
international law. 
Discussion 
In addition to the power to try persons for offenses under the 
code, general courts-martial have power to try certain persons for 
violations of the law of war and for crimes or offenses against the 
law of the territory occupied as an incident of war or belligerency 
whenever the local civil authority is superseded in whole or part 
by the military authority of  the occupying power. See R.C.M. 
201(f)(l)(B). In cases where a person is tried by general court- 
martial for offenses against the law of an occupied territory, the 
court-martial normally  sits in the country where the offense is 
committed, and must do so under certain circumstances. See Ar-
ticles 4,64, and 66, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, arts. 4, 64, 
and 66, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3559-60T.I.A.S. No. 3365. 
(b)  Requisites of court-martial jurisdiction. A court- 
martial always has jurisdiction  to determine 
whether it has jurisdiction. Otherwise for a court- 
martial to have jurisdiction: 
(1)  The court-martial must be convened by an of- 
ficial empowered to convene it; 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 504; 1302 
(2)  The court-martial must be composed in ac- 
cordance with these rules with respect to number 
and qualifications of its personnel. As used 
here6'personnel" includes only the military judge, 
the members, and the summary court-martial; 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 501-504; 1301. 
(3)  Each charge before the court-martial must be 
referred to it by competent authority; 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 601. 
(4) The accused must be a person subject to 
court-martial jurisdiction; and 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 202. 
(5)  The offense must be subject to court-martial 
jurisdiction. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 203. 
The judgment of a court-martial without jurisdiction is void 
and is entitled to no legal effect. See R.C.M. 907@)(2)(C)(iv).  But 
see R.C.M. 810(d) concerning the effect of certain decisions by 
courts-martial without jurisdiction. R.C.M. 20l(c) 
(c)  Contempt. A court-martial may punish for con- 
tempt any person who uses any menacing word, 
sign, or gesture in its presence, or who disturbs its 
proceedings by any riot or disorder. The punishment 
may not exceed confinement for 30 days or a fine of 
$100, or both. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 809 for procedures and standards for contempt 
proceedings. 
(d)  Exclusive and nonexclusive jurisdiction. 
(1)  Courts-martial have exclusive jurisdiction  of 
purely military offenses. 
(2)  An act or omission which violates both the 
code and local criminal law, foreign or domestic, 
may be tried by a court-martial, or by a proper civil- 
ian tribunal, foreign or domestic, or, subject to 
R.C.M. 907(b)(2)(C) and regulations of the Secre- 
tary concerned, by both. 
(3) Where an act or omission is subject to trial by 
court-martial and by one or more civil tribunals, for- 
eign or domestic, the determination which nation, 
state, or agency will exercise jurisdiction is a matter 
for the nations, states, and agencies concerned, and 
is not a right of the suspect or accused. 
Discussion 
In the case of an act or omission which violates the code and 
a criminal law of a State, the United States, or both, the determi- 
nation which agency shall exercise jurisdiction  should normally 
be made through consultation or prior agreement between appro- 
priate military officials (ordinarily the staff judge advocate) and 
appropriate civilian authorities (United States Attorney, or 
equivalent). See also Memorandum of Understanding Between 
Departments of Justice and Defense Relating to the Investigation 
and Prosecution  of Crimes Over Which the Two Departments 
Have Concurrent Jurisdiction at Appendix 3. 
Under the Constitution, a person may not be tried for the 
same misconduct  by  both a court-martial and another federal 
court. See R.C.M. 907(b)(2)(C). Although it is constitutionally 
permissible to try a person by  court-martial and by  a State court 
for the same act, as a matter of policy a person who is pending 
trial or has been tried by  a State court should not ordinarily be 
tried by  court-martial for the same act. Overseas, international 
agreements might preclude trial by  one state of a person acquitted 
or finally convicted of a given act by  the other state. 
Under international law, a friendly foreign nation has juris- 
diction to punish offenses committed within its borders by  mem- 
bers of a visiting force, unless expressly or impliedly consents to 
relinquish its jurisdiction  to the visiting sovereign. The proce- 
dures and standards for determining which nation will exercise 
jurisdiction are normally established by  treaty. See, for example, 
NATO Status of Forces Agreement, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 
1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846. As a matter of policy, efforts should be 
made to maximize the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over 
persons subject to the code to the extent possible under applicable 
agreements. 
See R.C.M. 106 concerning delivery of offenders to civilian au- 
thorities. 
See also R.C.M. 201(g) concerning the jurisdiction  of other 
military tribunals. 
(e) Reciprocal jurisdiction. 
(1)  Each armed force has court-martial jurisdic- 
tion over all persons subject to the code. 
(2)(A)  A commander of a unified or specified 
combatant command may convene courts-martial 
over members of any of the armed forces. 
(B)  So much of the authority vested in the 
President under Article 22(a)(9) to empower any 
commanding officer of a joint command or  joint task 
force to convene courts-martial is delegated to the 
Secretary of defense, and such a commanding officer 
may convene general courts-martial for the trial of 
members of any of the armed forces. 
(C) A commander who is empowered to con- 
vene a court-martial under subsections (e)(2)(A) or 
(e)(2)(B) of this rule may expressly authorize a com- 
manding officer of a subordinate joint command or 
subordinate joint  task force who is authorized to 
convene special and summary courts-martial to con- 
vene such courts-martial for the trial of members of 
other armed forces under regulations which the su- 
perior command may prescribe. 
(3)  A member of one armed force may be tried by 
a court-martial convened by a member of another 
armed force when: 
(A) The court-martial is convened by a com- 
mander authorized to convene courts-martial under 
subsection (e)(2) of this rule; or 
(B)  The accused cannot be delivered to the 
armed force of which the accused is a member with- 
out manifest injury to the armed forces. 
An accused should not ordinarily be tried by a 
court-martial convened by a member of a different 
armed force except when the circumstances de- 
scribed in (A) or (B) exist. However, failure to com- 
ply with this policy doe not affect an otherwise valid 
referral. 
(4)  Nothing in this rule prohibits detailing to a 
court-martial a military judge who is a member of an armed force different from that of the accused or the 
convening authority, or both. 
(5)  In all cases, departmental review after that by 
the officer with authority to convene a general court- 
martial for the command which held the trial, where 
that review is required by the code, shall be carried 
out by the department that includes the armed force 
of which the accused is a member. 
(6)  When there is a disagreement between the 
Secretaries of two military departments or between 
the Secretary of a military department and the com- 
mander of a unified or specified combatant com- 
mand or other joint command or joint task force as 
to which organization should exercise jurisdiction 
over a particular case or class of cases, the Secretary 
of Defense or an official acting under the authority 
of the Secretary of Defense shall designate which or- 
ganization will exercise  jurisdiction. 
(7) Except as provided in subsections (5) and (6) 
or as otherwise directed by the President or Secre- 
tary of Defense, whenever action under this Manual 
is required or authorized to be taken by a person su- 
perior to- 
(A) a commander of a unified or specified com- 
batant command or; 
(B) a commander of any other joint command 
or joint task force that is not part of a unified or spec- 
ified combatant command, 
the matter shall be referred to the Secretary of the 
armed force of which the accused is a member. The 
Secretary may convene a court-martial, take other 
appropriate action, or, subject to R.C.M. 504(c), re- 
fer the matter to any person authorized to convene a 
court-martial of the accused. 
Discussion 
'  "Manifest injury" does not mean minor inconvenience or ex- 
pense. Examples of manifest injury include direct and substantial 
effect on morale, discipline, or military operations, substantial ex- 
pense or delay, or loss of essential witnesses. 
As to the composition of a court-martial for the trial of an 
accused who is a member of another armed force, see R.C.M. 
503(a)(3) Discussion. Cases involving two or more accused who 
are members of different armed forces should not be referred to a 
court-martial for a common trial. 
R.C.M.  201(f)(l)(C) 
(i)  Except as otherwise expressly provided, 
general courts-martial may try any person subject to 
the code for any offense made punishable under the 
code. General courts-martial also may try any per- 
son for a violation of Article 83, 104, or 106. 
(ii)  Upon a finding of guilty of an offense 
made punishable by the code, general courts-martial 
may, within limits prescribed by this Manual, ad- 
judge any punishment authorized under R.C.M. 
1003. 
(iii)  Notwithstanding  any other rule, the 
death penalty may not be adjudged if: 
(a) Not specifically authorized for the offense by 
the code and Part IV of this Manual; or 
(b) The case has been referred as noncapital. 
(B)  Cases under the law of war. 
(i)  General courts-martial may try any per- 
son who by the law of war is subject to trial by mili- 
tary tribunal for any crime or offense against: 
(a) The law of war; or 
(b) The law of the territory occupied as an inci- 
dent of war or belligerency whenever the local civil 
authority is superseded in whole or part by the mili- 
tary authority of the occupying power. The law of 
the occupied territory includes the local criminal 
law as adopted or modified by competent authority, 
and the proclamations, ordinances, regulations, or 
orders promulgated by competent authority of the 
occupying power. 
Discussion 
Subsection (f)(l)(B)(i)(b)  is an exercise of the power of mili- 
tary government. 
(ii)  When a general court-martial exercises 
jurisdiction under the law of war, it may adjudge any 
punishment permitted by law of war. 
Discussion 
Certain limitations on the discretion of military tribunals to 
adjudge punishment under the law of war are prescribed in inter- 
national conventions.See, for example, Geneva Convention Rela- 
tive to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, art. 68, 6U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365. 
(f)  Types of courts-martial.  (C)  Limitations in judge alone cases. A general 
(1)  General courts-martial.  court-martial composed only of a military judge 
(A)  Cases under the code.  does not have jurisdiction  to try any person for any R.C.M.  201(f)(l)(C) 
offense for which the death penalty may be adjudged 
unless the case has been referred to trial as noncapi- 
tal. 
(2) Special courts-martial. 
(A)In general. Except as otherwise expressly 
provided, special courts-martial may try any person 
subject to the code for any noncapital offense made 
punishable by the code and, as provided in this rule, 
for capital offenses. 
(B) Punishments. 
(i) Upon a finding of  guilty, special courts- 
martial may adjudge, under limitations prescribed 
by this Manual, any punishment authorized under 
R.C.M. 1003 except death, dishonorable discharge, 
dismissal, confinement for more than 6 months, 
hard labor without confinement for more than 3 
months, forfeiture of pay exceeding two-thirds pay 
per month, or any forfeiture of pay for more than 6 
months. 
(ii)  A bad-conduct discharge may not be ad- 
judged by a special court-martial unless: 
(a) Counsel qualified under Article 27(b) is de- 
tailed to represent the accused; and 
(b)  A military judge is detailed to the trial, except 
in a case in which a military judge could not be de- 
tailed because of physical conditions or military exi- 
gencies. Physical conditions or military exigencies, 
as the terms are here used, may exist under rare cir- 
cumstances, such as on an isolated ship on the high 
seas or in a unit in an inaccessible area, provided 
compelling reasons exist why trial must be held at 
that time and at that place. Mere inconvenience does 
not constitute a physical condition or military exi- 
gency and does not excuse a failure to detail a mili- 
tary judge. If a military judge cannot be detailed be- 
cause of physical conditions or military exigencies, a 
bad-conduct discharge may be adjudged provided 
the other conditions have been met. In that event, 
however, the convening authority shall, prior to 
trial, make a written statement explaining why a 
military judge could not be obtained. This statement 
shall be appended to the record of trial and shall set 
forth in detail the reasons why a military judge could 
not be detailed, and why the trial had to be held at 
that time and place. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 503 concerning detailing the military judge and 
counsel. 
The requirement for counsel is satisfied when counsel quali- 
fied under Article 27(b), and not otherwise disqualified, has been 
detailed and made available, even though the accused may not 
choose to cooperate with, or use the services of, such detailed 
counsel. 
The physical condition or military exigency exception to the 
requirement for a military judge does not apply to the require- 
ment for detailing counsel qualified under Article 27(b). 
See also R.C.M. 1103(c) concerning the requirements for a 
record of trial in special courts-martial. 
(C)  Capital offenses 
(i)  A capital offense for which there is pre- 
scribed a mandatory punishment beyond the puni- 
tive power of a special court-martial shall not be re- 
ferred to such a court-martial. 
(ii) An officer exercising general court-mar- 
tial jurisdiction over the command which includes 
the accused may permit any capital offense other 
than one described in subsection (f)(2)(C)(i)  of this 
rule to be referred to a special court-martial for trial. 
(iii) The Secretary concerned may author- 
ize, by regulation, officers exercising special court- 
martial jurisdiction to refer capital offenses, other 
than those described in subsection (f)(2)(C)(i) of this 
rule, to trial by special court-martial without first 
obtaining the consent of the officer exercising gen- 
eral court-martial jurisdiction over the command. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 103(3) for a definition of capital offenses. 
(3) Summary courts-martial. See R.C.M. 1301(c) 
and (d)(l). 
(g)  Concurrent jurisdiction  of other military tribu- 
nals. The provisions of the code and this Manual 
conferring jurisdiction  upon courts-martial do not 
deprive military commissions, provost courts, or 
other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction 
with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute 
or by the law of war may be tried by military com- 
missions, provost courts, or other military tribunals. 
Discussion 
See Articles 104 and 106 for some instances of concurrent ju- 
risdiction. Rule 202.  Persons subject to the jurisdiction 
of courts-martial 
(a)  In general. Courts-martial may try any person 
when authorized to do so under the code. 
Discussion 
(1) Authority under the code. Article 2 lists classes of persons 
who are subject to the code. These include active duty personnel 
(Article 2(a)(l)); cadets, aviation cadets, and midshipmen (Arti- 
cle 2(a)(2)); certain retired personnel (Article 2(a)(4) and (5)); 
members of Reserve components not on active duty under some 
circumstances (Article 2(a)(3) and (6)); persons in the custody of 
the armed forces serving a sentence imposed by  court-martial 
(Article 2(a)(7)); and, under some circumstances, specified cate- 
gories of civilians (Article 2(a)(8), (9), (lo), (1 I), and (12); see 
subsection (3) and (4) of this discussion). In addition, certain per- 
sons whose status as members of the armed forces or as persons 
otherwise subject to the code apparently has ended may, never- 
theless, be amendable to trial by court-martial.See Article 3, 4, 
and 73. A person need not be subject to the code to be subject to 
trial by court-martial under Articles 83, 104, or 106. See also Ar- 
ticle 48 and R.C.M.  809 concerning who may be subject to the 
contempt powers of a court-martial. 
(2) Active duty personnel. Court-martial jurisdiction is most 
commonly exercised over active duty personnel. In general, a per- 
son becomes subject to court-martial jurisdiction upon enlistment 
in or induction into the armed forces, acceptance of a commis- 
sion, or entry onto active duty pursuant to orders. Court-martial 
jurisdiction over active duty personnel ordinarily ends on delivery 
of a discharge certificate or its equivalent to the person concerned 
issued pursuant to competent orders. Orders transferring a per- 
son to the inactive reserve are the equivalent of a discharge certifi- 
cate for purposes ofjurisdiction. 
These are several important qualifications and exceptions to 
these general guidelines. 
(A) Inception of  court-martial  jurisdiction over ac- 
tive duty personnel. 
(i)Enlistment.  "The  voluntary enlistment of 
any person who has the capacity to understand the significance  of 
enlisting in the armed forces shall be valid for purposes of juris- 
diction under [Article 2(a)] and a change of status from civilian to 
member of  the armed forces shall be effective upon taking the 
oath of enlistment." Article 2(b). A person who is, at the time of 
enlistment, insane, intoxicated, or under the age of  17 does not 
have the capacity to enlist by  law. No court-martial jurisdiction 
over such a person may exist as long as the incapacity continues. 
If the incapacity ceases to exist, a "constructive enlistment" may 
result under Article 2(c). See discussion of "constructive  enlist- 
ment" below. Similarly, if the enlistment was involuntary, court- 
martial jurisdiction will exist only when the coercion is removed 
and a "constructive enlistment" under Article 2(c) is established. 
Persons age 17 (but not yet 18) may not enlist without paren- 
tal consent. A parent or guardian may, within 90 days of its incep- 
tion, terminate the enlistment of a 17-year-old who enlisted with- 
out parental consent, if  the person has not yet reached the age of 
18. 10 U.S.C. 4 1170. See also DOD Directive 1332.14  and service 
regulations for specific rules on separation of persons 17 years of 
R.C.M.  202(a) 
age on the basis of a parental request. Absent effective action by a 
parent or guardian to terminate such an enlistment, court-martial 
jurisdiction exists over the person. An application by a parent for 
release does not deprive a court-martial of jurisdiction to try a 
person for offenses committed before action is completed on such 
an application. 
Even if a person lacked capacity to understand the effect of 
enlistment or did not enlist voluntarily, a "constructive enlist- 
ment" may be established under Article 2(c), which provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person 
serving with an armed force who- 
(I) submitted voluntary to military authority; 
(2) met the mental competency and minimum age quali- 
fications of sections 504 and 505 of this title at the time of volun- 
tary submission to military authority [that is, not insane, intoxi- 
cated, or under the age of 171; 
(3) received military pay or allowances; and 
(4) performed military duties; 
is subject to [the code] until such person's active service has been 
terminated in accordance with law or regulations promulgated by 
the Secretary concerned. 
Even if a person never underwent an enlistment or induction 
proceeding of any kind, court-martial jurisdiction could be estab- 
lished under this provision. 
(ii) Induction. Court-martial jurisdiction does 
not extend to a draftee until: the draftee has completed an induc- 
tion ceremony which was in substantial compliance with the re- 
quirements prescribed by statute and regulations; the draftee by 
conduct after an apparent induction, has waived objection to sub- 
stantive defects in it; or a "constructive enlistment" under Article 
2(c) exists. 
The fact that a person was improperly inducted (for exam- 
ple, because of incorrect classification or erroneous denial of ex- 
emption) does not of itself negate court-martial jurisdiction. 
When1a person has made timely and persistent efforts to correct 
such an error, court-martial jurisdiction  may be defeated if im- 
proper induction is found, depending on all the circumstances of 
the case. 
(iii) Call to active duty. A member of a reserve 
component may be called or ordered to active duty for a variety of 
reasons, including training, service in time of war or national 
emergency, discipline, or as a result of failure to participate satis- 
factorily in unit activities. 
When a person is ordered to active duty for failure to satis- 
factorily participate in unit activities, the order must substantially 
comply with procedures prescribed by  regulations, to the extent 
due process requires, for court-martial jurisdiction to exist. Gen- 
erally, the person must be given notice of the activation and the 
reasons therefor, and an opportunity to object to the activation. A 
person waives the right to contest involuntary activation by fail- 
ure to exercise this right within a reasonable time after notice of 
the right to do so. 
(B) Termination ofjurisdiction over active duty per- 
sonnel. As indicated above, the delivery of a valid discharge certif- 
icate or its equivalent ordinarily serves to terminate court-martial 
jurisdiction. 
(i) Effect of  completion of  term of  service. 
Completion of an enlistment or term of service does not by itself 
terminate court-martial jurisdiction.  An original term of enlist- R.C.M. 202(a) 
ment may be adjusted for a variety of reasons, such as making up 
time lost for unauthorized  absence. Even after such adjustments 
are considered, court-martial jurisdiction  normally continues 
past the time of scheduled separation until a discharge certificate 
or its equivalent is delivered or until the Government fails to act 
within a reasonable time after the person objects to continued re- 
tention. 
As indicated in subsection (c) of this rule, servicemembers 
may be retained past their scheduled time of separation, over pro- 
test, by action with a view to trial while they are still subject to the 
code. Thus, if action with a view to trial is initiated before dis- 
charge or the effective terminal date of self-executing orders, a 
person may be retained beyond the date that the period of service 
would otherwise have expired or the terminal date of such orders. 
(ii) 'Effect of discharge and reenlistment. 
Under Article 3(a),  a person who reenlists following a discharge 
may not be tried for offenses committed during the earlier term of 
service unless the offense was punishable by confinement for 5 
years or more and could not be tried in the courts of the United 
States or of a State, a Territory, or the District of Columbia. How- 
ever, see (iii)(a) below. 
(iii)Exceptions There are several exceptions 
to the general principle that court-martial jurisdiction terminates 
on discharge or its equivalent. 
(a)A person who was subject to the code 
at the time an offense was committed may be tried by  court-mar- 
tial for that offense despite a later discharge or other termination 
of that status if: 
(1) The offense is one for which a 
court-martial may adjudge confinement for 5 or more years; 
(2)The person cannot be tried in the 
courts of the United States or of a State, Territory, or the District 
of Columbia; and 
(3)  The person is, at the time of the 
court-martial, subject to the code, by reentry into the armed 
forces or otherwise. See Article 3(a). 
(b)  A person who was subject to the code 
at the time the offense was committed is subject to trial by  court- 
martial despite a later discharge if- 
(1) The discharge was issued before 
the end of the accused's  term of enlistment for the purpose of 
reenlisting; 
(2)  The person remains, at the time 
of the court-martial, subject to the code; and 
(3) The reenlistment occurred after 
26 July 1982. 
(c) Persons in the custody of the armed 
forces serving a sentence imposed by a court-martial remain sub- 
ject to the code and court-martial jurisdiction. A prisoner who 
has received a discharge and who remains in the custody of an 
armed force may be tried for an offense committed while a mem- 
ber of the armed forces and before the execution of the discharge 
as well as for offenses committed after it. 
(d)  A person discharged from the armed 
forces who is later charged with having fraudulently obtained 
that discharge is, subject to the statute of limitations, subject to 
trial by  court-martial on that charge, and is after apprehension 
subject to the code while in the custody of the armed forces for 
trial. Upon conviction of that charge such a person is subject to 
trial by court-martial for any offenses under the code committed 
before the fraudulent discharge. 
(e) No person who has deserted from the 
armed forces is relieved from court-martial jurisdiction by a sepa- 
ration from any later period of service. 
fl When a person's  discharge or other 
separation does not interrupt the status as a person belonging to 
the general category of persons subject to the code, court-martial 
jurisdiction over that person does not end. For example, when an 
officer holding a commission in a Reserve component of an armed 
force is discharged from that commission while on active duty be- 
cause of acceptance of a commission in a Regular component of 
that armed force, without an interval between the periods of ser- 
vice under the two commissions, that officer's military status  does 
not end. There is merely a change in personnel status  from tempo- 
rary to permanent officer, and court-martial jurisdiction over an 
offense committed before the discharge is not affected. 
(3) Public Health Service and National Oceanic and Atmos- 
pheric Administration. Members of the Public Health Service and 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration become 
subject to the code when assigned to an serving with the armed 
forces. 
(4) Limitations on jurisdiction  over civilians. Court-martial 
jurisdiction over civilians under the code is limited by judicial de- 
cisions. The exercise of jurisdiction  under Article 2(a)(ll) in 
peacetime has been held unconstitutional by  the Supreme Court 
of the United States. Article 2(a)(10) has also been limited. Before 
initiating court-martial proceedings against a civilian, relevant 
statutes and decisions should be carefully examined. 
(5) Members of a Reserve Component. Members of a reserve 
component in federal service on active duty, as well as those in 
federal service on inactive-duty training, are subject to the code. 
Moreover, members of a reserve component are amendable to the 
jurisdiction of courts-martial notwithstanding the termination of 
a period of such duty. See R.C.M. 204. 
(b)  Offenses under the law of war. Nothing in this 
rule limits the power of general courts-martial to try 
persons under the law of  war.See  R.C.M. 
201(f)(l)(B). 
(c)  Attachment of jurisdiction  over the person. 
(1)  In general. Court-martial jurisdiction  at-
taches over a person when action with a view to trial 
of that person is taken. Once court-martial jurisdic- 
tion over a person attaches, such jurisdiction shall 
continue for all purposes of trial, sentence, and pun- 
ishment, notwithstanding the expiration of that per- 
son's term of service or other period in which that 
person was subject to the code or trial by court-mar- 
tial. When jurisdiction  attaches over a  ser-
vicemember on active duty, the servicemember may 
be held on active duty over objection pending dispo- 
sition of any offense for which held and shall remain 
subject to the code during the entire period. Discussion 
Court-martial jurisdiction exists to try a person as long as 
that person occupies a status as a person subject to the code. See 
also Article 104 and 106. Thus, a servicemember is subject to 
court-martial jurisdiction until lawfully discharged or, when the 
servicemember's term of service has expired, the government fails 
to act within a reasonable time on objection by the servicemember 
to continued retention. 
Court-martial jurisdiction attaches over a person upon ac- 
tion with a view to trial. Once court-martial jurisdiction attaches, 
it continues throughout the trial and appellate process, and for 
purposes of punishment. 
If jurisdiction has attached before the effective terminal date 
of self-executing orders, the person may be held for trial by court- 
martial beyond the effective terminal date. 
(2)  Procedure. Actions by which court-martial 
jurisdiction attaches include: apprehension; imposi- 
tion of restraint, such as restriction, arrest, or con- 
finement; and preferral of charges. 
Rule 203.  Jurisdiction over the offense 
To the extent permitted by  the Constitution, 
courts-martial may try any offense under the code 
and, in the case of general courts-martial, the law of 
war. 
Discussion 
(a) In general. Courts-martial have power to try any of- 
fense under the code except when prohibited from doing so by the 
Constitution. (Jurisdiction over certain offenses and individuals 
may be affected by Article 3; see R.C.M. 202.) The major consti- 
tutional limitation on the subject-matter jurisdiction  of courts- 
martial was  established  by  the Supreme Court of the United 
States in O'Callahan v.  Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), which held 
that an offense under the code may not be tried by  court-martial 
unless it is"service-connected."  Later decisions by  the Supreme 
Court, the Court of Military Appeals, and other courts have es- 
tablished standards for applying the service-connection rule, as 
well as certain exceptions to it. Because each case depends on its 
own facts, and because these rules are subject to continuing inter- 
pretation, careful attention must be paid to service-connection  in 
every case. The remainder of this discussion provides guidance 
concerning service-connection  based on judicial decisions. 
(b) Pleading and prooj  The prosecution should plead 
the facts establishing  jurisdiction  (see R.C.M. 307(c)(3) Discus- 
sion (F)).If the issue is raised, the prosecution must prove the dis- 
puted facts necessary to establish  jurisdiction over the offense. See 
R.C.M. 907(b)(l)(A). Jurisdiction must exist over each offense. 
The fact that some offenses with which the accused is charged are 
service-connected does not necessarily establish jurisdiction over 
others, even if  they are of a similar or related nature. However, 
where related on-base and off-base offenses are involved, there is a 
military interest in having all the offenses tried by court-martial, 
R.C.M.  203 
so that they can be disposed of together without delay. The exis- 
tence of this interest helps provide a basis for finding service-con- 
nection for the off-base offenses. 
(c) Determining service-connection. 
(1) In general. In Relford  v.  Commandant, 
401 U.S. 355 (1971), the Supreme Court identified  12 factors 
which may be considered in deciding service-connection.  The fac- 
tors are- 
1. The serviceman's proper absence from the base. 
2. The crime's commission away from the base. 
3. Its commission at a place not under military control. 
4. Its commission within our territorial limits and not in 
an occupied zone of a foreign country. 
5. Its commission in peacetime and its being unrelated 
to authority stemming from the war power. 
6. The absence of any connection between the defen- 
dant's military duties and the crime. 
7. The victim's not being engaged in the performance of 
any duty relating to the military. 
8. The presence and availability of a civilian court in 
which the case can be prosecuted. 
9. The absence of any flouting of military authority. 
10. The absence of any threat to a military post. 
11. The absence of  any violation of military property. 
12. The offenses being among those traditionally prose- 
cuted in civilian courts. 
These factors are not exhaustive. The Supreme Court also 
described nine additional considerations in Relford: 
(1) the essential and obvious interest of the military in 
the security of persons and of property on the military enclave; (2) 
the responsibility of the military commander for maintenance of 
order in the command and the commander's authority to main- 
tain that order; (3) the impact and adverse effect that a crime 
committed against a person or property on a military base, thus 
violating the base's very security, has upon the morale, discipline, 
reputation and integrity of the base itself, upon its personnel, and 
upon the military operations and the military mission; (4) Article 
I, section 8, clause 14 of the Constitution of the United States, 
vesting in Congress the power "To make Rules for the Govern- 
ment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," means, in ap- 
propriate areas beyond the purely military offense, more than the 
mere power to arrest a servicemember-offender  and turn that per- 
son over to the civil authorities; (5) the distinct possibility that 
civil courts, particularly nonfederal courts, will have less than 
complete interest, concern, and capacity for all the cases that vin- 
dicate the military's disciplinary authority within its own com- 
munity; (6) the presence of factors such as geographical and mili- 
tary relationships which have important significance in favor of 
service-connection;  (7) historically, a crime against the person of 
one associated with the post was subiect even to the General Arti- 
cle; (8) the misreading and undue restriction of O'Callahan if it 
were interpreted as confining the court-martial to the purely mili- 
tary offenses that have no counterpart in  nonmilitary criminal 
law; (9) the inability appropriately and meaningfully to draw any 
line between a post's strictly military areas and its nonmilitary ar- 
em, orbetween a servicemember's duty and off-duty activities and 
hours on the post. In addition, the effect of the offense on the rep- 
utation and morale of the Armed Service is an appropriate con- 
sideration in determining service-connection. R.C.M.  203 
The test is not simply a numerical tally of the presence or ab- 
sence of these or other factors. Instead, the factors identify cir- 
cumstances which may tend to weigh for or against service-con- 
nection, depending on the facts of each case. Thus, certain factors 
will tend to weigh  more heavily than others in given situations. 
This balancing test has been described by the Supreme Court: 
"[The] issue turns in major part on gauging the impact 
of an offense on military discipline and effectiveness, on determin- 
ing whether the military interest in deterring the offense is distinct 
from and greater than that of civilian society, and on whether the 
distinct military interest can be vindicated adequately in civilian 
courts." 
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 760 (1975). 
(2) Military offenses. Military offenses, such as un- 
authorized  absence, disrespect offenses, and disobedience of 
superiors, are always service-connected. 
(3) Offenses on a military installation. Virtually all 
offenses which occur on a military base, post, or other installation 
are service-connected. Similarly, offenses aboard a military vessel 
or  aircraft are service-connected.  If anessential part of the offense 
occurs on a military installation, service-connection exists even 
though the remainder of the offense took place off base. However, 
on-base preparation to commit an offense or introduction onto a 
military installation of the fruits or instruments of a crime com- 
pleted off base may not necessarily be sufficient to prove service- 
connection over an off-base offense. An offense which directly 
threatens the security of an installation may be service-connected 
even though it occurs off base. When an offense is committed near 
a military installation, the proximity may support a finding of ser- 
vice-connection, as when it injures relationships between the mili- 
tary and civilian communities and makes it more difficult for ser- 
vicemembers to receive local support. 
(4)Drug offenses. Almost every involvement of ser- 
vice personnel with the commerce in drugs, including use, posses- 
sion, and distribution, is service-connected,  regardless of location. 
However, examples of situations in which drug involvement by a 
servicemember  which after Relford analysis might not be service- 
connected include use of marijuana by  a servicemember on a 
lengthy leave away from the military, or off-base distribution by a 
servicemember of a small amount of illegal drugs to a civilian for 
personal use. 
(5) Offenses involving military status and thejout- 
ing of military authority. The fact that the victim of an offense is a 
servicemember or that the accused used a military identification 
card may establish service-connected, especially in conjunction 
with other facts in a case. If the accused's status, either as a ser- 
vicemember generally, or as the occupant of a specific position, is 
of central importance to the criminal activity, as where it is cru- 
cial in enabling the accused to commit the crime, service-connec- 
tion will normally exist. The fact that the accused is an officer or 
military policeman or was in uniform when the offense was com- 
mitted does not necessarily establish service-connection,  although 
such circumstances may tend to support a finding of service-con- 
nection in conjunction with other facts. 
(6) During a declared war, or a period of hostilities 
as a result of which Congress is unable to meet, virtually all of- 
fenses would be service-connected. 
(d) Exceptions to the service-connection requirement. 
(1) The overseas exception. Offenses which are com- 
mitted outside the territorial limits of the United States and its 
possessions, and which are not subject to trial in the civilian 
courts of the United States, need not be service-connected to be 
tried by  court-martial. This exception depends on the location of 
the commission of the offense, not on the location of  the trial. 
Note that the overseas exception does not apply to all offenses 
committed abroad, for some criminal statutes of the United States 
apply to its citizens abroad. The offense must be service-con- 
nected in this case because the offense may also be tried in a civil- 
ian court of the United States. The fact that the offense occurred 
overseas may be a factor tending to establish service connection, 
however, even if potentially subject to trial in Federal civilian 
court. 
(2) The petty offenses exception. Petty offenses may 
be tried by  court-martial whether or not they are service-con- 
nected. An offense is petty if the maximum confinement which 
may be adjudged is 6 months or less and no punitive discharge is 
authorized. 
Rule 204.  Jurisdiction over certain reserve 
component personnel 
(a)  Service regulations. The Secretary concerned 
shall prescribe regulations setting forth rules and 
procedures for the exercise of court-martial jurisdic- 
tion and nonjudicial punishment authority over re- 
serve component personnel under Article 2(a)(3) 
and 2(d), subject to the limitations of this Manual 
and the UCMJ. 
Discussion 
Such regulations should describe procedures for ordering a 
reservist to active duty for disciplinary action, for the preferral, 
investigation, forwarding, and referral of charges, designation of 
convening authorities and commanders authorized to conduct 
nonjudicial punishment proceedings, and for other appropriate 
purposes. 
See definitions in R.C.M. 103 (Discussion). See paragraph 5e 
and f, Part V, concerning limitations on nonjudicial punishments 
imposed on reservists while on inactive-duty training. 
Members of the Army National Guard and the Air National 
Guard are subject to Federal court-martial jurisdiction only when 
the offense concerned is committed while the member is in Fed- 
eral service. 
(b)(l)  General and special court-martial proceed- 
ings. A member of a reserve component must be on 
active duty prior to arraignment at a general or spe- 
cial court-martial. A member ordered to active duty 
pursuant to Article 2(d) may be retained on active 
duty to serve any adjudged confinement or other re- 
striction on liberty if the order to active duty was ap- proved in accordance with Article 2(d)(5), but such 
member may not be retained on active duty pursu- 
ant to Article 2(d) after service of the confinement or 
other restriction on liberty. All punishments re- 
maining unserved at the time the member is released 
from active duty may be carried over to subsequent 
periods of inactive-duty training or active duty. 
Discussion 
An accused ordered to active duty pursuant to Article 2(d) 
may be retained on active duty after service of the punishment if 
permitted by  other authority. For example, an accused who com- 
mits another offense while on active duty ordered pursuant to Ar- 
ticle 2(d) may be retained on active duty pursuant to R.C.M. 
202(c)(l). 
(2)  Summary courts-martial. A member of a re- 
serve component may be tried by summary court- 
martial either while on active duty or inactive-duty 
training. A summary court-martial conducted dur- 
ing inactive-duty training may be in session only 
during normal periods of such training. The accused 
may not be held beyond such periods of training for 
trial or service or any punishment. All punishments 
remaining unserved at the end of a period of active 
duty or the end of any normal period of inactive 
duty training may be carried over to subsequent pe- 
riods of inactive-duty training or active duty. 
R.C.M.  204(d) 
Discussion 
A "normal period" of inactive-duty training does not include 
periods which are scheduled solely for the purpose of conducting 
court-martial proceedings. 
(c)  Applicability. This subsection is not applicable 
when a member is held on active duty pursuant to 
R.C.M. 202(c). 
(d)  Changes in type of service. A member of a re- 
serve component at the time disciplinary action is in- 
itiated, who is alleged to have committed an offense 
while on active duty or inactive-duty training, is sub- 
ject to court-martial jurisdiction without regard to 
any change between active and reserve service or 
within different categories of reserve service subse- 
quent to commission of the offense. This subsection 
does not apply to a person whose military status was 
completely terminated after commission of an of- 
fense. 
Discussion 
A member of a regular or reserve component remains subject 
to court-martial jurisdiction after leaving active duty for offenses 
committed prior to such termination of active duty if the member 
retains military status in a reserve component without having 
been discharged from all obligations of military service. 
See R.C.M.202(a), Discussion, paragraph (2)(B)(ii) and (iii) 
regarding the jurisdictional effect of a discharge from military ser- 
vice. A "complete termination"  of military status refers to a dis- 
charge relieving the servicemember of any further military ser- 
vice. It does not include a discharge conditioned upon acceptance 
of further military service. CHAPTER Ill.  INITIATION OF CHARGES; APPREHENSION; PRETRIAL 

RESTRAINT; RELATED MATTERS 

Rule 301.  Report of offense 
(a)  Who may report. Any person may report an of- 
fense subject to trial by court-martial. 
(b)  To whom reports conveyed for  disposition. Ordi-
narily, any military authority who receives a report 
of an offense shall forward as soon as practicable the 
report and any accompanying information to the im- 
mediate commander of the suspect. Competent au- 
thority superior to that commander may direct oth- 
erwise. 
Discussion 
Any military authority may receive a report of an offense. 
Typically such reports are made to law enforcement or investiga- 
tive personnel, or to appropriate persons in the chain of com- 
mand. A report may be made by any means, and no particular 
format is required. When a person who is not a law enforcement 
official receives a report of an offense, that person should forward 
the report to the immediate commander of the suspect unless that 
person believes it would be more appropriate to notify law en- 
forcement or investigative authorities. 
If the suspect is unidentified,  the military authority who re- 
ceives the report should refer it to a law enforcement or  investiga- 
tive agency. 
Upon receipt of a report, the immediate commander of a sus- 
pect should refer to R.C.M. 306 (Initial disposition). See also 
R.C.M. 302 (Apprehension); R.C.M. 303 (Preliminary inquiry); 
R.C.M. 304, 305 (Pretrial restraint, confinement). 
Rule 302.  Apprehension 
(a)  Definition and scope. 
(1)  Definition. Apprehension is the taking of a 
person into custody. 
Discussion 
Apprehension is the equivalent of "arrest"  in civilian termi- 
nology. (In military terminology, "arrest"  is a form of restraint. 
See Article 9; R.C.M. 304.) See subsection (c) of this rule con- 
cerning the bases for apprehension. An apprehension is not re- 
quired in every case; the fact that an accused was never appre- 
hended does not affect the  jurisdiction of a court-martial to try the 
accused. However, see R.C.M. 202(c) concerning attachment of 
jurisdiction. 
An apprehension is different from detention of a person for 
investigative purposes, although each involves the exercise of gov- 
ernment control over the freedom of movement of a person. An 
apprehension must be based on probable cause, and the custody 
initiated in an apprehension may continue until proper authority 
is notified and acts under R.C.M. 304 or 305. An investigative de- 
tention may be made on less than probable cause (see Mil. R. 
Evid. 314(f)), and normally involves a relatively short period of 
custody. Furthermore, an extensive search of the person is not au- 
thorized incident to an investigative detention, as it is with an ap- 
prehension. See Mil. R. Evid. 314(f) and (g). This rule does not af- 
fect any seizure of the person less severe than apprehension. 
Evidence obtained as the result of an apprehension which is 
in violation of this rule may be challenged under Mil. R. Evid. 
3  1  l(c)(l).  Evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful civilian 
arrest may be challenged under Mil. R. Evid. 3  1  l(c)(l), (2). 
(2) Scope. This rule applies only to apprehensions 
made by persons authorized to do so under subsec- 
tion (b) of this rule with respect to offenses subject to 
trial by court-martial. Nothing in this rule limits the 
authority of federal law enforcement officials to ap- 
prehend persons, whether or not subject to trial by 
court-martial, to the extent permitted by applicable 
enabling statutes and other law. 
Discussion 
R.C.M. 302 does not affect the authority of any official to de- 
tain, arrest, or apprehend persons not subject to trial under the 
code. The rule does not apply to actions taken by any person in a 
private capacity. 
Several federal agencies have broad powers to apprehend 
persons for violations of federal laws, including the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice. For example, agents of the Federal Bu- 
reau of Investigation, United States Marshals, and agents of the 
Secret Service may apprehend persons for any offenses committed 
in their presence and for felonies. 18 U.S.C.  $8 3052, 3053, 3056. 
Other agencies have apprehension powers include the General 
Services Administration, 40 U.S.C.  $ 318 and the Veterans Ad- 
ministration, 38 U.S.C. § 218. The extent to which such agencies 
become involved in the apprehension of persons subject to trial by 
courts-martial may depend on the statutory authority of the 
agency and the agency's formal or informal relationships with the 
Department of Defense. 
(b)  Who may apprehend. The following officials 
may apprehend any person subject to trial by court- 
martial: 
(1)  Military law enforcement officials.  Security 
police, military police, master at arms personnel, 
members of the shore patrol, and persons designated 
by proper authorities to perform military criminal 
investigative, guard, or police duties, whether sub- 
ject to the code or not, when in each of the foregoing 
instances, the official making the apprehension is in 
the execution of law enforcement duties; Discussion 
Whenever enlisted persons, including police and guards, and 
civilian police and guards apprehend any commissioned  or war- 
rant officer, such persons should make an immediate report to the 
commissioned officer to whom the apprehending person is re- 
sponsible. 
The  phrase "persons  designated by proper authority to per- 
form military criminal investigative, guard or police duties"  in- 
cludes special agents of the Defense Criminal Investigative Ser- 
vice. 
(2)  Commissioned, warrant, petty, and noncom- 
missioned  oficers. All commissioned, warrant, 
petty, and noncommissioned officers on active duty 
or inactive duty training; 
Discussion 
Noncommissioned and petty officers not otherwise perform- 
ing law enforcement duties should not apprehend a commis- 
sioned officer unless directed to do  so by a commissioned officer or 
in order to prevent disgrace to the service or the escape of one 
who has committed a serious offense. 
(3)  Civilians authorized  to apprehend deserters. 
Under Article 8, any civilian officer having authority 
to apprehend offenders under laws of the United 
States or of a State, Territory, Commonwealth, or 
possession, or the District of Columbia, when the 
apprehension is of a deserter from the armed forces. 
Discussion 
The code specifically provides that any civil officer, whether 
of a State, Territory, district, or of the United States may appre- 
hend any deserter. However, this authority does not permit state 
and local law enforcement officers to apprehend persons for other 
violations of the code. See Article 8. 
(c)  Grounds for  apprehension. A person subject to 
the code or trial thereunder may be apprehended for 
an offense triable by  court-martial upon probable 
cause to apprehend. Probable cause to apprehend 
exists when there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that an offense has been or is being committed and 
the person to be apprehended committed or is com- 
mitting it. Persons authorized to apprehend under 
subsection (b)(2) of this rule may also apprehend 
persons subject to the code who take part in quar- 
rels, frays, or disorders, wherever they occur. 
R.C.M.  302(e)(2) 
Discussion 
"Reasonable grounds" means that there must be the kind of 
reliable information that a reasonable, prudent person would rely 
on which makes it more likely than not that something is true. A 
mere suspicion is not enough but proof which would support a 
conviction is not necessary. A person who determines probable 
cause may rely on the reports of others. 
(d)  How an apprehension may be made. 
(1)  In general. An apprehension is made by 
clearly notifying the person to be apprehended that 
person is in custody. This notice should be given 
orally or in writing, but it may be implied by the cir- 
cumstances. 
(2)  Warrants. Neither warrants nor any other au- 
thorization shall be required for an apprehension 
under these rules except as required in subsection 
(e)(2) of this rule. 
(3)  Use of force.  Any person authorized under 
these rules to make an apprehension may use such 
force and means as reasonably necessary under the 
circumstances to effect the apprehension. 
Discussion 
In addition to any other action required by law or regulation 
or proper military officials, any person making an apprehension 
under these rules should: maintain custody of the person appre- 
hended; and inform as promptly as possible the immediate com- 
mander of the person apprehended, or any official higher in the 
chain of command of the person apprehended if it is impractical 
to inform the immediate commander. 
(e)  Where an apprehension may be made. 
(1) In general. An apprehension may be made at 
any place, except as provided in subsection (e)(2) of 
this rule. 
(2)  Private dwellings. A private dwelling includes 
dwellings, on or off a military installation, such as 
single family houses, duplexes, and apartments. The 
quarters may be owned, leased, or rented by the re- 
sidents, or assigned, and may be occupied on a tem- 
porary or permanent basis. "Private dwel1ing"does 
not include the following, whether or not subdivided 
into individual units: living areas in military bar- 
racks, vessels, aircraft, vehicles, tents, bunkers, field 
encampments, and similar places. No person may 
enter a private dwelling for the purpose of making 
an apprehension under these rules unless: R.C.M.  302(e)(2)(A) 
(A)  Pursuant to consent under Mil. R. Evid. 
3  14(e) of 3  16(d)(2); 
(B)  Under exigent circumstances described in 
Mil. R. Evid. 3  15(g) or 3  16(d)(4)(B); 
(C)  In the case of a private dwelling which is 
military property or under military control, or non- 
military property in a foreign country. 
(i) if the person to be apprehended is a resi- 
dent of the private dwelling, there exists, at the time 
of the entry, reason to believe that the person to be 
apprehended is present in the dwelling, and the ap- 
prehension has been authorized by an official listed 
in Mil. R. Evid. 315(d) upon a determination that 
probable cause to apprehend the person exists; or 
(ii) if the person to be apprehended is not a 
resident of the private dwelling, the entry has been 
authorized by an official listed in Mil. R. Evid. 
3  15(d) upon a determination that probable cause ex- 
ists to apprehend the person and to believe that the 
person to be apprehended is or will be present at the 
time of the entry; 
(D)  In the case of a private dwelling not in- 
cluded in subsection (e)(2)(C) of this rule, 
(i)  if the person to be apprehended is a resi- 
dent of the private dwelling, there exists at the time 
of the entry, reason to believe that the person to be 
apprehended is present and the apprehension is au- 
thorized by an arrest warrant issued by competent 
civilian authority; or 
(ii) if the person to be apprehended is not a 
resident of the private dwelling, the apprehension is 
authorized by an arrest warrant and the entry is au- 
thorized by a search warrant, each issued by compe- 
tent civilian authority. 
A person who is not a resident of  the private 
dwelling entered may not challenge the legality of an 
apprehension of that person on the basis of failure to 
secure a warrant or authorization to enter that 
dwelling, or on the basis of the sufficiency of such a 
warrant or authorization. Nothing in this subsection 
((e)(2)) affects the legality of an apprehension which 
is incident to otherwise lawful presence in a private 
dwelling. 
Discussion 
For example, if law enforcement officials enter a private 
dwelling pursuant to a valid search warrant or search authoriza- 
tion, they may apprehend persons therein if grounds for an appre- 
hension exist. This subsection is not intended to be an indepen- 
dent grant of authority to execute civilian arrest or search 
warrants. The authority must derive from an appropriate Federal 
or state procedure. See e.g. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 and 28 C.F.R. 
60.1. 
Rule 303.  Preliminary inquiry into reported 
offenses 
Upon receipt of information that a member of the 
command is accused or suspected of committing an 
offense or offenses triable by court-martial, the im- 
mediate commander shall make or cause to be made 
a preliminary inquiry into the charges or suspected 
offenses. 
Discussion 
The preliminary inquiry is usually informal. It may be an ex- 
amination of the charges and an investigative report or other 
summary of expected evidence. In other cases a more extensive 
investigation may be necessary. Although the commander may 
conduct the investigation personally or with members of the com- 
mand, in serious or complex cases the commander should con- 
sider whether to seek the assistance of law enforcement personnel 
in conducting any inquiry or further investigation. The inquiry 
should gather all reasonably available evidence bearing on guilt or 
innocence and any evidence relating to aggravation, extenuation, 
or mitigation. 
The Military Rules of Evidence should be consulted when 
conducting interrogations (see Mil. R. Evid. 301-306), searches 
(see Mil. R. Evid. 311-317), and eyewitness identifications (see 
Mil. R. Evid. 321). 
If the offense is one for which the Department of Justice has 
investigative responsibilities, appropriate coordination should be 
made under the Memorandum of Understanding, see Appendix 
3, and any implementing regulations. 
If it appears that any witness may not be available for later 
proceedings in the case, this should be brought to the attention of 
appropriate authorities. See also R.C.M. 702 (depositions). 
A person who is an accuser (see Article l(9)) is disqualified 
from convening a general or special court-martial in that case. 
R.C.M. 504(c)(l). Therefore, when the immediate commander is 
a general or special court-martial convening authority, the pre- 
liminary inquiry should be conducted by another officer of the 
command. That officer may be informed that charges may be pre- 
ferred if the officer determines that preferral is warranted. 
Rule 304.  Pretrial restraint 
(a)  Types of  pretrial  restraint. Pretrial restraint is 
moral or physical restraint on a person's  liberty 
which is imposed before and during disposition of- 
fenses. Pretrial restraint may consist of conditions 
on liberty, restriction in lieu of arrest, arrest, or con- 
finement. (1)  Conditions on lfberty. Conditions on liberty 
are imposed by orders directing a person to do or re- 
frain from doing specified acts. Such conditions may 
be imposed in conjunction with other forms of re- 
straint or separately. 
(2)  Restriction in lieu of arrest. Restriction in lieu 
of arrest is the restraint of a person by oral or written 
orders directing the person to remain within speci- 
fied limits; a restricted person shall, unless otherwise 
directed, perform full military duties while re- 
stricted. 
(3) Arrest. Arrest is the restraint of a person by 
oral or written order not imposed as punishment, di- 
recting the person to remain within specified limits; 
a person in the status of arrest may not be required 
to perform full military duties such as commanding 
or supervising personnel, serving as guard, or bear- 
ing arms. The status of arrest automatically ends 
when the person is placed, by the authority who or- 
dered the arrest or a superior authority, on duty in- 
consistent with the status of arrest, but this shall not 
prevent requiring the person arrested to do ordinary 
cleaning or policing, or to take part in routine train- 
ing and duties. 
(4)  Confinement. Pretrial confinement is physical 
restraint, imposed by order of competent authority, 
depriving a person of freedom pending disposition of 
offenses.See R.C.M. 305. 
Discussion 
Conditions on liberty include orders to report periodically to 
a specified official, orders not to go to a certain place (such as the 
scene of the alleged offense),  and orders not to associate with 
specified persons (such  as the alleged victim or potential wit- 
nesses). Conditions on liberty must not hinder pretrial prepara- 
tion, however. Thus, when such conditions are imposed, they 
must by sufficiently flexible to permit pretrial preparation. 
Restriction in lieu of arrest is a less severe restraint on liberty 
than is arrest. Arrest includes suspension from performing full 
military duties and the limits of arrest are normally narrower 
than those of restriction in lieu of arrest. The actual nature of the 
restraint imposed, and not the characterization of it by the officer 
imposing it, will determine whether it is technically an arrest or 
restriction in lieu of arrest. 
Breach of arrest or restriction in lieu of arrest or violation of 
conditions on liberty are offenses under the code. See paragraphs 
16, 19, and 102, Part IV. When such an offense occurs, it may 
warrant appropriate action such as nonjudicial punishment or 
court-martial. See R.C.M. 306. In addition, such a breach or vio- 
lation may provide a basis for the imposition of a more severe 
form of restraint. 
R.C.M. 304(c)(3) 
R.C.M. 707(a) requires that the accused be brought to trial 
within 120 days of preferral of charges or imposition of restraint 
under R.C.M. 304(a)(2)-(4). 
(b)  Who may order pretrial restraint. 
(1)  Of civilians and oficers. Only a commanding 
officer to whose authority the civilian or officer is 
subject may order pretrial restraint of that civilian 
or officer. 
Discussion 
Civilians may be restrained under these rules only when they 
are subject to trial by court-martial. See R.C.M. 202. 
(2) Of enlisted persons. Any commissioned officer 
may order pretrial restraint of any enlisted person. 
(3)  Delegation of authority. The authority to or- 
der pretrial restraint of civilians and commissioned 
and warrant officers may not be delegated. A com- 
manding officer may delegate to warrant, petty, and 
noncommissioned officers authority to order pretrial 
restraint of enlisted persons of the commanding of- 
ficer's command or subject to the authority of that 
commanding officer. 
(4) Authority to withhold. A superior competent 
authority may without from a subordinate the au- 
thority to order pretrial restraint. 
(c)  When a person  may be  restrained. No person 
may be ordered into restraint before trial except for 
probable cause. Probable cause to order pretrial re- 
straint exists when there is a reasonable belief that: 
(1)  An offense triable by  court-martial has been 
committed; 
(2)  The person to be restrained committed it; and 
(3)  The restraint ordered is required by the cir- 
cumstances. 
Discussion 
The decision whether to impose pretrial restraint, and, if so, 
what type or types, should be made on a case-by-case basis. The 
factors listed in the Discussion of R.C.M. 305(h)(2)(B) should be 
considered. The restraint should not be more rigorous than the 
circumstances require to ensure the presence of the person re- 
strained or to prevent foreseeable serious criminal misconduct. 
Restraint is not required in every case. The absence of pre- 
trial restraint does not affect the jurisdiction  of a court-martial. 
However, see R.C.M. 202(c) concerning attachment of jurisdic- 
tion. See R.C.M. 305 concerning the standards and procedures 
governing pretrial confinement. R.C.M.  304(d) 
(d)  Procedures for  ordering pretrial  restraint. Pre-
trial restraint other than confinement is imposed by 
notifying the person orally or in writing of the re- 
straint, including its terms or limits. The order to an 
enlisted person shall be delivered personally by the 
authority who issues it or through other persons 
subject to the code. The order to an officer or a civil- 
ian shall be delivered personally by the authority 
who issues it or by another commissioned officer. 
Pretrial confinement is imposed pursuant to orders 
by a competent authority by the delivery of a person 
to a place of confinement. 
(e)  Notice of basis for  restraint. When a person is 
placed under restraint, the person shall be informed 
of the nature of the offense which  is the basis for 
such restraint. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 305(e) concerning additional information which 
must be given to a person who is confined. If the person ordering 
the restrain is not the commander of the person restrained, that 
officer should be notified. 
(f)  Punishment prohibited.  Pretrial restraint is not 
punishment and shall not be used as such. No person 
who is restrained pending trial may be subjected to 
punishment or penalty for the offense which is the 
basis for that restraint. Prisoners being held for trial 
shall not be required to undergo punitive duty hours 
or training, perform punitive labor, or wear special 
uniforms prescribed  only for post-trial prisoners. 
This rule does not prohibit minor punishment dur- 
ing pretrial confinement for infractions of the rules 
of the place of confinement. Prisoners shall be af- 
forded facilities and treatment under regulations of 
the Secretary concerned. 
Discussion 
Offenses under the code by a person under restraint may be 
disposed of in the same manner as any other offenses. 
(g)  Release. Except as otherwise provided  in 
R.C.M. 305, a person may be released from pretrial 
restraint by a person authorized to impose it. Pre- 
trial restraint shall terminate when a sentence is ad- 
judged, the accused is acquitted of all charges, or all 
charges are dismissed. 
Discussion 
Pretrial restraint may be imposed (or reimposed) if charges 
are to be reinstated or of a rehearing or "other"  trial is to be or- 
dered. 
(h) Administrative  restraint. Nothing in this rule 
prohibits limitations on a servicemember imposed 
for operational or other military purposes indepen- 
dent of military justice,  including administrative 
hold or medical reasons. 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M. 306. 
Rule 305.  Pretrial confinement 
(a)  In general. Pretrial confinement is physical re- 
straint, imposed by order of competent authority, 
depriving a person of freedom pending disposition of 
charges. 
Discussion 
No member of the armed forces may be placed  in confine- 
ment in immediate association with enemy prisoners or other for- 
eign nationals not members of the armed forces of the United 
States. Article 12. However, if members of the armed forces of the 
United States are separated from prisoners of the other categories 
mentioned, they may be confined in the same confinement facili- 
ties. 
(b)  Who  may be conjned. Any person who is sub- 
ject to trial by court-martial may be confined if the 
requirements of this rule are met. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 201 and 202 and the discussions therein concern- 
ing persons who are subject to trial by courts-martial. 
(c)  Who  may order conjnement. See R.C.M. 304(b). 
Discussion 
"No provost marshal, commander of a guard, or master at 
arms may refuse to receive or keep any prisoner committed to his 
charge by  a commissioned officer of the armed forces, when the 
committing officer furnishes a statement, signed by him, of the of- 
fense charged against the prisoner." Article 1  l(a). (d)  When a person  may be confined. No person may 
be ordered into pretrial confinement except for prob- 
able cause. Probable cause to order pretrial confine- 
ment exists when there is a reasonable belief that: 
(1)  An offense triable by court-martial has been 
committed; 
(2)  The person confined committed it; and 
(3)  Confinement is required by  the circum- 
stances. 
Discussion 
The person who directs confinement should consider the 
matters discussed under subsection (h)(2)(B)  of this rule before 
ordering confinement. However, the person who initially orders 
confinement is not required to make a detailed analysis of the ne- 
cessity for confinement. It is often not possible to review a per- 
son's background and character or even the details of an offense 
before physically detaining the person. For example, until addi- 
tional information can be secured, it may be necessary to confine a 
person apprehended in the course of a violent crime. 
"[Wlhen  charged only with an offense normally tried by 
summary court-martial, [an accused] shall not ordinarily be 
paced in confinement."  Article 10. 
Confinement should be distinguished from custody. Custody 
is restraint which is imposed by apprehension and which may be, 
but is not necessarily, physical. Custody may be imposed by any- 
one authorized to apprehend (see R.C.M. 302(b)),  and may con- 
tinue until a proper authority under R.C.M.  304(B) is notified 
and takes action. Thus, a person who has been apprehended could 
be physically  restrained, but this would not be pretrial confine- 
ment in the sense of this rule until a person authorized to do so 
under R.C.M. 304@) directed confinement. 
(e)  Advice  to the accused upon confinement. Each 
person confined shall be promptly informed of: 
(1)  The nature of the offenses for which held; 
(2)  The right to remain silent and that any state- 
ment made by the person may be used against the 
person; 
(3)  The right to retain civilian counsel at no ex- 
pense to the United States, and the right to request 
assignment of military counsel; and 
(4)  The procedures by which pretrial confine- 
ment will be reviewed. 
(0  Military counsel. If requested by the prisoner and 
such request is made known to military authorities, 
military counsel shall be provided to the prisoner 
before the initial review under subsection (i) of this 
rule or within 72 hours of such a request being first 
communicated to military authorities, whichever 
occurs first. Counsel may be assigned for the limited 
purpose of representing the accused only during the 
R.C.M.  305(h)(2)(B) 
pretrial confinement proceedings before charges are 
referred. If assignment is made for this limited pur- 
pose, the prisoner shall be so informed. Unless oth- 
erwise provided by regulations of the Secretary con- 
cerned, a prisoner does not have a right under this 
rule to have military counsel of the prisoner's own 
selection. 
(g)  Who may direct release from  confinement. Any 
commander of a prisoner, an officer appointed under 
regulations of the Secretary concerned to conduct 
the review under subsection (i) of this rule, or, once 
charges have been referred, a military judge detailed 
to the court-martial to which the charges against the 
accused have been referred may direct release from 
pretrial confinement. For purposes of this subsec- 
tion, "any commander" includes the immediate or 
higher commander of the prisoner and the com- 
mander of the installation on which the confinement 
facility is located. 
(h)  Notification and action by commander. 
(1)  Report. Unless the commander of the prisoner 
ordered the pretrial confinement, the commissioned, 
warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer to whose 
charge the prisoner was committed shall, within 24 
hours after that commitment, cause to be made a re- 
port to the commander which shall contain the 
name of the prisoner, the offenses charged against 
the prisoner,  and the name of the person who or- 
dered or authorized confinement. 
Discussion 
This report may be made by any means. Ordinarily, the im- 
mediate commander of the prisoner should be notified. In unusual 
cases any commander to whose authority the prisoner is subject, 
such as the commander of the confinement facility, may be noti- 
fied. In the latter case, the commander so notified  must ensure 
compliance with subsection (h)(2) of this rule. 
(2)  Action by commander. 
*(A)  Decision. Not later than 72 hours after 
the commander's ordering of a prisoner into pretrial 
confinement, or after receipt of a report that a mem- 
ber of the commander's unit or organization has 
been confined, whichever situation is applicable, the 
commander shall decide whether pretrial confine- 
ment will continue. 
(B)  Requirements for  confinement. The com- 
mander shall direct the prisoner's  release from pre- 
trial confinement unless the commander believes R.C.M.  305(h)(2)(B) 
upon probable cause, that is, upon reasonable 
grounds, that: 
(i)  An offense triable by a court-martial has 
been committed; 
(ii) The prisoner committed it; and 
(iii)  Confinement is necessary because it is 
foreseeable that: 
(a) The prisoner will not appear at trial, 
pretrial hearing, or investigation, or 
(b) The prisoner will engage in serious 
criminal misconduct; and 
(iv)  Less severe forms of restraint are inade- 
quate. 
Serious criminal misconduct includes intimida- 
tion of witnesses or other obstruction of justice, seri- 
ously injuring others, or other offenses which pose a 
serious threat to the safety of the community or to 
the effectiveness, morale, discipline, readiness, or 
safety of the command, or to the national security of 
the United States. As used in this rule, "national se- 
curity" means the national defense and foreign rela- 
tions of the United States and specifically includes: a 
military or defense advantage over any foreign na- 
tion or  group of nations; a favorable foreign relations 
position; or a defense posture capable of successfully 
resisting hostile or destructive action from within or 
without, overt or covert. 
Discussion 
A person should not be confined as a mere matter of conve- 
nience or expedience. 
Some of the factors which should be considered under this 
subsection are: 
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offenses 
charged or suspected, including extenuating circumstances; 
(2) The weight of the evidence against the accused; 
(3) The  accused's ties to the locale, including family, off- 
duty employment, financial resources, and length of residence; 
(4) The accused's character and mental condition; 
(5) The accused's service record, including any record 
of previous misconduct; 
(6) The accused's record of appearance at or flight from 
other pretrial investigations, trials, and similar proceedings; and 
(7) The  likelihood that the accused can and will commit 
further serious criminal misconduct if allowed to remain at lib- 
erty. 
Although the Military Rules of Evidence are not applicable, 
the commander should judge the reliability of the information 
available. Before relying on the reports of others, the commander 
must have a reasonable belief that the information is believable 
and has a factual basis. The information may be received orally or 
in writing. Information need not be received under oath, but an 
oath may add to its reliability. A commander may examine the 
prisoner's  personnel records, police records, and may consider 
the recommendations of others. 
Less serious forms of restraint must always be considered 
before pretrial confinement may be approved. Thus the com- 
mander should consider whether the prisoner could be safely re- 
turned to the prisoner's unit, at liberty or under restriction, arrest, 
or conditions on liberty. See R.C.M. 304. 
(C)  Memorandum. If continued pretrial 
confinement is approved, the commander shall pre- 
pare a written memorandum which states the rea- 
sons for the conclusion that the requirements for 
confinement in subsection (h)(2)(B) of this rule have 
been met. This memorandum may include hearsay 
and may incorporate by reference other documents, 
such as witness statements, investigative reports, or 
official records. This memorandum shall be for- 
warded to the reviewing officer under subsection (i) 
of this rule. If such a memorandum was prepared by 
the commander before ordering confinement, a sec- 
ond memorandum need not be prepared. However, 
additional information may be added to the memo- 
randum at any time. 
(i)  Procedures for  review of pretrial confinement. 
(1) In general. A review of the adequacy of prob- 
able cause to believe the prisoner has committed an 
offense and of the necessity for continued pretrial 
confinement shall be made within 7 days of the im- 
position of confinement under military control. If 
the prisoner was apprehended by civilian authorities 
and remains in civilian custody at the request of mil- 
itary authorities, reasonable efforts will be made to 
bring the prisoner under military control in a timely 
fashion. In calculating the number of days of con- 
finement for purposes of this rule, the initial date of 
confinement shall count as one day and the date of 
the review shall also count as one day. 
(2)  By whom made. The review under this subsec- 
tion shall be made by a neutral and detached officer 
appointed in accordance with regulations prescribed 
by the Secretary concerned. 
(3) Nature of review. 
(A) Matters considered. The review under this 
subsection shall include a review of the memoran- 
dum submitted by the prisoner's commander under 
subsection (h)(2)(C) of this rule. Additional written 
matters may be considered, including any submitted 
by  the accused. The prisoner, and the prisoner's 
counsel, if any, shall be allowed to appear before the 
reviewing officer and make a statement, if  practica- ble. A representative of command may appear 
before the reviewing officer to make a statement. 
(B)  Rules of evidence. Except for Mil. R. Evid., 
Section V (Privileges) and Mil. R. Evid. 302 and 
305, the Military Rules of Evidence shall not apply 
to the matters considered. 
(C)  Standard of proot  The requirements for 
confinement under subsection (h)(2)(B) of this rule 
must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 
(4) Extension of time limit. The reviewing officer 
may, for good cause, extend the time limit for com- 
pletion of the initial review to 10 days after the impo- 
sition of pretrial confinement. 
(5)  Action by reviewing oficer. Upon completion 
of review, the reviewing officer  shall approve contin- 
ued confinement or order immediate release. 
(6)  Memorandum. The reviewing officer's con- 
clusions, including the factual findings on which 
they are based, shall be set forth in a written memo- 
randum. A copy of the memorandum and of all doc- 
uments considered by the reviewing officer shall be 
maintained  in accordance with regulations pre- 
scribed by the Secretary concerned and provided to 
the accused or the Government on request. 
(7)  Reconsideration of approval of continued con- 
finement. The reviewing officer shall, after notice to 
the parties, reconsider the decision to confine the 
prisoner upon request based upon any significant in- 
formation not previously considered. 
(j) Review by military judge.  Once the charges for 
which the accused has been confined are referred to 
trial, the military judge shall review the propriety of 
pretrial confinement upon motion for appropriate 
relief. 
(1)  Release. The military judge shall order release 
from pretrial confinement only if: 
(A)  The reviewing officer's decision was an 
abuse of  discretion, and there is not sufficient infor- 
mation presented to the military judge justifying 
continuation of pretrial confinement under subsec- 
tion (h)(2)(B) of this rule; 
(B)  Information not presented to the reviewing 
officer establishes that the prisoner should be re- 
leased under subsection (h)(2)(B) of this rule; or 
(C)  The provisions of subsection (i)(2) or (3) of 
this rule have not been complied with and informa- 
tion presented to the military judge does not estab- 
lish sufficient grounds for continued confinement 
under subsection (h)(2)(B) of this rule. 
R.C.M. 305(m)(2) 
(2)  Credit. The military judge shall order admin- 
istrative credit under subsection (k) of this rule for 
any pretrial confinement served as a result of an 
abuse of discretion or of failure to comply with the 
provisions of subsection (0, (h), or (i) of this rule. 
(k)  Remedy. The remedy for noncompliance with 
subsection (f),(h), (i), or (j)of this rule shall be an ad- 
ministrative credit against the sentence adjudged for 
any confinement served as the result of such non- 
compliance. Such credit shall be computed at the 
rate of  1 day credit for each day of confinement 
served as a result of such noncompliance. This credit 
is to be applied in addition to any other credit the ac- 
cused may be entitled as a result of pretrial confine- 
ment served. This credit shall be applied first against 
any confinement adjudged. If no confinement is ad- 
judged, or if the confinement adjudged is insufficient 
to offset all the credit to which the accused is enti- 
tled, the credit, using the conversion formula under 
R.C.M. 1003(b)(6) and (7), shall be applied against 
hard labor without confinement, restriction, fine, 
and forfeiture of pay, in that order, if adjudged. For 
purposes of this subsection,  1 day of confinement 
shall be equal to 1 day of total forfeiture or a like 
amount of fine. The credit shall not be applied 
against any other form of punishment. 
(1)  Confinement after release. No person whose re- 
lease from pretrial confinement has been directed by 
a person authorized in subsection (g) of this rule 
may be confined again before completion of trial ex- 
cept upon the discovery, after the order of release, of 
evidence or of misconduct which, either alone or in 
conjunction with all other available evidence, justi- 
fies confinement. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 304(b) concerning who may order confinement. 
(m)  Exceptions. 
(1)  Operational necessity. The Secretary of De- 
fense may suspend application of subsections (e)(2) 
and (3), (0, (h)(2)(A) and (C), and (i) of this rule to 
specific units or in specified areas when operational 
requirements of such units or in such areas would 
make application of such provisions impracticable. 
(2) At  sea. Subsections (e)(2)  and (3), (f), 
(h)(2)(C), and (i) of this rule shall not apply in the 
case of a person on board a vessel at sea. In such situ- R.C.M. 305(m)(2) 
ations, confinement on board the vessel at sea may 
continue only until the person can be transferred to a 
confinement facility ashore. Such transfer shall be 
accomplished at the earliest opportunity permitted 
by  the operational requirements and mission of the 
vessel. Upon such transfer the memorandum re- 
quired by  subsection (h)(2)(C) of this rule shall be 
transmitted to the reviewing officer under subsection 
(i) of this rule and shall include an explanation of 
any delay in the transfer. 
Discussion 
Under this subsection the standards for confinement remain 
the same (although the circumstances giving rise to the exception 
could bear on the application of those standards). Also, pretrial 
confinement remains subject to judicial review. The prisoner's 
commander still must determine whether confinement will con- 
tinue under subsection (h)(2)(B)  of this rule. The suspension of 
subsection (h)(2)(A) of this rule removes the 72-hour requirement 
since in a combat environment, the commander may not be avail- 
able to comply with it. The commander must make the pretrial 
confinement decision as soon as reasonably possible, however. 
(This provision  is not suspended under subsection (2) since the 
commander of a vessel is always available.) 
Rule 306.  Initial disposition 
(a)  Who  may dispose of offenses. Each commander 
has discretion to dispose of offenses by members of 
that command. Ordinarily the immediate com- 
mander of a person accused or suspected of commit- 
ting an offense triable by court-martial initially de- 
termines how to dispose of that offense. A superior 
commander may withhold the authority to dispose 
of offenses in individual cases, types of cases, or gen- 
erally. A superior commander may not limit the dis- 
cretion of  a subordinate commander to act on cases 
over which authority has not been withheld. 
Discussion 
Each commander in the chain of command has independent, 
yet overlapping discretion to dispose of offenses within the limits 
of that officer's authority. Normally, in keeping with the policy in 
subsection (b) of this rule, the initial disposition decision is made 
by the official at the lowest echelon with the power to make it. A 
decision by  a commander ordinarily does not bar a different dis- 
position by  a superior authority. See R.C.M. 401(c); 601(f). Once 
charges are referred to a court-martial by a convening authority 
competent to do so, they may be withdrawn from that court-mar- 
tial only in accordance with R.C.M. 604. 
See Appendix 3 with respect to offenses for which coordina- 
tion with the Department of Justice is required. 
(b)  Policy. Allegations of offenses should be dis- 
posed of in a timely manner at the lowest appropri- 
ate level of disposition listed in subsection (c) of this 
rule. 
Discussion 
The disposition decision is one of the most important and 
difficult  decisions facing a commander. Many factors must be 
taken into consideration and balanced, including, to the extent 
practicable, the nature of the offenses, any mitigating or  extenuat- 
ing circumstances, the character and military service of the ac- 
cused, any recommendations made by subordinate commanders, 
the interest ofjustice, military exigencies, and the effect of the de- 
cision on the accused and the command.  The  goal should be a dis- 
position that is warranted, appropriate, and fair. 
In deciding how an offense should be disposed of, factors the 
commander should consider, to the extent they are known, in- 
clude: 
(A) the character and military service of the ac- 
cused; 
(B) the nature of and circumstances surrounding 
the offense and the extent of the harm caused 
by the offense, including the offense's effect on 
morale, health, safety, welfare, and discipline; 
(C) appropriateness of the authorized punishment 
to the particular accused or offense; 
(D) possible improper motives of the accuser; 
(E) reluctance of the victim or others to testify; 
(F) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension 
or conviction of others; 
(G) availability and likelihood of prosecution of 
the same or similar and related  charges 
against the accused by another jurisdiction; 
(H) availability and admissibility of evidence; 
(I) existence of jurisdiction  over the accused and 
the offense; and 
(J) likely issues. 
(c)  How offenses may be disposed ofi Within the lim- 
its of the commander's authority, a commander may 
take the actions set forth in this subsection to ini- 
tially dispose of a charge or suspected offense. 
Discussion 
Prompt disposition of charges is essential. See R.C.M. 707 
(speedy trial requirements). 
Before determining an appropriate disposition, a com- 
mander should ensure that a preliminary inquiry under R.C.M. 
303 has been conducted. If charges have not already been pre- 
ferred, the commander may, if appropriate, prefer them and dis- pose of them under this rule. But see R.C.M. 601 (c) regarding 
disqualification of an accuser. 
If charges have been preferred, the commander should en- 
sure that the accused has been notified in accordance with R.C.M. 
308, and that charges are in proper form. See R.C.M. 307. Each 
commander who forwards or disposes of charges may make mi- 
nor changes therein. See R.C.M. 603(a) and (b). If major changes 
are necessary, the affected charge should be preferred anew. See 
R.C.M. 603(d). 
When charges are brought against two or more accused with 
a view to a joint or common trial, see R.C.M. 307(c)(5); 601(e)(3). 
If it appears that the accused may lack mental capacity to stand 
trkl or may not have been mentally responsible at the times of the 
offenses, see R.C.M. 706; 909; 916(k). 
(1) No action. A commander may decide to take 
no action on an offense. If charges have been pre- 
ferred, they may be dismissed. 
Discussion 
A decision to take no action or dismissal of charges at this 
stage does not bar later disposition of the offenses under subsec- 
tion (c)(2) through (5) of this rule. 
See R.C.M. 401(a) concerning who may dismiss charges, 
and R.C.M. 401(c)(l) concerning dismissal of charges. 
When a decision is made to take no action, the accused 
should be informed. 
(2)  Administrative action. A commander may 
take or initiate administrative action, in addition to 
or instead of other action taken under this rule, sub- 
ject  to regulations of the Secretary concerned. Ad- 
ministrative actions include corrective measures 
such as counseling, admonition, reprimand, exhor- 
tation, disapproval, criticism, censure, reproach, re- 
buke, extra military instruction, or the administra- 
tive withholding of privileges, or any combination of 
the above. 
Discussion 
Other administrative measures, which are subject to regula- 
tions of the Secretary concerned, include matters related to effi- 
ciency reports, academic reports, and other ratings; rehabilitation 
and reassignment;  career field reclassification; administrative re- 
duction for inefficiency; bar to reenlistment; personnel reliability 
program reclassification;  security classification  changes; pecuni- 
ary liability for negligence or misconduct; and administrative sep- 
aration. 
(3) Nonjudicial punishment.  A commander may 
consider the matter pursuant to Article 15, nonjudi- 
cia1 punishment. See Part V. 
R.C.M. 307(a) 
(4)  Disposition of charges. Charges may be dis- 
posed of in accordance with R.C.M. 401. 
Discussion 
If charges have not been preferred, they may be preferred. 
See R.C.M.  307 concerning preferral of charges. However, see 
R.C.M. 601(c) concerning disqualification of an accuser. 
Charges may be disposed of by dismissing them, forwarding 
them to another commander for disposition, or referring them to 
a summary, special, or general court-martial. Before charges may 
be referred to a general court-martial, compliance with R.C.M. 
405 and 406 is necessary. Therefore, if appropriate, an investiga- 
tion under R.C.M. 405 may be directed. Additional guidance on 
these matters is found in R.C.M. 401-407. 
(5)  Forwarding for  disposition.  A commander 
may forward a matter concerning an offense, or 
charges, to a superior or subordinate authority for 
disposition. 
Discussion 
The immediate commander may lack authority to take ac- 
tion which that commander believes is an appropriate disposition. 
In such cases, the matter should be forwarded to a superior officer 
with a recommendation as to disposition.  See also R.C.M. 
401(c)(2)  concerning forwarding charges. If allegations are for- 
warded to a higher authority for disposition, because of lack of 
authority or otherwise, the disposition decision becomes a matter 
within the discretion of the higher authority. 
A matter may be forwarded for other reasons, such as for in- 
vestigation of allegations and preferral of charges, if warranted 
(see R.C.M. 303; 307), or so that a subordinate can dispose of the 
matter. 
(d)  National security matters. If a commander not 
authorized to convene general courts-martial finds 
that an offense warrants trial by court-martial, but 
believes that trial would be detrimental to the prose- 
cution of a war or harmful to national security, the 
matter shall be forwarded to the general court-mar- 
tial convening authority for action under R.C.M. 
407(b). 
Rule 307.  Preferral of charges 
(a)  Who  may prefer charges.  Any person subject to 
the code may prefer charges. 
Discussion 
No person may be ordered to prefer charges to which that 
person is unable to make truthfully the required oath. See Article 
30(a) and subsection (b) of this rule. A person who has been the R.C.M.  307(a) 
accuser or nominal accuser (see Article  l(9)) may not also serve 
as the convening authority of a general or special court-martial to 
which the charges are later referred. See Articles 22(b) and 23(b); 
R.C.M. 601; however, see R.C.M. 1302(b) (summary court-mar- 
tial convening authority is not disqualified by being the accuser). 
A person authorized to dispose of offenses (see R.C.M. 306(a); 
40144  and 407) should not be ordered to prefer charges when 
this would disqualify that person from exercising that persons's 
authority or would improperly restrict that person's discretion to 
act on the case. See R.C.M. 104 and 504(c). 
Charges may be preferred against a person subject to trial by 
court-martial at any time but should be preferred without unnec- 
essary delay. See the statute of limitations prescribed by  Article 
43. Preferral of charges should not be unnecessarily delayed. 
When a good reason exists-as  when a person is permitted to con- 
tinue a course of conduct so that a ringleader or other conspira- 
tors may also be discovered or when a suspected counterfeiter 
goes uncharged until guilty knowledge becomes apparent-a  rea-
sonable delay is permissible. However, see R.C.M. 707 concern- 
ing speedy trial requirements. 
(b)  How charges are preferred; oath. A person who 
prefers charges must: 
(1)  Sign the charges and specifications under oath 
before a commissioned officer of the armed forces 
authorized to administer oaths; and 
(2)  State that the signer has personal knowledge 
of or has investigated the matters set forth in the 
charges and specifications and that they are true in 
fact to the best of that person's knowledge and belief. 
Discussion 
See Article  136 for authority to administer oaths. The fol- 
lowing form may be used to administer the oath: 
"You  (swear) (affirm) that you are a person subject to the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, that you have personal knowl- 
edge of or have investigated the matters set forth in the foregoing 
charge(s) and specification(s),  and that the same are true in fact to 
the best of your knowledge and belief. (So help you God.)" 
The accuser's belief may be based upon reports of others in 
whole or in part. 
(c)  How to allege offenses. 
(1)  In  general. The format of charge and specifi- 
cation is used to allege violations of the code. 
Discussion 
See Appendix 4 for a sample of a Charge Sheet (DD Form 
458). 
(2)  Charge. A charge states the article of the 
code, law of war, or local penal law of an occupied 
territory which the accused is alleged to have vio- 
lated. 
Discussion 
The particular subdivision of an article of  the code (for ex- 
ample, Article 118(1)) should not be included in the charge. 
When there are numerous infractions of the same article, there 
will be only one charge, but several specifications thereunder. 
There may also be several charges, but each must allege a viola- 
tion of a different article of the code. For violations of the law of 
war, see (D) below. 
(A) Numbering charges. If there is only one charge, it is 
not numbered. When  there is  more than one 
charge, each charge is numbered by  a Roman nu- 
meral. 
(B) Additional charges. Charges preferred after others 
have been  preferred  are labeled "additional 
charges"  and are also numbered with  Roman 
numerals, beginning with "I"  if there is more than 
one additional charge. These ordinarily relate to 
offenses not known at the time or committed after 
the original charges were preferred.  Additional 
charges do not require a separate trial if incorpo- 
rated in the trial of the original charges before ar- 
raignment. See R.C.M. 601(e)(2). 
(C) Preemption. An offense specifically defined by  Arti- 
cles 81 through 132 may not be alleged as a viola- 
tion of Article 134. See paragraph 60c(5)(a) of Part 
IV. But see subsection (d) of this rule. 
(D) Charges under the law of war. In the case of a person 
subject to trial by general court-martial for viola- 
tions of the law of war (see Article IS), the charge 
should be: "Violation of the Law of War"; or "Vio- 
lation  o f 
" referring to the local penal 
law of the occupied  territory. See  R.C.M. 
201(f)(l)(B). But see subsection (d) of this rule. Or- 
dinarily persons subject to the code should be 
charged with a specific violation of the code rather 
than a violation of the law of war. 
(3)  Specification. A specification is a plain, con- 
cise, and definite statement of the essential facts con- 
stituting the offense charged. A specification is suffi- 
cient if it alleges every element of the charged offense 
expressly or by necessary implication. No particular 
format is required. 
Discussion 
How to draft specifications. 
(A) Sample specifications. Before drafting a specifica- 
tion, the drafter should read the pertinent provi- 
sions of Part IV, where the elements of proof of va- 
rious offenses and forms for specifications appear. (B) Numbering specifications. If there is only one specifi- 
cation under a charge it is not numbered. When 
there is more than one specification under any 
charge, the specifications are numbered in Arabic 
numerals. The term "additional"  is not used in 
connection with the specifications under an addi- 
tional charge. 
(C) Name and description of the accused. 
(i) Name. The specification  should state the ac- 
cused's full name: first name, middle name or initial, last name. If 
the accused is known by more than one name, the name acknowl- 
edged by the accused should be used. If there is no such acknowl- 
edgment, the name believed to be the true name should be listed 
first, followed by all known aliases. For example: Seaman John P. 
Smith, U.S. Navy, alias Lt. Robert R. Brown, U.S. Navy. 
(ii) Military association. The specification should 
state the accused's rank or grade. If the rank or grade of the ac- 
cused has changed since the date of an alleged offense, and the 
change is pertinent to the offense charged, the accused should be 
identified by the present rank or grade followed by rank or grade 
on the date of the alleged offense. For example: In that Seaman 
,  then  Seaman  Apprentice 
,etc. 
(iii) Social security number or service number. The 
social security number or service number of an accused should 
not be stated in the specification. 
(iv) Basis of personal jurisdiction. 
(a) Military members on active duty. Ordinarily, 
no allegation of the accused's armed force or unit or organization 
is necessary for military members on active duty. 
(b) Persons subject to the code under Article 2(a), 
subsections (3) through (12), or subject  to trial by court-martial 
under Articles 3 or 4. The specification should describe the ac- 
cused's  armed force, unit or organization, position, or status 
which  will indicate the basis of jurisdiction.  For example: John 
Jones, (a person employed by and serving with the U.S. Army in 
the field in time of war) (a person convicted of having obtained a 
fraudulent discharge), etc. 
(D)Date and time of offense 
(i) In general. The  date of the commission of the of- 
fense charged should be stated in the specification with sufficient 
precision to identify the offense and enable the accused to under- 
stand what particular act or omission to defend against. 
(ii) Use of "on or about." In alleging the date of the 
offense it is proper to allege it as "on or about" a specified day. 
(iii) Hour. The exact hour of the offense is ordina- 
rily not alleged except in certain absence offenses. When the exact 
time is alleged, the 24-hour clock should be used. The use of "at 
or about" is proper. 
(iv) Extended periods.  When the acts specified ex- 
tend(~) over a considerable period of time it is proper to allege it 
(or them) as having occurred, for example, "from  about 15 June 
1983 to about 4 November 1983," or "did on divers occasions be- 
tween 15 June 1983 and 4 November 1983." 
(E)  Place of offense.  The place of the commission of the 
offense charged should be stated in the specifica- 
tion with sufficient precision to identify the offense 
and enable the accused to understand the particu- 
lar act or omission to defend against. In alleging 
R.C.M.  307(c)(3) 
the place of the offense, it is proper to allege it as 
"at or near"  a certain place if the exact place is un- 
certain. 
(F) Subject-matter jurisdiction  allegations.  Sufficient 
facts to establish subject-matter jurisdiction should 
be alleged. See R.C.M. 203 for a discussion of sub- 
ject-matter jurisdiction and the concept of service- 
connection. 
(i) On-base. If the offense occurred on a military in- 
stallation, that factor alone is usually sufficient to confer jurisdic- 
tion over the offense. 
(ii) Off-base area under military jurisdiction. If the 
offense occurred in an off-base area under military control, such 
as a housing area, the specification should state that such area was 
under the military jurisdiction of the United States. 
(iii) Off-base area not under military  jurisdiction. If 
the offense occurred in an off-base area not under military con- 
trol, other jurisdictional  factors should be alleged. Every signifi- 
cant fact and circumstance supporting subject-matter jurisdiction 
should be alleged. Offenses under the following articles usually re- 
quire no additional jurisdictional  information: 82-91,  93, 94, 96, 
98-105,  108, 110, 112, 112a, 113, 115, and some offenses under 
92, 133, and 134. This list is not exclusive, and is only a guide to 
the kinds of offenses usually requiring no additional language to 
demonstrate subject-matter jurisdiction. 
(iv)  Overseas. If the offense occurred outside the 
United States, its territories, and possessions, that factor alone is 
usually sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the offense. 
(G)Description of offense. 
(i) Elements. The elements of the offense must be 
alleged, either expressly or by necessary implication. If a specific 
intent, knowledge, or state of mind is an element of the offense, it 
must be alleged. 
(ii) Words indicating criminality. If the alleged act 
is not itself an offense but is made an offense either by applicable 
statute (including Articles 133 and 134), or regulation or  custom 
having the effect of law, then words indicating criminality such as 
"wrongfully,"  "unlawfully,"  or "without  authority" (depending 
upon the nature of the offense) should be used to describe the ac- 
cused's acts. 
(iii) Specificity. The specification should be suffi- 
ciently specific to inform the accused of the conduct charged, to 
enable the accused to prepare a defense, and to protect the ac- 
cused against double  jeopardy. Only those facts that make the ac- 
cused's conduct criminal ordinarily should be alleged. Specific ev- 
idence supporting the allegations ordinarily should not be 
included in the specifications. 
(iv) Duplicitousness. One specification should not 
allege more than one offense, either conjunctively (the accused 
"lost  and destroyed")  or alternatively (the accused "lost  or de- 
stroyed").  However, if two acts or a series of acts constitute one 
offense, they may be alleged conjunctively. See R.C.M. 906(b)(5). 
(H) Other considerations in  drafting specifications. 
(i) Principals. All principals are charged as if each 
was the perpetrator. See paragraph 1 of Part IV for a discussion of 
principals. 
(ii) Victim. In the case of an offense against the per- 
son or property of a person, the first name, middle initial and last 
name of such person should be alleged, if  known. If the name of R.C.M. 307(c)(3) 
the victim is unknown, a general physical description may be 
used. If this cannot be done, the victim may be described as "a 
person whose name is unknown."  Military rank or grade should 
be alleged, and must be alleged if an element of the offense, as in 
an allegation of disobedience of the command of a superior of- 
ficer. If the person has no military position, it may otherwise be 
necessary to allege the status as in an allegation of using provok- 
ing words toward a person subject to the code. See paragraph 42 
of Part IV. 
(iii) Property. In describing property generic terms 
should be used, such as "a  watch"  or "a  knife,"  and descriptive 
details such as make, model, color, and serial number should or- 
dinarily be omitted. In some instances, however, details may be 
essential to the offense, so  they must be alleged. For example: the 
length of a knife blade may be important when alleging a violation 
of general regulation prohibiting carrying a knife with a blade 
that exceeds a certain length. 
(iv)  Value. When the value of  property or other 
amount determines the maximum punishment which may be ad- 
judged for an offense, the value or amount should be alleged, for 
in such a case increased  punishments that are contingent upon 
value may not be adjudged unless there is an allegation, as well as 
proof, of a value which will support the punishment. If several ar- 
ticles of different kinds are the subject of the offense, the value of 
each article should be stated followed by a statement of the aggre- 
gate value. Exact value should be stated, if known. For ease of 
proof an allegation may be  "of  a  value not less than 
." If only an approximate value is known, it 
may be alleged as "of  a value of about  ." If 
the value of an item is unknown but obviously minimal, the term 
"of  some value"  may be used. These principles apply to allega- 
tions of amounts. 
(v) Documents. When documents other than regu- 
lations or orders must be alleged (for example, bad checks in vio- 
lation of Article 123a), the document may be set forth verbatim 
(including photocopies and similar reproductions) or may be de- 
scribed, in which case the description must be sufficient to inform 
the accused of the offense charged. 
(vi) Orders. 
(a)  General orders. A specification alleging a vio- 
lation of a general order or regulation (Article 92(1)) must clearly 
identify the specific order or regulation allegedly violated. The 
general order or regulation should be cited by its identifying title 
or number, section or paragraph, and date. It is not necessary to 
recite the text of the general order or regulation verbatim. 
(b)  Other orders. If the order allegedly violated is 
an "other lawful order" (Article 92(2)), it should be set forth ver- 
batim or described in the specification. When the order is oral, see 
(vii) below. 
(c)Negating exceptions. If the order contains ex- 
ceptions, it is not necessary that the specification contain a spe- 
cific allegation negating the exceptions. However, words of crimi- 
nality may be required  if the alleged act is not necessarily 
criminal. See subsection (G)(ii) of this discussion. 
(vii) Oral statements. When alleging oral state- 
ments the phrase "or words to that effect" should be added. 
(viii)  Joint offense. In the case of a joint  offense 
each accused may be charged separately as if each accused acted 
alone or all may be charged together in a single specification. For 
example: 
(a) If Doe and Roe are joint perpetrators of an 
offense and it is intended to charge and try both at the same trial, 
they should be charged in a single specification as follows: 
"In that Doe and Roe, acting jointly  and pursu- 
ant to a common intent, did. . . ." 
(b)If it is intended that Roe will be tried alone or 
that Roe will be tried with Doe at a common trial, Roe may be 
charged in the same manner as if Roe alone had committed the of- 
fense. However, to show in the specification that Doe was a joint 
actor with Roe, even though Doe is not to be tried with Roe, Roe 
may be charged as follows: 
"In  that Roe did, in conjunction with Doe, 
. . . . 
(ix) Matters in aggravation. Aggravating circum- 
stances which increase the maximum authorized punishment 
must be alleged in order to permit the possible increased punish- 
ment. Other matters in aggravation ordinarily should not be al- 
leged in the specification. 
(x) Abbreviations. Commonly used and understood 
abbreviations may be used, particularly abbreviations for ranks, 
grades, units and organizations, components, and geographic or 
political entities, such as the names of states or countries. 
(4) Multiple offenses. Charges and specifications 
alleging all known offenses by  an accused may be 
preferred at the same time. Each specification shall 
state only one offense. 
Discussion 
What is substantially one transaction should not be made the 
basis for an unreasonable multiplication of charges against one 
person. See R.C.M. 906(b)(12) and 1003(c)(l)(C).  For example, a 
person should not be charged with both failure to report for a rou- 
tine scheduled duty, such as reveille, and with absence without 
leave if the failure to report occurred during the period for which 
the accused is charged with absence without leave. There are 
times, however, when sufficient doubt as to the facts or the law ex- 
ists to warrant making one transaction the basis for charging two 
or more offenses. In no case should both an offense and a lesser in- 
cluded offense thereof be separately charged. 
See also R.C.M. 601(e)(2) concerning referral of several of- 
fenses. 
(5) Multiple offenders. A specification may name 
more than one person as an accused if each person so 
named is believed by the accuser to be a principal in 
the offense which is the subject of the specification. 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M. 601(e)(3) concerning  joinder of accused. 
A joint offense is one committed by two or more persons act- 
ing together with a common intent. Principals may be charged jointly  with the commission of the same offense, but an accessory 
after the fact cannot be charged jointly  with the principal whom 
the accused is alleged to have received, comforted, or assisted. Of- 
fenders are properly  joined only if there is a common unlawful de- 
sign or purpose;the mere fact that several persons happen to have 
committed the same kinds of offenses at the time, although mate- 
rial as tending to show concert of purpose, does not necessarily es- 
tablish this. The fact that several persons happen to have absented 
themselves without leave at about the same time will not, in the 
absence of evidence indicating a joint design, purpose, or plan jus- 
tify joining  them in one specification,  for they may merely have 
been availing themselves of the same opportunity. In joint of- 
fenses the participants may be separately or jointly  charged. 
However, if the participants are members of different armed 
forces, they must be charged separately because their trials must 
be separately reviewed. The preparation of joint charges is dis- 
cussed in subsection (c)(3) Discussion (H) (viii) (a) of this rule. 
The advantage of a joint charge is that all accused will be tried at 
one trial, thereby saving time, labor, expense. This must be 
weighed against the possible unfairness to the accused which may 
result if their defenses are inconsistent or antagonistic. An ac- 
cused cannot be called as a witness except upon that accused's 
own request. If the testimony of an accomplice is necessary, the 
accomplice should not be tried jointly with those against whom 
the accomplice is expected to testify. See also Mil.R.Evid. 306. 
See R.C.M. 603 concerning amending specifications. 
See R.C.M. 906@)(5) and (6) concerning motions to amend 
specifications and bills of particulars. 
(d) Harmless error in citation. Error in or omission 
of the designation of the article of the code or other 
statute, law of war, or regulation violated shall not 
be ground for dismissal of a charge or reversal of a 
R.C.M. 308(c) 
conviction if the error or omission did not prejudi- 
cially mislead the accused. 
Rule 308.  Notification  to accused of charges 
(a) Immediate commander. The immediate com- 
mander of the accused shall cause the accused to be 
informed of the charges preferred against the ac- 
cused, and the name of the person who preferred the 
charges and of any person who ordered the charges 
to be preferred, if known, as soon as practicable. 
Discussion 
When notice is given, a certificate to that effect on the 
Charge Sheet should be completed. See Appendix 4. 
(b)  Commanders at higher echelons. When the ac- 
cused has not been informed of the charges, com- 
manders at higher echelons to whom the preferred 
charges are forwarded shall cause the accused to be 
informed of the matters required under subsection 
(a) of this rule as soon as practicable. 
(c) Remedy. The sole remedy for violation of this 
rule is a continuance or recess of sufficient length to 
permit the accused to adequately prepare a defense, 
and no relief shall be granted upon a failure to com- 
ply with this rule unless the accused demonstrates 
that the accused has been hindered in the prepara- 
tion of a defense. CHAPTER IV.  FORWARDING AND DISPOSITION OF CHARGES 

Rule 401.  Forwarding and disposition of 
charges in general 
(a)  Who may dispose of charges. Only persons au- 
thorized to convene courts-martial or to administer 
nonjudicial punishment under Article  15 may dis- 
pose of charges. A superior competent authority 
may withhold the authority of a subordinate to dis- 
pose of charges in individual cases, types of cases, or 
generally. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 504 as to who may convene courts-martial and 
paragraph 2 of Part V as to who may administer nonjudicial pun- 
ishment. If the Dower to convene courts-martial and to administer 
nonjudicial punishment has been withheld, a commander may 
not dispose of charges under this rule. 
Ordinarily charges should be forwarded to the accused's im- 
mediate commander for initial consideration as to disposition. 
Each commander has independent discretion to determine how 
charges will be disposed of, except to the extent that the com- 
mander's authority has been withheld by  superior competent au- 
thority. See also R.C.M. 104. 
Each commander who forwards or disposes of charges may 
make minor changes therein. See R.C.M. 603(a) and (b). If major 
changes are necessary, the affected charge should be preferred 
anew. See R.C.M. 603(d). If a commander is an accuser (see Arti- 
cle l(9); 307(a)) that commander is ineligible to refer such 
charges to a general or special court-martial. See R.C.M. 601(c). 
However, see R.C.M. 1302(b) (accuser may refer charges to a 
summary courts-martial). 
(b)  Prompt determination. When a commander with 
authority to dispose of charges receives charges, that 
commander shall promptly determine what disposi- 
tion will be made in the interest of justice and disci- 
pline. 
Discussion 
In determining what level of  disposition is appropriate, see 
R.C.M. 306(b) and (c). When charges are brought against two or 
more accused with a view to a joint or common trial, see R.C.M. 
307(c)(5); 601(e)(3). If it appears that the accused may lack 
mental capacity to stand trial or may not have been mentally re- 
sponsible at the times of the offenses, see R.C.M. 706; 909; 916(k). 
As to the rules concerning speedy trial, see R.C.M. 707. See 
also Articles 10; 30; 33; 98. 
Before determining an appropriate disposition, a com- 
mander who receives charges should ensure that: (1) a prelimi- 
nary inquiry under R.C.M. 303 has been conducted; (2) the ac- 
cused has been notified in accordance with R.C.M. 308; and (3) 
the charges are in proper form. 
(c)  How charges may be disposed of: Unless the au- 
thority to do so has been limited or withheld by  su- 
perior competent authority, a commander may dis- 
pose of charges by dismissing any or all of them, 
forwarding any or all of  them to another com- 
mander for disposition, or referring any or all of 
them to a court-martial which the commander is 
empowered to convene. Charges should be disposed 
of in accordance with the policy in R.C.M. 306(b). 
Discussion 
A commander may dispose of charges individually or collec- 
tively. If charges are referred to a court-martial, ordinarily all 
known charges should be referred to a single court-martial. 
See Appendix 3 when the charges may involve matters in 
which the Department of Justice has an interest. 
(1)  Dismissal.  When a commander dismisses 
charges further disposition under R.C.M. 306(c) of 
the offenses is not barred. 
Discussion 
Charges are ordinarily dismissed by  lining out and initialing 
the deleted specifications or otherwise recording that a specifica- 
tion is dismissed. When all charges and specifications are dis- 
missed, the accuser and the accused ordinarily should be in- 
formed. 
A charge should be dismissed when it fails to state an offense, 
when it is unsupported by available evidence, or when there are 
other sound reasons why trial by court-martial is not appropriate. 
Before dismissing charges because trial would be detrimental to 
the prosecution  of  the war or harmful to national security, see 
R.C.M. 401(d); 407(b). 
If the accused has already refused nonjudicial punishment, 
charges should not be dismissed with a view to offering nonjudi- 
cia1 punishment  unless the accused has indicated willingness to 
accept nonjudicial punishment if  again offered. The decision 
whether to dismiss charges in such circumstances is within the 
sole discretion of the commander concerned. 
Charges may be amended in accordance with R.C.M. 603. 
It is appropriate to dismiss a charge and prefer another 
charge anew when, for example, the original charge failed to state 
an offense, or was so defective that a major amendment was re- 
quired (see R.C.M. 603(d)), or did not adequately reflect the na- 
ture or seriousness of the offense. 
See R.C.M. 907(b)(2)(C) concerning the effect of dismissing 
charges after the court-martial has begun. 
(2) Forwarding charges. 
(A) Forwarding  to a superior commander. 
When charges are forwarded to a superior com- mander for disposition, the forwarding commander 
shall make a personal recommendation as to disposi- 
tion. If the forwarding commander is disqualified 
from acting as convening authority in the case, the 
basis for the disqualification shall be noted. 
Discussion 
A  commander's  recommendation is within that com- 
mander's sole discretion. No authority may direct a commander 
to make a specific recommendation as to disposition. 
When charges are forwarded to a superior commander with 
a view to trial by general or special court-martial, they should be 
forwarded by a letter of transmittal or indorsement. To the extent 
practicable without unduly delaying forwarding the charges, the 
letter should include or carry as inclosures: a summary of the 
available evidence relating to each offense; evidence of previous 
convictions and nonjudicial punishments of the accused; an indi- 
cation that the accused has been offered and refused nonjudicial 
punishment, if applicable; and any other matters required by  su- 
perior authority or deemed appropriate by  the forwarding com- 
mander. Other matters which may be appropriate include infor- 
mation concerning the accused's background  and character of 
military service, and a description of any unusual circumstances 
in the case. The summary of evidence should include available 
witness statements, documentary evidence, and exhibits. When 
practicable, copies of signed statements of the witnesses should be 
forwarded, as should copies of any investigative  or laboratory re- 
ports. Forwarding charges should not be delayed, however, solely 
to obtain such statements or reports when it otherwise appears 
that sufficient evidence to warrant trial is or will be available in 
time for trial. If because of the bulk of documents or exhibits, it is 
impracticable to forward them with the letter of transmittal, they 
should be properly preserved and should be referred to in the let- 
ter of transmittal. 
When it appears that any witness may not be available for 
later proceedings  in the case or that a deposition may be appropri- 
ate, that matter should be brought to the attention of the conven- 
ing authority promptly and should be noted in the letter of trans- 
mittal. 
When charges are forwarded with a view to disposition other 
than trial by  general or special court-martial, they should be ac- 
companied by  sufficient information to enable the authority re- 
ceiving them to dispose of them without further investigation. 
(B) Other cases. When charges are forwarded 
to a commander who is not a superior of the for- 
warding commander, no recommendation as to dis- 
position may be made. 
Discussion 
Except when directed to forward charges, a subordinate 
commander may not be required to take any specific action to dis- 
pose of charges. See R.C.M. 104.See also paragraph ld(2) of Part 
V. ,When appropriate, charges may be sent or returned to a 
R.C.M.  403(a) 
subordinate commander for compliance with procedural require- 
ments. See, for example, R.C.M. 303 (preliminary inquiry); 
R.C.M. 308 (notification to accused of charges). 
(3)  Referral of charges. See R.C.M.403,404,407, 
601. 
(d)  National security matters. If a commander who 
is not a general court-martial convening authority 
finds that the charges warrant trial by court-martial 
but believes that trial would probably be detrimental 
to the prosecution of a war or harmful to national se- 
curity, the charges shall be forwarded to the officer 
exercising general court-martial convening author- 
ity. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 407(b). 
Rule 402.  Action by commander not 
authorized to convene courts-martial 
When in receipt of charges, a commander author- 
ized to administer nonjudicial punishment but not 
authorized to convene courts-martial may: 
(1)  Dismiss any charges; or 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 401(c)(l) concerning dismissal of charges, the ef- 
fect of dismissal, and options for further action. 
(2)  Forward them to a superior commander for dis- 
position. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 401(c)(2) for additional guidance concerning 
forwarding charges. See generally R.C.M. 303 (preliminary in- 
quiry); 308 (notification to accused of charges) concerning other 
duties of the immediate commander when in receipt of charges. 
When the immediate commander is authorized to convene 
courts-martial, see R.C.M. 403,404, or 407, as appropriate. 
Rule 403.  Action by commander exercising 
summary court-martial jurisdiction 
(a)  Recording receipt. Immediately upon receipt of 
sworn charges, an officer exercising summary court- 
martial jurisdiction over the command shall cause R.C.M.  403(a) 
the hour and date of receipt to be entered on the 
charge sheet. 
Discussion 
See Article 24 and R.C.M. 1302(a) concerning who may ex- 
ercise summary court-martial jurisdiction. 
The  entry indicating receipt is important because it stops the 
running of the statute of limitations. See Article 43; R.C.M. 
907@)(2)(B).  Charges may be preferred and forwarded to an of- 
ficer exercising summary court-martial jurisdiction over the com- 
mand to stop the running of the statute of limitations even though 
the accused is absent without authority. 
(b)  Disposition. When in receipt of charges a com- 
mander exercising summary court-martial jurisdic- 
tion may: 
(1)  Dismiss any charges; 
Discussion 
See R.C.M.401(c)(l)  concerning dismissal of charges, the ef- 
fect of dismissing charges, and options for further action. 
(2) Forward charges (or, after dismissing 
charges, the matter) to a subordinate commander 
for disposition; 
Discussion 
See R.C.M.401 (c)(2)(B) concerning forwarding charges to a 
subordinate. When appropriate, charges may be forwarded to a 
subordinate even if the subordinate previously considered them. 
(3)  Forward any charges to a superior com- 
mander for disposition; 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 401(c)(2)(A)  for guidance concerning forward- 
ing charges to a superior. 
(4)  Subject to R.C.M. 601(d), refer charges to a 
summary court-martial for trial; or 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 1302(c) concerning referral of charges to a sum- 
mary court-martial. 
(5)  Unless otherwise prescribed by  the Secretary 
concerned, direct a pretrial investigation under 
R.C.M. 405, and, if appropriate, forward the report 
of investigation with the charges to a superior com- 
mander for disposition. 
Discussion 
An investigation should be directed when it appears that the 
charges are of such a serious nature that trial by  general court- 
martial may be warranted. See R.C.M.405. If an investigation of 
the subject matter already has been conducted, see  R.C.M. 
405(b). 
Rule 404.  Action by commander exercising 
special court-martial jurisdiction 
When in receipt of charges, a commander exercis- 
ing special court-martial jurisdiction may: 
(a)  Dismiss any charges; 
Discussion 
See R.C.M.401(c)(l) concerning dismissal of charges, the ef- 
fect of dismissing charges, and options for further action. 
(b)  Forward charges (or, after dismissing charges, 
the matter) to a subordinate commander for disposi- 
tion; 
Discussion 
See R.C.M.401(c)(2)(B) concerning forwarding charges to a 
subordinate. When appropriate, charges may be forwarded to a 
subordinate even if that subordinate previously considered them. 
(c)  Forward any charges to a superior commander 
for disposition; 
Discussion 
See R.C.M.401(c)(2)(A)  for guidance concerning forward- 
ing charges to a superior. 
(d)  Subject to R.C.M. 601(d), refer charges to a 
summary court-martial or to a special court-martial 
for trial; or 
Discussion 
See Article 23 and R.C.M. 504(b)(2)  concerning who may 
convene special courts-martial. See R.C.M. 601 concerning referral of charges to a special 
court-martial. See R.C.M. 1302(c) concerning referral of charges 
to a summary court-martial. 
(e)  Unless otherwise prescribed by  the secretary 
concerned, direct a pretrial investigation under 
R.C.M. 405, and, if appropriate, forward the report 
of investigation with the charges to a superior com- 
mander for disposition. 
Discussion 
An investigation should be directed when it appears that the 
charges are of such a serious nature that trial by  general court- 
martial may be warranted. See R.C.M. 405. If an investigation of 
the subject matter already has been  conducted, see R.C.M. 
405(b). 
Rule 405.  Pretrial investigation 
(a) In general. Except as provided in subsection (k) 
of this rule, no charge or specification may be re- 
ferred to a general court-martial for trial until a 
thorough and impartial investigation of all the mat- 
ters set forth therein has been made in substantial 
compliance with this rule. Failure to comply with 
this rule shall have no effect if the charges are not re- 
ferred to a general court-martial. 
Discussion 
The primary purpose of the investigation required by Article 
32 and this rule is to inauire into the truth of the matters set forth 
in the charges, the form of the charges, and to secure information 
on which to determine what disposition should be made of the 
case. The investigation also serves as a means of discovery. The 
function of the investigation is to ascertain and impartially weigh 
all available facts in arriving at conclusions and recommenda- 
tions, not to perfect a case against the accused. The investigation 
should be limited to the issues raised by the charges and necessary 
to proper disposition of the case. The investigation is not limited 
to examination of the witnesses and evidence mentioned in the ac- 
companying allied papers. See subsection (e) of this rule. Recom- 
mendations of the investigating officer are advisory. 
If at any time after an investigation under this rule the 
charges are changed to allege a more serious or essentially differ- 
ent offense, further investigation should be directed with respect 
to the new  or different matters alleged. 
Failure to comply substantially with the requirements of Ar- 
ticle 32, which failure prejudices the accused, may result in delay 
in disposition of the case or disapproval of the proceedings. See 
R.C.M. 905(b)(l) and 906(b)(3) concerning motions for appropri- 
ate relief relating to the pretrial investigation. 
The accused may waive the pretrial investigation. See sub-
section (k) of this rule. In such case, no investigation need be held. 
R.C.M.  405(d)(2)(B) 
The commander authorized to direct the investigation may direct 
that it be conducted notwithstanding the waiver. 
(b)  Earlier investigation. If an investigation of the 
subject matter of an offense has been  conducted 
before the accused is charged with an offense, and 
the accused was present at the investigation and af- 
forded the rights to counsel, cross-examination, and 
presentation of evidence required by this rule, no 
further investigation is required unless demanded by 
the accused to recall witnesses for further cross-ex- 
amination and to offer new evidence. 
Discussion 
An earlier investigation includes courts of inquiry and simi- 
lar investigations which meet the requirements of this subsection. 
(c)  Who  may direct investigation. Unless prohibited 
by regulations of the Secretary concerned, an inves- 
tigation may be directed under this rule by any 
court-martial convening authority. That authority 
may also give procedural instructions not inconsis- 
tent with these rules. 
(d)  Personnel. 
(1) Investigating  oficer. The commander di- 
recting an investigation under this rule shall detail a 
commissioned officer not the accuser, as investigat- 
ing officer, who shall conduct the investigation and 
make a report of conclusions and recommendations. 
The investigating officer is disqualified to act later in 
the same case in any other capacity. 
Discussion 
The investigating officer should be an officer in the grade of 
major or lieutenant commander or higher or one with legal train- 
ing. The investigating officer may seek legal advice concerning the 
investigating officer's responsibilities from an impartial source, 
but may not obtain such advice from counsel for any party. 
(2)  Defense counsel. 
(A)  Detailed  counsel. Except as provided in 
subsection (d)(2)(B)  of this rule, military counsel 
certified in accordance with Article 27(b) shall be 
detailed to represent the accused. 
(B)  Individual  military counsel. The accused 
may request to be represented by individual military 
counsel. Such requests shall be acted on in accor- 
dance with R.C.M. 506(b). When the accused is rep- R.C.M.  405(d)(2)(B) 
resented by individual military counsel, counsel de- 
tailed to represent the accused shall ordinarily be 
excused, unless the authority who detailed the de- 
fense counsel, as a matter of discretion, approves a 
request by the accused for retention of detailed 
counsel. The investigating officer shall forward any 
request by the accused for individual military coun- 
sel to the commander who directed the investiga- 
tion. That commander shall follow the procedures in 
R.C.M. 506(b). 
(C)  Civilian counsel. The accused may be rep- 
resented by civilian counsel at no expense to the 
United States. Upon request, the accused is entitled 
to a reasonable time to obtain civilian counsel and to 
have such counsel present for the investigation. 
However, the investigation shall not be unduly 
delayed for this purpose. Representation by civilian 
counsel shall not limit the rights to military counsel 
under subsections (d)(2)(A) and (B) of this rule. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 502(d)(6) concerning the duties of defense coun- 
sel. 
(3)  Others. The commander who directed the in- 
vestigation may also, as a matter of discretion, detail 
or request an appropriate authority to detail: 
(A) Counsel to represent the United States; 
(B)  A reporter; and 
(C) An interpreter. 
(e) Scope of investigation. The investigating officer 
shall inquire into the truth and form of the charges, 
and such other matters as may be necessary to make 
a recommendation  as to the disposition of the 
charges. 
Discussion 
The investigation may properly include such inquiry into is- 
sues raised directly by the charges as is necessary to make an ap- 
propriate recommendation. For example, inquiry into the legality 
of a search or the admissibility of a confession may be appropri- 
ate. However, the investigating officer is not required to rule on 
the admissibility of evidence and need not consider such matters 
except as the investigating officer deems necessary to an informed 
recommendation. When the investigating officer is aware that evi- 
dence may not be admissible, this should be noted in the report. 
See also subsection (i) of this rule. 
(f)  Rights of the accused. At any pretrial investiga- 
tion under this rule the accused shall have the right 
to: 
(1)  Be informed of the charges under investiga- 
tion; 
(2)  Be informed of the identity of the accuser; 
(3)  Except in circumstances described in R.C.M. 
840(b)(2), be present throughout the taking of evi- 
dence; 
(4)  Be represented by counsel; 
(5)  Be informed of the witnesses and other evi- 
dence then known to the investigating officer; 
(6)  Be informed of the purpose of the investiga- 
tion; 
(7)  Be informed of the right against self-incrimi- 
nation under Article 3 1; 
(8)  Cross-examine witnesses who are produced 
under subsection (g) of this rule; 
(9)  Have witnesses produced as provided for in 
subsection (g) of this rule; 
(10)  Have evidence, including documents or 
physical evidence, within the control of military au- 
thorities produced as provided under subsection (g) 
of this rule; 
(11)  Present anything in defense, extenuation, or 
mitigation for consideration by the investigating of- 
ficer; and 
(12)  Make a statement in any form. 
(g)  Production of witnesses and evidence; alterna- 
tives. 
(1)  In general. 
(A)  Witnesses. Except as provided in subsec- 
tion (g)(4)(A) of this rule, any witness whose testi- 
mony would be relevant to the investigation and not 
cumulative, shall be produced if reasonably availa- 
ble. This includes witnesses requested by the ac- 
cused, if the request is timely. A witness is "reasona- 
bly available" when the witness is located within 100 
miles of the situs of the investigation and the signifi- 
cance of the testimony and personal appearance of 
the witness outweighs the difficulty, expense, delay, 
and effect on military operations of obtaining the 
witness' appearance. A witness who is unavailable 
under Mil. R. Evid. 804(a)(l)-(6), is not "reasonably 
available." 
(B)  Evidence. Subject to Mil.R.Evid.,  Section 
V, evidence, including documents or physical evi- 
dence, which is under the control of the Govern- 
ment and which is relevant to the investigation and not cumulative shall be produced if reasonably avail- 
able. Such evidence includes evidence requested by 
the accused, if the request is timely. Evidence is rea- 
sonably available if its significance outweighs the dif- 
ficulty, expense, delay, and effect on military opera- 
tions of obtaining the evidence. 
Discussion 
In preparing for the investigation, the investigating officer 
should consider what evidence will be necessary to prepare a thor- 
ough and impartial investigation. The investigating officer should 
consider, as to potential witnesses, whether their personal appear- 
ance will be necessary. Generally, personal appearance is pre- 
ferred, but the investigating officer should consider whether, in 
light of the probable importance of a witness' testimony, an alter- 
native to testimony under subsection (g)(4)(A) of this rule would 
be sufficient. 
After making a preliminary determination of what witnesses 
will be produced and other evidence considered, the investigating 
officer should notify the defense and inquire whether it requests 
the production of other witnesses or evidence. In addition to wit- 
nesses for the defense, the defense may request production of wit- 
nesses whose testimony would favor the prosecution. 
Once it is determined what witnesses the investigating officer 
intends to call it must be determined whether each witness is rea- 
sonably available. That determination is a balancing test. The 
more important the testimony of the witness, the greater the diffi- 
culty, expense, delay, or effect on military operations must be to 
permit nonproduction. For example, the temporary absence of a 
witness on leave for 10days would normally justify using an alter- 
native to that witness' personal appearance if the sole reason for 
the witness' testimony was to impeach the credibility of another 
witness by  reputation evidence, or to establish a mitigating char- 
acter trait of  the accused. On the other hand, if the same witness 
was the only eyewitness to the offense, personal appearance 
would be required if the defense requested it and the witness is 
otherwise reasonably available. The time and place of the investi- 
gation may be changed if reasonably necessary to permit the ap- 
pearance of a witness. Similar considerations apply to the produc- 
tion of evidence. 
If the production of witnesses or evidence would entail sub- 
stantial costs or delay, the investigating officer should inform the 
commander who directed the investigation. 
(2) Determination of reasonable availability. 
(A) Military witnesses. The investigating officer 
shall make an initial determination whether a mili- 
tary witness is reasonably available. If the investigat- 
ing officer decides that the witness is not reasonably 
available, the investigating officer shall inform the 
parties. Otherwise, the immediate commander of the 
witness shall be requested to make the witness avail- 
able. A determination by the immediate commander 
that the witness is not reasonably available is not 
R.C.M. 405(g)(2)(D) 
subject to appeal by the accused but may be re- 
viewed  by  the military judge  under R.C.M. 
906(b)(3). 
Discussion 
The investigating officer may discuss factors affecting rea- 
sonable availability with the immediate commander of the re- 
quested witness and with others. If the immediate commander de- 
termined that the witness is not reasonably available, the reasons 
for that determination should be provided to the investigating of- 
ficer. 
(B) Civilian witnesses. The investigating officer 
shall decide whether a civilian witness is reasonably 
available to appear as a witness. 
Discussion 
The investigating officer should initially determine whether a 
civilian witness is reasonably available without regard to whether 
the witness is willing to appear. If the investigating officer deter- 
mines that a civilian witness is apparently reasonably available, 
the witness should be invited to attend and when appropriate, in- 
formed that necessary expenses will be paid. 
If the witness refuses to testify, the witness is not reasonably 
available because civilian witnesses may not be compelled to at- 
tend a pretrial investigation. Under subsection (g)(3) of this rule, 
civilian witnesses may be paid for travel and associated expenses 
to testify at a pretrial investigation. 
(C)  Evidence. The investigating officer shall 
make an initial determination whether evidence is 
reasonably available. If the investigating officer de- 
cides that it is not reasonably available, the investi- 
gating officer shall inform the parties. Otherwise, the 
custodian of the evidence shall be requested to pro- 
vide the evidence. A determination by the custodian 
that the evidence is not reasonably available is not 
subject to appeal by the accused, but may be re- 
viewed  by  the military judge  under R.C.M. 
906('3)(3). 
Discussion 
The investigating officer may discuss factors affecting rea- 
sonableavailability with the custodian and with others. If the cus- 
todian determines that the evidence is not reasonably available, 
the reasons for that determination should be provided to the in- 
vestigating officer. 
(D)  Action when witness or evidence is not rea- 
sonably available. If the defense objects to a determi- R.C.M. 405(9)(2)(D) 
nation that a witness or evidence is not reasonably 
available, the investigating officer shall include a 
statement of the reasons for the determination in the 
report of investigation. 
(3)  Witness expenses. Transportation expenses 
and a per diem allowance may be paid to civilians re- 
quested to testify in connection with an investigation 
under this rule according to regulations prescribed 
by the Secretary of a Department. 
Discussion 
See Department of Defense Joint Travel Regulations, Vol 2, 
paragraphs C3054,  C6000. 
(4) Alternatives to testimony. 
(A)  Unless the defense objects, an investigating 
officer may consider, regardless of the availability of 
the witness: 
(i)  Sworn statements; 
(ii)  Statements under oath taken by tele- 
phone, radio, or similar means providing each party 
the opportunity to question the witness under cir- 
cumstances by  which the investigating officer may 
reasonably conclude that the witness' identity is as 
claimed; 
(iii)  Prior testimony under oath; 
(iv)  Depositions; 
(v)  Stipulations of fact or expected testi- 
mony; 
(vi)  Unsworn statements; and 
(vii)  Offers of proof of expected testimony of 
that witness. 
(B)  The investigating officer may consider, 
over objection of the defense, when the witness is not 
reasonably available: 
(i)  Sworn statements; 
(ii)  Statements under oath taken by  tele- 
phone, radio, or similar means providing each party 
the opportunity to question the witness under cir- 
cumstances by  which the investigating officer may 
reasonably conclude that the witness' identity is a 
claimed; 
(iii)  Prior testimony under oath; and 
(iv)  Deposition of that witness; and 
(v)  In time of war, unsworn statements. 
(5) Alternatives to evidence. 
(A) Unless the defense objects, an investigating 
officer may consider, regardless of the availability of 
the evidence: 
(i)  Testimony describing the evidence; 
(ii)  An authenticated copy, photograph, or 
reproduction of similar accuracy of the evidence; 
(iii) An alternative to testimony, when per- 
mitted under subsection (g)(4)(B) of this rule, in 
which the evidence is described; 
(iv)  A stipulation of fact, document's con- 
tents, or expected testimony; 
(v)  An unsworn statement describing the ev- 
idence; or 
(vi)  An offer of proof concerning pertinent 
characteristics of the evidence. 
(B)  The investigating officer may consider, 
over objection of the defense, when the evidence is 
not reasonably available: 
(i)  Testimony describing the evidence; 
(ii)  An authenticated copy, photograph, or 
reproduction of similar accuracy of the evidence; or 
(iii)  An alternative to testimony, when per- 
mitted under subsection (g)(4)(B) of this rule, in 
which the evidence is described. 
(h)  Procedure. 
(1)  Presentation of evidence. 
(A)  Testimony. All testimony shall be taken 
under oath, except that the accused may make an 
unsworn statement. The defense shall be given wide 
latitude in cross-examining witnesses. 
Discussion 
The following oath may be given to witnesses: 
"Do you (swear) (affirm) that the evidence you give shall be 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth (, so help you 
God)?" 
The investigating officer is required to include in the report 
of the investigation a summary of the substance of all testimony. 
See subsection (j)(2)(B) of this rule. After the hearing, the investi- 
gating officer should, whenever possible, reduce the substance of 
the testimony of each witness to writing and, unless it would un- 
duly delay completion of the investigation, have each witness sign 
and swear to the truth of the respective summaries. The  following  -
oath may be given to a witness in such cases: 
"You  (swear) (affirm) that this statement is the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth (,so help you God)?" If the 
accused testifies, the investigating officer may invite but not re- 
quire the accused to swear to the truth of a summary of that testi- 
mony. If substantially verbatim notes of a testimony or record- 
ings of testimony were taken during the investigation, they should 
be preserved until the end of trial. 
If it appears that material witnesses for either side will not be 
available at the time anticipated for trial, the investigating officer 
should notify the commander who directed the investigation so 
that depositions may be taken if necessary. R.C.M.  405(j)(2)(D) 
If during the investigation any witness subject to the code is 
suspected of an offense under the code, the investigating officer 
should comply with the warning requirements of Mil.R.Evid. 
305(c), (d), and, if necessary, (e). 
(B) Other evidence. The investigating officer 
shall inform the parties what other evidence will be 
considered. The parties shall be permitted to ex- 
amine all other evidence considered by  the investi- 
gating officer. 
(C) Defense evidence. The defense shall have 
full opportunity to present any matters in defense, 
extenuation, or mitigation. 
(2)  Objections. Any objection alleging failure to 
comply with this rule, except subsection (j),  shall be 
made to the investigating officer promptly upon dis- 
covery of the alleged error. The investigating officer 
shall not be required to rule on any objection. An ob- 
jection shall be noted in the report of investigation if 
a party so requests. The investigating officer may re- 
quire a party to file any objection in writing. 
Discussion 
See also subsection (k) of this rule. 
Although the investigating officer is not required to rule on 
objections, the investigating officer may take corrective action in 
response to an objection as to matters relating to the conduct of 
the proceedings when the investigating  officer believes such action 
is appropriate. 
If an objection raises a substantial question about a matter 
within the authority of the commander who directed the investi- 
gation (for example, whether the investigating officer was prop- 
erly appointed) the investigating officer should promptly inform 
the commander who directed the investigation. 
(3)  Access by spectators. Access by spectators to 
all or part of the proceeding may be restricted or 
foreclosed in the discretion of the commander who 
directed the investigation or the investigating officer. 
Discussion 
Closure may encourage complete testimony by  an embar- 
rassed or timid witness. 
Ordinarily the proceedings of a pretrial investigation should 
be open to spectators. 
(4) Presence of accused. The further progress of 
the taking of evidence shall not be prevented and the 
accused shall be considered to have waived the right 
to be present, whenever the accused: 
(A)  After being notified of the time and place 
of the proceeding is voluntarily absent (whether or 
not informed by  the investigating officer of the obli- 
gation to be present); or 
(B) After being warned by the investigating of- 
ficer that disruptive conduct will cause removal 
from the proceeding, persists in conduct which is 
such as to justify exclusion from the proceeding. 
(i)  Military Rules of Evidence. The Military Rules 
of Evidence--other  than Mil.R.Evid. 301, 302, 303, 
305, 412 and Section V-shall  not apply in pretrial 
investigations under this rule. 
Discussion 
The investigating officer should exercise reasonable control 
over the scope of the inquiry. See subsection (e) of this rule. An in-
vestigating officer may consider any evidence, even if that evi- 
dence would not be admissible at trial. However, see subsection 
(g)(4) of this rule as to limitations on the ways in which testimony 
may be presented. 
Certain rules relating to the form of testimony which may be 
considered by the investigating officer appear in subsection (g) of 
this rule. 
(j) Report of investigation. 
(1)  In general. The investigating officer shall 
make a timely written report of the investigation to 
the commander who directed the investigation. 
Discussion 
If practicable,  the charges and the report of investigation 
should be forwarded to the general court-martial convening au- 
thority within 8  days after an accused is ordered into arrest or 
confinement. Article 33. 
(2)  Contents. The report of investigation shall in- 
clude: 
(A)  A statement of names and organizations or 
addresses of defense counsel and whether defense 
counsel was present throughout the taking of evi- 
dence, or if not present the reason why; 
(B)  The substance of the testimony taken on 
both sides, including any stipulated testimony; 
(C)  Any other statements, documents, or mat- 
ters considered by the investigating officer, or recit- 
als of the substance or nature of such evidence; 
(D)  A statement of any reasonable grounds for 
belief that the accused was not mentally responsible R.C.M. 405(j)(2)(D) 
for the offense or was not competent to participate in 
the defense during the investigation; 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 909 (mental capacity); 916(k) (mental responsi- 
bility). 
(E)  A statement whether the essential wit- 
nesses will be available at the time anticipated for 
trial and the reasons why any essential witness may 
not then be available; 
(F) An explanation of any delays in the investi- 
gation; 
(G) The investigating officer's  conclusion 
whether the charges and specifications are in proper 
form; 
(H) The investigating officer's  conclusion 
whether reasonable grounds exist to believe that the 
accused committed the offenses alleged; and 
(I) The recommendations of the investigating 
officer, including disposition. 
Discussion 
For example, the investigating officer may recommend that 
the charges and specifications be amended or that additional 
charges be preferred. See R.C.M. 306 and 401 concerning other 
possible dispositions. 
See Appendix 5 for a sample of the Investigating Officer's 
Report (DD Form 457). 
(3) Distribution of the report. The investigating 
officer shall cause the report to be delivered to the 
commander who directed the investigation. That 
commander shall promptly cause a copy of the re- 
port to be delivered to each accused. 
(4) Objections. Any objection to the report shall 
be made to the commander who directed the investi- 
gation within 5 days of its receipt by  the accused. 
This subsection does not prohibit a convening au- 
thority from referring the charges or taking other ac- 
tion within the 5-day period. 
(k)  Waiver. The accused may waive an investigation 
under this rule. In addition, failure to make a timely 
objection under this rule, including an objection to 
the report, shall constitute waiver of the objection. 
Relief from the waiver may be granted by the inves- 
tigating officer, the commander who directed the in- 
vestigation, the convening authority, or the military 
judge, as appropriate, for good cause shown. 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M. 905(b)(l); 906(b)(3). 
If the report fails to include reference to objections which 
were made under subsection (h)(2) of this rule, failure to object to 
the report will constitute waiver of such objections in the absence 
of good cause for relief from the waiver. 
The commander who receives an objection may direct that 
the investigation be reopened or take other action, as appropriate. 
Even if the accused made a timely objection to failure to pro- 
duce a witness, a defense request for a deposition may be neces- 
sary to preserve the issue for later review. 
Rule 406.  Pretrial advice 
(a)  In general. Before any charge may be referred 
for trial by  a general court-martial, it shall be re- 
ferred to the staff judge advocate of the convening 
authority for consideration and advice. 
Discussion 
A pretrial advice need not be prepared in cases referred to 
special or summary courts-martial. A convening authority may, 
however, seek the advice of a lawyer before referring charges to 
such a court-martial. When charges have been withdrawn from a 
general court-martial (see R.C.M. 604) or,when a mistrial has 
been declared in a general court-martial (see R.C.M. 915), supple- 
mentary advice is necessary before the charges may be referred to 
another general court-martial. 
The staff judge advocate may make changes in the charges 
and specifications in accordance with R.C.M. 603. 
(b)  Contents. The advice of the staff judge advocate 
shall include a written and signed statement which 
sets forth that person's: 
(1)  Conclusion with respect to whether each 
specification alleges an offense under the code; 
(2)  Conclusion with respect to whether the alle- 
gation of each offense is warranted by the evidence 
indicated in the report of  investigation  (if there is 
such a report); 
(3)  Conclusion with respect to whether a court- 
martial would have jurisdiction  over the accused 
and the offense; and 
(4)  Recommendation of the action to be taken by 
the convening authority. 
Discussion 
The staff judge advocate is personally responsible for the pre- 
trial advice and must make an independent and informed  ap- 
praisal of the charges and evidence in order to render the advice. Another person may prepare the advice, but the staffjudge advo- 
cate is, unless disqualified, responsible for it and must sign it per- 
sonally. Grounds for disqualification in a case include previous 
action in that case as investigating officer, military judge,  trial 
counsel, defense counsel, or member. 
The advice need not set forth the underlying analysis or ra- 
tionale for its conclusions. Ordinarily, the charge sheet, forward- 
ing letter and indorsements, and report of investigation are for- 
warded with the pretrial advice. In addition, the pretrial advice 
should include when appropriate: a brief summary of the evi- 
dence; discussion of significant aggravating, extenuating, or miti- 
gating factors; and any previous recommendations, by com- 
manders or others who have forwarded the charges, for 
disposition of the case. However, there is no legal requirement to 
include such information and failure to do so is not error. 
Whatever matters are included in the advice, whether or not 
they are  required, should be accurate. Information which is incor- 
rect or so incomplete as to be misleading may result in a determi- 
nation that the advice is defective, necessitating appropriate re- 
lief. See R.C.M. 905(b)(l); 906(b)(3). 
The standard of proof to be applied in R.C.M. 406(b)(2)  is 
probable cause. See R.C.M. 601(d)(l). Defects in the pretrial ad- 
vice are not jurisdictional  and are raised by pretrial motion. See 
R.C.M. 905@)(1) and its Discussion. 
(c) Distribution.  A copy of  the advice of  the staff 
judge advocate shall be provided  to the defense if 
charges are referred to trial by general court-mar- 
tial. 
Rule 407.  Action by commander exercising 
general court-martial jurisdiction 
(a)  Disposition. When in receipt of charges, a com- 
mander exercising general court-martial jurisdiction 
may: 
(1)  Dismiss any charges; 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 401(c)(l) concerning dismissal of charges and 
the effect of dismissing charges. 
(2) Forward charges (or, after dismissing 
charges, the matter) to a subordinate commander 
for disposition; 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 401(c)(2)(B) concerning forwarding charges to a 
subordinate. 
A subordinate commander may not be required to take any 
specific action or to dispose of charges. See R.C.M. 104. See also 
paragraph  ld(2) of Part V. When appropriate, charges may be 
sent or  returned to a subordinate commander for compliance with 
R.C.M. 407(b) 
procedural requirements. See, for example, R.C.M. 303 (prelimi- 
nary inquiry); R.C.M. 308 (notification to accused of charges). 
(3)  Forward any charges to a superior com- 
mander for disposition; 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 401 (c)(2)(A) for guidance concerning forward- 
ing charges to a superior. 
(4)  Refer charges to a summary court-martial or 
a special court-martial for trial; 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 601; 1302(c). 
(5)  Unless otherwise prescribed by the Secretary 
concerned, direct a pretrial investigation under 
R.C.M. 405, after which additional action under this 
rule may be taken; 
Discussion 
An investigation  should be directed when it appears the 
charges are of such a serious nature that trial by general court- 
martial may be warranted. See R.C.M. 405. If an investigation of 
the subject matter already has been conducted. See R.C.M. 
405(b). 
(6)  Subject to R.C.M.  601(d), refer charges to a 
general court-martial. 
Discussion 
See Article 22 and R.C.M. 504(b)(l) concerning who may 
exercise general court-martial jurisdiction. 
See R.C.M.  601 concerning referral of charges. See R.C.M. 
306 and 401 concerning other dispositions. 
(b)  National security matters. When in receipt of 
charges the trial of which the commander exercising 
general court-martial jurisdiction finds would prob- 
ably be inimical to the prosecution of a war or harm- 
ful to national security, that commander, unless oth- 
erwise prescribed by regulations of the Secretary 
concerned, shall determine whether trial is war- 
ranted and, if so, whether the security considera- 
tions involved are paramount to trial. As the com- 
mander finds appropriate, the commander may R.C.M. 407(b) 
dismiss the charges, authorize trial of them, or for-  43(e), the Secretary may take action suspending the statute of lim- 
ward them to a superior authority.  itations in time of war. 
Discussion 
In  time of war, charges may be forwarded to the Secretary 
concerned for disposition  under Article 43(e). Under Article CHAPTER V.  COURT-MARTIAL COMPOSITION AND PERSONNEL; 
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Rule 501.  Composition and personnel of 
courts-martial 
(a)  Composition of courts-martial. 
(1)  General courts-martial. General courts-mar- 
tial shall consist of: 
(A) A military judge and not less than five 
members; or 
(B) Except in capital cases, of the military 
judge alone if requested and approved under R.C.M. 
903. 
(2)  Special courts-martial. Special courts-martial 
shall consist of: 
(A) Not less than three members; 
(B) A military judge and not less than three 
members; or 
(C) A military judge alone if a military judge is 
detailed and if requested and approved under 
R.C.M. 903. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 1301(a) concerning composition of summary 
courts-martial. 
(b)  Counsel in general  and special  courts-martial. 
Military trial and defense counsel shall be detailed to 
general and special courts-martial. Assistant trial 
and associate or assistant defense counsel may be de- 
tailed. 
(c)  Other personnel. Other personnel, such as re- 
porters, interpreters, bailiffs, clerks, escorts, and 
orderlies, may be detailed or employed as appropri- 
ate but need not be detailed by  the convening au- 
thority personally. 
Discussion 
The convening authority may direct that a reporter not be 
used in special courts-martial. Regulations of the Secretary con- 
cerned may also require or restrict the use of reporters in special 
courts-martial. 
Rule 502.  Qualifications and duties of 
personnel of courts-martial 
(a)  Members. 
(1)  Qualifications. The members detailed to a 
court-martial shall be those persons who in the opin- 
ion of the convening authority are best qualified for 
:the duty by reason of their age, education, training, 
experience, length of service, and judicial  tempera- 
ment. Each member shall be on active duty with the 
armed forces and shall be: 
(A)  A commissioned officer; 
(B)  A warrant officer, except when the accused 
is a commissioned officer; or 
(C)  An enlisted person if the accused is an en- 
listed person and has made a timely request under 
R.C.M. 503(a)(2). 
Discussion 
Retired members of any Regular component and members 
of Reserve components of the armed forces are eligible to serve as 
members if they are on active duty. 
Members of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin- 
istration and of the Public Health Service are eligible to serve as 
members when assigned to and serving with an armed force. The 
Public Health Service includes both commissioned and warrant 
officers. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
includes only commissioned officers. 
(2)  Duties. The members of a court-martial shall 
determine whether the accused is proved guilty and, 
if necessary, adjudge a proper sentence, based on the 
evidence and in accordance with the instructions of 
the military judge. Each member has an equal voice 
and vote with other members in deliberating upon 
and deciding all matters submitted to them, except 
as otherwise specifically provided in these rules. No 
member may use rank or position to influence an- 
other member. No member of a court-martial may 
have access to or use in any open or closed session 
this Manual, reports of decided cases, or any other 
reference material, except the president of a special 
court-martial without a military judge may use such 
materials in open session. 
Discussion 
Members should avoid any conduct or communication with 
the military judge, witnesses, or other trial personnel during the 
trial which might present an appearance of partiality. Except as 
provided in these rules, members should not discuss any part of a 
case with anyone until the matter is submitted to them for deter- 
mination. Members should not on their own visit or conduct a 
view of the scene of the crime and should not investigate or gather 
evidence of the offense. Members should not form an opinion on R.C.M.  502(a)(2) 
any matter in connection with a case until that matter has been 
submitted to them for determination. 
(b) President. 
(1)  Qualijcations. The president of a court-mar- 
tial shall be the detailed member senior in rank then 
serving. 
(2) Duties. The president shall have the same du- 
ties as the other members and shall also: 
(A)  Preside over closed sessions of the mem- 
bers of the court-martial during their deliberations; 
(B)  Speak for the members of the court-martial 
when announcing the decision of the members or re- 
questing instructions from the military judge; and 
(C) In a special court-martial without a mili- 
tary judge, perform the duties assigned by this Man- 
ual to the military judge except as otherwise ex- 
pressly provided. 
(c)  Qualijcations of military  judge.  A military judge 
shall be a commissioned officer on active duty in the 
armed forces who is a member of the bar of a Federal 
court or a member of the bar of the highest court of a 
State and who is certified to be qualified for duty as a 
military judge by the Judge Advocate General of the 
armed force of which the military judge is a member. 
In addition, the military judge of a general court- 
martial shall be designated for such duties by the 
Judge Advocate General or the Judge Advocate 
General's designee, certified to be qualified for duty 
as a military judge of a general court-martial, and as- 
signed and directly responsible to the Judge Advo- 
cate General or the Judge Advocate General's desig- 
nee. The Secretary concerned may prescribe 
additional qualifications for military judges in spe- 
cial courts-martial. As used in this subsection "mili- 
tary judge"  does not include the president of a spe- 
cial court-martial without a military judge. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 801 for description of some of the general duties 
of the military judge. 
Military judges assigned as general court-martial judges may 
perform duties in addition to the primary duty ofjudge of a gen- 
eral court-martial only when such duties are  assigned or approved 
by the Judge Advocate General, or a designee, of the service of 
which the military judge  is a member. Similar restrictions on 
other duties which a military judge in special courts-martial may 
perform may be prescribed in regulations of the Secretary con- 
cerned. 
(d)  Counsel. 
(1)  Certijed counsel required. Only persons certi- 
fied under Article 27(b) as competent to perform du- 
ties as counsel in courts-martial by the Judge Advo- 
cate General of the armed force of which the counsel 
is a member may be detailed as defense counsel or 
associate defense counsel in general or special 
courts-martial or as trial counsel in general courts- 
martial. 
Discussion 
To be certified by the Judge Advocate General concerned 
under Article 27(b), a person must be a member of the bar of a 
Federal court or the highest court of a State. The  Judge Advocate 
General concerned may establish additional requirements for cer- 
tification. 
When the accused has individual military or civilian defense 
counsel, the detailed counsel is "associate  counsel"  unless ex- 
cused from the case. See R.C.M. 506(b)(3). 
(2)  Other military counsel. Any commissioned of- 
ficer may be  detailed as trial counsel in special 
courts-martial, or as assistant trial counsel or assis- 
tant defense counsel in general or special courts- 
martial. The Secretary concerned may establish ad- 
ditional qualifications for such counsel. 
(3) Qualijcations of individual military and civil- 
ian defense counsel. Individual military or civilian 
defense counsel who represents an accused in a 
court-martial shall be: 
(A) A member of the bar of a Federal court or 
of the bar of the highest court of a State; or 
(B)  If not a member of such a bar, a lawyer 
who is authorized by a recognized licensing author- 
ity to practice law and is found by the military judge 
to be qualified to represent the accused upon a show- 
ing to the satisfaction of the military judge that the 
counsel has appropriate training and familiarity 
with the general principles of criminal law which ap- 
ply in a court-martial. 
Discussion 
In making such a determination-particularly  in the case of 
civilian defense counsel who are members only of a foreign 
bar-the  military judge also should inquire into: 
(i)  the availability of the counsel at times at which ses- 
sions of the court-martial have been scheduled; 
(ii) whether the accused wants the counsel to appear 
with military defense counsel; 
(iii) the familiarity of the counsel with spoken English; (iv) practical alternatives for discipline of the counsel in 
the event of misconduct; 
(v) whether foreign witnesses are expected to testify 
with whom the counsel may more readily communicate than 
might military counsel; and 
(vi) whether ethnic or other similarity between the ac- 
cused and the counsel may facilitate communication and confi- 
dence between the accused and civilian defense counsel. 
(4) Disqualifications. No person shall act as trial 
counsel or assistant trial counsel or, except when ex- 
pressly requested by the accused, as defense counsel 
or associate or assistant defense counsel in any case 
in which that person is or has been: 
(A) The accuser; 
(B)  An investigating officer; 
(C) A military judge; or 
(D) A member. 
No person who has acted as counsel for a party may 
serve as counsel for an opposing party in the same 
case. 
Discussion 
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed 
that a person who, between referral and trial of a case, has been 
detailed as counsel for any party to the court-martial to which the 
case has been referred, has acted in that capacity. 
(5) Duties of trial and assistant trial counsel. The 
trial counsel shall prosecute cases on behalf of the 
United States and shall cause the record of trial of 
such cases to be prepared. Under the supervision of 
trial counsel an assistant trial counsel may perform 
any act or duty which trial counsel may perform 
under law, regulation, or custom of the service. 
Discussion 
(A) General duties before  trial. Immediately upon re- 
ceipt of referred charges, trial counsel should cause 
a copy of the charges to be served upon accused. 
See R.C.M. 602. 
Trial counsel should: examine the charge sheet and allied pa- 
pers for completeness and correctness; correct (and initial) minor 
errors or obvious mistakes in the charges but may not without au- 
thority make any substantial changes (see R.C.M. 603); and as- 
sure that the information about the accused on the charge sheet 
and any evidence of previous convictions are accurate. 
(B) Relationship with convening authority. Trial counsel 
should: report to the convening authority any sub- 
stantial irregularity  in the convening orders, 
charges, or allied papers; report an actual or antici- 
pated reduction  of the number of members below 
R.C.M. 502(d)(5) 
quorum to the convening authority; bring to the at- 
tention of the convening authority any case in 
which trial counsel finds trial inadvisable for lack 
of evidence or  other reasons. 
(C) Relations with  the accused and defense  counsel. 
Trial counsel must communicate with a repre- 
sented accused only through the accused's defense 
counsel. However, see R.C.M.  602. Trial counsel 
may not attempt to induce an accused to plead 
guilty or surrender other important rights. 
(D) Preparation for  trial. Trial counsel should: ensure 
that a suitable room, a reporter (if authorized), and 
necessary equipment and supplies are provided for 
the court-martial; obtain copies of the charges and 
specifications and convening orders for each mem- 
ber and all personnel of the court-martial; give 
timely notice to the members, other parties, other 
personnel of the court-martial, and witnesses for 
the prosecution and (if known) defense of the date, 
time, place, and uniform of the meetings of the 
court-martial; ensure that any person having cus- 
tody of the accused is also informed; comply with 
applicable discovery rules (see R.C.M.  701); pre- 
pare to make a prompt, full, and orderly presenta- 
tion of the evidence at trial; consider the elements 
of proof of each offense charged, the burden of 
proof of guilt and the burdens of proof on motions 
which may be anticipated, and the Military Rules 
of Evidence; secure for use at trial such legal texts 
as may be available and necessary to sustain the 
prosecution's contentions; arrange for the presence 
of witnesses and evidence in accordance with 
R.C.M. 703; prepare to make an opening statement 
of the prosecution's case (see R.C.M. 913); prepare 
to conduct the examination and cross-examination 
of witnesses; and prepare to make final argument 
on the findings and, if necessary, on sentencing (see 
R.C.M. 919; 1001(g)). 
(E) Trial. Trial counsel should bring to the attention of 
the military judge any substantial irregularity in 
the proceedings. Trial counsel should not allude to 
or disclose to the members any evidence not yet ad- 
mitted or reasonably expected to be admitted in ev- 
idence or intimate, transmit, or  purport to transmit 
to the military judge or members the views of the 
convening authority or others as to the guilt or in- 
nocence of the accused, an appropriate sentence, or 
any other matter within the discretion of the court- 
martial. 
(F) Post-trial duties. Trial counsel must promptly pro- 
vide written notice of the findings and sentence ad- 
judged  to the convening authority or a designee, 
the accused's immediate commander, and (if appli- 
cable) the officer in charge of the confinement facil- 
ity (see R.C.M. 1101(a)), and supervise the prepa- 
ration, authentication, and distribution of copies of 
the record as required by  these rules and regula- 
tions of the Secretary concerned (see R.C.M. 1103; 
1104). R.C.M. 502(d)(5) 
(G)Assistant trial counsel. An assistant trial counsel 
may act in that capacity only under the supervision 
of the detailed trial counsel. Responsibility for trial 
of a case may not devolve to an assistant not quali- 
fied to serve as trial counsel. Unless the contrary 
appears, all acts of an assistant trial counsel are 
presumed to have been done by the direction of the 
trial counsel. An assistant trial counsel may not act 
in the absence of trial counsel at trial in a general 
court-martial unless the assistant has the qualifica- 
tions required of a  trial counsel. See R.C.M. 
805(c). 
(6) Duties of defense and associate or assistant de- 
fense counsel. Defense counsel shall represent the ac- 
cused in matters under the code and these rules aris- 
ing from the offenses of which the accused is then 
suspected or charged. Under the supervision of the 
defense counsel an associate or assistant defense 
counsel may perform any act or duty which a de- 
fense counsel may perform under law, regulation, or 
custom of the service. 
Discussion 
(A) Initial advice by military defense counsel. Defense 
counsel should promptly explain to the accused the 
general duties of the defense counsel and inform 
the accused of the rights to request individual mili- 
tary counsel of the accused's own selection, and of 
the effect of such a request, and to retain civilian 
counsel. If the accused wants to request individual 
military counsel, the defense counsel should imme- 
diately inform the convening authority through 
trial counsel and, if the request is approved, serve 
as associate counsel if the accused requests and the 
convening authority permits. Unless the accused 
directs otherwise, military counsel will begin prep- 
aration of the defense immediately after being de- 
tailed without waiting for approval of a request for 
individual military counsel or retention of civilian 
counsel. See R.C.M. 506. 
(B) 	General duties of defense counsel. Defense counsel 
must: guard the interests of the accused zealously 
within the bounds of the law without regard to per- 
sonal opinion as to the guilt of the accused; disclose 
to the accused any interest defense counsel may 
have in connection with the case, any disqualifica- 
tion, and any other matter which  might influence 
the accused in the selection of counsel; represent 
the accused  with undivided  fidelity and may not 
disclose the accused's secrets or confidences except 
as the accused  may authorize (see also Mil. R. 
Evid. 502). A defense counsel designated  to re- 
present two or more co-accused in a joint or com- 
mon trial or in allied cases must be particularly 
alert to conflicting interests of those accused. De- 
fense counsel should bring such matters to the at- 
tention of the military judge so that the accused's 
understanding and choice may be made a matter of 
record. See R.C.M. 901(d)(4)(D). 
Defense counsel must explain to the accused: the elections 
available as to composition of the court-martial and assist the ac- 
cused to make any request necessary to effect the election (see 
R.C.M. 903); the right to plead guilty or not guilty and the mean- 
ing and effect of a plea of guilty; the rights to introduce evidence, 
to testify or remain silent, and to assert any available defense; and 
the rights to present evidence during sentencing and the rights of 
the accused to testify under oath, make an unsworn statement, 
and have counsel make a statement on behalf of the accused. 
These explanations must be made regardless of the intentions of 
the accused as to testifying and pleading. 
Defense counsel should try to obtain complete knowledge of 
the facts of the case before advising the accused, and should give 
the accused a candid opinion of the merits of the case. 
(C) Preparation for  trial. Defense counsel may have the 
assistance of trial counsel in obtaining the presence 
of witnesses and evidence for the defense. See 
R.C.M. 703. 
Defense counsel should consider the elements of proof of the 
offenses alleged and the pertinent rules of evidence to ensure that 
evidence that the defense plans to introduce is admissible and to 
be prepared to object to inadmissible evidence offered by the pros- 
ecution. 
Defense counsel should: prepare to make an opening state- 
ment of the defense case (see R.C.M. 913(b)); and prepare to ex- 
amine and cross-examine witnesses, and to make final argument 
on the findings and, if necessary, on sentencing (see R.C.M. 919; 
lWl(g)). 
(D) Trial. Defense counsel should represent and protect 
the interests of the accused at trial. 
When a trial proceeds in the absence of the accused, defense 
counsel must continue to represent the accused. 
(E) Post-trial duties. 
(i) Deferment of confinement. If the accused is sen- 
tenced to confinement, the defense counsel must explain to the ac- 
cused the right to request the convening authority to defer service 
of the sentence to confinement and assist the accused in making 
such a request if the accused chooses to make one. See R.C.M. 
1101(c). 
(ii) Examination of the record; appellate brief: The 
defense counsel should in any case examine the record for accu- 
racy and note any errors in it. This notice may be forwarded for 
attachment to the record. See R.C.M.  1103(b)(3)(C). See also 
R.C.M.  1103(i)(l)(B). 
(iii) Submission of matters. If the accused is con- 
victed, the defense counsel may submit to the convening author- 
ity matters for the latter's consideration  in deciding whether to 
approve the sentence or to disapprove any findings. See R.C.M. 
1105. Defense counsel should discuss with the accused the right 
to submit matters to the convening authority and the powers of 
the convening authority in  taking action on the case. Defense 
counsel may also submit a brief of any matters counsel believes 
should be considered on further review. 
(iv) Appellate  rights. Defense counsel must explain 
to the accused the rights to appellate review that apply in the case, R.C.M.  502(f) 
and advise the accused concerning the exercise of those rights. If 
the case is subject to review by the Court of Military Review, de- 
fense counsel should explain the powers of that court and advise 
the accused of the right to be represented by counsel before it. See 
R.C.M. 1202 and 1203. Defense counsel should also explain the 
possibility of further review by the Court of Military Appeals and 
the Supreme Court. See R.C.M. 1204 and 1205. If the case may be 
examined in the office of the Judge Advocate General under Arti- 
cle 69(a), defense counsel should explain the nature of such re- 
view to the accused. See  R.C.M. 1201(b)(l). Defense counsel 
must explain the consequences of waiver of appellate review, 
when applicable, and, if the accused elects to waive appellate re- 
view,  defense counsel will assist in preparing the waiver. See 
R.C.M. 1 110. If the accused waives appellate review, or if it is not 
available, defense counsel should explain that the case will be re- 
viewed by a judge advocate and should submit any appropriate 
matters for consideration  by  the judge  advocate. See R.C.M. 
11 12. The accused should be advised of the right to apply to the 
Judge Advocate General for relief under Article 69(b) when such 
review is available. See R.C.M. 1201(b)(3). 
(v) Examination of post-trial  recommendation. 
When the post-trial recommendation  is served on defense coun- 
sel, defense counsel should examine it and reply promptly in writ- 
ing, noting any errors or omissions. Failure to note defects in the 
recommendation waives them. See R.C.M.  1106(f). 
(F) Associate  or assistant defense counsel. Associate or 
assistant counsel may act in that capacity only 
under the supervision and by  the general direction 
of the defense counsel. A detailed defense counsel 
becomes associate defense counsel when  the ac- 
cused has individual military or civilian counsel 
and detailed counsel is not excused. Although as- 
sociate counsel acts under the general supervision 
of the defense counsel, associate defense counsel 
may act without such supervision when circum- 
stances require. See, for example, R.C.M. 805(c). 
An assistant defense counsel may do this only if 
such counsel has the qualifications to act as defense 
counsel. Responsibility for trial of a case may not 
devolve upon an assistant who is not qualified  to 
serve as defense counsel. An assistant defense 
counsel may not act in  the absence of the defense 
counsel at trial unless the assistant has the qualifi- 
cations required of a defense counsel. See  also 
R.C.M. 805. Unless the contrary appears, all acts 
of an assistant or associate defense counsel are pre- 
sumed to have been done under the supervision of 
the defense counsel. 
(e)  Interpreters,  reporters, escorts, bailiffs, clerks, 
and guards. 
(1) Qualifications. The qualifications of interpret- 
ers and reporters may be prescribed by the Secretary 
concerned. Any person who is not disqualified under 
subsection (e)(2) of this rule may serve as escort, bai- 
liff, clerk, or orderly, subject to removal by the mili- 
tary judge. 
(2) Disqualifications. In addition to any disquali- 
fications which may be prescribed by the Secretary 
concerned, no person shall act as interpreter, re- 
porter, escort, bailiff, clerk, or orderly in any case in 
which that person is or has been in the same case: 
(A) The accuser; 
(B)  A witness; 
(C)  An investigating officer; 
(D)  Counsel for any party; or 
(E)  A member of the court-martial or of any 
earlier court-martial of which the trial is a rehearing 
or new or other trial. 
(3) Duties. In addition to such other duties as the 
Secretary concerned may prescribe, the following 
persons may perform the following duties. 
(A)  Interpreters. Interpreters shall interpret for 
the court-martial or for an accused who does not 
speak or understand English. 
Discussion 
The accused also may retain an unofficial interpreter without 
expense to the United States. 
(B)  Reporters. Reporters shall record the pro- 
ceedings and testimony and shall transcribe them so 
as to comply with the requirements for the record of 
trial as prescribed in these rules. 
(C)  Others. Other personnel detailed for the as- 
sistance of the court-martial shall have such duties 
as may be imposed by the military judge. 
(4) Payment of reporters, interpreters. The Secre- 
tary concerned may prescribe regulations for the 
payment of allowances, expenses, per diem, and 
compensation of reporters and interpreters. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 807 regarding oaths for reporters, interpreters, 
and escorts. 
(f)  Action upon discovery of disqualification or lack 
of qualifications. Any person who discovers that a 
person detailed to a court-martial is disqualified or 
lacks the qualifications specified by  this rule shall 
cause a report of the matter to be made before the 
court-martial is first in session to the convening au- 
thority or, if discovered later, to the military judge. R.C.M. 503 
Rule 503.  Detailing members, military judge, 

and counsel 

(a)  Members. 
(1)  In general. The convening authority shall de- 
tail qualified persons as members for courts-martial. 
Discussion 
The  following persons are subject to challenge under R.C.M. 
912(f) and should not be detailed as members: any person who is, 
in the same case, an accuser, witness, investigating officer, or 
counsel for any party; any person who, in the case of a new trial, 
other trial, or rehearing, was a member of any court-martial 
which previously heard the case; any person who is junior to the 
accused, unless this is unavoidable; an enlisted member from the 
same unit as the accused; any person who is in arrest or confine- 
ment. 
(2)  Enlisted  members. An enlisted accused may, 
before assembly, request orally on the record or in 
writing that enlisted persons serve as members of the 
general or special court-martial to which that ac- 
cused's case has been or will be referred. If such a re- 
quest is made, an enlisted accused may not be tried 
by  a court-martial the membership of which does 
not include enlisted members in a number compris- 
ing at least one-third of the total number of members 
unless eligible enlisted members cannot be obtained 
because of physical conditions or military exigen- 
cies. If the appropriate number of enlisted members 
cannot be obtained, the court-martial may be assem- 
bled, and the trial may proceed without them, but 
the convening authority shall make a detailed writ- 
ten explanation why enlisted members could not be 
obtained which must be appended to the record of 
trial. 
Discussion 
When such a request  is made, the convening authority 
should: 
(1) Detail an appropriate number of enlisted members 
to the court-martial and, if appropriate, relieve an appropriate 
number of commissioned or warrant officers previously detailed; 
(2) Withdraw the charges from the court-martial to 
which they were originally referred and refer them to a court- 
martial which  includes the proper proportion of enlisted mem- 
bers; or 
(3) Advise the court-martial before which the charges 
are then pending to proceed in the absence of enlisted members if 
eligible enlisted members cannot be detailed because of physical 
conditions or military exigencies. 
See also R.C.M. 1103(b)(2)(D)(iii). 
(3)  Members from  another command or armed 
force.  A convening authority may detail as members 
of general and special court-martial persons under 
that convening authority's command or made avail- 
able by their commander, even if those persons are 
members of an armed force different from that of the 
convening authority or accused. 
Discussion 
Concurrence of the proper commander may be oral and need 
not be shown by the record of trial. 
Members should ordinarily be of the same armed force as the 
accused. When a court-martial composed of members of different 
armed forces is selected, at least a majority of the members should 
be of the same armed force as the accused unless exigent circum- 
stances make it impractical to do  so without manifest injury to the 
service. 
(b)  Military judge. 
(1)  By whom detailed. The military judge shall be 
detailed, in accordance with regulations of the Sec- 
retary concerned, by a person assigned as a military 
judge  and directly responsible to the Judge Advo- 
cate General or the Judge Advocate General's desig- 
nee. The authority to detail military judges may be 
delegated to persons assigned as military judges.  If 
authority to detail military judges has been dele- 
gated to a military judge, that military judge may de- 
tail himself or herself as military judge for a court- 
martial. 
(2)  Record  of detail. The order detailing a mili- 
tary judge shall be reduced to writing and included 
in the record of trial or announced orally on the re- 
cord at the court-martial. The writing or announce- 
ment shall indicate by whom the military judge was 
detailed. The Secretary concerned may require that 
the order be reduced to writing. 
(3)  Military judge from a different armed force. 
A military judge from one armed force may be de- 
tailed to a court-martial convened in a different 
armed force when permitted by the Judge Advocate 
General of the armed force of  which the military 
judge  is a member. The Judge Advocate General 
may delegate authority to make military judges 
available for this purpose. 
(c)  Counsel. 
(1)  By whom detailed. Trial and defense counsel, 
assistant trial and defense counsel, and associate de- 
fense counsel shall be detailed in accordance with 
regulations of the Secretary concerned. If authority to detail counsel has been delegated to a person, that 
person may detail himself or herself as counsel for a 
court-martial. 
(2)  Record of detail. The order detailing a counsel 
shall be reduced to writing and included in the re- 
cord of trial or announced orally on the record at the 
court-martial. The'writing or announcement shall 
indicate by whom the counsel was detailed. The Sec- 
retary concerned may require that the order be re- 
duced to writing. 
(3)  Counsel from  a different armed force.  A per- 
son from one armed force may be detailed to serve as 
counsel in a court-martial in a different armed force 
when permitted by the Judge Advocate General of 
the armed force of which the counsel is a member. 
The Judge Advocate General may delegate author- 
ity to make persons available for this purpose. 
Rule 504.  Convening courts-martial 
(a)  In general. A court-martial is created by a con- 
vening order of the convening authority. 
(b)  Who  may convene courts-martial. 
(1)  General courts-martial. Unless otherwise lim- 
ited by superior competent authority, general 
courts-martial may be convened by persons occupy- 
ing positions designated in Article 22(a) and by any 
commander designated by  the Secretary concerned 
or empowered by the President. 
Discussion 
The authority to convene courts-martial is independent of 
rank and is retained as long as the convening authority remains a 
commander in one of the designated positions. The rule by which 
command devolves are found in regulations of the Secretary con- 
cerned. 
(2)  Special courts-martial.  Unless otherwise lim- 
ited by superior competent authority, special courts- 
martial may be convened by persons occupying posi- 
tions designated in  Article 23(a) and by  com- 
manders designated by the Secretary concerned. 
Discussion 
See the discussion of subsection (b)(l) of this rule. Persons 
authorized to convene general courts-martial may also convene 
special courts-martial. 
(A) Definition. For purposes of Articles 23 and 
24, a command or unit is "separate or detached" 
R.C.M. 504(c)(2) 
when isolated or removed from the immediate disci- 
plinary control of a superior in such manner as to 
make its commander the person held by  superior 
commanders primarily responsible for discipline. 
"Separate  or detached"  is used in a disciplinary 
sense and not necessarily in a tactical or physical 
sense. 
Discussion 
The power of a commander of a separate or detached unit to 
convene courts-martial, like that of any other commander, may 
be limited by superior competent authority. 
(B) Determination. If a commander is in doubt 
whether the command is separate or detached, the 
matter shall be determined: 
(i)  In the Army or the Air Force, by the of- 
ficer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction 
over the command; or 
(ii)  In the Naval Service or Coast Guard, by 
the flag or general officer in command or the senior 
officer present who designated the detachment. 
(3) Summary courts-martial. See R.C.M. 
1302(a). 
Discussion 
See the discussion under subsection (b)(l) of this rule. 
(4)  Delegation prohibited.  The power to convene 
courts-martial may not be delegated. 
(c)  Disqualification. 
(1)  Accuser.  An accuser may not convene a gen- 
eral or special court-martial for the trial of the per- 
son accused. 
Discussion 
See also Article l(9); 307(a); 601(c). However, see R.C.M. 
1302(b) (accuser may convene a summary court-martial). 
(2)  Other. A convening authority junior in rank 
to an accuser may not convene a general or special 
court-martial for the trial of the accused unless that 
convening authority is superior in command to the 
accuser. A convening authority junior in command 
to an accuser may not convene a general or special 
court-martial for the trial of the accused. R.C.M. 504(~)(3) 
(3) Action when disqualijied. When a commander 
who would otherwise convene a general or special 
court-martial is disqualified in a case, the charges 
shall be forwarded to a superior competent author- 
ity for disposition. That authority may personally 
dispose of the charges or forward the charges to an- 
other convening authority who is superior in rank to 
the accuser, or, if in the same chain of command, 
who is superior in command to the accuser. 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M. 401(c). 
(d)  Convening orders. 
(1)  General and special courts-martial. A conven- 
ing order for a general or special court-martial shall 
designate the type of court-martial and detail the 
members and may designate where the court-martial 
will meet. If the convening authority has been desig- 
nated by the Secretary concerned, the convening or- 
der shall so state. 
Discussion 
See Appendix 6 for a suggested format for a convening order. 
(2)  Summary courts-martial. A convening order 
for a summary court-martial shall designate that it is 
a summary court-martial and detail the summary 
court-martial, and may designate where the court- 
martial will meet. If the convening authority has 
been designated by  the Secretary concerned, the 
convening order shall so state. 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M. 1302(c). 
(3) Additional matters. Additional matters to be 
included in convening orders may be prescribed by 
the Secretary concerned. 
(e)  Place. The convening authority shall ensure that 
an appropriate location and facilities for courts-mar- 
tial are provided. 
Rule 505.  Changes of members, military 
judge, and counsel 
(a)  In general. Subject to this rule, the members, 
military judge, and counsel may be changed by an 
authority competent to detail such persons. Mem- 
bers also may be excused as provided in subsections 
(c)(l)(B)(ii) and (c)(2)(A) of this rule. 
Discussion 
Changes of the members of the court-martial should be kept 
to a minimum. If extensive changes are necessary and no session 
of the court-martial has begun, it may be appropriate to withdraw 
the charges from one court-martial and refer them to another.  See 
R.C.M. 604. 
(b)  Procedure. When new persons are added as 
members or counsel or when substitutions are made 
as to any members or counsel or the military judge, 
such persons shall be detailed in accordance with 
R.C.M. 503. An order changing the members of the 
court-martial, except one which excuses members 
without replacement, shall be reduced to writing 
before authentication of the record of trial. 
Discussion 
When members or counsel have been excused and the ex- 
cusal is not reduced to writing, the excusal should be announced 
on the record. A member who has been temporarily excused need 
not be formally reappointed to the court-martial. 
(c)  Changes of members. 
(1)  Before assembly. 
(A) By convening authority. Before the court- 
martial is assembled, the convening authority may 
change the members of the court-martial without 
showing cause. 
(B)  By convening authority's delegate. 
(i)  Delegation. The convening authority may 
delegate, under regulations of the Secretary con- 
cerned, authority to excuse individual members to 
the staffjudge advocate or legal officer or other prin- 
cipal assistant to the convening authority. 
(ii)  Limitations. Before the court-martial is 
assembled, the convening authority's delegate may 
excuse members without cause shown; however, no 
more than one-third of the total number of members 
detailed by the convening authority may be excused 
by  the convening authority's delegate in any one 
court-martial. After assembly the convening author- 
ity's delegate may not excuse members. 
(2)  After assembly. 
(A)  Excusal. After assembly no member may 
be excused, except: (i)  By  the convening authority for good 
cause shown on the record; 
(ii)  By the military judge for good  cause 
shown on the record; or 
(iii)  As a result of challenge under R.C.M. 
912. 
(B)  New members. New members may be de- 
tailed after assembly only when, as a result of ex- 
cusals under subsection (c)(2)(A) of this rule, the 
number of members of the court-martial is reduced 
below a quorum, or the number of enlisted members, 
when the accused has made a timely written request 
for enlisted members, is reduced below one-third the 
total membership. 
(d)  Changes of detailed counsel. 
(1) Trial counsel. An authority competent to de- 
tail trial counsel may change the trial counsel and 
any assistant trial counsel at any time without show- 
ing cause. 
(2)  Defense counsel. 
(A)  Before formation  of attorney-client rela- 
tionship. Before an attorney-client relationship has 
been formed between the accused and detailed de- 
fense counsel or associate or assistant defense coun- 
sel, an authority competent to detail defense counsel 
may excuse or change such counsel without showing 
cause. 
(B)  After formation  of attorney-client  relation- 
ship. After an attorney-client relationship has been 
formed between the accused and detailed defense 
counsel or associate or assistant defense counsel, an 
authority competent to detail such counsel may ex- 
cuse or change such counsel only: 
(i)  Under R.C.M. 506(b)(3); 
(ii) Upon request of the accused or applica- 
tion for withdrawal by  such counsel under R.C.M. 
506(c); or 
(iii) For other good cause shown on the re- 
cord. 
(e)  Change of military judge. 
(1)  Before  assembly. Before the court-martial is 
assembled, the military judge may be changed by an 
authority competent to detail the military judge, 
without cause shown on the record. 
(2)  After assembly. After the court-martial is as- 
sembled, the military judge may be changed by an 
authority competent to detail the military judge only 
when, as a result of disqualification under R.C.M. 
R.C.M.  506(b)(l)(H) 
902 or for good cause shown, the previously detailed 
military judge is unable to proceed. 
(f)  Good cause. For purposes of this rule, "good 
cause"  includes physical disability, military exi- 
gency, and other extraordinary circumstances which 
render the member, counsel, or military judge una- 
ble to proceed with the court-martial within a rea- 
sonable time. "Good cause" does not include tempo- 
rary inconveniences which are incident to normal 
conditions of military life. 
Rule 506.  Accused's rights to counsel 
(a)  In general. The accused has the right to be repre- 
sented before a general or special court-martial by 
civilian counsel if  provided at no expense to the 
Government, and either by  the military counsel de- 
tailed under Article 27 or military counsel of the ac- 
cused's own selection, if reasonably available. The 
accused is not entitled to be represented by  more 
than one military counsel. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 502(d)(3) as to qualifications of civilian counsel 
or individual military counsel. 
(b)  Individual military counsel. 
(1)  Reasonably available. Subject to this subsec- 
tion, the Secretary concerned shall define "reasona- 
bly available." While so assigned, the following per- 
sons are not reasonably available to serve as 
individual military counsel because of the nature of 
their duties or positions: 
(A) A general of flag officer; 
(B)  A trial or appellate military judge; 
(C)  A trial counsel; 
(D) An appellate defense or government coun- 
sel; 
(E)  A principal legal advisor to a command, 
organization, or agency and, when such command, 
organization, or agency has general court-martial 
jurisdiction,  the principal assistant of such an advi- 
sor; 
(F) An instructor or student at a service school 
or academy: 
(G) A student at a college or university; 
(H) A member of the staff of  the Judge Advo- 
cate General of the Army, Navy, or Air Force, the 
Chief Counsel of the Coast Guard, or the Director, R.C.M. 506(b)(l)(H) 
Judge Advocate Division, Headquarters, Marine 
Corps. 
The Secretary concerned may determine other 
persons to be not reasonably available because of the 
nature or responsibilities of their assignments, geo- 
graphic considerations, exigent circumstances, or 
military necessity. A person who is a member of an 
armed force different from that of which the accused 
is a member shall be reasonably available to serve as 
individual military counsel for such accused to the 
same extent as that person is available to serve as in- 
dividual military counsel for an accused in the same 
armed force as the person requested. The Secretary 
concerned may prescribe circumstances under 
which exceptions may be made to the prohibitions in 
this subsection when merited by  the existence of an 
attorney-client relationship regarding matters relat- 
ing to  a charge in question. However, if the attorney- 
client relationship arose solely because the counsel 
represented the accused on review under Article 70, 
this exception shall not apply. 
(2)  Procedure. Subject to this subsection, the Sec- 
retary concerned shall prescribe procedures for de- 
termining whether a requested person is "reasonably 
available" to act as individual military counsel. Re- 
quests for an individual military counsel shall be 
made by the accused or the detailed defense counsel 
through the trial counsel to the convening authority. 
If the requested person is among those not reasona- 
bly available unher subsection (b)(l) of this rule or 
under regulations of the Secretary concerned, the 
convening authority shall deny the request and no- 
tify the accused, unless the accused asserts that there 
is an existing attorney-client relationship regarding 
a charge in question or that the person requested will 
not, at the time of the trial or investigation for which 
requested be among those so listed as not reasonably 
available, the convening authority shall forward the 
request to the commander or head of the organiza- 
tion, activity, or agency to which the requested per- 
son is assigned. That authority shall make an admin- 
istrative determination whether  the requested 
person is reasonably available in accordance with 
the procedure prescribed  by  the Secretary con- 
cerned. This determination is a matter within the 
sole discretion of that authority. An adverse deter- 
mination may be reviewed upon request of the ac- 
cused through that authority to the next higher com- 
mander  or  level  of  supervision,  but  no 
administrative review may be made which requires 
action at the departmental or higher level. 
(3)  Excusal of detailed counsel. If the accused is 
represented by  individual military counsel, detailed 
defense counsel shall normally be excused. The au- 
thority who detailed the defense counsel, as a matter 
of discretion, may approve a request from the ac- 
cused that detailed defense counsel shall act as asso- 
ciate counsel. The action of the authority who de- 
tailed the counsel is subject to review only for abuse 
of discretion. 
Discussion 
A request under subsection (b)(3) should be considered in 
light of the general statutory policy that the accused is not enti- 
tled to be represented by more than one military counsel. Among 
the factors that may be considered in the exercise ofdiscretion are 
the seriousness of the case, retention of civilian defense counsel, 
complexity of legal or factual issues, and the detail of additional 
trial counsel. 
See R.C.M. 905(b)(6) and 960(b)(2) as to motions concern- 
ing denial of a request for individual military counsel or retention 
of detailed counsel as associate counsel. 
(c)  Excusal or withdrawal. Except as otherwise pro- 
vided in R.C.M. 505(d)(2) and subsection (b)(3) of 
this rule, defense counsel may be excused only with 
the express consent of the accused, or by  the military 
judge upon application for withdrawal by  the de- 
fense counsel for good cause shown. 
(d)  Waiver. The accused may expressly waive the 
right to be represented by counsel and may thereaf- 
ter conduct the defense personally. Such waiver 
shall be accepted by the military judge only if  the 
military judge finds that the accused is competent to 
understand the disadvantages of self-representation 
and that the waiver is voluntary and understanding. 
The military judge may require that a defense coun- 
sel remain present even if the accused waives counsel 
and conducts the defense personally. The right of 
the accused to conduct the defense personally may 
be revoked if the accused is disruptive or fails to fol- 
low basic rules of decorum and procedure. 
(e)  Nonlawyer present.  Subject to the discretion of 
the military judge, the accused may have present 
and seated at the counsel table for purpose of consul- 
tation persons not qualified to serve as counsel under 
R.C.M. 502. R.C.M. 506(e) 
Discussion 
See also Mil.R.Evid. 615 if the person is a potential witness 
in the case. CHAPTER VI.  REFERRAL, SERVICE, AMENDMENT, AND WITHDRAWAL OF 

CHARGES 

Rule 601.  Referral 
(a)  In general. Referral is the order of a convening 
authority that charges against an accused will be 
tried by a specified court-martial. 
Discussion 
Referral of charges requires three elements: a convening au- 
thority who is authorized to convene the court-martial and is not 
disqualified (see R.C.M. 601(b) and (c)); preferred charges which 
have been received by the convening authority for disposition (see 
R.C.M. 307 as to preferral of charges and Chapter IV as to dispo- 
sition); and a court-martial convened by that convening authority 
or a predecessor (see R.C.M. 504). 
If trial would be warranted but would be detrimental to the 
prosecution of a war or inimical to national security, see R.C.M. 
401(d) and 407(b). 
(b)  Who may refer. Any convening authority may 
refer charges to a court-martial convened by  that 
convening authority or a predecessor, unless the 
power to do so has been withheld by superior com- 
petent authority. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 306(a), 403,404,407, and 504. 
The  convening authority may be of any command, including 
a command different from that of the accused, but as a practical 
matter the accused must be subject to the orders of the convening 
authority or otherwise under the convening authority's control to 
assure the appearance of the accused at trial. The convening au- 
thority's power over the accused may be based upon agreements 
between the commanders concerned. 
(c)  Disqualification.  An accuser may not refer 
charges to a general or special court-martial. 
Discussion 
Convening authorities are not disqualified from referring 
charges by  prior participation in the same case except when they 
have acted as accuser. For a definition of "accuser,"  see Article 
l(9). A convening authority who is disqualified may forward the 
charges and allied papers for disposition by competent authority 
superior in rank or command. See R.C.M. 401(c) concerning ac- 
tions which the superior may take. 
See R.C.M. 1302 for rules relating to convening summary 
courts-martial. 
(d)  When  charges may be referred. 
(1)  Basis for  referral. If the convening authority 
finds or is advised by a judge advocate that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that an offense triable 
by a court-martial has been committed and that the 
accused committed it, and that the specification al- 
leges an offense, the convening authority may refer 
it. The finding may be based on hearsay in whole or 
in part. The convening authority or judge advocate 
may consider information from any source and shall 
not be limited to the information reviewed by any 
previous authority, but a case may not be referred to 
a general court-martial except in compliance with 
subsection (d)(2) of this rule. The convening author- 
ity or judge advocate shall not be required before 
charges are referred to resolve legal issues, including 
objections to evidence, which may arise at trial. 
Discussion 
For a discussion of selection among alternative dispositions, 
see R.C.M. 306. The convening authority is not obliged to refer all 
charges which the evidence might support. The convening au- 
thority should consider the options and considerations under 
R.C.M. 306 in exercising the discretion to refer. 
(2)  General courts-martial. The convening au- 
thority may not refer a specification under a charge 
to a general court-martial unless- 
(A) There has been  substantial compliance 
with  the pretrial investigation  requirements of 
R.C.M. 405; and 
(B)  The convening authority has received the 
advice of the staff judge  advocate required under 
R.C.M. 406. These requirements may be waived by 
the accused. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 201(f)(2)(C)  concerning limitations on referral 
of capital offenses to special courts-martial. See R.C.M. 103(3) for 
the definition of a capital offense. 
See R.C.M. 1301(c) concerning limitations on the referral of 
certain cases to summary courts-martial. 
(e)  How charges shall be referred. 
(1)  Order, instructions. Referral shall be by  the 
personal order of the convening authority. The con- 
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vening authority may include proper instructions in 
the order. 
Discussion 
Referral is ordinarily evidenced by  an indorsement on the 
charge sheet. Although the indorsement should be completed on 
all copies of the charge sheet, only the original must be signed. 
The  signature may be that of a person acting by the order or direc- 
tion of the convening authority. In such a case the signature ele- 
ment must reflect the signer's authority. 
If, for any reason, charges are referred to a court-martial dif- 
ferent from that to which they were originally referred, the new 
referral is ordinarily made by a new indorsement attached to the 
original charge sheet. The previous indorsement should be lined 
out and initialed by the person signing the new referral. The  origi- 
nal indorsement should not be obliterated. See also R.C.M. 604. 
If the only officer present in a command refers the charges to 
a summary court-martial and serves as the summary court-mar- 
tial under R.C.M.  1302, the indorsement should be completed 
with the additional comments, "only  officer present in the com- 
mand." 
The convening authority may instruct that the charges 
against the accused be tried with certain other charges against the 
accused. See subsection (2) below. 
The convening authority may instruct that charges against 
one accused be referred for  joint or common trial with another ac- 
cused. See subsection (3) below. 
Capital offenses may be referred as noncapital if the death 
penalty is not mandatory. When a convening authority has dis- 
cretion to refer a capital case as noncapital, the convening author- 
ity should be guided by  the criteria for adjudging capital punish- 
ment found at R.C.M. 1004. 
The  convening authority may acknowledge by an instruction 
that no bad-conduct discharge may be adjudged when the prereq- 
uisites for a bad-conduct discharge under Article 19 will not be 
met. See R.C.M. 201(f)(2)(B)(ii).  For example, this instruction 
may be given when a court reporter is not detailed. 
Any special instructions must be stated in the referral in- 
dorsement. 
When the charges have been referred to a court-martial, the 
indorsed charge sheet and allied papers should be promptly trans- 
mitted to the trial counsel. 
(2) Joinder of offenses. In the discretion of the 
convening authority, two or more offenses charged 
against an  accused may be referred to the same 
court-martial for trial, whether serious or minor of- 
fenses or both, regardless whether related. Addi- 
tional charges may be joined with other charges for 
a single trial at any time before arraignment if  all 
necessary procedural requirements concerning the 
additional charges have been complied with. After 
arraignment of the accused upon charges, no addi- 
tional charges may be referred to the same trial with- 
out consent of the accused. 
Discussion 
Ordinarily all known charges should be referred  to a single 
court-martial. 
(3)  Joinder of accused. Allegations against two or 
more accused may be referred for joint trial if the ac- 
cused are alleged to have participated in the same 
act or transaction or in the same series of acts or 
transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such 
accused may be charged in  one or more specifica- 
tions together or separately, and every accused need 
not be charged in each specification. Related allega- 
tions against two or more accused which may be 
proved by substantially the same evidence may be 
referred to a common trial. 
Discussion 
A joint offense is one committed by two or more persons act- 
ing together with a common intent. Joint offenses may be referred 
for joint trial, along with all related offenses against each of the 
accused. A common trial may be used when the evidence of sev- 
eral offenses committed by several accused separately is essen- 
tially the same, even though the offenses were not jointly  commit- 
ted. See  R.C.M. 307(c)(5)  Discussion. Convening authorities 
should consider that joint and common trials may be complicated 
by procedural and evidentiary rules. 
(f) Superior convening authorities. Except as other- 
wise provided in these rules, a superior competent 
authority may cause charges, whether or not re- 
ferred, to be transmitted to the authority for further 
consideration, including, if appropriate, referral. 
Rule 602. Service of charges 
The trial counsel detailed to the court-martial to 
which charges have been referred for trial shall 
cause to be served upon each accused a copy of the 
charge sheet. In time of peace, no person may, over 
objection, be brought to trial-including  an Article 
39(a) session-before  a general court-martial within 
a period of five days after service of charges, or 
before a special court-martial within a period  of 
three days after service of charges. In computing 
these periods, the date of service of charges and the 
date of trial are excluded; holidays and Sundays are 
included. R.C.M. 602 
Discussion 
Trial counsel should comply with  this rule immediately 
upon receipt of the charges. Whenever after service the charges 
are amended or changed the trial counsel must give notice of the 
changes to the defense counsel. Whenever such amendments or 
changes add a new party, a new offense, or substantially new alle- 
gations, the charge sheet so amended or changed must be served 
anew. See also R.C.M. 603. 
Service may be made only upon the accused; substitute ser- 
vice upon defense counsel is insufficient. The trial counsel should 
promptly inform the defense counsel when charges have been 
served. 
If the accused has questions when served with charges, the 
accused should be told to discuss the matter with defense counsel. 
Rule 603.  Changes to charges and 
specifications 
(a) Minor changes defined. Minor changes in 
charges and specifications are any except those 
which add a party, offenses, or substantial matter 
not fairly included in those previously preferred, or 
which are likely to mislead the accused as to the of- 
fenses charged. 
Discussion 
Minor changes include those necessary to correct inartfully 
drafted or redundant specifications; to correct a misnaming of the 
accused; to allege the proper article; or to correct other slight er- 
rors. Minor charges also include those which reduce the serious- 
ness of an offense, as when the value of an allegedly stolen item in 
a larceny specification is reduced, or when a desertion specifica- 
tion is amended to allege only unauthorized absence. 
(b) Minor changes before arraignment. Any person 
forwarding, acting upon, or prosecuting charges on 
behalf of the United States except an investigating 
officer appointed under R.C.M. 405 may make mi- 
nor changes to charges or specifications before ar- 
raignment. 
Discussion 
Charges forwarded or referred for trial should be free from 
defects of form and substance. Minor errors may be corrected and 
the charge may be redrafted without being sworn anew by the ac- 
cuser. Other changes should be signed and sworn to be an ac- 
cuser. All changes in the charges should be initialed by the person 
who makes them. A trial counsel acting under this provision ordi- 
narily should consult with the convening authority before making 
any changes which, even though minor, change the nature or seri- 
ousness of the offense. 
(c)  Minor changes after arraignment. After arraign- 
ment the military judge may, upon motion, permit 
minor changes in the charges and specifications at 
any time before findings are announced if  no sub- 
stantial right of the accused is prejudiced. 
(d) Major changes. Changes or amendments to 
charges or specifications other than minor changes 
may not be made over the objection of the accused 
unless the charge or specification affected is pre- 
ferred anew. 
Discussion 
If there has been a major change or amendment over the ac- 
cused's objection to a charge already referred, a new referral is 
necessary. Similarly, in the case of a general court-martial, a new 
investigation under R.C.M. 405 will be necessary if the charge as 
amended or changed was not covered in the prior investigation. If 
the substance of the charge or specification  as amended or 
changed has not been referred or, in the case of a general court- 
martial, investigated, a new referral and, if appropriate, investiga- 
tion are necessary. When charges are re-referred,  they must be 
served anew under R.C.M. 602. 
Rule 604. Withdrawal of charges 
(a)  Withdrawal. The convening authority or a supe- 
rior competent authority may for any reason cause 
any charges or specifications to be withdrawn from a 
court-martial at any time before findings are an- 
nounced. 
Discussion 
Charges which are withdrawn from a court-martial should 
be dismissed (see R.C.M. 401(c)(l)) unless it is intended to refer 
them anew promptly or to forward them to another authority for 
disposition. 
Charges should not be withdrawn from a court-martial arbi- 
trarily or unfairly to an accused. See also subsection (b) of this 
rule. 
Some or all charges and specifications may be withdrawn. In 
a joint  or common trial the withdrawal may be limited to charges 
against one or some of the accused. 
Charges which have been properly referred to a court-mar- 
tial may be withdrawn only by the direction of the convening au- 
thority or a superior competent authority in the exercise of that 
officer's independent judgment.  When directed to do so by  the 
convening authority or a superior competent authority, trial 
counsel may withdraw charges or specifications by  lining out the 
affected charges or specifications, renumbering remaining charges 
or specifications as necessary, and initialing the changes. Charges 
and specifications withdrawn before commencement of trial will 
not be brought to the attention of the members. When charges or 
specifications are withdrawn after they have come to the attention of the members, the military judge must instruct them that the 
withdrawn charges or specifications may not be considered for 
any reason. 
(b)  Referral of withdrawn charges. Charges which 
have been withdrawn from a court-martial may be 
referred to another court-martial unless the with- 
drawal was for an improper reason. Charges with- 
drawn after the introduction of evidence on the gen- 
eral issue of guilt may be referred to another court- 
martial only if the withdrawal was necessitated by 
urgent and unforeseen military necessity. 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M. 915 (Mistrial). 
When charges which have been withdrawn from a court- 
martial are referred to another court-martial, the reasons for the 
withdrawal and later referral should be included in the record of 
the later court-martial, if the later referral is more onerous to the 
accused. Therefore, if further prosecution is contemplated at the 
time of the withdrawal, the reasons for the withdrawal should be 
included in or attached to the record of the earlier proceeding. 
R.C.M. 604(b) 
Improper reasons for withdrawal include an intent to inter- 
fere with the free exercise by  the accused of constitutional or 
codal rights, or with the impartiality of a court-martial. A with-
drawal is improper if it was not directed personally and indepen- 
dently by the convening authority or by a superior competent au- 
thority. 
Whether the reason for a withdrawal is proper, for purposes 
of the propriety of a later referral, depends in part on the stage in 
the proceedings at which the withdrawal takes place. Before ar- 
raignment, there are many reasons for a withdrawal which will 
not preclude another referral. These include receipt of additional 
charges, absence of the accused, reconsideration by the convening 
authority or by a superior competent authority of the seriousness 
of the offenses, questions concerning the mental capacity of the 
accused, and routine duty rotation of the personnel constituting 
the court-martial. Charges withdrawn after arraignment may be 
referred to another court-martial under some circumstances. For 
example, it is permissible to refer charges which were withdrawn 
pursuant to a pretrial agreement if the accused fails to fulfill the 
terms of the agreement. See R.C.M. 705. Charges withdrawn af- 
ter some evidence on the general issue of guilty is introduced may 
be re-referred  only under the narrow circumstances described in 
the rule. CHAPTER VII.  PRETRIAL MATTERS 

Rule 701.  Discovery 
(a)  Disclosure by the trial counsel. Except as other- 
wise provided in subsections (f)  and (g)(2) of this 
rule, the trial counsel shall provide the following in- 
formation or matters to the defense- 
(1)  Papers accompanying charges; convening or- 
ders; statements. As soon as practicable after service 
of charges under R.C.M. 602, the trial counsel shall 
provide the defense with copies of, or, if extraordi- 
nary circumstances make it impracticable to provide 
copies, permit the defense to inspect: 
(A) Any paper which  accompanied the 
charges when they were referred to the court-mar- 
tial, including papers sent with charges upon a re- 
hearing or new trial; 
(B) The convening order and any amending or- 
ders; and 
(C) Any sworn or signed statement relating to 
an offense charged in the case which is in the posses- 
sion of the trial counsel. 
(2)  Documents, tangible objects, reports. After 
service of charges, upon request of the defense, the 
Government shall permit the defense to inspect: 
(A) Any books, papers, documents, photo- 
graphs, tangible objects, buildings, or places, or cop- 
ies of portions thereof, which are within the posses- 
sion, custody, or control of military authorities, and 
which are material to the preparation of the defense 
or are intended for use by the trial counsel as evi- 
dence in the prosecution case-in-chief at trial, or 
were obtained from or belong to the accused; and 
(B) Any results or reports of physical or 
mental examinations, and of scientific tests or exper- 
iments, or copies thereof, which are within the pos- 
session, custody, or control of military authorities, 
the existence of which is known to the trial counsel, 
and which are material to the preparation of the de- 
fense or are intended for use by the trial counsel as 
evidence in the prosecution case-in-chief at trial. 
Discussion 
For specific rules concerning certain mental examinations of 
the accused see R.C.M. 706 and Mil.R.Evid. 302 
(3) Witnesses. Before the beginning of trial on the 
merits the trial counsel shall notify the defense of the 
names and addresses of the witnesses the trial coun- 
sel intends to call: 
(A) In the prosecution case-in-chief; and 
(B)  To rebut a defense of alibi, innocent inges- 
tion, or lack of mental responsibility, when  trial 
counsel has received timely notice under subsection 
(b)(l) or (2) of this rule. 
Discussion 
Such notice should be in writing except when impracticable. 
(4) Prior convictions of accused offered  on the 
merits. Before arraignment the trial counsel shall no- 
tify the defense of any records of prior civilian or 
court-martial convictions of the accused of which 
the trial counsel is aware and which the trial counsel 
may offer on the merits for any purpose, including 
impeachment, and shall permit the defense to in- 
spect such records when they are in the trial coun- 
sel's possession. 
(5)  Information to be offered at sentencing. Upon 
request of the defense the trial counsel shall: 
(A) Permit the defense to inspect such written 
material as will be presented by the prosecution at 
the presentencing proceedings; and 
(B)  Notify the defense of the names and ad- 
dresses of the witnesses the trial counsel intends to 
call at the presentencing proceedings under R.C.M. 
1001(b). 
(6) Evidence favorable  to the defense. The trial 
counsel shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the 
defense the existence of evidence known to the trial 
counsel which reasonably tends to: 
(A) Negate the guilt of the accused of an of- 
fense charged; 
(B) Reduce the degree of guilt of the accused of 
an offense charged; or 
(C) Reduce the punishment. 
Discussion 
In addition to the matters required to be disclosed under sub- 
section (a) of this rule, the Government is required to notify the 
defense of or provide to the defense certain information under 
other rules. Mil.R.Evid. 506 covers the disclosure of unclassified 
information  which is  under the control of the Government. 
Mil.R.Evid. 505 covers disclosure of classified information. 
Other R.C.M. and Mil.R.Evid. concern disclosure of other 
specific matters. See R.C.M. 308 (identification of accuser), 405 (report of Article 32 investigation), 706(c)(3)(B) (mental exami- 
nation  of accused), 914 (production of certain statements), and 
1004(b)(l)  (aggravating circumstances in capital cases); 
Mil.R.Evid. 301(c)(2)  (notice of immunity or leniency to wit- 
nesses),  302 (mental examination of accused), 304(d)(l) (state- 
ments by accused), 31 l(d)(l) (evidence seized from accused), 
321(c)(l)  (evidence based on lineups), 507 (identity of infor- 
mants), 612 (memoranda used to refresh recollection), and 61  3(a) 
(prior inconsistent statements). 
Requirements for notice of intent to use certain evidence are 
found in: Mil.R.Evid.  201A(b) (judicial notice of foreign law), 
301(c)(2) (immunized witnesses),  304(d)(2)  (notice of intent to 
use undisclosed confessions),  304(f) (testimony of accused for 
limited purpose on confession), 31 1(d)(2)(B) (notice of intent to 
use undisclosed evidence seized), 31 l(f) (testimony of accused for 
limited purpose on seizures), 321(c)(2)(B) (notice of intent to use 
undisclosed line-up evidence), 321(e) (testimony  of accused for 
limited purpose of line-ups), 412(c)(l) and (2) (intent of defense to 
use evidence of sexual misconduct by a victim); 505(h) (intent to 
disclose classified information), 506(h) (intent to disclose privi- 
lege government information), and 609(b) (intent to impeach 
with conviction over 10 years old). 
(b)  Disclosure by  the defense. Except as otherwise 
provided in subsections (f) and (g)(2) of this rule, the 
defense shall provide the following information to 
the trial counsel- 
(1)  Names of witnesses and statements. 
(A) Before the beginning of trial on the merits, 
the defense shall notify the trial counsel of the names 
and addresses of all witnesses, other than the ac- 
cused, whom the defense intends to call during the 
defense case in chief, and provide all sworn or signed 
statements known by the defense to have been made 
by such witnesses in connection with the case. 
(B)  Upon request of the trial counsel, the de- 
fense shall also 
(i)  Provide the trial counsel with the names 
and addresses of any witnesses whom the defense in- 
tends to call at the presentencing proceedings under 
R.C.M. 1001(c); and 
(ii)  Permit the trial counsel to inspect any 
written material that will be presented by  the de- 
fense at the presentencing proceeding. 
Discussion 
Such notice shall be in writing except when impracticable. 
See R.C.M. 701(f) for statements that would not be subject to dis- 
closure. 
(2)  Notice of certain defenses. The defense shall 
notify the trial counsel before the beginning of trial 
R.C.M. 701(b)(4) 
on the merits of its intent to offer the defense of alibi, 
innocent ingestion, or lack of mental responsibility, 
or its intent to introduce expert testimony as to the 
accused's mental condition. Such notice by  the de- 
fense shall disclose, in the case of an alibi defense, 
the place or places at which the defense claims the 
accused to have been at the time of the alleged of- 
fense, and, in the case of an innocent ingestion de- 
fense, the place or places where, and the circum- 
stances under which the defense claims the accused 
innocently ingested the substance in question, and 
the names and addresses of  the witnesses upon 
whom the accused intends to rely to establish any 
such defenses. 
Discussion 
Such notice should be in writing except when impracticable. 
See R.C.M. 916(k) concerning the defense of lack of mental re- 
sponsibility. See R.C.M. 706 concerning inquiries into the mental 
responsibility of the accused. See Mil.R.Evid. 302 concerning 
statements by the accused during such inquiries. If the defense 
needs more detail as to the time, date, or place of the offense to 
comply with this rule, it should request a bill of particulars. See 
R.C.M. 906(b)(6). 
(3)  Documents and tangible objects. If the defense 
requests disclosure under subsection (a)(2)(A) of 
this rule, upon compliance with such request by the 
Government, the defense, on request of the trial 
counsel, shall permit the trial counsel to inspect 
books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible 
objects, or copies or portions thereof, which are 
within the possession, custody, or control of the de- 
fense and which the defense intends to introduce as 
evidence in the defense case-in-chief at trial. 
(4)  Reports of examination and tests. If the de- 
fense requests disclosure under subsection (a)(2)(B) 
of this rule, upon compliance with such request by 
the Government, the defense, on request  of trial 
counsel, shall (except as provided in R.C.M. 706 and 
Mil.R.Evid. 302) permit the trial counsel to inspect 
any results or reports of physical or mental examina- 
tions and of  scientific tests or experiments made in 
connection with the particular case, or copies 
thereof, which are within the possession, custody, or 
control of the defense which the defense intends to 
introduce as evidence in the defense case-in-chief at 
trial or which were prepared by a witness whom the 
defense intends to call at trial when the results or re- 
ports relate to that witness' testimony. R.C.M. 701(b)(5) 
(5) Inadmissibility of withdrawn defense. If an in- 
tention to rely upon a defense under subsection 
(b)(2) of this rule is withdrawn, evidence of such in- 
tention and disclosures by the accused or defense 
counsel made in connection with such intention is 
not, in any court-martial, admissible against the ac- 
cused who gave notice of the intention. 
Discussion 
In addition to the matters covered in subsection (b) of this 
rule, defense counsel is required to give notice or disclose evi- 
dence under certain Military Rules of Evidence: Mil.R.Evid. 
201A(b) (judicial notice of foreign law), 304(f) (testimony by  the 
accused for a limited purpose in relation to a confession), 3  1  1(b) 
(same, search), 321(e) (same, lineup), 412(c)(l) and (2) (intent to 
offer evidence of sexual misconduct by a victim), 505(h) (intent to 
disclose classified information),  506(h) (intent to disclose privi- 
leged government information), 609@) (intent to impeach a wit- 
ness with a conviction older than 10 years), 612(2) (writing used 
to refresh recollection), and 613(a) (prior inconsistent state- 
ments). 
(c)  Failure to call witness. The fact that a witness' 
name is on a list of expected or intended witnesses 
provided to an opposing party, whether required by 
this rule or not, shall not be ground for comment 
upon a failure to call the witness. 
(d)  Continuing duty to disclose. If, before or during 
the court-martial, a party discovers additional evi- 
dence or material previously requested or required 
to be produced, which is subject to discovery or in- 
spection under this rule, that party shall promptly 
notify the other party or the military judge of the ex- 
istence of the additional evidence or material. 
(e)  Access  to witnesses and evidence. Each party 
shall have adequate opportunity to prepare its case 
and equal opportunity to interview witnesses and in- 
spect evidence. No party may unreasonably impede 
the access of another party to a witness or evidence. 
Discussion 
Convening authorities, commanders and members of their 
immediate staffs should make no statement, oral or written, and 
take no action which could reasonably be understood to discour- 
age or prevent witnesses from testifying truthfully before a court- 
martial, or as a threat of retribution for such testimony. 
(f) Information not subject to disclosure. Nothing in 
this rule shall be construed to require the disclosure 
of information protected from disclosure by the Mil- 
itary Rules of Evidence. Nothing in this rule shall 
require the disclosure or production of notes, memo- 
randa, or similar working papers prepared by coun- 
sel and counsel's assistants and representatives. 
(g)  Regulation of discovery. 
(1) Time, place,  and manner. The military judge 
may, consistent with this rule, specify the time, 
place, and manner of making discovery and may 
prescribe such terms and conditions as are just. 
(2)  Protective and modifying orders. Upon a suffi- 
cient showing the military judge may at any time or- 
der that the discovery or inspection be denied, re- 
stricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is 
appropriate. Upon motion by  a party, the military 
judge may permit the party to make such showing, 
in whole or in part, in writing to be inspected only by 
the military judge. If the military judge grants relief 
after such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the 
party's statement shall be sealed and attached to the 
record of trial as an appellate exhibit. Such material 
may be examined by reviewing authorities in closed 
proceedings for the purpose of reviewing the deter- 
mination of the military judge. 
(3)  Failure to comply. If at any time during the 
court-martial it is brought to the attention of the 
military judge that a party has failed to comply with 
this rule, the military judge may take one or more of 
the following actions: 
(A) Order the party to permit discovery; 
(B) Grant a continuance; 
(C)  Prohibit the party from introducing evi- 
dence, calling a witness, or raising a defense not dis- 
closed; and 
(D) Enter such other order as is just under the 
circumstances.  This rule shall not limit the right of 
the accused to testify in the accused's behalf. 
Discussion 
Factors to be considered in determining whether to grant an 
exception to exclusion under subsection (3)(C) include: the extent 
of disadvantage that resulted from a failure to disclose; the reason 
for the failure to disclose; the extent to which later events miti- 
gated the disadvantage caused by  the failure to disclose; and any 
other relevant factors. 
The sanction of excluding the testimony of a defense witness 
should be used only upon finding that the defense counsel's failure 
to comply with this rule was willful and motivated by  a desire to 
obtain a tactical advantage or to conceal a plan to present 
fabricated testimony. Moreover, the sanction ofexcluding the tes- 
timony of a defense witness should only be used  if  alternative 
sanctions could not have minimized the prejudice to the Govern- ment. Before imposing this sanction, the military judge  must 
weigh  the defendant's right to compulsory process against the 
counterveiling public interests, including (1) the integrity of the 
adversary process; (2) the interest in the fair and efficient adminis- 
tration of military justice; and (3) the potential prejudice to the 
truth-determining function of the trial process. 
Procedures governing refusal to disclose classified informa- 
tion are in Mil.R.Evid. 505. Procedures governing refusal to dis- 
close other government information are in Mil.R.Evid. 506. Pro- 
cedures governing refusal to disclose an informant's  identity are 
in Mil.R.Evid. 507. 
(h) Inspect. As used in this rule "inspect"  includes 
the right to photograph and copy. 
Rule 702.  Depositions 
(a)  In general. A deposition may be ordered when- 
ever, after preferral of charges, due to exceptional 
circumstances of the case it is in the interest of jus- 
tice that the testimony of a prospective witness be 
taken and preserved for use at an investigation under 
Article 32 or a court-martial. 
Discussion 
A deposition is the out-of-court testimony of a witness under 
oath in response to questions by the parties, which is reduced to 
writing or recorded on videotape or audiotape or  similar material. 
A deposition taken on oral examination is an oral deposition, and 
a deposition taken on written interrogatories is a written deposi- 
tion. Written interrogatories are questions, prepared by the prose- 
cution, defense, or both, which are reduced to writing before sub- 
mission to a witness whose testimony is to be taken by  deposition. 
The answers, reduced to writing and properly sworn to, consti- 
tute the deposition testimony of the witness. 
Not that under subsection (i) of this rule a deposition may be 
taken by agreement of the parties without necessity of an order. 
A deposition may be taken to preserve the testimony of a wit- 
ness who is likely to be unavailable at the investigation under Ar- 
ticle 32 (see R.C.M. 405(g)) or at the time of trial (see R.C.M. 
703(b)). Part of all of a deposition, so far as otherwise admissible 
under the Military Rules of Evidence, may be used on the merits 
or on an interlocutory question as substantive evidence if the wit- 
ness is unavailable under Mil.R.Evid. 804(a) except that a deposi- 
tion may be admitted in a capital case only upon offer by  the de- 
fense. See Mil.R.Evid. 804(b)(l). In any case, a deposition may be 
used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching 
the testimony of the deponent as a witness. See Mil.R.Evid. 613. 
If only a part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, an 
adverse party may required the proponent to offer all which is rel- 
evant to the part offered, and any party may offer other parts. See 
Mil.R.Evid. 106. 
A deposition which is transcribed is ordinarily read to the 
court-martial by the party offering it. See also subsection (g)(3) of 
this rule. The transcript of a deposition may not be inspected by 
the members. Objections may be made to testimony in a written 
R.C.M. 702(c)(3)(A) 
deposition in the same way that they would  be if the testimony 
were offered through the personal appearance of a witness. 
Part or all of a deposition so far as otherwise admissible 
under the Military Rules of Evidence may be used in presentenc- 
ing proceedings as substantive evidence as provided in R.C.M. 
1001. 
DD  Form 456 (Interrogatories and Deposition) may be used 
in conjunction with this rule. 
(b)  Who  may order. A convening authority who has 
the charges for disposition or, after referral, the con- 
vening authority or the military judge  may order 
that a deposition be taken on request of a party. 
(c)  Request to take deposition. 
(1) Submission of  request. At any time after 
charges have been preferred, any party may request 
in writing that a deposition be taken. 
Discussion 
A copy of the request and any accompanying papers ordina- 
rily should be served on the other parties when the request is sub- 
mitted. 
(2)  Contents of request. A request for a deposition 
shall include: 
(A) The  name and address of the person whose 
deposition is requested, or, if the name of the person 
is unknown, a description of the office or position of 
the person; 
(B) A statement of the matters on which the 
person is to be examined; 
(C)  A statement of the reasons for taking the 
deposition; and 
(D) Whether an oral or written deposition is 
requested. 
(3) Action on request. 
(A) In general. A request for a deposition may 
be denied only for good cause. 
Discussion 
Good cause for denial includes: failure to state a proper 
ground for taking a deposition; failure to show the probable rele- 
vance of the witness' testimony, or that the witness' testimony 
would be unnecessary. The fact that the witness is or will be avail- 
able for trial is good cause for denial in the absence of unusual cir- 
cumstances, such as improper denial of a witness request at an 
Article 32 hearing, unavailability of an essential witness at an Ar- 
ticle 32 hearing, or when the Government has improperly im- 
peded defense access to a witness. R.C.M. 702(c)(3)(B) 
(B) Written deposition. A request for a written 
deposition may not be approved without the consent 
of the opposing party except when the deposition is 
ordered solely in lieu of producing a witness for sen- 
tencing under R.C.M. 1001 and the authority order- 
ing the deposition determines that the interests of 
the parties and the court-martial can be adequately 
served by a written deposition. 
Discussion 
A request for an oral deposition may be approved without 
the consent of the opposing party. 
(C) Notification of decision. The authority who 
acts on the request shall promptly inform the re- 
questing party of the action on the request and, if the 
request is denied, the reasons for denial. 
(D) Waiver. Failure to review before the mili- 
tary judge a request for a deposition denied by a con- 
vening authority waives further consideration of the 
request. 
(d)  Action when request is approved. 
(1)  Detail of deposition oficer. When a request for 
a deposition is approved, the convening authority 
shall detail an officer to serve as deposition officer or 
request an appropriate civil officer to serve as deposi- 
tion officer. 
Discussion 
See Article 49(c). 
When a deposition will be at a point distant from the com- 
mand, an appropriate authority may be requested to make availa- 
ble an officer to serve as deposition officer. 
(2)  Assignment of counsel. If charges have not yet 
been referred to a court-martial when a request to 
take a deposition is approved, the convening author- 
ity who directed the taking of the deposition shall 
ensure that counsel qualified as required  under 
R.C.M. 502(d) are assigned to represent each party. 
Discussion 
The  counsel who represents the accused at a deposition ordi- 
narily will form an attorney-client relationship with the accused 
which will continue through a later court-martial. See R.C.M. 
506. 
If the accused has formed an attorney-client  relationship 
with military counsel concerning the charges in question, ordina- 
rily that counsel should be appointed to represent the accused. 
(3) Instructions. The convening authority may 
give instructions not inconsistent with this rule to 
the deposition officer. 
Discussion 
Such instruction  may include the time and place for taking 
the deposition. 
(e)  Notice. The party at whose request a deposition 
is to be taken shall give to every other party reasona- 
ble written notice of the time and place for taking the 
deposition and the name and address of each person 
to be examined. On motion of a party upon whom 
the notice is served the deposition officer may for 
cause shown extend or shorten the time or change 
the place for taking the deposition, consistent with 
any instructions from the convening authority. 
(f)  Duties of the deposition oficer. In accordance 
with this rule, and subject to any instructions under 
subsection (d)(3) of this rule, the deposition officer 
shall: 
(1)  Arrange a time and place for taking the depo- 
sition and, in the case of an oral deposition, notify 
the party who requested the deposition accordingly; 
(2)  Arrange for the presence of  any witness 
whose deposition is to be taken in accordance with 
the procedures for production of witnesses and evi- 
dence under R.C.M. 703(e); 
(3)  Maintain order during the deposition and 
protect the parties and witnesses from annoyance, 
embarrassment, or oppression; 
(4)  Administer the oath to each witness, the re- 
porter, and interpreter, if any; 
(5)  In the case of a written deposition, ask the 
questions submitted by counsel to the witness; 
(6)  Cause the proceedings to be recorded so that a 
verbatim record is made or may be prepared; 
(7)  Record, but not rule upon, objections or mo- 
tions and the testimony to which they relate; 
(8)  Authenticate the record of the deposition and 
forward it to the authority who ordered the deposi- 
tion; and 
(9)  Report to the convening authority any sub- 
stantial irregularity in the proceeding. Discussion 
When any unusual problem, such as improper conduct by 
counsel or a witness, prevents an orderly and fair proceeding,  the 
deposition officer should adjourn the proceedings and inform the 
convening authority. 
The authority who ordered the deposition should forward 
copies to the parties. 
(g)  Procedure. 
(1)  Oral depositions. 
(A) Rights of accused. At an oral deposition, 
the accused shall have the rights to: 
(i)  Be present except when: (a) the accused, 
absent good cause shown, fails to appear after notice 
of time and place of the deposition; (b) the accused is 
disruptive within the meaning of R.C.M. 804(b)(2); 
or (c) the deposition is ordered in lieu of production 
of a witness on sentencing under R.C.M. 1001 and 
the authority ordering the deposition determines 
that the interests of the parties and the court-martial 
can  be served adequately by an oral deposition with- 
out the presence of the accused; and 
(ii)  Be represented by counsel as provided in 
R.C.M. 506. 
(B)  Examination of witnesses. Each witness 
giving an oral deposition shall be examined under 
oath. The scope and manner of examination and 
cross-examination shall be such as would be allowed 
in the trial itself. The Government shall make avail- 
able to each accused for examination and use at the 
taking of the deposition any statement of the witness 
which is in the possession of the United States and to 
which the accused would be entitled at the trial. 
Discussion 
As to objections, see subsections (f)(7) and (h) of this rule. As 
to production  of prior statements of witnesses,  see R.C.M. 914; 
Mil.R.Evid. 612, 613. 
A sample oath for a deposition follows. 
"You (swear) (affirm) that the evidence you give shall be the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth (so help you 
God)?" 
(2)  Written depositions. 
(A) Rights of accused. The accused shall have 
the right to be represented by counsel as provided in 
R.C.M. 506 for the purpose of taking a written depo- 
sition, except when the deposition is taken for use at 
a summary court-martial. 
R.C.M. 702(h)(l) 
(B)  Presence of parties. No party has a right to 
be present at a written deposition. 
(C) Submission of interrogatories to opponent. 
The party requesting a written deposition shall sub- 
mit to opposing counsel a list of written questions to 
be asked of the witness. Opposing counsel may ex- 
amine the questions and shall be allowed a reasona- 
ble time to prepare cross-interrogatories and objec- 
tions, if any. 
Discussion 
The interrogatories and cross-interrogatories should be sent 
to the deposition officer by the party who requested the deposi- 
tion. See subsection (h)(3) of this rule concerning objections. 
(D)  Examination of witnesses. The deposition 
officer shall swear the witness, read each question 
presented by the parties to the witness, and record 
each response. The testimony of the witness shall be 
recorded on videotape, audiotape, or similar mate- 
rial or shall be transcribed. When the testimony is 
transcribed, the deposition shall, except when im- 
practicable, be submitted to the witness for examina- 
tion. The deposition officer may enter additional 
matters then stated by the witness under oath. The 
deposition shall be signed by  the witness if the wit- 
ness is available. If the deposition is not signed by 
the witness, the deposition officer shall record the 
reason. The certificate of authentication shall then 
be executed. 
(3)  How recorded. In the discretion of the author- 
ity who ordered the deposition, a deposition may be 
recorded by a reporter or by other means including 
videotape, audiotape, or sound film. In the discre- 
tion of the military judge,  depositions recorded by 
videotape, audiotape, or sound film may be played 
for the court-martial or may be transcribed and read 
to the court-martial. 
Discussion 
A deposition read in evidence or one that is played during a 
court-martial, is recorded and transcribed by  the reporter in the 
same was as any other testimony. The deposition need not be in- 
cluded in the record of trial. 
(h)  Objections. 
(1)  In general. A failure to object prior to the dep- 
osition to the taking of the deposition on grounds R.C.M. 702(h)(l) 
which may be corrected if  the objection is made 
prior to the deposition waives such objection. 
(2)  Oral depositions. Objections to questions, tes- 
timony, or evidence at an oral deposition and the 
grounds for such objection shall be stated at the time 
of taking such deposition. If an objection relates to a 
matter which could have been corrected if the objec- 
tion had been made during the deposition, the objec- 
tion is waived if not made at the deposition. 
Discussion 
A party may show that an objection was made during the 
deposition but not recorded, but, in the absence of such evidence, 
the transcript of the deposition governs. 
(3)  Written depositions. Objections to any ques- 
tion in written interrogatories shall be served on the 
party who proposed  the question before the inter- 
rogatories are sent to the deposition officer or the ob- 
jection is waived. Objections to answers in a written 
deposition may be made at trial. 
(i) Deposition by agreement not precluded. 
(1)  Taking deposition. Nothing in this rule shall 
preclude the taking of a deposition without cost to 
the United States, orally or upon written questions, 
by agreement of the parties. 
(2)  Use of deposition. Subject to Article 49, noth-
ing in this rule shall preclude the use of a deposition 
at the court-martial by agreement of the parties un- 
less the military judge forbids its use for good cause. 
Rule 703.  Production of witnesses and 
evidence 
(a)  In general. The prosecution and defense and the 
court-martial shall have equal opportunity to obtain 
witnesses and evidence, including the benefit of com- 
pulsory process. 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M.  801(c) concerning the opportunity of the 
court-martial to obtain witnesses and evidence. 
(b)  Right to witnesses. 
(1)  On the  merits or on interlocutory questions. 
Each party is entitled to the production of any wit- 
ness whose testimony on a matter in issue on the 
merits or on an interlocutory question would be rele- 
vant and necessary. 
Discussion 
See Mil.R.Evid. 401 concerning relevance. 
Relevant testimony is necessary when it is not cumulative 
and when it would contribute to a party's presentation of the case 
in some positive way on a matter in issue. A matter is not in issue 
when it is stipulated as a fact. 
(2)  On sentencing. Each party is entitled to the 
production of a witness whose testimony on sentenc- 
ing is required under R.C.M. 1001(e). 
(3)  Unavailable witness. Notwithstanding subsec- 
tions (b)(l) and (2) of this rule, a party is not entitled 
to the presence of  a witness who is unavailable 
within the meaning of Mil.R.Evid. 804(a). However, 
if the testimony of a witness who is unavailable is of 
such central importance to an issue that it is essen- 
tial to a fair trial, and if there is no adequate substi- 
tute for such testimony, the military judge shall 
grant a continuance or other relief in  order to at- 
tempt to secure the witness' presence or shall abate 
the proceedings, unless the unavailability of the wit- 
ness is the fault of or could have been prevented by 
the requesting party. 
(c)  Determining which witness will be produced. 
(1)  Witnesses for  the prosecution. The trial coun- 
sel shall obtain the presence of witnesses whose testi- 
mony the trial counsel considers relevant and neces- 
sary for the prosecution. 
(2)  Witnesses  for  the defense. 
(A) Request. The defense shall submit to the 
trial counsel a written list of witnesses whose pro- 
duction by the Government the defense requests. 
(B)  Contents of request. 
(i)  Witnesses on merits or interlocutory ques- 
tions. A list of witnesses whose testimony the defense 
considers relevant and necessary on the merits or on 
an interlocutory question shall include the name, 
telephone number, if known, and address or location 
of the witness such that the witness can be found 
upon the exercise of due diligence and a synopsis of 
the expected testimony sufficient to show its rele- 
vance and necessity. 
(ii)  Witnesses on sentencing. A list of wit- 
nesses wanted for presentencing proceedings shall 
include the name, telephone number, if  known, and 
address or location of the witness such that the wit- 
ness can be found upon the exercise of due diligence, 
a synopsis of the testimony that it is expected the 
witness will give, and the reasons why the witness' personal appearance will be necessary under the 
standards set forth in R.C.M. 1001(e). 
(C)  Time of request. A list of witnesses under 
this subsection shall be submitted in time reasonably 
to allow production of each witness on the date 
when the witness' presence will be necessary. The 
military judge may set a specific date by which such 
lists must be submitted. Failure to submit the name 
of a witness in a timely manner shall permit denial of 
a motion for production of the witness, but relief 
from such denial may be granted for good cause 
shown. 
(D) Determination. The trial counsel shall ar- 
range for the presence of any witness listed by the 
defense unless the trial counsel contends that the 
witness' production is not required under this rule. 
If the trial counsel contends that the witness' pro- 
duction is not required by  this rule, the matter may 
be submitted to the military judge.  If the military 
judge grants a motion for a witness, the trial counsel 
shall produce the witness or the proceedings shall be 
abated. 
Discussion 
When significant or unusual costs would be involved in pro- 
ducing witnesses, the trial counsel should inform the convening 
authority, as the convening authority may elect to dispose of the 
matter by  means other than a  court-martial. See R.C.M. 
906(b)(7). See also R.C.M. 905(j). 
(d)  Employment of expert witnesses. When the em- 
ployment at Government expense of an expert is 
considered necessary by  a party, the party shall, in 
advance of employment of the expert, and with no- 
tice to the opposing party, submit a request to the 
convening authority to authorize the employment 
and to fix the compensation for the expert. The re- 
quest shall include a complete statement of reasons 
why employment of the expert is necessary and the 
estimated cost of employment. A request denied by 
the convening authority may be renewed before the 
military judge who shall determine whether the tes- 
timony of the expert is relevant and necessary, and, 
if  so, whether the Government has provided or will 
provide an adequate substitute. If the military judge 
grants a motion for employment of an expert or finds 
that the Government is required to provide a substi- 
tute, the proceedings shall be abated if  the Govern- 
ment fails to comply with the ruling. In the absence 
R.C.M. 703(e)(2)(8) 
of advance authorization, an expert witness may not 
be paid fees other than those to which entitled under 
subsection (e)(2)(D) of this rule. 
Discussion 
See Mil.R.Evid. 702, 706. 
(e) Procedures for production of witnesses. 
(1)  Military witnesses. The attendance of a mili- 
tary witness may be obtained by  notifying the com- 
mander of the witness of the time, place, and date 
the witness' presence is required and requesting the 
commander to issue any necessary orders to the wit- 
ness. 
Discussion 
When military witnesses are located near the court-martial, 
their presence can usually be obtained through informal coordi- 
nation with them and their commander. If the witness is not near 
the court-martial and attendance would involve travel at govern- 
ment expense, or if informal coordination is inadequate, the ap- 
propriate superior should be requested to issue the necessary or- 
der. 
If practicable, a request for the attendance of a military wit- 
ness should be made so that the witness will have at least 48 hours 
notice before starting to travel to attend the court-martial. 
The attendance of persons not on active duty should be ob- 
tained in the manner prescribed in subsection (e)(2) of this rule. 
(2)  Civilian witnesses-subpoena. 
(A) In general. The presence of witnesses not 
on active duty may be obtained by subpoena. 
Discussion 
A subpoena is not necessary if the witness appears volunta- 
rily at no expense to the United States.  \ 
Civilian employees of the Department of Defense may be di- 
rected by appropriate authorities to appear as witnesses in courts- 
martial as an incident of their employment. Appropriate travel 
orders may be issued for this purpose. 
A subpoena may not be  used to compel a civilian to travel 
outside the United States and its territories. 
A witness must be subject to United States  jurisdiction to be 
subject to a subpoena. Foreign nationals in a foreign country are 
not subject to subpoena. Their presence may be obtained through 
cooperation of the host nation. 
(B) Contents. A subpoena shall state the com- 
mand by  which the proceeding is directed, and the 
title, if  any, of the proceeding. A subpoena shall R.C.M.  703(e)(2)(B) 
command each person to whom it is directed to at- 
tend and give testimony at the time and place speci- 
fied therein. A subpoena may also command the per- 
son to whom it is directed to produce books, papers, 
documents or other objects designated therein at the 
proceeding or at an earlier time for inspection by the 
parties. 
Discussion 
A subpoena may not be used to compel a witness to appear at 
an examination or interview before trial, but a subpoena may be 
used to obtain witnesses for a deposition or a court of inquiry. 
A subpoena normally is prepared, signed, and issued in du- 
plicate on the official forms. See Appendix 7 for an example of a 
Subpoena with certificate of service (DD Form 453) and a Travel 
Order (DD  Form 453-1). 
(C)  Who may issue. A subpoena may be issued 
by the summary court-martial or trial counsel of a 
special or general court-martial to secure witnesses 
or evidence for that court-martial. A subpoena may 
also be issued by the president of a court of inquiry 
or by an officer detailed to take a deposition to se- 
cure witnesses or evidence for those proceedings re- 
spectively. 
(D) Service. A subpoena may be served by the 
person authorized by this rule to issue it, a United 
States marshal, or any other person who is not less 
than 18 years of age. Service shall be made by deliv- 
ering a copy of the subpoena to the person named 
and by tendering to the person named travel orders 
and fees as may be prescribed by the Secretary con- 
cerned. 
Discussion 
See Department of Defense Pay and Entitlements Manual. 
If practicable, a subpoena should be issued in time to permit 
service at least 24 hours before the time the witness will have to 
travel to comply with the subpoena. 
Informal service. Unless formal service is advisable, the per- 
son who issued the subpoena may mail it to the witness in dupli- 
cate, enclosing a postage-paid  envelope bearing a return address, 
with the request that the witness sign the acceptance of service on 
the copy and return it in the envelope provided. The return envel- 
ope should be addressed to the person who issued the subpoena. 
The person who issued the subpoena should include with it a 
statement to the effect that the rights of the witness to fees and 
mileage will not be impaired by voluntary compliance with the re- 
quest and that a voucher for fees and mileage will be delivered to 
the witness promptly on being discharged from attendance. 
Formal service. Formal service is advisable whenever it is an- 
ticipated that the witness will not comply voluntarily with the 
subpoena. Appropriate fees and mileage must be paid  or ten- 
dered. See Article 47. If formal service is advisable, the person 
who issued the subpoena must assure timely and economical ser- 
vice. That person may do so by  serving the subpoena personally 
when the witness is in the vicinity. When the witness is not in the 
vicinity, the subpoena may be sent in duplicate to the commander 
of a military installation near the witness.  Such commanders 
should give prompt and effective assistance, issuing travel orders 
for their personnel to serve the subpoena when necessary. 
Service should ordinarily be made by a person subject to the 
code. The  duplicate copy of the subpoena must have entered upon 
it proof of service as indicated on the form and must be promptly 
returned to the person who issued the subpoena. If service cannot 
be made, the person who issued the subpoena must be informed 
promptly. A stamped, addressed envelope should be provided for 
these purposes. 
(E) Place of service. 
(i)  In general. A subpoena requiring the at- 
tendance of a witness at a deposition, court-martial, 
or court of inquiry may be served at any place within 
the United States, it Territories, Commonwealths, 
or possessions. 
(ii)  Foreign territory. In foreign territory, the 
attendance of civilian witnesses may be obtained in 
accordance with existing agreements or, in the ab- 
sence of agreements, with principles of international 
law. 
(iii)  Occupied territory. In occupied enemy 
territory, the appropriate commander may compel 
the attendance of civilian witnesses located within 
the occupied territory. 
(F) RelieJ: If a person subpoenaed requests re- 
lief on grounds that compliance is unreasonable or 
oppressive, the convening authority or, after refer- 
ral, the military judge may direct that the subpoena 
be modified or withdrawn if appropriate. 
(G)  Neglect or refusal to appear. 
(i)  Issuance of warrant of attachment. The 
military judge  or, if there is no military judge,  the 
convening authority may, in accordance with this 
rule, issue a warrant of attachment to compel the at- 
tendance of a witness or production of documents. 
Discussion 
A warrant of attachment (DD Form 454) may be used when 
necessary to compel a witness to appear or produce evidence 
under this rule. A warrant of attachment is a legal order ad- 
dressed to an official directing that official to have the person 
named in the order brought before a court. 
Subpoenas issued under R.C.M. 703 are Federal process and 
a person not subject to the code may be prosecuted in a Federal ci- R.C.M. 703(f)(4)(C) 
vilian  court under Article 47 for failure to comply with a sub- 
poena issued in compliance with this rule and formally served. 
The different purposes of the warrant of attachment and 
criminal compliant under Article 47 should be  borne in mind. 
The warrant of attachment, available without the intervention of 
civilian judicial proceedings, has as its purpose the obtaining of 
the witness'  presence,  testimony, or documents. The criminal 
complaint, prosecuted through the civilian Federal courts, has as 
its purpose punishment for failing to comply with process issued 
by military authority. It serves to vindicate the military interest in 
obtaining compliance with its lawful process. 
(ii)  Requirements. A warrant of attachment 
may be  issued only upon probable cause to believe 
that the witness was duly served with a subpoena, 
that the subpoena was issued  in accordance with 
these rules, that appropriate fees and mileage were 
tendered to the witness, that the witness is material, 
that the witness refused or willfully neglected to ap- 
pear at the time and place specified on the subpoena, 
and that no valid excuse reasonably appears for the 
witness' failure to appear. 
(iii) Form. A warrant of attachment shall be 
written. All documents in support of the warrant of 
attachment shall be attached to the warrant, to- 
gether with the charge sheet and convening orders. 
(iv)  Execution. A warrant of attachment 
may be executed by a United States marshal or such 
other person who is not less than 18 years of age as 
the authority issuing the warrant may direct. Only 
such nondeadly force as may be necessary to bring 
the witness before the court-martial or other pro- 
ceeding may be used to execute the warrant. A wit- 
ness attached under this rule shall be brought before 
the court-martial or proceeding without delay and 
shall testify as soon as practicable and be released. 
Discussion 
In executing a warrant of attachment, no more force than 
necessary to bring the witness to the court-martial, deposition, or 
court of inquiry may be used. 
(v)  Definition. For purposes of subsection 
(e)(2)(G) of this rule "military judge"  does not in- 
clude a summary court-martial or the president of a 
special court-martial without a military judge. 
(0 Right to evidence. 
(1) In general.  Each party is entitled to the pro- 
duction of evidence which is relevant and necessary. 
Discussion 
See Mil.R.Evid. 401 concerning relevance. 
Relevant evidence is necessary when it is not cumulative and 
when it would contribute to a party's presentation  of the case in 
some positive way on a matter in issue. A matter is not in issue 
when it is stipulated as a fact. 
As to the discovery and introduction of classified or other 
government information, see Mil.R.Evid. 505 and 506. 
(2)  Unavailable evidence. Notwithstanding sub- 
section (f)(l) of this rule, a party is not entitled to the 
production of evidence which is destroyed, lost, or 
otherwise not subject to compulsory process. How- 
ever, if such evidence is of such central importance 
to an issue that it is essential to a fair trial, and if 
there is no adequate substitute for such evidence, the 
military judge shall grant a continuance or other re- 
lief in order to attempt to produce the evidence or 
shall abate the proceedings, unless the unavailability 
of the evidence is the fault of or could have been pre- 
vented by the requesting party. 
(3) Determining what evidence will be produced. 
The procedures in subsection (c) of this rule shall ap- 
ply to a determination of what evidence will be pro- 
duce, except that any defense request for the produc- 
tion of evidence shall list the items of evidence to be 
produced and shall include a description of each 
item sufficient to show its relevance and necessity, a 
statement where it can be obtained, and, if known, 
the name, address, and telephone number of the cus- 
todian of the evidence. 
(4) Procedures for production of evidence. 
(A) Evidence  under the control of the Govern- 
ment. Evidence under the control of the Govern- 
ment may be obtained by notifying the custodian of 
the evidence of the time, place, and date the evidence 
is required and requesting the custodian to send or 
deliver the evidence. 
(B)  Evidence not under the control of the Gov- 
ernment. Evidence not under the control of the Gov- 
ernment may be obtained by subpoena issued in ac- 
cordance with subsection (e)(2) of this rule. 
(C)  Relief: If the person having custody of evi- 
dence requests relief on grounds that compliance 
with the subpoena or order of production is unrea- 
sonable or oppressive, the convening authority or, 
after referral, the military judge may direct that the 
subpoena or order of production be withdrawn or 
modified. Subject to Mil.R.Evid. 505 and 506, the R.C.M. 703(f)(4)(C) 
military judge may direct that the evidence be sub- 
mitted to the military judge for an in camera inspec- 
tion in order to  determine whether such relief should 
be granted. 
Rule 704.  Immunity 
(a)  Types of immunity. Two types of immunity may 
be granted under this rule. 
(1)  Transactional  immunity. A person may be 
granted transactional immunity from trial by court- 
martial for one or more offenses under the code. 
(2)  Testimonial  immunity. A  person may be 
granted immunity from the use of testimony, state- 
ments, and any information directly or indirectly de- 
rived from such testimony or statements by that per- 
son in a later court-martial. 
Discussion 
"Testimonial"  immunity is also called "use"  immunity. 
Immunity ordinarily should be granted only when testimony 
or other information from the person is necessary to the public in- 
terest, including the needs of good order and discipline, and when 
the person has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide 
other information on the basis of the privilege against self-incrim- 
ination. 
Testimonial immunity is preferred because it does not bar 
prosecution of the person for the offenses about which testimony 
or information is given under the grant of immunity. 
In any trial of a person granted testimonial immunity after 
the testimony or information is given, the Government must meet 
a heavy burden to show that it has not used in any way for the 
prosecution of that person the person's  statements, testimony, or 
information derived from them. In many cases this burden makes 
difficult a later prosecution of such a person for any offense that 
was the subject of that person's testimony or statements. There- 
fore, if it is intended to prosecute a person to whom testimonial 
immunity has been or will be granted for offenses about which 
that person may testify or  make statements, it may be necessary to 
try that person before the testimony or statements are given. 
(b) Scope. Nothing in this rule bars: 
(1)  A later court-martial for perjury, false swear- 
ing, making a false official statement, or failure to 
comply with an order to testify; or 
(2)  Use in a court-martial under subsection (b)(l) 
of this rule of testimony or statements derived from 
such testimony or statements. 
(c) Authority to grant  immunity. Only a general 
court-martial convening authority may grant immu- 
nity, and may do so only in accordance with this 
rule. 
Discussion 
Only general court-martial convening authorities are author- 
ized to grant immunity. However, in some circumstances, when a 
person testifies or makes statements pursuant to a promise of im- 
munity, or a similar promise, by a person with apparent authority 
to make it, such testimony or statements and evidence derived 
from them may be inadmissible in a later trial. Under some cir- 
cumstances a promise of immunity by someone other than a gen- 
eral court-martial convening authority may bar prosecution alto- 
gether. Persons not authorized to grant immunity should exercise 
care when dealing with accused or suspects to avoid inadvertently 
causing statements to be inadmissible or prosecution to be barred. 
A convening authority who grants immunity to a prosecu- 
tion witness in a court-martial  may be disqualified from taking 
post-trial action in the case under some circumstances. 
(1) Persons subject  to the code. A general court- 
martial convening authority may grant immunity to 
any person subject to the code. However, a general 
court-martial convening authority may grant immu- 
nity to a person subject to the code extending to a 
prosecution in a United States district-court only 
when specifically authorized to do so by the attorney 
General of the United states or other authority des- 
ignated under 18 U.S.C. 5 6004. 
Discussion 
When testimony or a statement for which a person subject to 
the code may be granted immunity may relate to an offense for 
which that person could be prosecuted in a United States district 
court, immunity should not be granted without prior coordina- 
tion with the Department of Justice. Ordinarily coordination 
with the local United States Attorney is appropriate. Unless the 
Department of Justice indicates it has no interest in the case, au- 
thorization for the grant of immunity should be sought from the 
Attorney General. A request for such authorization should be 
forwarded through the office of the Judge Advocate General con- 
cerned. Service regulations may provide additional guidance. 
Even if the Department of Justice expresses no interest in the 
case, authorization by  the Attorney General for the grant of im- 
munity may be necessary to compel the person to testify or make 
a statement if such testimony or statement would  make the per- 
son liable for a Federal civilian offense. 
(2) Persons  not subject  to the code. A general 
court-martial convening authority may grant immu- 
nity to persons not subject to the code only when 
specifically authorized to do so by the Attorney 
General of the United States or other authority des- 
ignated under 18 U.S.C. 5 6004. Discussion 
See the discussion under subsection (c)(l) of this rule con- 
cerning forwarding a request for authorization to grant immunity 
to the Attorney General. 
(3)  Other limitations. The authority to grant im- 
munity under this rule may not be delegated. The 
authority to grant immunity may be limited by supe- 
rior authority. 
Discussion 
Department of Defense Directive 1355.1 (21 July 1981) pro- 
vides: "A  proposed grant of immunity in a case involving espio- 
nage, subversion, aiding the enemy, sabotage, spying, or violation 
of rules or statutes concerning classified information or the for- 
eign relations of the United States, shall be forwarded to the Gen- 
eral Counsel of the Department of Defense for the purpose of con- 
sultation with the Department of Justice. The General Counsel 
shall obtain the view of other appropriate elements of the Depart- 
ment of defense in furtherance of such consultation." 
(d) Procedure. A grant of immunity shall be written 
and signed by the convening authority who issues it. 
The grant shall include a statement of the authority 
under which it is made and shall identify the matters 
to which it extends. 
Discussion 
A person who has received a valid grant of immunity from a 
proper authority may be ordered to testify. In addition, a ser- 
vicemember who has received a valid grant of immunity may be 
ordered to answer questions by investigators or counsel pursuant 
to that grant. See Mil.R.Evid. 301(c). A person who refuses to tes- 
tify despite a valid grant of immunity may be prosecuted for such 
refusal. Persons subject to the code may be charged under Article 
134. See paragraph 108, Part IV. A grant of immunity removes 
the right to refuse to testify or make a statement on self-incrimi- 
nation grounds. It does not, however,  remove other privileges 
against disclosure of information. See Mil.R.Evid., Section V. 
An immunity order or grant must not specify the contents of 
the testimony it is expected the witness will give. 
When immunity is granted to a prosecution witness, the ac- 
cused must be notified in accordance with Mil.R.Evid. 301(c)(2). 
(e)  Decision to grant immunity. Unless limited by 
superior competent authority, the decision to grant 
immunity is a matter within the sole discretion of 
the appropriate general court-martial convening au- 
thority. However, if a defense request to immunize a 
witness has been denied, the military judge  may, 
upon motion by the defense, grant appropriate relief 
R.C.M. 705(b)(2)(A) 
directing that either an appropriate convening au- 
thority grant testimonial immunity to a defense wit- 
ness or, as to the affected charges and specifications, 
the proceedings against the accused be abated, upon 
findings that: 
(1)  The witness intends to invoke the right 
against self-incrimination to the extent permitted by 
law if called to testify; and 
(2)  The Government has engaged in discrimina- 
tory use of immunity to obtain a tactical advantage, 
or the Government, through its own overreaching, 
has forced the witness to invoke the privilege against 
self-incrimination; and 
(3)  The witness' testimony is material, clearly ex- 
culpatory, not cumulative, not obtainable from any 
other source and does more than merely affect the 
credibility of other witnesses. 
Rule 705.  Pretrial agreements 
(a) In general. Subject to such limitations as the 
Secretary concerned may prescribe, an accused and 
the convening authority may enter into a pretrial 
agreement in accordance with this rule. 
Discussion 
The authority of convening authorities to refer cases to trial 
and approve pretrial agreements extends only to trials by courts- 
martial. To  ensure that such actions do not preclude appropriate 
action by  Federal civilian authorities in cases likely to be prose- 
cuted in the United States district courts, convening authorities 
shall ensure that appropriate consultation under the "Memoran- 
dum of Understanding Between the Departments of Justice and 
Defense Relating to the Investigation and Prosecution of Crimes 
Over Which the Two Departments Have Concurrent Jurisdic- 
tion" has taken place prior to trial by court-martial or approval of 
a pretrial agreement in cases where such consultation is required. 
See Appendix 3. 
(b) Nature of agreement. A pretrial agreement may 
include: 
(1)  A promise by  the accused to plead guilty to, 
or to enter a confessional stipulation as to ork or 
more charges and specifications, and to fulfill such 
additional terms or conditions which may be in- 
cluded in the agreement and which are not prohi- 
bited under this rule; and 
(2)  A promise by the convening authority to do 
one or more of the following: 
(A) Refer the charges to a certain type of 
court-martial; R.C.M.  705(b)(2)(B) 
(B)  Refer a capital offense as noncapital; 
(C) Withdraw one or more charges or specifi- 
cations from the court-martial; 
Discussion 
A convening-authority may withdraw certain offenses from a 
court-martial and dismiss them if the accused fulfills the ac- 
cused's promises in the agreement. Except when jeopardy has at- 
tached (see R.C.M. 907(b)(2)(C)), such withdrawal and dismissal 
does not bar later reinstitution of the charges by  the same or a dif- 
ferent convening authority. Such reinstitution may invalidate the 
pretrial agreement, however. If the agreement is intended to grant 
immunity to an accused, see R.C.M. 704. 
(D) Have the trial counsel present no evidence 
as to one or more specifications or portions thereof; 
and 
(E) Take specified action on the sentence ad- 
judged by  the court-martial. 
Discussion 
For example, the convening authority may agree to approve 
no sentence in excess of a specified maximum, to suspend all or 
part of a sentence, to defer confinement, or to mitigate certain 
forms of punishment into less severe forms. 
(c)  Terms and conditions. 
(1)  Prohibited terms or conditions. 
(A) Not voluntary. A term or condition in a 
pretrial agreement shall not be enforced if  the ac- 
cused did not freely and voluntarily agree to it. 
(B) Deprivation of certain rights. A term or 
condition in a pretrial agreement shall not be en- 
forced if it deprives the accused of: the right to coun- 
sel; the right to due process; the right to challenge 
the jurisdiction  of the court-martial; the right to a 
speedy trial; the right to complete sentencing pro- 
ceedings; the complete and effective exercise of post- 
trial and appellate rights. 
Discussion 
A pretrial agreement provision which prohibits the accused 
from making certain pretrial motions (see R.C.M. 905-907)  may 
be improper. 
(2)  Permissible  terms or conditions. Subject to 
subsection (c)(l)(A) of this rule, subsection (c)(l)(B) 
of this rule does not prohibit either party from pro- 
posing the following additional conditions: 
(A)  A promise to  enter into a stipulation of fact 
concerning offenses to which a plea of guilty or as to 
which a confessional stipulation will be entered; 
(B)  A promise to testify as a witness in the trial 
of another person; 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 704(a)(2) concerning testimonial immunity. 
Only a general court-martial convening authority may grant im- 
munity. 
(C)  A promise to provide restitution; 
(D)  A promise to conform the accused's  con- 
duct to certain conditions of probation before action 
by the convening authority as well as during any pe- 
riod of suspension of the sentence, provided that the 
requirements of R.C.M. 1109 must be complied with 
before an alleged violation of such terms may relieve 
the convening authority of the obligation to fulfill 
the agreement; and 
(E) A promise to waive procedural require- 
ments such as the Article 32 investigation, the right 
to trial by court-martial composed of members or 
the right to request trial by military judge alone, or 
the opportunity to obtain the personal appearance of 
witnesses at sentencing proceedings. 
(d)  Procedure. 
(1)  Negotiation. Pretrial agreement negotiations 
may be initiated by  the accused, defense counsel, 
trial counsel, the staff judge advocate, convening au- 
thority, or their duly authorized representatives. Ei- 
ther the defense or the or the government may pro- 
pose any term or condition not prohibited by law or 
public policy. Government representatives shall ne- 
gotiate with defense counsel unless the accused has 
waived the right to counsel. 
(2)  Formal submission. After negotiation, if  any, 
under subsection (d)(l) of this rule, if  the accused 
elects to propose a pretrial agreement, the defense 
shall submit a written offer. All terms, conditions, 
and promises between the parties shall be written. 
The proposed  agreement shall be signed by  the ac- 
cused and defense counsel, if any. If the agreement 
contains any specified action on the adjudged sen- 
tence, such action shall be set forth on a page sepa- 
rate from the other portions of the agreement. 
11-70 Discussion 
The  first part of the agreement ordinarily contains an offer to 
plead guilty and a description of the offenses to  which the offer ex- 
tends. It must also contain a complete and accurate statement of 
any other agreed terms or conditions. For example, if the conven- 
ing authority agrees to withdraw certain specifications, or if the 
accused agrees to waive the right to an Article 32 investigation, 
this should be stated. The written agreement should contain a 
statement by the accused that the accused enters it freely and vol- 
untarily and may contain a statement that the accused has been 
advised of certain rights in connection with the agreement. 
(3) Acceptance. The convening authority may ei- 
ther accept or reject an offer of the accused to enter 
into a pretrial agreement or may propose by 
counteroffer any terms or conditions not prohibited 
by law or public policy. The decision whether to ac- 
cept or reject an offer is within the sole discretion of 
the convening authority. When the convening au- 
thority has accepted a pretrial agreement, the agree- 
ment shall be signed by the convening authority or 
by a person, such as the staff judge advocate or trial 
counsel, who has been authorized by the convening 
authority to sign. 
Discussion 
The convening authority should consult with the staff judge 
advocate or trial counsel before acting on an offer to enter into a 
pretrial agreement. 
(4)  Withdrawal. 
(A)By accused. The accused may withdraw 
from a pretrial agreement at any time; however, the 
accused may withdraw a plea of guilty or a confes- 
sional stipulation entered pursuant to a pretrial 
agreement only as provided in R.C.M. 910(h) or 
81  l(d), respectively. 
(B)  By convening authority. The convening au- 
thority may withdraw from a pretrial agreement at 
any time before the accused begins performance of 
promises contained in the agreement, upon the fail- 
ure by the accused to fulfill any material promise or 
condition in the agreement, when inquiry by the mil- 
itary judge discloses a disagreement as to a material 
term in the agreement, or if findings are set aside be- 
cause a plea of guilty entered pursuant to the agree- 
ment is held improvident on appellate review. 
(e)  Nondisclosure of existence of agreement. Except 
in a special court-martial without a military judge, 
R.C.M. 706(b)(2) 
no member of a court-martial shall be informed of 
the existence of a pretrial agreement. In addition, ex- 
cept as provided in Mil.R.Evid. 410, the fact that an 
accused offered to enter into a pretrial agreement, 
and any statements made by an accused in connec- 
tion therewith, whether during negotiations or dur- 
ing a providence inquiry, shall not be otherwise dis- 
closed to the members. 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M. 910(f) (plea agreement inquiry). 
Rule 706.  Inquiry into the mental capacity or 
mental responsibility of the accused 
(a)  Initial action. If it appears to any commander 
who considers the disposition of charges, or to any 
investigating officer, trial counsel, defense counsel, 
military judge, or member that there is reason to be- 
lieve that the accused lacked mental responsibility 
for any offense charged or lacks capacity to stand 
trial, that fact and the basis of the belief or observa- 
tion shall be transmitted through appropriate chan- 
nels to the officer authorized to order an inquiry into 
the mental condition of the accused. The submission 
may be accompanied by an application for a mental 
examination under this rule. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 909 concerning the capacity of the accused to 
stand trial and R.C.M. 916(k) concerning mental responsibility of 
the accused. 
(b)  Ordering an  inquiry. 
(1)  Before referral. Before referral of charges, an 
inquiry into the mental capacity or mental responsi- 
bility of the accused may be ordered by the conven- 
ing authority before whom the charges are pending 
for disposition. 
(2) After referral. After referral of charges, an in- 
quiry into the mental capacity or mental responsibil- 
ity of the accused may be ordered by  the military 
judge. The convening authority may order such an 
inquiry after referral of charges but before beginning 
of the first session of the court-martial (including 
any Article 39(a) session) when the military judge is 
not reasonably available. The military judge may or- 
der a mental examination of the accused regardless R.C.M.  706(b)(2) 
of any earlier determination by the convening au- 
thority. 
(c)  Inquiry. 
(1) By whom conducted. When a mental examina- 
tion is ordered under subsection (b) of this rule, the 
matter shall be referred to a board consisting of one 
or more persons. Each member of the board shall be 
either a physician or a clinical psychologist. Nor- 
mally, at least one member of the board shall be ei- 
ther a psychiatrist or a clinical psychologist. The 
board shall report as to the mental capacity or 
mental responsibility or both of the accused. 
(2)  Matters in inquiry. When a mental examina- 
tion is ordered under this rule, the order shall con- 
tain the reasons for doubting the mental capacity or 
mental responsibility,  or both, of the accused, or 
other reasons for requesting the examination. In ad- 
dition to other requirements, the order shall require 
the board to make separate and distinct findings as 
to each of the following questions: 
(A) At the time of the alleged criminal con- 
duct, did the accused have a severe mental disease or 
defect? (The term "severe mental disease or defect" 
does not include an abnormality manifested only by 
repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct, 
or minor disorders such as nonpsychotic behavior 
disorders and personality defects.) 
(B) What is the clinical psychiatric diagnosis? 
(C) Was the accused, at the time of the alleged 
criminal conduct and as a result of such severe 
mental disease or defect, unable to appreciate the na- 
ture and quality or wrongfulness of his or her con- 
duct? 
(D) Does the accused have sufficient mental 
capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings 
and to conduct or cooperate intelligently in the de- 
fense? 
Other appropriate questions may also be included. 
(3)  Directions to board. In addition to the require- 
ments specified in subsection (c)(2) of this rule, the 
order to the board shall specify: 
(A)  That upon completion of the board's inves- 
tigation, a statement consisting only of the board's 
ultimate conclusions as to all questions specified in 
the order shall be submitted to the officer ordering 
the examination, the accused's commanding officer, 
the investigating officer, if  any, appointed pursuant 
to Article 32 and to all counsel in the case, the con- 
vening authority, and, after referral, to the military 
judge; 
(B)  That the full report of the board may be re- 
leased by the board or other medical personnel only 
to other medical personnel for medical purposes, un- 
less otherwise authorized by the convening author- 
ity or, after referral of charges, by the military judge, 
except that a copy of the full report shall be fur- 
nished to the defense and, upon request, to the com- 
manding officer of the accused; and 
(C) That neither the contents of the full report 
nor any matter considered by the board during its 
investigation shall be released by the board or other 
medical personnel to any person not authorized to 
receive the full report, except pursuant to an order 
by the military judge. 
Discussion 
Based on the report, further action in the case may be sus- 
pended, the charges may be dismissed by  the convening author- 
ity, administrative action may be taken to discharge the accused 
from the service or, subject to Mil.R.Evid.  302, the charges may 
be tried by court-martial. 
(4) Additional examinations. Additional exami- 
nations may be directed under this rule at any stage 
of the proceedings as circumstances may require. 
(5)  Disclosure  to trial counsel. No person, other 
than the defense counsel, accused, or, after referral 
of charges, the military judge may disclose to the 
trial counsel any statement made by the accused to 
the board or any evidence derived from such state- 
ment. 
Discussion 
See Mil.R.Evid. 302. 
Rule 707.  Speedy trial 
(a)  In general. The accused shall be brought to trial 
within 120 days after the earlier of: 
(1)  Preferral of charges; 
Discussion 
Delay from the time of an offense to preferral of charges or 
the imposition of pretrial restraint is not considered for speedy 
trial purposes. See also Article 43 (statute of limitations). In some 
circumstances such delay may prejudice the accused and may re- 
sult in dismissal of the charges or other relief. Offenses ordinarily should be disposed of promptly to serve the interests of good or- 
der and discipline. Priority shall be given to persons in arrest or 
confinement. 
(2)  The imposition of restraint under R.C.M. 
304(a)(2)-(4); or 
(3)  Entry on active duty under R.C.M. 204. 
(b)  Accountability. 
(1)  In general. The date of preferral of  charges, 
the date on which pretrial restraint under R.C.M. 
304 (a)(2)-(4) is imposed, or the date of entry on ac- 
tive duty under R.C.M. 204 shall not count for pur- 
pose of computing time under subsection (a) of this 
rule. The date on which the accused is brought to 
trial shall count. The accused is brought to trial 
within the meaning of this rule at the time of ar- 
raignment under R.C.M. 904. 
(2)  Multiple Charges. When charges are preferred 
at different times, accountability for each charge 
shall be determined from the appropriate date under 
subsection (a) of this rule for that charge. 
(3)  Events which affect time periods. 
(A)  Dismissal  or mistrial. If charges are dis- 
missed, or if  a mistrial is granted, a new  120-day 
time period under this rule shall begin on the date of 
dismissal or mistrial for cases in which there is no 
repreferral and cases in which the accused is in pre- 
trial restraint. In all other cases, a new 120-day time 
period under the rule shall begin on the earlier of 
(i)  the date of repreferral; 
(ii)  the date of imposition of restraint under 
R.C.M. 304(a)(2)-(4). 
(B) Release from restraint. If the accused is re- 
leased from pretrial restraint for a significant period, 
the 120-day time period under this rule shall begin 
on the earlier of 
(i)  the date of preferral of charges; 
(ii)  the date on which  restraint under 
R.C.M. 304(a) (2)-(4)  is reimposed; or 
(iii)  the date of entry on active duty under 
R.C.M. 204. 
(C)  Government appeals. If notice of appeal 
under R.C.M. 908 is filed, a new  120-day time pe- 
riod under this rule shall begin, for all charges 
neither proceeded on nor severed under R.C.M. 
908(b)(4), on the date of notice to the parties under 
R.C.M. 908(b)(8) or 908(c)(3), unless it is deter- 
mined that the appeal was filed solely for the pur- 
pose of delay with the knowledge that it was totally 
R.C.M. 707(c)(2) 
frivolous and without merit. After the decision of 
the Court of Military Review under R.C.M. 908, if 
there is a further appeal to the Court of Military Ap- 
peals or, subsequently, to the Supreme Court, a new 
120-day time period under this rule shall begin on 
the date the parties are notified of the final decision 
of the Court of Military Appeals, or, if  appropriate, 
the Supreme Court. 
(D) Rehearings. If a rehearing is ordered or au- 
thorized by  an appellate court, a new 120-day time 
period under this rule shall begin on the date that the 
responsible convening authority receives the record 
of trial and the opinion authorizing or directing a re- 
hearing. 
(c)  Excludable delay. All periods of time covered by 
stays issued by appellate courts and all other pretrial 
delays approved by a military judge or the conven- 
ing authority shall be excluded when determining 
whether the period in subsection (a) of this rule has 
run. 
(1)  Procedure. Prior to referral, all requests for 
pretrial delay, together with supporting reasons, will 
be submitted to the convening authority or, if  au- 
thorized under regulations prescribed by the Secre- 
tary concerned, to a military judge for resolution. 
After referral, such requests for pretrial delay will be 
submitted to the military judge for resolution. 
Discussion 
The decision to grant or deny a reasonable delay is a matter 
within the sole discretion of the convening authority or a military 
judge.  This decision should be based on the facts and circum- 
stances then and there existing. Reasons to grant a delay might, 
for example, include the need for: time to enable counsel to pre- 
pare for trial in complex cases; time to allow examination into the 
mental capacity of the accused; time to process a member of the 
reserve component to active duty for disciplinary action; time to 
complete other proceedings related to the case; time requested by 
the defense; time to secure the availability of the accused, substan- 
tial witnesses, or other evidence; time to obtain appropriate secur- 
ity clearances for access to classified information or time to de- 
classify evidence; or additional time for other good cause. 
Pretrial delays should not be granted ex parte, and when 
practicable, the decision granting the delay, together with sup- 
porting reasons and the dates covering the delay, should be re- 
duced to writing. 
Prior to referral, the convening authority may delegate the 
authority to grant continuances to an Article 32 investigating of- 
ficer. 
(2)  Motions. Upon accused's  timely motion to a 
military judge under R.C.M. 905 for speedy trial re- R.C.M. 707(c)(2) 
lief, counsel should provide the court a chronology 
detailing the processing of the case. This chronology 
should be made a part of the appellate record. 
(d)  Remedy. A failure to comply with the right to a 
speedy trial will result in dismissal of the affected 
charges. This dismissal will be with or without 
prejudice to the government's right to reinstitute 
court martial proceedings against the accused for 
the same offense at a later date. The charges must be 
dismissed with prejudice where the accused has been 
deprived of his or her constitutional right to a 
speedy trial. In determining whether to dismiss 
charges with or without prejudice, the court shall 
consider, among others, each of the following fac- 
tors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and cir- 
cumstances of the case that lead to dismissal; the im- 
pact of a reprosecution on the administration of 
justice; and any prejudice to the accused resulting 
from the denial of a speedy trial. 
(e)  Waiver.Except as provided in R.C.M. 910(a)(2), 
a plea of guilty which results in a finding of guilty 
waives any speedy trial issue as to that offense. 
Discussion 
Speedy trial issues may also be waived by a failure to raise 
the issue at trial. See R.C.M. 905(e) and 907(b)(2). CHAPTER VIII.  TRIAL PROCEDURE GENERALLY 

Rule 801.  Military judge's responsibilities; 

other matters 

(a) Responsibilities of military judge.  The military 
judge is the presiding officer in a court-martial. 
Discussion 
The military judge is responsible for ensuring that court- 
martial proceedings are conducted in a fair and orderly manner, 
without unnecessary delay or waste of time or resources. Unless 
otherwise specified, the president of a special court-martial with- 
out a military judge has the same authority and responsibility as a 
military judge. See R.C.M. 502(b)(2). 
The military judge shall: 
(1)  Determine the time and uniform for each ses- 
sion of a court-martial; 
Discussion 
The military judge should consult with counsel concerning 
the scheduling of sessions and the uniform to be worn. The mili- 
tary judge recesses or adjourns the court-martial as appropriate. 
Subject to R.C.M. 504(d)(l),  the military judge may also deter- 
mine the place of trial. See also R.C.M. 906(b)(l1). 
(2)  Ensure that the dignity and decorum of the 
proceedings are maintained; 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M. 804 and 806. Courts-martial should be con- 
ducted in an atmosphere which  is conducive to calm and de- 
tached deliberation and determination of the issues presented and 
which reflects the seriousness of the proceedings. 
(3)  Subject to the code and this Manual, exercise 
reasonable control over the proceedings to promote 
the purposes of these rules and this Manual; 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 102. The military judge may, within the frame- 
work established by the code and this Manual, prescribe the man- 
ner and order in which the proceedings may take place. Thus, the 
military judge may determine: when, and in what order, motions 
will be litigated (see R.C.M. 905); the manner in which voir dire 
will be conducted and challenges made (see R.C.M. 902(d) and 
912); the order in which  witnesses may testify (see R.C.M. 913; 
Mil.R.Evid. 61 1); the order in which  the parties may argue on a 
motion or objection; and the time limits for argument (see R.C.M. 
905; 919; lOOl(g)). 
The military judge should prevent unnecessary waste of time 
and promote the ascertainment of truth, but must avoid undue in- 
terference with  the parties' presentations or the appearance of 
partiality. The parties are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to 
properly present and support their contentions on any relevant 
matter. 
(4)  Subject to subsection (e) of this rule, rule on 
all interlocutory questions'and all questions of law 
raised during the court-martial; and 
(5)  Instruct the members on questions of law and 
procedure which may arise. 
Discussion 
The military judge instructs the members concerning find- 
ings (see R.C.M. 920) and sentence (see R.C.M. 1005), and when 
otherwise appropriate. For example, preliminary instructions to 
the members concerning their duties and the duties of other trial 
participants and other matters are normally appropriate. See 
R.C.M. 913. Other instructions (for example, instructions on the 
limited purpose for which evidence has been  introduced, see 
Mil.R.Evid. 105) may be given whenever the need arises. 
(b) Rules of court; contempt. The military judge 
may: 
(1)  Subject to R.C.M. 108, promulgate and en- 
force rules of court. 
(2)  Subject to R.C.M. 809, exercise contempt 
power. 
(c)  Obtaining evidence. The court-martial may act 
to obtain evidence in addition to that presented by 
the parties. The right of the members to have addi- 
tional evidence obtained is subject to an interlocu- 
tory ruling by the military judge. 
Discussion 
The members may request and the military judge may re- 
quire that a witness be recalled, or that a new witness be sum- 
moned, or other evidence produced. The members or military 
judge may direct trial counsel to make an inquiry along certain 
lines to discover and produce additional evidence. See also 
Mil.R.Evid. 614. In taking such action, the court-martial must 
not depart from an impartial role. 
(d)  Uncharged offenses. If during the trial there is 
evidence that the accused may be guilty of an un- 
tried offense not alleged in any specification before 
the court-martial, the court-martial shall proceed 
with the trial of the offense charged. R.C.M. 80l(d) 
Discussion 
A report of the matter may be made to the convening author- 
ity after trial. If charges are preferred for an offense indicated by 
the evidence referred to in this subsection, no member of the 
court-martial who participated in the first trial should sit in any 
later trial. Such a member would ordinarily be subject to a chal- 
lenge for cause. See R.C.M. 912. See also Mil.R.Evid.  105 con- 
cerning instructing the members on evidence of uncharged mis- 
conduct. 
(e)  Interlocutory questions and questions of law. For 
purposes of this subsection "military judge"  does 
not include the president of a special court-martial 
without a military judge. 
(1)  Rulings by the military  judge. 
(A) Finality of rulings. Any ruling by the mili- 
tary judge upon a question of law, including a mo- 
tion for a finding of not guilty, or upon any interloc- 
utory question is final. 
(B)  Changing a ruling. The military judge may 
change a ruling made by that or another military 
judge in the case except a previously granted motion 
for a finding of not guilty, at any time during the 
trial. 
(C) Article 39(a) sessions.  When required by 
this Manual or otherwise deemed appropriate by the 
military judge, interlocutory questions or questions 
of law shall be presented and decided at sessions 
held without members under R.C.M. 803. 
Discussion 
Sessions without members are appropriate for interlocutory 
questions, questions of law, and instructions. See also Mil.R.Evid. 
103; 304; 31 1; 321. Such sessions should be used to the extent pos- 
sible consistent with the orderly, expeditious progress of the pro- 
ceedings. 
(2)  Ruling by the  president of a special court-mar- 
tial without a military judge. 
(A)  Questions of law. Any ruling by the presi- 
dent of a special court-martial without a military 
judge on any question of law other than a motion for 
a finding of not guilty is final. 
(B)  Questions of fact.  Any ruling by  the presi- 
dent of a special court-martial without a military 
judge on any interlocutory question of fact, includ- 
ing a factual issue of mental capacity of the accused, 
or on a motion for a finding of not guilty, is final un- 
less objected to by a member. 
(C)  Changing a ruling. The president of a spe- 
cial court-martial without a military judge may 
change a ruling made by that or another president in 
the case except a previously granted motion for a 
finding of not guilty, at any time during the trial. 
(D) Presence of members. Except as provided 
in R.C.M. 505 and 912, all members will be present 
at all sessions of a special court-martial without a 
military judge, including sessions at which questions 
of law or interlocutory questions are litigated. How- 
ever, the president of a special court-martial without 
a military judge may examine an offered item of real 
or documentary evidence before ruling on its admis- 
sibility without exposing it to other members. 
(3)  Procedures  for rulings by the  president of a spe- 
cial court-martial without a military judge  which are 
subject to objection by a member. 
(A) Determination.  The president of a special 
court-martial without a military judge shall deter- 
mine whether a ruling is subject to objection. 
(B)  Instructions.  When a ruling by the presi- 
dent of a special court-martial without a military 
judge is subject to objection, the president shall so 
advise the members and shall give such instructions 
on the issue as may be necessary to enable the mem- 
bers to understand the issue and the legal standards 
by which they will determine it if objection is made. 
(C)  Voting. When a member objects to a ruling 
by the president of a special court-martial without a 
military judge which is subject to objection, the 
court-martial shall be closed, and the members shall 
vote orally, beginning with the junior in rank, and 
the question shall be decided by a majority vote. A 
tie vote on a motion for a finding of not guilty is a de- 
termination against the accused. A tie vote on any 
other question is a determination in favor of the ac- 
cused. 
(D) Consultation. The president of  a special 
court-martial without a military judge may close the 
court-martial and consult with other members 
before ruling on a matter, when such ruling is sub- 
ject to the objection of any member. 
(4) Standard of pro05  Questions of fact in an in- 
terlocutory question shall be determined by  a pre- 
ponderance of the evidence, unless otherwise stated 
in this Manual. In the absence of a rule in this Man- 
ual assigning the burden of persuasion, the party 
making the motion or raising the objection shall bear 
the burden of persuasion. Discussion 
A ruling on an interlocutory question should be preceded by 
any necessary inquiry into the pertinent facts and law. For exam- 
ple, the party making the objection, motion, or request may be re- 
quired to furnish evidence or legal authority in support of the con- 
tention. An interlocutory issue may have a different standard of 
proof. See, for example, Mil.R.Evid. 314(e)(5),  which requires 
consent for a search to be proved by  clear and convincing evi- 
dence. 
Most of the common motions are discussed in specific rules 
in this Manual, and the burden of persuasion is assigned therein. 
The prosecution  usually bears the burden  of persuasion  (see 
Mil.R.Evid. 304(e);  311(e); see also R.C.M.  905 through 907) 
once an issue has been raised. What "raises"  an issue may vary 
with the issue. Some issues may be raised by  a timely motion or 
objection. See, for example, Mil.R.Evid.  304(e). Others may not 
be raised until the defense has made an offer of proof or presented 
evidence in support of its position. See, for example, Mil.R.Evid. 
31  1(g)(2). The rules in this Manual and relevant decisions should 
be consulted when a question arises as to whether an issue is 
raised, as well as which side has the burden  of persuasion. The 
military judge or president of a special court-martial may require 
a party to clarify a motion or objection or to make an offer of 
proof,  regardless of the burden of persuasion, when it appears 
that the motion or objection is vague, inapposite, irrelevant, or 
spurious. 
(5) Scope. Subsection (e) of this rule applies to the 
disposition of questions of law and interlocutory 
questions arising during trial except the question 
whether a challenge should be sustained. 
Discussion 
Questions of law and interlocutory questions include all is- 
sues which arise during trial other than the findings (that is, guilty 
or not guilty), sentence, and administrative matters such as de- 
claring recesses and adjournments. A question may be both inter- 
locutory and a question of law. Challenges are specifically cov- 
ered in R.C.M. 902 and 912. 
Questions of the applicability of a rule of law to an undis- 
puted set of facts are normally questions of law. Similarly, the le- 
gality of an act is normally a question of law. For example, the le- 
gality of an order when disobedience of an order is charged, the 
legality of restraint when there is a prosecution for breach of ar- 
rest, or the sufficiency of warnings before interrogation are nor- 
mally questions of law. It is possible, however, for such questions 
to be decided solely upon some factual issue, in which case they 
would be questions of fact. For example, the question of what 
warnings, if any, were given by an interrogator to a suspect would 
be a factual question. 
A question is interlocutory unless the ruling on it  would  fi-
nally decide whether the accused is guilty. Questions which may 
determine the ultimate issue of guilt are not interlocutory. An is- 
sue may arise as both an interlocutory question and a question 
which may determine the ultimate issue of guilt. An issued is not 
R.C.M. 801(g) 
purely interlocutory if an accused raises a defense or objection 
and the disputed facts involved determine the ultimate question 
of guilt. For example, if during a trial for desertion the accused 
moves to dismiss for lack or jurisdiction  and presents some evi- 
dence that the accused is not a member of an armed force, the ac- 
cused's status as a military person  may determine the ultimate 
question of guilt because status is an element of the offense. If the 
motion is denied, the disputed facts must be resolved by each 
member in deliberation upon the findings. (The accused's status 
as a servicemember would have to be proved by a preponderance 
of the evidence to uphold jurisdiction, see R.C.M. 907, but be- 
yond a reasonable doubt to permit a finding of guilty.) If, on the 
other hand, the accused was charged with larceny and presented 
the same evidence as to military status, the evidence would  bear 
only upon amenability to trial and the issue would be disposed of 
solely as an interlocutory question. 
Interlocutory questions may be questions of fact or questions 
of law. This distinction  is important because the president  of a 
special court-martial without a military judge rules finally on in- 
terlocutory questions of law, but not on interlocutory questions of 
fact. On interlocutory questions of fact the president of a special 
court-martial without a military judge rules subject to the objec- 
tion of any other member. On mixed questions of fact and law, 
rulings by the president are subject to objection by any member to 
the extent that the issue of fact can be isolated and considered sep- 
arately. 
(f)  Rulings on record. All sessions involving rulings 
or instructions made or given by the military judge 
or the president of a special court-martial without a 
military judge shall be made a part of the record. All 
rulings and instructions shall be made or given in 
open session in the presence of the parties and the 
members, except as otherwise may be determined in 
the discretion of the military judge. For purposes of 
this subsection [R.C.M. 801(f)] "military judge" 
does not include the president of a special court- 
martial without a military judge: 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 808 and 1103 concerning preparation  of the re- 
cord of trial. 
(g)  Effect  of failure  to raise defenses or objections. 
Failure by a party to raise defenses or objections or 
to make requests or motions which must be made at 
the time set by this Manual or by the military judge 
under authority of this Manual, or prior to any ex- 
tension thereof made by the military judge, shall 
constitute waiver thereof, but the military judge for 
good cause shown may grant relief from the waiver. R.C.M. 802 
Rule 802.  Conferences 
(a)  In general.  After referral, the military judge 
may, upon request of any party or sua sponte, order 
one or more conferences with the parties to consider 
such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious 
trial. 
Discussion 
Conferences between the military judge and counsel may be 
held when necessary before or during trial. The purpose of such 
conference is to inform the military judge of anticipated issues 
and to expeditiously resolve matters on which the parties can 
agree, not to litigate or decide contested issues. See subsection (c) 
below. No party may be compelled to resolve any matter at a con- 
ference. 
A conference may be appropriate in order to resolve schedul- 
ing difficulties, so that witnesses and members are not unnecessa- 
rily inconvenienced. Matters which will ultimately be in the mili- 
tary judge's  discretion, such as conduct of  voir dire, seating 
arrangements in the courtroom, or procedures when there are 
multiple accused may be resolved  at a conference. Conferences 
may be  used to advise the military judge of issues or problems, 
such as unusual motions or objections, which are likely to arise 
during trial. 
Occasionally it may be appropriate to resolve certain issues, 
in addition to routine or administrative matters, if  this can be 
done with the consent of the parties. For example, a request for a 
witness which, if litigated and approved at trial, would delay the 
proceedings and cause expense or inconvenience, might be re- 
solved at a conference. Note, however, that this could only be 
done by an agreement of the parties and not by a binding ruling of 
the military judge. Such a resolution must be included in the re- 
cord. See subsection (b) below. 
A military judge may not participate in negotiations relating 
to pleas. See R.C.M. 705 and Mil.R.Evid. 410. 
No place or method is prescribed for conducting a confer- 
ence. A conference may be conducted by radio or telephone. 
(b)  Matters on record.  Conferences need not be 
made part of the record, but matters agreed upon at 
a conference shall be included in the record orally or 
in writing. Failure of a party to object at trial to fail- 
ure to comply with this subsection shall waive this 
requirement. 
(c)  Rights of parties.  No party may be prevented 
under this rule from presenting evidence or from 
making any argument, objection, or motion at trial. 
(d) Accused's presence. The presence of the accused 
is neither required not prohibited at a conference. 
Discussion 
Normally the defense counsel may be presumed to speak for 
the accused. 
(e)  Admission. No admissions made. by the accused 
or defense counsel at a conference shall be used 
against the accused unless the admissions are re- 
duced to writing and signed by the accused and de- 
fense counsel. 
(f)  Limitations. This rule shall not be invoked in the 
case of an accused who is not represented by coun- 
sel, or in special court-martial without a military 
judge. 
Rule 803.  Court-martial sessions without 

members under Article 39(a) 

A military judge  who has been detailed to the 
court-martial may, under Article 39(a), after service 
of charges, call the court-martial into session with- 
out the presence of members. Such sessions may be 
held before and after assembly of the court-martial, 
and when authorized in these rules, after adjourn- 
ment and before action by the convening authority. 
All such sessions are a part of the trial and shall be 
conducted in the presence of the accused, defense 
counsel, and trial counsel, in  accordance with 
R.C.M. 804 and 805, and shall be made a part of the 
record. For purposes of this rule "military judge" 
does not include the president of a special court- 
martial without a military judge. 
Discussion 
The purpose of Article 39(a) is "to give statutory sanction to 
pretrial and other hearings without the presence of the members 
concerning those matters which are amendable to disposition on 
either a tentative or final basis by  the military judge."  The mili- 
tary judge  and members may, and ordinarily should, call the 
court-martial into session without members to ascertain the ac- 
cused's understanding of the right to counsel, the right to request 
trial by  military judge alone, or when applicable, enlisted mem- 
bers, and the accused's choices with respect to these matters; dis- 
pose of interlocutory matters; hear objections and motions; rule 
upon other matters that may legally be ruled upon by  the military 
judge, such as admitting evidence; and perform other procedural 
functions which do not require the presence of members. See, for 
example, R.C.M. 901-910.  The military judge may, if  permitted 
by  regulations of the Secretary concerned, hold the arraignment, 
receive pleas, and enter findings of guilty upon an accepted plea of 
guilty. Evidence may be  admitted and process, includ~ng  a sub- 
poena, may be issued to compel attendance of witnesses and pro- 
duction of evidence at such sessions. See R.C.M. 703. 
Article 39(a) authorizes sessions only after charges have 
been referred to trial and served on the accused, but the accused 
has an absolute tight to object, in time of peace, to any session un- 
til the period prescribed by Article 35 has run. 
See R.C.M. 804 concerning waiver by  the accused  of  the 
right to be present. See also R.C.M. 802 concerning conferences. 
Rule 804.  Presence of the accused at trial 

proceedings 

(a)  Presence required. The accused shall be present 
at the arraignment, the time of the plea, every stage 
of the trial including sessions conducted under Arti- 
cle 39(a), voir dire and challenges of members, the 
return of the findings, sentencing proceedings, and 
post-trial sessions, if  any, except as otherwise pro- 
vided by this rule. 
(b)  Continued presence  not required. The further 
progress of the trial to an including the return of the 
findings and, if necessary, determination of a sen- 
tence shall not be prevented and the accused shall be 
considered to have waived the right to be present 
whenever an accused, initially present: 
(1)  Is voluntarily absent after arraignment 
(whether or not informed by the military judge of 
the obligation to remain during the trial); or 
(2)  After being warned by the military judge that 
disruptive conduct will cause the accused to be re- 
moved from the courtroom, persists in conduct 
which is such as to justify exclusion from the court- 
room. 
Discussion 
Express waiver. The accused may expressly waive the right to 
be present at trial proceedings. There is no right to be absent, 
however, and the accused may be required to be present over ob- 
jection. Thus, an accused cannot frustrate efforts to identify the 
accused at trial by waiving the right to be present. The right to be 
present  is so fundamental, and the Government's interest in the 
attendance of the accused so substantial, that the accused should 
be permitted to waive the right to be present only for good cause, 
and only after the military judge explains to the accused the right, 
and the consequences of foregoing it, and secures the accused's 
personal consent to proceeding without the accused. 
Voluntary absence. In any case the accused may forfeit the 
right to be  present by  being voluntarily absent after arraignment. 
"Voluntary  absence"  means voluntary absence from trial. 
For an absence from court-martial proceedings to be voluntary, 
the accused must have known of the scheduled proceedings and 
intentionally missed them. For example, although an accused ser- 
R.C.M. 804(b)(2) 
vicemember might voluntarily be absent without authority, this 
would not justify proceeding with a court-martial in the accused's 
absence unless  the accused  was aware that the court-martial 
would be held during the period of the absence. 
An accused who is in military custody or otherwise subject 
to military control at the time of trial or other proceeding may not 
properly be absent from the trial or proceeding without securing 
the permission of the military judge on the record. 
The prosecution has the burden to establish by  a preponder- 
ance of the evidence that the accused's absence from trial is volun- 
tary. Voluntariness may not be presumed, but it may be inferred, 
depending on the circumstances. For example, it may be inferred, 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that an accused who 
was present when the trial recessed and who knew when the pro- 
ceedings were scheduled to resume, but who nonetheless is not 
present when court reconvenes at the designated time, is absent 
voluntarily. 
Where there is some evidence that an accused who is absent 
for a hearing or trial may lack mental capacity to stand trial, ca- 
pacity to voluntarily waive the right to be present for trial must be 
shown. See R.C.M. 909. 
Subsection (1) authorizes but does not require trial to pro- 
ceed in  the absence of the accused upon the accused's voluntary 
absence. When an accused is absent from trial after arraignment, 
a continuance or a recess may be appropriate, depending on all 
the circumstances. 
Removal for disruption. Trial may proceed without the pres- 
ence of an accused who has disrupted the proceedings, but only 
after at least one warning by  the military judge that such behavior 
may result in removal from the courtroom. In order to justify re- 
moval from the proceedings,  the accused's behavior should be of 
such a nature as to materially interfere with the conduct of the 
proceedings. 
The  military judge should consider alternatives to removal of 
a disruptive accused. Such alternatives include physical restraint 
(such as binding, shackling, and gagging) of the accused, or physi- 
cally segregating the accused in the courtroom. Such alternatives 
need not be tried before removing a disruptive accused under sub- 
section (2). Removal may be preferable to such an alternative as 
binding and gagging, which can be an affront to the dignity and 
decorum of the proceedings. 
Disruptive behavior of the accused may also constitute con- 
tempt. See R.C.M. 809. When the accused is removed  from the 
courtroom for disruptive behavior, the military judge should- 
(A) Afford the accused and defense counsel ample op- 
portunity to consult throughout the proceedings. 
To this end, the accused should be held or other- 
wise required to remain in the vicinity of the trial, 
and frequent recesses permitted to allow counsel to 
confer with the accused. 
(B) Take such additional steps as may be reasonably 
practicable to enable the accused to be informed 
about the proceedings. Although not required, 
technological aids, such as closed-circuit television 
or audio transmissions,  may be used for this pur- 
pose. 
(C) Afford the accused a continuing opportunity to re- 
turn to the courtroom upon assurance of good be- 
havior. To this end, the accused should be brought R.C.M. 804(b)(2) 
to the courtroom at appropriate intervals, and of- 
fered the opportunity to remain upon good behav- 
ior. 
(D) Ensure that the reasons for removal appear in the 
record. 
(c) Appearance and security of accused. 
(1) Appearance. The accused shall be properly at- 
tired in the uniform or dress prescribed by the mili- 
tary judge.  An accused servicemember shall wear 
the insignia of grade and may wear any decorations, 
emblems, or ribbons to which entitled. The accused 
and defense counsel are responsible for ensuring that 
the accused is properly attired; however, upon re- 
quest, the accused's commander shall render such 
assistance as may be reasonably necessary to ensure 
that the accused is properly attired. 
Discussion 
This subsection recognizes the right, as well as the obliga- 
tion, of an accused servicemember to present a good military ap- 
pearance at trial. An accused servicemember who refuses to pre- 
sent a proper military appearance before a court-martial may be 
compelled to do so. 
(2)  Custody. Responsibility for maintaining cus- 
tody or control of an accused before and during trial 
may be assigned, subject to R.C.M. 304 and 305, and 
subsection (c)(3) of this rule, under such regulations 
as the Secretary concerned may prescribe. 
(3)  Restraint. Physical restraint shall not be im- 
posed on the accused during open sessions of the 
court-martial unless prescribed by  the military 
judge. 
Rule 805.  Presence of military judge, 
members, and counsel 
(a)  Military judge. No court-martial proceeding, ex- 
cept the deliberations of the members, may take 
place in the absence of the military judge, if detailed. 
(b)  Members. Unless trial is by military judge alone 
pursuant to a request by  the accused, no court-mar- 
tial proceeding may take place in the absence of any 
detailed member except: Article 39(a) sessions 
under R.C.M. 803; examination of members under 
R.C.M. 912(d); when the member has been excused 
under R.C.M. 505 or 912(f); or as otherwise pro- 
vided in R.C.M. 1102. No general court-martial pro- 
ceeding requiring the presence of members may be 
conducted unless at least 5 members are present and, 
except as provided in R.C.M. 912(h), no special 
court-martial proceeding requiring the presence of 
members may be conducted unless at least 3 mem- 
bers are present. Except as provided in R.C.M. 
503(b), when an enlisted accused has requested en- 
listed members, no proceeding requiring the pres- 
ence of members may be conducted unless at least 
one-third of the members actually sitting on the 
court-martial are enlisted persons. 
(c)  Counsel. As long as at least one qualified counsel 
for each party is present, other counsel for each 
party may be absent from a court-martial session. 
An assistant counsel who lacks the qualifications 
necessary to serve as counsel for a party may not act 
at a session in the absence of such qualified counsel. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M.504(d) concerning qualifications of counsel. 
Ordinarily, no court-martial proceeding should take place if 
any defense or assistant defense counsel is absent unless the ac- 
cused expressly consents to the absence. The military judge may, 
however proceed  in the absence of one or more defense counsel, 
without the consent of the accused, if the military judge finds that, 
under the circumstances, a continuances, a continuance is not 
warranted and that the accused's  right to be adequately repre- 
sented would not be impaired. 
See R.C.M. 502(d)(6) and 505(d)(2) concerning withdrawal 
or substitution of counsel. See R.C.M. 506(d) concerning the 
right of the accused to proceed without counsel. 
(d) Effect  of replacement of member or military 
judge. 
(1)  Members. When after presentation of  evi- 
dence on the merits has begun, a new member if de- 
tailed under R.C.M. 505(c)(2)(B), trial may not pro- 
ceed unless the testimony and evidence previously 
admitted on the merits, if recorded verbatim, is read 
to the new member, or, if not recorded verbatim, 
and in the absence of a stipulation as to such testi- 
mony and evidence, the trial proceeds as if no evi- 
dence has been presented. 
Discussion 
When a new member is detailed, the military judge should 
give such instructions as  may be appropriate. See also R.C.M.912 
concerning voir dire and challenges. 
When the court-martial has been reduced below a quorum, a 
mistrial may be appropriate. See R.C.M.915. R.C.M.  806(b) 
(2)  Military judge. When, after the presentation 
of  evidence on the merits has begun in trial before 
military judge alone, a new military judge is detailed 
under R.C.M. 505(e)(2) trial may not proceed unless 
the accused requests, and the military judge  ap- 
proves, trial by military judge alone, and a verbatim 
record of the testimony and evidence or a stipulation 
thereof is read to the military judge, or the trial pro- 
ceeds as if no evidence had been presented. 
Rule 806.  Public trial 
(a)  In general. Except as otherwise provided in this 
rule, courts-martial shall be open to the public. For 
purposes of this rule, "public"  includes members of 
both the military and civilian communities. 
Discussion 
Because of the requirement for public trials, courts-martial 
must be conducted in facilities which can accommodate a reason- 
able number of spectators. Military exigencies may occasionally 
make attendance at courts-martial difficult or impracticable, as, 
for example, when a court-martial is conducted on a ship at sea or 
in a unit in a combat zone. This does not violate this rule. How- 
ever, such exigencies should not be manipulated to prevent at- 
tendance at a court-martial. The requirements of this rule may be 
met even though only servicemembers are able to attend a court- 
martial. Although not required, servicemembers should be en- 
couraged to attend courts-martial. 
When public access to a court-martial is limited for some 
reason, including lack of space, special care must be taken to 
avoid arbitrary exclusion of specific groups or persons. This may 
include allocating a reasonable number of seats to members of the 
press and to relatives of the accused, and establishing procedures 
for entering and exiting from the courtroom. See also subsection 
(b) below. There is no requirement that there actually be specta- 
tors at a court-martial. 
The fact that a trial is conducted with members does not 
make it a public trial. 
(b)  Control of spectators. In order to maintain the 
dignity and decorum of the proceedings or for other 
good cause, the military judge may reasonably limit 
the number of spectators in, and the means of access 
to, the courtroom, exclude specific persons from the 
courtroom, and close a session; however, a session 
may be closed over the objection of the accused only 
when expressly authorized by  another provision of 
this Manual. 
Discussion 
The military judge is responsible for protecting both the ac- 
cused's right to and the public's interest in a public trial. The  mili- 
tary judge must also ensure that the dignity and decorum of the 
proceedings are maintained and that the other rights and interests 
of the parties and society are protected. Public access to a session 
may be limited, and certain persons excluded from the court- 
room, and, under unusual circumstances, a session may be closed. 
A court-martial session is "closed"  when no member of the 
public is permitted  to attend. A court-martial is not "closed" 
merely because the exclusion of certain individuals results in 
there being no spectators present, so long as the exclusion is not so 
broad as to effectively bar everyone who might attend the sessions 
and is for a proper purpose. Note, however, that exclusion of spe- 
cific individuals, if unreasonable under the circumstances, may vi- 
olate the accused's right to a public trial, even though other spec- 
tators remain. 
Whenever a session is closed, or some of the public is ex- 
cluded, closure or exclusion must be limited in time and scope to 
the minimum necessary to achieve the purpose for which it is au- 
thorized. Prevention of overcrowding or noise may justify  limit- 
ing access to the courtroom. Disruptive or distracting appearance 
or conduct may justify excluding certain spectators. Certain spec- 
tators may be excluded when necessary to protect witnesses from 
harm or intimidation. Access may be reduced  when no other 
means is available to relieve inability to testify due to embarrass- 
ment or extreme nervousness. 
Under some circumstances,  it may be necessary  to conduct 
an evidentiary hearing to  justify exclusion of some spectators (for 
example, where harm to or intimidation of a witness is the reason 
for the exclusion). 
A session may be closed without the consent of the accused 
only under Mil.R.Evid. 412(c), 505(i) and (i),or 506(i). 
Witnesses will ordinarily be excluded from the courtroom so 
that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses. See 
Mil.R.Evid.  615. In addition, witnesses may be instructed no to 
discuss their testimony or prospective testimony with anyone ex- 
cept counsel, counsel's  agent, or the accused in the case. 
The accused may waive the right to a public trial. The fact 
that the prosecution and defense jointly  seek to have some ses- 
sions closed does not, however, automatically justify  closure, for 
the public has an interest in attending courts-martial. Opening 
courts-martial to public scrutiny reduces the chance of arbitrary 
or capricious decisions and enhances public confidence in the 
court-martial process.  Absent an overriding interest articulated 
in findings, a court-martial must be open to the public. 
The most likely reason  for a defense request to close court- 
martial proceedings is to minimize the potentially adverse effect 
of publicity on the trial. Thus, for example, a pretrial Article 
39(a) hearing at which the admissibility of a confession will be liti- 
gated may, under some circumstances, be closed in order to pre- 
vent disclosure to the public (and hence to potential members) of 
the very evidence that may be excluded. When such publicity may 
be a problem a session should be closed only as a last resort. 
There are other methods of protecting the proceedings from 
harmful effects of publicity, including a thorough voir dire (see 
R.C.M. 912), and, if necessary, a continuance to allow the harm- 
ful effects of publicity to dissipate. See R.C.M. 9067(b)(1). Other 
methods which may occasionally be appropriate and which are 
usually preferable to closing a session include: directing members 
not to read, listen to, or watch any accounts concerning the case; 
directing counsel, witnesses, and other personnel connected with R.C.M. 806(b) 
the case not to discuss the case with certain persons (see R.C.M. 
801); and selecting members from recent arrivals in the com- 
mand, or from outside the immediate area (see R.C.M. 503(a)(3)). 
In more extreme cases, the place of trial may be changed (see 
R.C.M. 906(b)(11)) or members may be sequestered. 
Occasionally the defense and prosecution may agree to re- 
quest a closed session to enable a witness to testify without fear of 
intimidation or acute embarrassment, or to testify about a matter 
which, while not classified, is of a sensitive or private nature. Clo- 
sure may be appropriate in such cases, but the military judge must 
carefully examine the reasons for the request and weigh them 
against the public's  interest in attending courts-martial. Exclud- 
ing only part of the public  may be more appropriate in some 
cases. 
(c)  Photography and broadcasting prohibited.  Video 
and audio recording and the taking of photo- 
graphs-except  for the purpose of preparing the re- 
cord of trial-in  the courtroom during the proceed- 
ings and radio or television broadcasting of 
proceedings from the courtroom shall not be permit- 
ted. However, the military judge may, as a matter of 
discretion permit contemporaneous closed-circuit 
video or audio transmission  to permit viewing or 
hearing by an accused removed under R.C.M. 804 
or by spectators when courtroom facilities are inade- 
quate to accommodate a reasonable number of spec- 
tators. 
Rule 807.  Oaths 
(a) Definition. "Oath"  includes "affirmation." 
Discussion 
An affirmation is the same as an oath, except in an affirma- 
tion the words "so help you God" are omitted. 
(b)  Oaths in courts-martial. 
(1)  Who  must be sworn. 
(A)  Court-martial personnel.  The military 
judge, members of a general or special court-martial, 
trial counsel, assistant trial counsel, defense counsel, 
associate defense counsel, assistant defense counsel, 
reporter, interpreter, and escort shall take an oath to 
perform their duties faithfully. For purposes of this 
rule, "defense counsel," "associate defense counsel," 
and "assistant  defense counsel,"  include detailed 
and individual military and civilian counsel. 
Discussion 
Article 42(a) provides that regulations of the Secretary con- 
cerned shall prescribed: the form of the oath; the time and place of 
the taking thereof; the manner of recording it; and whether the 
oath shall be taken for all cases in which the duties are to be per- 
formed or in each case separately. In the case of certified legal per- 
sonnel (Article 26(b); Article 27(b)) these regulations  may pro- 
vide for the administration of an oath on a one-time basis. See also 
R.C.M. 813 and 901 concerning the point in the proceedings at 
which it is ordinarily determined whether the required oaths have 
been taken or are then administered. 
(B) Witnesses. Each witness before a court- 
martial shall be examined on oath. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 307 concerning the requirement for an oath in 
preferral of charges. See R.C.M. 405 and 702 concerning the re- 
quirements for an oath in Article 32 investigations and deposi- 
tions. 
An accused making an unsworn statement is not a "wit- 
ness." See R.C.M. 1001(c)(2)(C). 
(2) Procedure for administering oaths. Any proce- 
dure which appeals to the conscience of the person 
to whom the oath is administered and which binds 
that person to speak the truth, or, in the case of one 
other than a witness, properly to perform certain du- 
ties, is sufficient. 
Discussion 
When the oath is administered in a session  to the military 
judge, members, or any counsel, all persons in the courtroom 
should stand. In those rare circumstances in which the trial coun- 
sel testifies as a witness, the military judge administers the oath. 
Unless otherwise prescribed  by  the Secretary concerned the 
forms below may be used, as appropriate, to administer an oath. 
(A) Oath for  military judge.  When the military judge is 
not previously sworn, the trial counsel will admin- 
ister the following oath to the military judge: 
"Do you (swear) (affirm) that you will faithfully and impar- 
tially perform, according to your conscience and the laws applica- 
ble to trial by court-martial, all the duties incumbent upon you as 
military judge of this court-martial (, so help you God)?" 
(B)Oathfor members. The following oath, as appropri- 
ate, will be administered to the members by  the 
trial counsel: 
"Do you (swear) (affirm) that you will answer truthfully the 
questions concerning whether you should serve as a member of 
this court-martial; that you will faithfully andimpartially try, ac- 
cording to the evidence, your conscience, and the laws applicable 
to trial by  court-martial, the case of the accused now before this 
court; and that you will not disclose or discover the vote or opin- ion of any particular member of the court (upon a challenge or) 
upon  the findings or sentence unless required to do so in due 
course of law (, so help you God)?" 
(C) Oaths  for  counsel. When counsel for either side, in- 
cluding any associate or assistant, is not previously 
sworn the following oath, as appropriate, will be 
administered by  the military judge: 
"Do you (swear) (affirm) that you will faithfully perform all 
the duties of (trial) (assistant trial) (defense) (associate defense) 
(assistant defense) counsel in the case now in hearing (, so help 
you God)?" 
(D) Oath for  reporter. The trial counsel will administer 
the following oath to every reporter of a court-mar- 
tial who has not been previously sworn: 
"Do you (swear) (affirm) that you will faithfully perform the 
duties of reporter to this court-martial (, so help you God)?" 
(E) Oath for  interpreter. The trial counsel or the sum- 
mary court-martial shall administer the following 
oath to every interpreter in  the trial of any case 
before a court-martial: 
"Do you (swear) (affirm) that in the case now in hearing you 
will interpret truly the testimony you are called upon to interpret 
(, so help you God)?" 
(F)  Oath  for witnesses. The trial counsel or the summary 
court-martial will administer the following oath to 
each witness before the witness first testifies in a 
case: 
"Do you (swear) (affirm) that the evidence you shall give in 
the case now in hearing shall be  the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth (, so help you God)?" 
(G) Oath for  escort. The escort on views or inspections 
by  the court-martial will, before serving, take the 
following oath, which will be administered by  the 
trial counsel: 
"Do you (swear) (affirm) that you will escort the court-mar- 
tial and will well and truly point out to them (the place in which 
the offense charged in this case is alleged to have been committed) 
(  ); and that you will not speak to the mem- 
bers concerning (the alleged offense) (  1, ex-
cept to describe (the place aforesaid) (  (7  so 
help you God)?" 
See Article 136 concerning persons authorized to administer 
oaths. 
Rule 808.  Record of trial 
The trial counsel of  a general or special court- 
martial shall take such action as may be necessary to 
ensure that a record which will meet the require- 
ments of R.C.M. 1103 can be prepared. 
Discussion 
Except in a special court-martial not authorized to adjudge a 
bad-conduct discharge (that is, when no qualified reporter is de- 
tailed or, absent exigency, military judge is detailed), the trial 
counsel should ensure that a qualified court reporter is detailed to 
R.C.M. 809(a) 
the court-martial. Trial counsel should also ensure that all exhib- 
its and other documents relating to the case are properly main- 
tained for later inclusion in the record. See also R.C.M. 1  103(j)  as 
to the use of videotapes, audiotapes, and similar recordings for 
the record of trial. Because of the potential requirement for a ver- 
batim transcript, all proceedings, including sidebar conferences, 
arguments, and rulings and instructions by  the military judge, 
should be recorded. 
Where there is recorder failure or loss of court reporter's 
notes, the record should be reconstructed  as completely as possi- 
ble. See also R.C.M. 1103(f). If the interruption is discovered dur- 
ing trial, the military judge should summarize or reconstruct the 
portion of the proceedings which has not been recorded and then 
proceed anew and repeat the proceedings from the point where 
the interruption began. 
See R.C.M. 1305 concerning the record of trial in summary 
courts-martial. 
See DD  Forms 490 (Record of Trial), 49 1 (Summarized Re- 
cord of Trial), and 491-1  (Summarized  Record of Tr~al-Article 
39(a) Session). 
Rule 809.  Contempt proceedings 
(a)  In general. Courts-martial may exercise con- 
tempt power under Article 48. 
Discussion 
Article 48 provides: "A court-martial provost court, or mili- 
tary commission may punish for contempt any person  who uses 
any menacing word, sign, or gesture in its presence, or who dis- 
turbs its proceedings by  any riot or disorder. The punishment 
may not exceed confinement for 30 days or a fine of $100, or 
both." 
Article 48 makes punishable "direct"  contempt, that is, con- 
tempt which is committed in the presence of the court-martial or 
its immediate proximity."Presence"  includes those places outside 
the courtroom itself, such as waiting areas, deliberation room, 
and other places set aside for the use of the court-martial while it 
is in session. A "direct"  contempt may be actually seen or heard 
by the court-martial, in which case it may be punished summa- 
rily. See subsection (b)(l) below. A "direct"  contempt may also 
be a contempt not actually observed by  the court-martial, for ex- 
ample, when an unseen person makes loud noises, whether inside 
or outside the courtroom, which impede the orderly progress of 
the proceedings.  In such a case the procedures for punishing for 
contempt are more extensive. See subsection (b)(2) below. 
The words "any  person,"  as used in  Article 48, include all 
persons, whether or not subject to military law, except the mili- 
tary judge, members, and foreign nationals outside the territorial 
limits of the United States who are not subject to the code. 
Each contempt may be separately punished. 
A person subject to the code who commits contempt may be 
tried by  court-martial or otherwise disciplined for such miscon- 
duct in addition to or instead of punishment for contempt. The 
military judge may order the offender removed whether or not 
contempt proceedings are held. In some cases it may be appropri- 
ate to warn a person whose conduct is improper that persistence R.C.M. 809(a) 
therein may result in removal or punishment for contempt. See 
R.C.M. 804,806. 
The military judge may issue orders when appropriate to en- 
sure the orderly progress of the trial. Violation of such orders is 
not punishable under Article 48, but may be prosecuted as a vio- 
lation of Article 90 or 92. See also Article 98. 
Refusal to appear or to testify is not punishable under Arti- 
cle 48. Persons not subject to military law having been duly sub- 
poenaed, may be prosecuted in Federal civilian court under Arti- 
cle 47 for neglect or refusal to appear or refusal to qualify as a 
witness or to testify or to produce evidence. Persons subject to the 
code may be punished  under Article 134 for such offenses. See 
paragraph  108, Part IV. 
A summary court-martial may punish for contempt. 
(b)  Method of disposition. 
(1)  Summary disposition. When conduct consti- 
tuting contempt is directly witnessed by  the court- 
martial, the conduct may be punished summarily. In 
such cases, the regular proceedings shall be sus- 
pended while the contempt is disposed of. 
(2) Disposition upon notice and hearing. When the 
conduct apparently constituting contempt is not di- 
rectly witnessed by the court-martial, the alleged of- 
fender shall be brought before the court-martial and 
informed orally or in writing of the alleged con- 
tempt. The alleged offender shall be given a reasona- 
ble opportunity to present evidence, including call- 
ing witnesses. The alleged offender shall have the 
right to be represented by counsel and shall be so ad- 
vised. The contempt must be proved beyond a rea- 
sonable doubt before it may be punished. 
(c)  Procedure; who may  punish for contempt. 
(1)  Members not present.  When the conduct al- 
legedly constituting contempt occurs during a ses- 
sion when the members are not present, the military 
judge shall determine whether to punish for con- 
tempt, and, if so, what the punishment shall be. The 
military judge may punish summarily under subsec- 
tion (b)(l) only if the military judge recites the facts 
for the record and states that they were directly wit- 
nessed by the military judge in the actual presence of 
the court-martial. 
(2)  Members present. When the conduct allegedly 
constituting contempt occurs during a session when 
the members are present, contempt proceedings may 
be initiated by the military judge or upon motion of 
any member, unless the military judge rules that as a 
matter of law, contempt has not been committed. If 
contempt proceedings are initiated the following 
procedures apply. 
(A) Instructions. The military judge shall in- 
struct the members so that they can properly decide 
the questions presented. 
(B)  Findings. The members shall decide in a 
closed session, upon vote by secret written ballot 
whether to hold an alleged offender in contempt. At 
least two-thirds of the members must concur in a 
finding of contempt to convict unless that member 
directly witnessed the conduct in question in the 
presence of the court-martial and finds it to be con- 
temptuous. 
(C)  Sentence. If the members find the offender 
in contempt, they shall, without reopening the 
court-martial determine the punishment in accor- 
dance with the procedures in R.C.M. 1006. 
(D)  Announcement. After reaching findings, 
and, if  necessary, a sentence, the court-martial shall 
be reopened and the results announced by the presi- 
dent. 
(d) Record; review. A record of the contempt pro- 
ceedings shall be part of the record of the court-mar- 
tial during which it occurred. If the person was held 
in contempt, then a separate record of the contempt 
proceedings shall be prepared and forwarded to the 
convening authority for review. The convening au- 
thority may approve or disapprove all or part of the 
sentence. The action of the convening authority is 
not subject to further review or appeal. 
(e)  Sentence. A sentence of confinement pursuant to 
a finding of contempt shall begin to run when it is 
adjudged unless deferred, suspended, or disap- 
proved by the convening authority. The place of 
confinement for a civilian or military person who is 
held in contempt and is to be punished by confine- 
ment shall be designated by the convening authority. 
A fine does not become effective until ordered exe- 
cuted by  the convening authority. The military 
judge  may delay announcing the sentence after a 
finding of contempt to permit the person involved to 
continue to participate in the proceedings. 
Discussion 
The immediate commander of the person held in contempt, 
or, in the case of a civilian, the convening authority should be no- 
tified immediately so that the necessary action on the sentence 
may be taken. See R.C.M. 1101. 
(f)  Informing person  held in contempt. The person 
held in contempt shall be informed by the convening authority in writing of the holding and sentence, if 
any, of the court-martial and of the action of the 
convening authority upon the sentence. 
Discussion 
Copies of this communication should be furnished to such 
other persons including the immediate commander of  the of- 
fender as may be concerned with the execution of the punishment. 
A copy shall be included with the record of both the trial and the 
contempt proceeding. 
Rule 810.  Procedures for rehearings, new 
trials, and other trials 
(a)  In general. 
(1)  Rehearings in full  and new or other trials. In 
rehearings which require findings on all charges and 
specifications referred to a court-martial and in new 
or other trials, the procedure shall be the same as in 
an original trial except as otherwise provided in this 
rule. 
(2)  Rehearings on sentence only. In  a rehearing on 
sentence only, the procedure shall be the same as in 
an original trial, except that the portion of the proce- 
dure which ordinarily occurs after challenges and 
through and including the findings is omitted, and 
except as otherwise provided in this rule. 
(A)  Contents of the record. The contents of the 
record of the original trial consisting of evidence 
properly admitted on the merits relating to each of- 
fense of which the accused stands convicted but not 
sentenced may be established by any party whether 
or not testimony so read is otherwise admissible 
under Mil.R.Evid.  804(b)(l) and whether or not it 
was given through an interpreter. 
Discussion 
Matters excluded from the record of the original trial on the 
merits or improperly admitted on the merits must not be brought 
to the attention of the members as a part of the original record of 
trial. 
(B)  Plea. The accused at a rehearing only on 
sentence may not withdraw any plea of guilty upon 
which findings of guilty are based. However, if such 
a plea is found to be improvident, the rehearing shall 
be suspended and the matter reported to the author- 
ity ordering the rehearing. 
R.C.M. 810(c)(2) 
(3)  Combined rehearings.  When a rehearing on 
sentence is combined with a trial on the merits of 
one or  more specifications referred to the court-mar- 
tial, whether or not such specifications are being 
tried for the first time or reheard, the trial will pro- 
ceed first on the merits, without reference to the of- 
fenses being reheard on sentence only. After findings 
on the merits are announced, the members, if any, 
shall be advised of the offenses on which the rehear- 
ing on sentence has been directed. Additional chal- 
lenges for cause may be permitted, and the sentenc- 
ing procedure shall be the same as at an original 
trial, except as otherwise provided in this rule. A sin- 
gle sentence shall be adjudged for all offenses. 
(b)  Composition. 
(1)  Members. No member of the court-martial 
which previously heard the case may sit as a member 
of the court-martial at any rehearing, new trial, or 
other trial of the same case. 
(2)  Military judge.  The military judge at a rehear- 
ing may be the same military judge who presided 
over a previous trial of the same case. The existence 
or absence of a request for trial by military judge 
alone at a previous hearing shall have no effect on 
the composition of a court-martial on rehearing. 
(3)  Accused's election. The accused at a rehearing 
or new or other trial shall have the same right to re- 
quest enlisted members or trial be military judge 
alone as the accused would have at an original trial. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 902; 903. 
(c)  Examination of record of formerproceedings.  No 
member may, upon a rehearing or upon a new or 
other trial, examine the record of any former pro- 
ceedings in the same case except: 
(1)  When permitted to do so by the military judge 
after such matters have been received in evidence; or 
(2)  That the president of a special court-martial 
without a military judge may examine that part of 
the record of former proceedings which relates to er- 
rors committed at the former proceedings when nec- 
essary to decide the admissibility of offered evidence 
or other questions of law, and such a part of the re- 
cord may be read to the members when necessary for 
them to consider a matter subject to objection by any 
member. R.C.M.  810(c)(2) 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 801(e)(2). 
When a rehearing is ordered, the trial counsel should be pro- 
vided a record of the former proceedings, accompanying docu- 
ments, and any decision or review relating to the case, as well as a 
statement of the reason for the rehearing. 
(d) Sentence limitations. 
(1)  In general. Except as otherwise provided in 
subsection (d)(2) of this rule, offenses on which a re- 
hearing, new trial, or other trial has been ordered 
shall not be the basis for punishment in excess of or 
more severe than the legal sentence adjudged at the 
previous trial or hearing, as ultimately reduced by 
the convening or higher authority, unless the sen- 
tence prescribed for the offense is mandatory. When 
a rehearing on sentencing is combined with trial on 
new charges, the maximum punishment shall be the 
maximum punishment for the offenses being reheard 
as limited above plus the total maximum punish- 
ment under R.C.M. 1003 for any new charges of 
which the accused has been found guilty. In the case 
of an "other  trial"  no sentence limitations apply if 
the original trial was invalid because a summary or 
special court-martial improperly tried an offense in- 
volving a mandatory punishment or one otherwise 
considered capital. 
Discussion 
In adjudging a sentence not in excess of one more severe than 
one imposed previously, a court-martial is not limited to adjudg- 
ing the same or a lesser amount of the same type of punishment 
formerly adjudged. An  appropriate sentence on a retried or 
reheard offense should be adjudged without regard to any credit 
to which the accused may be entitled. 
See R.C.M. 201(f)(2)(C); 1301(c). 
See R.C.M. 103(2) and (3) as to when a rehearing may be a 
capital case. 
The members should not be advised of the basis for the sen- 
tence limitation under this rule. 
(2)  Pretrial agreement. If, after the earlier court- 
martial, the sentence was approved in accordance 
with a pretrial agreement and at the rehearing the 
accused fails to comply with the pretrial agreement, 
by failing to enter a plea of guilty or otherwise, the 
sentence as to the affected charges and specifications 
may include any otherwise lawful punishment not in 
excess of or more severe than that lawfully adjudged 
at the earlier court-martial. 
(e)  Dejnition. "Other trial" means another trial of a 
case in which the original proceedings were declared 
invalid because of lack of jurisdiction  or failure of a 
charge to state an offense. 
Rule 811.  Stipulations 
(a) In general. The parties may make an oral or 
written stipulation to any fact, the contents of a doc- 
ument, or the expected testimony of a witness. 
(b) Authority to reject. The military judge  may, in 
the interest of justice, decline to accept a stipulation. 
Discussion 
Although the decision to stipulate should ordinarily be left 
to the parties, the military judge should not accept a stipulation if 
there is any doubt of the accused's  or any other party's  under- 
standing of the nature and effect of the stipulation. The military 
judge should also refuse to accept a stipulation which is unclear or 
ambiguous. A stipulation of fact which amounts to a complete de- 
fense to any offense charged should not be accepted nor, if a plea 
of not guilty  is  outstanding, should one which  practically 
amounts to a confession, except as described  in  the discussion 
under subsection (c) of this rule. If a stipulation is rejected, the 
parties may be entitled to a continuance. 
(c)  Requirements. Before accepting a stipulation in 
evidence, the military judge must be satisfied that 
the parties consent to its admission. 
Discussion 
Ordinarily, before accepting any stipulation the military 
judge should inquire to ensure that the accused understands the 
right not to stipulate, understands the stipulation, and consents to 
it. 
If the stipulation practically amounts to a confession to an 
offense to which a not guilty plea is outstanding, it may not be ac- 
cepted unless the military judge ascertains: (A) from the accused 
that the accused understands the right not to stipulate and that 
the stipulation will not be accepted without the accused's consent; 
that the accused understands the contents and effect of the stipu- 
lation; that a factual basis exists for the stipulation; and that the 
accused, after consulting with counsel, consents to the stipula- 
tion; and (B) from the accused  and counsel for each party 
whether there are any agreements between the parties in connec- 
tion with the stipulation, and, if so, what the terms of such agree- 
ments are. 
A stipulation practically amounts to a confession when it  is 
the equivalent ofa guilty plea, that is, when it establishes, directly 
or by reasonable inference, every element of a charged offense and 
when the defense does not present evidence to contest any poten- 
tial remaining issue of the merits. Thus, a stipulation which tends 
to establish, by  reasonable inference, every element of a charged 
offense does not practically  amount to a confession if the defense 
contests an issue going to guilt which is not foreclosed by  the stip- 
11-86 ulation. For example, a stipulation of fact that contraband drugs 
were discovered in a vehicle owned by the accused would nor- 
mally practically amount to a confession if no other evidence were 
presented on the issue, but would not if the defense presented evi- 
dence to show that the accused was unaware of the presence of 
the drugs. Whenever a stipulation establishes the elements of a 
charged offense, the military judge should conduct an inquiry as 
described above. 
If, during an inquiry into a confessional stipulation the mili- 
tary judge discovers that there is a pretrial agreement, the mili- 
tary judge must conduct an inquiry into the pretrial agreement. 
See R.C.M. 910(f). See also R.C.M. 705. 
(d)  Withdrawal. A party may withdraw from an 
agreement to stipulate or from a stipulation at any 
time before a stipulation is accepted; the stipulation 
may not then be accepted. After a stipulation has 
been accepted a party may withdraw from it only if 
permitted to do so in the discretion of the military 
judge. 
Discussion 
If a party withdraws from an agreement to stipulate or from 
a stipulation, before or after it has been accepted, the opposing 
party may be entitled to a continuance to obtain proof of the mat- 
ters which were to have been stipulated. 
If a party is permitted to withdraw from a stipulation previ- 
ously accepted, the stipulation must be disregarded by  the court- 
martial, and an instruction to that effect should be given. 
(e)  Effect of stipulation. Unless properly withdrawn 
or ordered stricken from the record, a stipulation of 
fact that has been accepted is binding on the court- 
martial and may not be contradicted by the parties 
thereto. The contends of a stipulation of expected 
testimony or of  a document's contents may be at- 
tacked, contradicted, or explained in the same way 
as if the witness had actually so testified or the docu- 
ment had been actually admitted. The fact that the 
parties so stipulated does not admit the truth of the 
indicated testimony or document's contents, nor 
does it add anything to the evidentiary nature of the 
testimony or document. The Military Rules of Evi- 
dence apply to the contents of stipulations. 
(0 Procedure. When offered, a written stipulation 
shall be presented to the military judge and shall be 
included in the record whether accepted or not. 
Once accepted, a written stipulation of expected tes- 
timony shall be read to the members, ifany, but shall 
not be presented to them; a written stipulation of 
fact or of  a document's contents may be read to the 
R.C.M. 813(a)(3) 
members, if  any, presented to them, or both. Once 
accepted, an oral stipulation shall be announced to 
the members, if  any. 
Rule 812.  Joint and common trials 
In joint trials and in common trials, each accused 
shall be accorded the rights and privileges as if tried 
separately. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 307(c)(5) concerning preparing charges and 
specifications for  joint trials. See R.C.M. 601(e)(3) concerning re- 
ferral of charges for joint or common trials, and the distinction 
between the two. See R.C.M. 906(b)(9) concerning motions to 
sever and other appropriate motions in joint  or common trials. 
In a joint or common trial, each accused may be represented 
by separate counsel, make challenges for cause, make peremptory 
challenges (see R.C.M. 912), cross-examine witnesses, elect 
whether to testify, introduce evidence, request that the member- 
ship of the court include enlisted persons, if an enlisted accused, 
and, if a military judge has been detailed, request trial by  military 
judge alone. 
Where different elections are made (and, when necessary, ap- 
proved) as to court-martial composition a severance is necessary. 
Thus, if one co-accused elects to be tried by a court-martial com- 
posed of officers, and a second requests that enlisted members be 
detailed to the court, and a third submits a request for trial by mil- 
itary judge alone, which request is approved, three separate trials 
must be conducted. 
In a joint or common trial, evidence which is admissible 
against only one or some of the joint or several accused may be 
considered only against the accused concerned. For example, 
when a stipulation is accepted which was made by  only one or 
some of the accused, the stipulation does not apply to those ac- 
cused who did not join  it. See also Mil.R.Evid. 306. In such in- 
stances the members must be instructed that the stipulation or ev- 
idence may be considered only with respect to the accused with 
respect to whom it is accepted. 
Rule 813.  Announcing personnel of the 
court-martial and accused 
(a)  Opening sessions. When the court-martial is 
called to order for the first time in a case, the mili- 
tary judge  shall ensure that the following is an- 
nounced: 
(1) The order, including any amendment, by 
which the court-martial is convened; 
(2)  The name, rank, and unit or address of the ac- 
cused; 
(3)  The name and rank of the military judge, if 
one has been detailed; R.C.M. 813(a)(4) 
(4)  The names and ranks of the members, if any, 
who are present; 
(5)  The names and ranks of members who are ab- 
sent, if presence of members is required; 
(6) The names and ranks (if any) of counsel who 
are present; 
(7)  The names and ranks (if any) of counsel who 
are absent; and 
(8)  The name and rank (if any) of any detailed 
court reporter. 
(b) Later proceedings.  When the court-martial is 
called to order after a recess or adjournment or after 
it has been closed for any reason, the military judge 
shall ensure that the record reflects whether all par- 
ties and members who were present at the time of 
the adjournment or recess, or at the time the court- 
martial closed, are present. 
(c) Additions,  replacement, and absences of person- 
nel. Whenever there is a replacement of the military 
judge, any member, or counsel, either through the 
appearance of new personnel or personnel previ- 
ously absent or through the absence of personnel 
previously present, the military judge shall ensure 
the record reflects the change and the reason for it. CHAPTER IX. TRIAL PROCEDURES THROUGH FINDINGS 

Rule 901.  Opening session 
(a)  Call to order. A court-martial is in session when 
the military judge so declares. 
Discussion 
The  military judge should examine the charge sheet, conven- 
ing order, and any amending orders before calling the initial ses- 
sion to order. 
Article 35 provides that in time of peace, no proceedings, in- 
cluding Article 39(a) sessions, may be conducted over the ac- 
cused's objection until five days have elapsed from the service of 
charges on the accused in the case of a general court-martial. The 
period is three days for a special court-martial. In computing 
these periods, the date of service and the date of the proceedings 
are excluded. Holidays and Sundays are not excluded. Failure to 
object waives the right to the waiting period, but if it appears that 
the waiting period has not elapsed, the military judge should 
bring this to the attention of the defense and secure an affirmative 
waiver on the record. 
(b) Announcement of parties.  After the court-mar- 
tial is called to order, the presence or absence of the 
parties, military judge, and members shall be an- 
nounced. 
Discussion 
If the orders detailing the military judge and counsel have 
not been reduced to writing, an oral announcement of such detail- 
ing is required. See R.C.M. 503(b) and (c). 
(c)  Swearing reporter and interpreter. After the per- 
sonnel have been accounted for as required in sub- 
section (b) of this rule, the trial counsel shall an- 
nounce whether the reporter and interpreter, if any 
is present, have been properly sworn. If not sworn, 
the reporter and interpreter, if any, shall be sworn. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 807 concerning the oath to be administered to a 
court reporter or interpreter.  If a reporter or interpreter is re- 
placed at any time during trial, this should be noted for the re- 
cord, and the procedures in this subsection should be repeated. 
(d)  Counsel. 
(1) Trial counsel. The trial counsel shall an- 
nounce the legal qualifications and status as to oaths 
of the members of the prosecution and whether any 
member of the prosecution has acted in any manner 
which might tend to disqualify that counsel. 
(2) Defense counsel. The detailed defense counsel 
shall announce the legal qualifications and status as 
to oaths of the detailed members of the defense and 
whether any member of the defense has acted in any 
manner which might tend to disqualify that counsel. 
Any defense counsel not detailed shall state that 
counsel's  legal qualifications, and whether that 
counsel has acted in any manner which might tend 
to disqualify the counsel. 
(3)  Disqualijication. If it appears that any counsel 
may be disqualified, the military judge shall decide 
the matter and take appropriate action. 
Discussion 
Counsel may be disqualified because of lack of necessary 
qualifications, or because of duties or actions which are inconsis- 
tent with the roleof counsel. See R.C.M. 502(d) concerning quali- 
fications of counsel. 
If it appears that any counsel may be disqualified, the mili- 
tary judge should conduct an inquiry or hearing. If any detailed 
counsel is disqualified, the appropriate authority should be in- 
formed. If any defense counsel is disqualified, the accused should 
be so informed. 
If the disqualification of trial or defense counsel is one which 
the accused may waive, the accused should be so informed by the 
military judge,  and given the opportunity to decide whether to 
waive the disqualification. In the case of defense counsel, if the 
disqualification is not waivable or if the accused elects not to 
waive the disqualification, the accused should be informed of the 
choices available and given the opportunity to exercise such op- 
tions. 
If any counsel is disqualified, the military judge should en- 
sure that the accused is not prejudiced by any actions of the dis- 
qualified counsel or any break in representation of the accused. 
Disqualification of counsel is not a jurisdictional defect; such 
error must be tested for prejudice. 
If the membership of the prosecution or defense changes at 
any time during the proceedings, the procedures in this subsec- 
tion should be repeated as to the new counsel. In addition, the 
military judge should ascertain on the record whether the accused 
objects to a change of defense counsel. See R.C.M. 505(d)(2) and 
506(c). 
(4) Inquiry. The military judge shall, in open ses- 
sion: 
(A) Inform the accused of the rights to be rep- 
resented by military counsel detailed to the defense; 
or by individual military counsel requested by  the 
accused, if such military counsel is reasonably avail- 
able; and by  civilian counsel, either alone or in asso- R.C.M. 901(d)(4)(A) 
ciation with military counsel, if such civilian counsel 
is provided at no expense to the United States; 
(B)  Inform the accused that, if afforded indi- 
vidual military counsel, the accused may request re- 
tention of detailed counsel as associate counsel, 
which request may be granted or denied in  the sole 
discretion of the authority who detailed the counsel; 
(C) Ascertain from the accused whether the 
accused understands these rights; 
(D)  Promptly inquire, whenever two or more 
accused in a joint  or common trial are represented 
by the same detailed or individual military or civil- 
ian counsel, or by civilian counsel who are associ- 
ated in the practice of law, with respect to such joint 
representation and shall personally advise each ac- 
cused of the right to effective assistance of counsel, 
including separate representation. Unless it appears 
that there is good cause to believe no conflict of in- 
terest is likely to arise, the military judge shall take 
appropriate measures to protect each accused's right 
to counsel; and 
Discussion 
Whenever it appears that any defense counsel may face a 
conflict of interest, the military judge should inquire into the mat- 
ter, advise the accused of the right to effective assistance of coun- 
sel, and ascertain the accused's choice of counsel. When defense 
counsel is aware of a potential conflict of interest, counsel should 
discuss the matter with the accused. If the accused elects to waive 
such conflict, counsel should inform the military judge of the 
matter at an Article 39(a) session so that an appropriate record 
can be made. 
(E) Ascertain from the accused by whom the 
accused chooses to be represented. 
(5)  Unsworn counsel. The military judge shall ad- 
minister the oath to any counsel not sworn. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 807. 
(e)  Presence of members. In cases in which a mili- 
tary judge has been detailed, the procedures de- 
scribed in  R.C.M. 901 through 903, 904 when au- 
thorized by  the Secretary concerned, and 905 
through 910 shall be conducted without members 
present in accordance with R.C.M. 803. 
Rule 902.  Disqualification  of military judge 
(a)  In general. Except as provided in subsection (e) 
of this rule, a military judge shall disqualify himself 
or herself in any proceeding in which that military 
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 
(b)  Specific grounds. A military judge shall also dis- 
qualify himself or herself in the following circum- 
stances: 
(1) Where the military judge has a personal bias 
or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowl- 
edge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding. 
(2) Where the military judge has acted as coun- 
sel, investigating officer, legal officer, staff judge ad- 
vocate, or convening authority as to any offense 
charged or in the same case generally. 
(3)  Where the military judge has been or will be a 
witness in  the same case, is the accuser, has for- 
warded charges in the case with a personal recom- 
mendation as to disposition, or, except in the per- 
formance of duties as military judge in a previous 
trial of the same or a related case, has expressed an 
opinion concerning the guilt or innocence of the ac- 
cused. 
(4)  Where the military judge is not eligible to act 
because the military judge is not qualified under 
R.C.M. 502(c) or not detailed under R.C.M. 503(b). 
(5)  Where the military judge, the military judge's 
spouse, or a person within the third degree of rela- 
tionship to either of them or a spouse of such person: 
(A) Is a party to the proceeding; 
(B)  Is known by the military judge to have an 
interest, financial or otherwise, that could be sub- 
stantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; 
or 
(C)  Is to the military judge's  knowledge likely 
to be a material witness in the proceeding. 
Discussion 
A military judge should inform himself or herself about his 
or her financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform 
himself or herself about the financial interests of his or her spouse 
and minor children living in his or her household. 
(c)  Definitions. For the purposes of this rule the fol- 
lowing words or phrases shall have the meaning in- 
dicated-
(1)  "Proceeding"  includes pretrial, trial, post- 
trial, appellate review, or other stages of litigation. (2)  The "degree of relationship"  is calculated ac- 
cording to the civil law system. 
Discussion 
Relatives within the third degree of relationship are children, 
grandchildren, great grandchildren, parents, grandparents, great 
grandparents,  brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, nephews, and 
nieces. 
(3)  "Military  judge"  does not include the presi- 
dent of a special court-martial without a military 
judge. 
(d)  Procedure. 
(1) The military judge shall, upon motion of any 
party or sua sponte, decide whether the military 
judge is disqualified. 
Discussion 
There is no peremptory challenge against a military judge. A 
military judge  should carefully consider whether any of the 
grounds for disqualification in this rule exist in each case. The 
military judge should broadly construe grounds for challenge but 
should not step down from a case unnecessarily. 
Possible grounds for disqualification  should be raised at the 
earliest reasonable opportunity. They may be raised at any time, 
and an earlier adverse ruling does not bar later consideration of 
the same issue, as, for example, when additional evidence is dis- 
covered. 
(2)  Each party shall be permitted to question the 
military judge and to present evidence regarding a 
possible ground for disqualification before the mili- 
tary judge decides the matter. 
(3)  Except as provided  under subsection (e) of 
this rule, if the military judge rules that the military 
judge is disqualified, the military judge shall recuse 
himself or herself. 
(e)  Waiver. No military judge shall accept from the 
parties to the proceeding a waiver of any ground for 
disqualification enumerated in subsection (b) of this 
rule. Where the ground for disqualification arises 
only under subsection (a) of this rule, waiver may be 
accepted provided it is preceded by  a full disclosure 
on the record of the basis for disqualification. 
Rule 903.  Accused's elections on 
composition of court-martial 
(a)  Time of elections. 
(1)  Request for  enlisted  members. Before the end 
of the initial Article 39(a) session or, in the absence 
R.C.M. 903(c)(2)(A) 
of such a session, before assembly, the military judge 
shall ascertain, as applicable, whether an enlisted ac- 
cused elects to be tried by a court-martial including 
enlisted members. The military judge may, as a mat- 
ter of discretion, permit the accused to defer request- 
ing enlisted members until any time before assem- 
bly, which time may be determined by the military 
judge. 
(2)  Request for  trial by military judge  alone. 
Before the end of the initial Article 39(a) session, or, 
in the absence of such a session, before assembly, the 
military judge shall ascertain, as applicable, whether 
in a noncapital case, the accused requests trial by the 
military judge  alone. The accused may defer re- 
questing trial by military judge alone until any time 
before assembly. 
Discussion 
Only an enlisted accused may request that enlisted members 
be detailed to a court-martial. Trial by  military judge alone is not 
permitted in capital cases (see R.C.M. 201(f)(l)(C)) or in special 
courts-martial in which no military judge has been detailed. 
(b)  Form of election. 
(1)  Request for  enlisted  members. A request for 
the membership of the court-martial to include en- 
listed persons shall be in writing and signed by  the 
accused or shall be made orally on the record. 
(2)  Request for  trial by military judge  alone. A re- 
quest for trial by military judge  alone shall be  in 
writing and signed by  the accused or shall be made 
orally on the record. 
(c) Action on election. 
(1)  Request for  enlisted members. Upon notice of 
a timely request for enlisted members by an enlisted 
accused, the convening authority shall detail en- 
listed members to the court-martial in accordance 
with R.C.M. 503 or prepare a detailed written state- 
ment explaining why physical conditions or military 
exigencies prevented this. The trial of the general is- 
sue shall not proceed until this is done. 
(2)  Request  for military  judge  alone. Upon receipt 
of a timely request for trial by military judge alone 
the military judge shall: 
(A) Ascertain whether the accused has con- 
sulted with defense counsel and has been informed 
of the identity of the military judge and of the right 
to trial by members; and R.C.M. 903(c)(2)(A) 
Discussion 
Ordinarily the military judge should inquire personally of 
the accused to ensure that the accused's waiver of the right to trial 
by members is knowing and understanding. Failure to do so is not 
error, however, where such knowledge and understanding other- 
wise appear on the record. 
DD Form  1722 (Request for Trial Before Military Judge 
Alone (Art.  16, UCMJ)) should normally be used for the purpose 
of requesting trial by military judge alone under this rule, if a 
written request is used. 
(B)  Approve or disapprove the request, in the 
military judge's discretion. 
Discussion 
A timely request for trial by military judge  alone should be 
granted unless there is substantial reason  why, in the interest of 
justice, the military judge should not sit as factfinder. The mili- 
tary judge may hear arguments from counsel before acting on the 
request. The basis for denial of a request must be made a matter of 
record. 
(3)  Other. In the absence of a request for enlisted 
members or a request for trial by military judge 
alone, trial shall be by a court-martial composed of 
officers. 
Discussion 
Ordinarily if no request for enlisted members or trial by mili- 
tary judge alone is submitted, the military judge should inquire 
whether such a request will be made (see subsection (a)(l) of this 
rule) unless these elections are not available to the accused. 
(d)  Right to withdraw request. 
(1)  Enlisted  members. A  request for enlisted 
members may be withdrawn by the accused as a 
matter of right any time before the end of the initial 
Article 39(a) session, or, in the absence of such a ses- 
sion, before assembly. 
(2)  Military judge.  A request for trial by military 
judge alone may be withdrawn by the accused as a 
matter of right any time before it is approved, or 
even after approval, if there is a change of the mili- 
tary judge. 
Discussion 
Withdrawal of a request for enlisted members or trial by  mil- 
itary judge alone should be shown in the record. 
(e)  Untimely requests. Failure to request, or failure 
to withdraw a request for enlisted members or trial 
by  military judge alone in a timely manner shall 
waive the right to submit or to withdraw such a re- 
quest. However, the military judge may until the be- 
ginning of the introduction of evidence on the mer- 
its, as a matter of discretion, approve an untimely 
request or withdrawal of a request. 
Discussion 
In exercising discretion whether to approve an untimely re- 
quest or withdrawal of a request, the military judge should bal- 
ance the reason for the request (for example, whether it is a mere 
change of tactics or results from a substantial change of circum- 
stances) against any expense, delay, or inconvenience which 
would result from granting the request. 
(f)  Scope. For purposes of this rule, "military judge" 
does not include the president  of a special court- 
martial without a military judge. 
Rule 904.  Arraignment 
Arraignment shall be conducted in a court-mar- 
tial session and shall consist of reading the charges 
and specifications to the accused and calling on the 
accused to plead. The accused may waive the read- 
ing. 
Discussion 
Arraignment is complete when the accused is called upon to 
plead; the entry of pleas is not part of the arraignment. 
When authorized by  regulations of the Secretary concerned, 
the arraignment should be conducted at an Article 39(a) session 
when a military judge has been detailed. The accused may not be 
arraigned at a conference under R.C.M. 802. 
Once the accused has been arraigned, no additional charges 
against that accused may be referred to that court-martial for trial 
with the previously referred charges. See R.C.M. 601(e)(2). 
The defense should be asked whether it has any motions to 
make before pleas are entered. Some motions ordinarily must be 
made before a plea is entered. See R.C.M. 905(b). 
Rule 905.  Motions generally 
(a)  Definitions and form. A motion is an application 
to the military judge for particular relief. Motions 
may be oral or, at the discretion of the military 
judge, written. A motion shall state the grounds 
upon which it is made and shall set forth the ruling or relief sought. The substance of a motion, not its 
form or designation, shall control. 
Discussion 
Motions may be motions to suppress [(see R.C.M. 
905(b)(3))]; motions for appropriate relief (see R.C.M. 906); mo- 
tions to dismiss (see R.C.M. 907); or motions for findings of not 
guilty (see R.C.M. 917). 
(b)  Pretrial motions. Any defense, objection, or re- 
quest which is capable of determination without the 
trial of the general issue of guilt may be raised before 
trial. The following must be raised before a plea is 
entered: 
(1)  Defenses or objections based on defects (other 
than jurisdictional defects) in the preferral, forward- 
ing, investigation, or referral of charges; 
Discussion 
Such nonjurisdictional  defects include unsworn charges, in- 
adequate Article 32 investigation, and inadequate pretrial advice. 
See R.C.M. 307; 401-407; 601-604. 
(2)  Defenses or objections based on defects in the 
charges and specifications (other than any failure to 
show jurisdiction or to charge an offense, which ob- 
jections shall be resolved by the military judge at any 
time during the pendency of the proceedings); 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 307; 906(b)(3). 
(3)  Motions to suppress evidence; 
Discussion 
Mil.R.Evid. 304(d), 31 l(d), and 321(c) deal with the admis- 
sibility of confessions and admissions, evidence obtained from un- 
lawful searches and seizures, and eyewitness identification, re- 
spectively. Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence on 
other grounds may be raised by  objection at trial or by motions in 
limine. See R.C.M. 906(b)(13); Mil.R.Evid. 103(c); 104(a) and 
(c). 
(4)  Motions for discovery under R.C.M. 701 or 
for production of witnesses or evidence; 
R.C.M. 905(d) 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M. 703; 1001(e). 
(5)  Motions for severance of charges or accused; 
or 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 812; 906(b)(9) and (10). 
(6) Objections based on denial of request for indi- 
vidual military counsel or for retention of detailed 
defense counsel when individual military counsel 
has been granted. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 506(b); 906(b)(2). 
(c)  Burden of proot 
(1)  Standard. Unless otherwise provided in this 
Manual, the burden of proof on any factual issue the 
resolution of which is necessary to decide a motion 
shall be by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Discussion 
See Mil.R.Evid.  104(a) concerning the applicability  of the 
Military Rules of Evidence to certain preliminary questions. 
(2) Assignment. 
(A) Except as otherwise provided in this Man- 
ual the burden of persuasion on any factual issue the 
resolution of which is necessary to decide a motion 
shall be on the moving party. 
Discussion 
See, for example, subsection (c)(2)(B) of this rule, R.C.M. 
908 and Mil.R.Evid. 304(e), 31 l(e), and 321(d) for provisions spe- 
cifically assigning the burden of proof. 
(B)  In the case of a motion to dismiss for lack 
of jurisdiction,  denial of the right to speedy trial 
under R.C.M. 707, or the running of the statute of 
limitations, the burden of persuasion shall be  upon 
the prosecution. 
(d) Ruling on motions. A motion made before pleas 
are entered shall be determined before pleas are en- 
tered unless, if  otherwise not prohibited by  this R.C.M. 905(d) 
Manual, the military judge for good cause orders 
that determination be deferred until trial of the gen- 
eral issue or after findings, but no such determina- 
tion shall be deferred if a party's right to review or 
appeal is adversely affected. Where factual issues are 
involved in determining a motion, the military judge 
shall state the essential findings on the record. 
Discussion 
When trial cannot proceed further as the result of dismissal 
or other rulings on motions, the court-martial should adjourn and 
a record of the proceedings should be prepared for the convening 
authority. See R.C.M. 908(b)(4) regarding automatic stay of cer- 
tain rulings and orders subject to appeal under that rule. Notwith- 
standing the dismissal of some specifications, trial may proceed in 
the normal manner as long as one or more charges and specifica- 
tions remain. The promulgating orders should reflect the action 
taken by the court-martial on each charge and specification, in- 
cluding any which were dismissed by  the military judge on a mo- 
tion. See R.C.M. 11  14. 
(e)  Effect of failure  to raise defenses or objections. 
Failure by a party to raise defenses or objections or 
to make motions or requests which must be made 
before pleas are entered under subsection (b) of this 
rule shall constitute waiver. The military judge for 
good cause shown may grant relief from the waiver. 
Other motions, requests, defenses, or objections, ex- 
cept lack of jurisdiction  or failure of a charge to al- 
lege an offense, must be raised before the court-mar- 
tial is adjourned for that case and, unless otherwise 
provided in this Manual, failure to do so shall consti- 
tute waiver. 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M. 910(j) concerning matters waived by a plea 
of guilty. 
(f)  Reconsideration. On request of any party or sua 
sponte, the military judge may reconsider any rul- 
ing, other than one amounting to a finding of not 
guilty, made by the military judge. 
(g)  Effect offinal determinations. Any matter put in 
issue and finally determined by  a court-martial, re- 
viewing authority, or appellate court which had ju- 
risdiction  to determine the matter may not be dis- 
puted by  the United  States in any other court- 
martial of the same accused, except that, when the 
offenses charged at one court-martial did not arise 
out of the same transaction as those charged at the 
court-martial at which the determination was made, 
a determination of law and the application of law to 
the facts may be disputed by the United States. This 
rule also shall apply to matters which were put in is- 
sue and finally determined in any other judicial pro- 
ceeding in which the accused and the United States 
or a Federal governmental unit were parties. 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M. 907(b)(2)(C). Whether a matter has been fi- 
nally determined in another judicial proceeding with jurisdiction 
to decide it, and whether such determination binds the United 
States in another proceeding are interlocutory questions. See 
R.C.M. 801(e). It does not matter whether the earlier proceeding 
ended in an acquittal, conviction, or otherwise, as long as the de- 
termination is final. Except for a ruling which is, or amounts to, a 
finding of not guilty, a ruling ordinarily is not final until action on 
the court-martial is completed. See Article 76; R.C.M. 1209. The 
accused  is not bound in a court-martial by  rulings in  another 
court-martial. But see Article 3(b); R.C.M. 202. 
The determination must have been made by a court-martial, 
reviewing authority, or appellate court, or by another judicial 
body, such as a United States court. A pretrial determination by a 
convening authority is not a final determination under this rule, 
although some decisions by  a convening authority may bind the 
Government under other rules. See, for example, R.C.M.  601, 
604, 704, 705. 
The United States is bound by  a final determination by  a 
court of competent jurisdiction even if the earlier determination is 
erroneous, except when the offenses charged at the second pro- 
ceeding arose out of a different transaction from those charged at 
the first and the ruling at the first proceeding was based on an in- 
correct determination of law. 
A final determination in one case may be the basis for a mo- 
tion to dismiss or a motion for appropriate relief in another case, 
depending on the circumstances. The nature of the earlier deter- 
mination and the grounds for it will determine its effect in other 
proceedings. 
Examples: 
(1) The military judge dismissed a charge for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, on grounds that the accused was only 16 
years old at the time of enlistment  and  when  the offenses oc- 
curred. At a second court-martial of the same accused for a differ- 
ent offense, the determination  in the first case would  require dis- 
missal of the new charge unless the prosecution could show that 
since that determination the accused had effected a valid enlist- 
ment or constructive enlistment. See R.C.M. 202. Note, however, 
that if the initial ruling had been based on an error of law (for ex- 
ample, if the military judge had ruled the enlistment invalid be- 
cause the accused was 18 at the time of enlistment) this would not 
require dismissal in the second court-martial for a different of- 
fense. 
(2) The accused was tried in United States district court 
for assault on a Federal officer. The accused defended solely on 
the basis of alibi and was acquitted. The accused is then charged 
in a court-martial with assault on a different person  at the same R.C.M. 906(b)(3) 
time and place as the assault on a Federal officer was alleged to 
have occurred. The acquittal of the accused in Federal district 
court would bar conviction of the accused in the court-martial. In 
cases of this nature, the facts of the first trial must be examined to 
determine whether the finding of the first trial is logically incon- 
sistent with guilt in the second case. 
(3) At a court-martial for larceny, the military judge ex- 
cluded evidence of a statement made by  the accused relating to 
the larceny and other uncharged offenses because the statement 
was obtained by  coercion. At a second court-martial for an unre- 
lated offense, the statement excluded at the first trial would be 
inadmissible, based on the earlier ruling, if the first case had be- 
come final. If the earlier ruling had been based on an incorrect in- 
terpretation  of law, however, the issue of admissibility could be 
litigated anew at the second proceeding. 
(4) At a court-martial for absence without authority, 
the charge and specification were dismissed for failure to state an 
offense. At a later court-martial for the same offense, the earlier 
dismissal would be grounds for dismissing the same charge and 
specification, but would not bar further proceedings on a new 
specification not containing the same defect as the original specifi- 
cation. 
(h)  Written motions. Written motions may be sub- 
mitted to the military judge after referral and when 
appropriate they may be supported by affidavits, 
with service and opportunity to reply to the oppos- 
ing party. Such motions may be disposed of before 
arraignment and without a session. Upon request, 
either party is entitled to an Article 39(a) session to 
present oral argument or have an evidentiary hear- 
ing concerning the disposition of written motions. 
(i)  Service. Written motions shall be served on all 
other parties. Unless otherwise directed by the mili- 
tary judge, the service shall be made upon counsel 
for each party. 
(j) Application  to convening  authority. Except as 
otherwise provided  in this Manual, any matters 
which may be resolved upon motion without trial of 
the general issue of  guilt may be submitted by a 
party to the convening authority before trial for de- 
cision. Submission of such matter to the convening 
authority is not, except as otherwise provided in this 
Manual, required, and is, in any event, without 
prejudice to the renewal of the issue by timely mo- 
tion before the military judge. 
(k)  Production of statements on motion to suppress. 
Except as provided in this subsection, R.C.M. 914 
shall apply at a hearing on a motion to suppress evi- 
dence under subsection (b)(3) of this rule. For pur- 
poses of  this subsection, a law enforcement officer 
shall be deemed a witness called by the Government, 
and upon a claim of privilege the military judge shall 
excise portions of  the statement containing privi- 
leged matter. 
Rule 906.  Motions for appropriate relief 
(a)  In general. A motion for appropriate relief is a 
request for a ruling to cure a defect which deprives a 
party of a right or hinders a party from preparing for 
trial or presenting its case. 
(b)  Grounds for  appropriate relief: The following 
may be requested by motion for appropriate relief. 
This list is not exclusive. 
(1)  Continuances. A continuance may be granted 
only by the military judge. 
Discussion 
The military judge should, upon a showing of reasonable 
cause, grant a continuance to any party for as long and as often as 
is just. Article 40. Whether a request for a continuance should be 
granted is a matter within the discretion of the military judge. 
Reasons for a continuance may include: insufficient opportunity 
to prepare for trial; unavailability of an essential witness; the in- 
terest of Government in the order of trial of related cases; and ill- 
ness of an accused, counsel, military judge, or member. See also 
R.C.M. 602; 803. 
(2) Record of denial of individual military coun- 
sel or of denial of  request to retain detailed counsel 
when a request for individual military counsel was 
granted. If a request for military counsel was denied, 
which denial was upheld on appeal (if available) or if 
a request to retain detailed counsel was denied when 
the accused is represented by  individual military 
counsel, and if the accused so requests, the military 
judge shall ensure that a record of the matter is in- 
cluded in the record of trial, and may make findings. 
The trial counsel may request a continuance to in- 
form the convening authority of those findings. The 
military judge may not dismiss the charges or other- 
wise effectively prevent further proceedings based on 
this issue. However, the military judge  may grant 
reasonable continuances until the requested military 
counsel can be made available if  the unavailability 
results from temporary conditions or if  the decision 
of unavailability is in the process of review in admin- 
istrative channels. 
(3)  Correction ofdefects in the Article 32 investi- 
gation or pretrial advice. R.C.M. 906(b)(3) 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 405; 406. If the motion is granted, the military 
judge should ordinarily grant a continuance so the defect may be 
corrected. 
(4)  Amendment of charges or specifications. A 
charge or specifications. A charge or specification 
may not be amended over the accused's  objection 
unless the amendment is minor within the meaning 
of R.C.M. 603(a). 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M. 307. 
An amendment may be appropriate when a specification  is 
unclear, redundant, inartfully drafted, misnames an accused, or is 
laid under the wrong article. A specification may be amended by 
striking surplusage, or substituting or adding new language. Sur- 
plusage may include irrelevant or redundant details or aggravat- 
ing circumstances which are not necessary to enhance the maxi- 
mum authorized punishment or to explain the essential facts of 
the offense. When a specification is amended after the accused has 
entered a plea to it, the accused should be asked to plead anew to 
the amended specification. A bill of particulars (see subsection 
(b)(6) of this rule) may also be used when a specification is indefi- 
nite or ambiguous. 
If a specification, although stating an offense, is so defective 
that the accused appears to have been misled, the accused should 
be given a continuance upon request, or, in an appropriate case 
(see R.C.M. 907(b)(3)), the specification may be dismissed. 
(5)  Severance of  a duplicitous specification into 
two or more specifications. 
Discussion 
Each specification  may state only one offense.  R.C.M. 
307(c)(4). A duplicitous specification is one which alleges two or 
more separate offenses. Lesser included offenses (see Part IV, par- 
agraph 2) are not separate, nor is a continuing offense involving 
several separate acts. The sole remedy for a duplicitous specifica- 
tion is severance of the specification  into two or more specifica- 
tions, each of which alleges a separate offense contained in the du- 
plicitous specification. However,  if the duplicitousness  is 
combined with or results in other defects, such as misleading the 
accused, other remedies may be appropriate. See subsection (b)(3) 
of this rule. See also R.C.M. 907(B)(3). 
(6) Bill of particulars. A bill of particulars may be 
amended at any time, subject to such conditions as 
justice permits. 
Discussion 
The purposes of a bill of particulars are to inform the ac- 
cused of the nature of the charge with sufficient precision  to en- 
able the accused to prepare for trial, to  avoid or minimize the dan- 
ger of surprise at the time of trial, and to enable the accused to 
plead the acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for 
the same offense when the specification itself is too vague and in- 
definite for such purposes.  (I
A bill of particulars should not be used to conduct discovery 
of the Government's theoiy of a case, to force detailed disclosure 
of acts underlying a charge, or to restrict the Government's proof 
at trial. 
A bill of particulars need not be sworn because it is not part 
of the specification. A bill of particulars cannot be used to repair a 
specification which is otherwise not legally sufficient. 
(7)  Discovery and production  of evidence and 
witnesses. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 701 concerning discovery. See R.C.M. 703, 914 
and 1001(e) concerning production of evidence and witnesses. 
(8)  Relief from pretrial confinement in violation 
of R.C.M. 305. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 3056). 
(9)  Severance of multiple accused, if  it appears 
that an accused or the Government is prejudiced by 
a joint or common trial. In a common trial, a sever- 
ance shall be granted whenever any accused, other 
than the moving accused, faces charges unrelated to 
those charged against the moving accused. 
Discussion 
A motion for severance is a request that one or more accused 
against whom charges have been referred to a joint  or common 
trial be tried separately. Such a request should be liberally consid- 
ered in a common trial, and should be granted if good cause is 
shown. For example, a severance is ordinarily appropriate when: 
the moving party wishes to use the testimony of one or more of 
the coaccused or the spouse of a coaccused; a defense of a coac- 
cused is antagonistic to the moving party; or evidence as to any 
other accused will improperly prejudice the moving accused. 
If a severance is granted by  the rnilitary judge, the military 
judge will decide which accused will be tried first. See R.C.M. 
801(a)(l). In the case of joint  charges, the military judge will di- 
rect an appropriate amendment of the charges and specifications. See also R.C.M. 307(c)(5); 601(e)(3); 604; 812. 
(10)  Severance of offenses, but only to prevent 
manifest injustice. 
Discussion 
Ordinarily, all known charges should be tried at a single 
court-martial. Joinder of minor and major offenses, or of unre- 
lated offenses is not alone a sufficient ground to sever offenses. For 
example, when an essential witness as to one offense is unavaila- 
ble, it might be appropriate to sever that offense to prevent viola- 
tion of the accused's right to a speedy trial. 
(11) Change of  place of trial. The place of trial 
may be  changed when necessary to prevent 
prejudice to the rights of the accused or for the con- 
venience of  the Government if the rights of the ac- 
cused are not prejudiced thereby. 
Discussion 
A change of the place of trial may be necessary  when there 
exists in the place where the court-martial is pending so great a 
prejudice against the accused that the accused cannot obtain a fair 
and impartial trial there, or to obtain compulsory process over an 
essential witness. 
When it is necessary to change the place of trial, the choice of 
places to which the court-martial will be transferred will be left to 
the convening authority, as long as the choice is not inconsistent 
with the ruling of the military judge. 
(12) Determination of multiplicity of offenses for 
sentencing purposes. 
See R.C.M. 1003 concerning determination of the maximum 
punishment.  See also R.C.M. 907(b)(3)(B)  concerning dismissal 
of charges on grounds of multiplicity. 
A ruling on this motion ordinarily should be deferred until 
after findings are entered. 
(13)  Preliminary ruling on admissibility of evi- 
dence. 
Discussion 
See Mil.R.Evid.  104(c) 
A request for a preliminary ruling on admissibility is a re- 
quest that certain matters which are ordinarily decided during 
trial of the general issue be resolved before they arise, outside the 
presence of members. The purpose of such a motion is to avoid 
R.C.M. 907(b)(l)(B) 
the prejudice which may result from bringing inadmissible mat- 
ters to the attention of court members. 
Whether to rule on an evidentiary  question before it arises 
during trial on the general issue is a matter within the discretion 
of  the military judge. But see R.C.M. 905(b)(3) and (d); and 
Mil.R.Evid. 304(e)(2); 3  11(e)(2); 32 1(d)(2). 
(14)  Motions relating to mental capacity or re- 
sponsibility of the accused. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 706, 909, and 916(k) regarding procedures and 
standards concerning the mental capacity or responsibility of the 
accused. 
Rule 907.  Motions to dismiss 
(a)  In general. A motion to dismiss is a request to 
terminate further proceedings as to one or more 
charges and specifications on grounds capable of res- 
olution without trial of the general issue of guilt. 
Discussion 
Dismissal of a specification  terminates the proceeding with 
respect to that specification  unless the decision to dismiss is re- 
considered and reversed by the military judge. See R.C.M. 905(f). 
Dismissal of a specification on grounds stated in subsection (b)(l) 
or (b)(3)(A) below does not ordinarily bar a later court-martial 
for the same offense if the grounds for dismissal no longer exist. 
See also R.C.M. 905(g) and subsection (b)(2) below. 
See R.C.M. 916 concerning defenses. 
(b)  Grounds  for  dismissal. Grounds for dismissal in- 
clude the following- 
(1)  Nonwaivable grounds. A charge or specifica- 
tion shall be dismissed at any stage of the proceed- 
ings if: 
(A) The court-martial lacks jurisdiction  to try 
the accused for the offense; or 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 201-203. 
(B)  The specification fails to state an offense. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 307(c) R.C.M. 907(b)(2) 
(2)  Waivable  grounds. A charge or specification 
shall be dismissed upon motion made by the accused 
before the final adjournment of the court-martial in 
that case if: 
(A) Dismissal is required under R.C.M. 707; 
(B)  The statute of limitations (Article 43) has 
run, provided that, if it appears that the accused is 
unaware of the right to assert the statute of limita- 
tions in bar of trial, the military judge shall inform 
the accused of this right; 
Discussion 
Except for certain offenses for which there is no limitation as 
to time, see Article 43(a), a person charged with an offense under 
the code may not be tried by court-martial over objection if sworn 
charges have not been received by the officer exercising summary 
court-martial jurisdiction over the command within five years. 
See Article 43(b). This period may be  tolled  (Article 43(c) and 
(d)), extended (Article 43(e) and (g)), or suspended (Article 43(f)) 
under certain circumstances. The prosecution bears the burden of 
proving that the statute of limitations has been tolled, extended, 
or suspended if it appears that is has run. 
Some offenses are continuing offenses and any period of the 
offense occurring within the statute of limitations is not barred. 
Absence without leave, desertion, and fraudulent enlistment are 
not continuing offenses and are committed, respectively, on the 
day the person  goes absent, deserts, or first receives pay or al- 
lowances under the enlistment. 
When computing the statute of limitations, periods in which 
the accused was fleeing from justice or periods when the accused 
was absent without leave or in desertion are excluded. The mili- 
tary judge must determine by a preponderance, as an interlocu- 
tory matter, whether theaccused was absent without authority or 
fleeing from  justice.  It would not be necessary that the accused be 
charged with the absence offense. In cases where the accused is 
charged with both an absence offense and a non-absence offense, 
but is found not guilty of the absence offense, the military judge 
would reconsider, by a preponderance, his or her prior determina- 
tion whether that period of time is excludable. 
If sworn charges have been received by an officer exercising 
summary court-martial  jurisdiction over the command within the 
period of thestatute, minor amendments (see R.C.M. 603(a)) may 
be made in the specification after the statute of limitations has 
run. However, if new charges are drafted or a major amendment 
made (see R.C.M. 603(d)) after the statute of limitations has run, 
prosecution is barred. The date of receipt of sworn charges is ex- 
cluded  when computing the appropriate statutory period. The 
date of the offense is included in the computation of the elapsed 
time. Article 43(g) allows the government time to reinstate 
charges dismissed as defective or insufficient for any cause. The 
government would have up to six months to reinstate the charges 
if  the original period  of limitations has expired or will  expire 
within six months of the dismissal. 
In somecases, the issue whether the statute of limitations has 
run will depend on the findings on the general issue of guilt. For 
example, where the date of an offense is in dispute, a finding by 
the court-martial that the offense occurred at an earlier time may 
affect a determination as to the running of  the statute of limita- 
tions. 
When the statute of limitations has run as to a lesser in- 
cluded offense, but not as to the charged offense, see R.C.M. 
920(e)(2) with regard to instructions on the lesser offense. 
(C) The accused has previously been tried by 
court-martial or federal civilian court for the same 
offense, provided that: 
(i)  No court-martial proceeding is a trial in 
the sense of this rule unless presentation of evidence 
on the general issue of guilt has begun; 
(ii)  No court-martial proceeding which has 
been terminated under R.C.M. 604(b) or R.C.M. 
915 shall bar later prosecution for the same offense 
or offenses, if so provided in those rules; 
(iii)  No court-martial proceeding in which 
an accused has been found guilty of any charge or 
specification is a trial in the sense of this rule until 
the finding of guilty has become final after review of 
the case has been fully completed; and 
(iv) No court-martial proceeding which 
lacked jurisdiction to try the accused for the offense 
is a trial in the sense of this rule. 
(D) Prosecution is barred by: 
(i) A pardon issued by the President; 
Discussion 
A pardon may grant individual or general amnesty. 
(ii)  Immunity from prosecution granted by a 
person authorized to do so; 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 704 
(iii)  Constructive condonation of desertion 
established by  unconditional restoration to duty 
without trial of a deserter by a general court-martial 
convening authority who knew of the desertion; or 
(iv)  Prior punishment under Articles 13 or 
15 for the same offense, if that offense was minor. 
Discussion 
See Articles  13 and  15(f). See paragraph  le of Part V for a 
definition of "minor"  offenses. (3)  Permissible grounds. A specification may be 
dismissed upon timely motion by the accused if: 
(A) The specification is so defective that it sub- 
stantially misled the accused, and the military judge 
finds that, in the interest of justice, trial should pro- 
ceed on remaining charges and specifications with- 
out undue delay; or 
(B) The specification is multiplicious with an- 
other specification, is unnecessary to enable the 
prosecution to meet the exigencies of proof through 
trial, review, and appellate action, and should be dis- 
missed in the interest of justice. 
Discussion 
A specification is multiplicious with another if it alleges the 
same offense, or an offense necessarily included in the other. A 
specification may also be multiplicious with another if  they de- 
scribe substantially the same misconduct in two different ways. 
For example, assault and disorderly conduct may be mul- 
tiplicious if the disorderly conduct consists solely of the assault. 
See also R.C.M.  1003(c)(l)(C). 
Ordinarily, a specification should not be dismissed for multi- 
plicity before trial unless it clearly alleges the same offense, or one 
necessarily included therein, as is alleged in another specification. 
It may be appropriate to dismiss the less serious of any mul- 
tiplicious specifications after findings have been reached. Due 
consideration must be given, however, to possible post-trial or ap- 
pellate action with regard to the remaining specification 
Rule 908.  Appeal by the United States 
(a)  In general. In a trial by a court-martial over 
which a military judge presides and in which a puni- 
tive discharge may be adjudged, the United States 
may appeal an order or ruling that terminates the 
proceedings with respect to a charge or specification 
or which excludes evidence that is substantial proof 
of a fact material in the proceedings. However, the 
United States may not appeal an order or ruling that 
is, or amounts to, a finding of not guilty, with respect 
to the charge or specification. 
(b)  Procedure. 
(1) Delay. After an order or ruling which may be 
subject to an appeal by the United States, the court- 
martial may not proceed, except as to matters unaf- 
fected by the ruling or order, if the trial counsel re- 
quests a delay to determine whether to file notice of 
appeal under this rule. Trial counsel is entitled to no 
more than 72 hours under this subsection. 
(2)  Decision  to appeal. The decision whether to 
file notice of appeal under this rule shall be made 
R.C.M. 908(b)(5) 
within 72 hours of the ruling or order to be appealed. 
If the Secretary concerned so prescribes, the trial 
counsel shall not file notice of appeal unless author- 
ized to do so by a person designated by the Secretary 
concerned. 
(3)  Notice of appeal. If the United States elects to 
appeal, the trial counsel shall provide the military 
judge with written notice to this effect not later than 
72 hours after the ruling or order. Such notice shall 
identify the ruling or order to be appealed and the 
charges and specifications affected. Trial counsel 
shall certify that the appeal is not taken for the pur- 
pose of delay and (if the order or ruling appealed is 
one which excludes evidence) that the evidence ex- 
cluded is substantial proof of a fact material in the 
proceeding. 
(4)  Effect on the court-martial. Upon written no- 
tice to the military judge under subsection (b)(3) of 
this rule, the ruling or order that is the subject of the 
appeal is automatically stayed and no session of the 
court-martial may proceed  pending disposition by 
the Court of Military Review of the appeal, except 
that solely as to charges and specifications not af- 
fected by the ruling or order: 
(A) Motions may be litigated, in the discretion 
of the military judge,  at any point in the proceed- 
ings; 
(B)  When trial on the merits has not begun, 
(i)  a severance may be granted upon request 
of all the parties; 
(ii)  a severance may be granted upon request 
of the accused and when appropriate under R.C.M. 
906(b)(10); or 
(C) When trial on the merits has begun but has 
not been completed, a party may, on that party's re- 
quest and in the discretion of the military judge, pre- 
sent further evidence on the merits. 
(5) Record. Upon written notice to the military 
judge under subsection (b)(3) of this rule, trial coun- 
sel shall cause a record of the proceedings to be pre- 
pared. Such record shall be verbatim and complete 
to the extent necessary to resolve the issues ap- 
pealed. R.C.M. 1103(g), (h), and (i) shall apply and 
the record shall be authenticated in accordance with 
R.C.M. 1104(a). The military judge or the Court of 
Military Review may direct that additional parts of 
the proceeding be included in the record; R.C.M. 
1104(d) shall not apply to such additions. R.C.M. 908(b)(6) 
(6)  Forwarding. Upon written notice to the mili- 
tary judge under subsection (b)(3) of this rule, trial 
counsel shall promptly and by  expeditious means 
forward the appeal to a representative of the Gov- 
ernment designated by the Judge Advocate General. 
The matter forwarded shall include: a statement of 
the issues appealed; the record of the proceedings or, 
if  preparation of the record has not been completed, 
a summary of the evidence; and such other matters 
as the Secretary concerned may prescribe. The per- 
son designated by the Judge Advocate General shall 
promptly decide whether to file the appeal with the 
Court of Military Review and notify the trial coun- 
sel of that decision. 
(7)  Appealfiled. If the United States elects to file 
an appeal, it shall be filed directly with the Court of 
Military Review, in accordance with the rules of 
that court. 
(8)  Appeal not3led. If the United States elects not 
to file an appeal, trial counsel promptly shall notify 
the military judge and the other parties. 
(9)  Pretrial  confinement of accused pending  ap- 
peal.  If an accused is in pretrial confinement at the 
time the United States files notice of its intent to ap- 
peal under subsection (3) above, the commander, in 
determining whether the accused should be confined 
pending the outcome of an appeal by the United 
States, should consider the same factors which 
would authorize the imposition of pretrial confine- 
ment under R.C.M. 305(h)(2)(B). 
(c) Appellate proceedings. 
(1) Appellate counsel. The parties shall be repre- 
sented before appellate courts in proceedings under 
this rule as provided in R.C.M. 1202. Appellate 
Government counsel shall diligently prosecute an 
appeal under this rule. 
(2)  Court of Military Review. An appeal under 
Article 62 shall, whenever practicable, have priority 
over all other proceedings before the Court of Mili- 
tary Review. In determining an appeal under Article 
62, the Court of Military Review may take action 
only with respect to matters of law. 
(3) Action following  decision of Court of Military 
Review. After the Court of Military Review has de- 
cided any appeal under Article 62, the accused may 
petition for review by the Court of Military Appeals, 
or the Judge Advocate General may certify a ques- 
tion to the Court of Military Appeals. The parties 
shall be notified of the decision of the Court of Mili- 
tary Review promptly. If the decision is adverse to 
the accused, the accused shall be notified of the deci- 
sion and of the right to petition the Court of Military 
Appeals for review within 60 days orally on the re- 
cord at the court-martial or in accordance with 
R.C.M. 1203(d). If the accused is notified orally on 
the record, trial counsel shall forward by expeditious 
means a certificate that the accused was so notified 
to the Judge Advocate General, who shall forward a 
copy to the clerk of  the Court of Military Appeals 
when required by the Court. If the decision by  the 
Court of Military Review permits it, the court-mar- 
tial may proceed as to the affected charges and speci- 
fications pending further review by the Court of Mil- 
itary Appeals or the Supreme Court, unless either 
court orders the proceedings stayed. Unless the case 
is reviewed by the Court of Military Appeals, it shall 
be returned to the military judge  or the convening 
authority for appropriate action in accordance with 
the decision of the Court of Military Review. If the 
case is reviewed by the Court of Military Appeals, 
R.C.M. 1204 and 1205 shall apply. 
(d)  Military judge. For purposes of this rule, "mili- 
tary judge"  does not include the president of a spe- 
cial court-martial without a military judge. 
Rule 909.  Capacity of the accused to stand 
trial by court-martial 
(a)  In general. No person may be brought to trial by 
court-martial if that person is presently  suffering 
from a mental disease or defect rendering him or her 
mentally incompetent to the extent that he or she is 
unable to understand the nature of the proceedings 
against that person or to conduct or cooperate intel- 
ligently in the defense of the case. 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M.916(k). 
(b)  Presumption of capacity. A person is presumed 
to have the capacity to stand trial unless the con- 
trary is established. 
(c)  Determination at trial. 
(1)  Nature of issue.The mental capacity of the ac- 
cused is an interlocutory question of fact. Discussion 
The military judge rules finally on the mental capacity of the 
accused. The president of a special court-martial without a mili- 
tary judge rules on the matter subject to objection by  any mem- 
ber. See R.C.M. 801(e). 
(2)  Standard.Tria1 may proceed unless it is estab- 
lished by  a preponderance of the evidence that the 
accused is presently suffering from a mental disease 
or defect rendering him or her mentally incompetent 
to the extent that he or she is unable to understand 
the nature of the proceedings against the accused or 
to conduct or cooperate intelligently in the defense 
of the case. 
Discussion 
If the accused is not found to possess sufficient mental capac- 
ity to stand trial, the proceedings should be suspended. Depend- 
ing on the nature and potential duration of the accused's incapac- 
ity, the case may be continued or charges withdrawn or 
dismissed. When appropriate, administrative action may be taken 
to discharge the accused from the service on grounds of mental 
disability. Additional mental examinations may be directed at 
any stage of the proceedings as circumstances may require. 
Rule 910.  Pleas 
(a) Alternatives. 
(1)  In general. An accused may plead as follows: 
guilty; not guilty to an offense as charged, but guilty 
of a named lesser included offense; guilty with ex- 
ceptions, with or without substitutions, not guilty of 
the exceptions, but guilty of the substitutions, if any; 
or, not guilty. A plea of guilty may not be received as 
to an offense for which the death penalty may be ad- 
judged by the court-martial. 
Discussion 
See  paragraph  2, Part IV, concerning lesser included offenses. 
When the plea is to a named lesser included offense without the 
use of exceptions and substitutions, the defense counsel should 
provide a written revised specification accurately reflecting the 
plea and request that the revised specification be included in the 
record as an appellate exhibit. A plea of guilty to a lesser included 
offense does not bar the prosecution from proceeding on the of- 
fense as charged. See also subsection (g) of this rule. 
A plea  of guilty does not prevent the introduction of evi- 
dence, either in support of the factual basis for the plea, or, after 
findings are entered, in aggravation. See R.C.M. 1001(b)(4). 
R.C.M. 910(c)(3) 
(2)  Conditional pleas.  With the approval of the 
military judge and the consent of the Government, 
an accused may enter a conditional plea of guilty, re- 
serving the right, on further review or appeal, to re- 
view of the adverse determination of any specified 
pretrial motion. If the accused prevails on further re- 
view or appeal, the accused shall be allowed to with- 
draw the plea of guilty. The Secretary concerned 
may prescribe who may consent for Government; 
unless otherwise prescribed by the Secretary con- 
cerned, the trial counsel may consent on behalf of 
the Government. 
(b)  Refusal to plead; irregular plea.  If an accused 
fails or refuses to plead, or makes an irregular plea, 
the military judge shall enter a plea of not guilty for 
the accused. 
Discussion 
An irregular plea includes pleas such as guilty without crimi- 
nality or guilty to a charge but not guilty to all specifications 
thereunder. When a plea is ambiguous, the military judge should 
have it clarified before proceeding further. 
(c) Advice to accused. Before accepting a plea of 
guilty, the military judge shall address the accused 
personally and inform the accused of, and determine 
that the accused understands, the following: 
(1)  The nature of the offense to which the plea is 
offered, the mandatory minimum penalty, if any, 
provided by law, and the maximum possible penalty 
provided by  law; 
Discussion 
The elements of each offense to which the accused  has 
pleaded guilty should be described to the accused. See also subsec- 
tion (e) of this rule. 
(2)  In a general or special court-martial, if the ac- 
cused is not represented by counsel, that the accused 
has the right to be represented by counsel at every 
stage of the proceedings; 
Discussion 
In a general or special court-martial, if the accused in not 
represented by counsel, a plea of guilty should not be accepted. 
(3)  That the accused has the right to plead not 
guilty or to persist in that plea if already made, and R.C.M. 910(c)(3) 
that the accused has the right to be tried by a court- 
martial, and that at such trial the accused has the 
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
against the accused, and the right against self-in- 
crimination; 
(4)  That if the accused pleads guilty, there will 
not be a trial of any kind as to those offenses to 
which the accused has so pleaded, so that by plead- 
ing guilty the accused waives the rights described in 
subsection (c)(3) of this Rule; and 
(5)  That if the accused pleads guilty, the military 
judge will question the accused about the offenses to 
which the accused has pleaded guilty, and, if the ac- 
cused answers these questions under oath, on the re- 
cord, and in the presence of counsel, the accused's 
answers may-later  be used against the accused in a 
prosecution for perjury or false statement. 
Discussion 
The advice in  subsection (5) is inapplicable in court-martial 
in which the accused is not represented by  counsel. 
(d) Ensuring that the plea  is voluntary. The military 
judge shall not accept a plea of guilty without first, 
by  addressing the accused personally, determining 
that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force 
or threats or of promises apart from a plea agree- 
ment under R.C.M. 705. The military judge shall 
also inquire whether the accused's willingness to 
plead guilty results from prior discussions between 
the convening authority, a representative of the con- 
vening authority, or trial counsel, and the accused or 
defense counsel. 
(e) Determining accuracy ofplea. The military judge 
shall not accept a plea of guilty without making such 
inquiry of  the accused as shall satisfy the military 
judge that there is a factual basis for the plea. The 
accused shall be questioned under oath about the of- 
fenses. 
Discussion 
A plea of guilty must be in accord with the truth. Before the 
plea is accepted, the accused must admit every element of the of- 
fense(~)  to which the accused  pleaded guilty. Ordinarily, the ele- 
ments should be explained to the accused. If any potential defense 
is raised by  the accused's account of the offense or by  other matter 
presented to the military judge, the military judge should explain 
such a defense to the accused and should not accept the plea un- 
less the accused admits facts which negate the defense. If the stat- 
ute of limitations would otherwise bar trial for the offense, the 
military judge should not accept a plea of guilty to it without an 
affirmative waiver by  the accused. See R.C.M. 907(b)(2)(B). 
The  accused need not describe from personal recollection all 
the circumstances necessary to establish a factual basis for the 
plea. Nevertheless the accuse must be convinced of, and able to 
describe all the facts necessary to establish guilt. For example, an 
accused may be unable to recall certain events in an offense, but 
may still be able to adequately describe the offense based on wit- 
ness statements or similar sources which the accused believes to 
be true. 
The accused should remain at the counsel table during ques- 
tioning by the military judge. 
(f)  Plea agreement inquiry. 
(1)  In general. A plea agreement may not be ac- 
cepted if it does not comply with R.C.M. 705. 
(2) Notice. The parties shall inform the military 
judge if a plea agreement exists. 
Discussion 
The military judge should ask whether a plea agreement ex- 
ists. See subsection (d) of this rule. Even if the military judge fails 
to so inquire or the accused answers incorrectly, counsel have an 
obligation to bring any agreements or understandings in connec- 
tion with the plea to the attention of the military judge. 
(3)  Disclosure. If a plea agreement exists, the mili- 
tary judge shall require disclosure of the entire 
agreement before the plea is accepted, provided that 
in trial before military judge alone the military judge 
ordinarily shall not examine any sentence limitation 
contained in the agreement until after the sentence 
of the court-martial has been announced. 
(4)  Inquiry. The military judge shall inquire to 
ensure: 
(A) That the accused understands the agree- 
ment; and 
(B)  That the parties agree to the terms of the 
agreement. 
Discussion 
If the plea agreement contains any unclear or ambiguous 
terms, the military judge should obtain clarification from the par- 
ties. If there is doubt about the accused's  understanding of any 
terms in  the agreement, the military judge should explain those 
terms to the accused. 
(g)  Findings. Findings based on a plea of guilty may 
be entered immediately upon acceptance of the plea 
at an Article 39(a) session unless: R.C.M. 911 
(1)  Such action is not permitted by regulations of 
the Secretary concerned; 
(2) The plea is to a lesser included offense and the 
prosecution intends to proceed to trial on the offense 
as charged; or 
(3)  Trial is by  a special court-martial without a 
military judge,  in which case the president of the 
court-martial may enter findings based on the pleas 
without a formal vote except when subsection (g)(2) 
of this rule applies. 
Discussion 
If the accused has pleaded guilty to some offenses but not to 
others, the military judge should ordinarily defer informing the 
members of the offenses to which the accused has pleaded guilty 
until after findings on the remaining offenses have been entered. 
See R.C.M. 913(a), Discussion and R.C.M. 920(e), Discussion, 
paragraph 3. 
(h) Later action. 
(1)  Withdrawal by  the accused. If after accept- 
ance of the plea but before the sentence is announced 
the accused requests to withdraw a plea of guilty and 
substitute a plea of not guilty or a plea of guilty to a 
lesser included offense, the military judge may as a 
matter of discretion permit the accused to do so. 
(2)  Statements by accused  inconsistent with plea. 
If after findings but before the sentence is announced 
the accused makes a statement to the court-martial, 
in testimony or otherwise, or presents evidence 
which is inconsistent with a plea of guilty on which a 
finding is based, the military judge shall inquire into 
the providence of the plea. If, following such in- 
quiry, it appears that the accused entered the plea 
improvidently or through lack of understanding of 
its meaning and effect a plea of not guilty shall be en- 
tered as to the affected charges and specifications. 
Discussion 
When the accused withdraws a previously accepted plea for 
guilty or a plea of guilty is set aside, counsel should be given a rea- 
sonable time to prepare to proceed. In a trial by  military judge 
alone, recusal of the military judge or disapproval of the request 
for trial by  military judge alone will ordinarily be necessary when 
a plea is rejected or withdrawn after findings; in trial with mem- 
bers, a mistrial will ordinarily be necessary. 
(3)  Pretrial agreement inquiry. After sentence is 
announced the military judge shall inquire into any 
parts of a pretrial agreement which were not previ- 
ously examined by the military judge. If the military 
judge  determines that the accused does not under- 
stand the material terms of the agreement, or that 
the parties disagree as to such terms, the military 
judge shall conform, with the consent of the Govern- 
ment, the agreement to the accused's understanding 
or permit the accused to withdraw the plea. 
Discussion 
See subsection (f)(3) of this rule. 
(i)  Record of proceedings.  A verbatim record of the 
guilty plea proceedings shall be made in cases in 
which a verbatim record is required under R.C.M. 
1103. In other special courts-martial, a summary of 
the explanation and replies shall be included in the 
record of trial. As to summary courts-martial, see 
R.C.M.1305. 
(i) Waiver. Except as provided  in subsection (a)(2) 
of this rule, a plea of guilty which results in a finding 
of guilty waives any objection, whether or not previ- 
ously raised, insofar as the objection relates to the 
factual issue of guilt of the offense(s) to which the 
plea was made. 
Rule 911.  Assembly of the court-martial 
The military judge shall announce the assembly of 
the court-martial. 
Discussion 
When trial is by a court-martial with members,  the court- 
martia!  is ordinarily assembled immediately after the members 
are sworn. The members are ordinarily sworn at the first session 
at which they appear, as soon as all parties and personnel have 
been announced. The  members are seated with the president, who 
is the senior member, in  the center, and the other members alter- 
nately to the president's  right and left according to rank. If the 
rank of a member is changed, or if the membership of the court- 
martial changes, the members should be reseated accordingly. 
When trial is by military judge alone, the court-martial is or- 
dinarily assembled immediately following approval of the request 
for trial by  military judge alone. 
Assembly of the court-martial is significant because it marks 
the point  after which: substitution of the members and military 
judge may no longer take place without good cause (see Article 
29; R.C.M.505; 902; 912); the accused may no longer, as a matter 
of right, request trial by military judge  alone or withdraw such a 
request  previously  approved (see Article  16; R.C.M. 
903(a)(2)(d)); and the accused may no longer request, even with R.C.M. 911 
the permission of the military judge, or withdraw from a request 
for, enlisted members (see Article 25(c)(l); R.C.M. 903(a)(l)(d)). 
Rule 912.  Challenge of selection of 
members; examination and challenges of 
members 
(a) Pretrial matters. 
(1)  Questionnaires. Before trial the trial counsel 
may, and shall upon request of the defense counsel, 
submit to each member written questions requesting 
the following information: 
(A) Date of birth; 
(B) Sex; 
(C) Race; 
(D) Marital status and sex, age, and number of 
dependents; 
(E)  Home of record; 
(F) Civilian and military education, including, 
when available, major areas of study, name of school 
or institution, years of education, and degrees re- 
ceived; 
(G)  Current unit to which assigned; 
(H) Past duty assignments; 
(I) Awards and decorations received; 
(J) Date of rank; and 
(K) Whether the member has acted as accuser, 
counsel, investigating officer, convening authority, 
or legal officer or staff judge advocate for the conven- 
ing authority in the case, or has forwarded the 
charges with a recommendation as to disposition. 
Additional information may be requested with the 
approval of  the military judge. Each member's re- 
sponses to the questions shall be written and signed 
by the member. 
Discussion 
Using questionnaires before trial may expedite voir dire and 
may permit more informed exercise of challenges. 
If the questionnaire is marked or admitted as an exhibit at 
the court-martial it must be attached to or included in the record 
of trial. See R.C.M.  1103(b)(2)(D)(iv) and (b)(3)(B). 
(2)  Other materials. A copy of any written mater- 
ials considered by the convening authority in select- 
ing the members detailed to the court-martial shall 
be provided to any party upon request, except that 
such materials pertaining solely to persons who were 
not selected for detail as members need not be pro- 
vided unless the military judge, for good cause, so di- 
rects. 
(b)  Challenge of selection of members. 
(1)  Motion. Before the examination of members 
under subsection (d) of this rule begins, or at the 
next session after a party discovered or could have 
discovered by the exercise of diligence, the grounds 
therefor, which ever is earlier, that party may move 
to stay the proceedings on the ground that members 
were selected improperly. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 502(a) and 503(a) concerning selection of mem- 
bers. Members are also improperly selected when, for example, a 
certain group or class is arbitrarily excluded from consideration 
as members. 
(2)  Procedure. Upon a motion under subsection 
(b)(l) of this rule containing an offer of proof of mat- 
ters which, if true, would constitute improper selec- 
tion of members, the moving party shall be entitled 
to present evidence, including any written materials 
considered by  the convening authority in selecting 
the members. Any other party may also present evi- 
dence on the matter. If the military judge determines 
that the members have been selected improperly, the 
military judge shall stay any proceedings requiring 
the presence of members until members are properly 
selected. 
(3)  Waiver. Failure to make a timely motion 
under this subsection shall waive the improper selec- 
tion  unless it constitutes a violation of R.C.M. 
501(a), 502(a)(l), or 503(a)(2). 
(c)  Stating grounds for  challenge. The trial counsel 
shall state any ground for challenge for cause against 
any member of which the trial counsel is aware. 
(d) Examination of  members. The military judge 
may permit the parties to conduct the examination 
of members or may personally conduct the examina- 
tion. In the latter event the military judge shall per- 
mit the parties to supplement the examination by 
such further inquiry as the military judge deems 
proper or the military judge  shall submit to the 
members such additional questions by the parties as 
the military judged deems proper. A member may be 
questioned outside the presence of other members 
when the military judge so directs. Discussion 
Examination of  the members is called "voir  dire."  If the 
members have not already been placed under oath for the purpose 
of voir dire (see R.C.M. 807(b)(2) Discussion (B)), they should be 
sworn before they are questioned. 
The opportunity for voir dire should be used to obtain infor- 
mation for the intelligent exercise of challenges; counsel should 
not purposely use voir dire to present factual matter which will 
not be admissible or to argue the case. 
The nature and scope of the examination of members is 
within the discretion of the military judge. Members may be ques- 
tioned individually or collectively. Ordinarily, the military judge 
should permit counsel to personally question the members. Trial 
counsel ordinarily conducts an inquiry before the defense. 
Whether trial counsel will question all the members before the de- 
fense begins or whether some other procedure will be followed de- 
pends on the circumstances. For example, when members are 
questioned individually outside the presence of other members, 
each party would ordinarily complete questioning that member 
before another member is questioned. The military judge and 
each party may conduct additional questioning, after initial ques- 
tioning by a party, as necessary. 
Ordinarily the members should be asked whether they are 
aware of any ground for challenge against them. This may expe- 
dite further questioning. The  members should be cautioned, how- 
ever, not to disclose information in the presence of other members 
which might disqualify them. 
(e)  Evidence. Any party may present evidence relat- 

ing to whether grounds for challenge exist against a 

member. 

(0 Challenges and removal for  cause. 

(1)  Grounds. A member shall be excused for 
cause whenever it appears that the member: 
(A) Is not competent to serve as a member under 
Article 25(a), (b), or (c); 
(B)  Has not been properly detailed as a member 
of the court-martial; 
(C) Is an accuser as to any offense charged; 
(D) Will be a witness in the court-martial; 
(E)  Has acted as counsel for any party as to any 
offense charged; 
(F) Has been an investigating officer as to any of- 
fense charged; 
(G) Has acted in the same case as convening au- 
thority or as the legal officer or staff judge advocate 
to the convening authority; 
(H) Will act in the same case as reviewing author- 
ity or as the legal officer or staff judge  advocate to 
the reviewing authority; 
(I)  Has forwarded charges in the case with a per- 
sonal recommendation as to disposition; 
R.C.M. 912(f)(4) 
(J)  Upon a rehearing or new or other trial of the 
case, was a member of the court-martial which 
heard the case before; 
(K) Is junior to the accused in grade or rank, un- 
less it is established that this could not be avoided; 
(L)  Is in arrest or confinement; 
(M) Has informed or expressed a definite opinion 
as to the guilt or innocence of the accused as to any 
offense charged; 
(N) Should not sit as a member in the interest of 
having the court-martial free from substantial doubt 
as to legality, fairness, and impartiality. 
Discussion 
Examples of matters which may be grounds for challenge 
under subsection (N) are that the member: has a direct personal 
interest in the result of the trial; is closely related to the accused, a 
counsel, or a witness in the case; has participated as a member or 
counsel in the trial of a closely related  case; has a decidedly 
friendly or hostile attitude toward a party; or has an inelastic 
opinion concerning an appropriate sentence for the offenses 
charged. 
(2)  When made. 
(A)  Upon completion of examination. Upon 
completion of any examination under subsection (d) 
of this rule and the presentation of evidence, if any, 
on the matter, each party shall state any challenges 
for cause it elects to make. 
(B)  Other times. A challenge for cause may be 
made at any other time during trial when it becomes 
apparent that a ground for challenge may exist. Such 
examination of the member and presentation of evi- 
dence as may be necessary may be made in order to 
resolve the matter. 
(3)  Procedure. Each party shall be permitted to 
make challenges outside the presence of the mem- 
bers. The party making a challenge shall state the 
grounds for it. Ordinarily the trial counsel shall 
enter any challenges for cause before the defense 
counsel. The military judge shall rule finally on each 
challenge. When a challenge for cause is granted, the 
member concerned shall be excused. The burden of 
establishing that grounds for a challenge exist is 
upon the party making the challenge. A member 
successfully challenged shall be excused. 
(4)  Waiver. The grounds for challenge in subsec- 
tion (f)(l)(A) of this rule may not be waived except 
that membership of enlisted members in the same 
unit as the accused may be waived. Membership of R.C.M. 912(f)(4) 
enlisted members in the same unit as the accused 
and any other ground for challenge is waived if the 
party knew of or could have discovered by the exer- 
cise of diligence the ground for challenge and failed 
to raise it in a timely manner. Notwithstanding the 
absence of a challenge or waiver of a challenge by 
the parties, the military judge may, in the interest of 
justice, excuse a member against whom a challenge 
for cause would lie. When a challenge for cause has 
been denied, failure by the challenging party to exer- 
cise a peremptory challenge against any member 
shall constitute waiver of further consideration of 
the challenge upon later review. However, when a 
challenge for cause is denied, a peremptory chal- 
lenge by the challenging party against any member 
shall preserve the issue for later review, provided 
that when the member who was unsuccessfully chal- 
lenged for cause is peremptorily challenged by  the 
same party, that party must state that it would have 
exercised its peremptory challenge against another 
member if the challenge for cause had been granted. 
Discussion 
See also Mil.R.Evid.  606(b) when a member may be a wit- 
ness. 
(g)  Peremptory challenges. 
(1)  Procedure. Each party may challenge one 
member peremptorily. Any member so challenged 
shall be excused. No party may be required to exer- 
cise a peremptory challenge before the examination 
of members and determination of any challenges for 
cause has been completed. Ordinarily the trial coun- 
sel shall enter any peremptory challenge before the 
defense. 
Discussion 
No reason is necessary for a peremptory challenge. 
(2)  Waiver. Failure to exercise a peremptory 
challenge when properly called upon to do so shall 
waive the right to make such a challenge. The mili- 
tary judge may, for good cause shown, grant relief 
from the waiver, but a peremptory challenge may 
not be made after the presentation of evidence before 
the members has begun. However, nothing in this 
subsection shall bar the exercise of a previously 
unexercised peremptory challenge against a member 
newly detailed under R.C.M. 505(c)(2)(B), even if 
presentation of evidence on the merits has begun. 
Discussion 
When the membership of the court-martial has been reduced 
below a quorum (see R.C.M. 501) or, when enlisted  members 
have been requested, the fraction of enlisted members has been re- 
duced below one-third, the proceedings should be adjourned and 
the convening authority notified so that new members may be de- 
tailed. See R.C.M. 505. See also R.C.M. 805(d) concerning other 
procedures when new members are detailed. 
(h) Special courts-martial without a military judge. 
In a special court-martial without a military judge, 
the procedures in  this rule shall apply, except that 
challenges shall be made in the presence of the mem- 
bers and a ruling on any challenge for cause shall be 
decided by a majority vote of the members upon se- 
cret written ballot in closed session. The challenged 
member shall not be present at the closed session at 
which the challenge is decided. A tie vote on a chal- 
lenge disqualifies the member challenged. Before 
closing, the president shall give such instructions as 
may be necessary to resolve the challenge. Each 
challenge shall be decided separately, and all unex- 
cused members except the challenged member shall 
participate. When only three members are present 
and one is challenged, the remaining two may decide 
the challenge. When the president is challenged, the 
next senior member shall act as president for pur- 
poses of deciding the challenge. 
(i) Dejinitions. 
(1)  Military judge. For purpose of this rule, "mili- 
tary judge"  does not include the president of a spe- 
cial court-martial without a military judge. 
(2)  Witness. For purposes of this rule, "witness" 
includes one who testifies at a court-martial and any- 
one whose declaration is received in evidence for any 
purpose, including written declarations made by affi- 
davit or otherwise. 
Discussion 
For example, a person who by certificate has attested or oth- 
erwise authenticated an official record or other writing intro- 
duced in evidence is a witness. 
(3) Investigating oficer. For purposes of this rule, 
"investigating officer"  includes any person who has 
investigated charges under R.C.M. 405 and any per- son who as counsel for a member of a court of in- 
quiry, or otherwise personally has conducted an in- 
vestigation of the general matter involving the 
offenses charged. 
Rule 913.  Presentation of the case on the 
merits 
(a)  Preliminary instructions. The military judge may 
give such preliminary instructions as may be appro- 
priate. If mixed pleas have been entered, the military 
judge should ordinarily defer informing the mem- 
bers of the offenses to which the accused pleaded 
guilty until after the findings on the remaining con- 
tested offenses have been entered. 
Discussion 
Preliminary instructions may include a description of the du- 
ties of members, procedures to be followed in the court-martial, 
and other appropriate matters. 
Exceptions to the rule requiring the military judge to defer 
informing the members of an accused's prior pleas of guilty in- 
clude cases in which the accused has specifically requested, on the 
record, that the military judge instruct the members of the prior 
pleas of guilty and cases in which a plea of guilty was to a lesser 
included offense within the contested offense charged in the speci- 
fication. See R.C.M. 910(g), Discussion and R.C.M. 920(e), Dis- 
cussion, paragraph 3. 
(b)  Opening statements. Each party may make one 
opening statement to the court-martial before pres- 
entation of evidence has begun. The defense may 
elect to make its statement after the prosecution has 
rested, before the presentation of evidence for the 
defense. The military judge may, as a matter of dis- 
cretion, permit the parties to address the court-mar- 
tial at other times. 
Discussion 
Counsel should confine their remarks to evidence they ex- 
pect to be offered which they believe in good faith will be available 
and admissible and a brief statement of the issues in the case. 
(c)  Presentation of evidence. Each party shall have 
full opportunity to present evidence. 
(1)  Order of presentation.  Ordinarily the follow- 
ing sequence shall be followed: 
(A) Presentation of evidence for the prosecu- 
tion; 
(B)  Presentation of evidence for the defense; 
R.C.M. 913(c)(3) 
(C)  Presentation of prosecution evidence in re- 
buttal; 
(D) Presentation of defense evidence in surre- 
buttal; 
(E)  Additional rebuttal evidence in the discre- 
tion of the military judge; and 
(F) Presentation of evidence requested by the 
military judge or members. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 801(a) and Mil.R.Evid. 61 1 concerning control 
by the military judge over the order of proceedings. 
(2) Taking testimony. The testimony of witnesses 
shall be taken orally in open session, unless other- 
wise provided in this Manual. 
Discussion 
Each witness must testify under oath. See R.C.M. 
807(b)(l)(B); Mil.R.Evid. 603. After a witness is sworn, the wit- 
ness should be identified for the record (full name, rank, and unit, 
if military, or full name and address, if civilian). The party calling 
the witness conducts direct examination of the witness, followed 
by cross-examination of the witness by  the opposing party. Redi- 
rect and re-cross-examination are conducted as necessary, fol- 
lowed by any questioning by  the military judge and members. See 
Mil.R.Evid. 61 1; 614. 
All documentary and real evidence (except marks or wounds 
on a person's  body) should be marked for identification when first 
referred to in the proceedings and should be included in the re- 
cord of trial whether admitted in evidence or not. See R.C.M. 
1 103(b)(2)(C), (c). "Real evidence" include physical objects, such 
as clothing, weapons, and marks or wounds on a person's body. It 
if is impracticable to attach an item of real evidence to the record, 
the item should be clearly and accurately described by testimony, 
photographs, or other means so that it may be considered on re- 
view. Similarly, when documentary evidence is used, if the docu- 
ment cannot be attached to the record (as in the case of an origi- 
nal official record or a large map), a legible copy or accurate 
extract should be included in the record. When a witness points to 
or otherwise refers to certain parts of a map, photograph, dia- 
gram, chart, or other exhibit, the place to which the witness 
pointed or referred should be clearly identified for the record, ei- 
ther by  marking the exhibit or by  an accurate description of the 
witness' actions with regard to the exhibit. 
(3) Views and inspections. The military judge 
may, as a matter of discretion, permit the court-mar- 
tial to view or inspect premises or a place or an arti- 
cle or object. Such a view or inspection shall take 
place only in the presence of all parties, the members 
(if any), and the military judge. A person familiar R.C.M. 913(c)(3) 
with the scene may be designated by  the military 
judge to escort the court-martial. Such person shall 
perform the duties of escort under oath. The escort 
shall not testify, but may point out particular fea- 
tures prescribed by  the military judge. Any state- 
ment made at the view or inspection by the escort, a 
party, the military judge,  or any member shall be 
made part of the record. 
Discussion 
A view or inspection should be permitted only in extraordi- 
nary circumstances. The fact that a view or inspection has been 
made does not necessarily preclude the introduction in evidence 
of photographs, diagrams, maps, or sketches of the place or item 
viewed, if these are otherwise admissible. 
(4) Evidence subject to exclusion. When offered 
evidence would be subject to exclusion upon objec- 
tion, the military judge may, as a matter of discre- 
tion, bring the matter to the attention of the parties 
and may, in the interest of justice,  exclude the evi- 
dence without an objection by a party. 
Discussion 
The military judge should not exclude evidence which is not 
objected to by a party except in extraordinary circumstances. 
Counsel should be permitted to try the case and present  the evi- 
dence without unnecessary interference by the military judge. See 
also Mil.R.Evid.  103. 
(5) Reopening case. The military judge may, as a 
matter of discretion, permit a party to reopen its case 
after it has rested. 
Rule 914.  Production of statements of 
witnesses 
(a)  Motion for production. After a witness other 
than the accused has testified on direct examination, 
the military judge, on motion of a party who did not 
call the witness, shall order the party who called the 
witness to produce, for examination and use by the 
moving party, any statement of the witness that re- 
lates to the subject matter concerning which the wit- 
ness has testified, and that is: 
(1)  In the case of a witness called by  the trial 
counsel, in the possession of the United States; or 
(2)  In the case of a witness called by the defense, 
in the possession of the accused or defense counsel. 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M. 701 (Discovery) 
Counsel should anticipate legitimate demands for statements 
under this and similar rules and avoid delays in the proceedings 
by  voluntary disclosure before arraignment. 
This rule does not apply to investigations under Article 32. 
As to procedures for certain government information as to 
which a privilege is asserted, see Mil.R.Evid. 505; 506. 
(b)  Production of entire statement. If the entire con- 
tents of the statement relate to the subject matter 
concerning which the witness has testified, the mili- 
tary judge shall order that the statement be delivered 
to the moving party. 
(c)  Production of excised statement. If the party who 
called the witness claims that the statement contains 
matter that does not relate to the subject matter con- 
cerning which the witness has testified, the military 
judge shall order that it be delivered to the military 
judge. Upon inspection, the military judge shall ex- 
cise the portions of the statement that do not relate 
to the subject matter concerning which the witness 
has testified, and shall order that the statement, with 
such material excised, be delivered to the moving 
party. Any portion of a statement that is withheld 
from an accused over objection shall be preserved by 
the trial counsel, and, in the event of a conviction, 
shall be made available to the reviewing authorities 
for the purpose of determining the correctness of the 
decision to excise the portion of the statement. 
(d)  Recess for  examination of the statement. Upon 
delivery of the statement to the moving party, the 
military judge may recess the trial for the examina- 
tion of the statement and preparation for its use in 
the trial. 
(e)  Remedy for failure  to produce  statement. If the 
other party elects not to comply with an order to de- 
liver a statement to the moving party, the military 
judge shall order that the testimony of the witness be 
disregarded by the trier of fact and that the trial pro- 
ceed, or, if  it is the trial counsel who elects not to 
comply, shall declare a mistrial if required in the in- 
terest of justice. 
(f)  Definition. As used in this rule, a "statement"  of 
a witness means: 
(1)  A written statement made by the witness that 
is signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the 
witness; R.C.M. 916(b) 
(2)  A substantially verbatim  recital of an oral 
statement made by the witness that is recorded con- 
temporaneously with the making of the oral state- 
ment and contained in a stenographic, mechanical, 
electrical, or other recording or a transcription 
thereof; or 
(3)  A statement, however taken or recorded, or a 
transcription thereof, made by  the witness to a Fed- 
eral grand jury. 
Rule 915.  Mistrial 
(a)  In general. The military judge may, as a matter 
of discretion, declare a mistrial when such action is 
manifestly necessary in the interest of justice be- 
cause of  circumstances arising during the proceed- 
ings which cast substantial doubt upon the fairness 
of the proceedings. A mistrial may be declared as to 
some or all charges, and as to the entire proceedings 
or as to only the proceedings after findings. 
Discussion 
The power to grant a mistrial should be used with great cau- 
tion, under urgent circumstances, and for plain and obvious rea- 
sons. As examples, a mistrial may be appropriate when inadmissi- 
ble matters so prejudicial  that a curative instruction would  be 
inadequate are brought to the attention of the members or when 
members engage in prejudicial misconduct. Also a mistrial is ap- 
propriate when the proceedings must be terminated because of a 
legal defect, such as a jurisdictional  defect, which can be cured; 
for example, when the referral is jurisdictionally  defective. See 
also R.C.M. 905(g) concerning the effect of rulings in one pro- 
ceeding on later proceedings. 
(b)  Procedure. On motion for a mistrial or when it 
otherwise appears that grounds for a mistrial may 
exist, the military judge shall inquire into the views 
of the parties on the matter and then decide the mat- 
ter as an interlocutory question. 
Discussion 
Except in a special court-martial without a military judge, 
the hearing on a mistrial should be conducted out of the presence 
of the members. 
(c)  Effect of declaration of mistrial. 
(1) Withdrawal of charges. A declaration of a 
mistrial shall have the effect of withdrawing the af- 
fected charges and specifications from the court- 
martial. 
Discussion 
Upon declaration of a mistrial, the affected charges are re- 
turned to the convening authority who may refer them anew or 
otherwise dispose of them. See R.C.M. 401-407. 
(2)  Further proceedings.  A declaration of a mis- 
trial shall not prevent trial by another court-martial 
on the affected charges and specifications except 
when the mistrial was declared after jeopardy at- 
tached and before findings, and the declaration was: 
(A) An abuse of  discretion and without the 
consent of the defense; or 
(B) The  direct  result  of  intentional 
prosecutorial misconduct designed to necessitate a 
mistrial. 
Rule 916.  Defenses 
(a)  In general. As used in this rule, "defenses"  in- 
cludes any special defense which, although not de- 
nying that the accused committed the objective acts 
constituting the offense charged, denies, wholly or 
partially, criminal responsibility for those acts. 
Discussion 
Special defenses are also called "affirmative defenses." 
"Alibi"  and "good  character"  are not special defenses, as 
they operate to deny that the accused committed one or more of 
the acts constituting the offense. As to evidence of the accused's 
good character, see Mil.R.Evid. 404(a)(l). See R.C.M. 701(b)(l) 
concerning notice of alibi. 
(b)  Burden ofprooJ: Except for the defense of lack of 
mental responsibility, once a defense under this rule 
is placed in issue by some evidence, the prosecution 
shall have the burden of proving beyond a reasona- 
ble doubt that the defense did not exist. The accused 
has the burden of proving the defense of lack of 
mental responsibility by  clear and convincing evi- 
dence. 
Discussion 
A defense may be raised  by  evidence presented  by  the de- 
fense, the prosecution, or the court-martial. For example, in a 
prosecution for assault, testimony by  prosecution witnesses that 
the victim brandished a weapon  toward the accused may raise a 
defense of self-defense. See subsection (e) below. More than one 
defense may be raised as to a particular offense. The defenses need 
not necessarily be consistent. 
See R.C.M. 920(e)(3) concerning instructions on defenses. R.C.M. 916(c) 
(c)  Justification. A death, injury, or other act caused 
or done in the proper performance of a legal duty is 
justified and not unlawful. 
Discussion 
The duty may be imposed by  statute, regulation, or order. 
For example, the use of force by  a law enforcement officer when 
reasonably necessary  in the proper execution of a lawful appre- 
hension is justified because the duty to apprehend is imposed by 
lawful authority. Also, killing an enemy combatant in battle is 
justified. 
(d)  Obedience to orders. It is a defense to any offense 
that the accused was acting pursuant to orders un- 
less the accused knew the orders to be unlawful or a 
person of ordinary sense and understanding would 
have known the orders to be unlawful. 
Discussion 
Ordinarily the lawfulness of an order is finally decided by the 
military judge.  See R.C.M. 801(e). An exception might exist 
when the sole issue is whether the person who gave the order in 
fact occupied a certain position at the time. 
An act performed pursuant to a lawful order is justified. See 
subsection (c) of this rule. An act performed pursuant to an un- 
lawful order is excused unless the accused knew it to be unlawful 
or a person  of ordinary sense and understanding would  have 
known it to be unlawful. 
(e)  Self-defense. 
(1) Homicide or assault cases involving deadly 
force. It is a defense to a homicide, assault involving 
deadly force, or battery involving deadly force that 
the accused: 
(A) Apprehended, on reasonable grounds, that 
death or grievous bodily harm was about to be in- 
flicted wrongfully on the accused; and 
(B) Believed that the force the accused used 
was necessary for protection against death or griev- 
ous bodily harm. 
Discussion 
The words "involving  deadly force"  described the factual 
circumstances of the case, not specific assault offenses. If the ac- 
cused is charged with simple assault, battery or any form of ag- 
gravated assault, or if  simple assault, battery or any form of ag- 
gravated assault is in issue as a lesser included offense, the accused 
may rely on this subsection if the test specified in subsections (A) 
and (B) is satisfied. 
The test for the first element of self-defense is objective. 
Thus, the accused's apprehension of death or grievous bodily 
harm must have been  one which a reasonable,, prudent person 
would have held under the circumstances. BecauSe this test is ob- 
jective, such matters as intoxication or emotional instability of the 
accused are irrelevant. On the other hand, such matters as the rel- 
ative height, weight, and general build of the accused and the al- 
leged  victim, and the possibility  of safe retreat are ordinarily 
among the circumstances which should be considered in deter- 
mining the reasonableness of the apprehension of death or griev- 
ous bodily harm. 
The test for the second element is entirely subjective. The ac- 
cused is not objectively limited to the use of reasonable force. Ac- 
cordingly, such matters as the accused's emotional control, edu- 
cation, and intelligence are relevant in determining the accused's 
actual belief as to the force necessary to repel the attack. 
See also Mil.R.Evid. 404(a)(2) as to evidence concerning the 
character of the victim. 
(2)  Certain aggravated assault cases. It is a de- 
fense to assault with a dangerous weapon or means 
likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm that 
the accused: 
(A)  Apprehended, on reasonable grounds, that 
bodily harm was about to be inflicted wrongfully on 
the accused; and 
(B)  In order to deter the assailant, offered but 
did not actually apply or attempt to apply such 
means or force as would be likely to cause death or 
grievous bodily harm. 
Discussion 
The principles in the discussion of subsection (e)(l) of this 
rule concerning reasonableness of the apprehension of bodily 
harm apply here. 
If, as a result of the accused's offer of a means or force likely 
to produce grievous bodily harm, the victim was killed or injured 
unintentionally by the accused, this aspect of self-defense may op- 
erate in conjunction with the defense of accident (see subsection 
(f)  of this rule) to excuse the accused's acts. The death or injury 
must have been an unintended  and unexpected result of the ac- 
cused's exercise of the right of self-defense. 
(3)  Other assaults. It is a defense to any assault 
punishable under Article 90, 91, or 128 and not 
listed in subsections (e)(l) or (2) of this rule that the 
accused: 
(A) Apprehended, upon reasonable grounds, 
that bodily harm was about to be inflicted wrong- 
fully on the accused; and 
(B)  Believed that the force that accused used 
was necessary  for protection against bodily harm, 
provided that the force used by the accused was less than force qeasonably  likely to produce death or 
grievous bodily harm. 
Discussion 
The principles in the discussion under subsection (e)(l) ap- 
ply here. 
If, in using only such force as the accused was entitled to use 
under this aspect of self-defense, death or serious injury to the vic- 
tim results, this aspect of self-defense may operate in conjunction 
with the defense of accident (see subsection (0of this rule) to ex- 
cuse the accused's acts. The death or serious injury must have 
been an unintended and unexpected result of the accused's proper 
exercise of the right of self-defense. 
(4)  Loss of right to self-defense. The right to self- 
defense is lost and the defenses described in subsec- 
tions (e)(l), (2), and (3) of this rule shall not apply if 
the accused was an aggressor, engaged in mutual 
combat, or provoked the attack which gave rise to 
the apprehension, unless the accused had withdrawn 
in good faith after the aggression, combat, or provo- 
cation and before the offense alleged occurred. 
Discussion 
A  person  does not become an aggressor or provocator 
merely because that person approaches another to seek an inter- 
view, even if the approach is not made in a friendly manner. For 
example, one may approach another and demand an explanation 
of offensive words or redress of a complaint. If the approach is 
made in a nonviolent manner, the right to self-defense is not lost. 
Failure to retreat, when retreat is possible, does not deprive 
the accused of the right to self-defense if the accused was lawfully 
present. The availability of avenues of retreat is one factor which 
may be considered  in  addressing the reasonableness of the ac- 
cused's  apprehension of bodily harm and the sincerity of the ac- 
cused's belief that the force used was necessary for self-protection. 
(5) Defense of another. The principles of self-de- 
fense under subsection (e)(l) through (4) of this rule 
apply to defense of another. It is a defense to homi- 
cide, attempted homicide, assault with intent to kill, 
or any assault under Article 90, 91, or 128 that the 
accused acted in defense of another, provided that 
the accused may not use more force than the person 
defended was lawfully entitled to use under the cir- 
cumstances. 
Discussion 
The accused acts at the accused's peril when  defending an- 
other. Thus, if  the accused goes to the aid of an apparent assault 
R.C.M. 916(h) 
victim, the accused is guilty of any assault the accused commits 
on the apparent assailant if, unbeknownst to the accused, the ap- 
parent victim was in fact the aggressor and not entitled to use self- 
defense. 
(f)  Accident. A death, injury, or other event which 
occurs as the unintentional and unexpected result of 
doing a lawful act in a lawful manner is an accident 
and excusable. 
Discussion 
The defense of accident is not available when the act which 
caused the death, injury, or event was a negligent act. 
(g)  Entrapment. It is a defense that the criminal de- 
sign or suggestion to commit the offense originated 
in the Government and the accused had no predis- 
position to commit the offense. 
Discussion 
The "Government"  includes agents of the Government and 
persons cooperating with them (for example, informants). The 
fact that persons acting for the Government merely afford oppor- 
tunities or facilities for the commission  of the offense does not 
constitute entrapment. Entrapment occurs only when the crimi- 
nal conduct is the product of the creative activity of law enforce- 
ment officials. 
When the defense of entrapment is raised, evidence of un- 
charged misconduct by the accused of a nature similar to that 
charged is admissible to show predisposition. See Mil.R.Evid. 
404(b). 
(h)  Coercion or duress. It is a defense to any offense 
except killing an innocent person that the accused's 
participation in the offense was caused by a reasona- 
ble apprehension that the accused or another inno- 
cent person would be immediately killed or would 
immediately suffer serious bodily injury if  the ac- 
cused did not commit the act. The apprehension 
must reasonably continue throughout the commis- 
sion of the act. If the accused has any reasonable op- 
portunity to avoid committing the act without sub- 
jecting the accused or another innocent person to the 
harm threatened, this defense shall not apply. 
Discussion 
The immediacy of the harm necessary may vary with the cir- 
cumstances. For example, a threat to kill a person's  wife the next 
day may be immediate if the person has no opportunity to contact R.C.M. 916(h) 
law enforcement officials or otherwise protect the intended victim 
or avoid committing the offense before then. 
(i)  Inability. It is a defense to refusal or failure to 
perform a duty that the accused was, through no 
fault of  the accused, not physically or financially 
able to perform the duty. 
Discussion 
The test of inability is objective in nature. The accused's 
opinion that a physical impairment prevented performance of the 
duty will not suffice unless the opinion is reasonable under all the 
circumstances. 
If the physical or financial inability of the accused occurred 
through the accused's own fault or design, it is not a defense. For 
example, if the accused, having knowledge of an order to get a 
haircut, spends money on other nonessential items, the accused's 
inability to pay for the haircut would not be a defense. 
(j) Ignorance or mistake of  fact. Except as otherwise 
provided in this subsection, it is a defense to an of- 
fense that the accused held, as a result of ignorance 
or mistake, an incorrect belief of the true circum- 
stances such that, if the circumstances were as the 
accused believed them, the accused would not be 
guilty of the offense. If the ignorance or mistake goes 
to an element requiring premeditation, specific in- 
tent, willfulness, or knowledge of a particular fact, 
the ignorance or mistake need only have existed in 
the mind of the accused. If the ignorance or mistake 
goes to any other element requiring only general in- 
tent or knowledge, the ignorance or mistake must 
have existed in the mind of the accused and must 
have been reasonable under all the circumstances. 
However, if the accused's knowledge or intent is im- 
material as to an element, then ignorance or mistake 
is not a defense. 
Discussion 
Examples of ignorance or mistake which need only exist in 
fact include: ignorance of the fact that the person assaulted was 
an officer; belief that property allegedly stolen belonged to the ac- 
cused; belief that a controlled substance was really sugar. 
Examples of ignorance or mistake which must be reasonable 
as well as actual include: belief that the accused charged with un- 
authorized absence had permission  to go; belief that the accused 
had a medical "profile" excusing shaving as otherwise required by 
regulation. Some offenses require special standards of conduct 
(see, for example, paragraph 68, Part IV, Dishonorable failure to 
maintain sufficient funds); the element of reasonableness must be 
applied in accordance with  the standards imposed by  such of- 
fenses. 
Examples of offenses in which the accused's intent or knowl- 
edge is immaterial include: carnal knowledge (accused's knowl- 
edge of age of victim immaterial); improper use of countersign 
(mistake as to authority of person to whom disclosed  not a de- 
fense). Such ignorance or mistake may be relevant in extenuation 
and mitigation, however. 
See subsection (1)(1) of this rule concerning ignorance or 
mistake of law. 
(k)  Lack of mental responsibility. 
(1)  Lack of mental responsibility. It is an affirma- 
tive defense to any offense that, at the time of  the 
commission of the acts constituting the offense, the 
accused, as a result of a severe mental disease or de- 
fect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality 
or the wrongfulness of his or her acts. Mental disease 
or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 706 concerning sanity inquiries. See also R.C.M. 
909 concerning the capacity of the accused to stand trial. 
(2) Partial mental responsibility. A mental condi- 
tion not amounting to a lack of mental responsibility 
under subsection (k)(l) of this rule is not a defense, 
nor is evidence of such a mental condition admissi- 
ble as to whether the accused entertained a state of 
mind necessary to be proven as an element of the of- 
fense. 
(3)  Procedure. 
(A) Presumption. The accused is presumed to 
have been mentally responsible at the time of the al- 
leged offense. This presumption continues until the 
accused establishes, by  clear and convincing evi- 
dence, that he or she was not mentally responsible at 
the time of the alleged offense. 
Discussion 
The  accused is presumed to be mentally responsible, and this 
presumption continues throughout the proceedings unless the 
finder of fact determines that the accused has proven lack of 
mental responsibility by clear and convincing evidence. See sub- 
section (b) of this rule. 
(B) Inquiry. If a question is raised concerning 
the mental responsibility of the accused, the military 
judge shall rule finally whether to direct an inquiry 
under R.C.M. 706. In a special court-martial with- out a military judge, the president shall rule finally 
except to the extent that the question is one of fact, 
in which case the president rules subject to objection 
by any member. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 801(e)(3) for the procedures for voting on rul- 
ings of the president of a special court-martial without a military 
judge. 
If an inquiry is directed, priority should be given to it. 
(C)  Determination. The issue of mental respon- 
sibility shall not be considered as an interlocutory 
question. 
(1)  Not defenses generally. 
(1) Ignorance or mistake of law. Ignorance or 
mistake of  law, including general orders or regula- 
tions, ordinarily is not a defense. 
Discussion 
For example, ignorance that it is a crime to possess mari- 
juana is not a defense to wrongful possession of marijuana. 
Ignorance or mistake of law may be a defense in some limited 
circumstances. If the accused, because of a mistake as to a sepa- 
rate nonpenal law, lacks the criminal intent or state of mind nec- 
essary to establish guilt, this may be a defense. For example, if the 
accused, under mistaken belief that the accused is entitled to take 
an item under property law, takes an item, this mistake of law (as 
to the accused's legal right) would, if genuine, be a defense to lar- 
ceny. On the other hand, if the accused disobeyed an order, under 
the actual but mistaken belief that the order was unlawful, this 
would not be a defense because the accused's mistake was as to 
the order itself, and not as to a separate nonpenal law. Also, mis- 
take of law may be a defense when the mistake results from reli- 
ance on the decision or pronouncement of an authorized public 
official or agency. For example, if an accused, acting on the advice 
of an official responsible for administering benefits that the ac- 
cused is entitled to those benefits, applies for and receives those 
benefits, the accused may have a defense even though the accused 
was not legally eligible for the benefits. On the other hand, reli- 
ance on the advice of counsel that a certain course of conduct is 
legal is not, of itself, a defense. 
(2) Voluntary intoxication. Voluntary intoxica- 
tion, whether caused by alcohol or drugs, is not a de- 
fense. However, evidence of any degree of voluntary 
intoxication may be introduced for the purpose of 
raising a reasonable doubt as to the existence of ac- 
tual knowledge, specific intent, willfulness, or a pre- 
meditated design to kill, if actual knowledge, specific 
intent, willfulness, or premeditated design to kill is 
an element of the offense. 
R.C.M. 917(e) 
Discussion 
Intoxication may reduce premeditated murder to unpremed- 
itated murder, but it will not reduce murder to manslaughter or 
any other lesser offense. See paragraph 43c(2)(c), Part IV. 
Although voluntary intoxication is not a defense, evidence of 
voluntary intoxication may be admitted in extenuation. 
Rule 917.  Motion for a finding of not guilty 
(a) In  general. The military judge, on motion by the 
accused or sua sponte, shall enter a finding of not 
guilty of one or more offenses charged after the evi- 
dence on either side is closed and before findings on 
the general issue of guilt are announced if  the evi- 
dence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of the of- 
fense affected. If a motion for a finding of not guilty 
at the close of the prosecution's case is denied, the 
defense may offer evidence on that offense without 
having reserved the right to do so. 
(b)  Form of motion. The motion shall specifically in- 
dicate wherein the evidence is insufficient. 
(c)  Procedure. Before ruling on a motion for a find- 
ing of not guilty, whether made by counsel or sua 
sponte, the military judge shall give each party an 
opportunity to be heard on the matter. 
Discussion 
The military judge ordinarily should permit the trial counsel 
to reopen the case as to the insufficiency specified in the motion. 
See R.C.M.801(e)(2) and (3) for additional procedures to be 
followed in a special court-martial without a military judge. 
(d) Standard. A motion for a finding of not guilty 
shall be granted only in the absence of some evidence 
which, together with all reasonable inferences and 
applicable presumptions, could reasonably tend to 
establish every essential element of an offense 
charged. The evidence shall be  viewed in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, without an evalu- 
ation of the credibility of witnesses. 
(e)  Motion as to greater offense. A motion for a find- 
ing of not guilty may be granted as to part of a speci- 
fication and, if  appropriate, the corresponding 
charge, as long as a lesser offense charged is alleged 
in the portion of the specification as to which the 
motion is not granted. In such cases, the military 
judge shall announce that a finding of not guilty has 
been granted as to specified language in the specifica- 
tion and, if appropriate, corresponding charge. In R.C.M. 917(e) 
cases before members, the military judge  shall in- 
struct the members accordingly, so that any findings 
later announced will not be inconsistent with the 
granting of the motion. 
(0 Effect of ruling. A ruling granting a motion for a 
finding of not guilty is final when announced and 
may not be reconsidered. Such a ruling is a finding of 
not guilty of the affected specification, or affected 
portion thereof, and, when appropriate, of the corre- 
sponding charge. A ruling denying a motion for a 
finding of not guilty may be reconsidered at any time 
before findings on the general issue of guilt are an- 
nounced. 
(g)  Effect of denial on review. If all the evidence ad- 
mitted before findings, regardless by whom offered, 
is sufficient to sustain findings of guilty, the findings 
need not be set aside upon review solely because the 
motion for finding of not guilty should have been 
granted upon the state of the evidence when it was 
made. 
Rule 918.  Findings 
(a)  General jindings.  The general findings of a 
court-martial state whether the accused is guilty of 
each offense charged. If two or more accused are 
tried together, separate findings as to each shall be 
made. 
(1) As  to a specijication. General findings as to a 
specification may be: guilty; not guilty of an offense 
as charged, but guilty of a named lesser included of- 
fense; guilty with exceptions, with or without substi- 
tutions, not guilty of the exceptions, but guilty of the 
substitutions, if any; not guilty only by reason of 
lack of mental responsibility; or, not guilty. Excep- 
tions and substitutions may not be used to substan- 
tially change the nature of the offense or to increase 
the seriousness of the offense or the maximum pun- 
ishment for it. 
Discussion 
Exceptions and substitutions. One or more words or figures 
may be excepted from a specification and, when necessary, others 
substituted, if the remaining language of the specification, with or 
without substitutions, states an offense by  the accused which is 
punishable by  court-martial. Changing the date or place of the of- 
fense may, but does not necessarily, change the nature or identity 
of an offense. 
If A and B are joint  accused and A is convicted but B is ac- 
quitted of the offense charged, A should be  found guilty be ex- 
cepting the name of B from the specification as well as any other 
words indicating the offense was a joint  one. 
Lesser included offenses. If the evidence fails to prove the of- 
fense charged but does prove an offense necessarily included  in 
the offense charged, the factfinder may find the accused not guilty 
of the offense charged but guilty offa  named lesser offense, which 
is included in the offense charged, without the use of exceptions 
and substitutions. Ordinarily an attempt is a lesser included of- 
fense even if the evidence establishes that the offense charged was 
consummated. See Part IV concerning lesser included offenses. 
Offenses arising from  the same act or transaction. The ac- 
cused may be found guilty of two or more offenses arising from 
the same act or transaction, whether or not the offenses are sepa- 
rately punishable. But see R.C.M. 906(b)(12);  907(b)(3)(B); 
1003(c)(l)(C). 
(2) As to a charge. General findings as to a charge 
may be: guilty; not guilty, but guilty of a violation of 
Article  ;not guilty only by reason 
of lack of mental responsibility; or not guilty. 
Discussion 
Where there are two or more specifications under one 
charge, conviction of any of those specifications requires a finding 
of guilty of the corresponding charge. Under such circumstances 
any findings of not guilty as to the other specifications do not af- 
fect that charge. If the accused is found guilty of one specification 
and of a lesser included offense prohibited by a different Article as 
to another specification under the same charge, the findings as to 
the corresponding charge should be: Of the Charge as the specifi- 
cation 1: Guilty; as to specification 2; not guilty, but guilty of a vi- 
olation of Article 
An attempt should be found as a violation  of Article 80 un- 
less the attempt is punishable under Articles 85, 94, 100, 104, or 
128, in which case it should be found as a violation of that Article. 
A court-martial may not find an offense as a violation of an 
article under which  it was not charged solely for the purpose of 
increasing the authorized punishment or for the purpose of ad- 
judging less than the prescribed  mandatory punishment. 
(b) Specialjindings. In a trial by court-martial com- 
posed  of military judge  alone, the military judge 
shall make special findings upon request by  any 
party. Special findings may be requested only as to 
matters of fact reasonably in issue as to an offense 
and need be made only as to offenses of which the ac- 
cused was found guilty. Special findings may be re- 
quested at any time before general findings are an- 
nounced. Only one set of special findings may be 
requested  by  a party in a case. If the request is for 
findings on specific matters, the military judge may 
require that the request be written. Special findings 
may be entered orally on the record at the court- 
martial or in writing during or after the court-mar- tial, but in any event shall be made before authenti- 
cation and included in the record of trial. 
Discussion 
Special findings ordinarily include findings as to the elements 
of the offenses of which  the accused has been found guilty, and 
any affirmative defense relating thereto. 
See also R.C.M. 905(d); Mil.R.Evid. 304(d)(4); 311(d)(4); 
321(f) concerning other findings to be made by the military judge. 
Members may not make special findings. 
(c)  Basis of findings.  Findings may be based on di- 
rect or circumstantial evidence. Only matters prop- 
erly before the court-martial on the merits of  the 
case may be considered. A finding of guilty of any of- 
fense may be reached only when the factfinder is sat- 
isfied that guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Discussion 
Direct evidence is evidence which tends directly to prove or 
disprove a fact in issue (for example, an elemenl of the offense 
charged). Circumstantial evidence is evidence which  tends di- 
rectly to prove not a fact in  issue but some other fact or circum- 
stance from which, either alone or together with other facts or cir- 
cumstances,  one may  reasonably  infer the existence or 
nonexistence of a fact in issue. There is no general rule for deter- 
mining or comparing the weight to be given to direct or circum- 
stantial evidence. 
A reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason and common 
sense. A reasonable doubt is not mere conjecture; it is an honest, 
conscientious doubt suggested by the evidence, or lack of it, in the 
case. An absolute or mathematical certainty is not required. The 
rule as to reasonable doubt extends to every element of the of- 
fense. It is not necessary that each particular fact advanced by the 
prosecution which is not an element be proved beyond a reasona- 
ble doubt. 
The factfinder should consider the inherent probability  or 
improbability of the evidence, using common sense and knowl- 
edge of human nature, and should weigh the credibility of wit- 
nesses. A fact finder may properly believe one witness and disbe- 
lieve others whose testimony conflicts with that of the one. A 
factfinder may believe part of the testimony of a witness and dis- 
believe other parts. 
Findings of guilty may not be based solely on the testimony 
of a witness other than the accused which is self-contradictory, 
unless the contradiction is adequately explair~ed  by the witness. 
Even if apparently credible and corroborated, the testimony of an 
accomplice should be considered with great caution. 
R.C.M. 919(c) 
Rule 919.  Argument by counsel on findings 
(a) In general.  After the closing of evidence, trial 
counsel shall be permitted to open the argument. 
The defense counsel shall be permitted to reply. 
Trial counsel shall then be permitted to reply in re- 
buttal. 
(b)  Contents. Arguments may properly include rea- 
sonable comment on the evidence in the case, in- 
cluding inferences to be drawn therefrom, in support 
of a party's theory of the case. 
Discussion 
The military judge may exercise reasonable control over ar- 
gument. See R.C.M. 801(a)(3). 
Argument may include comment about the testimony, con- 
duct, motives, interests, and biases of witnesses to the extent sup- 
ported by  the evidence. Counsel should not express a personnel 
belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evi- 
dence or the guilt or innocence of the accused, nor should counsel 
make arguments calculated to inflame passions or prejudices.  In 
argument counsel may treat the testimony of witnesses as conclu- 
sively establishing the facts related by the witnesses. Counsel may 
not cite legal authorities or the facts of other cases when arguing 
to members on findings. 
Trial counsel may not comment on the accused's exercise of 
the right against self-incrimination or the right to counsel. See 
Mil.R.Evid. 512. Trial counsel may not argue that the prosecu- 
tion's evidence is unrebutted if the only rebuttal could come from 
the accused. When the accused is on trial for several offenses and 
testifies only as to some of the offenses, trial counsel may not com- 
ment on the accused's failure to testify as to the others. When the 
accused testifies on the merits regarding an offense charged, trial 
counsel may comment on the accused's failure in that testimony 
to deny or explain specific incriminating facts that the evidence 
for the prosecution tends to establish regarding that offense. 
Trial counsel may not comment on the failure of the defense 
to call witnesses or of the accused to testify at the Article 32 inves- 
tigation or upon the probable effect of the court-martial's findings 
on relations between the military and civilian communities. 
The rebuttal argument of trial counsel is generally limited to 
matters argued by  the defense. If trial counsel is permitted to in- 
troduce new matter in closing argument, the defense should be al- 
lowed to reply in rebuttal. However, this will not preclude trial 
counsel from presenting a final argument. 
(c)  Waiver of objection to improper argument. Fail-
ure to object to improper argument before the mili- 
tary judge begins to instruct the members on find- 
ings shall constitute waiver of the objection. 
Discussion 
If an objection that an argument is improper is sustained, the 
military judge should immediately instruct the members that the 
argument was improper and that they must disregard it. In ex- R.C.M. 919(c) 
traordinary cases improper argument may require a mistrial. See 
R.C.M. 915. The military judge should be alert to improper argu- 
ment and take appropriate action when necessary. 
Rule 920.  Instructions on findings 
(a)  In general. The military judge  shall give the 
members appropriate instructions on findings. 
Discussion 
Instructions consist of a statement of the issues in the case 
and an explanation of the legal standards and procedural require- 
ments by  which the members will determine findings. Instruc- 
tions should be tailored to fit the circumstances of the case, and 
should fairly and adequately cover the issues presented. 
(b)  When given. Instructions on findings shall be 
given before or after arguments by counsel, or at 
both times, and before the members close to deliber- 
ate on findings, but the military judge may, upon re- 
quest of the members, any party, or sua sponte, give 
additional instructions at a later time. 
Discussion 
After members have reached a finding on a specification, in- 
structions may not be given on an offense included therein which 
was not described in an earlier instruction unless the finding is il- 
legal. This is true even if the finding has not been  announced. 
When instructions are to be given is a matter within the sole dis- 
cretion of the military trial judge. 
(c)  Requests for  instructions. At the close of the evi- 
dence or at such other time as the military judge 
may permit, any party may request that the military 
judge instruct the members on the law as set forth in 
the request. The military judge may require the re- 
quested instruction to be written. Each party shall 
be given the opportunity to be heard on any pro- 
posed instruction on findings before it is given. The 
military judge shall inform the parties of the pro- 
posed action on such requests before their closing ar- 
guments. 
Discussion 
Requests for and objections to instructions should be re- 
solved at an Article 39(a) session. But see R.C.M. 801(e)(3); 803. 
If an issue has been raised, ordinarily the military judge must 
instruct on the issue when requested to do so. The military judge 
is not required to give the specific instruction requested by  coun- 
sel, however, as long as the issue is adequately covered in the in- 
structions. 
The military judge should not identify the source of any in- 
struction when addressing the members. 
All written requests for instructions should be marked as ap- 
pellate exhibits, whether or not they are given. 
(d) How given. Instructions on findings shall be 
given orally on the record in the presence of all par- 
ties and the members. Written copies of the instruc- 
tions, or, unless a party objects, portions of them, 
may also be given to the members for their use dur- 
ing deliberations. 
Discussion 
A copy of any written instructions delivered to the members 
should be marked as an appellate exhibit. 
(e)  Required  instructions. Instructions on findings 
shall include: 
(1)  A description of the elements of each offense 
charged, unless findings on such offenses are unnec- 
essary because they have been entered pursuant to a 
plea of guilty; 
(2)  A description of the elements of each lesser 
included offense in issue, unless trial of a lesser in- 
cluded offense is barred by  the statute of limitations 
(Article 43) and the accused refuses to waive the bar; 
(3)  A description of  any special defense under 
R.C.M. 916 in issue; 
(4)  A direction that only matters properly before 
the court-martial may be considered; 
(5)  A charge that- 
(A) The accused must be presumed to be inno- 
cent until the accused's guilt is established by legal 
and competent evidence beyond reasonable doubt; 
(B)  In the case being considered, if there is a 
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, the 
doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused and 
the accused must be acquitted; 
(C)  If, when a lesser included offense is in is- 
sue, there is a reasonable doubt as to the degree of 
guilt of the accused, the finding must be in a lower 
degree as to which there is not reasonable doubt; and 
(D) The burden of proof to establish the guilt 
of the accused is upon the Government. [When the 
issue of lack of mental responsibility is raised, add:] 
However, the burden of proving the defense of lack R.C.M. 921(c)(3) 
of mental responsibility by clear and convincing evi- 
dence is upon the accused. 
(6)  Directions on the procedures under R.C.M. 
92 1 for deliberations and voting; and 
(7)  Such other explanations, descriptions, or di- 
rections as may be necessary and which are properly 
requested by a party or which the military judge de- 
termines, sua sponte, should be given. 
Discussion 
A matter is "in  issue" when some evidence, without regard 
to its source or credibility, has been admitted upon which mem- 
bers might rely if they choose. An instruction on a lesser included 
offense is proper when an element from the charged offense which 
distinguishes that offense from the lesser offense is in dispute. 
See R.C.M. 9 18(c) and discussion as to reasonable doubt and 
other matters relating to the basis for findings which may be the 
subject of an instruction. 
Other matters which may be the subject of instruction in ap- 
propriate cases included: inferences (see the explanations in Part 
IV concerning inferences relating to specific offenses); the limited 
purpose for which evidence was admitted (regardless of whether 
such evidence was offered by the prosecution of defense) (see 
Mil.R.Evid.  105); the effect  of character evidence (see 
Mil.R.Evid. 404; 405); the effect of judicial  notice (see 
Mil.R.Evid. 201, 201A); the weight to be given a pretrial state- 
ment (see Mil.R.Evid. 340(e)); the effect  of stipulations (see 
R.C.M. 811); that, when a guilty plea to a lesser included offense 
has been accepted, the members should accept as proved the mat- 
ters admitted by the plea, but must determine whether the re- 
maining elements are established; that a plea of guilty to one of- 
fense may not be the basis for inferring the existence of a fact or 
element of another offense; the absence of the accused from trial 
should not be held against the accused; and that no adverse infer- 
ences may be drawn from an accused's  failure to testify (see 
Mil.R.Evid. 301(g)). 
The military judge may summarize and comment upon evi- 
dence in the case in instructions. In doing so, the military judge 
should present an accurate, fair, and dispassionate statement of 
what the evidence shows; not depart from an impartial role; not 
assume as true the existence or nonexistence of a fact in issue 
when the evidence is conflicting or disputed, or when there is no 
evidence to support the matter; and make clear that the members 
must exercise their independent judgment as to the facts. 
(f)  Waiver. Failure to object to an instruction or to 
omission of an instruction before the members close 
to deliberate constitutes waiver of the objection in 
the absence of plain error. The military judge  may 
require the party objecting to specify of what respect 
the instructions given were improper. The parties 
shall be given the opportunity to be heard on any ob- 
jection outside the presence of the members. 
Rule 921.  Deliberations and voting on 
findings 
(a)  In general. After the military judge instructs the 
members on findings, the members shall deliberate 
and vote in a closed session. Only the members shall 
be present during deliberations and voting. Superi- 
ority in rank shall not be used in any manner in an 
attempt to control the independence of members in 
the exercise of their judgment. 
(b)  Deliberations.  Deliberations properly include 
full and free discussion of the merits of the case. Un- 
less otherwise directed by the military judge, mem- 
bers may take with them in deliberations their notes, 
if any, any exhibits admitted in evidence, and any 
written instructions. Members may request that the 
court-martial be reopened and that portions of the 
record be read to them or additional evidence intro- 
duced. The military judge may, in the exercise of dis- 
cretion, grant such request. 
(c)  Voting. 
(1)  Secret ballot. Voting on the findings for each 
charge and specification shall be by secret written 
ballot. All members present shall vote. 
(2)  Numbers of votes required to convict. 
(A) Death penalty  mandatory. A finding of 
guilty of an offense for which the death penalty is 
mandatory results only if all members present vote 
for a finding of guilty. 
Discussion 
Article 106 is the only offense under the code for which the 
death penalty is mandatory. 
(B) Other offenses. As to any offense for which 
the death penalty is not mandatory, a finding of 
guilty results only if  at least two-thirds of the mem- 
bers present vote for a finding of guilty. 
Discussion 
In computing the number of votes required to convict, any 
fraction of a vote is rounded up to the next whole number. For ex- 
ample, if there are five members, the concurrence of at least four 
would be required to convict. The military judge should instruct 
the members on the specific number of votes required to convict. 
(3) Acquittal. If fewer than two-thirds of the 
members present  vote for a finding of guilty-or, 
when the death penalty is mandatory, if fewer than R.C.M. 921(c)(3) 
all the members present vote for a  finding of 
guilty-a  finding of not guilty has resulted as to the 
charge or specification on which the vote was taken. 
(4)  Not guilty only by reason of lack of mental re- 
sponsibility.  When the defense of lack of mental re- 
sponsibility is in issue under R.C.M. 916(k)(l), the 
members shall first vote on whether the prosecution 
has proven the elements of the offense beyond a rea- 
sonable doubt. If at least two-thirds of the members 
present (all members for offenses where the death 
penalty is mandatory) vote for a finding of guilty, 
then the members shall vote on whether the accused 
has proven lack of mental responsibility. If a major- 
ity of the members present concur that the accused 
has proven lack of mental responsibility be clear and 
convincing evidence, a finding of not guilty only by 
reason of lack of mental responsibility  results. If the 
vote on lack of mental responsibility does not result 
in a finding of not guilty only by reason of lack of 
mental responsibility, then the defense of lack of 
mental responsibility has been rejected and the find- 
ing of guilty stands. 
Discussion 
If lack of mental responsibility is in issue with regard to more 
than one specification, the members should determine the issue of 
lack of mental responsibility on each specification separately. 
(5) Included offenses. Members shall not vote on 
a lesser included offense unless a finding of not guilty 
of the offense charged has been reached. If a finding 
of not guilty of an offense charged has been reached 
the members shall vote on each included offense on 
which they have been instructed, in order of severity 
beginning with the most severe. The members shall 
continue the vote on each included offense on which 
they have been instructed until a finding of guilty re- 
sults or findings of not guilty have been reached as to 
each such offense. 
(6)  Procedure for  voting. 
(A)  Order. Each specification shall be voted on 
separately before the corresponding charge. The or- 
der of voting on several specifications under a charge 
or on several charges shall be determined by the 
president unless a majority of the members object. 
(B)  Counting votes. The junior member shall 
collect the ballots and count the votes. The president 
shall check the count and inform the other members 
of the result. 
Discussion 
Once findings have been reached, they may be reconsidered 
only in accordance with R.C.M. 924. 
(d) Action after jndings are reached. After the 
members have reached findings on each charge and 
specification before them, the court-martial shall be 
opened and the president shall inform the military 
judge that findings have been reached. The military 
judge may, in the presence of the parties, examine 
any writing which the president intends to read to 
announce the findings and may assist the members 
in putting the findings in proper form. Neither that 
writing nor any oral or written clarification or dis- 
cussion concerning it shall constitute announcement 
of the findings. 
Discussion 
Ordinarily a findings worksheet should be provided to the 
members as an aid to putting the findings in proper form. See Ap-
pendix 10 for a format for findings. If the military judge examines 
any writing by the members or otherwise assists them to put find- 
ings in proper form, this must be done in an open session  and 
counsel should be given the opportunity to examine such a writ- 
ing and to be heard on any instructions the military judge may 
give. See Article 39(b). 
The president should not disclose any specific number of 
votes for or against any finding. 
Rule 922.  Announcement of findings 
(a) In general. Findings shall be announced in the 
presence of all parties promptly after they have been 
determined. 
Discussion 
See Appendix 10. A finding of an offense about which no in- 
structions were given is not proper. 
(b) Findings by members. The president shall an- 
nounce the findings by the members. 
(1)  If a finding is based on a plea of guilty, the 
president shall so state. 
(2)  In a capital case, if a finding of guilty is unani- 
mous with respect to a capital offense, the president 
shall so state. This provision  shall not apply during 
reconsideration under R.C.M. 924(a) of a finding of 
guilty previously announced in open court unless the 
prior finding was announced as unanimous. Discussion 
If the findings announced are ambiguous, the military judge 
should seek clarification. See also R.C.M. 924. A nonunanimous 
finding of guilty as to a capital offense may be reconsidered, but 
not for the purpose of rendering a unanimous verdict in order to 
authorize a capital sentencing proceeding. The president shall not 
make a statement regarding unanimity with respect to reconsider- 
ation of findings as to an offense in which the prior findings were 
not unanimous. 
(c)  Findings by military judge.  The military judge 
shall announce the findings when trial is by military 
judge alone or when findings may be entered upon 
R.C.M. 910(g). 
(d)  Erroneous announcement. If an error was made 
in  the announcement of the findings of the court- 
martial, the error may be corrected by a new an- 
nouncement in accordance with this rule. The error 
must be discovered and the new announcement 
made before the final adjournment of the court-mar- 
tial in the case. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 1102 concerning the action to be taken if the er- 
ror in the announcement is discovered after final adjournment. 
(e)  Polling prohibited.  Except as provided in 
Mil.R.Evid. 606, members may not be questioned 
about their deliberations and voting. 
Rule 923.  Impeachment of findings 
Findings which are proper on their face may be 
impeached only when extraneous prejudicial infor- 
mation was improperly brought to the attention of a 
member, outside influence was improperly brought 
to bear upon any member, or unlawful command in- 
fluence was brought to bear upon any member. 
Discussion 
Deliberations of the members ordinarily are not subject to 
disclosure. See Mil.R.Evid. 606. Unsound reasoning by a mem- 
ber, misconception of the evidence, or misapplication of the law is 
R.C.M. 924(c) 
not a proper basis for challenging the findings. However, when a 
showing of a ground for impeaching the verdict has been made, 
members may be questioned about such a ground. The military 
judge determines, as an interlocutory matter, whether such an in- 
quiry will be conducted and whether a finding has been  im- 
peached. 
Rule 924.  Reconsideration of findings 
(a)  Time  for  reconsideration.  Members may recon- 
sider any finding reached by them before such find- 
ing is announced in open session. Members may re- 
consider any finding of guilty reached by them at 
any time before announcement of the sentence. 
(b)  Procedure. Any member may propose that a 
finding be reconsidered. If such a proposal is made 
in a timely manner the question whether to recon- 
sider shall be determined in closed session by secret 
written ballot. Any finding of not guilty shall be re- 
considered if a majority vote for reconsideration. 
Any finding of guilty shall be reconsidered if more 
than one-third of the members vote for reconsidera- 
tion. When the death penalty is mandatory, a re- 
quest by any member for reconsideration of a guilty 
finding requires reconsideration. Any finding of not 
guilty only by reason of lack of mental responsibility 
shall be reconsidered on the issue of the finding of 
guilty of the elements if more than one-third of the 
members vote for reconsideration, and on the issue 
of mental responsibility if a majority vote for recon- 
sideration. If a vote to reconsider a finding succeeds, 
the procedures in R.C.M. 921 shall apply. 
Discussion 
After the initial secret ballot vote on a finding in closed ses- 
sion, no other vote may be taken on that finding unless a vote to 
reconsider succeeds. 
(c)  Military judge  sitting alone. In trial by  military 
judge alone, the military judge may reconsider any 
finding of guilty at any time before announcement of 
sentence. CHAPTER X. 
Rule 1001. Presentencing procedure 
(a)  In  general. 
(1) Procedure. After findings of guilty have been 
announced, the prosecution and defense may pre- 
sent matter pursuant to this rule to aid the court- 
martial in determining an appropriate sentence. 
Such matter shall ordinarily be presented in the fol- 
lowing sequence- 
(A)  Presentation by trial counsel of: 
(i)  service data relating to the accused taken 
from the charge sheet; 
(ii)  personal data relating to the accused and 
of the character of the accused's prior service as re- 
flected in the personnel records of the accused; 
(iii)  evidence of prior convictions, military 
or civilian; 
(iv)  evidence of aggravation; and 
(v)  evidence of rehabilitative potential. 
(B)  Presentation by the defense of evidence in 
extenuation or mitigation or both. 
(C)  Rebuttal. 
(D)  Argument by the trial counsel on sentence. 
(E)  Argument by the defense counsel on sen- 
tence. 
(F)  Rebuttal arguments in the discretion of the 
military judge. 
(2) Adjudging sentence.  A sentence shall be ad- 
judged in all cases without unreasonable delay. 
(3) Advice and inquiry. The military judge shall 
personally inform the accused of the right to present 
matters in extenuation and mitigation, including the 
right to make a sworn or unsworn statement or to re- 
main silent, and shall ask whether the accused 
chooses to exercise those rights. 
(b)  Matter to be presented  by the prosecution. 
(1)  Service data  from the charge sheet. Trial coun- 
sel shall inform the court-martial of the data on the 
charge sheet relating to the pay and service of the ac- 
cused and the duration and nature of any pretrial re- 
straint. In the discretion of the military judge,  this 
may be done by reading the material from the charge 
sheet or by giving the court-martial a written state- 
ment of  such matter. If the defense objects to the 
data as being materially inaccurate or incomplete, or 
containing specified objectionable matter, the mili- 
tary judge shall determine the issue. Objections not 
asserted are waived. 
(2)  Personal data and character of prior service of 
the accused. Under regulations of the Secretary con- 
cerned, trial counsel may obtain and introduce from 
the personnel records of the accused evidence of the 
accused's  marital status; number of dependents, if 
any; and character of prior service. Such evidence 
includes copies of reports reflecting the past military 
efficiency, conduct, performance, and history of the 
accused and evidence of any disciplinary actions in- 
cluding punishments under Article 15. 
"Personnel  records of the accused"  includes any 
records made or maintained in accordance with de- 
partmental regulation~  that reflect the past military 
efficiency, conduct, performance, and history of the 
accused. If the accused objects to a particular docu- 
ment as inaccurate or incomplete in a specified re- 
spect, or as containing matter that is not admissible 
under the Military Rules of Evidence, the matter 
shall be determined by the military judge.  Objec- 
tions not asserted are waived. 
(3)  Evidence of prior convictions of the accused. 
(A) In general. The trial counsel may intro- 
duce evidence of military or civilian convictions of 
the accused. For purposes of this rule, there is a 
"conviction"  in a court-martial case when a sen- 
tence has been adjudged. 
Discussion 
A vacation of a suspended sentence (see R.C.M. 1109) is not 
a conviction and is not admissible as such, but may be admissible 
under subsection (b)(2) of this rule as reflective of the character of 
the prior service of the accused. 
(B) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an 
appeal therefrom does not render evidence of a con- 
viction inadmissible except that a conviction by 
summary court-martial or special court-martial 
without a military judge  may not be used for pur- 
poses of this rule until review has been completed 
pursuant to Article 64 or Article 66, if  applicable. 
Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible. 
(C)  Method of proof: Previous convictions may 
be proved by any evidence admissible under the Mil- 
itary Rules of Evidence. Discussion 
Normally, previous convictions may be proved by use of the 
personnel records of the accused, by  the record of the conviction, 
or by the order promulgating the result of trial. See DD Form 493 
(Extract of Military Records of Previous Convictions). 
(4) Evidence  in aggravation.  The trial counsel 
may present evidence as to any aggravating circum- 
stances directly relating to or resulting from the of- 
fenses of which the accused has been found guilty. 
Except in capital cases a written or oral deposition 
taken in accordance with R.C.M. 702 is admissible 
in aggravation. 
Discussion 
Evidence in aggravation may include evidence of financial, 
social, psychological, and medical impact on or cost to any person 
or entity who was the victim of an offense committed by  the ac- 
cused and evidence of significant adverse impact on the mission, 
discipline, or efficiency of the command directly and immediately 
resulting from the accused's offense. 
See also R.C.M. 1004 concerning aggravating circumstances 
in capital cases. 
(5) Evidence of rehabilitative potential.  The trial 
counsel may present, by testimony or oral deposition 
in accordance with R.C.M. 702(g)(l), evidence, in 
the form of opinions concerning the accused's previ- 
ous performance as a servicemember and potential 
for rehabilitation. On cross-examination, inquiry is 
allowable into relevant and specific instances of con- 
duct. 
(c)  Matter to be presented  by the defense. 
(1)  In general. The defense may present matters 
in rebuttal of any material presented by the prosecu- 
tion and may present matters in extenuation and 
mitigation regardless whether the defense offered ev- 
idence before findings. 
(A) Matter in extenuation. Matter in extenua- 
tion of an offense serves to explain the circumstances 
surrounding the commission of an offense, including 
those reasons for committing the offense which do 
not constitute a legal justification or excuse. 
(B)  Matter in mitigation. Matter in mitigation 
of an offense is introduced to lessen the punishment 
to be adjudged by the court-martial, or to furnish 
grounds for a recommendation of clemency. It in- 
cludes the fact that nonjudicial punishment under 
Article 15 has been imposed for an offense growing 
R.C.M. 1001(d) 
out of the same act or omission that constitutes the 
offense of which the accused has been found guilty, 
particular acts of good conduct or bravery and evi- 
dence of the reputation or record of the accused in 
the service for efficiency, fidelity, subordination, 
temperance, courage, or any other trait that is desir- 
able in a servicemember. 
(2)  Statement by the accused. 
(A) In general. The accused may testify, make 
an unsworn statement, or both in extenuation, in 
mitigation or to rebut matters presented by the pros- 
ecution, or for all three purposes whether or not the 
accused testified prior to findings. The accused may 
limit such testimony or statement to any one or 
more of the specifications of which the accused has 
been found guilty. This subsection does not permit 
the filing of an affidavit of the accused. 
(B)  Testimony of the accused. The accused may 
give sworn oral testimony under this paragraph and 
shall be subject to cross-examination concerning it 
by the trial counsel or examination on it by the 
court-martial, or both. 
(C)  Unsworn statement. The accused may 
make an unsworn statement and may not be cross- 
examined by the trial counsel upon it or examined 
upon it by the court-martial. The prosecution may, 
however, rebut any statements of facts therein. The 
unsworn statement may be oral, written, or both, 
and may be made by the accused, by  counsel, or 
both. 
Discussion 
An unsworn statement ordinarily should not include what is 
properly argument, but inclusion of such matter by  the accused 
when personally making an oral statement normally should not 
be grounds for stopping the statement. 
(3)  Rules of evidence relaxed. The military judge 
may, with respect to matters in extenuation or miti- 
gation or both, relax the rules of evidence. This may 
include admitting letters, affidavits, certificates of 
military and civil officers, and other writings of simi- 
lar authenticity and reliability. 
(d)  Rebuttal and surrebu ttal. The prosecution  may 
rebut matters presented by the defense. The defense 
in surrebuttal may then rebut any rebuttal offered by 
the prosecution. Rebuttal and surrebuttal may con- 
tinue, in the discretion of the military judge. If the 
Military Rules of Evidence were relaxed under sub- R.C.M.  1001(d) 
section (c)(3) of this rule, they may be relaxed dur- 
ing rebuttal and surrebuttal to the same degree. 
(e)  Production of witnesses. 
(1) In general. During the presentence proceed- 
ings, there shall be much greater latitude than on the 
merits to receive information by means other than 
testimony presented through the personal appear- 
ance of witnesses. Whether a witness shall be pro- 
duced to testify during presentence proceedings is a 
matter within the discretion of the military judge, 
subject to the limitations in subsection (e)(2) of this 
rule. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 703 concerning the procedures for production of 
witnesses. 
(2)  Limitations. A witness may be produced to 
testify during presentence proceedings through a 
subpoena or travel orders at Government expense 
only if- 
(A) The testimony expected to be offered by 
the witness is necessary for consideration of a matter 
of substantial significance to a determination of an 
appropriate sentence, including evidence necessary 
to resolve an alleged inaccuracy or dispute as to a 
material fact; 
(B) The weight or credibility of the testimony 
is of substantial significance to the determination of 
an appropriate sentence; 
(C) The other party refuses to enter into a stip- 
ulation of fact containing the matters to which the 
witness is expected to testify, except in an extraordi- 
nary case when such a stipulation of fact would be 
an insufficient substitute for the testimony; 
(D) Other forms of evidence, such as oral dep- 
ositions, written interrogatories, or former testi- 
mony would not be sufficient to meet the needs of 
the court-martial in the determination of an appro- 
priate sentence; and 
(E) The significance of the personal appear- 
ance of the witness to the determination of an appro- 
priate sentence, when balanced against the practical 
difficulties of producing the witness, favors produc- 
tion of the witness. Factors to be considered include 
the costs of producing the witness, the timing of the 
request for production of the witness, the potential 
delay in the presentencing proceeding that may be 
caused by  the production of the witness, and the 
likelihood of significant interference with military 
operational deployment, mission accomplishment, 
or essential training. 
(f) Additional  matters to be considered. In addition 
to matters introduced under this rule, the court- 
martial may consider- 
(1)  That a plea of guilty is a mitigating factor; and 
(2) Any evidence properly introduced on the 
merits before findings, including: 
(A) Evidence of other offenses or acts of mis- 
conduct even if introduced for a limited purpose; 
and 
(B)  Evidence relating to any mental impair- 
ment or deficiency of the accused. 
Discussion 
The fact that the accused is of low intelligence or that, be- 
cause of a mental or neurological condition the accused's ability 
to adhere to the right is diminished, may be extenuating. On the 
other hand, in determining the severity of a sentence, the court- 
martial may consider evidence tending to show that an accused 
has little regard for the rights of others. 
(g) Argument. After introduction of matters relat- 
ing to sentence under this rule, counsel for the prose- 
cution and defense may argue for an appropriate 
sentence. Trial counsel may not in argument purport 
to speak for the convening authority or any higher 
authority, or refer to the views of such authorities or 
any policy directive relative to punishment or to any 
punishment or quantum of punishment greater than 
that court-martial may adjudge. Trial counsel may, 
however, recommend a specific lawful sentence and 
may also refer to generally accepted sentencing phi- 
losophies, including rehabilitation of the accused, 
genera1 deterrence, specific deterrence of miscon- 
duct by  the accused, and social retribution. Failure 
to object to improper argument before the military 
judge begins to instruct the members on sentencing 
shall constitute waiver of the objection. 
Rule 1002. Sentence determination 
Subject to limitations in this Manual, the sentence 
to be adjudged is a matter within the discretion of 
the court-martial; except when a mandatory mini- 
mum sentence is prescribed  by  the code, a court- 
martial may adjudge any punishment authorized in 
this Manual, including the maximum punishment or any lesser punishment, or may adjudge a sentence of 
no punishment. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 1003 concerning authorized punishments and 
limitations on punishments. See also R.C.M.  1004 in capital 
cases. 
Rule 1003.  Punishments 
(a)  In general.  Subject to the limitations in this 
Manual, the punishments authorized in this rule 
may be adjudged in the case of any person found 
guilty of an offense by a court-martial. 
Discussion 
"Any  person"  includes officers, enlisted persons, person in 
custody of  the armed forces serving a sentence imposed by a 
court-martial, and, insofar as the punishments are applicable, any 
other person subject to the code. See R.C.M. 202. 
(b) Authorized punishments. Subject to the limita- 
tions in this Manual, a court-martial may adjudge 
only the following punishments: 
(1)  Reprimand. A court-martial shall not specify 
the terms or wording of a reprimand. A reprimand, 
if approved, shall be issued, in writing, by the con- 
vening authority; 
Discussion 
A reprimand adjudged by a court-martial is a punitive cen- 
sure. 
(2) Forfeiture of pay and allowances. Unless a to- 
tal forfeiture is adjudged, a sentence to forfeiture 
shall state the exact amount in whole dollars to be 
forfeited each month and the number of months the 
forfeitures will last. 
Allowances shall be subject to forfeiture only 
when the sentence includes forfeiture of all pay and 
allowances. The maximum authorized amount of a 
partial forfeiture shall be determined by using the 
basic pay or, in the case of reserve component per- 
sonnel on inactive-duty, compensation for periods of 
inactive-duty training, authorized by the cumulative 
years of service of the accused, and, if no confine- 
ment is adjudged, any sea or foreign duty pay. If the 
sentence also includes reduction in grade, expressly 
R.C.M. 1003(b)(5) 
or by operation of law, the maximum forfeiture shall 
be based on the grade to which the accused is re- 
duced. 
Discussion 
A forfeiture deprives the accused of the amount of pay (and 
allowances) specified as it accrues. Forfeitures accrue to the 
United States. 
"Basic pay"  does not include pay for special qualifications, 
such as diving pay, or incentive pay such as flying, parachuting, 
or duty on board a submarine. 
(3)  Fine. Any court-martial may adjudge a fine 
instead of forfeitures. General courts-martial may 
also adjudge a fine in addition to forfeitures. Special 
and summary courts-martial may not adjudge any 
fine in excess of the total amount of forfeitures which 
may be adjudged in that case. In order to enforce 
collection, a fine may be accompanied by a provision 
in the sentence that, in the event the fine is not paid, 
the person fined shall, -in addition to any period of 
confinement adjudged, be further confined until a 
fixed period considered an equivalent punishment to 
the fine has expired. The total period of confinement 
so adjudged shall not exceed the jurisdictional limi- 
tations of the court-martial; 
Discussion 
A fine is in the nature of a judgement and, when ordered exe- 
cuted, makes the accused immediately liable to the United States 
for the entire amount of money specified in the sentence. A fine 
normally should not be adjudged against a member of the armed 
forces unless the accused was unjustly enriched as a result of the 
offense of which convicted. Ordinarily, a fine, rather than a forfei- 
ture, is the proper monetary penalty to be adjudged against a ci- 
vilian subject to military law. 
See R.C.M.  11 13(d)(3) concerning imposition of confine- 
ment when the accused fails to pay a fine. 
(4) Loss of numbers, lineal position, or seniority. 
These punishments are authorized only in cases of 
Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard officers; 
Discussion 
All losses of numbers will be numbers in  the appropriate lin- 
eal list. 
(5) Reduction in pay grade. Except as provided in 
R.C.M. 1301(d), a court-martial may sentence an R.C.M. 1003(b)(5) 
enlisted member to be  reduced to the lowest or any 
intermediate pay grade; 
Discussion 
Reduction under Article 58a is not a part of the sentence but 
is an administrative result thereof. 
(6) Restriction to specified limits. Restriction may 
be adjudged for no more than 2 months for each 
month of authorized confinement and in no case for 
more than 2 months. Confinement and restriction 
may be adjudged in the same case, but they may not 
together exceed the maximum authorized period of 
confinement, calculating the equivalency at the rate 
specified in this subsection; 
Discussion 
Restriction does not exempt the person on whom it is im- 
posed from any military duty. Restriction and hard labor without 
confinement may be adjudged in the same case provided  they do 
not exceed  the maximum limits for each. See subsection 
(c)(l)(A)(ii) of this rule. See also R.C.M. 11  13(d)(5). The sen- 
tence adjudged should specify the limits of the restriction. 
(7) Hard  labor without confinement. Hard labor 
without confinement may be adjudged for no more 
than  1-1/2  months for each month of authorized 
confinement and in no case for more than three 
months. Hard labor without confinement may be ad- 
judged  only in the cases of enlisted members. The 
court-martial shall not specify the hard labor to be 
performed. Confinement and hard labor without 
confinement may be adjudged in the same case, but 
they may not together exceed the maximum author- 
ized  period of  confinement, calculating the 
equivalency at the rate specified in this subsection. 
Discussion 
Hard labor without confinement is performed in addition to 
other regular duties and does not excuse or relieve a person from 
performing regular duties. Ordinarily, the immediate commander 
of the accused will designate the amount and character of the la- 
bor to be performed. Upon completion of the daily assignment, 
the accused should be permitted to take leave or liberty to which 
entitled. 
See R.C.M. 1301(d) concerning limitations on hard labor 
without confinement in summary courts-martial. 
(8) Confinement. The place of confinement shall 
not be designated by the court-martial. A court-
martial shall not adjudge a sentence to solitary con- 
finement or to confinement without hard labor; 
Discussion 
The authority executing a sentence to confinement may re- 
quire hard labor whether or not the words "at hard labor" are in- 
cluded in the sentence. See Article 58(b). To promote uniformity, 
the words "at  hard labor" should be omitted in a sentence to con- 
finement. 
(9) Confinement on bread  and  water or dimin- 
ished rations. Confinement on bread and water or di- 
minished rations may be adjudged only in cases of 
enlisted members attached to or embarked in a ves- 
sel and for no more then 3 days. The categories of 
enlisted personnel upon whom this type of punish- 
ment may be imposed may be further limited by reg- 
ulations of the Secretary concerned. If adjudged in 
the same sentence with confinement, hard labor 
without confinement, or restriction, confinement on 
bread and water or diminished  rations for 1 day 
shall be treated as the equivalent of confinement for 
2 days; 
Discussion 
A sentence to confinement on bread and water or diminished 
rations may be served in a place where the prisoner can communi- 
cate only with authorized personnel. The ration to be furnished is 
that specified by the authority charged with the administration of 
the punishment, but may not consist solely of bread and water un- 
less that punishment was specifically adjudged. A medical  of- 
ficer's approval must be obtained before the punishment  may be 
executed. See R.C.M. 11  13(d)(5); 1305(d). 
(10) Punitive separation. A court-martial may not 
adjudge an administrative separation from the ser- 
vice. There are three types of punitive separation. 
(A) Dismissal. Dismissal applies only to com- 
missioned officers, commissioned warrant officers, 
cadets, and midshipmen and may be adjudged only 
by a general court-martial. Regardless of the maxi- 
mum punishment specified for an offense in Part IV 
of this Manual, a dismissal may be adjudged for any 
offense of which a commissioned officer, commis- 
sioned warrant officer, cadet, or midshipman has 
been found guilty; (B)  Dishonorable  discharge.  A dishonorable 
discharge applies only to enlisted persons and war- 
rant officers who are not commissioned and may be 
adjudged only by  a general court-martial. Regard- 
less of the maximum punishment specified for an of- 
fense in Part IV of this Manual, a dishonorable dis- 
charge may be adjudged for any offense of which a 
warrant officer who is not commissioned has been 
found guilty. A dishonorable discharge should be re- 
served for those who should be separated under con- 
ditions of dishonor, after having been convicted of 
offenses usually recognized in civilian jurisdictions 
as felonies, or of offenses of a military nature requir- 
ing severe punishment; and 
Discussion 
See also subsection (d)(l) of this rule regarding when a dis- 
honorable discharge is authorized as an additional punishment. 
(C) Bad conduct discharge. A bad-conduct dis- 
charge applies only to enlisted persons and may be 
adjudged by a general court-martial and by a special 
court-martial which has met the requirements of 
, 
R.C.M. 201(F)(2)(B). A bad-conduct discharge is 
less severe than a dishonorable discharge and is de- 
signed as a punishment for bad-conduct rather than 
as a punishment for serious offenses of either a civil- 
ian or military nature. It is also appropriate for an 
accused who has been convicted repeatedly of minor 
offenses and whose punitive separation appears to be 
necessary; 
Discussion 
See also subsections (d)(2) and (3) of this rule regarding 
when a bad-conduct discharge is authorized as an additional pun- 
ishment. 
(11) Death. Death may be adjudged only in ac- 
cordance with R.C.M. 1004; and 
(12)  Punishments under the law of war. In cases 
tried under the law of war, a general court-martial 
may adjudge any punishment not prohibited by the 
law of war. 
(c)  Limits on punishments. 
(1)  Based  on offenses. 
(A)  Offenses listed in Part IV. 
(i)  Maximum punishment.  The maximum 
limits for the authorized punishments of  confine- 
R.C.M. 1003(c)(l)(C) 
ment, forfeitures and punitive discharge (if any) are 
set forth for each offense listed in  Part IV of this 
Manual. These limitations are for each separate of- 
fense, not for each charge. When a dishonorable dis- 
charge is authorized, a bad-conduct discharge is also 
authorized. 
(ii)  Other punishments.  Except as otherwise 
specifically provided in this Manual, the types of 
punishments listed in subsections (b)(l), (3), (4), (9, 
(6) and (7) of this rule may be adjudged in addition 
to or instead of confinement, forfeitures, a punitive 
discharge (if authorized), and death (if authorized). 
(B)  Offenses not listed Part IK 
(i)  Included or related offenses. For an of- 
fense not listed in Part IV of this Manual which is in- 
cluded in or closely related to an offense listed 
therein the maximum punishment shall be that of 
the offense listed; however if  an offense not listed is 
included in a listed offense, and is closely related to 
another or is equally closely related to two or more 
listed offenses, the maximum punishment shall be 
the same as the least severe of the listed offenses. 
(ii)  Not included or related offenses. An of- 
fense not listed in Part IV and not included  in or 
closely related to any offense listed therein is punish- 
able as authorized by the United States Code, or as 
authorized by the custom of the service. When the 
United States Code provides for confinement for a 
specified period or not more than a specified period 
the maximum punishment by court-martial shall in- 
clude confinement for that period. If the period is  1 
year or longer, the maximum punishment by court- 
martial also includes a dishonorable discharge and 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances; if 6 months or 
more, a bad-conduct discharge and forfeiture of all 
pay and allowances; if less than 6 months, forfeiture 
of two-thirds pay per month for the authorized pe- 
riod of confinement. 
(C) Multiplicity.  When the accused is found 
guilty of two or more offenses, the maximum author- 
ized punishment may be imposed for each separate 
offense. Except as provided in paragraph 5 of Part 
IV, offenses are not separate if each does not require 
proof of an element not required to prove the other. 
If the offenses are not separate, the maximum pun- 
ishment for those offenses shall be the maximum au- 
thorized punishment for the offense carrying the 
greatest maximum punishment. R.C.M.1003(c)(l)(C) 

Discussion 
See also R.C.M. 906(b)(12); 907(b)(3)(B). 
The basis of the concept of multiplicity in sentencing is that 
an accused may not be punished twice for what is, in effect, one 
offense. Offenses arising out of the same act or transaction may be 
multiplicious for sentencing depending on the evidence. No single 
test or formula has been developed which will resolve the ques- 
tion of multiplicity. 
The following tests have been used for determining whether 
offenses are separate. Offenses are not separate if one is included 
in the other or unless each requires proof of an element not re- 
quired to prove the other. For example, if an accused is found 
guilty of escape from confinement (see paragraph 19, Part IV) and 
desertion (see paragraph 9, Part IV) which both arose out of the 
same act or transaction, the offenses would be separate because 
intent to remain permanently absent is not an element of escape 
from confinement and a freeing from restraint is not an element of 
desertion. However, if the accused had been found guilty of unau- 
thorized absence instead of desertion, the offenses would not be 
separate because unauthorized absence does not require proof of 
any element not also required to prove escape. 
Even if  each offense requires proof of an element not re- 
quired to prove the other, they may not be separately punishable 
if the offenses were committed as the result of a single impulse or 
intent. For example, if an accused found guilty of larceny (see par- 
agraph 46, Part IV) and of unlawfully opening mail matter (see 
paragraph 93, Part IV) opened the mail bag for the purpose of 
stealing money in a letter in the bag, the offenses would not be 
separately punishable. Also, if there was a unity of time and the 
existence of a connected chain of events, the offenses may not be 
separately punishable, depending on all the circumstances, even if 
each required proof of a different element. 
(2)  Based on rank of accused. 
(A)  Commissioned or warrant oficers, cadets, 
and midshipmen. 
(i)  A commissioned or warrant officer or a 
cadet, or midshipman may not be reduced in grade 
by any court-martial. However, in time of war or na- 
tional emergency the Secretary concerned, or such 
Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary as may be 
designated by the Secretary concerned, may com- 
mute a sentence of dismissal to reduction to any en- 
listed grade. 
(ii)  Only a general court-martial may sen- 
tence a commissioned or warrant officer or a cadet, 
or midshipman to confinement. 
(iii)  A commissioned or warrant officer or a 
cadet or midshipman may not be sentenced to hard 
labor without confinement. 
(iv)  Only a general court-martial, upon con- 
viction of  any offense in violation of the Code, may 
sentence a commissioned or warrant officer or a ca- 
det or midshipman to be separated from the service 
with a punitive separation. In the case of commis- 
sioned officers, cadets, midshipmen, and commis- 
sioned warrant officers, the separation shall be by 
dismissal. In the case of all other warrant officers, 
the separation shall by dishonorable discharge. 
(B)  Enlisted persons.  See subsection (b)(9) of 
this rule and R.C.M. 1301(d). 
(3) Based on reserve status in  certain circum- 
stances. 
(A) Restriction on liberty. A member of a re- 
serve component whose order to active duty is ap- 
proved pursuant to Article 2(d)(5) may be required 
to serve any adjudged restriction on liberty during 
that period of active duty. Other members of a re- 
serve component ordered to active duty pursuant to 
Article 2(d)(l) or tried by summary court-martial 
while on inactive duty training may not- 
(i)  by sentenced to confinement; or 
(ii) be required to serve a court-martial pun- 
ishment consisting of any other restriction on liberty 
except during subsequent periods of inactive-duty 
training or active duty. 
(B)  Forfeiture. A sentence to forfeiture of pay 
of a member not retained on active duty after com- 
pletion of disciplinary proceedings may be collected 
from active duty and inactive-duty training pay dur- 
ing subsequent periods of duty. 
Discussion 
For application of this subsection, see R.C.M. 204. At the 
conclusion of nonjudicial punishment proceedings or final ad- 
journment of the court-martial, the reserve component member 
who was ordered to active duty for the purpose of conducting dis- 
ciplinary proceedings should be released from active duty within 
one working day unless the order to active duty was approved by 
the Secretary concerned and confinement or other restriction on 
liberty was adjudged. Unserved punishments may be carried over 
to subsequent periods of inactive-duty training or active duty. 
(4) Based on other rules. The maximum limits on 
punishments in this rule may be further limited by 
other Rules of Courts-martial. 
Discussion 
The maximum punishment may be limited  by: the jurisdic- 
tional limits of the court-martial (see R.C.M. 201(f) and 1301(d)); 
the nature of the proceedings (seeR.C.M. 810(d) (sentence limita- 
tions in rehearings, new trials, and other trials)); and by  instruc- 
tions by  a convening authority (see R.C.M. 60l(e)(l)).See also R.C.M. 1107(d)(3) concerning limits on the maximum punish- 
ment which may be approved depending on the nature of the re- 
cord. 
(d)  Circumstances permitting  increased punish- 
men  ts. 
(1)  Three or more convictions. If an accused is 
found guilty of  an offense or offenses for none of 
which a dishonorable discharge is otherwise author- 
ized, proof of three or more previous convictions ad- 
judged by  a court-martial during the year next pre- 
ceding the commission of any offense of which the 
accused stands convicted shall authorize a dishonor- 
able discharge and forfeiture of all pay and al- 
lowances and, if the confinement otherwise author- 
ized is less than 1 year, confinement for 1 year. In 
computing the 1-year period preceding the commis- 
sion of any offense, periods of unauthorized absence 
shall be excluded. For purposes of this subsection, 
the court-martial convictions must be final. 
(2)  Two or more convictions. If an accused is 
found guilty of an offense or offenses for none of 
which a dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge is 
otherwise authorized, proof of two or more previous 
convictions adjudged by a court-martial during the 3 
years next preceding the commission of any offense 
of which the accused stands convicted shall author- 
ize a bad-conduct discharge and forfeiture of all pay 
and allowances and, if  the confinement otherwise 
authorized is less than 3 months, confinement for 3 
months. In computing the 3 year period preceding 
the commission of any offense, periods of unautho- 
rized absence shall be excluded. For purposes of this 
subsection the court-martial convictions must be fi-
nal. 
(3)  Two or more offenses. If an accused is found 
guilty of two or more offenses for none of which a 
dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge is otherwise 
authorized, the fact that the authorized confinement 
for these offenses totals 6 months or more shall, in 
addition, authorize a bad-conduct discharge and for- 
feiture of all pay and allowances. 
Discussion 
All of these increased punishments are subject to all other 
limitations on punishments set forth elsewhere in this rule. Con- 
victions by  summary court-martial may not be used to increase 
the maximum punishment under this rule. However they may be 
admitted and considered under R.C.M. 1001. 
R.C.M.  1004(b)(4)(B) 
Rule 1004. Capital cases 
(a)  In general. Death may be adjudged only when: 
(1)  Death is expressly authorized under Part IV 
of this Manual for an offense of which the accused 
has been found guilty or is authorized under the law 
of war for an offense of which the accused has been 
found guilty under the law of war; and 
(2) The accused was convicted of such an offense 
by the concurrence of all the members of the court- 
martial present at the time the vote was taken; and 
(3) The requirements of subsections (b) and (c) of 
this rule have been met. 
(b)  Procedure.  In addition to the provisions in 
R.C.M. 1001, the following procedures shall apply 
in capital cases- 
(1)  Notice. Before arraignment, trial counsel shall 
give the defense written notice of which aggravating 
factors under subsection (c) of this rule the prosecu- 
tion intends to prove. Failure to provide timely no- 
tice under this subsection of any aggravating factors 
under subsection (c) of this rule shall not bar later 
notice and proof of such additional aggravating fac- 
tors unless the accused demonstrates specific 
prejudice from such failure and that a continuance 
or a recess is not an adequate remedy. 
(2)  Evidence of aggravating factors.  Trial counsel 
may present evidence in accordance with R.C.M. 
1001(b)(4) tending to establish one or more of the 
aggravating factors in subsection (c) of this rule. 
Discussion 
See also subsection (b)(5) of this rule. 
(3)  Evidence in extenuation and mitigation. The 
accused shall be given broad latitude to present evi- 
dence in extenuation and mitigation. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 1001(c). 
(4)  Necessary findings.  Death may not be ad- 
judged unless- 
(A)  The members find that at least one of the 
aggravating factors under subsection (c) existed; 
(B)  Notice of such factor was provided in ac- 
cordance with paragraph (1) of this subsection and 
all members concur in the finding with respect to 
such factor: and R.C.M.  1004(b)(4)(C) 
(C) All members concur that any extenuating 
or mitigating circumstances are substantially out- 
weighed by any aggravating circumstances admissi- 
ble under R.C.M. 1001(b)(4), including the factors 
under subsection (c) of this rule. 
(5)  Basis forjndings. The findings in subsection 
(b)(4) of this rule may be based on evidence intro- 
duced before or after findings under R.C.M. 921, or 
both. 
(6)  Instructions. In addition to the instructions 
required  under R.C.M.  1005, the military judge 
shall instruct the members of such aggravating fac- 
tors under subsection (c) of this rule as may be in is- 
sue in the case, and on the requirements and proce- 
dures under subsections (b)(4), (9, (7), and (8) of 
this rule. The military judge shall instruct the mem- 
bers that they must consider all evidence in extenua- 
tion and mitigation before they may adjudge death. 
(7)  Voting. In closed session, before voting on a 
sentence, the members shall vote by secret written 
ballot separately on each aggravating factor under 
subsection (c) of this rule on which they have been 
instructed. Death may not be adjudged  unless all 
members concur in a finding of the existence of at 
least one such aggravating factor. After voting on all 
the aggravating factors on which they have been in- 
structed, the members shall vote on a sentence in ac- 
cordance with R.C.M. 1006. 
(8)  Announcement. If death is adjudged, the pres- 
ident shall, in addition to complying with R.C.M. 
1007, announce which aggravating factors under 
subsection (c) of  this rule were found by the mem- 
bers. 
(c)  Aggravating factors.  Death may be adjudged 
only if the members find, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
one or more of the following aggravating factors: 
(1)  That the offense was committed before or in 
the presence of the enemy, except that this factor 
shall not apply in the case of a violation of Article 
118 or 120; 
Discussion 
See paragraph  23, Part IV, for a definition  of "before  or in 
the presence of the enemy." 
(2)  That in committing the offense the accused- 
(A)  Knowingly created a grave risk of substan- 
tial damage to the national security of the United 
States; or 
(B)  Knowingly created a grave risk of substan- 
tial damage to a mission, system, or function of the 
United States, provided that this subparagraph shall 
apply only if  substantial damage to the national se- 
curity of the United States would have resulted had 
the intended damage been effected; 
(3) That the offense caused substantial damage to 
the national security of the United States, whether 
or not the accused intended such damage, except 
that this factor shall not apply in case of a violation 
of Article 1  18 or 120; 
(4) That the offense was committed in such a way 
or under circumstances that the lives of persons 
other than the victim, if  any, were unlawfully and 
substantially endangered, except that this factor 
shall not apply to a violation of Articles 104, 106a, 
or 120; 
(5)  That the accused committed the offense with 
the intent to avoid hazardous duty; 
(6) That, only in the case of a violation of Article 
11  8 or 120, the offense was committed in time of war 
and in territory in which the United States or an ally 
of the United States was then an occupying power or 
in which the armed forces of the United States were 
then engaged in active hostilities; 
(7)  That, only in the case of a violation of Article 
1  18(1): 
(A) The accused was serving a sentence of con- 
finement for 30 years or more or for life at the time 
of the murder; 
(B)  The murder was committed while the ac- 
cused was engaged in the commission or attempted 
commission of any robbery, rape, aggravated arson, 
sodomy, burglary, kidnapping, mutiny, sedition, or 
piracy of an aircraft or vessel, or was engaged in 
flight or attempted flight after the commission or at- 
tempted commission of any such offense; 
(C) The murder was committed for the pur- 
pose of receiving money or a thing of value; 
(D) The accused procured another by means of 
compulsion, coercion, or a promise of an advantage, 
a service, or a thing of value to commit the murder; 
(E) The murder was committed with the intent 
to avoid or to prevent lawful apprehension or effect 
an escape from custody or confinement; 
(F) The victim was the President of the United 
States, the President-elect, the Vice President, or, if 
there was no Vice President, the officer in the order 
of succession to the office of President of the United States, the Vice-President-elect, or any individual 
who is acting as President under the Constitution 
and laws of the United States, any Member of Con- 
gress (including a Delegate to, or Resident Commis- 
sioner in, the Congress) or Member-of-Congress 
elect, justice or judge of the United States, a chief of 
state or head of government (or the political 
equivalent) of a foreign nation, or a foreign official 
(as such term is defined in section 11  16(b)(3)(A) of 
title 18, United States Code), if the official was on of- 
ficial business at the time of the offense and was in 
the United States or in a  place described in 
Mil.R.Evid. 3  15(c)(2), 3  15(c)(3); 
(G) The accused then knew that the victim was 
any of the following persons in the execution of of- 
fice: a commissioned, warrant, noncommissioned, or 
petty officer of the armed services of the United 
States; a member of any law enforcement or security 
activity or agency, military or civilian, including 
correctional custody personnel; or any firefighter; 
(H) The murder was committed with intent to 
obstruct justice; 
(I) The murder was preceded by  the inten- 
tional infliction of substantial physical harm or pro- 
longed, substantial mental or physical pain and suf- 
fering to the victim; 
(J) The accused has been found guilty in the 
same case of another violation of Article 118; 
(8) That only in the case of a violation of Article 
11  8(4), the accused was the actual perpetrator of the 
killing or was a principal whose participation in the 
burglary, sodomy, rape, robbery, or aggravated ar- 
son was major and who manifested a reckless indif- 
ference for human life. 
Discussion 
Reckless indifference means a heedless disregard of conse- 
quences under circumstances involving grave danger to the life of 
others, although no harm is intended. The  accused must have had 
actual knowledge of the grave danger to others or knowledge of 
circumstances that would cause an ordinary reasonable man to 
realize the highly dangerous character of such conduct. In deter- 
mining whether participation in the offense was "major"  the ac- 
cused's presence at the scene and the extent to which the accused 
aided, abetted, assisted, encouraged, or advised the other partici- 
pant(~)  should be considered. 
(9)  That, only in the case of a violation of Article 
120: 
(A) The victim was under the age of  12; or 
R.C.M.  1004(e) 
(B)  The accused maimed or attempted to kill 
the victim; 
(10)  That, only in the case of a violation of the 
law of war, death is authorized under the law of war 
for the offense; 
(11) That, only in the case of a violation of Arti- 
cle 104 or 106a: 
(A) The accused has been convicted of another 
offense involving espionage or treason for which ei- 
ther a sentence of death or imprisonment for life was 
authorized by statute; or 
(B)  That in committing the offense, the ac- 
cused knowingly created a grave risk of death to a 
person other than the individual who was the victim. 
For purposes of this rule, "national  security" 
means the national defense and foreign relations of 
the United States and specifically includes: a mili- 
tary or defense advantage over any foreign nation or 
group of nations; a favorable foreign relations posi- 
tion; or a defense posture capable of successfully re- 
sisting hostile or destructive action from within or 
without. 
Discussion 
Examples of substantial damage of the national security of 
the United States include: impeding the performance of a combat 
mission or operation; impeding the performance of an important 
mission  in a hostile fire or imminent danger pay  area (see  37 
U.S.C. 9 310(a)); and disclosing military plans, capabilities, or in- 
telligence such as to jeopardize any combat mission or operation 
of the armed services of the United States or its allies or to materi- 
ally aid an enemy of the United States. 
(d)  Spying. If the accused has been found guilty of 
spying under Article 106, subsections (a)(2), (b), and 
(c) of this rule and R.C.M. 1006 and 1007 shall not 
apply. Sentencing proceedings in accordance with 
R.C.M. 1001 shall be conducted, but the military 
judge shall announce that by operation of law a sen- 
tence of death has been adjudged. 
(e)  Other  penalties. Except for a violation of Article 
106, when death is an authorized punishment for an 
offense, all other punishments authorized under 
R.C.M. 1003 are also authorized for that offense, in- 
cluding confinement for life, and may be adjudged in 
lieu of the death penalty, subject to limitations spe- 
cifically prescribed  in this Manual. A sentence of 
death includes a dishonorable discharge or dismis- 
sal, as appropriate. Confinement is a necessary inci- 
dent of a sentence of death but not a part of it. R.C.M. 1004(e) 
Discussion 
A sentence of death may not be ordered executed until ap- 
proved by  the President. See R.C.M. 1207. A sentence to death 
which has been finally ordered executed will be carried out in the 
manner prescribed  by  the Secretary concerned. See R.C.M. 
11  13(d)(l). 
Rule 1005. Instructions on sentence 
(a) In general. The military judge shall give the 
members appropriate instructions on sentence. 
Discussion 
Instructions should be tailored to the facts and circum- 
stances of the individual case. 
(b)  When given.  Instructions on sentence shall be 
given after arguments by  counsel and before the 
members close to deliberate on sentence, but the mil- 
itary judge may, upon request of the members, any 
party, or sua sponte, give additional instructions at a 
later time. 
(c)  Requests for  instructions. After presentation of 
matters relating to sentence or at such other time as 
the military judge may permit, any party may re- 
quest that the military judge  instruct the members 
on the law as set forth in the request. The military 
judge may require the requested instruction to be 
written. Each party shall be given the opportunity to 
be heard on any proposed instruction on sentence 
before it is given. The military judge shall inform the 
parties of the proposed action on such requests 
before their closing arguments on sentence. 
Discussion 
Requests for and objections to instructions should be re- 
solved at an  Article 39(a) session. But see R.C.M. 801(e)(l)(C); 
803. 
The military judge is not required to give the specific instruc- 
tion requested by counsel if the matter is adequately covered in 
the instructions. 
The military judge should not identify the source of any in- 
struction when addressing the members. 
All written requests for instructions should be marked as ap- 
pellate exhibits, whether or not they are given. 
(d)  How given. Instructions on sentence shall be 
given orally on the record in the presence of all par- 
ties and the members. Written copies of the instruc- 
tions, or unless a party objects, portions of them, 
may also be given to the members for their use dur- 
ing deliberations. 
Discussion 
A copy of any written instructions delivered to the members 
should be marked as an appellate exhibit. 
(e)  Required  instructions. Instructions on sentence 
shall include: 
(1)  A statement of the maximum authorized pun- 
ishment which may be adjudged and of  the 
mandatory minimum punishment, if any; 
Discussion 
The maximum punishment is the lowest of: the total permit- 
ted by the applicable paragraph(s) in Part IV for each separate of- 
fense of which  the accused was convicted (see also R.C.M.  1003 
concerning additional limits on punishments and additional pun- 
ishments which may be adjudged); the jurisdictional  limit of the 
court-martial (see R.C.M. 201(f) and  1301(d)); or in a rehearing 
or new or other trial the punishment  adjudged by  a prior court- 
martial or approved on review, supplemented by the total permit- 
ted by any charges not tried previously (see R.C.M. 810(d)). The 
military judge may upon request or when otherwise appropriate 
instruct on lesser punishments.See R.C.M.  1003. The members 
should not be informed of the basis for the sentence limitation or 
of any sentence which might be imposed for the offense if not lim- 
ited as set forth above. If an additional punishment if authorized 
under R.C.M.  1003(d), the members must be informed of the ba- 
sis for the increased permissible punishment. 
A carefully drafted sentence worksheet ordinarily should be 
used and should include reference to all authorized  punishments 
in the case. 
(2)  A statement of the procedures for delibera- 
tion and voting on the sentence set out in R.C.M. 
1006; 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M. 1004 concerning additional instructions re- 
quired in capital cases. 
(3)  A statement informing the members that they 
are solely responsible for selecting an appropriate 
sentence and may not rely on the possibility of any 
mitigating action by the convening or higher author- 
ity; and Discussion 
See also R.C.M. 1002. 
(4)  A statement that the members should con- 
sider all matters in extenuation, mitigation, and ag- 
gravation, whether introduced before or after find- 
ings, and matters introduced under R.C.M. 
lool(b)(l), (2), (3) and (5). 
Discussion 
For example, tailored instructions on sentencing should 
bring attention to the reputation or record of the accused in the 
service for good conduct, efficiency, fidelity, courage, bravery, or 
other traits of good character, and any pretrial restraint imposed 
on the accused. 
(f)  Waiver. Failure to object to an instruction or to 
omission of an instruction before the members close 
to deliberate on the sentence constitutes waiver of 
the objection in the absence of plain error. The mili- 
tary judge may require the party objecting to specify 
in what respect the instructions were improper. The 
parties shall be given the opportunity to be heard on 
any objection outside the presence of the members. 
Rule 1006. Deliberations and voting on 
sentence 
(a)  In general. The members shall deliberate and 
vote after the military judge instructs the members 
on sentence. Only the members shall be present dur- 
ing deliberations and voting. Superiority in rank 
shall not be used in any manner to control the inde- 
pendence of members in the exercise of their judg- 
ment. 
(b)  Deliberations.  Deliberations may properly in- 
clude full and free discussion of the sentence to be 
imposed in the case. Unless otherwise directed by 
the military judge, members may take with them in 
deliberations their notes, if  any, any exhibits admit- 
ted in evidence, and any written instructions. Mem- 
bers may request that the court-martial be reopened 
and that portions of the record be read to them or 
additional evidence introduced. The military judge 
may, in the exercise of discretion, grant such re- 
quests. 
(c)  Proposal of sentences. Any member may propose 
a sentence. Each proposal shall be in writing and 
shall contain the complete sentence proposed. The 
R.C.M. 1006(d)(4)(B) 
junior member shall collect the proposed sentences 
and submit them to the president. 
Discussion 
A proposal should state completely each kind and, when ap- 
propriate, amount of authorized punishment proposed by  that 
member. See R.C.M.l003(b). 
(d)  Voting. 
(1)  Duty of members. Each member has the duty 
to vote for a proper sentence for the offenses of 
which the court-martial found the accused guilty, 
regardless of the member's vote or opinion as to the 
guilt of the accused. 
(2)  Secret ballot. Proposed sentences shall be 
voted on by secret written ballot. 
(3)  Procedure. 
(A)  Order. All members shall vote on each pro- 
posed  sentence in its entirety beginning with the 
least severe and continuing, as necessary, with the 
next least severe, until a sentence is adopted by the 
concurrence of  the number of members required 
under subsection (d)(4) of this rule. The process of 
proposing sentences and voting on them may be re- 
peated as necessary until a sentence is adopted. 
(B)  Counting votes. The junior member shall 
collect the ballots and count the votes. The president 
shall check the count and inform the other members 
of the result. 
Discussion 
A sentence adopted by  the required number of members may 
be reconsidered only in accordance with R.C.M. 1009. 
(4)  Number of votes required. 
(A) Death. A sentence which includes death 
may be adjudged only if all members present vote for 
that sentence. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 1004. 
(B)  Confinement  for  life or more than 10 years. 
A sentence which includes confinement for life or 
more than 10 years may be adjudged only if at least 
three-fourths of the members present vote for that 
sentence. R.C.M.  1006(d)(4)(C) 
(C)  Other. A sentence other than those de- 
scribed in subsection (d)(4)(A) or (B) of this rule 
may be adjudged only if  at least two-thirds of the 
members present vote for that sentence. 
Discussion 
In computing the number of votes required to adopt a sen- 
tence, any fraction of a vote is rounded up to the next whole num- 
ber. For example, if there are seven members, at least six would 
have to concur to impose a sentence requiring a three-forths vote, 
while at least five would have to concur to impose a sentence re- 
quiring a two-thirds vote. 
(5) Mandatory sentence. When a mandatory min- 
imum is prescribed under Article 118 the members 
shall vote on a sentence in accordance with this rule. 
(6)  Effect of failure  to agree. If the required num- 
ber of members do not agree on a sentence after a 
reasonable effort to do  so, a mistrial may be declared 
as to the sentence and the case shall be returned to 
the convening authority, who may order a rehearing 
on sentence only or order that a sentence of no pun- 
ishment be imposed. 
(e) Action after a sentence is reached. After the 
members have agreed upon a sentence, the court- 
martial shall be opened and the president shall in- 
form the military judge that a sentence has been 
reached. The military judge may, in the presence of 
the parties, examine any writing which the president 
intends to read to announce the sentence and may 
assist the members in putting the sentence in proper 
form. Neither that writing nor any oral or written 
clarification or discussion concerning it shall consti- 
tute announcement of the sentence. 
Discussion 
Ordinarily a sentence worksheet should be provided to the 
members as an aid to putting the sentence in proper form.  See Ap-
pendix 11 for a format for forms of sentences. If a sentence work- 
sheet has been  provided, the military judge should examine it 
before the president announces the sentence. If the military judge 
intends to instruct the members after such examination, counsel 
should be permitted to examine the worksheet and to be heard on 
any instructions the military judge may give. 
The president  should not disclose any specific number of 
votes for or against any sentence. 
If the sentence is ambiguous or apparently illegal,  see 
R.C.M. 1009. 
Rule 1007. Announcement of sentence 
(a)  In general. The sentence shall be announced by 
the president or, in a court-martial composed of a 
military judge alone, by the military judge,  in  the 
presence of all parties promptly after it has been de- 
termined. 
Discussion 
See Appendix 11. 
An element of a sentence adjudged by  members about which 
no instructions were given and which  is not listed on a sentence 
worksheet is not proper. 
(b) Erroneous announcement. If the announced sen- 
tence is not the one actually determined by the 
court-martial, the error may be corrected by a new 
announcement made before the record of trial is au- 
thenticated and forwarded to the convening author- 
ity. This action shall not constitute reconsideration 
of the sentence. If the court-martial has been  ad- 
journed before the error is discovered, the military 
judge may call the court-martial into session to cor- 
rect the announcement. 
Discussion 
For procedures governing reconsideration  of the sentence, 
see R.C.M. 1009. See also R.C.M. 1102 concerning the action to 
be taken if  the error in  the announcement is discovered  after the 
record is authenticated and forwarded to the convening author- 
ity. 
(c) Polling prohibited.  Except as provided  in 
Mil.R.Evid.  606, members may not otherwise be 
questioned about their deliberations and voting. 
Rule 1008.  impeachment of sentence 
A sentence which is proper on its face may be im- 
peached only when extraneous prejudicial informa- 
tion was improperly brought to the attention of a 
member, outside influence was improperly brought 
to bear upon any member, or unlawful command in- 
fluence was brought to bear upon any member. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M.923 Discussion concerning impeachment of find- 
ings. R.C.M. 1010(c) 
Rule 1009. Reconsideration of sentence 
(a)  Time  for  reconsideration. Subject to this rule, a 
sentence may be reconsidered by the members or the 
military judge who reached it at any time before the 
record of trial is authenticated. 
(b) Limitations. After a sentence has been  an-
nounced, it may not be increased upon reconsidera- 
tion unless the sentence announced was less than the 
mandatory minimum prescribed for an offense of 
which the accused has been found guilty. 
(c)  Initiation of reconsideration. 
(1)  By members. Any member may propose that 
a sentence reached by the members be reconsidered. 
(2)  By military  judge. 
(A) Adjudged  by military judge.  The military 
judge may initiate reconsideration of a sentence ad- 
judged by that military judge. 
(B)  Reached  by members. When a sentence 
reached by members is ambiguous or apparently ille- 
gal, the military judge shall bring the matter to the 
attention of the members if the matter is discovered 
before the court-martial is adjourned. If the matter 
is discovered after adjournment, the military judge 
may call a session for reconsideration and proceed in 
accordance with subsection (d) of this rule, or may 
bring the matter to the attention of the convening 
authority. 
Discussion 
If the ambiguity or illegality is discovered before the sen- 
tence is announced, see also R.C.M. 1006. If the ambiguity or ap- 
parent illegality is the result of an erroneous announcement, see 
R.C.M. 1007(b). See R.C.M. 804 and 805 concerning persons re- 
quired to be present. 
(3)  By convening authority. When a sentence ad- 
judged by  the court-martial is ambiguous or appar- 
ently illegal, the convening authority may return the 
matter to the court-martial for clarification or may 
approve a sentence no more severe than the legal, 
unambiguous portions of the adjudged sentence. 
(d)  Procedure with members. 
(1) Instructions. When a  sentence has been 
reached by members and reconsideration has been 
initiated under subsection (c) of  this rule, the mili- 
tary judge shall instruct the members on the proce- 
dure for reconsideration. 
(2) Voting. The members shall vote by  secret 
written ballot in closed session whether to recon- 
sider a sentence already reached by them 
(3)  Number of votes required. 
(A)  With a view to increasing. Subject to sub- 
section (b) of this rule, members may reconsider a 
sentence with a view of increasing it only if at least a 
majority vote for reconsideration. 
(B)  With a view to decreasing. Members may 
reconsider a sentence with a view to decreasing it 
only if: 
(i)  In the case of a sentence which includes 
death, at least one member votes to reconsider; 
(ii)  In the case of a sentence which includes 
confinement for life or more than 10 years, more 
than one-fourth of the members vote to reconsider; 
or 
(iii)  In the case of any other sentence, more 
than one-third of the members vote to reconsider. 
Discussion 
After a sentence has been adopted by  secret ballot vote in 
closed session, no other vote may be taken on the sentence unless 
a vote to reconsider succeeds. 
For example, if six of nine (two-thirds) members adopt a sen- 
tence, a vote of at least five would be necessary to reconsider to in- 
crease it; four would have to vote to reconsider in order to de- 
crease it. If seven of nine (three-fourths) members is required to 
adopt a sentence, a vote of at least five would be necessary to re- 
consider to increase it, while three would be necessary to recon- 
sider to decrease it. 
(4) Successful vote. If a vote to reconsider a sen- 
tence succeeds, the procedures in R.C.M. 1006 shall 
apply. 
Rule 1010. Notice concerning post-trial and 
appellate rights 
In each general and special court-martial, prior to 
adjournment, the military judge shall ensure that the 
defense counsel has informed the accused orally and 
in writing of: 
(a)  The right to submit matters to the convening au- 
thority to consider before taking action; 
(b)  The right to appellate review, as applicable, and 
the effect of waiver or withdrawal of such right; 
(c)  The right to apply for relief from the Judge Ad- 
vocate General if  the case is neither reviewed by  a 
Court of Military Review nor reviewed by the Judge 
Advocate General under R.C.M. 1201(b)(l); and R.C.M.  1010(d) 
(d)  The right to the advice and assistance of counsel 
in the exercise of the foregoing rights or any decision 
to waive them. 
The written advice to the accused concerning 
post-trial and appellate rights shall be signed by the 
accused and the defense counsel and inserted in the 
record of trial as an appellate exhibit. 
Discussion 
The post-trial duties of the defense counsel concerning the 
appellate rights of the accused are  set forth in paragraph (E)(iv) of 
the Discussion accompanying R.C.M. 502(d)(6).  The defense 
counsel shall explain the appellate rights to the accused and pre- 
pare the written document of such advisement prior to or during 
trial. 
Rule 1011.  Adjournment 
The military judge may adjourn the court-martial 
at the end of the trial of an accused or proceed to 
trial of other cases referred to that court-martial. 
Such an adjournment may be for a definite or indefi- 
nite period. 
Discussion 
A court-martial and its personnel have certain powers and 
responsibilities following the trial. See, for example, R.C.M. 
502(d)(5) Discussion (F); 502(d)(6) Discussion (E); 808; 1007; 
1009; Chapter XI. -  - 
CHAPTER XI.  POST-TRIAL PROCEDURE 

Rule 1101.  Report of result of trial; post-trial 
restraint; deferment of confinement 
(a)  Report of the result of trial. After final adjourn- 
ment of the court-martial in a case, the trial counsel 
shall promptly notify the accused's immediate com- 
mander, the convening authority or the convening 
authority's designee, and, if appropriate, the officer 
in charge of the confinement facility of the findings 
and sentence. 
(b)  Post-trial conJinement. 
(1)  In general. An accused may be placed in post- 
trial confinement if  the sentence adjudged by the 
court-martial includes death or confinement. 
(2)  Who  may order conJinement. Unless limited 
by superior authority, a commander of the accused 
may order the accused into post-trial confinement 
when post-trial  confinement is authorized under 
subsection (b)(l) of this rule. A commander author- 
ized to order post-trial confinement under this sub- 
section may delegate this authority to the trial coun- 
sel. 
Discussion 
The commander may  release the accused, order confine- 
ment, or order other appropriate restraint. Regardless whether 
the accused is ordered into confinement, a sentence to confine- 
ment begins to run on the date it is adjudged unless it is deferred 
under subsection (c) of this rule. See Article 57. 
(3) ConJinement on other grounds. Nothing in 
this rule shall prohibit confinement of a person after 
a court-martial on proper grounds other than the of- 
fenses for which the accused was tried at the court- 
martial. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 304, 305, and paragraph 5b(2), Part V, for other 
grounds for confinement. 
(c)  Deferment of conJinement. 
(1) In general.  Deferment of a sentence to con- 
finement is a postponement of the service and of the 
running of the sentence. 
Discussion 
Deferment is not suspension of the sentence or a form of 
clemency. 
(2)  Who  may defer. The convening authority or, 
if the accused is no longer in the convening author- 
ity's jurisdiction, the officer exercising general court- 
martial jurisdiction over the command to which the 
accused is assigned, may, upon written application 
of the accused, at any time after the adjournment of 
the court-martial, defer the accused's  service of a 
sentence to confinement which has not been ordered 
executed. 
(3)  Action on deferment request. The authority 
acting on the deferment request may, in that author- 
ity's  discretion, defer service of a sentence to con- 
finement. The  accused shall have the burden to show 
that the interests of the accused and the community 
in  release outweigh the community's interests in 
confinement. Factors that the authority acting on a 
deferment request may consider in determining 
whether to grant the deferment request include: the 
probability of the accused's flight; the probability of 
the accused's commission of other offenses, intimi- 
dation of witness, or interference with the adminis- 
tration of justice; the nature of the offenses (includ- 
ing the effect on the victim) of which the accused 
was convicted; the sentence adjudged; the com- 
mand's immediate need for the accused; the effect of 
deferment on good order and discipline in the com- 
mand; and the accused's character, mental condi- 
tion, family situation, and service record. The deci- 
sion of the authority acting on the deferment shall be 
subject to judicial review only for abuse of discre- 
tion. The action of the convening authority shall be 
written and a copy shall be provided to the accused. 
Discussion 
The deferment request and the action on the request must be 
attached to the record of trial. See  R.C.M. 1103(b)(3)(D). If the 
request for deferment is denied, the basis for the denial should be 
in writing and attached to the record of trial. 
(4)  Orders. The action granting deferment shall 
be  reported in the convening authority's action 
under R.C.M. 1107(f)(4)(E) acd shall include the 
date of the action on the request when it occurs prior R.C.M. 1101(~)(4) 
to or concurrently with the action. Action granting 
deferment after the convening authority's  action 
under R.C.M. 1107 shall be reported in orders under 
R.C.M. 11 14 and included in the record of trial. 
(5)  Restraint when deferment is granted. When 
deferment of confinement is granted, no form of re- 
straint or other limitation on the accused's  liberty 
may be ordered as a substitute form of punishment. 
An accused may, however, be restricted to specified 
limits or conditions may be placed on the accused's 
liberty during the period of deferment for any other 
proper reason, including a ground for restraint 
under R.C.M. 304. 
(6) End of deferment. Deferment of a sentence to 
confinement ends when: 
(A) The convening authority takes action 
under R.C.M. 1107, unless the convening authority 
specifies in the action that service of confinement af- 
ter the action is deferred; 
(B) The confinement is suspended; 
(C) The deferment expires by its own terms; or 
(D) The deferment is otherwise rescinded in 
accordance with subsection (c)(7) of this rule. Defer- 
ment of confinement may not continue after the con- 
viction is final under R.C.M. 1209. 
Discussion 
A sentence to confinement which has been ordered executed 
may not be deferred. When the sentence is ordered executed, the 
confinement may be suspended but may not be further deferred. 
Deferment and suspension of confinement cannot exist concur- 
rently. When deferment of confinement ends, the sentence to con- 
finement begins to run or resumes running, as appropriate. When 
the convening authority has specified in the action that confine- 
ment will be deferred after the action, the deferment may not be 
terminated, except under subsections (6)(B), (C), or (D), until the 
conviction is final under R.C.M. 1209. 
(7)  Rescission of deferment. 
(A) Who  may rescind. The authority who 
granted the deferment or, if the accused is no longer 
within that authority's jurisdiction,  the officer exer- 
cising general court-martial jurisdiction over the 
command to which the accused is assigned, may re- 
scind the deferment. 
(B) Action. Deferment of confinement may be 
rescinded when additional information is presented 
to a proper authority which, when considered with 
all  other information  in the case, that authority 
finds, in  that authority's  discretion, is grounds for 
denial of deferment under subsection (c)(3) of this 
rule. The accused shall promptly be informed of the 
basis for the rescission and of the right to submit 
written matters in the accused's behalf and to re- 
quest that the rescission be reconsidered. However, 
the accused may be required to serve the sentence to 
confinement pending this action. 
(C)  Execution. When deferment is rescinded 
after the convening authority's action under R.C.M. 
1107, the confinement may be ordered executed. 
However, no such order may be issued within 7 days 
of notice of the rescission to the accused under sub- 
section (c)(7)(B) of this rule, to afford the accused an 
opportunity to respond. The authority rescinding 
the deferment may extend this period for good cause 
shown. The accused shall be credited with any con- 
finement actually served during this period. 
(D)  Orders. Rescission of a deferment before or 
concurrently with the initial action in  the case shall 
be  reported  in  the  action  under  R.C.M. 
1  107(f)(4)(E),  which action shall include the dates of 
the granting of the deferment and the rescission. Re- 
scission of a deferment after the convening author- 
ity's action shall be reported in supplementary or- 
ders in accordance with R.C.M. 11 14 and shall state 
whether the approved period of confinement is to be 
executed or whether all or part of it is to be sus- 
pended. 
Discussion 
See Appendix 16for forms 
Rule 1102.  Post-trial sessions 
(a)  In general. Post-trial sessions may be proceed- 
ings in revision or Article 39(a) sessions. Such ses- 
sions may be directed by the military judge or the 
convening authority in accordance with this rule. 
(b)  Purpose. 
(1)  Proceedings in revision. Proceedings in revi- 
sion may be directed to correct an apparent error, 
omission, or improper or inconsistent action by the 
court-martial, which can be rectified by reopening 
the proceedings without material prejudice to the 
accused. Discussion 
Because the action at a proceeding in revision is corrective, a 
proceeding in revision may not be conducted for the purpose of 
presenting additional evidence. 
Examples when a proceeding in revision is appropriate in- 
clude: correction of an ambiguous or apparently illegal action by 
the court-martial; inquiry into the terms of a pretrial agreement; 
and inquiry to establish the accused's awareness of certain rights. 
See also R.C.M. 1104(d) concerning correction of the record 
by certificate of correction. 
(2) Article 39(a)  sessions. An Article 39(a) session 
under this rule may be called for the purpose of in- 
quiring into, and, when appropriate, resolving any 
matter which arises after trial and which substan- 
tially affects the legal sufficiency of any findings of 
guilty or the sentence. 
Discussion 
For example, an Article 39(a) session may be called to ex- 
amine allegations of misconduct by a member or by  counsel. 
(c)  Matters not subject to post-trial sessions. Post-
trial session may not be directed: 
(1) For reconsideration of a finding of not guilty 
of any specification, or a ruling which amounts to a 
finding of not guilty; 
(2)  For reconsideration of a finding of not guilty 
of any charge, unless the record shows a finding of 
guilty under a specification laid under that charge, 
which sufficiently alleges a violation of some article 
of the code; or 
(3)  For increasing the severity of the sentence un- 
less the sentence prescribed  for the offense is 
mandatory. 
(d)  When directed. The military judge may direct a 
post-trial session any time before the record is au- 
thenticated. The convening authority may direct a 
post-trial session any time before the convening au- 
thority takes initial action on the case or at such 
later time as the convening authority is authorized 
to do so by a reviewing authority, except that no pro- 
ceeding in revision may be held when any part of the 
sentence has been ordered executed. 
(e)  Procedure. 
(1) Personnel. The requirements of R.C.M. 505 
and 805 shall apply at post-trial sessions except 
that-
R.C.M. 1103(b)(2)(B) 
(A) For a proceeding in revision, if trial was 
before members and the matter subject to the pro- 
ceeding in revision requires the presence of mem- 
bers: 
(i)  The absence of any members does not in- 
validate the proceedings if, in the case of a general 
court-martial, at least five members are present, or, 
in the case of a special court-martial, at least three 
members are present; and 
(ii) A different military judge  may be de- 
tailed, subject to R.C.M. 502(c) and 902, if the mili- 
tary judge who presided at the earlier proceedings is 
not reasonably available. 
(B) For an Article 39(a) session, a different 
military judge may be detailed, subject to R.C.M. 
502(c) and 902, for good cause. 
(2) Action. The military judge shall take such ac- 
tion as may be appropriate, including appropriate 
instructions when members are present. The mem- 
bers may deliberate in closed session, if necessary, to 
determine what corrective action, if any, to take. 
(3)  Record. All post-trial sessions, except any de- 
liberations by the members, shall be held in open ses- 
sion. The record of the post-trial sessions shall be 
prepared, authenticated, and served in accordance 
with R.C.M. 1103 and 1104 and shall be included in 
the record of the prior proceedings. 
Rule 1103. Preparation of record of trial 
(a)  In general. Each general, special, and summary 
court-martial shall keep a separate record of the pro- 
ceedings in each case brought before it. 
(b)  General courts-martial. 
(1)  Responsibility for preparation. The trial coun- 
sel shall: 
(A) Under the direction of the military judge, 
cause the record of trial to be prepared; and 
(B)  Under regulations prescribed by the Secre- 
tary concerned, cause to be retained stenographic or 
other notes or mechanical or electronic recordings 
from which the record of trial was prepared. 
(2)  Contents. 
(A) In general. The record of trial in each gen- 
eral court-martial shall be separate, complete, and 
independent of any other document. 
(B)  Verbatim transcript required. Except as 
otherwise provided in subsection (j)  of this rule, the 
record of trial shall include a verbatim written tran- R.C.M.  1103(b)(2)(B) 
script of all sessions except sessions closed for delib- 
erations and voting when: 
(i)  Any part of the sentence adjudged ex- 
ceeds six months confinement or other punishments 
which may be adjudged by a special court-martial; 
or 
(ii)  A bad-conduct discharge has been ad- 
judged. 
Discussion 
A verbatim  transcript includes: all proceedings  including 
sidebar conferences, arguments of counsel, and rulings and in- 
structions by the military judge; matter which the military judge 
orders stricken from the record or disregarded; and when a re- 
cord is amended in revision  proceedings (see R.C.M. 1102), the 
part of the original record changed and the changes made, with- 
out physical alteration of the original record. Conferences under 
R.C.M.  802 need  not be recorded, but matters agreed upon at 
such conferences must be included in the record. If testimony is 
given through an interpreter, a verbatim transcript must so re- 
flect. 
(C)  Verbatim transcript not  required. If a ver- 
batim transcript is not required under subsection 
(b)(2)(B) of this rule, a summarized report of the 
proceedings may be prepared instead of a verbatim 
transcript. 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M. 910(i) concerning guilty plea inquiries. 
(D) Other matters. In addition to the matter re- 
quired under subsection (b)(2)(B) or (b)(2)(C) of this 
rule, a complete record shall include: 
(i)  The original charge sheet or a duplicate; 
(ii)  A copy of the convening order and any 
amending order(s); 
(iii)  The request, if any, for trial by military 
judge alone, or that the membership of  the court- 
martial include enlisted persons, and, when applica- 
ble, any statement by the convening authority re- 
quired under R.C.M. 201(0(2)(B)(ii) or 503(a)(2); 
(iv)  The original dated, signed action by the 
convening authority; and 
(v)  Exhibits, or, with the permission  of  the 
military judge, copies, photographs, or descriptions 
of  any exhibits which were received in evidence and 
any appellate exhibits. 
(3)  Matters attached to the record. The following 
matters shall be attached to the record: 
(A)  If not used as exhibits- 
(i)  The report of investigation under Article 
32, if any; 
(ii) The staff judge advocate's pretrial advice 
under Article 34, if any; 
(iii)  If the trial was a rehearing or new or 
other trial of the case, the record of the former hear- 
ing(~); and 
(iv)  Written special findings, if any, by the 
military judge. 
(B)  Exhibits or, with the permission of the mil- 
itary judge, copies, photographs, or descriptions of 
any exhibits which were marked for and referred to 
on the record but not received in evidence; 
(C) Any matter filed by  the accused under 
R.C.M. 1105, or any written waiver of the right to 
submit such matter; 
(D) Any deferment request and the action on 
it; 
(E)  Explanation for any substitute authentica- 
tion under R.C.M. 1  104(a)(2)(B); 
(F) Explanation for any failure to serve the re- 
cord of trial on the accused under R.C.M. 1104(b); 
(G) The post-trial recommendation of the staff 
judge advocate or legal officer and proof of service 
on defense counsel in  accordance with R.C.M. 
1  106(0(  1); 
(H)  Any response by defense counsel to the 
post-trial review; 
(I) Recommendations and other papers rela- 
tive to clemency; 
(J) Any statement why it is impracticable for 
the convening authority to act; 
(K) Conditions of suspension, if any, and proof 
of service on probationer under R.C.M. 1108; 
(L) The certificate of a medical officer concern- 
ing the physical condition of an accused sentenced to 
confinement on bread and water or diminished ra- 
tions; 
(M) Any waiver or withdrawal of appellate re- 
view under R.C.M. 1  110; and 
(N) Records of any proceedings in connection 
with vacation of suspension under R.C.M. 1109. 
(c)  Special courts-martial. 
(1) Involving a bad-conduct discharge. The re- 
quirements of  subsections (b)(l), (b)(2)(A), 
(b)(2)(B), (b)(2)(D), and (b)(3) of this rule shall ap- 
11-138 ply in a special court-martial in which a bad-conduct 
discharge has been adjudged. 
(2)  Not involving a bad-conduct discharge. If the 
special court-martial resulted in findings of guilty 
but a bad-conduct discharge was not adjudged, the 
requirements of subsections (b)(l), (b)(2)(C), 
(b)(2)(D), and (b)(3)(A)-(F) and (I)-(N) of this rule 
shall apply. 
(d) Summary courts-martial. The summary court- 
martial record of trial shall be prepared as pre- 
scribed in  R.C.M. 1305. 
(e) Acquittal; courts-martial resulting in  jndings of 
not guilty only by reason of lack of mental responsi- 
bility; termination prior tojndings. Notwithstanding 
subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this rule, if  proceed- 
ings resulted in an acquittal of all charges and speci- 
fications or in a finding of not guilty only by reason 
of lack of mental responsibility of all charges and 
specifications, or if the proceedings were terminated 
by withdrawal, mistrial, or dismissal before findings, 
the record may consist of the original charge sheet, a 
copy of the convening order and amending orders (if 
any), and sufficient information to establish jurisdic- 
tion over the accused and the offenses (if not shown 
on the charge sheet). The convening authority or 
higher authority may prescribe additional require- 
ments. 
Discussion 
The notes or recordings of court-martial proceedings de- 
scribed in this subsection should be retained if reinstitution  and 
re-referral of the affected charges is likely or when they may be 
necessary for the trial of another accused in a related case. See 
R.C.M. 905(g) and 914. 
(f) Loss of notes or recordings of the proceedings.  If, 
because of loss of recordings or notes, or other rea- 
sons, a verbatim transcript cannot be prepared when 
required by subsection (b)(2)(B) or (c)(l) of this 
rule, a record which meets the requirements of sub- 
section (b)(2)(C) of this rule shall be prepared, and 
the convening authority may: 
(1)  Approve only so much of the sentence which 
could be adjudged by a special court-martial, except 
that no bad-conduct discharge may be approved; or 
(2)  Direct a rehearing as to any offense of which 
the accused was found guilty if the finding is sup- 
ported by  the summary of the evidence contained in 
the record, provided that the court-martial in a re- 
R.C.M.  1103(i)(l)(A) 
hearing may not adjudged any sentence in  excess of 
that adjudged by the earlier court-martial. 
(g)  Copies of the record of trial. 
(1)  General and special courts-martial. 
(A) In general. In general and special courts- 
martial which require a verbatim transcript under 
subsections (b) or (c) of this rule and are subject to a 
review by  a Court of Military Review under Article 
66, the trial counsel shall cause to be prepared an 
original and four copies of the record of trial. In all 
other general and special courts-martial the trial 
counsel shall cause to be prepared an original and 
one copy of the record of trial. 
Discussion 
In a joint  or common trial an additional copy of the record 
must be prepared for each accused. See R.C.M. 1104(b). 
(B) Additional copies. The convening or higher 
authority may direct that additional copies of the re- 
cord of trial of any general or special court-martial 
be prepared. 
(2) Summary courts-martial. Copies of the sum- 
mary court-martial record of trial shall be prepared 
as prescribed in R.C.M. 1305(b). 
(h) Security classijcation. If the record of trial con- 
tains matter which must be classified under applica- 
ble security regulations, the trial counsel shall cause 
a proper security classification to be assigned to the 
record of trial and on each page thereof on which 
classified material appears. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M.  1104(b)(l)(D) concerning the disposition  of 
records of trial requiring security protection. 
(i)  Examination and correction before authentica- 
tion. 
(1) General and special courts-martial. 
(A) Examination and correction by trial coun- 
sel.  In general and special courts-martial, the trial 
counsel shall examine the record of trial before au- 
thentication and cause those changes to be made 
which are necessary to report the proceedings accu- 
rately. The trial counsel shall not change the record 
after authentication. R.C.M.  1103(i)(l)(A) 
Discussion 
The trial counsel may personally correct and initial the nec- 
essary changes or, if major changes are necessary, direct the re- 
porter to rewrite the entire record or the portion  of the record 
which is defective. 
The  trial counsel must ensure that the reporter makes a true, 
complete, and accurate record of the proceedings such that the re- 
cord will meet the applicable requirements of this rule. 
(B)  Examination  by defense counsel. Except 
when unreasonable delay will result, the trial coun- 
sel shall permit the defense counsel to examine the 
record before authentication. 
Discussion 
If the defense counsel discovers errors or omissions in the re- 
cord, the defense counsel may suggest to the trial counsel appro- 
priate changes to make the record accurate, forward for attach- 
ment to the record under Article 38(c) any objections to the 
record, or  bring any suggestions for correction of the record to the 
attention of the person who authenticates the record. 
The defense counsel should be granted reasonable access to 
the reporter's notes and tapes to facilitate the examination of the 
record. 
A suitable notation that the defense counsel has examined 
the record should be made on the authentication page. See Ap-
pendix 13 or 14 for sample forms. 
(2) Summary courts-martial. The summary 
court-martial shall examine and correct the sum- 
mary court-martial record of trial as prescribed in 
R.C.M. 1305(a). 
(j)  Videotape and similar records. 
(1)  Recording proceedings.  If authorized by regu- 
lations of the Secretary concerned, general and spe- 
cial courts-martial may be recorded by  videotape, 
audiotape, or similar material from which sound 
and visual images may be reproduced to accurately 
depict the entire court-martial. Such means of re- 
cording may be used in lieu of recording by a quali- 
fied court reporter, when one is required, subject to 
this rule. 
(2)  Preparation of written record. When the court- 
martial, or any part of it, is recorded by videotape, 
audiotape, or similar material under subsection 
(j)(l)  of this rule, a written transcript or summary as 
required  in  subsection (b)(2)(A),  (b)(2)(B), 
(b)(2)(C), or (c) of this rule, as appropriate, shall be 
prepared in accordance with this rule and R.C.M. 
1104 before the record is forwarded under R.C.M. 
1104(e), unless military exigencies prevent  tran- 
scription. 
(3)  Military exigency. If military exigency pre- 
vents preparation of a written transcript or sum- 
mary, as required, and when the court-martial has 
been recorded by  videotape, audiotape, or similar 
material under subsection Cj)(l) of this rule, the 
videotape,  audiotape, or similar material, together 
with the matters in subsections (b)(2)(D) and (b)(3) 
of this rule shall be authenticated and forwarded in 
accordance with R.C.M. 1104, provided that in such 
case the convening authority shall cause to be at- 
tached to the record a statement of the reasons why 
a written record could not be prepared, and pro- 
vided further that in such case the defense counsel 
shall be given reasonable opportunity to listen to or 
to view and listen to the recording whenever defense 
counsel is otherwise entitled to examine the record 
under these rules. Subsection (g) of this rule shall 
not apply in case of military exigency under this sub- 
section. 
(4)  Further review. 
(A) Cases reviewed by the Court of Military Re- 
view. Before review, if any, by a Court of Military 
Review of a case in which the record includes an au- 
thenticated recording prepared under subsection 
(j)(3) of this rule, a complete written transcript shall 
be prepared and certified as accurate in accordance 
with regulations of the Secretary concerned. The au- 
thenticated recording shall be retained for examina- 
tion by appellate authorities. 
(B)  Cases not reviewed by the Court of Military 
Review. In cases in which the record includes an au- 
thenticated recording prepared under subsection 
(j)(3) of this rule, a written record shall be prepared 
under such circumstances as the Secretary con- 
cerned may prescribe. 
(5) Accused's copy. When a record includes an au- 
thenticated recording under subsection (j)(3) of this 
rule, the Government shall, in order to comply with 
R.C.M. 1104(b): 
(A) Provide the accused with a duplicate copy 
of the videotape, audiotape, or similar matter and 
copies of any written contents of and attachments to 
the record, and give the accused reasonable opportu- 
nity to use such viewing equipment as is necessary to 
listen to or view and listen to the recording; or R.C.M. 1104(b)(l)(C) 
(B)  With the written consent of the accused, 
defer service of the record until a written record is 
prepared under subsection (4) of this rule. 
Rule 1104.  Records of trial: Authentication; 

service; loss; correction; forwarding 

(a) Authentication. 
(1)  In general. A record is authenticated by the 
signature of a person specified in this rule who 
thereby declares that the record accurately reports 
the proceedings. No person may be required to au- 
thenticate a record of trial if that person is not satis- 
fied that it accurately reports the proceedings. 
(2)  General and special courts-martial. 
(A) Authentication by the military judge.  In 
special courts-martial in which a bad-conduct dis- 
charge has been  adjudged and in general courts- 
martial, except as provided in subsection (a)(2)(B) of 
this rule, the military judge present at the end of the 
proceedings shall authenticate the record of trial, or 
that portion over which the military judge presided. 
If  more than one military judge presided  over the 
proceedings, each military judge  shall authenticate 
the record of the proceedings over which that mili- 
tary judge presided, except as provided in subsection 
(a)(2)(B) of this rule. The record of trial of special 
courts-martial in which no bad-conduct  discharge 
was adjudged shall be authenticated in accordance 
with regulations of the Secretary concerned. 
(B) Substitute authentication. If the military 
judge cannot authenticate the record of trial because 
of the military judge's  death, disability, or absence, 
the trial counsel present at the end of the proceed- 
ings shall authenticate the record of trial. If the trial 
counsel cannot authenticate the record of trial be- 
cause of the trial counsel's death, disability, or ab- 
sence, a member shall authenticate the record of 
trial. In a court-martial composed of a military 
judge alone, or as to sessions without members, the 
court reporter shall authenticate the record of trial 
when this duty would fall upon a member under this 
subsection. A person authorized to authenticate a 
record under this subsection may authenticate the 
record only as to those proceedings at which that 
person was present. 
Discussion 
See Appendix 13 or 14 for sample forms. 
Substitute authentication is authorized only in emergencies. 
A brief, temporary absence of the military judge from the situs of 
the preparation of the record of trial does not justify  a substitute 
authentication. Prolonged absence, including permanent change 
of station, ordinarily justifies substitute authentication. 
The person who authenticates the record of trial instead of 
the military judge should attach to the record of trial an explana- 
tion for the substitute authentication. See R.C.M. 1103(b)(3)(E). 
(3) Summary courts-martial. The summary 
court-martial shall authenticate the summary court- 
martial record of trial as prescribed in R.C.M. 
1305(a). 
(b)  Service. 
(1) General and special courts-martial. 
(A) Service of record  of trial on accused. In 
each general and special court-martial, except as 
provided in subsection (b)(l)(C) or (D) of this rule, 
the trial counsel shall cause a copy of the record of 
trial to be served on the accused as soon as the re- 
cord of trial is authenticated. 
(B)  Proof of service of record of trial on accused. 
The trial counsel shall cause the accused's receipt for 
the copy of the record of trial to be attached to the 
original record of trial. If it is impracticable to se- 
cure a receipt from the accused before the original 
record of trial is forwarded to the convening author- 
ity, the trial counsel shall prepare a certificate indi- 
cating that a copy of the record of trial has been 
transmitted to the accused, including the means of 
transmission and the address, and cause the certifi- 
cate to be attached to the original record of trial. In 
such a case the accused's receipt shall be forwarded 
to the convening authority as soon as it is obtained. 
(C) Substitute service. If it is impracticable to 
serve the record of trial on the accused because of 
the transfer of the accused to a distant place, the un- 
authorized absence of the accused, or military exi- 
gency, or if the accused so requests on the record at 
the court-martial or in writing, the accused's copy of 
the record shall be forwarded to the accused's de- 
fense counsel, if any. Trial counsel shall attach a 
statement to the record explaining why the accused 
was not served personally. If the accused has more 
than one counsel, R.C.M. 1106(f)(2) shall apply. If 
the accused has no counsel and if  the accused is ab- 
sent without authority, the trial counsel shall pre- 
pare an explanation for the failure to serve the re- R.C.M. 1104(b)(l)(C) 
cord. The explanation and the accused's copy of the 
record shall be forwarded with the original record. 
The accused shall be provided with a copy of the re- 
cord as soon as practicable. 
Discussion 
See Appendix  13 or 14 for sample forms. 
(D) Classified information. 
(i)  Forwarding to convening authority. If the 
copy of the record of trial prepared for the accused 
contains classified information, the trial counsel, un- 
less directed otherwise by the convening authority, 
shall forward the accused's copy to the convening 
authority, before it is served on the accused. 
(ii)  Responsibility of the convening authority. 
The convening authority shall: 
(a)  cause any classified information to be de- 
leted or withdrawn from the accused's  copy of the 
record of trial; 
(b)  cause a certificate indicating that classi- 
fied information has been deleted or withdrawn to be 
attached to the record of trial; and 
(c)  cause the expurgated copy of the record 
of trial and the attached certificate regarding classi- 
fied information to be served on the accused as pro- 
vided in subsections (b)(l)(A) and (B) of this rule ex- 
cept that the accused's receipt shall show that the 
accused has received an expurgated copy of the re- 
cord of trial. 
(iii)  Contents  of cert8cate. The certificate re- 
garding deleted or withdrawn classified information 
shall indicate: 
(a)  that the original record of trial may be in- 
spected in the Office of the Judge Advocate General 
concerned under such regulations as the Secretary 
concerned may prescribe; 
(b)  the pages of the record  of  trial from 
which matter has been deleted; 
(c)  the pages of the record of trial which 
have been entirely deleted; and 
(d)  the exhibits which have been withdrawn. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 1103(h) concerning classified information 
(2) Summary courts-martial. The summary 
court-martial record of trial shall be disposed of as 
provided in R.C.M. 1305(e). Subsection (b)(l)(D) of 
this rule shall apply if classified information is in- 
cluded in the record of trial of a summary court- 
martial. 
(c)  Loss of record. If the authenticated record of 
trial is lost or destroyed, the trial counsel shall, if 
practicable, cause another record of trial to be pre- 
pared for authentication. The new record of trial 
shall become the record of trial in the case if the re- 
quirements of R.C.M. 1103 and this rule are met. 
(d)  Correction of record after authentication; certifi- 
cate of correction. 
(1) In general. A record of trial found to be in- 
complete or defective after authentication may be 
corrected to make it accurate. A record of trial may 
be returned to the convening authority by superior 
competent authority for correction under this rule. 
Discussion 
The record of trial is corrected with a certificate of correc- 
tion. 
See Appendix 13 or 14 for a form for a certificate of correc- 
tion. A certificate of correction may be used only to make the re- 
cord of trial correspond to the actual proceedings. If the members 
were not sworn, for example, the error cannot be cured by a cer- 
tificate of correction. If the members were sworn but the record 
did not so reflect, the record could be corrected. 
(2)  Procedure. An authenticated  record of trial 
believed  to be incomplete or defective may be  re- 
turned to the military judge or summary court-mar- 
tial for a certificate of correction. The military judge 
or summary court-martial shall give notice of the 
proposed  correction to all parties and permit them 
to examine and respond to the proposed correction 
before authenticating the certificate of correction. 
All parties shall be given reasonable access to any 
original reporter's notes or tapes of the proceedings. 
Discussion 
The type of opportunity to respond depends on the nature 
and scope of the proposed correction. In many instances an ade- 
quate opportunity can be provided by allowing the respective par- 
ties to present affidavits and other documentary evidence to the 
person authenticating the certificate of correction or by  a confer- 
ence telephone call among the authenticating person, the parties, 
and the reporter. In other instances, an evidentiary hearing with 
witnesses may be required. The accused need not be  present at 
any hearing on a certificate of correction. R.C.M.  1  105(d)(2) 
(3)  Authentication  of certificate of correction; ser- 
vice on the accused. The  certificate of correction shall 
be authenticated as provided in subsection (a) of this 
rule and a copy served on the accused as provided in 
subsection (b) of this rule. The certificate of correc- 
tion and the accused's receipt for the certificate of 
correction shall be attached to each copy of the re- 
cord of trial required to be prepared under R.C.M. 
1103(g). 
(e)  Forwarding. After every court-martial, includ- 
ing a rehearing and new and other trials, the authen- 
ticated record shall be forwarded to the convening 
authority for initial review and action, provided that 
in case of a special court-martial in which a bad-con- 
duct discharge was adjudged or a general court-mar- 
tial, the convening authority shall refer the record to 
the staff judge advocate or legal officer for a recom- 
mendation under R.C.M. 1106 before the convening 
authority takes action. 
Rule 1105.  Matters submitted by the accused 
(a)  In general. After a sentence is adjudged in any 
court-martial, the accused may submit matters to 
the convening authority in accordance with this 
rule. 
(b)  Matters which may be submitted. The accused 
may submit to the convening authority any written 
matters which may reasonably tend to affect the 
convening authority's decision whether to disap- 
prove any findings of guilty or to approve the sen- 
tence. Such matters are not subject to the Military 
Rules of Evidence and may include: 
(1)  Allegations of errors affecting the legality of 
the findings or sentence; 
(2)  Portions or summaries of the record and cop- 
ies of documentary evidence offered or introduced at 
trial; 
(3)  Matters in mitigation which were not availa- 
ble for consideration at the court-martial; and 
Discussion 
For example, post-trial conduct of the accused, such as pro- 
viding restitution to the victim or exemplary behavior, might be 
appropriate. 
(4)  Clemency recommendations by  any member, 
the military judge, or any other person. The defense 
may ask any person for such a recommendation. 
Discussion 
A clemency recommendation  should state reasons for the 
recommendation and should specifically indicate the amount and 
character of the clemency recommended. 
A clemency recommendation by a member should not dis- 
close the vote or opinion of any member expressed in delibera- 
tions. Except as provided  in  R.C.M. 923 and 1008 and 
Mil.R.Evid. 606(b), a clemency recommendation  does not im- 
peach the findings or the sentence. 
(c)  Time  periods. 
(1)  General and special courts-martial. After a 
general or special court-martial, the accused may 
submit matters under this rule within the later of 10 
days after a copy of the authenticated record of trial 
or, if applicable, the recommendation of the staff 
judge advocate or legal officer is served on the ac- 
cused. If the accused shows that additional time is 
required for the accused to submit such matters, the 
convening authority may, for good cause, extend the 
10-day period for not more than 20 additional days. 
(2)  Summary courts-martial. After a summary 
court-martial, the accused may submit matters 
under this rule within 7 days after the sentence is an- 
nounced. If the accused shows that additional time 
is required  for the accused to submit such com- 
ments, the convening authority may, for good cause, 
extend the period in which comments may be sub- 
mitted for up to 20 additional days. 
(3)  Post-trial sessions. A post-trial session under 
R.C.M. 1102 shall have no effect on the running of 
any time period in this rule, except when such ses- 
sion results in the announcement of a new sentence, 
in which case the period shall run from that an- 
nouncement. 
(4)  Good cause. For purposes of this rule, good 
cause for an extension ordinarily does not include 
the need for securing matters which could reasona- 
bly have been presented at the court-martial. 
(d)  Waiver. 
(1)  Failure to submit matters. Failure to submit 
matters within the time prescribed by this rule shall 
be deemed a waiver of the right to submit such mat- 
ters. 
(2) Submission of  matters. Submission of any 
matters under this rule shall be deemed a waiver of 
the right to submit additional matters unless the 
right to submit additional matters within the pre- 
scribed time limits is expressly reserved in writing. R.C.M. 1105(d)(3) 
(3) Written waiver. The accused may expressly 
waive, in writing, the right to submit matters under 
this rule. Once filed, such waiver may not be re- 
voked. 
(4)  Absence of accused. If, as a result of the unau- 
thorized absence of the accused, the record cannot 
be served on the accused in accordance with R.C.M. 
1104(b)(l) and if  the accused has no counsel to re- 
ceive the record, the accused shall be deemed to have 
waived the right to submit matters under this rule 
within the time limit which begins upon service on 
the accused of the record of trial. 
Discussion 
The accused is not required  to raise objections to the trial 
proceedings in order to preserve them for later review. 
Rule 1106.  Recommendation of the staff 
judge advocate or legal officer 
(a)  In general. Before the convening authority takes 
action under R.C.M. 1107 on a record of trial by 
general court-martial or a record or trial by special 
court-martial which includes a sentence to a bad- 
conduct discharge, that convening authority's staff 
judge advocate or legal officer shall, except as pro- 
vided in  subsection (c) of this rule, forward to the 
convening authority a recommendation  under this 
rule. 
(b)  Disqualification.  No person who has acted as 
member, military judge, trial counsel, assistant trial 
counsel, defense counsel, associate or assistant de- 
fense counsel, or investigating officer in any case 
may later act as a staff judge advocate or legal officer 
to any reviewing or convening authority in the same 
case. 
Discussion 
The  staffjudge advocate or legal officer may also be ineligible 
when, for example, the staffjudge advocate or legal officer; served 
as the defense counsel in a companion case; testified as to a con- 
tested matter (unless the testimony is clearly uncontroverted); has 
other than an official interest in the same case; or must review that 
officer's own pretrial action (such as the pretrial advice under Ar- 
ticle 34; see R.C.M. 406) when the sufficiency or correctness of 
the earlier action has been placed in issue. 
(c)  When the convening authority has no staffjudge 
advocate. 
(1)  When the convening authority does not have a 
staff judge  advocate or legal oficer or that person  is 
disqualified.  If the convening authority does not 
have a staff judge advocate or legal officer, or if the 
person serving in that capacity is disqualified under 
subsection (b) of this rule or otherwise, the conven- 
ing authority shall: 
(A) Request the assignment of another staff 
judge  advocate or legal officer to prepare a recom- 
mendation under this rule; or 
(B)  Forward the record for action to any of- 
ficer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction  as 
provided in R.C.M. 1107(a). 
(2)  When the convening authority has a legal of- 
ficer  but wants the recommendation of a staff  judge 
advocate. If the convening authority has a legal of- 
ficer but no staff judge advocate, the convening au- 
thority may, as a matter of discretion, request desig- 
nation of a staff judge  advocate to prepare the 
recommendation. 
(d)  Form and content of recommendation. 
(a)  In generaLThe purpose of the recommenda- 
tion of the stafjudge advocate or legal officer is to as- 
sist the convening authority to decide what action to 
take on the sentence in the exercise of command pre- 
rogative. The staff judge  advocate or legal officer 
shall use the record of trial in the preparation of the 
recommendation. 
(2)  Form. The recommendation of the staff judge 
advocate or legal officer shall be a concise written 
communication. 
(3)  Required contents. Except as provided in sub- 
section (e) of this rule, the recommendation of the 
staff judge advocate or legal officer shall include con- 
cise information as to: 
(A) The findings and sentence adjudged by the 
court-martial; 
(B)  A summary of the accused's service record, 
to include length and character of service, awards 
and decorations received, and any records of nonju- 
dicial punishment and previous convictions; 
(C) A statement of the nature and duration of 
any pretrial restraint; 
(D)  If there is a pretrial agreement, a statement 
of any action the convening authority is obligated to 
take under the agreement or a statement of the rea- 
sons why the convening authority is not obligated to 
take specific action under the agreement; and (E) A specific recommendation as to the action 
to be taken by  the convening authority on the sen- 
tence. 
(4) Legal errors. The staff judge advocate or legal 
officer is not required to examine the record for legal 
errors. However, when the recommendation is pre- 
pared by a staff judge advocate, the staff judge advo- 
cate shall state whether, in the staff judge advocate's 
opinion, corrective action on the findings or sen- 
tence should be taken when an allegation of legal er- 
ror is raised in matters submitted under R.C.M. 
1105 or when otherwise deemed appropriate by the 
staff judge advocate. The response may consist of a 
statement of agreement or disagreement with the 
matter raised by the accused. An analysis or ratio- 
nale for the staff judge advocate's  statement, if any, 
concerning legal errors is not required. 
(5)  Optional matters. The recommendation of the 
staff judge advocate or legal officer may include, in 
addition to matters included under subsections 
(d)(3) and (4) of this rule, any additional matters 
deemed appropriate by the staff judge advocate or le- 
gal officer. Such matter may include matters outside 
the record. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M.  1107(b)(3)(B)(iii)  if matters adverse to the ac- 
cused from outside the record are included. 
(6)  Efect of error. In case of error in the recom- 
mendation not otherwise waived under subsection 
(f)(6) of this rule, appropriate corrective action shall 
be taken by  appellate authorities without returning 
the case for further action by a convening authority. 
(e)  No jndings of guilty; findings of not guilty only 
by reason of lack of mental responsibility. If the pro- 
ceedings resulted in an acquittal or in a finding of 
not guilty only by reason of lack of mental responsi- 
bility of all charges and specifications, or if, after the 
trial began, the proceedings were terminated with- 
out findings and no further action is contemplated, a 
recommendation under this rule is not required. 
(f) Service of recommendation on defense counsel 
and accused; defense response. 
(1) Service of recommendation on defense counsel 
and accused. Before forwarding the recommenda- 
tion and the record of trial to the convening author- 
ity for action under R.C.M. 1107, the staff judge ad- 
vocate or legal officer shall cause a copy of the 
R.C.M.  1106(f)(3) 
recommendation to be served on counsel for the ac- 
cused. A separate copy will be served on the ac- 
cused. If it is impracticable to serve the recommen- 
dation on the accused for reasons including but not 
limited to the transfer of the accused to a distant 
place, the unauthorized absence of the accused, or 
military exigency, or if the accused so requests on 
the record at the court-martial or in writing, the ac- 
cused's copy shall be forwarded to the accused's de- 
fense counsel. A statement shall be attached to the 
record explaining why the accused was not served 
personally. 
Discussion 
The method of service and the form of the proof of service 
are not prescribed and may be by  any appropriate means. See 
R.C.M. 1103(b)(3)(G). 
(2) Counsel for  the accused. The accused may, at 
trial or in writing to the staff judge advocate or legal 
officer before the recommendation has been served 
under this rule, designate which counsel (detailed, 
individual military, or civilian) will be served with 
the recommendation. In the absence of such desig- 
nation, the staff judge advocate or legal officer shall 
cause the recommendation to be served in the fol- 
lowing order of precedence, as applicable, on: (1) ci- 
vilian counsel; (2) individual military counsel; or (3) 
detailed defense counsel. If the accused has not re- 
tained civilian counsel and the detailed defense 
counsel and individual military counsel, if any, have 
been relieved or are not reasonably available to re- 
present the accused, substitute military counsel to 
represent the accused shall be detailed by an appro- 
priate authority. Substitute counsel shall enter into 
an attorney-client relationship with the accused 
before examining the recommendation and prepar- 
ing any response. 
Discussion 
When the accused is represented by more than one counsel, 
the military judge should inquire of the accused and counsel 
before the end of the court-martial as to who will act for the ac- 
cused under this rule. 
(3)  Record of trial. The staff judge advocate or le- 
gal officer shall, upon request of counsel for the ac- 
cused served with the recommendation, provide that R.C.M. 1106(f)(3) 
counsel with a copy of the record of trial for use 
while preparing the response to the recommenda- 
tion. 
(4)  Response.  Counsel for the accused may sub- 
mit, in writing, corrections or rebuttal to any matter 
in the recommendation believed to be erroneous, in- 
adequate, or misleading, and may comment on any 
other matter. 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M.1105. 
(5)  Time period. Counsel for the accused shall be 
given  10 days from service of the record of trial 
under R.C.M. 1104(b) or receipt of the recommen- 
dation, whichever is later, in  which to submit com- 
ments on the recommendation. The convening au- 
thority may, for good cause, extend the period in 
which comments may be submitted for up to 20 ad- 
ditional days. 
(6)  Waiver. Failure of counsel for the accused to 
comment on any matter in the recommendation-or 
matters attached to the recommendation in a timely 
manner shall waive later claim of error with regard 
to such matter in the absence of plain error. 
Discussion 
The accused is not required  to raise objections to the trial 
proceedings in order to preserve them for later review. 
(7) New matter in addendum to recommendation. 
The staff judge advocate or legal officer may supple- 
ment the recommendation after counsel for the ac- 
cused has been served with the recommendation and 
given an opportunity to comment. When new matter 
is introduced after counsel for the accused has ex- 
amined the recommendation, however, counsel for 
the accused must be served with the new matter and 
given a further opportunity to comment. 
Discussion 
"New  matter"  includes discussion of the effect of new deci- 
sions on issues in the case, matter from outside the record of trial, 
and issues not previously discussed. "New matter" does not ordi- 
narily include any discussion by  the staff judge advocate or legal 
officer of the correctness of the initial defense comments on the 
recommendation. 
Rule 1107. Action by convening authority 
(a)  Who may take action. The convening authority 
shall take action on the sentence and, in the discre- 
tion of the convening authority, the findings, unless 
it is impracticable. If it is impracticable for the con- 
vening authority to act, the convening authority 
shall, in accordance with such regulations as the 
Secretary concerned may prescribe, forward the case 
to an officer exercising general court-martial juris- 
diction who may take action under this rule. 
Discussion 
The convening authority may not delegate the function of 
taking action on the findings or sentence. The convening author- 
ity who convened the court-martial may take action on the case 
regardless whether the accused is a member of or present in the 
convening authority's command. 
It would be impracticable for the convening authority to take 
initial action when, for example, a command has been decommis- 
sioned or inactivated before the convening authority's action; 
when a command has been alerted for immediate overseas move- 
ment; or when the convening authority is disqualified because the 
convening authority has other than an official interest in the case 
or because a member of the court-martial which tried the accused 
later became the convening authority. 
If the convening authority forwards the case to an officer ex- 
ercising general court-martial jurisdiction  for initial review and 
action, the record should include a statement of the reasons why 
the convening authority did not act. 
(b)  General considerations. 
(1)  Discretion of convening authority. The action 
to be taken on the findings and sentence is within the 
sole discretion of the convening authority. Deter- 
mining what action to take on the findings and sen- 
tence of a court-martial is a matter of command pre- 
rogative. The convening authority is not required to 
review the case for legal errors or factual sufficiency. 
Discussion 
The action is taken in the interests ofjustice, discipline, mis- 
sion requirements, clemency, and other appropriate reasons. If 
errors are noticed by  the convening authority, the convening au- 
thority may take corrective action under this rule. 
(2)  When  action may be taken. The convening au- 
thority may take action only after the applicable 
time periods under R.C.M. 1105(c) have expired or 
the accused has waived the right to present matters 
under R.C.M. 1105(d), whichever is earlier, subject 
to regulations of the Secretary concerned. R.C.M. 1107(d)(l) 

(3) Matters considered. 
(A) Required  matters. Before taking action, 
the convening authority shall consider: 
(i)  The result of trial; 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 1101(a). 
(ii)  The recommendation of the staff judge 
advocate or legal officer under R.C.M. 1106, if appli- 
cable; and 
(iii) Any matters submitted by the accused 
under R.C.M. 1105 or, if  applicable, R.C.M. 
1106(f). 
(B)  Additional  matters. Before taking action 
the convening authority may consider: 
(i)  The record of trial; 
(ii)  The personnel  records of the accused; 
and 
(iii)  Such other matters as the convening au- 
thority deems appropriate. However, if the conven- 
ing authority considers matters adverse to the ac- 
cused from outside the record, with knowledge of 
which the accused is not chargeable, the accused 
shall be notified and given an opportunity to rebut. 
(4) When proceedings resulted in finding  of not 
guilty or not guilty only by reason of lack of mental 
responsibility,  or there was a ruling amounting to a 
finding of  not guilty. The convening authority shall 
not take action approving or disapproving a finding 
of not guilty, a finding of not guilty only by reason of 
lack of mental responsibility, or a ruling amounting 
to a finding of not guilty. 
(5) Action  when accused'lacks mental capacity. 
The convening authority may not approve a sen- 
tence while the accused lacks mental capacity to un- 
derstand and to conduct or cooperate intelligently in 
the post-trial proceedings. In the absence of substan- 
tial evidence to the contrary, the accused is pre- 
sumed to have the capacity to understand and to 
conduct or cooperate intelligently in the post-trial 
proceedings. If a substantial question is raised as to 
the requisite mental capacity of the accused, the con- 
vening authority may direct an examination of the 
accused in accordance with R.C.M. 706 before de- 
ciding whether the accused lacks mental capacity, 
but the examination may be limited to determining 
the accused's present capacity to understand and co- 
operate in the post-trial proceedings. The convening 
authority may approve the sentence unless it is es- 
tablished, by  a  preponderance of  the evi-
dence-including  matters outside the record of 
trial-that  the accused does not have the requisite 
mental capacity. Nothing in  this subsection shall 
prohibit the convening authority from disapproving 
the findings of guilty and sentence. 
(c) Action on findings. Action on the findings is not 
required. However, the convening authority may, in 
the convening authority's sole discretion: 
(1)  Change a finding of guilty to a charge or spec- 
ification to a finding of guilty to an offense that is a 
lesser included offense of the offense stated in the 
charge or specification; or 
(2)  Set aside any finding of guilty and- 
(A) Dismiss the specification and, if appropri- 
ate, the charge, or 
(B)  Direct a rehearing in accordance with sub- 
section (e) of this rule. 
Discussion 
The convening authority may for any reason or no reason 
disapprove a finding of guilty or approve a finding of guilty only 
of a lesser offense. However, see subsection (e) of this rule if a re- 
hearing is ordered. The convening authority is not required to re- 
view the findings for legal  or factual sufficiency  and is not re- 
quired to explain a decision to order or not to order a rehearing, 
except as provided in subsection (e) of this rule. The power to or- 
der a rehearing, or to take other corrective action on the findings, 
is designed solely to provide an expeditious means to correct er- 
rors that are identified in the course of exercising discretion under 
the rule. 
(d) Action on the sentence. 
(1)  In general. The convening authority may for 
any or no reason disapprove a legal sentence in 
whole or in part, mitigate the sentence, and change a 
punishment to  one of a different nature as long as the 
severity of the punishment is not increased. The con- 
vening or higher authority may not increase the pun- 
ishment imposed by a court-martial. The approval 
or disapproval shall be explicitly stated. 
Discussion 
A sentence adjudged by a court-martial may be approved if it 
was within the jurisdiction  of the court-martial to adjudge (see 
R.C.M. 201(f)) and did not exceed  the maximum limits pre- 
scribed in Part IV and Chapter X of this Part for the offense(s) of 
which the accused legally has been found guilty. R.C.M. 1107(d)(l) 
When mitigating forfeitures, the duration and amounts of 
forfeiture may be changed as long as the total amount forfeited is 
not increased and neither the amount nor duration of the forfeit- 
ures exceeds the jurisdiction of the court-martial. When mitigat- 
ing confinement on bread and water or diminished rations, con- 
finement, or hard labor without confinement, the convening 
authority should use the equivalencies at R.C.M. 1003(b)(6), (7), 
and (9),as appropriate. One form of punishment may be changed 
to a less severe punishment of a different nature, as long as the 
changed punishment is one which the court-martial could have 
adjudged. For example, a bad-conduct discharge adjudged by a 
special court-martial  could be changed to confinement for 6 
months (but not vice versa). A pretrial agreement may also affect 
what punishments may be changed by the convening authority. 
See also R.C.M. 810(d) concerning sentence limitations 
upon a rehearing or new or other trial. 
(2) Determining  what sentence should be ap- 
proved.  The convening authority shall approve that 
sentence which is warranted by the circumstances of 
the offense and appropriate for the accused. When 
the court-martial has adjudged a mandatory punish- 
ment, the convening authority may nevertheless ap- 
prove a lesser sentence. 
Discussion 
In determining what sentence should be approved the con- 
vening authority should consider all relevant factors including 
the possibility of rehabilitation, the deterrent effect of the sen- 
tence, and all matters relating to clemency, such as pretrial con- 
finement. See also R.C.M. 1001 through 1004. 
When an accused  is not serving confinement, the accused 
should not be deprived  of  more than two-thirds pay for any 
month as a result of one or more sentences by  court-martial and 
other stoppages or involuntary deductions, unless requested  by 
the accused. 
(3)  Limitations on sentence based  on record  of 
trial. If the record of trial does not meet the require- 
ments of  R.C.M. 1103(b)(2)(B) or (c)(l), the con- 
vening authority may not approve a sentence in ex- 
cess of that which may be adjudged by  a special 
court-martial, or one which includes a bad-conduct 
discharge. 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M.  1 103(f). 
(e)  Ordering rehearing or other trial. 
(1)  Rehearing. 
(A) In  general. Subject to subsections (e)(l)(B) 
through (e)(l)(E) of this rule, the convening author- 
ity may in the convening authority's discretion order 
a rehearing. A rehearing may be ordered as to some 
or all offenses of which findings of guilty were en- 
tered and the sentence, or as to sentence only. 
Discussion 
A rehearing may be appropriate when an error substantially 
affecting the findings or sentence is noticed  by  the convening au- 
thority. The  severity of the findings or the sentence of the original 
court-martial may not be increased at a rehearing unless the sen- 
tence prescribed for the offense is mandatory. See R.C.M.810(d). 
If the accused is placed  under restraint pending a rehearing, see 
R.C.M. 304; 305. 
(B)  When the convening authority may order a 
rehearing. The convening authority may order a re- 
hearing: 
(i)  When taking action on the court-martial 
under this rule; 
(ii)  In cases subject to review by the Court of 
Military Review, before the case is forwarded under 
R.C.M. 11  1  l(a)(l) or (b)(l), but only as to any sen- 
tence which was approved or findings of guilty 
which were not disapproved in any earlier action. In 
such a case, a supplemental action disapproving the 
sentence and some or all of the findings, as appropri- 
ate, shall be taken; or 
(iii)  When authorized  to do so by superior 
competent authority. If the convening authority finds 
a rehearing as to any offenses impracticable, the con- 
vening authority may dismiss those specifications 
and, when appropriate, charges. 
Discussion 
If a superior authority has approved some findings of guilty 
and has authorized a rehearing as to other offenses and the sen- 
tence, the convening authority may, unless otherwise directed, re- 
assess the sentence based on the approved findings of guilty and 
dismiss the remaining charges. 
(C)  Limitations. 
(i)  Sentence approved. A rehearing shall not 
be ordered if, in the same action, a sentence is ap- 
proved. 
(ii)  Lack of suficient evidence. A rehearing 
may not be ordered as to findings of guilty when 
there is a lack of sufficient evidence in the record to support the findings of guilty of the offense charged 
or of any lesser included offense. A rehearing may be 
ordered, however, if the proof of guilt consisted of 
inadmissible evidence for which there is available an 
admissible substitute. A rehearing may be ordered as 
to any lesser offense included in an offense of which 
the accused was found guilty, provided there is suffi- 
cient evidence in the record to support the lesser in- 
cluded offense. 
Discussion 
For example, if proof of absence without leave was by im- 
properly authenticated  documentary evidence admitted over the 
objection of the defense, the convening authority may disapprove 
the findings of guilty and sentence and order a rehearing if there is 
reason to believe that properly authenticated documentary evi- 
dence or other admissible evidence of guilt will be available at the 
rehearing. On the other hand, if no proof of unauthorized absence 
was introduced at trial, a rehearing may not be ordered. 
(iii) Rehearing on sentence only. A rehearing 
on sentence only shall not be referred to a different 
kind of court-martial from that which made the 
original findings. 
(D)  Additional charges. Additional charges 
may be referred for trial together with charges as to 
which a rehearing has been directed. 
(E) Lesser included offenses. If at a previous 
trial the accused was convicted of a lesser included 
offense, a rehearing may be ordered only as to that 
included offense or as to an offense included in that 
found. If, however, a rehearing is ordered improp- 
erly on the original offense charged and the accused 
is convicted of that offense at the rehearing, the find- 
ing as to the lesser included offense of which the ac- 
cused was convicted at the original trial may never- 
theless be approved. 
(2)  "Other"  trial. The convening or higher au- 
thority may order an "other"tria1 if the original pro- 
ceedings were invalid because of lack of jurisdiction 
or failure of a specification to state an offense. The 
authority ordering an6'other" trial shall state in the 
action the basis for declaring the proceedings inva- 
lid. 
(f)  Contents of action and related matters. 
(1)  In general. The convening authority shall 
state in writing and insert in the record of trial the 
convening authority's  decision as to the sentence, 
whether any findings of guilty are disapproved, and 
orders as to further disposition. The action shall be 
R.C.M. 1107(f)(4)(A) 
signed personally by the convening authority. The 
convening authority's authority to sign shall appear 
below the signature. 
Discussion 
See Appendix 16  for forms. 
(2) Modification of initial action. The convening 
authority may recall and modify any action taken by 
that convening authority at any time before it has 
been published or before the accused has been offi- 
cially notified. In addition, in any special court-mar- 
tial not involving a bad-conduct discharge or any 
summary court-martial, the convening authority 
may recall and correct an illegal, erroneous, incom- 
plete, or ambiguous action at any time before com- 
pletion of review under R.C.M. 11 12, as long as the 
correction does not result in action less favorable to 
the accused than the earlier action. When so di- 
rected by a higher reviewing authority or the Judge 
Advocate General, the convening authority shall 
modify any incomplete, ambiguous, void, or inaccu- 
rate action noted in  review  of the record of  trial 
under Article 64,66, or 67, or examination of the re- 
cord of trial under Article 69. The convening au- 
thority shall personally sign any supplementary or 
corrective action. 
(3) Findings of guilty. If any findings of guilty are 
disapproved, the action shall so state. If a rehearing 
is not ordered, the affected charges and specifica- 
tions shall be dismissed by the convening authority 
in the action. If a rehearing or other trial is directed, 
the reasons for the disapproval shall be set forth in 
the action. 
Discussion 
If a rehearing or other trial is not directed, the reasons for 
disapproval need  not be stated in the action, but they may be 
when appropriate. It may be appropriate to state them when the 
reasons may affect administrative disposition of the accused; for 
example, when the finding is disapproved because of the lack of 
mental responsibility of the accused or the running of the statute 
of limitations. 
No express action is necessary to approve findings of guilty. 
See subsection (c) of this rule. 
(4)  Action on sentence. 
(A) In general. The action shall state whether 
the sentence adjudged by  the court-martial is ap- R.C.M. 1107(f)(4)(A) 
proved. If only part of the sentence is approved, the 
action shall state which parts are approved. A re- 
hearing may not be directed if any sentence is ap- 
proved. 
Discussion 
See Appendix 16 for forms. 
See R.C.M. 1108 concerning suspension of sentences. 
See R.C.M. 11 13 concerning execution of sentences. 
(B) Execution; suspension. The action shall in- 
dicate, when appropriate, whether an approved sen- 
tence is to be executed or whether the execution of 
all or any part of the sentence is to be suspended. No 
reasons need be stated. 
(C)  Place of confinement. If the convening au- 
thority orders a sentence of confinement into execu- 
tion, the convening authority shall designate the 
place of confinement in the action, unless otherwise 
prescribed by the Secretary concerned. If a sentence 
of confinement is ordered into execution after the in- 
itial action of the convening authority, the authority 
ordering the execution shall designate the place of 
confinement unless otherwise prescribed by the Sec- 
retary concerned. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 11  13(d)(2)(C) concerning the place of confine- 
ment. 
(D) Ctistody or confinement pending appellate 
review; capital cases. When a record of trial involves 
an approved sentence to death, the convening au- 
thority shall, unless any approved sentence of con- 
finement has been ordered into execution and a place 
of confinement designated, provide in the action for 
the temporary custody or confinement of the ac- 
cused pending final disposition of the case on appel- 
late review. 
(E)  Deferment of service of sentence to confine- 
ment. Whenever the service of the sentence to con- 
finement  is deferred by  the convening authority 
under R.C.M. 1101(c) before or concurrently with 
the initial action in the case, the action shall include 
the date on which the deferment became effective. 
The reason for the deferment need not be stated in 
the action. 
(F) Credit for  illegal pretrial  confinement. 
When the military judge has directed that the ac- 
cused receive credit under R.C.M. 305(k), the con- 
vening authority shall so direct in the action. 
(G)  Reprimand. The convening authority shall 
include in the action any reprimand which the con- 
vening authority has ordered executed. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M.  1003(b)(l) concerning reprimands. 
(5) Action on rehearing or new or other trial. 
(A) Rehearing or other trial. In acting on a re- 
hearing or other trial the convening authority shall 
be subject to the sentence limitations prescribed in 
R.C.M. 810(d). Except when a rehearing or other 
trial is combined with a trial on additional offenses 
and except as otherwise provided in R.C.M. 810(d), 
if any part of the original sentence was suspended 
and the suspension was not properly vacated before 
the order directing the rehearing, the convening au- 
thority shall take the necessary suspension action to 
prevent an increase in the same type of punishment 
as was previously suspended. The convening author- 
ity may approve a sentence adjudged upon a rehear- 
ing or other trial regardless whether any kind or 
amount of the punishment adjudged at the former 
trial has been served or executed. However, in com- 
puting the term or amount of punishment to be actu- 
ally served or executed under the new sentence, the 
accused shall be credited with any kind or amount of 
the former sentence included within the new sen- 
tence that was served or executed before the time it 
was disapproved or set aside. The convening author- 
ity shall, if  any part of a sentence adjudged upon a 
rehearing or other trial is approved, direct in the ac- 
tion that any part or amount of the former sentence 
served or executed between the date it was adjudged 
and the date it was disapproved or set aside shall be 
credited to the accused. If, in the action on the re- 
cord of a rehearing, the convening authority disap- 
proves the findings of guilty of all charges and speci- 
fications which were tried at the former hearing and 
that part of the sentence which was based on these 
findings, the convening authority shall, unless a fur- 
ther rehearing is ordered, provide in the action that 
all rights, privileges, and property affected by  any 
executed portion of the sentence adjudged at the for- mer hearing shall be restored. The convening au- 
thority shall take the same restorative action if a 
court-martial at a rehearing acquits the accused of 
all charges and specifications which were tried at the 
former hearing. 
(B)  New trial. The action of the convening au- 
thority on a new trial shall, insofar as practicable, 
conform to the rules prescribed  for rehearings and 
other trials in subsection (f)(5)(A) of this rule. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 810 for procedures at other trials. 
(g) Incomplete, ambiguous, or erroneous action. 
When the action of the convening or of a higher au- 
thority is incomplete, ambiguous, or contains cleri- 
cal error, the authority who took the incomplete, 
ambiguous, or erroneous action may be instructed 
by an authority acting under Article 64, 66,67, or 69 
to withdraw the original action and substitute a cor- 
rected action. 
(h) Service on accused. A copy of the convening au- 
thority's action shall be served on the accused or on 
defense counsel. If the action is served on defense 
counsel, defense counsel shall, by  expeditious 
means, provide the accused with a copy. 
Discussion 
If the promulgating order is prepared promptly, service of it 
will satisfy subsection (h). 
Rule 1108. Suspension of execution of 
sentence; remission 
(a)  In general. Suspension of a sentence grants the 
accused a probationary period during which the sus- 
pended part of an approved sentence is not executed, 
and upon the accused's successful completion of 
which the suspended part of the sentence shall be re- 
mitted. Remission cancels the unexecuted part of a 
sentence to which it applies. 
(b)  Who  may suspend and remit. The convening au- 
thority may, after approving the sentence, suspend 
the execution of all or any part of the sentence of a 
court-martial except for a sentence of death. The 
general court-martial convening authority over the 
accused at the time of the court-martial may, when 
taking the action under R.C.M. 11 12(f), suspend or 
R.C.M. 1108(d) 
remit any part of the sentence. The Secretary con- 
cerned and, when designated by the Secretary con- 
cerned, any Under Secretary, Assistant Secretary, 
Judge Advocate General, or commanding officer 
may suspend or remit any part or amount of the un- 
executed part of any sentence other than a sentence 
approved by the President. The commander of the 
accused who has the authority to convene a court- 
martial of the kind which adjudged the sentence 
may suspend or remit any part or amount of the un- 
executed part of any sentence by summary court- 
martial or of any sentence by special court-martial 
which does not include a bad-conduct discharge re- 
gardless of whether the person acting has previously 
approved the sentence. The "unexecuted part of any 
sentence"  includes that part which has been ap- 
proved and ordered executed but which has not ac- 
tually been carried out. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 11 13 (execution of sentences); R.C.M. 1201 (ac- 
tion by  the Judge Advocate General); R.C.M. 1206 (powers and 
responsibilities of the Secretary). 
The military judge and members of courts-martial may not 
suspend sentences. 
(c)  Conditions of suspension. The authority who sus- 
pends the execution of the sentence of a court-mar- 
tial shall: 
(1)  Specify in  writing the conditions of the sus- 
pension; 
(2)  Cause a copy of the conditions of the suspen- 
sion to be served on the probationer; and 
(3)  Cause a receipt to be secured from the proba- 
tioner for service of the conditions of the suspension. 
Unless otherwise stated, an action suspending a 
sentence includes as a condition that the probationer 
not violate any punitive article of the code. 
(d) Limitations on suspension. Suspension shall be 
for a stated period or until the occurrence of an an- 
ticipated future event. The period shall not be unrea- 
sonably long. The Secretary concerned may further 
limit by regulations the period for which the execu- 
tion of a sentence may be suspended. The convening 
authority shall provide in the action that unless the 
suspension is sooner vacated, the expiration of the 
period of suspension shall remit the suspended por- 
tion of the sentence. An appropriate authority may, 
before the expiration of the period of suspension, re- R.C.M. 1108(d) 
mit any part of the sentence, including a part which 
has been suspended; reduce the period of suspen- 
sion; or, subject to R.C.M. 1109, vacate the suspen- 
sion in whole or in part. 
(e)  Termination of suspension by remission. Expira-
tion of the period provided in the action suspending 
a sentence or part of a sentence shall remit the sus- 
pended portion unless the suspension is sooner va- 
cated. Death or separation which terminates status 
as a person subject to the code shall result in remis- 
sion of the suspended portion of the sentence. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M.  1109(b)(4) concerning interruption of the period 
of suspension. 
Rule 1109.  Vacation of suspension of 
sentence 
(a) In general. Suspension of execution of the sen- 
tence of a court-martial may be vacated for violation 
of the conditions of the suspension as provided in 
this rule. 
(b)  Timeliness. 
(1)  Violation of conditions. Vacation  shall be 
based on a violation of the conditions of suspension 
which occurs within the period of suspension. 
(2)  Vacation proceedings.  Vacation proceedings 
under this rule shall be completed within a reasona- 
ble time. 
(3)  Order vacating the suspension. The order va- 
cating the suspension shall be issued before the expi- 
ration of the period of suspension. 
Discussion 
The order vacating a suspended sentence must be issued 
before the end of suspension even though, in certain cases, it may 
not be effective as an order of execution of the suspended sentence 
until thecompletion of appellate review or action by the President 
or the Secretary concerned. See R.C.M. 11  13 concerning execu- 
tion of sentences. 
(4) Interruptions to the period  of suspension. Un-
authorized absence of the probationer or the com- 
mencement of proceedings under this rule to vacate 
suspension interrupts the running of the period of 
suspension. 
(c)  Conjinement of probationer pending  vacation 
proceedings. 
(1)  In general. A probationer under a suspended 
sentence to confinement may be confined pending 
action under subsection (d)(2) of this rule in accor- 
dance with the procedures in subsection (c) of this 
rule. 
(2)  Who  may order conjinement. Any person who 
may order confinement under R.C.M. 304(b) may 
order confinement of  a probationer under a sus- 
pended sentence to confinement. 
(3)  Basis for  conjinement. A probationer under a 
suspended sentence to confinement may be ordered 
into confinement upon probable cause to believe the 
probationer violated any conditions of the suspen- 
sion. 
Discussion 
A determination that confinement is necessary to ensure the 
presence of the probationer or to prevent further misconduct is 
not required. 
If the violation of the conditions also constitutes an offense 
under the code for which trial by court-martial is considered, an 
appropriate form of pretrial restraint may be imposed as an alter- 
native to confinement under this rule. See R.C.M. 304 and 305. 
(4)  Review of conjinement. Unless proceedings 
under subsection (d)(l) or (e) of this rule are com- 
pleted within 7 days of imposition of confinement of 
the probationer (not including any delays requested 
by probationer), a preliminary hearing shall be con- 
ducted by a neutral and detached officer appointed 
in accordance with regulations of the Secretary con- 
cerned. 
(A)  Rights of accused. Before the preliminary 
hearing, the accused shall be notified in writing of: 
(i) The time, place, and purpose of the hear- 
ing, including the alleged violation(s) of the condi- 
tions of suspension; 
(ii) The right to be present at the hearing; 
(iii) The right to be represented at the hear- 
ing by civilian counsel provided by the probationer 
or, upon request, by military counsel detailed for 
this purpose; and 
(iv)  The opportunity to be heard, to present 
witnesses who are reasonably available and other ev- 
idence, and the right to confront and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses unless the hearing officer deter- 
mines that this would subject these witnesses to risk 
or harm. For purposes of this subsection, a witness is 
not reasonably available if the witness requires reim- 
11-152 bursement by the United States for cost incurred in 
appearing, cannot appear without unduly delaying 
the proceedings, or, if a military witness, cannot be 
excused from other important duties. 
(B)  Rules of evidence. Except for Mil.R.Evid. 
Section V (Privileges) and Mil.R.Evid. 302 and 305, 
the Military Rules of Evidence shall not apply to 
matters considered at the preliminary hearing under 
this rule. 
(C)  Decision. The hearing officer shall deter- 
mine whether there is probable cause to believe that 
the probationer violated the conditions of the proba- 
tioner's suspension. If the hearing officer determines 
that probable cause is lacking, the hearing officer 
shall, in writing, order the probationer released from 
confinement. If the hearing officer determines that 
there is probable cause to believe that the proba- 
tioner violated the conditions of suspension, the 
hearing officer shall set forth in a written memoran- 
dum the decision, the reasons for the decision, and 
the information relied on. The hearing officer shall 
forward the original memorandum or release order 
to the probationer's commander and forward a copy 
to the probationer and the officer in charge of the 
confinement facility. 
(d)  Vacation of suspended general court-martial sen- 
tence or of a suspended special court-martial sentence 
including a bad-conduct discharge. 
(1) Action by oficer having special court-martial 
jurisdiction over probationer. 
(A)  In general. Before vacation of the suspen- 
sion of any general court-martial sentence, or of a 
special court-martial sentence which, as approved, 
includes a bad-conduct discharge, the officer having 
special court-martial jurisdiction  over the proba- 
tioner shall personally hold a hearing on the alleged 
violation of the conditions of suspension. If there is 
no officer having special court-martial jurisdiction 
over the accused, who is subordinate to the officer 
having general court-martial jurisdiction over the 
accused, the officer exercising general court-martial 
jurisdiction over the accused shall personally hold 
the hearing under subsection (d)(l) of this rule. In 
such cases, subsection (d)(l)(D) of this rule shall not 
apply. 
(B) Notice to probationer.  Before the hearing 
the authority conducting the hearing shall cause the 
probationer to be notified in writing of: 
R.C.M. 1  lOS(d)(l)(E) 
(i)  The time, place, and purpose of the hear- 
1%; 
(ii)  The right to be present at the hearing; 
(iii)  The alleged violation(s) of the condi- 
tions of suspension and the evidence expected to be 
relied on; 
(iv)  The right to be represented at the hear- 
ing by civilian counsel provided by the probationer 
or, upon request, by military counsel detailed for 
this purpose; and 
(v)  The opportunity to be heard, to present 
witnesses and other evidence, and the right to con- 
front and cross-examine adverse witnesses unless the 
hearing officer determines that there is good cause 
for not allowing confrontation and cross-examina- 
tion. 
Discussion 
The notice should be provided  sufficiently in advance of the 
hearing to permit adequate preparation. 
(C)  Hearing. The procedure for the vacation 
hearing shall follow that prescribed  in R.C.M. 
405(g), (h)(l), and (9. 
(D)  Record; recommendation. The officer who 
conducts the vacation proceeding shall make a sum- 
marized record of the proceeding and forward the 
record and that officer's written recommendation 
concerning vacation to the officer exercising general 
court-martial jurisdiction  over the probationer.  , 
(E) Release from  con$nement.  If the special 
court-martial convening authority finds there is not 
probable cause to believe that the probationer vio- 
lated the conditions of the suspension, the special 
court-martial convening authority shall order the re- 
lease of the probationer from any confinement or- 
dered under subsection (c) of this rule. The special 
court-martial convening authority shall, in any 
event, forward the record and recommendation 
under subsection (d)(l)(D) of this rule. 
Discussion 
See Appendix  18 for a sample of a Report of Proceedings to 
Vacate Suspension of a General Court-Martial Sentence or of a 
Special Court-Martial Sentence Including a Bad-Conduct Dis- 
charge under Article 72, UCMJ, and R.C.M. 1109 (DD Form 
455). R.C.M.  1109(d)(2) 
(2) Action by oficer exercising general court-mar- 
tial jurisdiction over probationer. 
(A) In general. The officer exercising general 
court-martial jurisdiction over the probationer shall, 
based upon the record produced by and the recom- 
mendation of the officer exercising special court- 
martial jurisdiction over the probationer, decide 
whether the probationer violated a condition of sus- 
pension, and, if so, whether to vacate the suspended 
sentence. If the officer exercising general court-mar- 
tial jurisdiction decides to vacate, that officer shall 
prepare a written statement of the evidence relied on 
and the reasons for vacating. 
(B)  Execution. Any unexecuted part of a sus- 
pended sentence ordered vacated under this rule 
shall, subject to R.C.M. 11 13(c), be ordered exe- 
cuted. 
(e)  Vacation of a suspended special court-martial 
sentence not including a bad-conduct discharge or of 
a suspended summary court-martial sentence. 
(1)  In general. Before vacation of the suspension 
of a special court-martial sentence not including a 
bad-conduct discharge or of a summary court-mar- 
tial sentence, the officer having authority to convene 
for the command in which the probationer is serving 
or assigned the same kind of court-martial which 
imposed the sentence shall cause a hearing to be held 
on the alleged violation(s) of the conditions of sus- 
pension. 
(2)  Notice  to probationer. The person conducting 
the hearing shall notify the probationer before the 
hearing  of  the rights specified in subsections 
(d)(l)(B)(i), (ii), (iii), and (v) of this rule. The au- 
thority conducting the hearing shall also notify the 
probationer that the probationer has the right to ci- 
vilian counsel provided by the probationer or, upon 
request, counsel detailed for that purpose, if the pro- 
bationer was entitled to such counsel under R.C.M. 
506(a) at the court-martial which imposed the sen- 
tence. 
(3)  Hearing. The procedure for the vacation hear- 
ing shall follow that prescribed in R.C.M. 405(g), 
(h)(l), and (i). 
(4)  Record; recommendation. If the hearing is not 
held by the commander with authority to vacate the 
suspension, the person who conducts the vacation 
proceeding shall make a summarized record of the 
proceeding and forward the record and that officer's 
written recommendation concerning vacation to the 
commander with authority to vacate the suspension. 
(5)  Decision. If the appropriate authority decides 
that the probationer violated a condition of suspen- 
sion, and to vacate, that person shall prepare a re- 
cord of the hearing and a written statement indicat- 
ing the decision, the reasons for the decision, and the 
evidence relied on. 
Rule 1110.  Waiver or withdrawal of appellate 
review 
(a)  In general. After any general court-martial, ex- 
cept one in which the approved sentence includes 
death, and after any special court-martial in which 
the approved sentence includes a bad-conduct dis- 
charge, the accused may waive or withdraw appel- 
late review. 
Discussion 
Appellate review is not available for special courts-martial in 
which a bad-conduct discharge was not adjudged or approved or 
for summary courts-martial. Cases not subject to appellate re- 
view, or in which appellate review is waived or withdrawn, are re- 
viewed by  a judge advocate under R.C.M. 11 12. Such cases may 
also be submitted to the Judge Advocate General for review. See 
R.C.M. 1201(b)(3). Appellate review is mandatory when the ap- 
proved sentence includes death. 
(b)  Right to counsel. 
(1)  In general. The accused shall have the right to 
consult with counsel qualified  under  R.C.M. 
502(d)(l) before submitting a waiver or withdrawal 
of appellate review. 
(2)  Waiver. 
(A)  Counsel who represented the accused at the 
court-martial. The accused shall have the right to 
consult with any civilian, individual military, or de- 
tailed counsel who represented  the accused at the 
court-martial concerning whether to waive appellate 
review unless such counsel has been excused under 
R.C.M. 505(d)(2)(B). 
(B)  Associate  counsel. If counsel who repre- 
sented the accused at the court-martial has not been 
excused but is not immediately available to consult 
with the accused, because of physical separation or 
other reasons, associate defense counsel shall be de- 
tailed to the accused upon request by  the accused. 
Such counsel shall communicate with counsel who 
represented the accused at the court-martial, and shall advise the accused concerning whether to 
waive appellate review. 
(C) Substitute counsel. If counsel who repre- 
sented the accused at the court-martial has been ex- 
cused under R.C.M. 505(d)(2)(B), substitute defense 
counsel shall be detailed to advise the accused con- 
cerning waiver of appellate rights. 
(3)  Withdrawal. 
(A) Appellate defense counsel. If the accused is 
represented by appellate defense counsel, the ac- 
cused shall have the right to consult with such coun- 
sel concerning whether to withdraw the appeal. 
(B) Associate  defense counsel. If the accused is 
represented by appellate defense counsel, and such 
counsel is not immediately available to consult with 
the accused, because of physical separation or other 
reasons, associate defense counsel shall be detailed 
to the accused, upon request by the accused. Such 
counsel shall communicate with appellate defense 
counsel and shall advise the accused whether to 
withdraw the appeal. 
(C) No counsel. If appellate defense counsel 
has not been assigned to the accused, defense coun- 
sel shall be detailed for the accused. Such counsel 
shall advise the accused concerning whether to with- 
draw the appeal. If practicable, counsel who repre- 
sented the accused at the court-martial shall be de- 
tailed. 
(4)  Civilian counsel. Whether or not the accused 
was represented by civilian counsel at the court- 
martial, the accused may consult with civilian coun- 
sel, at no expense to the United States, concerning 
whether to waive or withdraw appellate review. 
(5) Record of  trial. Any defense counsel with 
whom the accused consults under this rule shall be 
given reasonable opportunity to examine the record 
of trial. 
Discussion 
Ordinarily counsel may use the accused's copy of the record. 
If this is not possible, as when the accused and counsel are physi- 
cally separated, another copy should be made available to coun- 
sel. 
(6) Consult. The right to consult with counsel, as 
used in this rule, does not require communication in 
the presence of one another. 
(c)  Compulsion, coercion, inducement prohibited. 
No person may compel, coerce, or induce an ac- 
R.C.M.  11  1  O(g)(l) 
cused by force, promises of clemency, or otherwise 
to waive or withdraw appellate review. 
(d) Form of waiver or withdrawal. A waiver or with- 
drawal of appellate review shall: 
(1)  Be written; 
(2)  State that the accused and defense counsel 
have discussed the accused's right to appellate re- 
view and the effect of waiver or withdrawal of appel- 
late review and that the accused understands these 
matters; 
(3)  State that the waiver or withdrawal is submit- 
ted voluntarily; and 
(4)  Be signed by the accused and by defense coun- 
sel. 
Discussion 
See Appendix 19 (DD Form 2330) or Appendix 20 (DD 
Form 2331) for samples of forms. 
(e)  To  whom submitted. 
(1)  Waiver. A waiver of appellate review shall be 
filed with the convening authority. The waiver shall 
be attached to the record of trial. 
(2)  Withdrawal. A withdrawal of appellate re- 
view may be filed with the authority exercising gen- 
eral court-martial  jurisdiction over the accused, who 
shall promptly forward it to the Judge Advocate 
General, or directly with the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral. 
(f)  Time limit. 
(1) Waiver.The accused may sign a waiver of ap- 
pellate review at any time after the sentence is an- 
nounced..The waiver must be filed within 10 days af- 
ter the accused or defense counsel is served with a 
copy of the action under R.C.M. 1107(h). Upon 
written application of the accused, the convening 
authority may extend this period for good cause, for 
not more than 30 days. 
(2)  Withdrawal. The accused may file withdrawal 
from appellate review at any time before such review 
is completed. 
(g)  Effect of waiver or withdrawal; substantial com- 
pliance required. 
(1)  In general. A waiver or withdrawal of appel- 
late review under this rule shall bar review by  the 
Judge Advocate General under R.C.M. 1201(b)(l) 
and by  the Court of Military Review. Once submit- 
ted, a waiver or withdrawal in compliance with this 
rule may not be revoked. R.C.M.  11  10(9)(2) 
(2)  Waiver. If the accused files a timely waiver of 
appellate review in accordance with this rule, the re- 
cord shall be forwarded for review by a judge advo- 
cate under R.C.M. 11 12. 
(3)  Withdrawal.Action on a withdrawal of appel- 
late review shall be carried out in accordance with 
procedures established by  the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral, or if the case is pending before a Court of Mili- 
tary Review, in accordance with the rules of such 
court. If the appeal is withdrawn, the Judge Advo- 
cate General shall forward the record to an appro- 
priate authority for compliance with R.C.M. 1  112. 
(4)  Substantial compliance required. A purported 
waiver or withdrawal of an appeal which does not 
substantially comply with this rule shall have no ef- 
fect. 
Rule 11  1  1.  Disposition of the record of trial 
after action 
(a)  General courts-martial. 
(1)  Cases forwarded  to the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral. A record of trial by general court-martial and 
the convening authority's  action shall be sent di- 
rectly to the Judge Advocate General concerned if 
the approved sentence includes death or if the ac- 
cused has not waived review under R.C.M. 11  10. 
Unless otherwise prescribed by  regulations of the 
Secretary concerned, 10 copies of the order promul- 
gating the result of  trial as to each accused shall be 
forwarded with the original record of trial. Two ad- 
ditional copies of the record of trial shall accompany 
the original record if the approved sentence includes 
death or if it includes dismissal of an officer, cadet, 
or midshipman, dishonorable or bad-conduct dis- 
charge, or confinement for one year or more and the 
accused has not waived appellate review. 
(2)  Cases forwarded  to a judge advocate. A record 
of trial by  general court-martial and the convening 
authority's action shall be sent directly to a judge ad- 
vocate for review under R.C.M. 11 12 if the sentence 
does not include death and if the accused has waived 
appellate review under R.C.M. 1  110. Unless other- 
wise prescribed by the Secretary concerned, 4 copies 
of the order promulgating the result of trial shall be 
forwarded with the original record of trial. 
(b)  Special courts-martial. 
(1)  Cases including an approved  bad-conduct dis- 
charge. If  the approved sentence of a special court- 
martial includes a bad-conduct discharge, the record 
shall be disposed of as provided in subsection (a) of 
this rule for records of trial by general court-martial. 
(2)  Other cases. The record of  trial by a special 
court-martial in which the approved sentence does 
not include a bad-conduct discharge shall be  for- 
warded directly to a judge advocate for review under 
R.C.M. 11 12. Four copies of the order promulgating 
the result of trial shall be forwarded with the record 
of trial, unless otherwise prescribed by regulations of 
the Secretary concerned. 
(c)  Summary courts-martial. The convening au- 
thority shall dispose of a record of trial by summary 
court-martial as provided by R.C.M. 1306. 
Discussion 
See DD  Form 494 (Court-Martial Data Sheet). 
Rule 1112.  Review by a judge advocate 
(a)  In general. Except as provided in subsection (b) 
of this rule, under regulations of  the Secretary con- 
cerned, a judge advocate shall review: 
(1)  Each general court-martial in which the ac- 
cused has waived  or withdrawn appellate review 
under R.C.M. 11 10. 
(2) Each special court-martial in  which the ac- 
cused has waived or withdrawn appellate review 
under R.C.M. 11 10 or in which the approved sen- 
tence does not include a bad-conduct discharge; and 
(3) Each summary court-martial. 
(b)  Exception. If the accused was found not guilty 
or not guilty only by reason of lack ofmental respon- 
sibility of all offenses or if the convening authority 
disapproved all findings of guilty, no review under 
this rule is required. 
(c)  Disqualification. No person may review a case 
under this rule if  that person has acted in  the same 
case as an accuser, investigating officer, member of 
the court-martial, military judge, or counsel, or has 
otherwise acted on behalf of  the prosecution or de- 
fense. 
(d)  Form and content of  review. The judge advo- 
cate's review shall be in writing and shall contain the 
following: 
(1)  Conclusions as to whether- 
(A) The court-martial had jurisdiction  over 
the accused and each offense as to which there is a 
finding of guilty which has not been disapproved; R.C.M. 11  12(g)(3) 
(B)  Each specification as to which there is a 
finding of guilty which has not been disapproved 
stated an offense; and 
(C) The sentence was legal; 
(2)  A response to each allegation of error made in 
writing by the accused. Such allegations may be filed 
under R.C.M. 1105, 1106(f), or directly with the 
judge advocate who reviews the case; and 
(3)  If the case is sent for action to the officer exer- 
cising general court-martial jurisdiction  under sub- 
section (e) of this rule, a recommendation as to the 
appropriate action to be taken and an opinion as to 
whether corrective action is required as a matter of 
law. 
Copies of the judge advocate's review under 
this rule shall be attached to the original and all cop- 
ies of the record of trial. A copy of the review shall 
be forwarded to the accused. 
(e)  Forwarding to oficer exercising general court- 
martial jurisdiction. In cases reviewed under subsec- 
tion (a) of this rule, the record of trial shall be sent 
for action to the officer exercising general court- 
martial convening authority over the accused at the 
time the court-martial was held (or to that officer's 
successor) when: 
(1) The judge  advocate who reviewed  the case 
recommends corrective action; 
(2)  The sentence approved by the convening au- 
thority includes dismissal, a dishonorable or bad- 
conduct discharge, or confinement for more than 6 
months; or 
(3)  Such action is otherwise required by regula- 
tions of the Secretary concerned. 
(f) Action by oficer exercising general court-martial 
jurisdiction. 
(1)  Action. The officer exercising general court- 
martial jurisdiction who receives a record under sub- 
section (e) of this rule may- 
(A)  Disapprove or approve the findings or sen- 
tence in whole or in part; 
(B)  Remit, commute, or suspend the sentence 
in whole or in part; 
(C) Except where the evidence was insufficient 
at the trial to support the findings, order a rehearing 
on the findings, on the sentence, or on both; or 
(D) Dismiss the charges. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 11 13 concerning when the officer exercising gen- 
eral court-martial jurisdiction may order parts of the sentence ex- 
ecuted. See R.C.M. 11 14 concerning orders promulgating the ac- 
tion of the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction. 
See also Appendix  16 (Forms for actions) and Appendix  17 
(Forms for court-martial orders). 
(2)  Rehearing. If the officer exercising general 
court-martial jurisdiction orders a rehearing, but the 
convening authority finds a rehearing impracticable, 
the convening authority shall dismiss the charges. 
(3)  Notijication. After the officer exercising gen- 
eral court-martial jurisdiction  has taken action, the 
accused shall be notified of the action and the ac- 
cused shall be provided with a copy of the judge ad- 
vocate's review. 
(g)  Forwarding following review under this rule. 
(1)  Records forwarded to the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral. If the judge advocate who reviews the case 
under this rule states that corrective action is re- 
quired as a matter of law, and the officer exercising 
general court-martial jurisdiction  does not take ac- 
tion that is at least as favorable to the accused as that 
recommended by the judge advocate, the record of 
trial and the action thereon shall be forwarded to the 
Judge Advocate General concerned for review 
under R.C.M. 1201@)(2). 
(2)  Sentence including dismissal. If the approved 
sentence includes dismissal, the record shall be for- 
warded to the Secretary concerned. 
Discussion 
A dismissal may not be ordered executed until approved by 
the Secretary or the Secretary's designee. See R.C.M. 1206. 
(3)  Other records. Records reviewed under this 
rule which are not forwarded under subsection 
(g)(l) of this rule shall be disposed of as prescribed 
by the Secretary concerned. 
Discussion 
A dismissal may not be ordered executed until approved by 
the Secretary or the Secretary's designee under R.C.M. 1206. R.C.M.  11  13 
Rule 1113.  Execution of sentences 
(a) In general. No sentence of a court-martial may 
be executed unless it has been approved by the con- 
vening authority. 
Discussion 
An order executing the sentence directs that the sentence be 
carried out. Except as provided in subsections (d)(2), (3), and (5) 
of this rule, no part of a sentence may be carried out until it is or- 
dered executed. 
(b)  Punishments which the convening authority may 
order executed in the initial action. Except as pro- 
vided in subsection (c) of this rule, the convening au- 
thority may order all or part of the sentence of a 
court-martial executed when the convening author- 
ity takes initial action under R.C.M. 1107. 
(c)  Punishments which the convening authority may 
not order executed in the initial action. 
(1)  Dishonorable or a bad-conduct discharge. Ex-
cept as may otherwise be prescribed by the Secretary 
concerned, a dishonorable or a bad-conduct dis- 
charge may be ordered executed only by: 
(A) The officer who reviews the case under 
R.C.M. 11 12(f), as part of the action approving the 
sentence, except when that action must be for- 
warded under R.C.M. 11 12(g)(l); or 
(B)  The officer then exercising general court- 
martial jurisdiction over the accused. 
A dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge may be or- 
dered executed only after a final judgment within the 
meaning of R.C.M. 1209 has been rendered in the 
case. If  on  the date of final judgement  a  ser- 
vicemember is not on appellate leave and more than 
6 months have elapsed since approval of the sen- 
tence by the convening authority, before a dishonor- 
able or a bad-conduct discharge may be executed, 
the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdic- 
tion over the servicemember shall consider the ad- 
vice  of that officer's  staff judge advocate as to 
whether retention of the servicemember would be in 
the best interest of the service. Such advice shall in- 
clude the findings and sentence as finally approved, 
the nature and character of duty since approval of 
the sentence by the convening authority, and a rec- 
ommendation whether the discharge should be exe- 
cuted. 
(2)  Dismissal of a commissioned officer,  cadet, or 
midshipman. Dismissal of a commissioned officer, 
cadet, or midshipman may be approved and ordered 
executed only by the Secretary concerned or such 
Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary as the Secre- 
tary concerned may designate. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 1206(a) concerning approval by the Secretary 
(3)  Sentences extending to death. A punishment 
of death may be ordered executed only by the Presi- 
dent. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M.  1207 concerning approval by the President 
(d)  Other considerations concerning the execution of 
certain sentences. 
(1)  Death. 
(A) Manner carried  out. A sentence to death 
which has been finally ordered executed shall be car- 
ried out in the manner prescribed by the Secretary 
concerned. 
(B) Action when accused lacks mental capacity. 
An accused lacking the mental capacity to under- 
stand the punishment to be suffered or the reason for 
imposition of the death sentence may not be put to 
death during any period when such incapacity ex- 
ists. The accused is presumed to have such mental 
capacity. If a substantial question is raised as to 
whether the accused lacks capacity, the convening 
authority then exercising general court-martial ju- 
risdiction over the accused shall order a hearing on 
the question. A military judge, counsel for the gov- 
ernment, and counsel for the accused shall be de- 
tailed. The convening authority shall direct an ex- 
amination of the accused in accordance with R.C.M. 
706, but the examination may be limited to deter- 
mining whether the accused understands the pun- 
ishment to be suffered and the reason therefore. The 
military judge shall consider all evidence presented, 
including evidence provided by the accused. The ac- 
cused has the burden of proving such lack of capac- 
ity by a preponderance of the evidence. The military 
judge shall make findings of fact, which will then be 
forwarded to the convening authority ordering the 
hearing. If the accused is found to lack capacity, the 
convening authority shall stay the execution until 
the accused regains appropriate capacity. Discussion 
A verbatim transcript of the hearing should accompany the 
findings of fact. 
(2) Conjnement. 
(A) Effective date of conjnement. Any period 
of confinement included in the sentence of a court- 
martial begins to run from the date the sentence is 
adjudged by the court-martial, but the following 
shall be excluded in computing the service of the 
term of confinement: 
(i)  Periods during which the sentence to con- 
finement is suspended or deferred; 
(ii)  Periods during which the accused is in 
custody of civilian authorities under Article 14 from 
the time of the delivery to the return to military cus- 
tody, if the accused was convicted in the civilian 
court; 
(iii)  Periods during which the accused has 
escaped or is absent without authority, or is absent 
under a parole which proper authority has later re- 
voked, or is erroneously released from confinement 
through misrepresentation  or fraud on the part of 
the prisoner, or is erroneously released from confine- 
ment upon the prisoner's  petition  for a writ of 
habeas corpus under a court order which is later re- 
versed; and 
(iv) Periods during which another sentence 
by court-martial to confinement is being served. 
When a prisoner serving a court-martial sentence to 
confinement is later convicted by a court-martial of 
another offense and sentenced to confinement, the 
later sentence interrupts the running of the earlier 
sentence. Any unremitted remaining portion of the 
earlier sentence will be served after the later sen- 
tence is fully executed. 
(B)  Nature of the conjnement. The omission of 
"hard  labor"  from any sentence of a court-martial 
which has adjudged confinement shall not prohibit 
the authority who orders the sentence executed from 
requiring hard labor as part of the punishment. 
(C) Place of conjnement. The authority who 
orders a sentence to confinement into execution shall 
designate the place of confinement under regulations 
prescribed by the Secretary concerned, unless other- 
wise prescribed by the Secretary concerned. Under 
such regulations as the Secretary concerned may 
prescribe, a sentence to confinement adjudged by a 
court-martial or other military tribunal, regardless 
R.C.M. 11  13(d)(5) 
whether the sentence includes a punitive discharge 
or dismissal and regardless whether the punitive dis- 
charge or dismissal has been executed, may be or- 
dered to be served in any place of confinement under 
the control of any of the armed forces or in any penal 
or correctional institution under the control of the 
United States or which the United States may be al- 
lowed to use. Persons so confined in a penal or cor- 
rectional institution not under the control of one of 
the armed forces are subject to the same discipline 
and treatment as persons confined or committed by 
the courts of the United States or of the State, Terri- 
tory, District of Columbia, or place in which the in- 
stitution is situated. When the service of a sentence 
to confinement has been deferred and the deferment 
is later rescinded, the convening authority shall des- 
ignate the place of confinement in the initial action 
on the sentence or in the order rescinding the defer- 
ment. No member of the armed forces may be placed 
in confinement in immediate association with enemy 
prisoners or other foreign nationals not members of 
the armed forces. The Secretary concerned may pre- 
scribe regulations governing the place and condi- 
tions of confinement. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 1101(c) concerning deferment of a sentence to 
confinement. 
(3) Conjnement in lieu ofjne. Confinement may 
not be executed for failure to pay a fine if the accused 
demonstrates that the accused has made good faith 
efforts to pay but cannot because of indigency, un- 
less the authority considering imposition of confioe- 
ment determines, after giving the accused notice and 
opportunity to be heard, that there is no other pun- 
ishment adequate to meet the Government's interest 
in appropriate punishment. 
(4)  Restriction; hard  labor without conjnement. 
When restriction and hard labor without confine- 
ment are included in  the same sentence, they shall, 
unless one is suspended, be executed concurrently. 
(5)  Conjnement on bread  and water or dimin- 
ished  rations. A sentence to confinement on bread 
and water or diminished rations may be executed 
only if  a medical officer examines the accused and 
the place of confinement and certifies in writing that 
service of such a sentence will not, in that officer's 
opinion, produce serious injury to the health of the R.C.M. 11  13(d)(5) 
accused. A sentence of confinement on bread and 
water or diminished rations may be executed in a 
place where the accused can communicate only with 
authorized personnel. 
(6) More than one sentence. If at the time forfeit- 
ures may be ordered executed, the accused is already 
serving a sentence to forfeitures by another court- 
martial, the authority taking action may order that 
the later forfeitures will be executed when the earlier 
sentence to forfeitures is completed. 
Rule 1114.  Promulgating  orders 
(a)  In general. 
(1)  Scope of rule. Unless otherwise prescribed by 
the Secretary concerned, orders promulgating the 
result of  trial and the actions of the convening or 
higher authorities on the record shall be prepared, 
issued, and distributed as prescribed in this rule. 
(2)  Purpose. A promulgating order publishes the 
result of the court-martial and the convening au- 
thority's action and any later action taken on the 
case. 
(3)  Summary courts-martial. An order promul- 
gating the result of a trial by summary court-martial 
need not be issued. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M.  1306(b)(2)concerning summary courts-martial. 
(b)  By whom issued. 
(1)  Initial orders. The order promulgating the re- 
sult of trial and the initial action of the convening 
authority shall be issued by the convening authority. 
(2)  Orders issued after the initial action. Any ac- 
tion taken on the case subsequent to the initial action 
shall be promulgated in  supplementary orders. The 
subsequent action and the supplementary order may 
be the same document if signed personally by the ap- 
propriate convening or higher authority. 
(A) When the President  or  the Secretary con- 
cerned has taken  final  action. General court-martial 
orders publishing the final result in cases in which 
the President or the Secretary concerned has taken 
final action shall be promulgated as prescribed by 
regulations of the Secretary concerned. 
(B)  Other cases. In cases other than those in 
subsection (b)(2)(A) of this rule, the final action may 
be promulgated by an appropriate convening au- 
thority. 
(c)  Contents. 
(1)  In general. The order promulgating the initial 
action shall set forth: the type of court-martial and 
the command by which it was convened; the charges 
and specifications, or a summary thereof, on which 
the accused was arraigned; the accused's pleas; the 
findings or other disposition of each charge and 
specification; the sentence, if any; and the action of 
the convening authority, or a summary thereof. Sup- 
plementary orders shall recite, verbatim, the action 
or order of the appropriate authority, or a summary 
thereof. 
(2)  Dates.  A promulgating order shall bear the 
date of the initial action, if any, of the convening au- 
thority. An order promulgating an acquittal, a 
court-martial terminated before findings, a court- 
martial resulting in a finding of not guilty only by 
reason of lack of mental responsibility of all charges 
and specifications, or action on the findings or sen- 
tence taken after the initial action of the convening 
authority shall bear the date of its publication. A 
promulgating order shall state the date the sentence 
was adjudged, the date on which the acquittal was 
announced, or the date on which the proceedings 
were otherwise terminated. 
Discussion 
See Appendix 17  for sample forms for promulgating orders. 
(3)  Order promulgated  regardless of the result of 
trial or nature of the action. An order promulgating 
the result of trial by general or special court-martial 
shall be issued regardless of the result and regardless 
of the action of the convening or higher authorities. 
(d)  Orders containing classified information. When 
an order contains information which must be classi- 
fied, only the order retained in the unit files and 
those copies which accompany the record of trial 
shall be complete and contain the classified informa- 
tion. The order shall be assigned the appropriate se- 
curity classification. Asterisks shall be substituted 
for the classified information in the other copies of 
the order. 
(e) Authentication. The promulgating order shall be 
authenticated by the signature of the convening or 
other competent authority acting on the case, or a R.C.M. 1114(f) 
person acting under the direction of such authority.  (f) Distribution. Promulgating orders shall be dis- 
A promulgating order prepared in compliance with  tributed as provided in regulations of the Secretary 
this rule shall be presumed authentic.  concerned. CHAPTER XII.  APPEALS AND REVIEW 

Rule 1201. Action by the Judge Advocate 

General 

(a)  Cases required  to be referred to a Court of Mili- 
tary Review. The Judge Advocate General shall refer 
to a Court of Military Review the record  in  each 
trial by court-martial: 
(1)  In which the sentence, as approved, extends 
to death; or 
(2)  In which- 
(A)  The sentence, as approved, extends to dis- 
missal of a commissioned officer, cadet, or midship- 
man, dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or 
confinement for 1 year or longer; and 
(B)  The accused has not waived or withdrawn 
appellate review. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 11  10 concerning waiver or withdrawal of appel- 
late review. 
See also subsection (b)(l) of this rule concerning cases re- 
viewed by  the Judge Advocate General which may be referred  to 
a Court of Military Review. 
See R.C.M. 1203 concerning review by the Court of Military 
Review and the powers and responsibilities of the Judge Advocate 
General after such review. See R.C.M. 1202 concerning appellate 
counsel 
(b)  Cases reviewed by the Judge Advocate General. 
(1)  Mandatory examination of certain general 
courts-martial. Except when the accused has waived 
the right to appellate review or withdrawn such re- 
view, the record of trial by a general court-martial in 
which there has been a finding of guilty and a sen- 
tence, the appellate review of which is not provided 
for in subsection (a) of this rule, shall be examined in 
the office of the Judge Advocate General. If any part 
of the findings or sentence is appropriate, the Judge 
Advocate General may modify or set aside the find- 
ings or sentence or both. If the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral so directs, the record shall be reviewed  by  a 
Court of  Military  Review in  accordance with 
R.C.M. 1203. If the case is forwarded to a Court of 
Military Review, the accused shall be informed and 
shall have the rights under R.C.M. 1202(b)(2). 
Discussion 
When a case is forwarded to a Court of Military  Review 
under this subsection, it is not subject to further review by  the 
Court of Military Appeals, except when forwarded by  the Judge 
Advocate General under R.C.M. 1203(c)(l). 
(2)  Mandatory review of cases forwarded  under 
R.  C.M. 11 12(g)(l). The Judge Advocate General 
shall review each case forwarded under R.C.M. 
11  12(g)(l). On such review, the Judge Advocate 
General may vacate or modify, in whole or part, the 
findings or sentence, or both, of a court-martial on 
the ground of newly discovered evidence, fraud on 
the court-martial, lack of jurisdiction  over the ac- 
cused or the offense, error prejudicial to the substan- 
tial rights of the accused, or the appropriateness of 
the sentence. 
(3)  Review by the Judge Advocate General afterfi- 
nal review. 
(A)  In  general. Notwithstanding R.C.M. 1209, 
the Judge Advocate General may, sua sponte or 
upon application of the accused or a person with au- 
thority to act for the accused, vacate or modify, in 
whole or in part, the findings, sentence, or both of a 
court-martial which has been finally reviewed, but 
has not been reviewed either by a Court of Military 
Review or by  the Judge Advocate General under 
subsection (b)(l) of this rule, on the ground of newly 
discovered  evidence, fraud on the court-martial, 
lack of jurisdiction  over the accused or the offense, 
error prejudicial to the substantial rights of the ac- 
cused, or the appropriateness of the sentence. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 1210 concerning petition for new trial. Review of 
a case by  a Judge Advocate General under this subsection is not 
part of appellate review within  the meaning of Article 76 or 
R.C.M. 1209. 
*Review  of a finding of not guilty only by  reason of lack of 
mental responsibility under this rule may not extend to the deter- 
mination of lack of mental responsibility. Thus, modification of a 
finding of not guilty only by  reason of lack of mental responsibil- 
ity under this rule is limited to changing the finding to not guilty 
or not guilty only by  reason of lack of mental responsibility of a 
lesser included offense. 
(B)  Procedure.  Each Judge Advocate General 
shall provide procedures for considering all cases 
properly submitted under subsection (b)(3) of this 
rule and may prescribe the manner by  which an ap- 
plication for relief under subsection (b)(3) of this 
rule may be  made and, if  submitted by  a person other than the accused, may require that the appli- 
cant show authority to act on behalf of the accused. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 11  14 concerning orders promulgating action 
under this rule. 
(C)  Time limits on applications. Any applica- 
tion  for review by  the Judge Advocate General 
under Article 69 must be made on or before the last 
day of the two year period beginning on the date the 
sentence is approved by the convening authority or 
the date the findings are announced for cases which 
do not proceed to sentencing, unless the accused es- 
tablishes good cause for failure to file within that 
time. 
(4)  Rehearing. If the Judge Advocate General 
sets aside the findings or sentence, the Judge Advo- 
cate General may, except when the setting aside is 
based on lack of sufficient  evidence in the record'to 
support the findings, order a rehearing. If the Judge 
Advocate General sets aside the findings and sen- 
tence and does not order a rehearing, the Judge Ad- 
vocate General shall order that the charges be dis- 
missed. If the Judge Advocate General orders a 
rehearing but the convening authority finds a re- 
hearing impractical, the convening authority shall 
dismiss the charges. 
(c)  Remission and suspension. The Judge Advocate 
General may, when so authorized by the Secretary 
concerned under Article 74, at any time remit or 
suspend the unexecuted part of any sentence, other 
than a sentence approved by the President. 
Rule 1202. Appellate counsel 
(a)  In general. The Judge Advocate General con- 
cerned shall detail one or more commissioned of- 
ficers as appellate Government counsel and one or 
more commissioned officers as appellate defense 
counsel who are qualified under Article 27(b)(l). 
(b)  Duties. 
(1) Appellate  Government counsel. Appellate 
Government counsel shall represent the United 
States before the Court of Military Review or the 
United States Court of Military Appeals when di- 
rected to do so by  the Judge Advocate General con- 
cerned. Appellate Government counsel may re- 
present the United States before the United States 
R.C.M.  1202(b)(2)(C) 
Supreme Court when requested to do so by the At- 
torney General. 
(2)  Appellate  defense counsel. Appellate defense 
counsel shall represent the accused before the Court 
of Military Review, the Court of Military Appeals, 
or the Supreme Court when the accused is a party in 
the case before such court and: 
(A)  The accused requests to be represented by 
appellate defense counsel; 
(B)  The United States is represented by coun- 
sel; or 
(C)  The Judge Advocate General has sent the 
case to the United States Court of Military Appeals. 
Appellate defense counsel is authorized to commu- 
nicate directly with the accused. The accused is a 
party in the case when named as a party in pleadings 
before the court or, even if not so named, when the 
military judge is named as respondent in a petition 
by the Government for extraordinary relief from a 
ruling in favor of the accused at trial. 
Discussion 
For a discussion of the duties of the trial defense counsel con- 
cerning post-trial and appellate matters, see R.C.M. 502(d)(6) 
Discussion (E). Appellate defense counsel may communicate 
with trial defense counsel concerning the case. See also 
Mil.R.Evid. 502 (privileges). 
If all or part of the findings and sentence are affirmed by  the 
Court of Military Review, appellate defense counsel should ad- 
vise the accused whether the accused should petition for further 
review in the United States Court of Military Appeals and con- 
cerning which issues should be raised. 
The accused may be represented by  civilian counsel before 
the Court of Military Review, the Court of Military Appeals, and 
the Supreme Court. Such counsel will not be provided at the ex- 
pense of the United States. Civilian counsel may represent the ac- 
cused before these courts in  addition to or instead of military 
counsel. 
If, after any decision of the Court of Military Appeals, the 
accused may apply for a writ of certiorari (see R.C.M. 1205), ap- 
pellate defense counsel should advise the accused whether to ap- 
ply for review by  the Supreme Court and which issues might be 
raised. If authorized to do so by  the accused, appellate defense 
counsel may prepare and file a petition for a writ of certiorari on 
behalf of the accused. 
The accused has no right to select appellate defense counsel. 
Under some circumstances, however, the accused may be entitled 
to request that the detailed appellate defense counsel be replaced 
by another appellate defense counsel. 
See also R.C.M. 1204(b)(l) concerning detailing counsel 
with respect to the right to petition the Court of Military Appeals 
for review. R.C.M.  1203 
Rule 1203.  Review by a Court of Military 

Review 

(a) In general. Each Judge Advocate General shall 
establish a Court of Military Review composed of 
appellate military judges. 
Discussion 
See Article 66 concerning the composition of the Courts of 
Military Review, the qualifications of appellate military judges, 
the grounds for their ineligibility, and restrictions upon the offi- 
cial relationship of the members of the court to other members. 
Uniform rules of court for the Courts of Military Review pre- 
scribed by the Judge Advocates General. 
(b) Cases reviewed by a Court of Military Review. A 
court of Military Review shall review cases referred 
to it by the Judge Advocate General under R.C.M. 
1201(a) or (b)(l). 
Discussion 
See R.C.M.  11  10 concerning withdrawal of a case pending 
before a Court of Military Review. 
See R.C.M. 908 concerning procedures for interlocutory ap- 
peals by the Government. 
In cases referred  to it under R.C.M.  1201, a Court of Mili- 
tary Review may act only with respect to the findings and sen- 
tence as approved by  proper authority. It may affirm only such 
findings of guilty or such part of a finding of guilty as includes an 
included offense, as it finds correct in law and fact and determines 
on the basis of the entire record should be approved. A Court of 
Military Review has generally the same powers as the convening 
authority to modify a sentence (see R.C.M. 1107), but it may not 
suspend all or part of a sentence. However, it may reduce the pe- 
riod of a suspension prescribed  by a convening authority. It may 
not defer service of  a sentence to confinement. (See R.C.M. 
1101(c)). It may, however, review a decision by a convening au- 
thority concerning deferral, to determine whether that decision 
was an abuse of the convening authority's discretion. 
In considering the record of a case referred  to it under 
R.C.M.  1201, a Court of Military Review may weigh  the evi- 
dence, judge the credibility of witnesses,  and determine contro- 
verted questions of fact, recognizing that the court-martial saw 
and heard the evidence. A finding or sentence of a court-martial 
may not be held incorrect on the ground of an error of law unless 
the error materially prejudices the substantial rights of the ac- 
cused. Article 59(a). 
If a Court of Military Review sets aside any findings of guilty 
or the sentence, it may, except as to findings set aside for lack of 
sufficient evidence in the record to support the findings, order an 
appropriate type of rehearing or reassess the sentence as appropri- 
ate. See R.C.M. 810 concerning rehearings. If the Court of Mili- 
tary Review sets aside all the findings and the sentence and does 
not order a rehearing, it must order the charges dismissed. See 
Articles 59(a) and 66. 
A Court of Military Review may on petition for extraordi- 
nary relief issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of its ju- 
risdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. Any 
party may petition a Court of Military Review for extraordinary 
relief. 
(c)  Action  on cases reviewed by a Court of Military 
Review. 
(1)  Forwarding by the Judge Advocate General to 
the Court of Military Appeals. The Judge Advocate 
General may forward the decision of the Court of 
Military Review to the Court of Military Appeals 
for review with respect to any matter of law. In such 
a case, the Judge Advocate General shall cause a 
copy of the decision of the Court of Military Review 
and the order forwarding the case to be served on the 
accused and on appellate defense counsel. 
(2) Action when sentence is set aside. In a case re- 
viewed by it under this rule in which the Court of 
Military Review has set aside the sentence and 
which is not forwarded to the Court of Military Ap- 
peals under subsection (c)(l) of this rule, the Judge 
Advocate General shall instruct an appropriate con- 
vening authority to take action in accordance with 
the decision of the Court of Military Review. If the 
Court of Military Review has ordered a rehearing, 
the record shall be sent to an appropriate convening 
authority. If that convening authority finds a rehear- 
ing impracticable that convening authority may dis- 
miss the charges. 
Discussion 
If charges are dismissed, see R.C.M. 1208 concerning resto- 
ration of rights, privileges, and property. See R.C.M. 1  1  14 con- 
cerning promulgating orders. 
(3) Action when sentence is afirmed in whole or 
part. 
(A)  Sentence requiring approval by the Presi- 
dent. If the Court of Military Review affirms any 
sentence which includes death, the Judge Advocate 
General shall transmit the record of trial and the de- 
cision of the Court of Military Review directly to the 
Court of Military Appeals when any period for re- 
consideration provided by the rules of the Courts of 
Military Review has expired. 
(B)  Other cases. If the Court of  Military Re- 
view affirms any sentence other than one which in- 
cludes death, the Judge Advocate General shall cause a copy of the decision of the Court of Military 
Review to be served on the accused in accordance 
with subsection (d) of this rule. 
(4)  Remission or suspension. If the Judge Advo- 
cate General believes that a sentence as affirmed by 
the Court of Military Review, other than one which 
includes death, should be remitted or suspended in 
whole or part, the Judge Advocate General may, 
before taking action under subsections (c)(l) or (3) 
of this rule, transmit the record of trial and the deci- 
sion of the Court of Military Review to the secretary 
concerned with a recommendation for action under 
Article 74 or may take such action as may be author- 
ized by the Secretary concerned under Article 74(a). 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 1201(c); 1206. 
(5) Action  when accused  lacks mental capacity. 
An appellate authority may not affirm the proceed- 
ings while the accused lacks mental capacity to un- 
derstand and to  conduct or cooperate intelligently in 
the appellate proceedings. In the absence of substan- 
tial evidence to the contrary, the accused is pre- 
sumed to have the capacity to understand and to 
conduct or cooperate intelligently in the appellate 
proceedings. If a substantial question is raised as to 
the requisite mental capacity of the accused, the ap- 
pellate authority may direct that the record be for- 
warded to an appropriate authority for an examina- 
tion of the accused in accordance with R.C.M. 706, 
but the examination may be limited to determining 
the accused's present capacity to understand and co- 
operate in the appellate proceedings. The order of 
the appellate authority will instruct the appropriate 
authority as to permissible actions that may be taken 
to dispose of the matter. If the record is thereafter 
returned to the appellate authority, the appellate au- 
thority may affirm part or all of the findings or sen- 
tence unless it is established, by a preponderance of 
the evidence-including  matters outside the record 
of trial-that  the accused does not have the requisite 
mental capacity. If the accused does not have the 
requisite mental capacity, the appellate authority 
shall stay the proceedings until the accused regains 
appropriate capacity, or take other appropriate ac- 
tion. Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit the 
appellate authority from making a determination in 
R.C.M. 1203(d)(2)(B) 
favor of the accused which will result in the setting 
aside of a conviction. 
(d) Notification to accused. 
(1)  Notification of decision. The accused shall be 
notified of the decision of the Court of Military Re- 
view in accordance with regulations of the Secretary 
concerned. 
Discussion 
The accused may be notified personally, or a copy of the de- 
cision may be sent, after service on appellate counsel of record, if 
any, by  first class certified mail to the accused at an address pro- 
vided by the accused or, if no such address has been provided by 
the accused, at the latest address listed for the accused in the ac- 
cused's official service record. 
If the Judge Advocate General has forwarded the case to the 
Court of Military Appeals, the accused should be so notified. See 
subsection (c)(l) of this rule. 
(2) Notification of  right to petition  the Court of 
Military Appeals for  review. If the accused has the 
right to petition the Court of Military Appeals for 
review, the accused shall be provided with a copy of 
the decision of the Court of Military Review bearing 
an endorsement notifying the accused of this right. 
The endorsement shall inform the accused that such 
a petition: 
(A) May be filed only within 60 days from the 
time the accused was in fact notified of the decision 
of the Court of Military Review or the mailed copy 
of the decision was postmarked, whichever is earlier; 
and 
(B)  May be forwarded through the officer im- 
mediately exercising general court-martial jurisdic- 
tion over the accused and through the appropriate 
Judge Advocate General or filed directly with the 
Court of Military Appeals. 
Discussion 
See Article 67(c). 
See also R.C.M.  1204(b). 
The accused may petition the Court of Military Appeals for 
review, as to any matter of law, of any decision of the Court of 
Military Review except: (1) a case which was referred to the 
Court of Military Review by  the Judge Advocate General under  . 
R.C.M. 1201(b)(l); (2) a case in which the Court of Military Re- 
view has set aside the sentence; and (3) a case in which the sen- 
tence includes death (because review by the Court of Military Ap- 
peals in mandatory). 
The placing of a petition for review in proper military chan- 
nels divests the Court of Military Review ofjurisdiction over the R.C.M.  1203(d)(2)(B) 
case, and jurisdiction  is thereby conferred on the Court of Mili- 
tary Appeals. See R.C.M. 11 13 concerning action to be taken if 
the accused does not file or the Court of Military Appeals denies a 
petition for review. 
(3)  Receipt by the accused-disposition.  When the 
accused has the right to petition the Court of Mili- 
tary Appeals for review, the receipt of the accused 
for the copy of the decision of the Court of Military 
Review, a certificate of service on the accused, or the 
postal receipt for delivery of certified mail shall be 
transmitted in duplicate by expeditious means to the 
appropriate Judge Advocate General. If the accused 
is personally served, the receipt or certificate of ser- 
vice shall show the date of service. The Judge Advo- 
cate General shall forward one copy of the receipt, 
certificate, or postal receipt to the clerk of the Court 
of Military Appeals when required by the court. 
(e)  Cases not reviewed by the Court of Military Ap- 
peals. If the decision of the Court of Military Review 
is not subject to review by the Court of Military Ap- 
peals, or if the Judge Advocate General has not for- 
warded the case to the Court of Military Appeals 
and the accused has not filed or the Court of Mili- 
tary Appeals has denied a petition for review, the 
Judge Advocate General shall- 
(1)  If the sentence affirmed by  the Court of Mili- 
tary Review includes a dismissal, transmit the re- 
cord, the decision of  the Court of Military Review, 
and the Judge Advocate General's recommendation 
to the Secretary concerned for action under R.C.M. 
1206; or 
(2)  If  the sentence affirmed by  the Court of Mili- 
tary Review does not include a dismissal, notify the 
convening authority, the officer exercising general 
court-martial jurisdiction over the accused, or the 
Secretary concerned, as appropriate, who, subject to 
R.C.M. 11 13(c)(l), may order into execution any 
unexecuted sentence affirmed by the Court of Mili- 
tary Review or take other action, as authorized. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 11 13, 1206, and Article 74(a) concerning the au- 
thority of the Secretary and others to take action. 
(f) Scope. Except as otherwise expressly provided in 
this rule, this rule does not apply to appeals by the 
Government under R.C.M. 908. 
Rule 1204. Review by the Court of Military 
Appeals 
(a)  Cases reviewed  by the Court of Military Appeals. 
Under such rules as it may prescribe, the Court of 
Military Appeals shall review the record in all cases: 
(1)  In which the sentence, as affirmed by a Court 
of Military Review, extends to death; 
(2)  Reviewed  by  a Court of Military Review 
which the Judge Advocate General orders sent to 
the Court of Military Appeals for review; and 
(3)  Reviewed by a Court of Military Review, ex- 
cept those referred to it by the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral under R.C.M. 1201(b)(l), in which, upon peti- 
tion by  the accused and on good cause shown, the 
Court of Military Appeals has granted a review. 
Discussion 
See Article 67(a) concerning the composition of the Court of 
Military Appeals. In any case reviewed by  it, the Court of Mili- 
tary Appeals may act only with respect to the findings and sen- 
tence as approved by  the convening authority and as affirmed or 
set aside as incorrect in law by the Court of Military Review. See 
Article 67(d) and (e). The rules of practice and procedure before 
the Court of Military Appeals are published in the Military Jus- 
tice Reporter. 
The Court of Military Appeals may entertain petitions for 
extraordinary relief and may issue all writs necessary or appropri- 
ate in aid of its jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and princi- 
ples of law. Any party may petition the Court of Military Appeals 
for extraordinary relief. However, in the interest of judicial econ- 
omy, such petitions usually should be filed with and adjudicated 
before the appropriate Court of Military Review prior to submis- 
sion to the Court of Military Appeals. 
(b)  Petition by the accused for  review by the Court of 
Military Appeals. 
(1)  Counsel. When the accused is notified of the 
right to forward a petition for review by the Court of 
Military Appeals, if  requested by the accused, asso- 
ciate counsel qualified under R.C.M. 502(d)(l) shall 
be detailed to advise and assist the accused in con- 
nection with preparing a petition for further appel- 
late review. 
Discussion 
If reasonably available, the counsel who conducted the de- 
fense at trial may perform these duties. The counsel detailed to re- 
present the accused should communicate with the appellate de- 
fense counsel representing the accused. See R.C.M. 1202. (2)  Forwarding petition. The accused shall file any 
petition for review by the Court of Military Appeals 
under subsection (a)(3) of this rule directly with the 
Court of Military Appeals. 
Discussion 
See Article 67(c) and R.C.M. 1203(d)(2) concerlrlng notify- 
ing the accused of the right to petition the Court of Military Ap- 
peals for review and the time limits for submitting a petition. See 
also the rules of the Court of Military Appeals concerning when 
the time for filing a petition begins to run and when a petition is 
now timely. 
(c)  Action on decision by the Court of Military Ap- 
peals. 
(1)  In general. After it has acted on a case, the 
Court of Military Appeals may direct the Judge Ad- 
vocate General to return the record to the Court of 
Military Review for further proceedings in accor- 
dance with the decision of the court. Otherwise, un- 
less the decision is subject to review by the Supreme 
Court, or there is to be further action by the Presi- 
dent or the Secretary concerned, the Judge Advo- 
cate General shall instruct the convening authority 
to take action in accordance with that decision. If 
the Court has ordered a rehearing, but the conven- 
ing authority to whom the record is transmitted 
finds a rehearing impracticable, the convening au- 
thority may dismiss the charges. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M.  1 114 concerning final orders in the case. See also 
R.C.M. 1206 and Article 74(a). 
(2)  Sentence requiring approval of the President. If 
the Court of Military Appeals has affirmed a sen- 
tence which must be approved by  the President 
before it may be executed, the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral shall transmit the record of trial, the decision of 
the Court of Military Review, the decision of the 
Court of Military Appeals, and the recommendation 
of the Judge Advocate General to the Secretary con- 
cerned for the action of the President. 
Discussion 
See Article 71(a) and R.C.M. 1207. 
R.C.M. 1205(b) 
(3)  Sentence requiring approval  of  the Secretary 
concerned. If the Court of Military Appeals has af- 
firmed a sentence which requires approval of the 
Secretary concerned before it may be executed, the 
Judge Advocate General shall follow the procedure 
in R.C.M. 1203(e)(l). 
Discussion 
See Article 71(b) and R.C.M. 1206. 
(4) Decision  subject  to review  by the Supreme 
Court. If the decision of the Court of Military Ap- 
peals is subject to review by the Supreme Court, the 
Judge Advocate General shall take no action under 
subsections (c)(l), (2), or (3) of this rule until: (A) 
the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari 
with the Supreme Court has expired; or (B) the Su- 
preme Court has denied any petitions for writ of cer- 
tiorari filed in the case. After (A) or (B) has oc- 
curred, the Judge Advocate General shall take 
action under subsection (c)(l), (2), or (3). If the Su- 
preme Court grants a writ of certiorari, the Judge 
Advocate General shall take action under R.C.M. 
1205  (b). 
Rule 1205.  Review by the Supreme Court 
(a)  Cases subject  to review by the Supreme Court. 
Under 28 U.S.C. 5 1259 and Article 67(h), decisions 
of the Court of Military Appeals may be reviewed by 
the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari in the fol- 
lowing cases: 
(1)  Cases reviewed by  the Court of Military Ap- 
peals under Article 67(b)(l); 
(2)  Cases certified to the Court of Military Ap- 
peals by the Judge Advocate General under Article 
67(b)(2); 
(3)  Cases in which the Court of Military Appeals 
granted a petition for review under Article 67(b)(3); 
and 
(4)  Cases other than those described in subsec- 
tions (a)(l), (2), and (3) of this rule in which the 
Court of Military Appeals granted relief. 
The Supreme Court may not review by writ of cer- 
tiorari any action of the Court of Military Appeals in 
refusing to grant a petition for review. 
(b)  Action by the Supreme Court. After the Supreme 
Court has taken action, other than denial of a peti- 
tion for writ of certiorari, in any case, the Judge Ad- R.C.M.  1205(b) 
vocate General shall, unless the case is returned to 
the Court of Military Appeals for further proceed- 
ings, forward the case to the President or the Secre- 
tary concerned in  accordance with  R.C.M. 
1204(c)(2) or (3) when appropriate, or instruct the 
convening authority to take action in accordance 
with the decision. 
Rule 1206.  Powers and responsibilities of the 
Secretary 
(a) Sentences requiring approval by the Secretary. 
No part of a sentence extending to dismissal of a 
commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman may be 
executed until approved by the Secretary concerned 
or such Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary as 
may be designated by the Secretary. 
Discussion 
See Article 7 l(b). 
(b)  Remission and suspension. 
(1)  In general. The Secretary concerned and, 
when designated by  the Secretary concerned, any 
Under Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Judge Advo- 
cate General, or commander may remit or suspend 
any part or amount of the unexecuted part of any 
sentence, including all uncollected forfeitures, other 
than a sentence approved by the President. 
(2)  Substitution of discharge. The Secretary con- 
cerned may, for good cause, substitute an adminis- 
trative discharge for a discharge or dismissal exe- 
cuted in accordance with the sentence of a court- 
martial. 
(3) Sentence commuted by the President. When 
the President has commuted a death sentence to a 
lesser punishment, the Secretary concerned may re- 
mit or suspend any remaining part or amount of the 
unexecuted portion of the sentence of a person con- 
victed by a military tribunal under Secretary's juris- 
diction. 
Rule 1207.  Sentences requiring approval by 
the President 
No part of a court-martial sentence extending to 
death may be executed until approved by the Presi- 
dent. 
Discussion 
See Article 7 1(a). See also R.C.M. 1203 and 1204 concerning 
review by  the Court of Military Review and Court of Military 
Appeals in capital cases. 
Rule 1208. Restoration 
(a) New trial. All rights, privileges, and property af- 
fected by an executed portion of a court-martial sen- 
tence-except  an executed dismissal or dis-
charge-which  has not again been adjudged upon a 
new trial or which, after the new trial, has not been 
sustained upon the action of any reviewing author- 
ity, shall be restored. So much of the findings and so 
much of the sentence adjudged at the earlier trial 
shall be set aside as may be required by the findings 
and sentence at the new trial. Ordinarily, action 
taken under this subsection shall be announced in 
the court-martial order promulgating the final re- 
sults of the proceedings. 
Discussion 
See Article 75(b) and (c) concerning the action to be  taken 
on an executed dismissal or discharge which is not imposed at a 
new trial. 
(b)  Other cases. In cases other than those in subsec- 
tion (a) of this rule, all rights, privileges, and prop- 
erty affected by an executed part of a court-martial 
sentence which has been set aside or disapproved by 
any competent authority shall be restored unless a 
new trial, other trial, or rehearing is ordered and 
such executed part is included in a sentence imposed 
at the new trial, other trial, or rehearing. Ordinarily, 
any restoration shall be announced in the court-mar- 
tial order promulgating the final results of the pro- 
ceedings. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 11  14 concerning promulgating orders. 
Rule 1209. Finality of courts-martial 
(a)  When a conviction isfinal. A court-martial con- 
viction is final when: 
(1)  Review is completed by  a Court of Military 
Review and- R.C.M.  1210(e) 
(A) The accused does not file a timely petition 
for review by the Court of Military Appeals and the 
case is not otherwise under review by that court; 
(B) A petition for review is denied or otherwise 
rejected by the Court of Military Appeals; or 
(C)  Review is completed in accordance with 
the judgment of the Court of Military Appeals 
and-
(i)  A petition for a writ of certiorari is not 
filed within the time limits prescribed by  the Su- 
preme Court, 
(ii)  A petition for writ of certiorari is denied 
or otherwise rejected by the Supreme Court, or 
(iii)  Review is otherwise completed in accor- 
dance with the judgment of the Supreme Court; or 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 1201,  1203,  1204,  and 1205 concerning cases 
subject to review by a Court of Military Review, the Court of Mil- 
itary Appeals, and the Supreme Court. See also R.C.M.  l 110. 
(2)  In cases not reviewed by a Court of Military 
Review-
(A) The findings and sentence have been found 
legally sufficient by a judge advocate and, when ac- 
tion by such officer is required, have been approved 
by the officer exercising general court-martial juris- 
diction over the accused at the time the court-mar- 
tial was convened (or that officer's successor); or 
(B) The findings and sentence have been af- 
firmed by the Judge Advocate General when review 
by  the Judge Advocate General is required under 
R.C.M. 11 12(g)(l) or 1201(b)(l). 
(b)  Effect  ofjnality. The appellate review of records 
of trial provided by  the code, the proceedings, find- 
ings, and sentences of courts-martial as approved, 
reviewed, or affirmed as required by the code, and all 
dismissals and discharges carried into execution 
under sentences by  courts-martial following ap- 
proval, review, or affirmation as required by  the 
code, are final and conclusive. Orders publishing the 
proceedings of courts-martial and all action taken 
pursuant to those proceedings are binding upon all 
departments, courts, agencies, and officers of the 
United States, subject only to action upon a petition 
for a new trial under Article 73, to action by  the 
Judge Advocate General under Article 69(b), to ac- 
tion by the Secretary concerned as provided in Arti- 
cle 74, and the authority of the President. 
Rule 1210. New trial 
(a) In general. At any time within 2 years after ap- 
proval by the convening authority of a court-martial 
sentence, the accused may petition the Judge Advo- 
cate General for a new trial on the ground of newly 
discovered evidence or fraud on the court-martial. A 
petition may not be submitted after the death of the 
accused. 
(b)  Who  may  petition. A petition for a new trial may 
be submitted by the accused personally, or by ac- 
cused's counsel, regardless whether the accused has 
been separated from the service. 
(c)  Form of petition. A petition for a new trial shall 
be written and shall be signed under oath or affirma- 
tion by  the accused, by a person possessing the 
power of attorney of the accused for that purpose, or 
by a person with the authorization of an appropriate 
court to sign the petition as the representative of the 
accused. The petition shall contain the following in- 
formation, or an explanation why such matters are 
not included: 
(1)  The name, service number, and current ad- 
dress of the accused; 
(2) The date and location of the trial; 
(3)  The type of court-martial and the title or posi- 
tion of the convening authority; 
(4) The request for the new trial; 
(5)  The sentence or a description thereof as ap- 
proved or affirmed, with any later reduction thereof 
by clemency or otherwise; 
(6)  A brief description of any finding or sentence 
believed to be unjust; 
(7)  A full statement of the newly discovered evi- 
dence or fraud on the court-martial which is relied 
upon for the remedy sought; 
(8) Affidavits pertinent to the matters in subsec- 
tion (c)(6) of this rule; and 
(9)  The affidavit of each person whom the ac- 
cused expects to present as a witness in the event of a 
new trial. Each such affidavit should set forth briefly 
the relevant facts within the personal knowledge of 
the witness. 
(d)  Effect of petition. The submission of a petition 
for a new trial does not stay the execution of a sen- 
tence. 
(e)  Who  may act on petition.  If the accused's case is 
pending before a Court of  Military Review or the 
Court of Military Appeals, the Judge Advocate 
General shall refer the petition to the appropriate R.C.M. 1210(e) 
court for action. Otherwise, the Judge Advocate 
General of the armed force which reviewed the pre- 
vious trial shall act on the petition, except that peti- 
tions submitted by persons who, at the time of trial 
and sentence from which the petitioner seeks relief, 
were members of the Coast Guard, and who, and 
who were members of the Coast Guard at the time 
the petition is submitted, shall be acted on in the De- 
partment in which the Coast Guard is serving at the 
time the petition is so submitted. 
(f)  Grounds  for  new trial. 
(1)  In general.  A new trial may be granted only 
on grounds of newly discovered evidence or fraud on 
the court-martial. 
(2)  Newly discovered evidence. A new trial shall 
not be granted on the grounds of newly discovered 
evidence unless the petition shows that: 
(A) The evidence was discovered after the 
trial; 
(B) The evidence is not such that it would have 
been discovered by the petitioner at the time of trial 
in the exercise of due diligence; and 
(C) The newly discovered evidence, if  consid- 
ered by a court-martial in the light of all other perti- 
nent evidence, would probably produce a substan- 
tially more favorable result for the accused. 
(3)  Fraud  on court-martial. No fraud on the 
court-martial warrants a new trial unless it had a 
substantial contributing effect on a finding of guilty 
or the sentence adjudged. 
Discussion 
Examples of fraud on a court-martial which may warrant 
granting a new trial are: confessed or proved perjury in testimony 
or forgery of documentary evidence which clearly had a substan- 
tial contributing effect on a finding of guilty and without which 
there probably would not have been a finding of guilty of the of- 
fense; willful concealment by the prosecution from the defense of 
evidence favorable to the defense which, if presented to the court- 
martial, would probably have resulted in a finding of not guilty; 
and willful concealment of a material ground for challenge of the 
military judge or any member or of the disqualification  of counsel 
or the convening authority, when the basis for challenge or dis- 
qualification was not known to the defense at the time of trial (see 
R.C.M. 912). 
(g)  Action on the petition. 
(1)  In general. The authority considering the pe- 
tition may cause such additional investigation to be 
made and such additional information to be secured 
as that authority believes appropriate. Upon written 
request, and in its discretion, the authority consider- 
ing the petition may permit oral argument on the 
matter. 
(2)  Courts of Military Review; Court of Military 
Appeals. The Courts of Military Review and the 
Court of Military Appeals shall act on a petition for 
a new trial in accordance with their respective rules. 
(3)  The Judge Advocates General. When a peti- 
tion is considered by the Judge Advocate General, 
any hearing may be before the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral or before an officer or officers designated by the 
Judge Advocate General. If the Judge Advocate 
General believes meritorious grounds for relief 
under Article 74 have been established but that a 
new trial is not appropriate, the Judge Advocate 
General may act under Article 74 if authorized to do 
so, or transmit the petition and related papers to the 
Secretary concerned with a recommendation. The 
Judge Advocate General may also, in cases which 
have been finally reviewed but have not been  re- 
viewed by a Court of Military Review, act under Ar- 
ticle 69. 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M. 1201(b)(3). 
(h) Action when new trial is granted. 
(1) Forwarding to convening authority. When a 
petition for a new trial is granted, the Judge Advo- 
cate General shall select and forward the case to a 
convening authority for disposition. 
(2)  Charges at new trial. At a new trial, the ac- 
cused may not be tried for any offense of which the 
accused was found not guilty or upon which the ac- 
cused was not tried at the earlier court-martial. 
Discussion 
See also R.C.M. 810 concerning additional special rules 
which apply at a new trial. In other respects a new trial is con- 
ducted like any other court-martial. 
(3) Action by convening authority. The convening 
authority's action on the record of a new trial is the 
same as in other courts-martial. 
(4)  Disposition of record. The disposition of the 
record of a new trial is the same as for other courts- 
martial. (5) Court-martial orders. Court-martial orders 
promulgating the final action taken as a result of a 
new trial, including any restoration of rights, privi- 
leges, and property, shall be promulgated in accor- 
dance with R.C.M. 1114. 
Discussion 
See Article 75 and R.C.M. 1208 concerning restoration of 
rights when the executed portion of a sentence is not sustained in 
a new trial or action following it. 
R.C.M.  1210(h)(6) 
(6) Action by persons  charged with execution of 
the sentence. Persons charged with the administra- 
tive duty of executing a sentence adjudged upon a 
new trial after it has been ordered executed shall 
credit the accused with any executed portion or 
amount of the original sentence included in the new 
sentence in computing the term or amount of pun- 
ishment actually to be executed pursuant to the sen- 
tence. CHAPTER XIII.  SUMMARY COURTS-MARTIAL 

Rule 1301. Summary courts-martial generally 
(a)  Composition. A summary court-martial is com- 
posed of one commissioned officer on active duty. 
Unless otherwise prescribed by the Secretary con- 
cerned a summary court-martial shall be of the same 
armed force as the accused. Whenever practicable, a 
summary court-martial should be an officer whose 
grade is not below lieutenant of the Navy or Coast 
Guard or captain of the Army, Air Force, or Marine 
Corps. When only one commissioned officer is pre- 
sent with a command or detachment, that officer 
shall be the summary court-martial of that com- 
mand or detachment. When more than one commis- 
sioned officer is present with a command or detach- 
ment, the convening authority may not be the 
summary court-martial of that command or detach- 
ment. 
(b) Function. The function of the summary court- 
martial is to promptly adjudicate minor offenses 
under a simple procedure. The summary court-mar- 
tial shall thoroughly and impartially inquire into 
both sides of the matter and shall ensure that the in- 
terests of both the Government and the accused are 
safeguarded and that justice  is done. A summary 
court-martial may seek advice a judge advocate or 
legal officer on questions of law, but the summary 
court-martial may not seek advice from any person 
on factual conclusions which should be drawn from 
evidence or the sentence which should be imposed, 
as the summary court-martial has the independent 
duty to make these determinations. 
Discussion 
For a definition of "minor offenses," see paragraph  le, Part 
v. 
(c) Jurisdiction.  Subject to Chapter 11, summary 
courts-martial have the power to try persons subject 
to the code, except commissioned officers, warrant 
officers, cadets, aviation cadets, and midshipmen, 
for any noncapital offense made punishable by  the 
code. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 103(3) for a definition of capital offenses 
(d)  Punishments. 
(1) Limitations-amount.  Subject to R.C.M. 
1003, summary courts-martial may adjudge any 
punishment not forbidden by the code except death, 
dismissal, dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, 
confinement for more than 1 month, hard labor 
without confinement for more than 45 days, restric- 
tion to specified limits for more than 2 months, or 
forfeiture of more than two-thirds of 1 month's pay. 
Discussion 
The maximum penalty which can be adjudged in a summary 
court-martial if  the accused is not attached to or embarked in a 
vessel is confinement for 30 days, forfeiture of two-thirds pay per 
month for one month, and reduction to the lowest pay grade. If 
the accused is attached to or embarked in a vessel, the maximum 
penalty is confinement for 3 days on bread and water or dimin- 
ished rations, confinement for 24 days (30 days if no confinement 
on bread and water or diminished rations is adjudged), forfeiture 
of two-thirds pay per month for one month, and reduction to the 
lowest pay grade. See subsection (2) below for additional limits on 
enlisted persons serving in pay grades above the fourth enlisted 
pay grade. 
A summary court-martial may not suspend all or part of a 
sentence, although the summary court-martial may recommend 
to the convening authority that all or part of a sentence be sus- 
pended. If a sentence includes both reduction in grade and forfeit- 
ures, the maximum forfeiture is calculated at the grade to which 
reduced. See also R.C.M.  1003 concerning other punishments 
which may be adjudged, the effects of certain types of punish- 
ment, and combination of certain types of punishment. The sum- 
mary court-martial should ascertain the effect of Article 58a in 
that armed force. 
(2)  Limitations-pay  grade.  In the case of en- 
listed members above the fourth enlisted pay grade, 
summary courts-martial may not adjudge confine- 
ment, hard labor without confinement, or reduction 
except to the next pay grade. 
Discussion 
The provisions of this subsection apply to an accused in the 
fifth enlisted pay grade who is reduced to the fourth enlisted pay 
grade by the summary court-martial. 
(e)  Counsel. The accused at a summary court-mar- 
tial does not have the right to counsel. If the accused 
has civilian counsel provided  by  the accused and 
qualified under R.C.M. 502(d)(3), that counsel shall 
be permitted to represent  the accused at the sum- mary court-martial if such appearance will not un- 
reasonably delay the proceedings and if military exi- 
gencies do not preclude it. 
Discussion 
Neither the Constitution nor any statute establishes any 
right to counsel at summary courts-martial. Therefore, it is not 
error to deny an accused the opportunity to be represented by 
counsel at a summary court-martial. However, appearance of 
counsel is not prohibited. The detailing authority may, as a mat- 
ter of discretion, detail, or otherwise make available, a military at- 
torney to represent the accused at a summary court-martial. 
(0 Power to obtain witnesses and evidence. A sum- 
mary court-martial may obtain evidence pursuant to 
R.C.M. 703. 
Discussion 
The summary court-martial must obtain witnesses for the 
prosecution and the defense pursuant to the standards in R.C.M. 
703. The summary court-martial rules on any request by  the ac- 
cused for witnesses or evidence in accordance with the procedure 
in R.C.M. 703(c) and (f). 
(g)  Secretarial limitations. The Secretary concerned 
may prescribe procedural or other rules for sum- 
mary courts-martial not inconsistent with this Man- 
ual or the code. 
Rule 1302. Convening a summary court- 
martial 
(a)  Who may convene summary courts-martial. Un-
less limited by  competent authority summary 
courts-martial may be convened by: 
(1)  Any person who may convene a general or 
special court-martial; 
(2)  The commander of a detached company or 
other detachment of the Army; 
(3) The commander of a detached squadron or 
other detachment of the Air Force; 
(4)  The commander or officer in charge of any 
other command when empowered by  the Secretary 
concerned; or 
(5)  A superior competent authority to any of the 
above. 
(b)  When convening authority is accuser. If the con- 
vening authority or the summary court-martial is 
the accuser, it is discretionary with the convening 
authority whether to forward the charges to a supe- 
R.C.M.  1304(a)(l) 
rior authority with a recommendation to convene 
the summary court-martial. If the convening au- 
thority or the summary court-martial is the accuser, 
the jurisdiction  of the summary court-martial is not 
affected. 
(c)  Procedure. After the requirements of Chapters 
I11 and IV of this Part have been satisfied, summary 
courts-martial shall be convened in accordance with 
R.C.M. 504(d)(2). The convening order may be by 
notation signed by the convening authority on the 
charge sheet. Charges shall be referred to summary 
courts-martial in accordance with R.C.M. 601. 
Discussion 
When the convening authority is the summary court-martial 
because the convening authority is the only commissioned officer 
present with the command or detachment, see R.C.M.  1301(a), 
that fact should be noted on the charge sheet. 
Rule 1303. Right to object to trial by 
summary court-martial 
No person who objects thereto before arraign- 
ment may be tried by summary court-martial even if 
that person also refused punishment under Article 
15 and demanded trial by court-martial for the same 
offenses. 
Discussion 
If the accused objects to trial by summary court-martial, the 
convening authority may dispose of the case in accordance with 
R.C.M. 401. 
Rule 1304. Trial procedure 
(a)  Pretrial duties. 
(1)  Examination ofjle.  The summary court-mar- 
tial shall carefully examine the charge sheet, allied 
papers, and immediately available personnel records 
of the accused before trial. 
Discussion 
"Personnel  records"  are those personnel records of the ac- 
cused which are maintained locally and are immediately availa- 
ble. "Allied  papers"  in a summary court-martial include conven- 
ing orders, investigative reports, correspondence relating to the 
case, and witness statements. R.C.M. 1304(a)(2) 
(2)  Report  of irregularity. The summary court- 
martial shall report to the convening authority any 
substantial irregularity in the charge sheet, allied pa- 
pers, or personnel records. 
Discussion 
The summary court-martial should examine the charge 
sheet, allied papers, and personnel records to ensure that they are 
complete and free from errors or  omissions which might affect ad- 
missibility. The summary court-martial should check the charges 
and specifications to ensure that each alleges personal jurisdiction 
over the accused (see R.C.M.202)  and an offense under the code 
(see R.C.M. 203 and Part IV). Substantial defects or errors in the 
charges and specifications must be reported to the convening au- 
thority, since such defects cannot be corrected except by  prefer- 
ring and referring the affected charge and specification anew in 
proper form. A defect or error is substantial if correcting it would 
state an offense not otherwise stated, or include an offense, per- 
son, or matter not fairly included in the specification as preferred. 
See subsection (3)  below concerning minor errors. 
(3)  Correction and amendment. The summary 
court-martial may, subject to R.C.M. 603, correct 
errors on the charge sheet and amend charges and 
specifications. Any such corrections or amendments 
shall be initialed. 
(b)  Summary court-martial procedure. 
Discussion 
A sample guide is at Appendix 9. The summary court-mar- 
tial should review and become familiar with the guide used before 
proceeding. 
(1)  Preliminary proceeding. After complying with 
R.C.M. 1304(a), the summary court-martial shall 
hold a preliminary proceeding during which the ac- 
cused shall be given a copy of the charge sheet and 
informed of.the following: 
(A)  The general nature of the charges; 
(B)  The fact that the charges have been  re- 
ferred to a summary court-martial for trial and the 
date of referral; 
(C) The identity of the convening authority; 
(D) The name(s) of the accuser(s); 
(E) The names of the witnesses who could be 
called to testify and any documents or physical evi- 
dence which the summary court-martial expects to 
introduce into evidence; 
(F) The accused's right to inspect the allied pa- 
pers and immediately available personnel records; 
(G)  That during the trial the summary court- 
martial will not consider any matters, including 
statements previously made by the accused to the of- 
ficer detailed as summary court-martial unless ad- 
mitted in accordance with the Military Rules of Evi- 
dence; 
(H) The accused's right to plead not guilty or 
guilty; 
(I) The accused's right to cross-examine wit- 
nesses and have the summary court-martial cross- 
examine witnesses on behalf of the accused; 
(J) The accused's right to call witnesses and 
produce evidence with the assistance of the sum- 
mary court-martial as necessary; 
(K) The accused's right to testify on the mer- 
its, or to remain silent with the assurance that no ad- 
verse inference will be drawn by the summary court- 
martial from such silence; 
(L) If any findings of guilty are announced, the 
accused's rights to remain silent, to make an un- 
sworn statement, oral or written or both, and to tes- 
tify, and to introduce evidence in extenuation or mit- 
igation; 
(M) The maximum sentence which the sum- 
mary court-martial may adjudge if  the accused is 
found guilty of the offense or offenses alleged; and 
(N) The accused's  right to object to trial by 
summary court-martial. 
(2)  Trial proceeding. 
(A) Objection to trial. The summary court- 
martial shall give the accused a reasonable period of 
time to decide whether to object to trial by summary 
court-martial. The summary court-martial shall 
thereafter record the response. If the accused objects 
to trial by  summary court-martial, the summary 
court-martial shall return the charge sheet, allied 
papers, and personnel records to the convening au- 
thority. If the accused fails to object to trial by sum- 
mary court-martial, trial shall proceed. 
(B) Arraignment.  After complying with 
R.C.M. 1304(b)(l) and (2)(A), the summary court- 
martial shall read and show the charges and specifi- 
cations to the accused and, if  necessary, explain 
them. The accused may waive the reading of the 
charges. The summary court-martial shall then ask 
the accused to plead to each specification and 
charge. 
(C)  Motions. Before receiving pleas the sum- 
mary court-martial shall allow the accused to make motions to dismiss or for other relief. The summary 
court-martial shall take action on behalf of the ac- 
cused, if requested by the accused, or if it appears 
necessary in the interests of justice. 
(D)  Pleas. 
(i)  Not guiltypleas. When a not guilty plea is 
entered, the summary court-martial shall proceed to 
trial. 
(ii)  Guilty pleas. If the accused pleads guilty 
to any offense, the summary court-martial shall 
comply with R.C.M. 910. 
(iii)  Rejected guilty pleas.  If the summary 
court-martial is in doubt that the accused's pleas of 
guilty are voluntarily and understandingly made, or 
if at any time during the trial any matter inconsis- 
tent with pleas of guilty arises, which inconsistency 
cannot be resolved, the summary court-martial shall 
enter not guilty pleas as to the affected charges and 
specifications. 
(iv) No plea.  If the accused refuses to plead, 
the summary court-martial shall enter not  guilty 
pleas. 
(v)  Changed pleas. The accused may change 
any plea at any time before findings are announced. 
The accused may change pleas from guilty to not 
guilty after findings are announced only for good 
cause. 
(E) Presentation of evidence. 
(i)  The Military Rules of Evidence (Part 111) 
apply to summary courts-martial. 
(ii)  The summary court-martial shall ar- 
range for the attendance of necessary witnesses for 
the prosecution and defense, including those re- 
quested by the accused. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 703. Ordinarily witnesses should be excluded 
from the courtroom until called to testify. See Mil.R.Evid. 615. 
(iii)  Witnesses for the prosecution shall be 
called first and examined under oath. The accused 
shall be  permitted to cross-examine these witnesses. 
The summary court-martial shall aid the accused in 
cross-examination if  such assistance is requested or 
appears necessary in the interests ofjustice. The wit- 
nesses for the accused shall then be called and simi- 
larly examined under oath. 
R.C.M. 1305(a) 
(iv)  The summary court-martial shall obtain 
evidence which tends to disprove the accused's guilt 
or establishes extenuating circumstances. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 703 and 1001. 
(F) Findings and sentence. 
(i)  The summary court-martial shall apply 
the principles in R.C.M. 91 8 in determining the find- 
ings. The summary court-martial shall announce the 
findings to the accused in open session. 
(ii)  The summary court-martial shall follow 
the procedures in R.C.M. 1001 and apply the princi- 
ples in the remainder of Chapter X in determining a 
sentence. The summary court-martial shall an- 
nounce the sentence to the accused in open session. 
(iii)  If the sentence includes confinement, 
the summary court-martial shall advise the accused 
of the right to apply to the convening authority for 
deferment of the service of the confinement. 
(iv)  If the accused is found guilty, the sum- 
mary court-martial shall advise the accused of the 
rights under R.C.M. 1306(a) and (d) after the sen- 
tence is announced. 
(v)  The summary court-martial shall, as 
soon as practicable, inform the convening authority 
of the findings, sentence, recommendations, if any, 
for suspension of the sentence, and any deferment 
request. 
(vi)  If the sentence includes confinement, the 
summary court-martial shall cause the delivery of 
the accused to the accused's commanding officer or 
the commanding officer's designee. 
Discussion 
If the accused's immediate commanding officer is not the 
convening authority, the summary court-martial should ensure 
that the immediate commanding officer is informed  of the find- 
ings, sentence, and any recommendations pertaining thereto. See 
R.C.M. 1101 concerning post-trial confinement. 
Rule 1305.  Record of trial 
(a)  In general.  The record of trial of a summary 
court-martial shall be prepared as prescribed in sub- 
section (b) of this rule. The convening or higher au- R.C.M.  1305(a) 
thority may prescribe additional requirements for  (C)  Classified information. If classified infor- 
the record of trial.  mation is included in the record of trial of a sum- 
mary court-martial, R.C.M. 1  104(b)(l)(D) shall ap- 
Discussion  ply. 
See Appendix 15 for a sample of a Record of Trial by  Sum- 
mary Court-Martial (DD Form 2329). 
Any petition submitted under R.C.M. 1306(a) should be ap- 
pended to the record of trial. 
(b)  Contents. The summary court-martial shall pre- 
pare an original and at least two copies of the record 
of trial, .which shall include: 
(1)  The pleas, findings, and sentence, and if  the 
accused was represented by counsel at the summary 
court-martial, a notation to that effect; 
(2)  The fact that the accused was advised of the 
matters set forth in R.C.M. 1304(b)(l); 
(3)  If the summary court-martial is the conven- 
ing authority, a notation to that effect. 
(c) Authentication. The summary court-martial 
shall authenticate the record by signing each copy. 
Discussion 
"Authentication"  means attesting that the record accurately 
reports the proceedings. See R.C.M. 1104(a). 
(d) Medical certificate. If the sentence ordered exe- 
cuted includes confinement on bread and water or 
diminished rations, the convening authority shall 
cause the medical certificate required by  R.C.M. 
11 13(d)(5) to be attached to the original copy of the 
record of trial. 
(e) Forwarding copies of the record. 
(1)  Accused's copy. 
(A)  Service. The summary court-martial shall 
cause a copy of the record of trial to be served on the 
accused as soon as it is authenticated. 
(B)  Receipt. The summary court-martial shall 
cause the accused's receipt for the copy of the record 
of trial to be obtained and attached to the original re- 
cord of trial or shall attach to the original record of 
trial a certificate that the accused was served a copy 
of the record. If the record of trial was not served on 
the accused personally, the summary court-martial 
shall attach a statement explaining how and when 
such service was accomplished. If the accused was 
represented by  counsel, such counsel may be served 
with the record of trial. 
(2)  Forwarding  to the convening authority. The 
original and one copy of the record of trial shall be 
forwarded to the convening authority after compli- 
ance with subsection (e)(l) of this rule. 
(3)  Further disposition.  After compliance with 
R.C.M. 1306(b) and (c), the record of trial shall be 
disposed of under regulations prescribed by the Sec- 
retary concerned. 
Rule 1306.  Post-trial procedure 
(a) Matters submitted  by the accused. After a sen- 
tence is adjudged, the accused may submit written 
matters to the convening authority in accordance 
with R.C.M. 1105. 
(b)  Convening authority's action. 
(1)  Who  shall act. Except as provided herein, the 
convening authority shall take action in accordance 
with R.C.M. 1107. The convening authority shall 
not take action before the period prescribed in 
R.C.M.  1105(c)(3) has expired, unless the right to 
submit matters has been  waived under R.C.M. 
1105(d). 
(2) Action. The action of the convening authority 
shall be shown on all copies of the record of trial ex- 
cept that provided the accused if the accused has re- 
tained that copy. An order promulgating the result 
of a trial by summary court-martial need not be is- 
sued. A copy of the action shall be forwarded to the 
accused. 
(3)  Signature. The action on the original record 
of trial shall be signed by  the convening authority. 
The convening authority's action on other copies of 
the record of trial shall either be signed by the con- 
vening authority or be prepared and certified as true 
copies of the original. 
(4) Subsequent action. Any action taken on a 
summary court-martial after the initial action by the 
convening authority shall be in writing, signed by 
the authority taking the action, and promulgated in 
appropriate orders. 
Discussion 
See R.C.M. 11 14 concerning promulgating orders. R.C.M.  1306(d) 
(c)  Review by a judge  advocate. Unless otherwise  (d)  Review  by the Judge Advocate  General. The ac- 
prescribed by  regulations of the Secretary con-  cused may request review of a final conviction by 
cerned, the original record of the summary court-  summary court-martial by the Judge Advocate Gen- 
martial shall be reviewed by a judge advocate in ac-  eral in accordance with R.C.M. 1201(b)(3). 
cordance with R.C.M. 11 12. PART III 

MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE 

SECTION I 

GENERAL PROVISIONS 

Rule 101. Scope 
(a) Applicability. These rules are applicable in 
courts-martial, including summary courts-martial, 
to the extent and with the exceptions stated in 
Mil.R.Evid. 1  101. 
(b)  Secondary Sources. If not otherwise prescribed 
in this Manual or these rules, and insofar as practi- 
cable and not inconsistent with or contrary to the 
code or this Manual, courts-martial shall apply: 
(1)  First, the rules of evidence generally recog- 
nized in the trial of criminal cases in the United 
States district courts; and 
(2)  Second, when not inconsistent with subdivi- 
sion (b)(l), the rules of evidence at common law. 
(c)  Rule of construction. Except as otherwise pro- 
vided in these rules, the term "military judge"  in-
cludes the president of a special court-martial with- 
out a military judge and a summary court-martial 
officer. 
Rule 102.  Purpose and construction 
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in 
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense 
and delay, and promotion of growth and develop- 
ment of the law of evidence to the end that the truth 
may be ascertained and proceedings justly  deter- 
mined. 
Rule 103.  Ruling on evidence 
(a)  Effect  of erroneous ruling. Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless the ruling materially prejudices a 
substantial right of a party, and 
(1)  Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting 
evidence, a timely objection  or motion to strike ap- 
pears of record, stating the specific ground of objec- 
tion, if  the specific ground was not apparent from 
the context; or 
(2)  Offer ofpro05 In case the ruling is one exclud- 
ing evidence, the substance of the evidence was 
made known to the military judge by offer or was ap- 
parent from the context within which questions 
were asked. 
The standard provided in this subdivision does not 
apply to errors involving requirements imposed by 
the Constitution of the United States as applied to 
members of the armed forces except insofar as the 
error arises under these rules and this subdivision 
provides a standard that is more advantageous to the 
accused than the constitutional standard. 
(b)  Record  of offer and ruling. The military judge 
may add any other or further statement which 
shows the character of the evidence, the form in 
which it was offered, the objection made, and the 
ruling thereon. The military judge may direct the 
making of an offer in question and answer form. 
(c)  Hearing of members. In a court-martial com- 
posed of a military judge and members, proceedings 
shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to 
prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested 
to the members by any means, such as making state- 
ments or offers of proof or asking questions in the 
hearing of the members. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes tak- 
ing notice of plain errors that materially prejudice 
substantial rights although they were not brought to 
the attention of the military judge. 
Rule 104.  Preliminary questions 
(a)  Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary 
questions concerning the qualification of a person to 
be a witness, the existence of a privilege, the admissi- 
bility of evidence, an application for a continuance, 
or the availability of a witness shall be determined by 
the military judge.  In making these determinations 
the military judge is not bound by the rules of evi- 
dence except those with respect to privileges. 
(b)  Relevancy conditioned  on fact.  When the rele- 
vancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a 
condition of fact, the military judge shall admit it 
upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence suf- 
ficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the 
condition. A ruling on the sufficiency of evidence to 
support a finding of fulfillment of a condition of fact 
is the sole responsibility of the military judge, except M.R.E.  104(b) 
where these rules or this Manual provide expressly 
to the contrary. 
(c)  Hearing of members. Except in cases tried before 
a special court-martial without a military judge, 
hearings on the admissibility of statements of an ac- 
cused under Mil.R.Evid. 301-306  shall in all cases 
be conducted out of the hearing of the members. 
Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so 
conducted when the interests of justice require or, 
when an accused is a witness, if the accused so re- 
quests. 
(d)  Testimony by accused. The accused does not, by 
testifying upon a preliminary matter, become sub- 
ject  to cross-examination as to other issues in the 
case. 
(e)  Weight and credibility. This rule does not limit 
the right of a party to introduce before the members 
evidence relevant to weight or credibility. 
Rule 105.  Limited admissibility 
When evidence which is admissible as to one 
party or for one purpose but not admissible as to an- 
other party or for another purpose is admitted, the 
military judge,  upon request, shall restrict the evi- 
dence to its proper scope and instruct the members 
accordingly. 
Rule 106.  Remainder of or related writings or 
recorded statements 
When a writing or recorded statement or part 
thereof is introduced by  a party, an adverse party 
may require that party at that time to introduce any 
other part or any other writing or recorded state- 
ment which ought in fairness to be considered con- 
temporaneously with it. 
SECTION II 
JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Rule 201.  Judicial notice of adjudicative 
facts 
(a)  Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial no- 
tice of adjudicative facts. 
(b)  Kinds of facts.  A judicially noticed fact must be 
one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is ei- 
ther (1) generally known universally, locally, or in 
the area pertinent to the event or (2) capable of accu- 
rate and ready determination by  resort to sources 
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
(c)  When discretionary. The military judge  may 
take judicial  notice, whether requested or not. The 
parties shall be informed in open court when, with- 
out being requested, the military judge takes judicial 
notice of an adjudicative fact essential to establish- 
ing an element of the case. 
(d)  When mandatory. The military judge shall take 
judicial  notice if requested by a party and supplied 
with the necessary information. 
(e)  Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon 
timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to 
the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor 
of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notifi- 
cation, the request may be made after judicial notice 
has been taken. 
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be 
taken at any stage of the proceeding. 
(g)  Instructing members. The military judge shall 
instruct the members that they may, but are not re- 
quired to, accept as conclusive any matter judicially 
noticed. 
Rule 201A.  Judicial notice of law 
(a)  Domestic law. The military judge may take judi- 
cial notice of domestic law. Insofar as a domestic law 
is a fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of  the action, the procedural requirements of 
Mil.R.Evid.  201-except  Mil.R.Evid. 
201(g)-apply. 
(b) Foreign law. A party who intends to raise an is- 
sue concerning the law of a foreign country shall 
give reasonable written notice. The military judge, in 
determining foreign law, may consider any relevant 
material or source including testimony whether or 
not submitted by a party or admissible under these 
rules. Such a determination shall be treated as a rul- 
ing on a question of law. 
SECTION Ill 
EXCLUSIONARY RULES AND RELATED 
MATTERS CONCERNING SELF- 
INCRIMINATION,  SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 
AND EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
Rule 301. Privilege concerning compulsory 
self-incrimination 
(a)  General rule. The privileges against self-incrimi- 
nation provided by the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States and Article 31 are applicable only to evidence of a testimonial or com- 
municative nature. The privilege most beneficial to 
the individual asserting the privilege shall be ap- 
plied. 
(b)  Standing. 
(1)  In general. The privilege of a witness to refuse 
to respond to a question the answer to which may 
tend to incriminate the witness is a personal one that 
the witness may exercise or waive at the discretion of 
the witness. 
(2)  Judicial advice. If a witness who is apparently 
uninformed of the privileges under this rule appears 
likely to incriminate himself or herself, the military 
judge should advise the witness of the right to de- 
cline to make any answer that might tend to incrimi- 
nate the witness and that any self-incriminating an- 
swer the witness might make can later be used as 
evidence against the witness. Counsel for any party 
or for the witness may request the military judge to 
so advise a witness provided that such a request is 
made out of the hearing of the witness and, except in 
a special court-martial without a military judge, the 
members. Failure to so advise a witness does not 
make the testimony of the witness inadmissible. 
(c)  Exercise of the privilege. If a witness states that 
the answer to a question may tend to incriminate 
him or her, the witness may not be required to an- 
swer unless facts and circumstances are such that no 
answer the witness might make to the question could 
have the effect of tending to incriminate the witness 
or that the witness has, with respect to the question, 
waived the privilege against self-incrimination. A 
witness may not assert the privilege if the witness is 
not subject to criminal penalty as a result of an an- 
swer by reason of immunity, running of the statute 
of limitations, or similar reason. 
(1)  Immunity generally. The minimum grant of 
immunity adequate to overcome the privilege is that 
which under either R.C.M. 704 or other proper au- 
thority provides that neither the testimony of the 
witness nor any evidence obtained from that testi- 
mony may be used against the witness at any subse- 
quent trial other than in a prosecution for perjury, 
false swearing, the making of a false official state- 
ment, or failure to comply with an order to testify af- 
ter the military judge  has ruled that the privilege 
may not be asserted by reason of immunity. 
(2)  Notification of immunity or leniency. When a 
prosecution witness before a court-martial has been 
M.R.E. 301(f)(3) 
granted immunity or leniency in exchange for testi- 
mony, the grant shall be reduced to writing and shall 
be served on the accused prior to arraignment or 
within a reasonable time before the witness testifies. 
If notification is not made as required by this rule, 
the military judge may grant a continuance until no- 
tification is made, prohibit or strike the testimony of 
the witness, or enter such other order as may be re- 
quired. 
(d)  Waiver by a witness. A witness who answers a 
question without having asserted the privilege 
against self-incrimination and thereby admits a self- 
incriminating fact may be required to disclose all in- 
formation relevant to that fact except when there is a 
real danger of further self-incrimination. This lim- 
ited waiver of the privilege applies only at the trial in 
which the answer is given, does not extend to a re- 
hearing or new or other trial, and is subject to 
Mil.R.Evid. 608(b). 
(e)  Waiver  by the accused. When an accused testifies 
voluntarily as a witness, the accused thereby waives 
the privilege against self-incrimination with respect 
to the matters concerning which he or she so testi- 
fies. If the accused is on trial for two or more offenses 
and on direct examination testifies concerning the is- 
sue of guilt or innocence as to only one or some of 
the offenses, the accused may not be cross-examined 
as to guilt or innocence with respect to the other of- 
fenses unless the cross-examination is relevant to an 
offense concerning which the accused has testified. 
This waiver is subject to Mil.R.Evid. 608(b). 
(f)  Effect of claiming the privilege. 
(1)  Generally. The fact that a witness has asserted 
the privilege against self-incrimination in refusing to 
answer a question cannot be considered as raising 
any inference unfavorable to either the accused or 
the government. 
(2)  On cross-examination. If a witness asserts the 
privilege against self-incrimination on cross-exami- 
nation, the military judge, upon motion, may strike 
the direct testimony of the witness in whole or in 
part, unless the matters to which the witness refuses 
to testify are purely collateral. 
(3)  Pretrial. The fact that the accused during offi- 
cial questioning and in exercise of rights under the 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States or Article 31, remained silent, refused to an- 
swer a certain question, requested counsel, or re- M.R.E. 301(f)(3) 
quested that the questioning be terminated is inad- 
missible against the accused. 
(g)  Instructions. When the accused does not testify 
at trial, defense counsel may request that the mem- 
bers of the court be instructed to disregard that fact 
and not to draw any adverse inference from it. De- 
fense counsel may request that the members not be 
so instructed. Defense counsel's election shall be 
binding upon the military judge except that the mili- 
tary judge  may give the instruction when the in- 
struction is necessary in the interests of justice. 
Rule 302.  Privilege concerning mental 

examination of an accused 

(a)  General rule. The accused has a privilege to pre- 
vent any statement made by the accused at a mental 
examination ordered under R.C.M. 706 and any de- 
rivative evidence obtained through use of such a 
statement from being received into evidence against 
the accused on the issue of guilt or innocence or dur- 
ing sentencing proceedings. This privilege may be 
claimed by the accused notwithstanding the fact that 
the accused may have been warned of the rights pro- 
vided by  Mil.R.Evid. 305 at the examination. 
(b)  Exceptions. 
(1)  There is no privilege under this rule when the 
accused first introduces into evidence such state- 
ments or derivative evidence. 
(2)  An expert witness for the prosecution may 
testify as to the reasons for the expert's conclusions 
and the reasons therefor as to the mental state of the 
accused if expert testimony offered by the defense as 
to the mental condition of the accused has been re- 
ceived in evidence, but such testimony may not ex- 
tend to statements of the accused except as provided 
in (1). 
(c)  Release of evidence. If the defense offers expert 
testimony concerning the mental condition of the 
accused, the military judge,  upon motion, shall or- 
der the release to the prosecution  of the full con- 
tents, other than any statements made by the ac- 
cused, of  any report prepared pursuant to R.C.M. 
706. If the defense offers statements made by the ac- 
cused at such examination, the military judge  may 
upon motion order the disclosure of such statements 
made by  the accused and contained in the report as 
may be necessary in the interests of justice. 
(d)  Noncompliance  by  the accused. The military 
judge may prohibit an accused who refuses to coop- 
erate in a mental examination authorized under 
R.C.M. 706 from presenting any expert medical tes- 
timony as to any issue that would have been the sub- 
ject of the mental examination. 
(e)  Procedure. The privilege in this rule may be 
claimed by the accused only under the procedure set 
forth in Mil.R.Evid. 304 for an objection or a motion 
to suppress. 
Rule 303.  Degrading questions 
No person may be compelled to make a statement 
or produce evidence before any military tribunal if 
the statement or evidence is not material to the issue 
and may tend to degrade that person. 
Rule 304.  Confessions and admissions 
(a)  General rule. Except as provided in subsection 
(b), an involuntary statement or any derivative evi- 
dence therefrom may not be received  in evidence 
against an accused who made the statement if the ac- 
cused makes a timely motion to suppress or an ob- 
jection to the evidence under this rule. 
(b)  Exceptions. 
(1)  Where the statement is involuntary only in 
terms of noncompliance with the requirements of 
Mil.R.Evid. 305(c) or 305(f), or the requirements 
concerning counsel under Mil.R.Evid.  305(d), 
305(e), and 305(g), this rule does not prohibit use of 
the statement to impeach by contradiction the in- 
court testimony of the accused or the use of such 
statement in a later prosecution against the accused 
for perjury, false swearing, or the making of a false 
official statement. 
(2)  Evidence that was obtained as a result of  an 
involuntary statement may be used when the evi- 
dence would have been obtained even if the involun- 
tary statement had not been made. 
(3)  Derivative evidence. Evidence that is chal- 
lenged under this rule as derivative evidence may be 
admitted against the accused if the military judge 
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
statement was made voluntarily, that the evidence 
was not obtained by use of the statement, or that the 
evidence would have been obtained even if the state- 
ment had not been made. 
(c)  Definitions. As used in these rules: 
(1)  Confession. A "confession" is an acknowledg- 
ment of guilt. (2) Admission. An "admission"  is a self-incrimi- 
nating statement falling short of an acknowledg- 
ment of guilt, even if it was intended by its maker to 
be exculpatory. 
(3)  Involuntary. A statement is "involuntary"  if it 
is obtained in violation  of the self-incrimination 
privilege or due process clause of the Fifth Amend- 
ment to the Constitution of the United States, Arti- 
cle 31, or through the use of coercion, unlawful in- 
fluence, or unlawful inducement. 
(d)  Procedure. 
(1)  Disclosure. Prior to arraignment, the prosecu- 
tion shall disclose to the defense the contents of all 
statements, oral or written, made by the accused 
that are relevant to the case, known to the trial coun- 
sel, and within the control of the armed forces. 
(2)  Motions and objections. 
(A) Motions to suppress or objections under 
this rule or Mil.R.Evid. 302 or 305 to statements 
that have been disclosed shall be made by  the de- 
fense prior to submission of a plea. In the absence of 
such motion or objection, the defense may not raise 
the issue at a later time except as permitted by the 
military judge for good cause shown. Failure to so 
move or object constitutes a waiver of the objection. 
(B) If the prosecution intends to offer against 
the accused a statement made by the accused that 
was not disclosed prior to arraignment, the prosecu- 
tion shall provide timely notice to the military judge 
and to counsel for the accused. The defense may 
enter an objection at that time and the military judge 
may make such orders as are required in the inter- 
ests of justice. 
(C) If evidence is disclosed as derivative evi- 
dence under this subdivision prior to arraignment, 
any motion to suppress or objection under this rule 
or Mil.R.Evid. 302 or 305 shall be made in accor- 
dance with the procedure for challenging a state- 
ment under (A). If such evidence has not been so dis- 
closed prior to arraignment, the requirements of (B) 
apply. 
(3)  Specificity. The military judge may require the 
defense to specify the grounds upon which the de- 
fense moves to suppress or object to evidence. If de- 
fense counsel, despite the exercise of due diligence, 
has been unable to interview adequately those per- 
sons involved in the taking of a statement, the mili- 
tary judge may make any order required in the inter- 
ests of justice,  including authorization for the 
M.R.E. 304(e)(3) 
defense to make a general motion to suppress or gen- 
eral objection. 
(4)  Rulings. A motion to suppress or an objection 
to evidence made prior to plea shall be ruled upon 
prior to plea unless the military judge,  for good 
cause, orders that it be deferred for determination at 
trial, but no such determination shall be deferred if a 
party's  right to appeal the ruling is affected ad- 
versely. Where factual issues are involved in ruling 
upon such motion or objection, the military judge 
shall state essential findings of fact on the record. 
(5)  Effect of guilty plea.  Except as otherwise ex- 
pressly provided in  R.C.M. 910(a)(2), a plea of 
guilty to an offense that results in a finding of guilty 
waives all privileges against self-incrimination and 
all motions and objections under this rule with re- 
spect to that offense regardless of whether raised 
prior to plea. 
(e)  Burden of pro05  When an appropriate motion or 
objection has been made by the defense under this 
rule, the prosecution  has the burden of establishing 
the admissibility of  the evidence. When a specific 
motion or objection has been required under subdi- 
vision (d)(3), the burden on the prosecution extends 
only to the grounds upon which the defense moved 
to suppress or object to the evidence. 
(1)  In general. The military judge must find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a statement by 
the accused was made voluntarily before it may be 
received  into evidence. When trial is by a special 
court-martial without a military judge, a determina- 
tion by the president of the court that a statement 
was made voluntarily is subject to objection by any 
member of the court. When such objection is made, 
it shall be resolved pursuant to R.C.M. 801(e)(3)(C). 
(2)  Weight of the evidence. If a statement is ad- 
mitted into evidence, the military judge shall permit 
the defense to present relevant evidence with respect 
to the voluntariness of the statement and shall in- 
struct the members to give such weight to the state- 
ment as it deserves under all the circumstances. 
When trial is by military judge  without members, 
the military judge shall determine the appropriate 
weight to give the statement. 
(3)  Derivative evidence. Evidence that is chal- 
lenged under this rule as derivative evidence may be 
admitted against the accused if  the military judge 
finds by  a preponderance of the evidence that the 
statement was made voluntarily, that the evidence M.R.E. 304(e)(3) 
was not obtained by use of the statement, or that the 
evidence would have been obtained even if the state- 
ment had not been made. 
(f)  Defense  evidence. The defense may present evi- 
dence relevant to the admissibility of evidence as to 
which there has been an objection or motion to sup- 
press under this rule. An accused may testify for the 
limited purpose of denying that the accused made 
the statement or that the statement was made volun- 
tarily. Prior to the introduction of such testimony by 
the accused, the defense shall inform the military 
judge that the testimony is offered under this subdi- 
vision. When the accused testifies under this subdivi- 
sion, the accused may be cross-examined only as to 
the matter on which he or she testifies. Nothing said 
by the accused on either direct or cross-examination 
may be used against the accused for any purpose 
other than in a prosecution for perjury, false swear- 
ing, or the making of a false official statement. 
(g)  Corroboration. An admission or a confession of 
the accused may be considered as evidence against 
the accused on the question of guilt or innocence 
only if  independent evidence, either direct or cir- 
cumstantial, has been introduced that corroborates 
the essential facts admitted to justify sufficiently an 
inference of  their truth. Other uncorroborated con- 
fessions or admissions of the accused that would 
themselves require corroboration may not be used to 
supply this independent evidence. If the independent 
evidence raises an inference of the truth of some but 
not all of the essential facts admitted, then the con- 
fession or admission may be considered as evidence 
against the accused only with respect to those essen- 
tial facts stated in the confession or admission that 
are corroborated by  the independent evidence. Cor- 
roboration is not required for a statement made by 
the accused before the court by which the accused is 
being tried, for statements made prior to or contem- 
poraneously with the act, or for statements offered 
under a rule of evidence other than that pertaining 
to the admissibility of admissions or confessions. 
(1)  Quantum of  evidence needed. The indepen- 
dent evidence necessary to establish corroboration 
need not be sufficient of itself to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt the truth of facts stated in the ad- 
mission or confession. The independent evidence 
need raise only an inference of the truth of the essen- 
tial facts admitted. The amount and type of evidence 
introduced as corroboration is a factor to be consid- 
ered by the trier of fact in determining the weight, if 
any, to be given to the admission or confession. 
(2)  Procedure. The military judge alone shall de- 
termine when adequate evidence of corroboration 
has been received. Corroborating evidence usually is 
to be introduced before the admission or confession 
is introduced but the military judge may admit evi- 
dence subject to later corroboration. 
(h) Miscellaneous. 
(1)  Oral statements. A voluntary oral confession 
or admission of the accused may be proved by the 
testimony of anyone who heard the accused make it, 
even if it was reduced to writing and the writing is 
not accounted for. 
(2)  Completeness. If only part of an alleged ad- 
mission or confession is introduced against the ac- 
cused, the defense, by  cross-examination or other- 
wise, may introduce the remaining portions of the 
statement. 
(3)  Certain admissions by silence. A person's fail- 
ure to deny an accusation of wrongdoing concerning 
an offense for which at the time of the alleged failure 
the person was under official investigation or was in 
confinement, arrest, or custody does not support an 
inference of an admission of the truth of the accusa- 
tion. 
(4)  Refusal  to obey order to submit body sub- 
stance. If an accused refuses a lawful order to submit 
for chemical analysis a sample of his or her blood, 
breath, urine or other body substance, evidence of 
such refusal may be admitted into evidence on: 
(A) A charge of violating an order to submit 
such a sample; or 
(B) Any other charge on which the results of 
the chemical analysis would have been admissible. 
Rule 305.  Warnings about rights 
(a)  General rule. A statement obtained in violation 
of this rule is involuntary and shall be treated under 
Mil.R.Evid. 304. 
(b)  Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1)  Person subject to the code. A "person  subject 
to the code"  includes a person acting as a knowing 
agent of a military unit or of a person subject to the 
code. 
(2)  Interrogation.  "Interrogation"  includes any 
formal or informal questioning in which an incrimi- 
nating response either is sought or is a reasonable 
consequence of such questioning. (c)  Warnings concerning the accusation, right to re- 
main silent, and use of statements. A person subject 
to the code who is required to give warnings under 
Article 31 may not interrogate or request any state- 
ment from an accused or a person suspected of an of- 
fense without first: 
(1) informing the accused or suspect of the nature 
of the accusation; 
(2)  advising the accused or suspect that the ac- 
cused or suspect has the right to remain silent; and 
(3) advising the accused or suspect that any state- 
ment made may be used as evidence against the ac- 
cused or suspect in a trial by court-martial. 
(d)  Counsel rights and warnings. 
(1)  General rule. When evidence of a testimonial 
or communicative nature within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States either is sought or is a reasonable consequence 
of an interrogation, an accused or a person suspected 
of an offense is entitled to consult with counsel as 
provided by paragraph (2) of this subdivision, to 
have such counsel present at the interrogation, and 
to be warned of these rights prior to the interroga- 
tion if- 
(A) The interrogation is conducted by a person 
subject to the code who is required to give warnings 
under Article 3  1 and the accused or suspect is in cus- 
tody, could reasonably believe himself or herself to 
be in custody, or is otherwise deprived of his or her 
freedom of action in any significant way; or 
(B) The interrogation is conducted by a person 
subject to the code acting in a law enforcement ca- 
pacity, or an agent of such a person, the interroga- 
tion is conducted subsequent to preferral of charges 
or the imposition of pretrial restraint under R.C.M. 
304, and the interrogation concerns the offenses or 
matters that were the subject of the preferral of 
charges or were the cause of the imposition of pre- 
trial restraint. 
(2)  Counsel. When a person entitled to counsel 
under this rule requests counsel, a judge advocate or 
an individual certified in accordance with Article 
27(b) shall be provided by the United States at no ex- 
pense to the person and without regard to the per- 
son's indigency or lack thereof before the interroga- 
tion may proceed. In addition to counsel supplied by 
the United  States, the person may retain civilian 
counsel at no expense to the United States. Unless 
otherwise provided by regulations of the Secretary 
M.R.E.  305(h)(l) 
concerned, an accused or suspect does not have a 
right under this rule to have military counsel of his 
or her own selection. 
(e)  Notice to Counsel. When a person subject to the 
code who is required to give warnings under subdivi- 
sion (c) intends to question an accused or person sus- 
pected of an offense and knows or reasonably should 
know that counsel either has been appointed for or 
retained by the accused or suspect with respect to 
that offense, the counsel must be notified of the in- 
tended interrogation and given a reasonable time in 
which to attend before the interrogation may pro- 
ceed. 
(f)  Exercise of rights. If a person chooses to exercise 
the privilege against self-incrimination or the right 
to counsel under this rule, questioning must cease 
immediately. 
(g)  Waiver. 
(1)  General rule. After receiving applicable warn- 
ings under this rule, a person may waive the rights 
described therein and in Mil.R.Evid. 301 and make a 
statement. The waiver must be made freely, know- 
ingly, and intelligently. A written waiver is not re- 
quired. The accused or suspect must acknowledge 
affirmatively that he or she understands the rights 
involved, affirmatively decline the right to counsel 
and affirmatively consent to making a statement. 
(2)  Counsel. If the right to counsel in subdivision 
(d) is applicable and the accused or suspect does not 
decline affirmatively the right to counsel, the prose- 
cution must demonstrate by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the individual waived the right to 
counsel. In addition, if the notice to counsel in sub- 
division (e) is applicable, a waiver of the right to 
counsel is not effective unless the prosecution  dem- 
onstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that 
reasonable efforts to notify the counsel were unavail- 
ing or that the counsel did not attend an interroga- 
tion scheduled within a reasonable period of time af- 
ter the required notice was given. 
(h) Nonmilitary interrogations. 
(1)  General rule. When a person subject to the 
code is interrogated by an official or agent of the 
United States, of the District of Columbia, or of a 
State, Commonwealth, or possession of  the United 
States, or any political subdivision of such a State, 
Commonwealth, or possession, and such official or 
agent is not required to give warning under subdivi- 
sion (c), the person's entitlement to rights warnings M.R.E. 305(h)(l) 
and the validity of any waiver of applicable rights 
shall be determined by the principles of law gener- 
ally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the 
United States district courts involving similar inter- 
rogations. 
(2)  Foreign  interrogations.  Neither warnings 
under subdivisions (c) or (d), nor notice to counsel 
under subdivision (e) are required during an interro- 
gation conducted abroad by  officials of a foreign 
government or their agents unless such interroga- 
tion is conducted, instigated, or participated  in by 
military personnel or their agents or by those offi- 
cials or agents listed in subdivision (h)(l). A state- 
ment obtained during such an interrogation is invol- 
untary within the meaning of Mil.R.Evid. 304(b)(3) 
if it is obtained through the use of coercion, unlawful 
influence, or unlawful inducement. An interrogation 
is not "participated  in"  by military personnel or 
their agents or by the officials or agents listed in sub- 
division (h)(l) merely because such a person was 
present at an interrogation conducted in a foreign 
nation by officials of a foreign government or their 
agents, or because such a person acted as an inter- 
preter or took steps to mitigate damage to property 
or physical harm during the foreign interrogation. 
Rule 306.  Statements by one of several 
accused 
When two or more accused are tried at the same 
trial, evidence of a statement made by one of them 
which is admissible only against him or her or only 
against some but not all of the accused may not be 
received in evidence unless all references inculpating 
an accused against whom the statement is inadmissi- 
ble are deleted effectively or the maker of the state- 
ment is subject to cross-examination. 
Rule 31  1.  Evidence obtained from unlawful 
searches and seizures 
(a)  General rule. Evidence obtained as a result of an 
unlawful search or seizure made by a person acting 
in a governmental capacity is inadmissible against 
the accused if: 
(1)  Objection. The accused makes a timely mo- 
tion to suppress or an objection to the evidence 
under this rule; and 
(2) Adequate interest. The accused had a reasona- 
ble expectation of privacy in the person, place or 
property searched; the accused had a legitimate in- 
terest in the property or evidence seized when chal- 
lenging a seizure; or the accused would  otherwise 
have grounds to object to the search or seizure under 
the Constitution of the United States as applied to 
members of the armed forces. 
(b)  Exceptions. 
(1)  Evidence that was obtained as a result of an 
unlawful search or seizure may be used to impeach 
by  contradiction the in-court testimony of the ac- 
cused. 
(2)  Evidence that was obtained as a result of an 
unlawful search or seizure may be used when the ev- 
idence would have been obtained even if such unlaw- 
ful search or seizure had not been made. 
(3)  Evidence that was obtained as a result of an 
unlawful search or seizure may be used if: 
(A) The search or seizure resulted from an au- 
thorization to search, seize or apprehend issued by 
an individual competent to issue the authorization 
under Mil.R.Evid. 31 5(d) or from a search warrant 
or arrest warrant issued by  competent civilian au- 
thority; 
(B)  The individual issuing the authorization or 
warrant had a substantial basis for determining the 
existence of probable cause; and 
(C)  The officials seeking and executing the au- 
thorization or warrant reasonably and with good 
faith relied on the issuance of the authorization or 
warrant. Good faith shall be determined on an ob- 
jective standard. 
(c)  Nature of search or seizure. A search or seizure is 
"unlawful"  if it was conducted, instigated, or partic- 
ipated in by: 
(1)  Military personnel. Military personnel or their 
agents and was in violation of the Constitution of the 
United States as applied to members of the armed 
forces, an Act of  Congress applicable to trials by 
court-martial that requires exclusion of evidence ob- 
tained in violation thereof, or Mil.R.Evid. 312-317; 
(2)  Other oficials. Other officials or agents of the 
United States, of the District of Columbia, or of a 
State, Commonwealth, or possession of the United 
States or any political subdivision of such a State, 
Commonwealth, or possession and was in violation 
of the Constitution of the United States, or is unlaw- 
ful under the principles of law generally applied in 
the trial of criminal cases in the United States dis- 
trict courts involving a similar search or seizure; or (3)  Oficials of a foreign government. Officials of a 
foreign government or their agents and was obtained 
as a result of a foreign search or seizure which sub- 
jected the accused to gross and brutal maltreatment. 
A search or seizure is not "participated in" merely 
because a person is present at a search or seizure 
conducted in a foreign nation by officials of a foreign 
government or their agents, or because a person ac- 
ted as an interpreter or took steps to mitigate dam- 
age to property or physical harm during the foreign 
search or seizure. 
(d) Motions to suppress and objections. 
(1)  Disclosure. Prior to arraignment, the prosecu- 
tion shall disclose to the defense all evidence seized 
from the person or property of the accused, or be- 
lieved to be owned by the accused, that it intends to 
offer into evidence against the accused at trial. 
(2) Motion or objection. 
(A) When evidence has been disclosed under 
subdivision (d)(l), any motion to suppress or objec- 
tion under this rule shall be made by  the defense 
prior to submission of a plea. In the absence of such 
motion or objection, the defense may not raise the is- 
sue at a later time except as permitted by the mili- 
tary judge for good cause shown. Failure to so move 
or object constitutes a waiver of the motion or objec- 
tion. 
(B)  If the prosecution intends to offer evidence 
seized from the person  or property of the accused 
that was not disclosed prior to arraignment, the 
prosecution shall provide timely notice to the mili- 
tary judge  and to counsel for the accused. The de- 
fense may enter an objection at that time and the 
military judge may make such orders as are required 
in the interest of justice. 
(C) If evidence is disclosed as derivative evi- 
dence under this subdivision prior to arraignment, 
any motion to suppress or objection under this rule 
shall be made in accordance with the procedure for 
challenging evidence under (A). If such evidence has 
not been so disclosed prior to arraignment, the re- 
quirements of (B) apply. 
(3)  Specijcity. The military judge may require the 
defense to specify the grounds upon which the de- 
fense moves to suppress or object to evidence. If de- 
fense counsel, despite the exercise of due diligence, 
has been unable to interview adequately those per- 
sons involved in the search or seizure, the military 
judge may enter any order required by  the interests 
M.R.E. 31  1(e)(3) 
of justice, including authorization for the defense to 
make a general motion to suppress or a general ob- 
jection. 
(4) Rulings. A motion to suppress or an objection 
to evidence made prior to plea shall be ruled upon 
prior to plea unless the military judge,  for good 
cause, orders that it be deferred for determination at 
the trial of the general issue or until after findings, 
but no such determination shall be deferred if  a 
party's  right to appeal the ruling is affected ad- 
versely. Where factual issues are involved in ruling 
upon such motion or objection, the military judge 
shall state essential findings of fact on the record. 
(e) Burden of proof: 
(1)  In general.  When an appropriate motion or 
objection has been made by the defense under subdi- 
vision (d), the prosecution has the burden of proving 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence 
was not obtained as a result of an unlawful search or 
seizure, that the evidence would have been obtained 
even if  the unlawful search or seizure had not been 
made, or that the evidence was obtained by  officials 
who reasonably and with good faith relied on the is- 
suance of an authorization to search, seize, or appre- 
hend or a search warrant or an arrest warrant. 
(2)  Derivative evidence. Evidence that is chal- 
lenged under this rule as derivative evidence may be 
admitted against the accused  if  the military judge 
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the ev- 
idence was not obtained as a result of an unlawful 
search or seizure, that the evidence ultimately would 
have been obtained by  lawful means even if  the un- 
lawful search or seizure had not been made, or that 
the evidence was obtained by  officials who reasona- 
bly and with good faith relied on the issuance of an 
authorization to search, seize or apprehend or a 
search warrant or an arrest warrant. Notwithstand- 
ing other provisions of this Rule, an apprehension 
made in a dwelling in a manner that violates R.C.M. 
302 (d)(2) and (e) does not preclude the admission 
into evidence of a statement of an individual appre- 
hended provided  (1) that the apprehension was 
based on probable cause, (2) that the statement was 
made subsequent to the apprehension at a location 
outside the dwelling, and (3) that the statement was 
otherwise in compliance with these rules. 
(3)  Specijc motions or objections. When a specific 
motion or objection has been required under subdi- 
vision (d)(3), the burden on the prosecution extends M.R.E.  31  1(e)(3) 
only to the grounds upon which the defense moved 
to suppress or object to the evidence. 
(f)  Defense evidence. The defense may present evi- 
dence relevant to the admissibility of evidence as to 
which there has been an appropriate motion or ob- 
jection under this rule. An accused may testify for 
the limited purpose of contesting the legality of the 
search or seizure giving rise to the challenged evi- 
dence. Prior to the introduction of such testimony 
by the accused, the defense shall inform the military 
judge that the testimony is offered under this subdi- 
vision. When the accused testifies under this subdivi- 
sion, the accused may be cross-examined only as to 
the matter on which he or she testifies. Nothing said 
by the accused on either direct or cross-examination 
may be used against the accused for any purpose 
other than in a prosecution for perjury, false swear- 
ing, or the making of a false official statement. 
(g)  Scope of motions and objections challenging 
probable cause. 
(1)  Generally. If the defense challenges evidence 
seized pursuant to a search warrant or search au- 
thorization on the grounds that the warrant or au- 
thorization was not based upon probable cause, the 
evidence relevant to the motion is limited to evi- 
dence concerning the information actually presented 
to  or otherwise known by the authorizing officer, ex- 
cept as provided in paragraph (2). 
(2) False statements. If the defense makes a sub- 
stantial preliminary showing that a government 
agent included a false statement knowingly and in- 
tentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth in 
the information presented to the authorizing officer, 
and if  the allegedly false statement is necessary to 
the finding of probable cause, the defense, upon re- 
quest, shall be entitled to a hearing. At the hearing, 
the defense has the burden of establishing by a pre- 
ponderance of the evidence the allegation of falsity 
or reckless disregard for the truth. If the defense 
meets its burden, the prosecution has the burden of 
proving by  a preponderance of the evidence, with 
the false information set aside, that the remaining in- 
formation presented to the authorizing officer is suf- 
ficient to establish probable cause. If the prosecution 
does not meet its burden, the objection or motion 
shall be granted unless the search is otherwise lawful 
under these rules. 
(h)  Objections to evidence seized unlawfully. If a de- 
fense motion or objection under this rule is sustained 
in whole or in part, the members may not be in- 
formed of that fact except insofar as the military 
judge must instruct the members to disregard evi- 
dence. 
(i)  Effect  of guilty plea.  Except as otherwise ex- 
pressly provided in R.C.M. 910(a)(2), a plea of 
guilty to an offense that results in a finding of guilty 
waives all issues under the Fourth Amendment to 
the Constitution  of  the United  States and 
Mil.R.Evid. 3 11-3  17 with respect to the offense 
whether or not raised prior to plea. 
Rule 312.  Body views and intrusions 
(a)  General rule. Evidence obtained from body 
views and intrusions conducted in accordance with 
this rule is admissible at trial when relevant and not 
otherwise inadmissible under these rules. 
(b)  Visual examination of the body. 
(1)  Consensual. Visual examination of the un- 
clothed body may be made with the consent of the 
individual subject to the inspection in accordance 
with Mil.R.Evid. 3  14(e). 
(2)  Involuntary.  An  involuntary display of the 
unclothed body, including a visual examination of 
body cavities, may be required only if conducted in 
reasonable fashion and authorized under the follow- 
ing provisions of the Military Rules of Evidence: in- 
spections and inventories under Mil.R.Evid. 3 13; 
searches under Mil.R.Evid. 314(b) and 314(c) if 
there is a reasonable suspicion that weapons, contra- 
band, or evidence of crime is concealed on the body 
of the person to be searched; searches within jails 
and similar facilities under Mil.R.Evid. 314(h) if 
reasonably necessary to maintain the security of the 
institution or its personnel; searches incident to law- 
ful apprehension under Mil.R.Evid. 3  14(g); emer- 
gency searches under Mil.R.Evid. 3  14(i); and proba- 
ble cause searches under Mil.R.Evid.  315. An 
examination of the unclothed body under this rule 
should be conducted whenever practicable by a per- 
son of the same sex as that of the person being ex- 
amined; provided, however, that failure to comply 
with this requirement does not make an examination 
an unlawful  search within  the meaning  of 
Mil.R.Evid. 3  1  1. 
(c)  Intrusion into body cavities. A reasonable non- 
consensual physical intrusion into the mouth, nose, 
and ears may be made when a visual examination of 
the body under subdivision (b) is permissible. Non- consensual intrusions into other body cavities may 
be made: 
(1)  For purposes of seizure. When there is a clear 
indication that weapons, contraband, or other evi- 
dence or crime is present, to remove weapons, con- 
traband, or evidence of crime discovered under sub- 
divisions (b) and (c)(2) of this rule or under 
Mil.R.Evid. 316(d)(4)(C) if such intrusion is made 
in a reasonable fashion by a'person with appropriate 
medical qualifications; or 
(2) For purposes of search. To search for weapons, 
contraband, or evidence of crime if authorized by a 
search warrant or search authorization under 
Mil.R.Evid. 315 and conducted by a person with ap- 
propriate medical qualifications. 
Notwithstanding  this rule, a  search  under 
Mil.R.Evid. 314(h) may be made without a search 
warrant or authorization if such search is based on a 
reasonable suspicion that the individual is conceal- 
ing weapons, contraband, or evidence of crime. 
(d) Extraction of body juids. Nonconsensual ex- 
traction of body fluids, including blood and urine, 
may be made from the body of an individual pursu- 
ant to a search warrant or a search authorization 
under Mil.R.Evid. 315. Nonconsensual extraction 
of body fluids may be made without such warrant or 
authorization, notwithstanding Mil.R.Evid. 315(g), 
only when there is clear indication that evidence of 
crime will be found and that there is reason to be- 
lieve that the delay that would result if a warrant or 
authorization were sought could result in the de- 
struction of the evidence. Involuntary extraction of 
body fluids under this rule must be done in a reason- 
able fashion by a person with appropriate medical 
qualifications. 
(e)  Other intrusive searches. Nonconsensual intru- 
sive searches of the body made to locate or obtain 
weapons, contraband, or evidence of crime and not 
within the scope of subdivisions (b) or (c) may be 
made only upon search warrant or search authoriza- 
tion under Mil.R.Evid. 315 and only if such search is 
conducted in a reasonable fashion by a person with 
appropriate medical qualifications and does not en- 
danger the health of the person to be searched. Com- 
pelling a person to ingest substances for the purposes 
of locating the property described above or to com- 
pel the bodily elimination of such property is a 
search within the meaning of this section. Notwith- 
standing this rule, a person who is neither a suspect 
M.R.E. 313(b) 
nor an accused may not be compelled to submit to 
an intrusive search of the body for the sole purpose 
of obtaining evidence of crime. 
(f)  Intrusions for  valid medical purposes. Nothing in 
this rule shall be deemed to interfere with the lawful 
authority of the armed forces to take whatever ac- 
tion may be necessary to preserve the health of a ser- 
vicemember. Evidence or contraband obtained from 
an examination or intrusion conducted for a valid 
medical purpose may be seized and is not evidence 
obtained from an unlawful search or seizure within 
the meaning of Mil.R.Evid. 311. 
(g)  Medical qualifications. The Secretary concerned 
may prescribe appropriate medical qualifications for 
persons who conduct searches and seizures under 
this rule. 
Rule 313.  Inspections and inventories in the 
armed forces 
(a)  General rule. Evidence obtained from inspec- 
tions and inventories in the armed forces conducted 
in accordance with this rule is admissible at trial 
when relevant and not otherwise inadmissible under 
these rules. 
(b) Inspections. An "inspection"  is an examination 
of the whole or part of a unit, organization, installa- 
tion, vessel, aircraft, or vehicle, including an exami- 
nation conducted at entrance and exit points, con- 
ducted as an incident of command the primary 
purpose of which is to determine and to ensure the 
security, military fitness, or good order and disci- 
pline of the unit, organization, installation, vessel, 
aircraft, or vehicle. An inspection may include but is 
not limited to an examination to determine and to 
ensure that any or all of the following requirements 
are met: that the command is properly equipped, 
functioning properly, maintaining proper standards 
of readiness, sea or airworthiness, sanitation and 
cleanliness, and that personnel are present, fit, and 
ready for duty. An inspection also includes an exam- 
ination to locate and confiscate unlawful weapons 
and other contraband. An order to produce body 
fluids, such as urine, is permissible in accordance 
with this rule. An examination made for the primary 
purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a trial by 
court-martial or in other disciplinary proceedings is 
not an inspection within the meaning of this rule. If 
a purpose of an examination is to locate weapons or 
contraband, and if: (1) the examination was directed M.R.E. 313(b) 
immediately following a report of a specific offense 
in the unit, organization, installation, vessel, air- 
craft, or vehicle and was not previously scheduled; 
(2) specific individuals are selected for examination; 
or (3) persons examined are subjected to substan- 
tially different intrusions during the same examina- 
tion, the prosecution must prove by clear and con- 
vincing evidence that the examination was an 
inspection within the meaning of this rule. Inspec- 
tions shall be conducted in a reasonable fashion and 
shall comply with Mil.R.Evid. 3  12, if applicable. In- 
spections may utilize any reasonable natural or tech- 
nological aid and may be conducted with or without 
notice to those inspected. Unlawful weapons, con- 
traband, or other evidence of crime located during 
an inspection may be seized. 
(c)  Inventories. Unlawful weapons, contraband, or 
other evidence of crime discovered in the process of 
an inventory, the primary purpose of which is ad- 
ministrative in nature, may be seized. Inventories 
shall be conducted in a reasonable fashion and shall 
comply with Mil.R.Evid. 312, if applicable. An ex- 
amination made for the primary purpose of ob- 
taining evidence for use in a trial by court-martial or 
in other disciplinary proceedings is not an inventory 
within the meaning of this rule. 
Rule 314.  Searches not requiring probable 
cause 
(a)  General rule. Evidence obtained from reasona- 
ble searches not requiring probable cause conducted 
pursuant to this rule is admissible at trial when rele- 
vant and not otherwise inadmissible under these 
rules. 
(b)  Border searches. Border searches for customs or 
immigration purposes may be conducted when au- 
thorized by Act of Congress. 
(c)  Searches upon entry to or exit  from United States 
installations, aircraft, and vessels abroad. In addition 
to the authority to conduct inspections under 
Mil.R.Evid. 3  13(b), a commander of a United States 
military installation, enclave, or aircraft on foreign 
soil, or in foreign or international airspace, or a 
United States vessel in foreign or international wa- 
ters, may authorize appropriate personnel to search 
persons or the property of such persons upon entry 
to or exit from the installation, enclave, aircraft, or 
vessel to ensure the security, military fitness, or good 
order and discipline of the command. Such searches 
may not be conducted at a time or in a manner con- 
trary to an express provision of a treaty or agree- 
ment to which the United States is a party. Failure 
to comply with a treaty or agreement, however, does 
not render a search unlawful within the meaning of 
Mil.R.Evid. 3 1  1. A search made for the primary 
purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a trial by 
court-martial or other disciplinary proceeding is not 
authorized by this subdivision. 
(d) Searches of government property.  Government 
property may be searched under this rule unless the 
person to whom the property is issued or assigned 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy therein at 
the time of the search. Under normal circumstances, 
a person does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in government property that is not issued for 
personal use. Wall or floor lockers in living quarters 
issued for the purpose of storing personal posses- 
sions normally are issued for personal use; but the 
determination as to whether a person has a reasona- 
ble expectation of privacy in government property 
issued for personal use depends on the facts and cir- 
cumstances at the time of the search. 
(e)  Consent searches. 
(1)  General rule. Searches may be conducted of 
any person or property with lawful consent. 
(2)  Who  may consent. A person may consent to a 
search of his or her person or property, or both, un- 
less control over such property has been given to an- 
other. A person may grant consent to search prop- 
erty when the person exercises control over that 
property. 
(3)  Scope of consent. Consent may be limited in 
any way by the person granting consent, including 
limitations in terms of time, place, or property and 
may be withdrawn at any time. 
(4)  Voluntariness. To be valid, consent must be 
given voluntarily. Voluntariness is a question to be 
determined from all the circumstances. Although a 
person's knowledge of the right to refuse to give con- 
sent is a factor to be considered in determining vol- 
untariness, the prosecution  is not required to 
demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to es- 
tablishing a voluntary consent. Mere submission to 
the color of authority of personnel performing law 
enforcement duties or acquiescence in an announced 
or indicated purpose to search is not a voluntary 
consent. (5)  Burden of pro08  Consent must be shown by 
clear and convincing evidence. The fact that a per- 
son was in custody while granting consent is a factor 
to be considered in determining the voluntariness of 
consent, but it does not affect the burden of proof. 
(0 Searches incident to a lawful stop. 
(1)  Stops. A person authorized to apprehend 
under R.C.M. 302(b) and others performing law en- 
forcement duties may stop another person tempora- 
rily when the person making the stop has informa- 
tion or observes unusual conduct that leads him or 
her reasonably to conclude in light of his or her ex- 
perience that criminal activity may be afoot. The 
purpose of the stop must be investigatory in nature. 
(2)  Frisks. When a lawful stop is performed, the 
person stopped may be frisked for weapons when 
that person is reasonably believed to be armed and 
presently dangerous. Contraband or evidence lo- 
cated in the process of a lawful frisk may be seized. 
(3) Motor  vehicles.  When a person lawfully 
stopped is the driver or a passenger in a motor vehi- 
cle, the passenger compartment of the vehicle may 
be searched for weapons if the official who made the 
stop has a reasonable belief that the person stopped 
is dangerous and that the person stopped may gain 
immediate control of a weapon. 
(g)  Searches incident to a lawful apprehension. 
(1)  General rule. A person who has been lawfully 
apprehended may be searched. 
(2)  Search for  weapons and destructible evidence. 
A search may be conducted for weapons or destruc- 
tible evidence, in the area within the immediate con- 
trol of a person who has been apprehended. The area 
within the person's "immediate control" is the area 
which the individual searching could reasonably be- 
lieve that the person apprehended could reach with a 
sudden movement to obtain such property; pro- 
vided, that the passenger compartment of an auto- 
mobile, and containers within the passenger com- 
partment may be searched as a contemporaneous 
incident of the apprehension of an occupant of the 
automobile, regardless whether the person appre- 
hended has been removed from the vehicle. 
(3)  Examination for  other persons.  When an ap- 
prehension takes place at a location in which other 
persons reasonably might be present who might in- 
terfere with the apprehension or endanger those ap- 
prehending, a reasonable examination may be made 
M.R.E. 315(c)(2) 
of the general area in which such other persons 
might be located. 
(h) Searches within jails,  confinement facilities,  or 
similar facilities.  Searches within jails, confinement 
facilities, or similar facilities may be authorized by 
persons with authority over the institution. 
(i)  Emergency searches to save life or for  related pur- 
poses. In emergency circumstances to save life or for 
a related purpose, a search may be conducted of per- 
sons or property in a good faith effort to render im- 
mediate medical aid, to obtain information that will 
assist in the rendering of such aid, or to prevent im- 
mediate or ongoing personal injury. 
(j)  Searches of open fields or woodlands. A search of 
open fields or woodlands is not an unlawful search 
within the meaning of Mil.R.Evid. 3  1  1. 
(k)  Other searches. A search of a type not otherwise 
included in this rule and not requiring probable 
cause under Mil.R.Evid.  315 may be conducted 
when permissible under the Constitution of  the 
United States as applied to members of the armed 
forces. 
Rule 315.  Probable cause searches 
(a)  General rule. Evidence obtained from searches 
requiring probable cause conducted in accordance 
with this rule is admissible at trial when relevant and 
not otherwise inadmissible under these rules. 
(b)  Definitions. As used in these rules: 
(1) Authorization to search. An "authorization to 
search" is an express permission, written or oral, is- 
sued by competent military authority to search a 
person or an area for specified property or evidence 
or for a specific person and to seize such property, 
evidence, or person. It may contain an order di- 
recting subordinate personnel to conduct a search in 
a specified manner. 
(2)  Search warrant. A "search warrant" is an ex- 
press permission to search and seize issued by  com- 
petent civilian authority. 
(c)  Scope of authorization. A search authorization 
may be issued under this rule for a search of: 
(1)  Persons. The person of anyone subject to mili- 
tary law or the law of war wherever found; 
(2)  Military property.  Military property of the 
United States or of nonappropriated fund activities 
of an armed force of the United States wherever lo- 
cated; M.R.E. 315(c)(3) 
(3)  Persons and property within military control. 
Persons or property situated on or in a military in- 
stallation, encampment, vessel, aircraft, vehicle, or 
any other location under military control, wherever 
located; or 
(4)  Nonmilitary property within a foreign  country. 
(A) Property owned, used, occupied by, or in 
the possession  of an agency of the United States 
other than the Department of Defense when situated 
in a foreign country. A search of such property may 
not be conducted without the concurrence of an ap- 
propriate representative of the agency concerned. 
Failure to obtain such concurrence, however, does 
not render a search unlawful within the meaning of 
Mil.R.Evid. 3  11. 
(B) Other property situated in a foreign coun- 
try. If the United States is a party to a treaty or 
agreement that governs a search in a foreign coun- 
try, the search shall be conducted in accordance 
with the treaty or agreement. If there is no treaty or 
agreement, concurrence should be obtained from an 
appropriate representative of the foreign country 
with respect to a search under paragraph (4)(B) of 
this subdivision. Failure to obtain such concurrence 
or noncompliance with a treaty or agreement, how- 
ever, does not render a search unlawful within the 
meaning of Mil.R.Evid. 3 1  1. 
(d)  Power to authorize. Authorization to search pur- 
suant to this rule may be granted by an impartial in- 
dividual in the following categories: 
(1)  Commander. A commander or other person 
serving in a position designated by the Secretary 
concerned as either a position analogous to an officer 
in charge or a position of command, who has control 
over the place where the property or person to be 
searched is situated or found, or, if that place is not 
under military control, having control over persons 
subject to military law or the law of war; or 
(2)  Military judge. A military judge or magistrate 
if authorized under regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary of Defense or the Secretary concerned. An 
otherwise impartial authorizing official does not lose 
the character merely because he or she is present at 
the scene of a search or is otherwise readily available 
to persons who may seek the issuance of a search au- 
thorization; nor does such an official lose impartial 
character merely because the official previously and 
impartially authorized investigative activities when 
such previous authorization is similar in intent or 
function to a pretrial authorization made by  the 
United States district courts. 
(e)  Power to search. Any commissioned officer, war- 
rant officer, petty officer, noncommissioned officer, 
and, when in the execution of guard or police duties, 
any criminal investigator, member of the Air Force 
security police, military police, or shore patrol, or 
person designated by  proper authority to perform 
guard or police duties, or any agent of any such per- 
son, may conduct or authorize a search when  a 
search authorization has been granted under this 
rule or a search would otherwise be proper under 
subdivision (g). 
(0 Basis for Search authorizations. 
(1)  Probable cause requirement. A search author- 
ization issued under this rule must be based upon 
probable cause. 
(2)  Probable cause determination. Probable cause 
to search exists when there is a reasonable belief that 
the person, property, or evidence sought is located in 
the place or on the person to be search. A search au- 
thorization may be based upon hearsay evidence in 
whole or in part. A determination of probable cause 
under this rule shall be based upon any or all of the 
following: 
(A) Written statements communicated to the 
authorizing officer; 
(B)  Oral statements communicated to the au- 
thorizing official in person,  via telephone, or by 
other appropriate means of communication; or 
(C)  Such information as may be known by the 
authorizing official that would not preclude the of- 
ficer from acting in an impartial fashion. The Secre- 
tary of Defense or the Secretary concerned may pre- 
scribe additional requirements. 
(g)  Exigencies. A search warrant or search authori- 
zation is not required under this rule for a search 
based on probable cause when: 
(1)  Insuficient time. There is a reasonable belief 
that the delay necessary to obtain a search warrant 
or search authorization would result in the removal, 
destruction, or concealment of the property or evi- 
dence sought; 
(2)  Lack of communications. There is a reasona- 
ble military operational necessity that is reasonably 
believed to prohibit or prevent communication with 
a person empowered to grant a search warrant or au- 
thorization and there is a reasonable belief that the 
delay necessary to obtain a search warrant or search authorization would result in the removal, destruc- 
tion, or concealment of the property or evidence 
sought; 
(3)  Search of operable vehicle. An operable vehi- 
cle is to be searched, except in the circumstances 
where a search warrant or authorization is required 
by the Constitution of the United States, this Man- 
ual, or these rules; or 
(4)  Not required  by the Constitution. A search 
warrant or authorization is not otherwise required 
by the Constitution of the United States as applied to 
members of the armed forces. For purpose of this 
rule, a vehicle is "operable"  unless a reasonable per- 
son would have known at the time of search that the 
vehicle was not functional for purposes of transpor- 
tation. 
(h)  Execution. 
(1)  Notice. If the person whose property is to be 
searched is present during a search conducted pur- 
suant to a search authorization granted under this 
rule, the person conducting the search should when 
possible notify him or her of the act of authorization 
and the general substance of the authorization. Such 
notice may be made prior to or contemporaneously 
with the search. Failure to provide such notice does 
not make a search unlawful within the meaning of 
Mil.R.Evid. 311. 
(2)  Inventory. Under regulations prescribed  by 
the Secretary concerned, and with such exceptions 
as may be authorized by the Secretary, an inventory 
of the property seized shall be made at the time of a 
seizure under this rule or as soon as practicable 
thereafter. At an appropriate time, a copy of the in- 
ventory shall be given to a person from whose pos- 
session or premises the property was taken. Failure 
to make an inventory, furnish a copy thereof, or oth- 
erwise comply with this paragraph does not render a 
search or seizure unlawful within the meaning of 
Mil.R.Evid. 31 1. 
(3)  Foreign searches. Execution of a search au- 
thorization outside the United States and within the 
jurisdiction  of a foreign nation should be in con- 
formity with existing agreements between  the 
United States and the foreign nation. Noncompli- 
ance with such an agreement does not make an oth- 
erwise lawful search unlawful. 
(4)  Search warrants. Any civilian or military 
criminal investigator authorized to request search 
warrants pursuant to applicable law or regulation is 
M.R.E. 316(d)(4)(C) 
authorized to serve and execute search warrants. 
The execution of a search warrant affects admissibil- 
ity only insofar as exclusion of evidence is required 
by the Constitution of the United States or an appli- 
cable Act of Congress. 
Rule 316.  Seizures 
(a)  General rule. Evidence obtained from seizures 
conducted in accordance with this rule is admissible 
at trial if the evidence was not obtained as a result of 
an unlawful search and if the evidence is relevant 
and not otherwise inadmissible under these rules. 
(b) Seizure of property. Probable cause to seize prop- 
erty or evidence exists when there is a reasonable be- 
lief that the property or evidence is an unlawful 
weapon, contraband, evidence of crime, or might be 
used to resist apprehension or to escape. 
(c) Apprehension. Apprehension is governed by 
R.C.M. 302. 
(d) Seizure of property or evidence. 
(1)  Abandoned property.  Abandoned property 
may be seized without probable cause and without a 
search warrant or search authorization. Such 
seizure may be made by any person. 
(2)  Consent. Property or evidence may be seized 
with consent consistent with the requirements appli- 
cable to consensual searches under Mil.R.Evid. 314. 
(3)  Government property. Government property 
may be seized without probable cause and without a 
search warrant or search authorization by any per- 
son listed in subdivision (e), unless the person to 
whom the property is issued or assigned has a rea- 
sonable expectation of privacy therein, as provided 
in Mil.R.Evid. 314(d), at the time of the seizure. 
(4)  Other property. Property or evidence not in- 
cluded in paragraph (1)-(3) may be seized for use in 
evidence by any person listed in subdivision (e) if: 
(A) Authorization. The person is authorized to 
seize the property or evidence by a search warrant or 
a search authorization under Mil.R.Evid. 315; 
(B)  Exigent circumstances. The person has 
probable cause to seize the property or evidence and 
under Mil.R.Evid. 315(g) a search warrant or search 
authorization is not required; or 
(C)  Plain view. The person while in the course 
of otherwise lawful activity observes in a reasonable 
fashion property or evidence that the person has 
probable cause to seize. M.R.E. 316(d)(5) 
(5)  Temporary detention.  Nothing in  this rule 
shall prohibit temporary detention of property on 
less than probable cause when authorized under the 
Constitution of the United States. 
(e)  Power to seize. Any commissioned officer, war- 
rant officer, petty officer, noncommissioned officer, 
and, when in the execution of guard or police duties, 
any criminal investigator, member of the Air Force 
security police, military police, or shore patrol, or 
individual designated by proper authority to per- 
form guard or police duties, or any agent of any such 
person, may seize property pursuant to this rule. 
(f)  Other seizures. A seizure of a type not otherwise 
included in this rule may be made when permissible 
under the Constitution of the United States as ap- 
plied to members of the armed forces. 
Rule 317.  Interception of wire and oral 
communications 
(a)  General rule. Wire or oral communications con- 
stitute evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful 
search or seizure within the meaning of Mil.R.Evid. 
3 11 when such evidence must be excluded under the 
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States as applied to members of the armed 
forces or if such evidence must be excluded under a 
statute applicable to members of the armed forces. 
(b) Authorization for  judicial  applications in the 
United States. Under 18 U.S.C.  25 16(1), the Attor- 
ney General, or any Assistant Attorney General spe- 
cially designated by the Attorney General may au- 
thorize an application  to a  federal judge  of 
competent jurisdiction  for, and such judge  may 
grant in conformity with 18 U.S.C.  251 8, an order 
authorizing or approving the interception of wire or 
oral communications by the Department of Defense, 
the Department of Transportation, or any Military 
Department for purposes of obtaining evidence con- 
cerning the offenses enumerated in  18 U.S.C. § 
25 16(1), to the extent such offenses are punishable 
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
(c) Regulations. Notwithstanding any other provi- 
sion of these rules, members of the armed forces or 
their agents may not intercept wire or oral commu- 
nications for law enforcement purposes unless such 
interception: 
(1)  takes place in the United States and is author- 
ized under subdivision (b); 
(2)  takes place outside the United States and is 
authorized under regulations issued by the Secretary 
of Defense or the Secretary concerned; or 
(3)  is authorized under regulations issued by the 
Secretary of Defense or the Secretary concerned and 
is not unlawful under 18 U.S.C.  25 1  1. 
Rule 321.  Eyewitness identification 
(a)  General rule. 
(1) Admissibility. Testimony concerning a rele- 
vant out of court identification by any person is ad- 
missible, subject to an appropriate objection under 
this rule, if such testimony is otherwise admissible 
under these rules. The witness making the identifica- 
tion and any person who has observed the previous 
identification may testify concerning it. When in tes- 
timony a witness identifies the accused as being, or 
not being, a participant in an offense or makes any 
other relevant identification concerning a person in 
the courtroom, evidence that on a previous occasion 
the witness made a similar identification is admissi- 
ble to corroborate the witness' testimony as to iden- 
tity even if the credibility of the witness has not been 
attacked directly, subject to appropriate objection 
under this rule. 
(2)  Exclusionary rule. An identification of the ac- 
cused as being a participant in an offense, whether 
such identification is made at the trial or otherwise, 
is inadmissible against the accused if: 
(A) The accused makes a timely motion to sup- 
press or an objection to the evidence under this rule 
and if the identification is the result of an unlawful 
lineup or other unlawful identification process con- 
ducted by the United States or other domestic au- 
thorities; or 
(B)  Exclusion of the evidence is required by the 
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States as applied to mem- 
bers of the armed forces. Evidence other than an 
identification of the accused that is obtained as a re- 
sult of the unlawful lineup or unlawful identification 
process is inadmissible against the accused if the ac- 
cused makes a timely motion to suppress or an ob- 
jection to the evidence under this rule and if  exclu- 
sion of  the evidence is required  under the 
Constitution of the United States as applied to mem- 
bers of the armed forces. (b)  Definition of "unlawful". 
(1)  Lineups and other identification processes.  A 
lineup or other identification process is "unlawful" if 
the identification  is unreliable. An identification  is 
unreliable if the lineup or other identification  pro- 
cess, under the circumstances, is so suggestive as to 
create a substantial likelihood of misidentification. 
(2)  Lineups: right to counsel. A lineup is "unlaw- 
ful"  if it is conducted in violation of the following 
rights to counsel: 
(A) Military lineups. An accused or suspect is 
entitled to counsel if, after preferral of charges or im- 
position of pretrial restraint under R.C.M. 304 for 
the offense under investigation, the accused is sub- 
jected by  persons subject to the code or their agents 
to a lineup for the purpose of identification. When a 
person entitled to counsel under this rule requests 
counsel, a judge advocate or a person certified in ac- 
cordance with Article 27(b) shall be provided by the 
United States at no expense to the accused or suspect 
and without regard to indigency or lack thereof 
before the lineup may proceed. The accused or sus- 
pect may waive the rights provided in this rule if the 
waiver is freely, knowingly, and intelligently made. 
(B)  Nonmilitary lineups. When a person sub- 
ject to the code is subjected to a lineup for purposes 
of identification by an official or agent of the United 
States, of the District of Columbia, or of a State, 
Commonwealth, or possession of the United States, 
or any political subdivision of such a State, Com- 
monwealth, or possession, and the provisions of par- 
agraph (A) do not apply, the person's entitlement to 
counsel and the validity of any waiver of applicable 
rights shall be determined by the principles of law 
generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in 
the United States district courts involving similar 
lineups. 
(c)  Motions to suppress and objections. 
(1)  Disclosure. Prior to arraignment, the prosecu- 
tion shall disclose to the defense all evidence of a 
prior identification  of  the accused as a lineup or 
other identification  process that it intends to offer 
into evidence against the accused at trial. 
(2)  Motion or objection. 
(A) When such evidence has been disclosed, 
any motion to suppress or objection under this rule 
shall be made by the defense prior to submission of a 
plea. In the absence of such motion or objection, the 
M.R.E. 321(d)(l) 
defense may not raise the issue at a later time except 
as permitted by  the military judge for good cause 
shown. Failure to so move constitutes a waiver of 
the motion or objection. 
(B)  If the prosecution intends to offer such evi- 
dence and the evidence was not disclosed prior to ar- 
raignment, the prosecution shall provide timely no- 
tice to the military judge and counsel for the 
accused. The defense may enter an objection at that 
time and the military judge may make such orders as 
are required in the interests of justice. 
(C)  If evidence is disclosed as derivative evi- 
dence under this subdivision prior to arraignment, 
any motion to suppress or objection under this rule 
shall be made in accordance with the procedure for 
challenging evidence under (A). If such evidence has 
not been so disclosed prior to arraignment, the re- 
quirements of (B) apply. 
(3)  Specificity. The military judge may require the 
defense to specify the grounds upon which the de- 
fense moves to suppress or object to evidence. If de- 
fense counsel, despite the exercise of due diligence, 
has been unable to interview adequately those per- 
sons involved in the lineup or other identification 
process, the military judge may enter any order re- 
quired by the interests of justice, including authori- 
zation for the defense to make a general motion to 
suppress or a general objection. 
(d)  Burden of pro05  When a specific motion or ob- 
jection  has been required under subdivision (c)(3), 
the burden on the prosecution extends only to the 
grounds upon which the defense moved to suppress 
or object to the evidence. When an appropriate ob- 
jection under this rule has been made by the defense, 
the issue shall be determined by the military judge as 
follows: 
(1)  Right to counsel. When an objection raises the 
right to presence of counsel under this rule, the pros- 
ecution must prove by a preponderance of the evi- 
dence that counsel was present at the lineup or that 
the accused, having been advised of the right to the 
presence of  counsel, voluntarily and intelligently 
waived that right prior to the lineup. When the mili- 
tary judge determines that an identification is the re- 
sult of  a lineup conducted without the presence of 
counsel or an appropriate waiver, any later identifi- 
cation by one present at such unlawful lineup is also 
a result thereof unless the military judge determines M.R.E. 321(d)(l) 

that the contrary has been shown by clear and con- 
vincing evidence. 
(2)  Unreliable identification. When an objection 
raises the issue of an unreliable identification, the 
prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the identification was reliable under 
the circumstances; provided,  however, that if the 
military judge finds the evidence of identification 
inadmissible under this subdivision, a later identifi- 
cation may be admitted if the prosecution proves by 
clear and convincing evidence that the later identifi- 
cation is not the result of the inadmissible identifica- 
tion. 
(e) Defense evidence. The defense may present evi- 
dence relevant to the issue of the admissibility of evi- 
dence as to which there has been an appropriate mo- 
tion or objection under this rule. An accused may 
testify for the limited purpose of contesting the legal- 
ity of the lineup or identification process giving rise 
to the challenged evidence. Prior to the introduction 
of such testimony by the accused, the defense shall 
inform the military judge  that the testimony is of- 
fered under this subdivision. When the accused testi- 
fies under this subdivision, the accused may be cross- 
examined only as to the matter on which he or she 
testifies. Nothing said by the accused on either direct 
or cross-examination may be used against the ac- 
cused for any purpose other than in a prosecution 
for perjury, false swearing, or the making of a false 
official statement. 
(0  Rulings. A motion to suppress or an objection to 
evidence made prior to plea under this rule shall be 
ruled upon prior to plea unless the military judge, 
for good cause, orders that it be deferred for deter- 
mination at the trial of the general issue or until after 
findings, but no such determination shall be deferred 
if a party's  right to appeal the ruling is affected ad- 
versely. Where factual issues are involved in ruling 
upon such motion or objection, the military judge 
shall state his or her essential findings of fact on the 
record. 
(g)  Effect of guilty pleas.  Except as otherwise ex- 
pressly provided in  R.C.M. 910(a)(2), a plea of 
guilty to an offense that results in a finding of guilty 
waives all issues under this rule with respect to that 
offense whether or not raised prior to the plea. 
SECTION IV 
RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS 
Rule 401.  Definition of "relevant evidence" 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable that it would be without 
the evidence. 
Rule 402.  Relevant evidence general 
admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as oth- 
erwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States as applied to members of the armed forces, the 
code, these rules, this Manual, or any Act of Con- 
gress applicable to members of the armed forces. Ev- 
idence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403.  Exclusion of relevant evidence on 
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of 
time 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the members, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404.  Character evidence not admissible 
to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes 
(a)  Character evidence generally. Evidence of a per- 
son's character or a trait of a person's  character is 
not admissible for the purpose of proving that the 
person acted in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion, except: 
(1)  Character of the accused. Evidence of a perti- 
nent trait of the character of the accused offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2)  Character of victim. Evidence of  a pertinent 
trait of  character of the victim of the crime offered 
by an accused, or by the prosecution  to rebut the 
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness 
of the victim offered by  the prosecution  in  a homi- 
cide or assault case to rebut evidence that the victim 
was an aggressor; M.R.E. 410(a)(2) 
(3)  Character of witness. Evidence of the charac- 
ter of a witness, as provided in Mil.R.Evid. 607, 608, 
and 609. 
(b)  Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that the per- 
son acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, 
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or acci- 
dent. 
Rule 405.  Methods of proving character 
(a)  Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evi- 
dence of character or a trait of character of a person 
is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to 
reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. 
On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into rele- 
vant specific instances of conduct. 
(b) SpeciJic instances of conduct. In cases in which 
character or a trait of character of a person is an es- 
sential element of an offense or defense, proof may 
also be made of specific instances of the person's 
conduct. 
(c)  Afidavits. The defense may introduce affidavits 
or other written statements of persons other than the 
accused concerning the character of the accused. If 
the defense introduces affidavits or other written 
statements under this subdivision, the prosecution' 
may, in rebuttal, also introduce affidavits or other 
written statements regarding the character of the ac- 
cused. Evidence of this type may be introduced by 
the defense or prosecution only if, aside from being 
contained in an affidavit or other written statement, 
it would otherwise be admissible under these rules. 
(d) Definitions. "Reputation"  means the estimation 
in which a person generally is held in the community 
in which the person lives or pursues a business or 
profession. "Community"  in the armed forces in- 
cludes a post, camp, ship, station, or other military 
organization regardless of size. 
Rule 406.  Habit; routine practice 
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine 
practice of an organization, whether corroborated or 
not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is 
relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or 
organization on a particular occasion was in con- 
formity with the habit or routine practice. 
Rule 407.  Subsequent remedial measures 
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if 
taken previously, would have made the event less 
likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures 
is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable 
conduct in connection with the event. This rule does 
not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent 
measures when offered for another purpose, such as 
proving ownership, control, or feasibility or precau- 
tionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment. 
Rule 408.  Compromise and offer to 
compromise 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promis- 
ing to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promis- 
ing to accept, a valuable consideration in compro- 
mising or attempting to compromise a claim which 
was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not 
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the 
claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or state- 
ments made in compromise negotiations is likewise 
not admissible. This rule does not require the exclu- 
sion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely 
because it is presented in the course of compromise 
negotiations. This rule also does not require exclu- 
sion when the evidence is offered for another pur- 
pose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, 
negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an 
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prose- 
cution. 
Rule 409.  Payment of medical and similar 
expenses 
Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to 
pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses occa- 
sioned by an injury is not admissible to prove liabil- 
ity for the injury. 
Rule 410.  Inadmissibility of pleas, plea 
discussions, and related statements 
(a)  In general. Except as otherwise provided in this 
rule, evidence of the following is not admissible in 
any court-martial proceeding against the accused 
who made the plea or was a participant in the plea 
discussions: 
(1)  a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn; 
(2)  a plea of nolo contendere; M.R.E. 410(a)(3) 
(3)  any statement made in the course of any judi- 
cial inquiry regarding either of the foregoing pleas; 
or 
(4)  any statement made in the course of plea dis- 
cussions with the convening authority, staff judge 
advocate, trial counsel or other counsel for the Gov- 
ernment which do not result in a plea of guilty or 
which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn. 
However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any 
proceeding where in another statement made in the 
course of the same plea or plea discussions has been 
introduced and the statement ought in fairness be 
considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a 
court-martial proceedings for perjury or false state- 
ment if the statement was made by  the accused 
under oath, on the record and in the presence of 
counsel. 
(b)  Definitions.  A "statement made in the course of 
plea discussions"inc1udes  a statement made by the 
accused solely for the purpose of requesting disposi- 
tion under an authorized procedure for administra- 
tive action in lieu of trial by court-martial; "on  the 
record" includes the written statement submitted by 
the accused in furtherance of such request. 
Rule 41  1.  Liability insurance 
Evidence that a person was or was not insured 
against liability is not admissible upon the issue 
whether the person acted negligently or otherwise 
wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion 
of evidence of insurance against liability when of- 
fered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, 
ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a wit- 
ness. 
Rule 412.  Nonconsensual sexual offenses; 
relevance of victim's past behavior 
(a)  Notwithstanding any other provision of these 
rules or this Manual, in a case in which a person is 
accused of a nonconsensual sexual offense, reputa- 
tion or opinion evidence of the part sexual behavior 
of an alleged victim of such nonconsensual sexual of- 
fense is not admissible. 
(b)  Notwithstanding any other provision of these 
rules or this Manual, in a case in which a person is 
accused of  a nonconsensual sexual offense, evidence 
of a victim's past sexual behavior other than reputa- 
tion or opinion evidence is also not admissible, un- 
less such evidence other than reputation or opinion 
evidence is- 
(1)  admitted in accordance with subdivisions 
(c)(l) and (c)(2) and is constitutionally required to 
be admitted; or 
(2)  admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) 
and is evidence of- 
(A) past sexual behavior with persons other 
than the accused, offered by the accused upon the is- 
sue of whether the accused was or was not, with re- 
spect to the alleged victim, the source of semen or in- 
jury; or 
(B)  past sexual behavior with the accused and 
is offered by the accused upon the issue of whether 
the alleged victim consented to the sexual behavior 
with respect to which the nonconsensual sexual of- 
fense is alleged. 
(c)(l)  If the person accused of committing a non- 
consensual sexual offense intends to offer under sub- 
division (b) evidence of specific instances of the al- 
leged victim's past sexual behavior, the accused shall 
serve notice thereof on the military judge and the 
trial counsel. 
(2)  The  notice described in paragraph (1) shall be 
accompanied by an offer of proof. If the military 
judge determines that the offer of proof contains evi- 
dence described in subdivision (b), the military judge 
shall conduct a hearing, which may be closed, to de- 
termine if such evidence is admissible. At such hear- 
ings the parties may call witnesses, including the al- 
leged victim, and offer relevant evidence. In a case 
before a court-martial composed of a military judge 
and members, the military judge shall conduct such 
hearings outside the presence of the members pursu- 
ant to Article 39(a). 
(3)  If the military judge determines on the basis 
of the hearing described in paragraph (2) that the ev- 
idence which the accused seeks to offer is relevant 
and that the probative value of such evidence out- 
weighs the danger of unfair prejudice, such evidence 
shall be admissible in the trial to the extent an order 
made by the military judge specifies evidence which 
may be offered and areas with respect to which the 
alleged victim may be examined or cross-examined. 
(d)  For purposes of this rule, the term "past sexual 
behavior" means sexual behavior other than the sex- 
ual behavior with respect to which a nonconsensual 
sexual offense is alleged. (e)  A "nonconsensual sexual offense" is a sexual of- 
fense in which consent by the victim is an affirmative 
defense or in which the lack of consent is an element 
of the offense. This term includes rape, forcible sod- 
omy, assault with intent to commit rape or forcible 
sodomy, indecent assault, and attempt to commit 
such offenses. 
SECTION V 

PRIVILEGES 

Rule 501.  General rule 
(a)  A person may not claim a privilege with respect 
to any matter except as required by  or provided for 
in: 
(1)  The Constitution of the United States as ap- 
plied to members of the armed forces; 
(2)  An  Act of Congress applicable to trials by 
courts-martial; 
(3)  These rules or this Manual; or 
(4)  The principles of common law generally rec- 
ognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United 
States district courts pursuant to rule 501 of the Fed- 
eral Rules of Evidence insofar as the application of 
such principles in trials by courts-martial is practi- 
cable and not contrary to or inconsistent with the 
code, these rules, or this Manual. 
(b)  A claim of privilege includes, but is not lim- 
ited to, the assertion by any person of a privilege to: 
(1)  Refuse to be a witness; 
(2)  Refuse to disclose any matter; 
(3)  Refuse to produce any object or writing; or 
(4)  Prevent another from being a witness or dis- 
closing any matter or producing any object or writ- 
ing. 
(c)  The term "person"  includes an appropriate rep- 
resentative of the Federal Government, a State, or 
political  subdivision thereof, or any other entity 
claiming to be the holder of a privilege. 
(d)  Notwithstanding any other provision of these 
rules, information not otherwise privileged does not 
become privileged on the basis that it was acquired 
by a medical officer or civilian physician in a profes- 
sional capacity. 
Rule 502.  Lawyer-client privilege 
(a)  General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege 
to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person 
from disclosing confidential communications made 
M.R.E.  502(c) 
for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of profes- 
sional legal services to the client, (1) between the cli- 
ent or the client's representative and the lawyer or 
the lawyer's  representative, (2) between the lawyer 
and the lawyer's representative, (3) by the client or 
the client's lawyer to a lawyer representing another 
in a matter of common interest, (4) between repre- 
sentatives of the client or between the client and a 
representative of the client, or (5) between lawyers 
representing the client. 
(b)  Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1)  A "client" is a person, public officer, corpora- 
tion, association, organization, or other entity, ei- 
ther public or private, who receives professional le- 
gal services from a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer 
with a view to obtaining professional legal services 
from the lawyer. 
(2)  A "lawyer"  is a person authorized, or reason- 
ably believed by the client to be authorized, to prac- 
tice law; or a member of the armed forces detailed, 
assigned, or otherwise provided to represent a per- 
son in a court-martial case or in any military investi- 
gation or proceeding. The term6'lawyer" does not in- 
clude a member of the armed forces serving in a 
capacity other than as a judge advocate, legal officer, 
or law specialist as defined in Article 1, unless the 
member: (a) is detailed, assigned, or otherwise pro- 
vided to represent a person in a court-martial case or 
in any military investigation or proceeding; (b) is au- 
thorized by the armed forces, or reasonably believed 
by the client to be authorized, to render professional 
legal services to members of the armed forces; or (c) 
is authorized to practice law and renders profes- 
sional legal services during off-duty employment. 
(3)  A "representative"  of a lawyer is a person em- 
ployed by  or assigned to assist a lawyer in providing 
professional legal services. 
(4)  A communication is "confidential"  if not in- 
tended to be disclosed to third persons other than 
those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the 
rendition of professional legal services to the client 
or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of 
the communication. 
(c)  Who  may  claim the privilege. The privilege may 
be claimed by the client, the guardian or conservator 
of the client, the personal representative of  a de- 
ceased client, or the successor, trustee, or similar 
representative of a corporation, association, or other 
organization, whether or not in existence. The law- M.R.E. 502(c) 
yer or the lawyer's representative who received the 
communication may claim the privilege on behalf of 
the client. The authority of the lawyer to do so is 
presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
(d)  Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule 
under the following circumstances: 
(1)  Crime or fraud.  If the communication clearly 
contemplated the future commission of a fraud or 
crime or if services of the lawyer were sought or ob- 
tained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to 
commit what the client knew or reasonably should 
have known to be a crime or fraud; 
(2)  Claimants through same deceased client. As to 
a communication relevant to an issue between par- 
ties who claim through the same deceased client, re- 
gardless of whether the claims are by testate or intes- 
tate succession or by inter vivos transaction; 
(3)  Breach of duty by lawyer or client. As to a 
communication relevant to an issue of breach of 
duty by the lawyer to the client or  by the client to the 
lawyer; 
(4)  Document attested by lawyer. As to a commu- 
nication relevant to an issue concerning an attested 
document to which the lawyer is an attesting wit- 
ness; or 
(5)  Joint clients. As to a communication relevant 
to a matter of common interest between two or more 
clients if  the communication was made by any of 
them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, 
when offered in an action between any of the clients. 
Rule 503.  Communications  to clergy 
(a)  General rule of privilege.  A person has a privi- 
lege to refuse to disclose and to prevent another 
from disclosing a confidential communication by the 
person to a clergyman or to a clergyman's assistant, 
if such communication is made either as a formal act 
of religion or as a matter of conscience. 
(b)  Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1)  A "clergyman"  is a minister, priest, rabbi, 
chaplain, or other similar functionary of a religious 
organization, or an individual reasonably believed to 
be so by the person consulting the clergyman. 
(2) A communication is "confidential"  if made to 
a clergyman in the clergyman's capacity as a spiri- 
tual adviser or to a clergyman's assistant in the assis- 
tant's official capacity and is not intended to be dis- 
closed to third persons other than those to whom 
disclosure is in furtherance of  the purpose of the 
communication or to those reasonably necessary for 
the transmission of the communication. 
(c)  Who  may claim the privilege.  The privilege may 
be claimed by the person, by the guardian, or conser- 
vator, or by a personal representative if  the person is 
deceased. The clergyman or clergyman's assistant 
who received the communication may claim the 
privilege on behalf of the person. The authority of 
the clergyman or clergyman's assistant to do so is 
presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
Rule 504.  Husband-wife privilege 
(a)  Spousal incapacity. A person has a privilege to 
refuse to testify against his or her spouse. 
(b)  Confidential communication made during mar- 
riage. 
(1)  General rule of privilege.  A person has a privi- 
lege during and after the marital relationship to re- 
fuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclos- 
ing, any confidential communication made to the 
spouse of the person while they were husband and 
wife and not separated as provided by law. 
(2)  Definition.  A communication is "confiden- 
tial" if made privately by any person to the spouse of 
the person and is not intended to be disclosed to 
third persons other than those reasonably necessary 
for transmission of the communication. 
(3)  Who  may claim the privilege.  The privilege 
may be claimed by the spouse who made the com- 
munication or by  the other spouse on his or her be- 
half. The authority of the latter spouse to do so is 
presumed in the absence of evidence of a waiver. The 
privilege will not prevent disclosure of the commu- 
nication at the request of the spouse to whom the 
communication was made if  that spouse is an ac- 
cused regardless of whether the spouse who made 
the communication objects to its disclosure. 
(c)  Exceptions. 
(1)  Spousal incapacity only. There is no privilege 
under subdivision (a) when, at the time the testi- 
mony of one of the parties to the marriage is to be in- 
troduced in  evidence against the other party, the 
parties are divorced or the marriage has been an- 
nulled. 
(2)  Spousal incapacity and confidential communi- 
cations. There is no privilege under subdivisions (a) 
or (b): 
(A) In proceedings in which one spouse is 
charged with a crime against the person or property of the other spouse or a child of either, or with a 
crime against the person or property of a third per- 
son committed in the course of committing a crime 
against the other spouse; 
(B) When the marital relationship was entered 
into with no intention of the parties to live together 
as spouses, but only for the purpose of using the pur- 
ported marital relationship as a sham, and with re- 
spect to the privilege in subdivision (a), the relation- 
ship remains a sham at the time the testimony or 
statement of one of the parties is to be introduced 
against the other; or with respect to the privilege in 
subdivision (b), the relationship was a sham at the 
time of the communication; or 
(C) In proceedings in which a  spouse is 
charged, in accordance with Article 133 or 134, with 
importing the other spouse as an alien for prostitu- 
tion or other immoral purpose in violation of  8 
U.S.C. 5 1328; with transporting the other spouse in 
interstate commerce for immoral purposes or other 
offense in violation of  18 U.S.C.  $5 2421-2424;  or 
with violation of such other similar statutes under 
which such privilege may not be claimed in the trial 
of criminal cases in the United States district courts. 
Rule 505.  Classified information 
(a)  General rule of privilege.  Classified information 
is privileged from disclosure if disclosure would be 
detrimental to the national security. As with other 
rules of privilege this rule applies to all stages of the 
proceedings. 
(b)  Dejinitions. As used in this rule: 
(1)  ClassiJied information. "Classified  informa- 
tion"  means any information or material that has 
been determined by the United States Government 
pursuant to an executive order, statute, or regula- 
tions, to require protection  against unauthorized 
disclosure for reasons of national security, and any 
restricted data, as defined in 42 U.S.C. 5 2014(y). 
(2)  National security. "National security"  means 
the national defense and foreign relations of the 
United States. 
(c)  Who may claim the privilege.  The privilege may 
be claimed by  the head of the executive or military 
department or government agency concerned based 
on a finding that the information is properly classi- 
fied and that disclosure would be detrimental to the 
national security. A person who may claim the privi- 
lege may authorize a witness or trial counsel to claim 
M.R.E. 505(f)(l) 
the privilege on his or her behalf. The authority of 
the witness or trial counsel to do so is presumed in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
(d) Action prior  to referral of charges. Prior to refer- 
ral of charges, the convening authority shall respond 
in writing to a request by the accused for classified 
information if the privilege in this rule is claimed for 
such information. The convening authority may: 
(1)  Delete specified items of classified informa- 
tion from documents made available to the accused; 
(2)  Substitute a portion or summary of the infor- 
mation for such classified documents; 
(3)  Substitute a statement admitting relevant 
facts that the classified information would tend to 
prove; 
(4)  Provide the document subject to conditions 
that will guard against the compromise of the infor- 
mation disclosed to the accused; or 
(5)  Withhold disclosure if  actions under (1) 
through (4) cannot be taken without causing identi- 
fiable damage to the national security. 
Any objection by the accused to withholding of 
information or to the conditions of disclosure shall 
be raised through a motion for appropriate relief at a 
pretrial session. 
(e)  Pretrial session. At any time after referral of 
charges and prior to arraignment, any party may 
move for a session under Article 39(a) to consider 
matters relating to classified information that may 
arise in connection with the trial. Following such 
motion or sua sponte, the military judge  promptly 
shall hold a session under Article 39(a) to establish 
the timing of requests for discovery, the provision of 
notice under subdivision (h), and the initiation of the 
procedure under subdivision (i). In addition, the 
military judge may consider any other matters that 
relate to classified information or that may promote 
a fair and expeditious trial. 
(f) Action after referral of charges. If a claim of priv- 
ilege has been made under this rule with respect to 
classified information that apparently contains evi- 
dence that is relevant and necessary to an element of 
the offense or a legally cognizable defense and is oth- 
erwise admissible in evidence in the court-martial 
proceeding, the matter shall be reported to the con- 
vening authority. The convening authority may: 
(1) institute action to obtain the classified infor- 
mation for the use by the military judge in making a 
determination under subdivision (i); M.R.E. 505(f)(2) 
(2)  dismiss the charges; 
(3)  dismiss the charges or specifications or both 
to which the information relates; or 
(4)  take such other action as may be required in 
the interests of justice. 
If, after a reasonable period of time, the information 
is not provided to the military judge  in circum- 
stances where proceeding with the case without such 
information would materially prejudice a substantial 
right of the accused, the military judge shall dismiss 
the charges or specifications or both to which the 
classified information relates. 
(g)  Disclosure of  classified information to the ac- 
cused. 
(1)  Protective order. If the Government agrees to 
disclose classified information to the accused, the 
military judge,  at the request of the Government, 
shall enter an appropriate protective order to guard 
against the compromise of the information disclosed 
to the accused. The terms of any such protective or- 
der may include provisions: 
(A) Prohibiting the disclosure of the informa- 
tion except as authorized by the military judge; 
(B) Requiring storage of material in a manner 
appropriate for the level of classification assigned to 
the documents to be disclosed; 
(C)  Requiring controlled access to the material 
during normal business hours and at other times 
upon reasonable notice; 
(D) All persons requiring security clearances 
shall cooperate with investigatory personnel in any 
investigations which are necessary to obtain a secur- 
ity clearance. 
(E) Requiring the maintenance of logs regard- 
ing access by all persons authorized by  the military 
judge to have access to the classified information in 
connection with the preparation of the defense; 
(F) Regulating the making and handling of 
notes taken from material containing classified in- 
formation; or 
(G) Requesting the convening authority to au- 
thorize the assignment of government security per- 
sonnel and the provision of government storage fa- 
cilities. 
(2)  Limited  disclosure. The military judge,  upon 
motion of  the Government, shall authorize (A) the 
deletion of specified items of classified information 
from documents to be made available to the defen- 
dant, (B) the substitution of a portion or summary of 
the information for such classified documents, or (C) 
the substitution of a statement admitting relevant 
facts that the classified information would tend to 
prove, unless the military judge determines that dis- 
closure of the classified information itself is neces- 
sary to enable the accused to prepare for trial. The 
Government's motion and any materials submitted 
in support thereof shall, upon request of the Govern- 
ment, be considered by the military judge in camera 
and shall not be disclosed to the accused. 
(3) Disclosure  at trial of certain statements previ- 
ously made by a witness. 
(A) Scope. After a witness called by the Gov- 
ernment has testified on direct examination, the mil- 
itary judge,  on motion of the accused, may order 
production of statements in the possession  of the 
United States under R.C.M. 914. This provision 
does not preclude discovery or assertion of a privi- 
lege otherwise authorized under these rules or this 
Manual. 
(B)  Closed session. If the privilege in this rule is 
invoked during consideration of a motion under 
R.C.M. 914, the Government may deliver such 
statement for the inspection only by the military 
judge in camera and may provide the military judge 
with an affidavit identifying the portions of the state- 
ment that are classified and the basis for the classifi- 
cation assigned. If the military judge finds that dis- 
closure of any portion of the statement identified by 
the Government as classified could reasonably be ex- 
pected to cause damage to the national security in 
the degree required to warrant classification under 
the applicable executive order, statute, or regulation 
and that such portion of the statement is consistent 
with the witness' testimony, the military judge shall 
excise the portion from the statement. With such 
material excised, the military judge shall then direct 
delivery of such statement to the accused for use by 
the accused. If the military judge finds that such por- 
tion of the statement is inconsistent with the witness' 
testimony, the Government may move for a pro- 
ceeding under subdivision (i). 
(4)  Record of trial. If, under this subdivision, any 
information is withheld from the accused, the ac- 
cused objects to such withholding, and the trial is 
continued to an adjudication of guilt of the accused, 
the entire unaltered text of the relevant documents 
as well as the Government's motion and any materi- 
als submitted in support thereof shall be sealed and attached to the record of trial as an appellate exhibit. 
Such material shall be made available to reviewing 
authorities in closed proceedings for the purpose of 
reviewing the determination of the military judge. 
(h) Notice of the accused's intention to disclose clas- 
sified information. 
(1)  Notice by the accused. If the accused reasona- 
bly expects to disclose or to cause the disclosure of 
classified information in any manner in connection 
with a court-martial proceeding, the accused shall 
notify the trial counsel in writing of such intention 
and file a copy of such notice with the military judge. 
Such notice shall be given within the time specified 
by the military judge under subdivision (e) or, if no 
time has been specified, prior to arraignment of the 
accused. 
(2)  Continuing duty to notify. Whenever the ac- 
cused learns of classified information not covered by 
a notice under (1) that the accused reasonably ex- 
pects to disclose at any such proceeding, the accused 
shall notify the trial counsel and the military judge 
in writing as soon as possible thereafter. 
(3)  Content of notice. The notice required by this 
subdivision shall include a brief description of  the 
classified information. The description, to be suffi- 
cient, must be more than a mere general statement of 
the areas about which evidence may be introduced. 
The accused must state, with particularity, which 
items of classified information he reasonably expects 
will be revealed by his defense. 
(4)  Prohibition  against disclosure. The accused 
may not disclose any information known or believed 
to be classified until notice has been given under this 
subdivision and until the Government has been af- 
forded a reasonable opportunity to seek a determina- 
tion under subdivision (i). 
(5)  Failure to comply. If the accused fails to com- 
ply with the requirements of this subdivision, the 
military judge may preclude disclosure of any classi- 
fied information not made the subject of notification 
and may prohibit the examination by the accused of 
any witness with respect to any such information. 
(i)  In camera proceedings for  cases involving classi- 
fied  in  formation. 
(1)  Definition.  For purposes of this subdivision, 
an "in camera proceeding"  is a session under Article 
39(a) from which the public is excluded. 
(2)  Motion for  in camera proceeding.  Within the 
time specified by the military judge for the filing of a 
M.R.E. 505(i)(4)(8) 
motion under this rule, the Government may move 
for an in camera proceeding concerning the use at 
any proceeding of any classified information. There- 
after, either prior to or during trial, the military 
judge  for good cause shown or otherwise upon a 
claim of privilege under this rule may grant the Gov- 
ernment leave to move for an in camera proceeding 
concerning the use of additional classified informa- 
tion. 
(3)  Demonstration of national security  nature of 
the information. In order to obtain an in camera pro-
ceeding under this rule, the Government shall sub- 
mit the classified information and an affidavit ex 
parte  for examination by  the military judge  only. 
The affidavit shall demonstrate that disclosure of the 
information reasonably could be expected to cause 
damage to the national security in the degree re- 
quired to warrant classification under the applicable 
executive order, statute, or regulation. 
(4)  In camera proceeding. 
(A) Procedure. Upon finding that the Govern- 
ment has met the standard set forth in subdivision 
(i)(3) with respect to some or all of the classified in- 
formation at issue, the military judge shall conduct 
an in camera proceeding. Prior to the in camera pro-
ceeding, the Government shall provide the accused 
with notice of the information that will be at issue. 
This notice shall identify the classified information 
that will be at issue whenever that information pre- 
viously has been made available to the accused in 
connection with proceedings in the same case. The 
Government may describe the information by ge- 
neric category, in such form as the military judge 
may approve, rather than identifying the classified 
information when the Government has not previ- 
ously made the information available to the accused 
in connection with pretrial proceedings. Following 
briefing and argument by the parties in the in cam- 
era proceeding the military judge shall determine 
whether the information may be disclosed at the 
court-martial proceeding. Where the Government's 
motion under this subdivision is filed prior to the 
proceeding at which disclosure is sought, the mili- 
tary judge shall rule prior to the commencement of 
the relevant proceeding. 
(B) Standard. Classified information is not 
subject to disclosure under this subdivision unless 
the information is relevant and necessary to an ele- 
ment of the offense or a legally cognizable defense M.R.E. 505(i)(4)(B) 
and is otherwise admissible in evidence. In presen- 
tencing proceedings, relevant and material classified 
information pertaining to the appropriateness of, or 
the appropriate degree of, punishment shall be ad- 
mitted only if no unclassified version of such infor- 
mation is available. 
(C)  Ruling. Unless the military judge makes a 
written determination that the information meets 
the standard set forth in (B), the information may 
not be disclosed or otherwise elicited at a court-mar- 
tial proceeding. The record of the in camera pro-
ceeding shall be sealed and attached to the record of 
trial as an appellate exhibit. The accused may seek 
reconsideration of the determination prior to or dur- 
ing trial. 
(D) Alternatives  to full  disclosure. If the mili- 
tary judge makes a determination under this subdi- 
vision that would permit disclosure of the informa- 
tion or if  the Government elects not to contest the 
relevance, necessity, and admissibility of any classi- 
fied information, the Government may proffer  a 
statement admitting for purposes of the proceeding 
any relevant facts such information would tend to 
prove or may submit a portion of summary to be 
used in lieu of the information. The military judge 
shall order that such statement, portion, or sum- 
mary by used by the accused in place of the classified 
information unless the military judge finds that use 
of the classified information itself is necessary to af- 
ford the accused a fair trial. 
(E) Sanctions. If the military judge determines 
that alternatives to full disclosure may not be used 
and the Government continues to object to disclo- 
sure of the information, the military judge shall issue 
any order that the interests of justice require. Such 
an order may include an order: 
(i)  striking or precluding all or part of the 
testimony of a witness; 
(ii) declaring a mistrial; 
(iii) finding against the Government on any 
issue as to which the evidence is relevant and mate- 
rial to the defense; 
(iv) dismissing the charges, with or without 
prejudice; or 
(v)  dismissing the charges or specifications 
or both to which the information relates. 
Any such order shall permit the Government to 
avoid the sanction for nondisclosure by permitting 
the accused to disclose the information at the perti- 
nent court-martial proceeding. 
(j)  Introduction of classijed information. 
(1)  Classijcation status. Writings, recordings, 
and photographs containing classified information 
may be admitted into evidence without change in 
their classification status. 
(2)  Precautions by the military judge.  In order to 
prevent unnecessary disclosure of classified informa- 
tion, the military judge may order admission into ev- 
idence of only part of a writing, recording, or photo- 
graph or may order admission into evidence of the 
whole writing, recording, or photograph with exci- 
sion of some or all of the classified information con- 
tained therein. 
(3)  Contents of writing, recording, or photograph. 
The military judge may permit proof of the contents 
of a writing, recording, or photograph that contains 
classified information without requiring introduc- 
tion into evidence of the original or a duplicate. 
(4)  Taking of testimony. During the examination 
of a witness, the Government may object to any 
question or line of inquiry that may require the wit- 
ness to disclose classified information not previously 
found to be relevant and necessary to the defense. 
Following such an objection, the military judge shall 
take such suitable action to determine whether the 
response is admissible as will safeguard against the 
compromise of any classified information. Such ac- 
tion mky include requiring the Government to pro- 
vide the military judge with a proffer or the witness' 
response to the question or line of inquiry and re- 
quiring the accused to provide the military judge 
with a proffer of the nature of the information the 
accused seeks to elicit. 
(5)  closed session. The military judge may ex- 
clude the public during that portion of the presenta- 
tion of evidence that discloses classified information. 
(6)  Record of trial. The record of trial with re- 
spect to any classified matter will be prepared under 
R.C.M. 1  103(h) and 1104(b)(l)(D). 
(k)  Securityprocedures to safeguard against compro- 
mise of classijed information disclosed  to courts- 
martial. The Secretary of Defense may prescribe se- 
curity procedures for protection against the compro- 
mise of classified information submitted to courts- 
martial and appellate authorities. Rule 506.  Government information other 

than classified information 

(a)  General rule of privilege.  Except where disclo- 
sure is required by an Act of Congress, government 
information is privileged from disclosure if  disclo- 
sure would be detrimental to the public interest. 
(b)  Scope. "Government information"  includes offi- 
cial communication and documents and other infor- 
mation within the custody or control of the Federal 
Government. This rule does not apply to classified 
information (Mil.R.Evid. 505) or to the identity of 
an informant (Mil.R.Evid. 507). 
(c)  Who  may claim the privilege.  The privilege may 
be claimed by the head of the executive or military 
department or government agency concerned. The 
privilege for records and information of the Inspec- 
tor General may be claimed by the immediate supe- 
rior of the inspector general officer responsible for 
creation of the records or information, the Inspector 
General, or any other superior authority. A person 
who may claim the privilege may authorize a wit- 
ness or the trial counsel to claim the privilege on his 
or her behalf. The authority of a witness or the trial 
counsel to do so is presumed in the absence of evi- 
dence to the contrary. 
(d)  Action prior to referral of charges. Prior to refer- 
ral of charges, the Government shall respond in 
writing to a request for government information if 
the privilege in this rule is claimed for such informa- 
tion. The Government shall: 
(1)  delete specified items of government informa- 
tion claimed to be privileged from documents made 
available to the accused; 
(2)  substitute a portion or summary of the infor- 
mation for such documents; 
(3) substitute a statement admitting relevant 
facts that the government information would tend to 
prove; 
(4)  provide the document subject to conditions 
similar to those set forth in subdivision (g) of this 
rule; or 
(5)  withhold disclosure if  actions under (1) 
through (4) cannot be taken without causing identi- 
fiable damage to the public interest. 
(e)  Actiolz  after referral of charges. After referral of 
charges, if  a claim of privilege has been made under 
this rule with  respect to government information 
that apparently contains evidence that is relevant 
and necessary to an element of the offense or a le- 
M.R.E. 506(g)(4) 
gally cognizable defense and is otherwise admissible 
in evidence in the court-martial proceeding, the mat- 
ter shall be reported to the convening authority. The 
convening authority may: 
(1)  institute action to obtain the information for 
use by the military judge in making a determination 
under subdivision (i); 
(2)  dismiss the charges; 
(3)  dismiss the charges or specifications or both 
to which the information relates; or 
(4)  take other action as may be required in the in- 
terests of justice. 
If, after a reasonable period of time, the information 
is not provided to the military judge, the military 
judge shall dismiss the charges or specifications or 
both to which the information relates. 
(f)  Pretrial  session. At any time after referral of 
charges and prior to arraignment any party may 
move for a session under Article 39(a) to consider 
matters relating to government information that 
may arise in  connection with the trial. Following 
such motion, or sua sponte, the military judge 
promptly shall hold a pretrial session under Article 
39(a) to establish the timing of requests for discov- 
ery, the provision  of notice under subdivision (h), 
and the initiation of the procedure under subdivision 
(i). In addition, the military judge may consider any 
other matters that relate to government information 
or that may promote a fair and expeditious trial. 
(g)  Disclosure of government  information to the ac- 
cused. If the Government agrees to disclose govern- 
ment information to the accused subsequent to a 
claim of privilege under this rule, the military judge, 
at the request of the Government, shall enter an ap- 
propriate protective order to guard against the com- 
promise of the information disclosed to the accused. 
The terms of any such protective order may include 
provisions: 
(1)  Prohibiting the disclosure of the information 
except as authorized by the military judge; 
(2)  Requiring storage of the material in a manner 
appropriate for the nature of the material to be dis- 
closed; upon reasonable notice; 
(3)  Requiring controlled access to the material 
during normal business hours and at other times 
upon reasonable notice; 
(4)  Requiring the maintenance of logs recording 
access by persons authorized by the military judge to M.R.E. 506(g)(4) 
have access to the government information in con- 
nection with the preparation of the defense; 
(5)  Regulating the making and handling of notes 
taken from material containing government infor- 
mation; or 
(6)  Requesting the convening authority to au- 
thorize the assignment of government security per- 
sonnel and the provision of government storage fa- 
cilities. 
(h) Prohibition against disclosure. The accused may 
not disclose any information known or believed to  be 
subject to a claim of privilege under this rule until 
the Government has been afforded a reasonable op- 
portunity to seek a determination under subdivision 
(0. 
(i)  In camera proceedings. 
(1) Dejinition.  For the purpose of this subdivi- 
sion, an "in camera proceeding"  is a closed session 
under Article 39(a). 
(2) Motion for  in camera proceeding.  Within the 
time specified by the military judge for the filing of a 
motion under this rule, the Government may move 
for an in camera proceeding concerning the use at 
any proceeding of any government information that 
may be subject to a claim of privilege. Thereafter, ei- 
ther prior to or during trial, the military judge for 
good cause shown or otherwise upon a claim of priv- 
ilege may grant the Government leave to move for 
an in camera proceeding concerning the use of addi- 
tional government information. 
(3) Demonstration of public interest nature of the 
information. In order to obtain an in camera pro-
ceeding under this rule, the Government shall 
demonstrate through submission of affidavits and 
the information for examination only by the military 
judge that disclosure of the information reasonably 
could be expected to cause identifiable damage to the 
public interest. 
(4) In camera proceeding 
(A) Procedure. Upon finding that the disclo- 
sure of some or all of the information submitted by 
the Government under subsection (1) reasonably 
could be expected to cause identifiable damage to the 
public interest, the military judge shall conduct an in 
camera proceeding. Prior to the in camera proceed-
ing, the Government shall provide the accused with 
notice of the information that will be at issue. This 
notice shall identify the information that will be at 
issue whenever that information previously has been 
made available to the accused in connection with 
proceedings in the same case. The Government may 
describe the information by generic category, in 
such form as the military judge may approve, rather 
than identifying the specific information of concern 
to the Government when the Government has not 
previously made the information available to the ac- 
cused in connection with pretrial proceedings. Fol- 
lowing briefing and argument by the parties in the in 
camera proceeding, the military judge shall deter- 
mine whether the information may be disclosed at 
the court-martial proceeding. When the Govern- 
ment's motion under this subdivision is filed prior to 
the proceeding at which disclosure is sought, the 
military judge shall rule prior to commencement of 
the relevant proceeding. 
(B)  Standard. Government information is sub- 
ject  to disclosure under the subdivision if the party 
making the request demonstrates a specific need for 
information containing evidence that is relevant to 
the guilt or innocence of the accused and otherwise 
admissible in the court-martial proceeding. 
(C)  Ruling. Unless the military judge makes a 
written determination that the information is not 
subject to disclosure under the standard set forth in 
(B), the information may be disclosed at the court- 
martial proceeding. The record of the in camera pro-
ceeding shall be sealed and attached to the record of 
trial as an appellate exhibit. The accused may seek 
reconsideration of the determination prior to or dur- 
ing trial. 
(D)  Sanction. If the military judge makes a de- 
termination under this subdivision that permits dis- 
closure of the information and the Government con- 
tinues to object to disclosure of the information, the 
military judge shall dismiss the charges or specifica- 
tions or both to which the information relates. 
(j) Introduction of government information subject 
to a claim of privilege. 
(1)  Precautions by military judge.  In order to pre- 
vent unnecessary disclosure of government informa- 
tion after there has been a claim of privilege under 
this rule, the military judge  may order admission 
into evidence of only part of a writing, recording, or 
photograph or may order admission into evidence of 
the whole writing, recording, or photograph with 
excision of some or all of the government informa- 
tion contained therein. M.R.E. 507(d) 
(2)  Contents of writing, recording, or photograph. 
The military judge may permit proof of the contents 
of a writing, recording, or photograph that contains 
government information that is the subject of a 
claim of privilege under this rule without requiring 
introduction into evidence of the original or a dupli- 
cate. 
(3)  Taking of testimony. During examination of a 
witness, the prosecution may object to any question 
or line of inquiry that may require the witness to dis- 
close government information not previously found 
relevant and necessary to the defense if such infor- 
mation has been or is reasonably likely to be the sub- 
ject of a claim of privilege under this rule. Following 
such an objection, the military judge shall take such 
suitable action to determine whether the response is 
admissible as will safeguard against the compromise 
of any government information. Such action may in- 
clude requiring the Government to provide the mili- 
tary judge with a proffer of the witness' response to 
the question or line of inquiry and requiring the ac- 
cused to provide the military judge with a proffer of 
the nature of the information the accused seeks to 
elicit. 
(k)  Procedures to safeguard  against compromise of 
government information disclosed  to courts-martial. 
The Secretary of Defense may prescribe procedures 
for protection against the compromise of govern- 
ment information submitted to courts-martial and 
appellate authorities after a claim of privilege. 
Rule 507.  Identity of informant 
(a) Rule of privilege. The United States or a State or 
subdivision thereof has a privilege to refuse to dis- 
close the identity of an informant. An"informant"  is 
a person who has furnished information relating to 
or assisting in an investigation of a possible violation 
of law to a person whose official duties include the 
discovery, investigation, or prosecution of crime. 
Unless otherwise privileged under these rules, the 
communications of an informant are not privileged 
except to the extent necessary to prevent the disclo- 
sure of the informant's identity. 
(b)  Who  may claim the privilege. The privilege may 
be claimed by  an appropriate representative of the 
United States, regardless of  whether information 
was furnished to an officer of the United States or a 
State or subdivision thereof. The privilege may be 
claimed by an appropriate representative of a State 
or subdivision if the information was furnished to an 
officer thereof, except the privilege shall not be al- 
lowed if the prosecution objects. 
(c)  Exceptions. 
(1)  Voluntary disclosures; informant as witness. 
No privilege exists under this rule: (A) if the identity 
of the informant has been disclosed to those who 
would have cause to resent the communication by a 
holder of the privilege or by the informant's own ac-
tion; or (B) if the informant appears as a witness for 
the prosecution. 
(2)  Testimony on the issue of guilt or innocence. If 
a claim of privilege has been made under this rule, 
the military judge  shall, upon motion by the ac- 
cused, determine whether disclosure of the identity 
of the informant is necessary to the accused's  de- 
fense on the issue of guilt or innocence. Whether 
such a necessity exists will depend on the particular 
circumstances of each case, taking into considera- 
tion the offense charged, the possible defense, the 
possible significance of the informant's testimony, 
and other relevant factors. If it appears from the evi- 
dence in the case or from other showing by a party 
that an informant may be able to give testimony nec- 
essary to the accused's defense on the issue of guilt 
or innocence, the military judge may make any or- 
der required by the interests of justice. 
(3) Legality of obtaining evidence. If a claim of 
privilege has been made under this rule with respect 
to a motion under Mil.R.Evid. 31 1, the military 
judge shall, upon motion of the accused, determine 
whether disclosure of the identity of the informant is 
required by the Constitution of the United States as 
applied to members of the armed forces. In making 
this determination, the military judge may make any 
order required by the interests of justice. 
(d) Procedures. If a claim of privilege has been made 
under this rule, the military judge may make any or- 
der required by the interests ofjustice. If the military 
judge determines that disclosure of the identity of 
the informant is required under the standards set 
forth in this rule, and the prosecution elects not to 
disclose the identity of the informant, the matter 
shall be reported to the convening authority. The 
convening authority may institute action to secure 
disclosure of the identity of the informant, terminate 
the proceedings, or take such other action as may be 
appropriate under the circumstances. If, after a rea- 
sonable period  of time disclosure is not made, the M.R.E. 507(d) 
military judge, sua sponte or upon motion of either 
counsel and after a hearing if  requested by either 
party, may dismiss the charge or specifications or 
both to which the information regarding the inform- 
ant would relate if the military judge determines that 
further proceedings would  materially prejudice a 
substantial right of the accused. 
Rule 508.  Political vote 
A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose the 
tenor of the person's vote at a political election con- 
ducted by secret ballot unless the vote was cast ille- 
gally. 
Rule 509.  Deliberations of courts and juries 
Except as provided in Mil.R.Evid. 606, the delib- 
erations of courts and grand and petit juries are priv- 
ileged to the extent that such matters are privileged 
in trial of criminal cases in the United States district 
courts, but the results of the deliberations are not 
privileged. 
Rule 510.  Waiver of privilege by voluntary 
disclosure 
(a)  A person upon whom these rules confer a privi- 
lege against disclosure of a confidential matter or 
communication waives the privilege if the person or 
the person's  predecessor while holder of the privi- 
lege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of 
any significant part of the matter or communication 
under such circumstances that it would be inappro- 
priate to allow the claim of privilege. This rule does 
not apply if  the disclosure is itself a privileged com- 
munication. 
(b)  Unless testifying voluntarily concerning a privi- 
leged matter or communication, an accused who tes- 
tifies in his or her own behalf or a person who testi- 
fies under a grant or promise of immunity does not, 
merely by reason of  testifying, waive a privilege to 
which he or she may be entitled pertaining to the 
confidential matter or communication. 
Rule 51 1.  Privileged matter disclosed under 
compulsion or without opportunity to claim 
privilege 
(a)  Evidence of a statement or other disclosure of 
privileged  matter is not admissible against the 
holder of  the privilege if  disclosure was compelled 
erroneously or was made without an opportunity for 
the holder of the privilege to claim the privilege. 
(b)  The telephonic transmission of information oth- 
erwise privileged under these rules does not affect its 
privileged  character. Use of electronic means of 
communication other than the telephone for trans- 
mission of information otherwise privileged under 
these rules does not affect the privileged character of 
such information if use of such means of communi- 
cation is necessary and in furtherance of the commu- 
nication. 
Rule 512.  Comment upon or inference from 
claim of privilege; instruction 
(a)  Comment or inference not permitted. 
(1)  The claim of a privilege by the accused 
whether in the present proceeding or upon a prior 
occasion is not a proper subject of comment by the 
military judge or counsel for any party. No inference 
may be drawn therefrom. 
(2)  The claim of a privilege by a person other 
than the accused whether in the present proceeding 
or upon a prior occasion normally is not a proper 
subject of comment by the military judge or counsel 
for any party. An adverse inference may not be 
drawn therefrom except when determined by the 
military judge to be required by the interests of jus- 
tice. 
(b)  Claiming privilege  without knowledge of mem- 
bers. In a trial before a court-martial with members, 
proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practi- 
cable, so as to facilitate the making of claims of privi- 
lege without the knowledge of  the members. This 
subdivision does not apply to a special court-martial 
without a military judge. 
(c)  Instruction. Upon request, any party against 
whom the members might draw an adverse inference 
from a claim of privilege is entitled to an instruction 
that no inference may be drawn therefrom except as 
provided in subdivision (a)(2). 
SECTION VI 
WITNESSES 
Rule 601.  General rule of competency 
Every person is competent to be  a witness except 
as otherwise provided in these rules. M.R.E. 608(c) 
Rule 602.  Lack of personal knowledge 
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evi- 
dence is introduced sufficient to support a finding 
that the witness has personal knowledge of the mat- 
ter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but 
need not, consist of the testimony of the witness. 
This rule is subject to the provisions of Mil.R.Evid. 
703, relating to opinion testimony by expert wit- 
nesses. 
Rule 603.  Oath or affirmation 
Before testifying, every witness shall be required 
to declare that the witness will testify truthfully, by 
oath or affirmation administered in a form calcu- 
lated to awaken the witness's  conscience and im- 
press the witness's mind with the duty to do so. 
Rule 604.  Interpreters 
An interpreter is subject to the provisions of these 
rules relating to qualifications as an expert and the 
administration of an oath or affirmation that the in- 
terpreter will make a true translation. 
Rule 605.  Competency of military judge as 
witness 
(a) The  military judge presiding at the court-martial 
may not testify in that court-martial as  a witness. No 
objection need be made to preserve the point. 
(b)  This rule does not preclude the military judge 
from placing on the record matters concerning 
docketing of the case. 
Rule 606. Competency of court member as 
witness 
(a) At the court-martial. A member of the court- 
martial may not testify as a witness before the other 
members in the trial of the case in which the member 
is sitting. If the member is called to testify, the op- 
posing party, except in a special court-martial with- 
out a military judge, shall be afforded an opportu- 
nity to object out of the presence of the members. 
(b) Inquiry into validity of jindings  or sentence. 
Upon an inquiry into the validity of the findings or 
sentence, a member may not testify as to any matter 
or statement occurring during the course of the de- 
liberations of the members of the court-martial or, to 
the effect  of anything upon the member's  or any 
other member's mind or emotions as influencing the 
member to assent to or dissent from the findings or 
sentence or concerning the member's mental process 
in connection therewith, except that a member may 
testify on the question whether extraneous prejudi- 
cial information was improperly brought to the at- 
tention of the members of the court-martial, 
whether any outside influence was improperly 
brought to bear upon any member, or whether there 
was unlawful command influence. Nor may the 
member's  affidavit or evidence of any statement by 
the member concerning a matter about which the 
member would be precluded from testifying be re- 
ceived for these purposes. 
Rule 607.  Who may impeach 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by 
any party, including the party calling the witness. 
Rule 608.  Evidence of character, conduct, 
and bias of witness 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or sup- 
ported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputa- 
tion, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence 
may refer only to character for truthfulness or un- 
truthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character 
is admissible only after the character of the witness 
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or rep- 
utation evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Spec$c  instances of conduct. Specific instances 
of conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking 
or supporting the credibility of the witness, other 
than conviction of crime as provided in Mil.R.Evid. 
609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They 
may, however, in  the discretion of the military 
judge, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, 
be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness 
(1) concerning character of the witness for truthful- 
ness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the charac- 
ter for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another wit- 
ness as to which character the witness being cross- 
examined has testified. The giving of testimony, 
whether by an accused or by another witness, does 
not operate as a waiver of the privilege against self- 
incrimination when examined with respect to mat- 
ters which relate only to credibility. 
(c)  Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice, or any motive 
to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the wit- M.R.E.  608(c) 
ness either by examination of the witness or by evi- 
dence otherwise adduced. 
Rule 609.  Impeachment by evidence of 

conviction of crime 

(a)  General rule. For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, (1) evidence that a witness 
other than the accused has been convicted of a crime 
shall be admitted, subject to Mil. R. Evid. 403, if the 
crime was punishable by death, dishonorable dis- 
charge, or imprisonment in excess of one year under 
the law under which the witness was convicted, and 
evidence that an accused has been convicted of such 
a crime shall be admitted if the military judge deter- 
mines that the probative value of admitting this evi- 
dence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; 
and (2) evidence that any witness has been convicted 
of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty 
or false statement, regardless of the punishment. In 
determining whether a crime tried by  court-martial 
was punishable by death, dishonorable discharge, or 
imprisonment in excess of one year, the maximum 
punishment prescribed by the President under Arti- 
cle 56 at the time of the conviction applies without 
regard to whether the case was tried by general, spe- 
cial, or summary court-martial. 
(b)  Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this 
rule is not admissible if  a period of more than ten 
years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or 
of the release of the witness from the confinement 
imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later 
date, unless the court determines, in the interests of 
justice, that the probative value of the conviction 
supported by  specific facts and circumstances sub- 
stantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, 
evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as 
calculated herein, is not admissible unless the propo- 
nent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance 
written notice of intent to use such evidence to pro- 
vide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to 
contest the use of such evidence. 
(c)  Effect  of pardon, annulment, or certificate of re- 
habilitation. Evidence of a conviction is not admissi- 
ble under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the 
subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of reha- 
bilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a 
finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, 
and that person has not been convicted of a subse- 
quent crime which was punishable by death, dishon- 
orable discharge, or imprisonment in excess of one 
year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a 
pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure 
based on a finding of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile ad- 
judications is generally not admissible under this 
rule. The military judge, however, may allow evi- 
dence of a juvenile  adjudication of a witness other 
than the accused if conviction of the offense would 
be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and 
the military judge is satisfied that admission in evi- 
dence is necessary for a fair determination of the is- 
sue of guilt or innocence. 
(e)  Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal 
therefrom does not render evidence of a conviction 
inadmissible except that a conviction by  summary 
court-martial or special court-martial without a mil- 
itary judge may not be used for purposes of impeach- 
ment until review has been completed pursuant to 
Article 64 or Article 66 if applicable. Evidence of the 
pendency of an appeal is admissible. 
(f)  Definition. For purposes of this rule, there is a 
"conviction"  in a court-martial case when a sen- 
tence has been adjudged. 
Rule 610.  Religious beliefs or opinions 
Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on 
matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose 
of showing that by reason of their nature the credi- 
bility of the witness is impaired or enhanced. 
Rule 61  1.  Mode and order of interrogation 
and presentation 
(a)  Control by the military judge.  The military judge 
shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and 
order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evi- 
dence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presen- 
tation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) 
avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect 
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrass- 
ment. 
(b)  Scope of cross-examination. Cross-examination 
should be limited to the subject matter of the direct 
examination and matters affecting the credibility of 
the witness. The military judge may, in the exercise 
of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters 
as if on direct examination. 
(c)  Leading questions. Leading questions should not 
be used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the testimony of the 
witness. Ordinarily leading questions should be per- 
mitted on cross-examination. When a party calls a 
hostile witness or a witness identified  with an ad- 
verse party, interrogation may be by leading ques- 
tions. 
Rule 612.  Writing used to refresh memory 
If a witness uses a writing to refresh his or her 
memory for the purpose of testifying, either 
(1)  while testifying, or 
(2) before testifying, if the military judge deter- 
mines it is necessary in the interests ofjustice, an ad- 
verse party is entitled to have the writing produced 
at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the 
witness thereon, and to introduce in  evidence those 
portions which relate to the testimony of the wit- 
ness. If it is claimed that the writing contains privi- 
leged information or matters not related to the sub- 
ject matter of the testimony, the military judge shall 
examine the writing in camera, excise any privileged 
information or portions not so related, and order de- 
livery of the remainder to the party entitled thereto. 
Any portion  withheld over objections shall be at- 
tached to the record of trial as an appellate exhibit. 
If a writing is not produced or delivered pursuant to 
order under this rule, the military judge shall make 
any order justice requires,  except that when the 
prosecution elects not to comply, the order shall be 
one striking the testimony or, if  in discretion of the 
military judge it is determined that the interests of 
justice so required, declaring a mistrial. This rule 
does not preclude disclosure of information required 
to be disclosed under other provisions of these rules 
or this Manual. 
Rule 613.  Prior statements of witnesses 
(a)  Examining witness concerning prior  statement. 
In examining a witness concerning a prior statement 
made by  the witness,  whether written or not, the 
statement need not be shown nor its contents dis- 
closed to him at that time, but on request the same 
shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel. 
(b)  Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement 
of witness. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent 
statement by a witness is not admissible unless the 
witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny 
M.R.E. 615 
the same and the opposite party is afforded an op- 
portunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the 
interests of justice otherwise require. This provision 
does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as 
defined in Mil.R.Evid. 801(d)(2). 
Rule 614.  Calling and interrogation of 
witnesses by the court-martial 
(a)  Calling by the court-martial. The military judge 
may, sua sponte, or at the request of the members or 
the suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all par- 
ties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus 
called. When the members wish to call or recall a 
witness, the military judge shall determine whether 
it is appropriate to do so under these rules or this 
Manual. 
(b) Interrogation by the court-martial. The military 
judge or members may interrogate witnesses, 
whether called by the military judge, the members, 
or a party. Members shall submit their questions to 
the military judge in writing so that a ruling may be 
made on the propriety of the questions or the course 
of questioning and so that questions may be asked on 
behalf of the court by the military judge in a form ac- 
ceptable to the military judge. When a witness who 
has not testified previously is called by the military 
judge or the members, the military judge may con- 
duct the direct examination or may assign the re- 
sponsibility to counsel for any party. 
(c)  Objections. Objections to the calling of witnesses 
by the military judge or the members or to the inter- 
rogation by the military judge or the members may 
be made at the time or at the next available opportu- 
nity when the members are not present. 
Rule 615.  Exclusion of witnesses 
At the request of the prosecution or defense the 
military judge shall order witnesses excluded so that 
they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, 
and the military judge may make the order sua 
sponte. This rule does not authorize exclusion of (I) 
the accused, or (2) a member of an armed service or 
an employee of the United States designated as rep- 
resentative of the United States by the trial counsel, 
or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a party to 
be essential to the presentation of the party's case. M.R.E. 615 
SECTION VII 

OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY 

Rule 701.  Opinion testimony by lay 
witnesses 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the tes- 
timony of the witness in the form of opinions or in- 
ference is limited to those opinions or inferences 
which are (a) rationally based on the perception of 
the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding 
of the testimony of the witness of the determination 
of a fact in issue. 
Rule 702.  Testimony by experts 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl- 
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evi- 
dence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness quali- 
fied as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Rule 703.  Bases of opinion testimony by 
experts 
The facts or data in the particular case upon 
which an expert bases an opinion or inference may 
be those perceived by or made known to the expert, 
at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in  the particular field in forming 
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or 
data need not be admissible in evidence. 
Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference 
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fact. 
Rule 705.  Disclosure of facts or data 
underlying expert opinion 
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or in- 
ference and give the expert's reasons therefor with- 
out prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, 
unless the military judge requires otherwise. The ex- 
pert may in any event be required to disclose the un- 
derlying facts or data on cross-examination. 
Rule 706.  Court appointed experts 
(a)  Appointment and compensation. The trial coun- 
sel, the defense counsel, and the court-martial have 
equal opportunity to obtain expert witnesses under 
Article 46. The employment and compensation of 
expert witnesses is governed by R.C.M. 703. 
(b)  Disclosure of employment. In the exercise of dis- 
cretion, the military judge may authorize disclosure 
to the members of the fact that the military judge 
called an expert witness. 
(c) Accused's  experts of own selection. Nothing in 
this rule limits the accused in calling expert wit- 
nesses of the accused's own selection and at the ac- 
cused's own expense. 
Rule 707.  Polygraph Examinations 
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a 
polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to 
take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph exami- 
nation, shall not be admitted into evidence. 
(b)  Nothing in this section is .intended to exclude 
from evidence statements made during a polygraph 
examination which are otherwise admissible. 
SECTION Vlll 
HEARSAY 
Rule 801.  Definitions 
The following definitions apply under this section: 
(a)  Statement. A "statement"  is (1) an oral or writ- 
ten assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if 
it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant"  is a person who makes 
a statement. 
(c)  Hearsay. "Hearsay"  is a statement, other than 
the one made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is 
not hearsay if: 
(1)  Prior statement by witness. The declarant tes- 
tifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-ex- 
amination concerning the statement, and the state- 
ment is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's 
testimony, and was given under oath subject to the 
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other pro- 
ceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent with the 
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an ex- M.R.E. 803(7) 
press or implied charge against the declarant of re- 
cent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or 
(C) one of identification of a person made after per- 
ceiving the person; or 
(2)  Admission  by party-opponent.  The statement 
is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own 
statement in either the party's  individual or repre- 
sentative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the 
party has manifested the party's adoption or belief in 
its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized 
by the party to make a statement concerning the 
subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or 
servant concerning a matter within the scope of the 
agency or employment of the agent or servant, made 
during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a 
statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the 
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
Rule 802.  Hearsay rule 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by 
these rules or by any Act of Congress applicable in 
trials by court-martial. 
Rule 803.  Hearsay exceptions; availability of 
declarant immaterial 
The foilowing are not excluded by the hearsay 
rule, even though the declarant is available as a wit- 
ness: 
(1)  Present sense impression. A statement describing 
or explaining an event or condition made while de- 
clarant was perceiving the event or condition or im- 
mediately thereafter. 
(2)  Excited utterance. A statement relating to a star- 
tling event or condition made while the declarant 
was under the stress of excitement cause by the event 
or condition. 
(3)  Then  existing mental, emotional, orphysical con- 
dition. A statement of the declarant's  then existing 
state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condi- 
tion (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental 
feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a 
statement of memory or belief  to prove the fact 
remembered or believed unless it relates to the exe- 
cution, revocation, identification, or terms of declar- 
ant's will. 
(4)  Statements for purposes  of medical diagnosis or 
treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical 
diagnosis or treatment and described medical his- 
tory, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensa- 
tion, or the inception or general character of the 
cause or external source thereof insofar as reasona- 
bly pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 
(5)  Recorded  recollection. A memorandum or re- 
cord concerning a matter about which a witness 
once had knowledge but now has insufficient recol- 
lection to enable the witness to testify fully and accu- 
rately, shown to have been made or adopted by the 
witness when the matter was fresh in  the witness's 
memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If 
admitted, the memorandum or record may be read 
into evidence, but may not itself be received as an ex- 
hibit unless offered by an adverse party. 
(6)  Records of regularly conducted activity. A mem- 
orandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any 
form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diag- 
noses, made at or near the time by, or from informa- 
tion transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept 
in the course of a regularly conducted business activ- 
ity, and if it was the regular practice of that business 
activity to make the memorandum, report, record, 
or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of 
the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the 
source of information or the method or circum- 
stances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthi- 
ness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph 
includes the armed forces, a business, institution, as- 
sociation, profession, occupation, and calling of 
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
Among those memoranda, reports, records, or data 
compilation normally admissible pursuant to this 
paragraph are enlistment papers, physical examina- 
tion papers, outline-figure and fingerprint cards, fo- 
rensic laboratory reports, chain of custody docu- 
ments, morning reports and other personnel 
accountability documents, service records, officer 
and enlisted qualification records, logs, unit person- 
nel diaries, individual equipment records, daily 
strength records of prisoners, and rosters of prison- 
ers. 
(7)  Absence of entry in records kept in accordance 
with the provisions  of paragraph  (6). Evidence that a 
matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, 
records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in 
accordance with the provisions of paragraph (6), to 
prove the nonconcurrence or nonexistence of the 
matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memo- 
randum, report, record, or data compilation was 
regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of M.R.E. 803(7) 
information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, 
statements, or data compilations, in any form, of 
public office or agencies, setting forth (A) the activi- 
ties of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed 
pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which mat- 
ters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, 
matters observed by police officers and other person- 
nel acting in a law enforcement capacity, or (C) 
against the government, factual findings resulting 
from an investigation made pursuant to authority 
granted by law, unless the sources of information or 
other circumstances indicate lack of  trustworthi- 
ness. Notwithstanding (B), the following are admis- 
sible under this paragraph as a record of a fact or 
event if made by a person within the scope of the 
person's  official duties and those duties included a 
duty to know or to ascertain through appropriate 
and trustworthy channels of information the truth 
of the fact or event and to record such fact or event: 
enlistment papers, physical examination papers, 
outline figure and fingerprint cards, forensic labora- 
tory reports, chain of custody documents, morning 
reports and other personnel accountability docu- 
ments, service records, officer and enlisted qualifica- . 
tion records, records of court-martial convictions, 
logs, unit personnel diaries, individual equipment 
records, guard reports, daily strength records of 
prisoners, and rosters of prisoners. 
(9)  Records of vital statistics. Records or data com- 
pilations, in any form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, 
or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a 
public office pursuant to requirements of law. 
(10)  Absence of public  record or entry. To prove the 
absence of a record, report, statement, or data com- 
pilation in any form, or the nonconcurrence or non- 
existence of a matter of which a record, report, state- 
ment, or data compilation,  in any form, was 
regularly made and preserved by a public office or 
agency, evidence in the form of a certification in ac- 
cordance with Mil.R.Evid. 902, or testimony, that 
diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, 
statement, or data compilation, or entry. 
(11)  Records of religious organizations. Statements 
of births, marriages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, 
ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or other 
similar facts of personal or family history contained 
in a regularly kept record of a religious organization. 
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. 
Statements of fact obtained in a certificate that the 
maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or 
administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, 
public official, or other person authorized by  the 
rules or practices of a religious organization or by 
law to perform the act certified, and purporting to 
have been issued at the time of the act or within a 
time thereafter. 
(13)  Family records. Statements of facts concerning 
personal or family history contained in family Bi- 
bles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, in- 
scription on family portraits, engravings on urns, 
crypts, or tombstones, or the like. 
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest  in 
property. The record of a document purporting to es- 
tablish or affect an interest in property, as proof of 
the content of the original recorded document and 
its execution and delivery by each person by whom it 
purports to have been executed, if the record is a re- 
cord of a public office and an applicable statute au- 
thorizes the recording of documents of the kind in 
that office. 
(15)  Statements in documents affecting an interest in 
property. A statement contained in a document pur- 
porting to establish or affect an interest in property if 
the matterstated was relevant to the purpose of the 
document, unless dealings with the property since 
the document was made have been inconsistent with 
the truth of the statement or the purport of the docu- 
ment. 
(16)  Statements in ancient documents. Statements in 
a document in existence twenty years or more the 
authenticity of which is established. 
(17)  Market reports, commercial publications. Mar-
ket quotations, tabulations, directories, lists (includ- 
ing government price lists), or other published com- 
pilations generally used and relied upon by  the 
public or by persons in particular occupations. 
(18) Learned treatises. TO  the extent called to the at- 
tention of an expert witness upon cross-examination 
or relied upon by the expert in direct examination, 
statements contained in published treatises, periodi- 
cals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine 
or other science or art, established as a reliable au- 
thority by the testimony or admission of the witness 
or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If 
admitted, the statements may be read into evidence 
but may not be received as exhibits. (19)  Reputation concerning personal  or  family  his- 
tory. Reputation among members of the person's 
family by  blood, adoption, or marriage, or among 
the person's  associates, or in the community, con- 
cerning the person's  birth, adoption, marriage, di- 
vorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, 
adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact 
of the person's personal or family history. 
(20)  Reputation concerning boundaries or general 
history. Reputation in a community, arising before 
the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs af- 
fecting lands in the community, and reputation as to 
events of general history important to the commu- 
nity or State or nation in which located. 
(21)  Reputation as to character. Reputation of a per- 
son's character among the person's associates or in 
the community. 
(22) Judgment of previous  conviction. Evidence of a 
final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of 
guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), ad- 
judging a person guilty of a crime punishable by 
death, dishonorable discharge, or imprisonment in 
excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sus- 
tain the judgment, but not including, when offered 
by  the Government for purposes other than im- 
peachment, judgments against persons other than 
the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be 
shown but does not affect admissibility. In determin- 
ing whether a crime tried by court-martial was pun- 
ishable by death, dishonorable discharge, or impris- 
onment in  excess of  one year,  the maximum 
punishment prescribed by the President under Arti- 
cle 56 at the time of the conviction applies without 
regard to whether the case was tried by general, spe- 
cial, or summary court-martial. 
(23)  Judgment as to personal, family or general his- 
tory, or boundaries. Judgments as proof of matters of 
personal, family, or general history, or boundaries 
essential to the judgment, if the same would be prov- 
able by evidence of reputation. 
(24)  Other exceptions. A statement not specifically 
covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but hav- 
ing equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trust- 
worthiness, if the court determines that (A) the 
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; 
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for 
which it is offered than any other evidence which the 
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; 
and (C)the general purposes of these rules and the 
M.R.E. 804(b)(l) 
interests ofjustice will best be served by admission of 
the statement into evidence. However, a statement 
may not be admitted under this exception unless the 
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party 
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to pro- 
vide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to pre- 
pare to meet it, the intention to offer the statement 
and the particulars of it, including the name and ad- 
dress of the declarant. 
Rule 804.  Hearsay exceptions; declarant 

unavailable 

(a)  Definitions of unavailability. "Unavailability as a 
witness"  includes situations in  which the declar- 
ant-
(1)  is exempted by ruling of the military judge on 
the ground of privilege from testifying concerning 
the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(2)  persists in refusing to testify concerning the 
subject matter of the declarant's statement despite 
an order of the military judge to do so; or 
(3)  testifies to a lack of memory of the subject 
matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(4)  is unable to be present or to testify at the hear- 
ing because of death or then existing physical or 
mental illness or infirmity; or 
(5)  is absent from the hearing and the proponent 
of the declarant's statement has been unable to pro- 
cure the declarant's attendance (or in the case of a 
hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or 
(4), the declarant's attendance or testimony) by pro- 
cess or other reasonable means; or 
(6)  is unavailable within the meaning of Article 
49(d)(2). A declarant is not unavailable as a witness 
if the declarant's exemption, refusal, claim of lack of 
memory, inability, or absence is due to the procure- 
ment or wrongdoing of the proponent of the declar- 
ant's statement for the purpose of preventing the 
witness from attending or testifying. 
(b)  Hearsay exceptions. The following are not ex- 
cluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavail- 
able as a witness. 
(1)  Former testimony. Testimony given as a wit- 
ness at another hearing of the same or different pro- 
ceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with 
law in the course of the same or another proceeding, 
if  the party against whom the testimony is now of- 
fered had an opportunity and similar motive to de- 
velop the testimony by  direct, cross, or redirect ex- M.R.E. 804(b)(l) 
amination. A  record of testimony given before 
courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military commis- 
sions, other military tribunals, and before proceed- 
ings pursuant to or equivalent to those required by 
Article 32 is admissible under this subdivision if 
such a record is a verbatim record. This paragraph is 
subject to the limitations set forth in Articles 49 and 
50. 
(2)  Statement under belief of impending death. In 
a prosecution for homicide or for any offense result- 
ing in the death of the alleged victim, a statement 
made by a declarant while believing that the declar- 
ant's death was imminent, concerning the cause or 
circumstances of what the declarant believed to be 
the declarant's impending death. 
(3)  Statement against interest. A statement which 
was at the time of its making so far contrary to the 
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so 
far tended to subject the declarant to civil or crimi- 
nal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the de- 
clarant against another, that a reasonable person in 
the position of the declarant would not have made 
the statement unless the person believed it to be true. 
A statement tending to expose the declarant to crim- 
inal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is 
not admissible unless corroborating circumstances 
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
(4)  Statement of personal or  family history. (A) A 
statement concerning the declarant's own birth, 
adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relation- 
ship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or 
other similar fact of personal or family history, even 
though declarant had no means of acquiring per- 
sonal knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a state- 
ment concerning the foregoing matters, and death 
also, of another person, if the declarant was related 
to the other by blood, adoption, or marriage or was 
so intimately associated with the other's family as to 
be likely to have accurate information concerning 
the matter declared. 
(5)  Other exceptions. A statement not specifically 
covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but hav- 
ing equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trust- 
worthiness, if the military judge determines that (A) 
the statement is offered as evidence of a material 
fact; (B) the statement is more probative of the point 
for which it is offered than any other evidence which 
the proponent can procure through reasonable ef- 
forts; and (C)the general purposes of these rules and 
the interest of justice  will best be served by admis- 
sion of the statement into evidence. However, a 
statement may not be admitted under this exception 
unless the proponent of it makes known to the ad- 
verse party sufficiently  in advance of  the trial or 
hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair op- 
portunity to prepare to meet it, the intention to offer 
the statement and the particulars of it, including the 
name and address of the declarant. 
Rule 805.  Hearsay within hearsay 
Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded 
under the hearsay rule if  each part of the combined 
statements conforms with an exception to the hear- 
say rule provided in these rules. 
Rule 806.  Attacking and supporting 
credibility of declarant 
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined 
in Mil.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E), has been 
admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant 
may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, 
by any evidence which would be admissible for those 
purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. Evi- 
dence of a statement or conduct by  the declarant at 
any time, inconsistent with the declarant's  hearsay 
statement, is not subject to any requirement that the 
declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to 
deny or explain. If the party against whom a hearsay 
statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a 
witness, the party is entitled to examine the declar- 
ant on the statement as if under cross-examination. 
SECTION IX 
AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION 
Rule 901.  Requirement of authentication or 
identification 
(a)  General provision.  The requirement of authenti- 
cation or identification as a condition precedent to 
admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to sup- 
port a finding that the matter in question is what its 
proponent claims. 
(b) Illustrations. By  way of  illustration only, and 
not by way of limitation, the following are examples 
of authentication or identification conforming with 
the requirements of this rule: 
(1)  Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testi-
mony that a matter is what it is claimed to be. (2)  Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. Nonexpert 
opinion as to the genuineness of handwriting, based 
upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the liti- 
gation. 
(3)  Comparison by trier or expert witness. Com-
parison by the trier of fact or by expert witnesses 
with specimens which have been authenticated. 
(4)  Distinctive  characteristics and the like. Ap-
pearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or 
other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunc- 
tion with circumstances. 
(5)  Voice identijication. Identification of a voice, 
whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or 
electronic transmission  or recording, by opinion 
based upon hearing the voice at any time under cir- 
cumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker. 
(6)  Telephone conversations. Telephone conversa- 
tions, by evidence that a call was made to the num- 
ber assigned at the time by the telephone company to 
a particular persons or business, if (A) in the case of 
a person, circumstances, including self-identifica- 
tion, show the person answering to be the one called, 
or (B) in the case of a business, the call was made to a 
place of business and the conversation related to 
business reasonably transacted over the telephone. 
(7)  Public records or reports. Evidence that a writ- 
ing authorized by law to be recorded or filed and in 
fact recorded or filed in a public office, or a pur- 
ported public record, report, statement, or data 
compilation, in any form, is from the public office 
where items of this nature are kept. 
(8) Ancient documents or data compilation. Evi-
dence that a document or data compilation, in any 
form, (A) is in such condition as to create no suspi- 
cion concerning its authenticity, (B) was in place 
where it, if authentic, would likely be, and (C) has 
been in existence 20 years or more at the time it is of- 
fered. 
(9)  Process or system. Evidence describing a pro- 
cess or system used to produce a result and showing 
that the process or system produces an accurate re- 
sult. 
(10) Methods provided  by statute or rule. Any 
method of authentication or identification provided 
by  Act of Congress, by  rules prescribed by the Su- 
preme Court pursuant to statutory authority, or by 
applicable regulations prescribed pursuant to statu- 
tory authority. 
M.R.E. 902(4) 
Rule 902. :Self-authentication 
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition 
precedent to admissibility is not required with re- 
spect to the following: 
(1)  Domestic public documents under seal. A docu- 
ment bearing a seal purporting to be that of the 
United States, or any State, district, Common- 
wealth, territory, or insular possession thereof, or 
the Panama Canal Zone, or the Trust Territory of 
the Pacific Islands, or a political subdivision, depart- 
ment, officer, or agency thereof, and a signature pur- 
porting to be an attestation or execution. 
(2)  Domestic public  documents not under seal. A 
document purporting to bear the signature in the of- 
ficial capacity of an officer or employee of any entity 
included in paragraph (1) hereof, having no seal, if a 
public officer having a seal and having official duties 
in the district or political subdivision of the officer or 
employee certifies under seal that the signer has the 
official capacity and that the signature is genuine. 
(3)  Foreign public documents. A document purport- 
ing to be executed or attested in an official capacity 
by a person authorized by the laws of a foreign coun- 
try to make the execution or attestation, and accom- 
panied by a final certification as to the genuineness 
of the signature and official position (A) of the exe- 
cuting or attesting person, or (B) of any foreign offi- 
cial whose certificate of genuineness of signature and 
official position  relates to the execution or attesta- 
tion or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness of 
signature and official position relating to the execu- 
tion of attestation. A final certification may be made 
by a secretary of embassy or legation, counsul gen- 
eral, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the 
United States, or a diplomatic or consular official of 
the foreign country assigned or accredited to the 
United States. If reasonable opportunity has been 
given to all parties to investigate the authenticity 
and accuracy of official documents, the court may, 
for good cause shown, order that they be treated as 
presumptively authentic without final certification 
or permit them to be evidenced by an attested sum- 
mary with or without final certification. 
(4)  Certijied copies of public  records. A copy of an 
official record or report of entry therein, or of a doc- 
ument authorized by law to be recorded or filed and 
actually recorded or filed in a public office, including 
data compilations in any form, certified as correct by 
the custodian or other person authorized to make M.R.E. 902(4) 
the certification, by  certificate complying with 
paragraphs (I), (2), or (3) of this rule or complying 
with any Act of Congress, rule prescribed by the Su- 
preme Court pursuant to statutory authority, or an 
applicable regulation prescribed pursuant to statu- 
tory authority. 
(4a) Documents or records of the United States ac- 
companied  by attesting certificates. Documents or 
records kept under the authority of the United 
States by  any department, bureau, agency, office, or 
court thereof when attached to or accompanied by 
an attesting certificate of the custodian of the docu- 
ment or record without further authentication. 
(5)  Oficial publications. Books, pamphlets, or other 
publications purporting to be issued by public au- 
thority. 
(6)  Newspapers and periodicals. Printed material 
purporting to be newspapers or periodicals. 
(7)  Trade inscriptions and the like. Inscriptions, 
signs, tags or labels purporting to have been affixed 
in the course of business and indicating ownership, 
control, or origin. 
(8) Acknowledged  documents. Documents accom- 
panied by  a certificate of acknowledgment executed 
in the manner provided by law by a notary public or 
other officer authorized by law to take acknowledg- 
ments. 
(9)  Commercial paper and related documents. Com-
mercial paper, signatures thereon, and documents 
relating thereto to the extent provided by  general 
commercial law. 
(10)  Presumptions under Acts of Congress and regu- 
lations. Any signature, document, or other matter 
declared by  Act of Congress or by applicable regula- 
tion prescribed pursuant to statutory authority to be 
presumptively or  prima facie  genuine or authentic. 
Rule 903.  Subscribing witness' testimony 
unnecessary 
The testimony of a subscribing witness is not nec- 
essary to authenticate a writing unless required by 
the laws of the jurisdiction  whose laws govern the 
validity of the writing. 
SECTION X 
CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS, 
AND PHOTOGRAPHS 
Rule 1001.  Definitions 
For purposes of this section the following defini- 
tions are applicable: 
(1)  Writings and recordings. "Writings"  and "re- 
cordings" consist of letters, words, or numbers, or 
their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewrit- 
ing, printing, photostating, photographing, mag- 
netic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, 
or other form of data compilation. 
(2)  Photographs. "Photographs"  include still photo- 
graphs, X-ray films, video tapes, and motion pic- 
tures. 
(3)  Original. An "original" of a writing or recording 
is the writing or recording itself or any counterpart 
intended to have the same effect by a person execut- 
ing or issuing it. An "original"  of a photograph in- 
cludes the negative or any print therefrom. If data 
are stored in a computer or similar device, any 
printout or other output readable by sight, shown to 
reflect the data accurately, is an "original." 
(4)  Duplicate. A "duplicate"  is a counterpart pro- 
duced by the same impression as the original, or 
from the same matrix, or by means of photography, 
including enlargements and miniatures, or by 
mechanical or electronic rerecording, or by chemi- 
cal reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques 
which accurately reproduce the original. 
Rule 1002.  Requirement of an original 
To prove the content of a writing, recording, or 
photograph, the original writing, recording, or pho- 
tograph is required, except as otherwise provided in 
these rules, this Manual, or by Act of Congress. 
Rule 1003.  Admissibility of duplicates 
A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an 
original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to 
the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circum- 
stances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in 
lieu of the original. 
Rule 1004.  Admissibility of other evidence of 
contents 
The original is not required, and other evidence of 
the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph 
is admissible if: (1)  Originals lost or destroyed. All originals are lost 
or have been destroyed, unless the proponent lost or 
destroyed them in bad faith; or 
(2)  Original not obtainable. No original can be ob- 
tained by any available judicial process or proce- 
dure; or 
(3)  Original in possession  of opponent. At a time 
when an original was under the control of the party 
against whom offered, the party was put on notice, 
by  the pleadings or otherwise, that the contents 
would be a subject of proof at the hearing, and the 
party does not produce the original at the hearing; or 
(4)  Collateral matters. The writing, recording, or 
photograph is not closely related to a controlling is- 
sue. 
Rule 1005.  Public records 
The contents of an official record, or of a docu- 
ment authorized to be recorded or filed and actually 
recorded or filed, including data compilations in any 
form, if  otherwise admissible, may be proved by 
copy, certified as correct or attested to in accordance 
with Mil.R.Evid. 902 or testified to be correct by a 
witness who has compared it with the original. If a 
copy which complies with the foregoing cannot be 
obtained by the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
then other evidence of the contents may be given. 
Rule 1006.  Summaries 
The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, 
or photographs which cannot conveniently be ex- 
amined in  court may be presented in the form of a 
chart, summary, or calculation. The originals, or 
duplicates, shall be made available for examination 
or copying, or both, by  other parties at reasonable 
time and place. The military judge may order that 
they be produced in court. 
Rule 1007.  Testimony or written admission 
of party 
Contents of writings, recordings, or photographs 
may be proved by the testimony or deposition of the 
party against whom offered or by the party's written 
admission, without accounting for the nonproduc- 
tion of the original. 
M.R.E. 1102 
Rule 1008.  Functions of military judge and 
members 
When the admissibility of other evidence of con- 
tents of writings, recordings, or photographs under 
these rules depends upon the fulfillment of a condi- 
tion of fact, the question whether the condition has 
been fulfilled is ordinarily for the military judge to 
determine in  accordance with the provisions of 
Mil.R.Evid. 104. However, when an issue is raised 
(a) whether the asserted writing ever existed, or (b) 
whether another writing, recording, or photograph 
produced at trial is the original, or (c) whether other 
evidence of contents correctly reflects the contents, 
the issue is for the trier of fact to determine as in the 
case of other issues of fact. 
SECTION XI 
MISCELLANEOUS RULES 
Rule 1101.  Applicability of rules 
(a)  Rules applicable. Except as otherwise provided 
in this Manual, these rules apply generally to all 
courts-martial, including summary courts-martial; 
to proceedings pursuant to Article 39(a); to limited 
factfinding proceedings ordered on review; to pro- 
ceedings in revision; and to contempt proceedings 
except those in which the judge may act summarily. 
(b)  Rules of privilege. The rules with respect to priv- 
ileges in  Section I11 and V apply at all stages of all 
actions, cases, and proceedings. 
(c)  Rules relaxed. The application of these rules 
may be relaxed in sentencing proceedings as pro- 
vided under R.C.M. 1001 and otherwise as provided 
in this Manual. 
(d) Rules inapplicable. These rules (other than with 
respect to privileges and Mil. R. Evid. 412) do not 
apply in investigative hearings pursuant to Article 
32; proceedings for vacation of suspension of sen- 
tence pursuant to Article 72; proceedings for search 
authorizations; proceedings involving pretrial re- 
straint; and in other proceedings authorized under 
the code or this Manual and not listed in subdivision 
(a). 
Rule 1102. Amendments 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence 
shall apply to the Military Rules of Evidence  180 
days after the effective date of such amendments un- 
less action to the contrary is taken by the President. M.R.E.  1103 
Rule 1103.  Title 
These rules may be known and cited as the Mili- 
tary Rules of Evidence. PART IV 
PUNITIVE ARTICLES 
Discussion 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 discuss the two articles of the code that are located in the punitive article subchapter of the code, but which are 
not punitive as such: Article 77, principals; and Article 79, lesser included offenses. 
R.C.M. 307 prescribes rules for preferral of charges. The discussion under that rule explains how to allege violations under the code 
using the format of charge and specification. 

Beginning with paragraph 3, the punitive articles of the code are discussed using the following sequence: 

a. Text of the article 
b. Elements of the offense or offenses 
c. Explanation 
d. Lesser included offenses 
e. Maximum punishment 
f. Sample specifications 
The  term "elements,"  as  used in Part IV, includes both the statutory elements of the offense and any aggravating factors listed under 
the President's  authority which increases the maximum permissible punishment when specified aggravating factors are pleaded and 
proven. 
The prescriptions of maximum punishments in subparagraph e of each paragraph of this part must be read in conjunction with 
R.C.M. 1003, which prescribes additional punishments that may be available and additional limitations on punishments. The sample 
specifications provided in subparagraph f of each paragraph in this part are guides. The specifications may be varied in form and content 
as necessary. See R.C.M. 307 for additional guidance. 
1.  Article 77-Principals  mission of an offense and who is not present at the 
a.  Text. "Any person punishable under this chapter  scene of the crime). All of these are now "princi- 
who- pals." 
(1) commits an offense punishable by this chap-  (2)  Who  may be liable for  an offense. 
ter, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, or procures  (a)  Perpetrator. A perpetrator is one who actu- 
its commission; or  ally commits the offense, either by the perpetrator's 
(2) causes an act to be done which if directly per-  own hand, or by causing an offense to be committed 
formed by him would be punishable by  this chapter;  by knowingly or intentionally inducing or setting in 
is a principal."  motion acts by an animate or inanimate agency or 
b.  Explanation.  instrumentality which result in the commission of 
(1)  Purpose. Article 77 does not define an offense. 
Its purpose is to make clear that a person need not  an offense. For example, a person who knowingly 
personally perform the acts necessary to constitute  conceals contraband drugs in an automobile, and 
an offense to be guilty of it. A person who aids, abets,  then induces another person, who is unaware and 
counsels, commands, or procures the commission of  has no reason to know of the presence of drugs, to 
an offense, or who causes an act to be done which, if  drive the automobile onto a military installation, is, 
done by  that person directly, would be an offense is  although not present  in the automobile, guilty of 
equally guilty of the offense as one who commits it  wrongful introduction of drugs onto a military in- 
directly, and may be punished to the same extent.  stallation. (On these facts, the driver would be guilty 
Article 77 eliminates the common law distinc-  of no crime.) Similarly, if, upon orders of a superior, 
tions between principal in the first degree ("perpe-  a soldier shot a person who appeared to the soldier 
trator");  principal in  the second degree (one who  to be an enemy, but was known to the superior as a 
aids, counsels, commands, or encourages the com-  friend, the superior would be guilty of murder (but 
mission of an offense and who is present at the scene  the soldier would be guilty of no offense). 
of the crime-commonly  known as an "aider  and  (b)  Other Parties. If one is not a perpetrator, to 
abettor");  and accessory before the fact (one who  be guilty of an offense committed by the perpetrator, 
aids, counsels, commands, or encourages the com-  the person must: (i)  Assist, encourage, advise, instigate, coun- 
sel, command, or procure another to commit, or as- 
sist, encourage, advise, counsel, or command an- 
other in the commission of the offense; and 
(ii)  Share in the criminal purpose of design. 
One who, without knowledge of the criminal 
venture or plan, unwittingly encourages or renders 
assistance to another in the commission of an offense 
is not guilty of a crime. See the parentheticals in the 
examples in paragraph  lb(2)(a) above. In some cir- 
cumstances, inaction may make one liable as a party, 
where there is a duty to act. If a person (for example, 
a security guard) has a duty to interfere in the com- 
mission of an offense, but does not interfere, that 
person is a party to the crime if  such a noninterfer- 
ence is intended to and does operate as an aid or en- 
couragement to the actual perpetrator. 
(3)  Presence. 
(a)  Not necessary. Presence at the scene of the 
crime is not necessary to make one a party to the 
crime and liable as a principal. For example, one 
who, knowing that person intends to shoot another 
person and intending that such an assault be carried 
out, provides the person with a pistol, is guilty of as- 
sault when the offense is committed, even though 
not present at the scene. 
(b)  Not suficient. Mere presence at the scene of 
a crime does not make one a principal unless the re- 
quirements of paragraph  lb(2)(a) or (b) have been 
met. 
(4) Parties whose intent differs  from  the perpetra- 
tor's. When an offense charged requires proof of a 
specific intent or particular state of mind as an ele- 
ment, the evidence must prove that the accused had 
that intent or state of mind, whether the accused is 
charged as a perpetrator or an "other  party"  to 
crime. It is possible for a party to have a state of 
mind more or less culpable than the perpetrator of 
the offense. In such a case, the party may be guilty of 
a'more or less serious offense than that committed 
by the perpetrator. For example, when a homicide is 
committed, the perpetrator may act in the heat of 
sudden passion caused by adequate provocation and 
be guilty of manslaughter, while the party who, 
without such passion, hands the perpetrator a 
weapon and encourages the perpetrator to kill the 
victim, would  be guilty of murder. On the other 
hand, if a party assists a perpetrator in an assault on 
a person who, known only to the perpetrator, is an 
officer, the party would be guilty only of assault, 
while the perpetrator would be guilty of assault on 
an officer. 
(5)  Responsibility for  other crimes. A principal 
may be convicted of crimes committed by another 
principal if such crimes are likely to result as a natu- 
ral and probable consequence of the criminal ven- 
ture or design. For example, the accused who is a 
party to a burglary is guilty as a principal not only of 
the offense of burglary, but also, if  the perpetrator 
kills an occupant in the course of the burglary, of 
murder. (See also paragraph 5 concerning liability 
for offenses committed by co-conspirators.) 
(6) Principals independently liable. One may be a 
principal, even if the perpetrator is not identified or 
prosecuted, or is acquitted. 
(7)  Withdrawal. A person may withdraw from a 
common venture or design and avoid liability for 
any offenses committed after the withdrawal. To be 
effective, the withdrawal must meet the following re- 
quirements: 
(a)  It must occur before the offense is commit- 
ted; 
(b) The assistance, encouragement, advice, in- 
stigation, counsel, command, or procurement given 
by the person must be effectively countermanded or 
negated; and 
(c)  The withdrawal must be clearly communi- 
cated to the would-be perpetrators or to appropriate 
law enforcement authorities in time for the perpetra- 
tors to abandon the plan or for law enforcement au- 
thorities to prevent the offense. 
2.  Article 78-Accessory  after the fact 
a.  Text. "Any  person subject to this chapter who, 
knowing that an offense punishable by this chapter 
has been committed, receives, comforts, or assists 
the offender in order to hinder or prevent his appre- 
hension, trial, or punishment shall be punished as a 
court-martial may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That an offense punishable by the code was 
committed by  a certain person; 
(2)  That the accused knew that this person had 
committed such offense; 
(3)  That thereafter the accused received, com- 
forted, or assisted the offender; and -  - - 
(4) That the accused did so for the purpose of 
hindering or preventing the apprehension, trial, or 
punishment of the offender. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1) In general. The assistance given a principal by 
an accessory after the fact is not limited to assistance 
designed to effect the escape or concealment of the 
principal, but also includes acts performed to con- 
ceal the commission of the offense by the principal 
(for example, by concealing evidence of the offense). 
(2) Failure to report offense. The mere failure to 
report a known offense will not make one an acces- 
sory after the fact. Such failure may violate a general 
order or regulation, however, and thus constitute an 
offense under Article 92. See paragraph 16. If the of- 
fense involved is a serious offense, failure to report it 
may constitute the offense of misprision of a serious 
offense, under Article 134. See paragraph 95. 
(3)  Offense punishable  by the code. The term "of- 
fense punishable by this chapter"  in the text of the 
article means any offense described in the code. 
(4)  Status of principal.  The principal who com- 
mitted the offense in question need not be subject to 
the code, but the offense committed must be punish- 
able by the code. 
(5)  Conviction or acquittal of  principal. The  prose- 
cution must prove that a principal committed the of- 
fense to which the accused is allegedly an accessory 
after the fact. However, evidence of the conviction 
or acquittal of the principal in a separate trial is not 
admissible to show that the principal did or did not 
commit the offense. Furthermore, an accused may 
be convicted as an accessory after the fact despite the 
acquittal in a separate trial of the principal whom 
the accused allegedly comforted, received, or as- 
sisted. 
(6)  Accessory after the fact  not a lesser included 
offense. The offense of being an accessory after the 
fact is not a lesser included offense of the primary of- 
fense. 
(7) Actual  knowledge. Actual knowledge is re- 
quired but may be proved  by circumstantial evi- 
dence. 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 80- attempts 
e.  Maximum  punishment. Any person subject to the 
code who is found guilty as an accessory after the 
fact to an offense punishable by the code shall be 
subject to the maximum punishment authorized for 
the principal offense, except that in no case shall the 
death penalty nor more than one-half of the maxi- 
mum confinement authorized for that offense be ad- 
judged,  nor shall the period of confinement exceed 
10 years in any case, including offenses for which life 
imprisonment may be adjudged. 
f.  Sample spec$cation. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), knowing that (at/on  board-location),  on or 
about  19  , 
had committed an offense punish- 
able by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, to wit: 
, did, (at/on  board-location) 
(subject-matter jurisdiction  data, if required), on or 
about  19  , in or- 
der to (hinder) (prevent) the (apprehension) (trial) 
(punishment) of the said  ,(receive) 
(comfort) (assist) the said  bY 
3.  Article 79-Conviction  of lesser included 
offenses 
a.  Text. "An accused may be found guilty of an of- 
fense necessarily included in the offense charged or 
of an attempt to commit either the offense charged 
or an offense necessarily included therein." 
b.  Explanation. 
(1) In general. A lesser offense is included in a 
charged offense when the specification contains alle- 
gations which either expressly or by fair implication 
put the accused on notice to be prepared to defend 
against it in addition to the offense specifically 
charged. This requirement of notice may be met 
when: 
(a)  All of the elements of the lesser offense are 
included in the greater offense, and the common ele- 
ments are identical (for example, larceny as a lesser 
included offense of robbery); 
(b) All of the elements of the lesser offense are 
included in the greater offense, but one or more ele- 
ments is legally  less serious (for example, house- 
breaking as lesser included offense of burglary); or 
(c)  All of the elements of the lesser offense are 
included and necessary parts of the greater offense, 
but the mental element is legally less serious (for ex- 
ample, wrongful appropriation as a lesser included 
offense of larceny). 
The notice requirement may also be met, depending 
on the allegations in the specification, even though an included offense requires proof of an element not 
required in the offense charged. For example, assault 
with a dangerous weapon may be included in a rob- 
bery.  . 
(2)  Multiple lesser included offenses. When the 
offense charged is a compound offense comprising 
two or more included offenses, an accused may be 
found guilty of any or all of the offenses included in 
the offense charged. For example, robbery includes 
both larceny and assault. Therefore, in a proper 
case, a court-martial may find an accused not guilty 
of robbery, but guilty of wrongful appropriation and 
assault. 
(3)  Findings of guilty to a lesser included offense. 
A court-martial may find an accused not guilty of 
the offense charged, but guilty of a lesser included 
offense by the process of exception and substitution. 
The court-martial may except (that is, delete) the 
words in the specification that pertain to the offense 
charged and, if  necessary, substitute language ap- 
propriate to the lesser included offense. For exam- 
ple, the accused is charged with murder in violation 
of Article 118, but found guilty of voluntary man- 
slaughter in violation of Article 119. Such a finding 
may be worded as follows: 
Of the Specification: Guilty, except the 
word "murder,"  substitut-
ing therefor the words 
"willfully  and unlawfully 
kill",  of the excepted word, 
not guilty, of the substituted 
words, guilty. 
Of the Charge: Not guilty, but guilty 
of a violation of Article 119. 
If a court-martial finds an accused guilty of a lesser 
included offense, the finding as to the charge shall 
state a violation of the specific punitive article vio- 
lated and not a violation of Article 79. 
(4)  Specificlesser included offenses. Specific lesser 
included offenses, if  any, are listed for each offense 
discussed in this Part, but the lists are not all-inclu- 
sive. 
4.  Article 80-Attempts 
a.  Text. 
"(a) An act, done with specific intent to commit 
an offense under this chapter, amounting to more 
than mere preparation and tending, even though 
failing, to effect its commission, is an attempt to 
commit that offense. 
(b) Any person subject to this chapter who at- 
tempts to commit any offense punishable by this 
chapter shall be punished as a court-martial may di- 
rect, unless otherwise specifically prescribed. 
(c) Any person subject to this chapter may be con- 
victed of an attempt to commit an offense although it 
appears on the trial that the offense was consum- 
mated." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused did a certain overt act;' 
(2)  That the act was done with the specific intent 
to commit a certain offense under the code; 
(3)  That the act amounted to more than mere 
preparation; and 
(4)  That the act apparently tended to effect the 
commission of the intended offense. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  In general. To constitute an attempt there 
must be a specific intent to commit the offense ac- 
companied by  an overt act which directly tends to 
accomplish the unlawful purpose. 
(2)  More than preparation.  Preparation consists 
of devising or arranging the means or measures nec- 
essary for the commission of the offense. The overt 
act required goes beyond preparatory steps and is a 
direct movement toward the commission of the of- 
fense. For example, a purchase of matches with the 
intent to burn a haystack is not an attempt to com- 
mit arson, but it is an attempt to commit arson to ap- 
plying a burning match to a haystack, even if no fire 
results. The overt act need not be  the last act essen- 
tial to the consummation of the offense. For exam- 
ple, an accused could commit an overt act, and then 
voluntarily decide not to go through with the in- 
tended offense. An attempt would nevertheless have 
been committed, for the combination of a specific in- 
tent to commit an offense, plus the commission of an 
overt act directly tending to accomplish it, consti- 
tutes the offense of attempt. Failure to complete the 
offense, whatever the cause, is not a defense. 
(3)  Factual impossibility. A person who pur- 
posely engages in conduct which would constitute 
the offense if  the attendant circumstances were as 
that person  believ-ed them to be is guilty of an at- 
tempt. For example, if A, without justification or ex- 
cuse and with intent to kill B, points a gun at B and 
pulls the trigger, A is guilty of attempt to murder, even though, unknown to A, the gun is defective and 
will not fire. Similarly, a person who reaches into the 
pocket of another with the intent to steal that per- 
son's billfold is guilty of an attempt to commit lar- 
ceny, even though the pocket is empty. 
(4)  Solicitation. Soliciting another to commit an 
offense does not constitute an attempt. See para-
graph 6 for a discussion of article 82, solicitation. 
(5) Attempts not under Article 80. While most at- 
tempts should be charged under Article 80, the fol- 
lowing attempts are specifically addressed by some 
other article, and should be charged accordingly: 
(a) Article 85-desertion 
(b) Article 9Lmutiny  or sedition 
(c)  Article loksubordinate  compelling 
(d) Article l0Laiding  the enemy 
(e) Article 106a-espionage 
(f)  Article 128-assault 
(6)  Regulations. An attempt to commit conduct 
which would violate a lawful general order or regu- 
lation under Article 92 (see paragraph  16) should be 
charged under Article 80. It is not necessary in such 
cases to prove that the accused intended to violate 
the order or regulation, but it must be proved that 
the accused intended to commit the prohibited con- 
duct. 
d. Lesser included offenses.  If the accused is charged 
with an attempt under Article 80, and the offense at- 
tempted has a lesser included offense, then the of- 
fense of attempting to commit the lesser included of- 
fense would ordinarily be a lesser included offense to 
the charge of attempt. For example, if  an accused 
was charged with attempted larceny, the offense of 
attempted wrongful appropriation would be a lesser 
included offense, although it, like the attempted lar- 
ceny, would be a violation of Article 80. 
e.  Maximum punishment. Any person subject to the 
code who is found guilty of an attempt under Article 
80 to commit any offense punishable by  the code 
shall be subject to the same maximum punishment 
authorized for the commission of the offense at- 
tempted, except that in no case shall the death pen- 
alty be adjudged, nor shall any mandatory minimum 
punishment provisions apply; and in no case, other 
than attempted murder, shall confinement exceed- 
ing 20 years be adjudged. 
f.  Sample specijication. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data) did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , attempt to 
(describe offense with sufficient detail to include ex- 
pressly or by necessary implication every element). 
5.  Article 81-Conspiracy 
a. Text. "Any  person subject to this chapter who 
conspires with any other person to commit an of- 
fense under this chapter shall, if  one or more of the 
conspirators does an act to effect the object of the 
conspiracy, be punished as a court-martial may di- 
rect." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused entered into an agreement 
with one or more persons to commit an offense 
under the code; and 
(2)  That, while the agreement continued to exist, 
and while the accused remained a party to the agree- 
ment, the accused or at least one of the co-conspira- 
tors performed an overt act for the purpose of bring- 
ing about the object of the conspiracy. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Co-conspirators. Two or more persons are re- 
quired in order to have a conspiracy. Knowledge of 
the identity of co-conspirators and their particular 
connection with the criminal purpose need not be es- 
tablished. The accused must be subject to the code, 
but the other co-conspirators need not be. A person 
may be guilty of conspiracy although incapable of 
committing the intended offense. For example, a 
bedridden  conspirator may knowingly furnish the 
car to be used in a robbery. The joining of another 
conspirator after the conspiracy has been established 
does not create a new conspiracy or affect the status 
of the other conspirators. However, the conspirator 
who joined an existing conspiracy can be convicted 
of this offense only if, at or after the time of joining 
the conspiracy, an overt act in furtherance of the ob- 
ject of the agreement is committed. 
(2)  Agreement. The agreement in a conspiracy 
need not be in any particular form or manifested in 
any formal words. It is sufficient if  the minds of the 
parties arrive at a common understanding to accom- 
plish the object of the conspiracy, and this may be 
shown by the conduct of the parties. The agreement 
need not state the means by which the conspiracy is 
to be accomplished or what part each conspirator is 
to play. (3)  Object of the agreement. The object of the 
agreement must, at least in part, involve the com- 
mission of one or more offenses under the code. An 
agreement to commit several offenses is ordinarily 
but a single conspiracy. Some offenses require two or 
more culpable actors acting in concert. There can be 
no conspiracy where the agreement exists only be- 
tween the persons necessary to commit such an of- 
fense. Examples include dueling, bigamy, incest, 
adultery, and bribery. 
(4) Overt act. 
(a) The overt act must be  independent of the 
agreement to commit the offense; must take place at 
the time of or after the agreement; must be done by 
one or more of the conspirators, but not necessarily 
the accused; and must be done to effectuate the ob- 
ject of the agreement. 
(b) The overt act need not be in itself criminal, 
but it must be a manifestation that the agreement is 
being executed. Although committing the intended 
offense may constitute the overt act, it is not essen- 
tial that the object offense be committed. Any overt 
act is enough, no matter how preliminary or prepar- 
atory in nature, as long as it is a manifestation that 
the agreement is being executed. 
(c) An overt act by one conspirator becomes 
the act of all without any new agreement specifically 
directed to that act and each conspirator is equally 
guilty even though each does not participate in, or 
have knowledge of, all of the details of the execution 
of the conspiracy. 
(5) Liability for  offenses. Each conspirator is lia- 
ble for all offenses committed pursuant to the con- 
spiracy by  any of the co-conspirators while the con- 
spiracy continues and the person remains a party to 
it. 
(6)  Withdrawal. A party to the conspiracy who 
abandons or withdraws from the agreement to com- 
mit the offense before the commission of an overt act 
by any conspirator is not guilty of conspiracy. An ef- 
fective withdrawal or abandonment must consist of 
affirmative conduct which is wholly inconsistent 
with adherence to the unlawful agreement and 
which shows that the party has severed all connec- 
tion with the conspiracy. A conspirator who effec- 
tively abandons or withdraws from the conspiracy 
after the performance of an overt act by  one of the 
conspirators remains guilty of conspiracy and of any 
offenses committed pursuant to the conspiracy up to 
the time of the abandonment or withdrawal. How- 
ever, a person who has abandoned or withdrawn 
from the conspiracy is not liable for offenses com- 
mitted thereafter by the remaining conspirators. The 
withdrawal of a conspirator from the conspiracy 
does not affect the status of the remaining members. 
(7)  Factual impossibility. It is not a defense that 
the means adopted by the conspirators to achieve 
their object, if apparently adapted to that end, were 
actually not capable of success, or that the conspira- 
tors were not physically able to accomplish their in- 
tended object. 
(8)  Conspiracy as a separate offense. A conspiracy 
to commit an offense is a separate and distinct of- 
fense from the offense which is the object of the con- 
spiracy, and both the conspiracy and the consum- 
mated offense which was its object may be charged, 
tried, and punished. The commission of the intended 
offense may also constitute the overt act which is an 
element of the conspiracy to commit that offense. 
(9)  Special conspiracies under ~rticle  134. The 
United States Code prohibits conspiracies to commit 
certain specific offenses which do not  require an 
overt act. These conspiracies should be charged 
under Article 134. Examples include conspiracies to 
impede or injure any Federal officer in the discharge 
of duties under 18 U.S.C. 5 372, conspiracies against 
civil rights under 18 U.S.C. 5 241, and certain drug 
conspiracies under 21 U.S.C. 5 846. See paragraph 
6Oc(4)(c)(ii). 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 8kattempts 
e.  Maximum  punishment. Any person subject to the 
code who is found guilty of conspiracy shall be sub- 
ject to the maximum punishment authorized for the 
offense which is the object of the conspiracy, except 
that in no case shall the death penalty be imposed. 
f. 	Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on  or about 
19  ,  conspire 
with  (and  1 to 
commit an offense under the Uniform Code of Mili- 
tary Justice, to wit: (larceny of  ,of 
a value of (about) $  ,the property 
of  ), and in order to effect the ob- 
ject of the conspiracy the said 	 (and 
) did 6. 	Article 82-Solicitation 
a. 	Text. 
"(a) Any person subject to this chapter who solic- 
its or advises another or other to desert in violation 
of section 885 of  this title (Article 85) or mutiny in 
violation of section 894 of this title (Article 94) shall, 
if the offense solicited or advised is attempted or 
committed, be punished with the punishment pro- 
vided for the commission of the offense, but, if the 
offense solicited or advised is not committed or at- 
tempted, he shall be punished as a court-martial 
may direct. 
(b) Any person subject to this chapter who solicits 
or advises another or others to commit an act of mis- 
behavior before the enemy in violation of section 899 
of this title (Article 99) or sedition in violation of 
section 894 of this title (Article 94) shall, if the of- 
fense solicited or advised is committed, be punished 
with the punishment provided for the commission of 
the offense, but, if the offense solicited or advised is 
not committed, he shall be punished as a court-mar- 
tial may direct." 
b. 	Elements. 
(1) That the accused solicited or advised a certain 
person or persons to commit any of the four offenses 
named in Article 82; and 
(2)  That the accused did so with the intent that 
the offense actually be committed. 

[Note: If the offense solicited or advised was at- 

tempted or committed, add the following element] 

(3)  That the offense solicited or advised was 
(committed) (attempted) as the proximate result of 
the solicitation. 
c. 	Explanation. 
(1)  Instantaneous offense.  The offense is complete 
when a solicitation is made or advice is given with 
the specific wrongful intent to influence another or 
others to commit any of the four offenses named in 
Article 82. It is not necessary that the person or per- 
sons solicited or advised agree to or act upon the so- 
licitation or advice. 
(2) Form of solicitation. Solicitation may be by 
means other than word of mouth or writing. Any act 
or conduct which reasonably may be construed as a 
serious request or advice to commit one of the four 
offenses named in Article 82 may constitute solicita- 
tion. It is not necessary that the accused act alone in 
the solicitation or in the advising; the accused may 
act through other persons in  committing this of- 
fense. 
(3) Solicitations in violation of Article 134. Solici-
tation to commit offenses other than violations of the 
four offense named in Article 82 may be charged as 
violations of Article 134. See paragraph  105. How- 
ever, some offenses require, as an element of proof, 
some act of solicitation by  the accused. These of- 
fenses are separate and distinct from solicitations 
under Articles 82 and 134. When the accused's act 
of solicitation constitutes, by itself, a separate of- 
fense, the accused should be charged with that sepa- 
rate, distinct offense-for  example, pandering (see 
paragraph 97) and obstruction of justice  (see para-
graph 96) in violation of Article 134. 
d. 	Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. If the offense solicited or 
advised is committed or (in the case of soliciting de- 
sertion or mutiny) attempted, then the accused shall 
be punished with the punishment provided for the 
commission of the offense solicited or advised. If the 
offense solicited or advised is not committed or (in 
the case of soliciting desertion or mutiny) attempted, 
then the following punishment may be imposed: 
(1)  To desert-Dishonorable  discharge, forfei- 
ture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 3 
years. 
(2)  To mutiny-Dishonorable  discharge, forfei- 
ture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 
10 years. 
(3)  To commit an act of misbehavior before the 
enemy-Dishonorable  discharge, forfeiture of all 
pay and allowances, and confinement for 10 years. 
(4) To commit an act of sedition-Dishonorable 
discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 10 years. 
f. 	Sample specifications. 
(1)  For soliciting desertion (Article 85) or mutiny 
(Article 94). 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  , (a time of 
war) by (here state the manner and form of solicita- 
tion  or advice), (solicit) (advise) 
(and  ) to (desert in violation of Ar- 
ticle 85) (mutiny in violation of Article 94) 
[Note: If the offense solicited or advised is attempted 
or committed, add the following  at the end of the 
specification:] and, as a result of such (solicitation) (advice), the of- 
fense (solicited) (advised) was,  on or about 
,  19  ,  (at/on 
board-location),  (attempted) (committed) by 
(and  1. 
(2)  For soliciting an act of misbehavior before the 
enemy (Article 99) or sedition (Article 94). 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data) did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  , (a time of 
war) by (here state the manner and form of solicita- 
tion or advice), (solicit) (advise), 
(and  ) to commit (an act of misbe- 
havior before the enemy in violation of Article 99) 
(sedition in violation of Article 94) 
[Note:  If the offense solicited or advised is committed, 
add the following at the end of the specification:] 
and, as a result of such (solicitation) (advice), the of- 
fense (solicited) (advised) was,  on or about 
19  ,  (at/on 
board-location),  committed by 
(and  1. 
7.  Article 83-Fraudulent  enlistment, 
appointment, or separation 
a. 	Text. 
"Any person who- 
(1) procures his own enlistment or appointment 
in the armed forces by knowingly false representa- 
tion or deliberate concealment as to his qualifica- 
tions for that enlistment or appointment and re- 
ceives pay or allowances thereunder; or 
(2) procures his own separation from the armed 
forces by  knowingly false representation or deliber- 
ate concealment as to his eligibility for that separa- 
tion; 
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct." 
b. 	Elements. 
(1)  Fraudulent enlistment or appointment. 
(a) That the accused was enlisted or appointed 
in an armed force; 
(b)  That the accused knowingly misrepre- 
sented or deliberately concealed a certain material 
fact or facts regarding qualifications of the accused 
for enlistment or appointment; 
(c) That the accused's  enlistment or appoint- 
ment was obtained or procured by  that knowingly 
false representation or deliberate concealment; and 
(d) That under this enlistment or appointment 
that accused received pay or allowances or both. 
(2)  Fraudulent separation. 
(a)  That the accused was separated from an 
armed force; 
(b) That the accused knowingly misrepre- 
sented or deliberately concealed a certain material 
fact or facts about the accused's eligibility for sepa- 
ration; and 
(c)  That the accused's separation was obtained 
or procured by that knowingly false representation 
or deliberate concealment. 
c. 	Explanation. 
(1)  In general. A fraudulent enlistment, appoint- 
ment, or separation is one procured by either a 
knowingly false representation as to any of the quali- 
fications prescribed by law, regulation, or orders for 
the specific enlistment, appointment, or separation, 
or a deliberate concealment as to any of those dis- 
qualifications. Matters that may be material to an 
enlistment, appointment, or separation include any 
information used by the recruiting, appointing, or 
separating officer in reaching a decision as to enlist- 
ment, appointment, or separation in any particular 
case, and any information that normally would have 
been so considered had it been provided to that of- 
ficer. 
(2)  Receipt of pay or allowances. A member of 
the armed forces who enlists or accepts an appoint- 
ment without being regularly separated from a prior 
enlistment or appointment should be charged under 
Article 83 only if  that member has received pay or 
allowances under the fraudulent enlistment or ap- 
pointment. Acceptance of food, clothing, shelter, or 
transportation from the government constitutes re- 
ceipt of allowances. However, whatever is furnished 
the accused while in custody, confinement, arrest, or 
other restraint pending trial for fraudulent enlist- 
ment or appointment is not considered  an allow- 
ance. The receipt of pay or allowances may be 
proved by circumstantial evidence. 
(3)  One offense. One who procures one's own en- 
listment, appointment, or separation by several mis- 
representations or concealment as to qualifications 
for the one enlistment, appointment, or separation 
so procured, commits only one offense under Article 
83. 
d. 	Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e. 	Maximum punishment. (1)  Fraudulent enlistment or appointment. Dis- 
honorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and al- 
lowances, and confinement for 2 years. 
(2) Fraudulent separation. Dishonorable dis- 
charge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 5 years. 
f. 	Sample specifications. 
(1)  For fraudulent enlistment or appointment. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  ,  by  means of 
(knowingly false representations that (here state the 
fact or facts material to qualification for enlistment 
or appointment which were represented), when in 
fact (here state the true fact of facts)) (deliberate 
concealment of the fact that (here state the fact or 
facts disqualifying the accused for enlistment or ap- 
pointment which were concealed)), procure him- 
self/herself  to be (enlisted as a  1 
(appointed as a  ) in the (here state 
the armed force in which the accused procured the 
enlistment or appointment), and did thereafter, (at/ 
on board-location),  receive (pay) (allowances) (pay 
and allowances) under the enlistment) (appoint- 
ment) so procured. 
(2)  For fraudulent separation. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  ,  by  means of 
(knowingly false representations that (here state the 
fact or facts material to eligibility for separation 
which were represented), when in fact (here state the 
true fact or facts)) (deliberate concealment of the 
fact that (here state the fact or facts concealed which 
made the accused ineligible for separation)), procure 
himself/herself  to be separated from the (here state 
the armed force from which the accused procured 
his/her separation). 
8.  Article 84-Effecting  unlawful enlistment, 
appointment, or separation 
a. 	Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who effects an 
enlistment or appointment in or a separation from 
the armed forces of any person who is known to him 
to be ineligible for that enlistment, appointment, or 
separation because it is prohibited by  law, regula- 
tion, or order shall be punished as a court-martial 
may direct." 
b. 	Elements. 
(1) That the accused effected the enlistment, ap- 
pointment, or separation of the person named; 
(2) That this person was ineligible for this enlist- 
ment, appointment, or separation because it was 
prohibited by law, regulation, or order; and 
(3)  That the accused knew of the ineligibility at 
the time of the enlistment, appointment, or separa- 
tion. 
c.  Explanation.  It must be proved that the enlist- 
ment, appointment, or separation was prohibited by 
law, regulation, or order when effected and that the 
accused then knew that the person enlisted, ap- 
pointed, or separated was ineligible for the enlist- 
ment, appointment, or separation. 
d. 	Lesser included offense.  Article 8kattempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 5 years. 
f. 	Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  , effect (the 
(enlistment) (appointment) of  as a 
in (here state the armed force in 
which the person was enlisted or appointed)) (the 
separation of  from (here state the 
armed force from which the person was separated)), 
then well knowing that the said 
was ineligible for such (enlistment) (appointment) 
(separation) because (here state facts whereby the 
enlistment, appointment, or separation was prohi- 
bited by law, regulation, or order). 
9. 	Article 85-Desertion 
a. 	Text. 
"(a) Any member of the armed forces who- 
(1) without authority goes or remains absent 
from his unit, organization, or place of duty with in- 
tent to remain away therefrom permanently; 
(2) quits his unit, organization, or place of duty 
with intent to avoid hazardous duty or to shirk im- 
portant service; or 
(3) without being regularly separated from one 
of the armed forces enlists or accepts an appoint- 
ment in the same or another one of the armed forces 
without fully disclosing the fact that he has not been 
regularly separated, or enters any foreign armed ser- 
vice except when authorized by the United States [Note: This provision  has been held not to state a 

separate offense by the United States Court of Mili- 

tary Appeals in United States v.  Huff,  7 U.S.C.M.A. 

247,22 C.M.R. 37 (1956)l; 

is guilty of desertion. 

(b) Any commissioned officer of the armed 
forces who, after tender of his resignation and before 
notice of its acceptance, quits his post or proper du- 
ties without leave and with intent to remain away 
therefrom permanently is guilty of desertion. 
(c) Any person found guilty of desertion or 
attempt to desert shall be punished, if the offense is 
committed in time of war, by  death or such other 
punishment as a court-martial may direct, but if the 
desertion or attempt to desert occurs at any other 
time, by  such punishment, other than death, as a 
court-martial may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Desertion with  intent to remain away perma- 
nently. 
(a)  That the accused absented himself or her- 
self from his or her unit, organization, or place of 
duty; 
(b) That such absence was without authority; 
(c) That the accused, at the time the absence 
began or at some time during the absence, intended 
to remain away from his or her unit, organization, or 
place of duty permanently; and 
(d) That the accused remained absent until the 
date alleged. 
[Note: If the absence was terminated by  apprehen- 
sion, add the following element] 
(e)  That the accused's absence was terminated 
by apprehension. 
(2)  Desertion with  intent to avoid hazardous duty 
or to shirk important service. 
(a) That the accused quit his or her unit, or- 
ganization, or other place of duty; 
(b) That the accused did so with the intent to 
avoid a certain duty or shirk a certain service; 
(c)  That the duty to be performed was hazard- 
ous or the service important; 
(d) That the accused knew that he or she 
would be required for such duty or service; and 
(e)  That the accused remained absent until the 
date alleged. 
(3)  Desertion before notice of acceptance of resig- 
nation. 
(a)  That the accused was a commissioned of- 
ficer of an armed force of the United States, and had 
tendered his or her resignation; 
(b)  That before he or she received notice of the 
acceptance of the resignation, the accused quit his or 
her post or proper duties; 
(c)  That the accused did so with the intent to 
remain away permanently from his or her post or 
proper duties; and 
(d) That the accused remained absent until the 
date alleged. 
[Note: If the absence was terminated by apprehen- 
sion, add the following element] 
(e)  That the accused's absence was terminated 
by apprehension. 
(4)  Attempted desertion. 
(a)  That the accused did a certain overt act; 
(b)  That the act was done with the specific in- 
tent to desert; 
(c)  That the act amounted to more than mere 
preparation; and 
(d)  That the act apparently tended to effect the 
commission of the offense of desertion. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Desertion with intent to remain away perma- 
nently. 
(a)  In general. Desertion with intent to remain 
away permanently is complete when the person ab- 
sents himself or herself without authority from his 
or her unit, organization, or place of duty, with the 
intent to remain away therefrom permanently. A 
prompt repentance and return, while material in ex- 
tenuation, is no defense. It is not necessary that the 
person be absent entirely from military jurisdiction 
and control. 
(b)  Absence without authority-inception,  du-
ration, termination. See paragraph  10c. 
(c)  Intent to remain away permanently. 
(i)  The intent to remain away permanently 
from the unit, organization, or place of duty may be 
formed any time during the unauthorized absence. 
The intent need not exist throughout the absence, or 
for any particular period of time, as long as it exists 
at some time during the absence. 
(ii)  The accused must have intended to re- 
main away permanently from the unit, organization, 
or place of duty. When the accused had such an in- 
tent, it is no defense that the accused also intended to report for duty elsewhere, or to enlist or accept an 
appointment in the same or a different armed force. 
(iii)  The intent to remain away permanently 
may be established by  circumstantial evidence. 
Among the circumstances from which an inference 
may be drawn that an accused intended to remain 
absent permanently or; that the period of absence 
was lengthy; that the accused attempted to, or did, 
dispose of uniforms or other military property; that 
the accused purchased a ticket for a distant point or 
was arrested, apprehended, or surrendered a consid- 
erable distance from the accused's station; that the 
accused could have conveniently surrendered to mil- 
itary control but did not; that the accused was dis- 
satisfied with the accused's unit, ship, or with mili- 
tary service; that the accused made remarks 
indicating an intention to desert; that the accused 
was under charges or had escaped from confinement 
at the time of the absence; that the accused made 
preparations indicative of an intent not to return (for 
example, financial arrangements); or that the ac- 
cused enlisted or accepted an appointment in the 
same or another armed force without disclosing the 
fact that the accused had not been regularly sepa- 
rated, or entered any foreign armed service without 
being authorized by the United States. On the other 
hand, the following are included in the circum- 
stances which may tend to negate an inference that 
the accused intended to remain away permanently: 
previous long and excellent service; that the accused 
left valuable personal property in the unit or on the 
ship; or that the accused was under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs during the absence. These lists are 
illustrative only. 
(iv)  Entries on documents, such as personnel 
accountability records, which administratively refer 
to an accused as a "deserter"  are not evidence of in- 
tent to desert. 
(v)  Proof of, or a plea of guilty to, an unau- 
thorized absence, even of extended duration, does 
not, without more, prove guilt of desertion. 
(d) Effect of enlistment or appointment in the 
same or a different armed force. Article 85a(3) does 
not state a separate offense. Rather, it is a rule of evi- 
dence by which the prosecution may prove intent to 
remain away permanently. Proof of an enlistment or 
acceptance of an appointment in a service without 
disclosing a preexisting duty status in the same or a 
different service provides the basis from which an in- 
ference of intent to permanently remain away from 
the earlier unit, organization, or place of duty may 
be drawn. Furthermore, if a person, without being 
regularly separated from one of the armed forces, 
enlists or accepts an appointment in the same or an- 
other armed force, the person's presence in the mili- 
tary service under such an enlistment or appoint- 
ment is not a return to military control and does not 
terminate any desertion or absence without author- 
ity from the earlier unit or organization, unless the 
facts of the earlier period  of service are known to 
military authorities. If a person, while in desertion, 
enlists or accepts an appointment in the same or an- 
other armed force, and deserts while serving the en- 
listment or appointment, the person may be tried 
and convicted for each desertion. 
(2) Quitting unit, organization, or place of duty 
with intent to avoid hazardous duty or to shirk im- 
portant service. 
(a) Hazardous duty or important service. 
"Hazardous duty"  or"important  service"  may in- 
clude service such as duty in a combat or other dan- 
gerous area; embarkation for certain foreign or sea 
duty; movement to a port of embarkation for that 
purpose; entrainment for duty on the border or coast 
in time of war or threatened invasion or other distur- 
bances; strike or riot duty; or employment in aid of 
the civil power in, for example, protecting property, 
or quelling or preventing disorder in  times of great 
public disaster. Such services as drill, target practice, 
maneuvers, and practice marches are not ordinarily 
"hazardous duty or important service."Whether  a 
duty is hazardous or a service is important depends 
upon the circumstances of the particular case, and is 
a question of fact for the court-martial to decide. 
(b)  Quits. "Quits"  in Article 85 means "goes 
absent without authority." 
(c) Actual knowledge. Article 85a(2) requires 
proof that the accused actually knew of the hazard- 
ous duty or important service. Actual knowledge 
may be proved by circumstantial evidence. 
(3) Attempting to desert. Once the attempt is 
made, the fact that the person desists, voluntarily or 
otherwise, does not cancel the offense. The offense is 
complete, for example, if the person, intending to de- 
sert, hides in an empty freight car on a military res- 
ervation, intending to escape by being taken away in 
the car. Entering the car with the intent to desert is 
the overt act. For a more detailed discussion of at- tempts, see paragraph 4. For an explanation con- 
cerning intent to remain away permanently, see sub-
paragraph 9c(l)(c). 
(4)  Prisoner with executed punitive  discharge. A 
prisoner whose dismissal or dishonorable or bad- 
conduct discharge has been executed is not a "mem- 
ber of the armed forces" within the meaning of Arti- 
cles 85 or 86, although the prisoner may still be sub- 
ject to military law under Article 2(a)(7). If the facts 
warrant, such a prisoner could be charged with es- 
cape from confinement under Article 95 or an of- 
fense under Article 134. 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 86-absence 

without leave 

e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Completed or attempted desertion with intent 
to avoid hazardous duty or to shirk important service. 
Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and al- 
lowances, and confinement for 5 years. 
(2)  Other cases of completed or attempted deser- 
tion. 
(a)  Terminated by apprehension. Dishonorable 
discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 3 years. 
(b)  Terminated otherwise. Dishonorable dis- 
charge, forfeiture of all pay  and allowances, and 
confinement for 2 years. 
(3)  In  time of war. Death or such other punish- 
ment as a court-martial may direct. 
f.  Sample specifications. 
(1)  Desertion with intent to remain away perma- 
nently. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data),  did,  on  or  about 
19  ,(a time of war) without author- 
ity and with intent to remain away therefrom perma- 
nently, absent himself/herself  from hidher (unit) 
(organization)  (place  of  duty),  to  wit: 
, located at (  19 
and did remain so absent in desertion until (he/she 
was apprehended) on or about 
(2) Desertion with  intent to avoid hazardous 
duty or shirk important service. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data),  did,  on  or  about 
19  ,  (a time of war) with intent to 
(avoid hazardous duty) (shirk important service), 
namely:  , quit hidher (unit) (or- 
IV-12 
ganization) (place of duty), to wit:  , 
located at (  ), and did remain so ab- 
sent in desertion until on or about 
19 
(3)  Desertion prior to acceptance of resignation. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data) having tendered his/her  resignation and prior 
to due notice of the acceptance of the same, did, on 
or about  19  (a 
time of war) without leave and with intent to remain 
away therefrom permanently,  quit hidher (post) 
(proper duties), to wit:  ,and did re- 
main so absent in desertion until (he/she was appre- 
hended)  on  or  about 
19 
(4)  Attempted desertion. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did (at/on  board-location), on or about 
19  , (a time of 
war) attempt to (absent himself/herself  from his/ 
her (unit) (organization) (place of duty) to wit: 
,without authority and with intent 
to remain away therefrom permanently) (quit his/ 
her (unit) (organization) (place of duty), to wit: 
,located at  ,  with 
intent to (avoid hazardous duty) (shirk important 
service)  namely  1 
10.  Article 86-Absence  without leave 
a.  Text. 
"Any  member of the armed forces who, without 
authority-
(1) fails to go to his appointed place of duty at 
the time prescribed; 
(2) goes from that place; or 
(3) absents himself or remains absent from his 
unit, organization, or place of duty at which he is re- 
quired to be at the time prescribed; shall be punished 
as a court-martial may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Failure to go to appointed place of duty. 
(a)  That a certain authority appointed a certain 
time and place of duty for the accused; 
(b) That the accused knew of that time and 
place; and 
(c)  That the accused, without authority, failed 
to go to the appointed place of duty at the time pre- 
scribed. (2)  Going from appointed place of duty. 
(a)  That a certain authority appointed a certain 
time and place of duty for the accused; 
(b)  That the accused knew of that time and 
place; and 
(c)  That the accused, without authority, went 
from the appointed place of duty after having re- 
ported at such place. 
(3)  Absence from unit, organization, or place of 
duty. 
(a) That the accused absented himself or her- 
self from his or her unit, organization, or place of 
duty at which he or she was required to be; 
(b) That the absence was without authority 
from anyone competent to give him or her leave; and 
(c)  That the absence was for a certain period of 
time. 
[Note: if  the absence was terminated by apprehen- 
sion, add the following element] 
(d) That the absence was terminated by appre- 
hension. 
(4)  Abandoning watch or guard. 
(a)  That the accused was a member of a guard, 
watch, or duty; 
(b) That the accused absented himself or her- 
self from his or her guard, watch, or duty section; 
(c)  That absence of the accused was without 
authority; and 
[Note: If the absence was with intent to abandon the 
accused's guard, watch, or duty section, add the fol- 
lowing element] 
(d) That the accused intended to abandon his 
or her guard, watch, or duty section. 
(5)  Absence from unit, organization, or place of 
duty with intent to avoid maneuvers or field exer- 
cises. 
(a) That the accused absented himself or her- 
self from his or her unit, organization, or place of 
duty at which he or she was required to be; 
(b) That the absence of the accused was with- 
out authority; 
(c)  That the absence was for a certain period of 
time; 
(d) That the accused knew that the absence 
would occur during a part of a period of maneuvers 
or field exercises; and 
(e)  That the accused intended to avoid all or 
part of a period of maneuvers or field exercises. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  In general. This article is designed to cover 
every case not elsewhere provided for in which any 
member of the armed forces is through the mem- 
ber's own fault not at the place where the member is 
required to be at a prescribed time. It is not neces- 
sary that the person be absent entirely from military 
jurisdiction  and control. The first part of this arti- 
cle-relating  to  the  appointed  place  of 
duty-applies  whether the place is appointed as a 
rendezvous for several or for one only. 
(2)  Actual  knowledge. The offenses of failure to 
go to and going from appointed place of duty require 
proof that the accused actually knew of the ap- 
pointed time and place of duty. The offense of ab- 
sence from unit, organization, or place of duty with 
intent to avoid maneuvers or field exercises requires 
proof that the accused actually knew that the ab- 
sence would occur during a part of a period of ma- 
neuvers or field exercises. Actual knowledge may be 
proved by circumstantial evidence. 
(3)  Intent. Specific intent is not an element of un- 
authorized absence. Specific intent is an element for 
certain aggravated unauthorized absences. 
(4) Aggravated forms  of unauthorized absence. 
There are variations of unauthorized absence under 
Article 86(3) which are more serious because of ag- 
gravating circumstances such as duration of the ab- 
sence, a special type of duty from which the accused 
absents himself or herself, and a particular specific 
intent which accompanies the absence. These cir- 
cumstances are not essential elements of a violation 
of Article 86. They simply constitute special matters 
in aggravation. The following are aggravated unau- 
thorized absences: 
(a)  Unauthorized absence for more than 3 days 
(duration). 
(b) Unauthorized absence for more than 30 
days (duration). 
(c) Unauthorized  absence from a  guard, 
watch, or duty (special type of duty). 
(d) Unauthorized absence from guard, watch, 
or duty section with the intent to abandon it (special 
type of duty and specific intent). 
(e)  Unauthorized absence with the intent to 
avoid maneuvers or field exercises (special type of 
duty and specific intent). 
(5) Control by civilian authorities. A member of 
the armed forces turned over to the civilian authori- 
ties upon request under Article 14 (see R.C.M. 106) is not absent without leave while held by them under 
that delivery. When a member of the armed forces, 
being absent with leave, or absent without leave, is 
held, tried, and acquitted by civilian authorities, the 
member's status as absent with leave, or absent with- 
out leave, is not thereby changed, regardless how 
long held. The fact that a member of the armed 
forces is convicted by the civilian authorities, or ad- 
judicated to be a juvenile offender, or the case is "di- 
verted" out of the regular criminal process for a pro- 
bationary period does not excuse any unauthorized 
absence, because the member's  inability to return 
was the result of willful misconduct. If a member is 
released by the civilian authorities without trial, and 
was on authorized leave at the time of arrest or de- 
tention, the member may be found guilty of unau- 
thorized absence only if it is proved that the member 
actually committed the offense for which detained, 
thus establishing that the absence was the result of 
the member's own misconduct. 
(6)  Inability to return. The status of absence with- 
out leave is not changed by an inability to return 
through sickness, lack of transportation facilities, or 
other disabilities. But the fact that all or part of a pe- 
riod of unauthorized absence was in a sense enforced 
or involuntary is a factor in extenuation and should 
be given due weight when considering the initial dis- 
position of the offense. When, however, a person on 
authorized leave, without fault, is unable to return at 
the expiration thereof, that person has not commit- 
ted the offense of absence without leave. 
(7)  Determining the unit or organization of an ac- 
cused. A person undergoing transfer between activi- 
ties is ordinarily considered to be attached to the ac- 
tivity to which ordered to report. A  person on 
temporary additional duty continues as a member of 
the regularly assigned unit and if the person is absent 
from the temporary duty assignment, the person be- 
comes absent without leave from both units, and 
may be charged with being absent without leave 
from either unit. 
(8)  Duration. Unauthorized absence under Arti- 
cle 86(3) is an instantaneous offense. It is complete at 
the instant an accused  absents himself or herself 
without authority. Duration of the absence is a mat- 
ter in aggravation for the purpose of increasing the 
maximum punishment authorized for the offense. 
Even if  the duration of the absence is not over 3 
days, it is ordinarily alleged in an Article 86(3) speci- 
fication. If the duration is not alleged or if alleged 
but not proved, an accused can be convicted of and 
punished for only 1 day of unauthorized absence. 
(9)  Computation of duration. In computing the 
duration of an unauthorized absence, any one con- 
tinuous period of absence found that totals not more 
than 24 hours is counted as 1 day; any such period 
that totals more than 24 hours and not more than 48 
hours is counted as 2 days, and so on. The hours of 
departure and return on different dates are assumed 
to be the same if not alleged and proved. For exam- 
ple, if an accused is found guilty of unauthorized ab- 
sence from 0600 hours, 4 April, to 1000 hours, 7 
April of the same year (76 hours), the maximum 
punishment would be based on an absence of 4 days. 
However, if the accused is found guilty simply of un- 
authorized absence from 4 April to 7 April, the max- 
imum punishment would be based on an absence of 
3 days. 
(10)  Termination-methods  of return to military 
control. 
(a)  Surrender to military authority. A surren- 
der occurs when a person presents himself or herself 
to any military authority, whether or not a member 
of the same armed force, notifies that authority of his 
or her unauthorized absence status, and submits or 
demonstrates a willingness to submit to military 
control. Such a surrender terminates the unautho- 
rized absence. 
(b) Apprehension by military authority. Appre-
hension by military authority of a known absentee 
terminates an unauthorized absence. 
(c)  Delivery to military authority. Delivery of a 
known absentee by anyone to military authority ter- 
minates the unauthorized absence. 
(d) Apprehension by civilian authorities at the 
request of the military. When an absentee is taken 
into custody by civilian authorities at the request of 
military authorities, the absence is terminated. 
(e) Apprehension by civilian authorities without 
prior  military request. When an absentee is in the 
hands of civilian authorities for other reasons and 
these authorities make the absentee available for re- 
turn to military control, the absence is terminated 
when the military authorities are informed of the ab- 
sentee's availability. 
(11) Findings of more than one absence under one 
specification. An accused may properly by found 
guilty of two or more separate unauthorized  ab- sences under one specification, provided that each 
absence is included within the period alleged in the 
specification and provided that the accused was not 
misled. If an accused is found guilty of two or more 
unauthorized absences under a single specification, 
the maximum authorized punishment shall not ex- 
ceed that authorized if the accused had been found 
guilty as charged in the specification. 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Failing to go to, or going from,  the appointed 
place  of duty. Confinement for 1 month and forfei- 
ture of two-thirds pay per month for 1 month. 
(2) Absence from unit, organization, or otherplace 
of duty. 
(a) For not more than 3 days. Confinement for 
1 month and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month 
for 1 month. 
(b) For more than 3 days but not more than 30 
days. Confinement for 6 months and forfeiture of 
two-thirds pay per month for 6 months. 
(c)  For more than 30 days. Dishonorable dis- 
charge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 1 year. 
(d) For more than 30 days and terminated by 
apprehension. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of 
all pay and allowances, and confinement for 18 
months. 
(3)  From guard  or  watch. Confinement for 3 
months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month 
for 3 months. 
(4)  From guard or watch with intent to abandon. 
Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and al- 
lowances, and confinement for 6 months. 
(5) With intent to avoid maneuvers of field  exer-
cises. Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay 
and allowances, and confinement for 6 months. 
f.  Sample specifications. 
(1)  Failing to go or leaving place  of duty. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did  (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  , without au- 
thority, (fail to go at the time prescribed to) (go 
from) hidher appointed place of duty, to wit: (here 
set forth the appointed place of duty). 
(2) Absence from  unit, organization, or place  of 
duty. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data),  did,  on  or  about 
nl  lc. (1) 
19  ,  without authority, absent him- 
self/herself from hidher (unit) (organization) (place 
of duty at which he/she  was required to be), to wit: 
,located at  ,  and 
did remain so absent until (he/she  was 
apprehended) on or about 
19 
(3) Absence from  unit, organization, or place  of 
duty with intent to avoid maneuvers orfield exercises. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data),  did,  on  or  about 
19  ,  without authority and with in- 
tent to avoid (maneuvers) (field exercises), absent 
himself/herself  from hidher (unit) (organization) 
(place of duty at which he/she  was required to be), 
to  wit:  located  at 
(  ),  and did remain so absent until 
on or about  19 
(4) Abandoning watch or guard. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), being a  member of  the 
(guard) (watch) (duty section), did, (at/on board-lo- 
cation),  on  or  about 
19  ,without authority, go from his/ 
her (guard) (watch) (duty section) (with intent to 
abandon the same). 
11. Article 87-Missing  movement 
a.  Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who through 
neglect or design misses the movement of a ship, air- 
craft, or unit with which he is required in the course 
of duty to move shall be punished as a court-martial 
may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused was required in the course of 
duty to move with a ship, aircraft or unit; 
(2)  That the accused knew of the prospective 
movement of the ship, aircraft or unit; 
(3) That the accused missed the movement of the 
ship, aircraft or unit; and 
(4) That the accused missed  the movement 
through design or neglect. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Movement. "Movement"  as used in Article 
87 includes a move, transfer, or shift of a ship, air- 
craft, or unit involving a substantial distance and pe- 
riod of time. Whether a particular movement is sub- 
stantial is a question to be determined by the court- fl  lc. (1) 
martial considering all the circumstances. Changes 
which do not constitute a "movement" include prac- 
tice marches of a short duration with a return to the 
point of departure, and minor changes in location of 
ships, aircraft, or units, as when a ship is shifted 
from one berth to another in the same shipyard or 
harbor or when a unit is moved from one barracks to 
another on the same post. 
(2)  Mode of movement. 
(a)  Unit. If a person is required in the course of 
duty to move with a unit, the mode of travel is not 
important, whether it be military or commercial, 
and includes travel by ship, train, aircraft, truck, 
bus, or walking. The word "unit"  is not limited to 
any specific technical category such as those listed in 
a table of organization and equipment, but also in- 
cludes units which are created before the movgment 
with the intention that they have organizational con- 
tinuity upon arrival at their destination regardless of 
their technical designation, and units intended to be 
disbanded upon arrival at their destination. 
(b) Ship, aircraft. If a person is assigned as a 
crew member or is ordered to move as a passenger 
aboard a particular ship or aircraft, military or 
chartered, then missing the particular sailing or 
flight is essential to .establish the offense of missing 
movement. 
(3) Design. "Design"  means on purpose, inten- 
tionally, or according to plan and requires specific 
intent to miss the movement. 
(4)  Neglect.  "Neglect"  means the omission to 
take such measures as are appropriate under the cir- 
cumstances to assure presence with a ship, aircraft, 
or unit at the time of a scheduled movement, or do- 
ing some act without giving attention to its probable 
consequences in connection with the prospective 
movement, such as a departure from the vicinity of 
the prospective movement to such a distance as 
would make it likely that one could not return in 
time for the movement. 
(5)  Actual knowledge. In order to be guilty of the 
offense, the accused must have actually known of the 
prospective movement that was missed. Knowledge 
of the exact hour or even of the exact date of the 
scheduled movement is not required. It is sufficient if 
the approximate date was known by the accused as 
long as there is a causal connection between the con- 
duct of the accused and the missing of the scheduled 
movement. Knowledge may be proved by circum- 
stantial evidence. 
(6) Proof of absence. That the accused actually 
missed the movement may be proved by documen- 
tary evibence, as by  a proper entry in a log or a 
morningreport. This fact may also be proved by the 
test.imony of personnel of the ship, aircraft, or unit 
(orby other evidence) that the movement occurred 
at a certain time, together with evidence that the ac- 
cused was physically elsewhere at that time. 
d. 	Lesser included offenses. 
(1) Design. 
(a) Article 87-missing  movement through 
neglect 
(b) Article 86-absence  without authority 
(c)  Article 80-attempts 
(2)  Neglect. Article 86-absence  without author- 
ity 
e. 	Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Design. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of 
all pay and allowances, and confinement for 2 years. 
(2)  Neglect. Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of 
all pay and allowances, and confinement for 1 year. 
f. 	Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  ,  through 
(neglect) (design) miss the movement of (Aircraft 
No.  ) (Flight  ) 
(the USS  ) (Company A,  1st Bat- 
talion, 7th Infantry) (  ) with which 
he/she  was required in the course of duty to move. 
12.  Article 88-Contempt  toward officials 
a. 	Text. 
"Any commissioned officer who uses contemptu- 
ous words against the President, the Vice President, 
Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 
a military department, the Secretary of Transporta- 
tion, or the Governor or legislature of any State, 
Territory, Commonwealth, or possession in which 
he is on duty or present shall be punished as a court- 
martial may direct." 
b. 	Elements. 
(1) That the accused was a commissioned officer 
of the United States armed forces; 
(2) That the accused used certain words against 
an official or legislature named in the article; (3)  That by an act of the accused these words 
came to the knowledge of a person other than the ac- 
cused; and 
(4) That the words used were contemptuous, ei- 
ther in themselves or by virtue of the circumstances 
under which they were used. 
[Note: If the words were against a Governor or legis- 
lature, add the following element] 
(5)  That the accused was then present in the 
State, Territory, Commonwealth, or possession of 
the Governor or legislature concerned. 
c.  Explanation. The official or legislature against 
whom the words are used must be occupying one of 
the offices or be one of the legislatures named in Ar- 
ticle 88 at the time of the offense. Neither "Con- 
gress" nor"legis1ature"  includes its members indi- 
vidually. "Governor"  does not include"1ieutenant 
governor."  It is immaterial whether the words are 
used against the official in an official or private ca- 
pacity. Ifnot personally contemptuous, adverse crit- 
icism of one of the officials or legislatures named in 
the article in the course of a political discussion, 
even though emphatically expressed, may not be 
charged as a violation of the article. Similarly,' ex- 
pressions of opinion made in a purely private con- 
versation should not ordinarily be charged. Giving 
broad circulation to a written publication containing 
contemptuous words of the kind made punishable 
by this article, or the utterance of contemptuous 
words of this kind in the presence of military subor- 
dinates, aggravates the offense. The truth or falsity 
of the statements is immaterial. 
d. 	Lesser included offense.  Article 8Gattempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Dismissal, forfeiture of 
all pay and allowances, and confinement for 1 year. 
f. 	Sample specijication. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  , [use (orally 
and publicly) (  ) the following con- 
temptuous words] [in a contemptuous manner, use 
(orally and publicly) (  ) the follow- 
ing words] against the [(President) (Vice President) 
(Congress) (Secretary of  )I  [(Gov- 
ernor)  (legislature)  of  the  (State  of 
) (Territory of  ) 
(  )  a  (State)  (Territory) 
(  )  in which  he/she,  the said 
,was then (on duty), (present)], to 
wit: "  ,"or words to that effect. 
13.  Article 89-Disrespect  toward a superior 
commissioned officer 
a. 	Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who behaves 
with disrespect toward his superior commissioned 
officer shall be punished as a court-martial may di- 
rect." 
b. 	Elements. 
(1)  That the accused did or omitted certain acts 
or used certain language to or concerning a certain 
commissioned officer; 
(2)  That such behavior or language was directed 
toward that officer; 
(3)  That the officer toward whom the acts, omis- 
sions, or words were directed was the superior com- 
missioned officer of the accused; 
(4) That the accused then knew that the commis- 
sioned officer toward whom the acts, omissions, or 
words were directed was the accused's superior 
commissioned officer; and 
(5) That, under the circumstances, the behavior 
or language was disrespectful to that commissioned 
officer. 
c. 	Explanation. 
(1) Superior commissioned oficer. 
(a) Accused and victim in same armed force. If 
the accused and the victim are in the same armed 
force, the victim is a "superior  commissioned of- 
ficer" of the accused when either superior in rank or 
command to the accused; however, the victim is not 
a "superior  commissioned officer-of  the accused if 
the victim is inferior in command, even though supe- 
rior in rank. 
(b) Accused  and victim in different armed 
forces.  If the accused and the victim are in  different 
armed forces, the victim is a "superior  commis- 
sioned officer"  of the accused when the victim is a 
commissioned officer and superior in the chain of 
command over the accused or when the victim, not a 
medical officer or a chaplain, is senior in grade to the 
accused and both are detained by  a hostile entity so 
that recourse to the normal chain of command is 
prevented. The victim is not a "superior  commis- 
sioned officer"  of  the accused merely because the 
victim is superior in grade to the accused. (c)  Execution of ofice. It is not necessary that 
the "superior commissioned officer" be in the execu- 
tion of office at the time of the disrespectful behav- 
ior. 
(2)  Knowledge. If the accused did not know that 
the person against whom the acts or words were di- 
rected was the accused's superior commissioned of- 
ficer, the accused may not be convicted of a violation 
of this article. Knowledge may be proved by circum- 
stantial evidence. 
(3) Disrespect. Disrespectful behavior is that 
which detracts from the respect due the authority 
and person of a superior commissioned officer. It 
may consist of acts or language, however expressed, 
and it is immaterial whether they refer to the supe- 
rior as an officer or as a private individual. Disre- 
spect by words may be conveyed by abusive epithets 
or other contemptuous or denunciatory language. 
Truth is no defense. Disrespect by  acts includes 
neglecting the customary salute, or showing a 
marked disdain, indifference, insolence, imperti- 
nence, undue familiarity, or other rudeness in the 
presence of the superior officer. 
(4)  Presence. It is not essential that the disrespect- 
ful behavior be in the presence of the superior, but 
ordinarily one should not be held accountable under 
this article for what was said or done in a purely pri- 
vate conversation. 
(5) Special defense-unprotected  victim. A supe- 
rior commissioned officer whose conduct in relation 
to the accused under all the circumstances departs 
substantially from the required standards appropri- 
ate to that officer's rank or position  under similar 
circumstances loses the protection of this article. 
That accused may not be convicted of being disre- 
spectful to the officer who has so lost the entitlement 
to respect protected by Article 89. 
d. 	 Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Article 117-provoking  speeches or gestures 
(2)  Article 8C-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Bad-conduct discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 1 year. 
f. 	Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  ,behave him- 
self/herself 	 with  disrespect  toward 
, hidher superior commissioned 
officer, then known by the said  to 
be hidher superior commissioned officer, by (saying 
to him/her "  ,"or words to that ef- 
fect) (contemptuously turning from and leaving 
him/her  while he/she,  the said  , 
was talking to him/her,  the said  ) 
14.  Article 90-Assaulting  or willfully 
disobeying superior commissioned officer 
a. 	Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who- 
(1) strikes his superior commissioned officer or 
draws or lifts up any weapon or offers any violence 
against him while he is in the execution of his office; 
or 
(2) willfully disobeys a lawful command of his 
superior commissioned officer; 
shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time 
of war, by death or such other punishment as a 
court-martial may direct, and if the offense is com- 
mitted at any other time, by  such punishment, other 
than death, as a court-martial may direct." 
b. 	Elements. 
(1) Striking or assaulting superior commissioned 
oficer. 
(a) That the accused struck, drew, or lifted up 
a weapon against, or offered violence against, a cer- 
tain commissioned officer; 
(b)  That the officer was the superior commis- 
sioned officer of the accused; 
(c)  That the accused then knew that the officer 
was the accused's  superior commissioned officer; 
and 
(d)  That the superior commissioned officer was 
then in the execution of office. 
(2)  Disobeying superior commissioned oficer. 
(a) That the accused received  a lawful com- 
mand from a certain commissioned officer; 
(b) That this officer was the superior commis- 
sioned officer of the accused; 
(c) That the accused then knew that this officer 
was the accused's superior commissioned officer; 
and 
(d)  That the accused willfully disobeyed  the 
lawful command. 
c. 	Explanation. 
(1)  Striking or assaulting superior commissioned 
oficer. (a)  Definitions. 
(i)  Superior commissioned officer. The defi- 
nitions in paragraph 13c(l)(a) and (b) apply here 
and in subparagraph c(2). 
(ii)  "Strikes" means an intentional blow, and 
includes any offensive touching of the person of an 
officer, however slight. 
(iii) The phrase "draws  or lifts up any 
weapon against" covers any simple assault commit- 
ted in  the manner stated. The drawing of  any 
weapon in an aggressive manner or the raising or 
brandishing of the same in a threatening manner in 
the presence of and at the superior is the sort of act 
proscribed. The raising in a threatening manner of a 
firearm, whether or not loaded, of a club, or of any- 
thing by which a serious blow or injury could be 
given is included in "lifts up." 
(iv)  The phrase "offers any violence against" 
includes any form of battery or of mere aisault not 
embraced in the preceding more specific terms 
"strikes"  and "draws or lifts up."  If not executed, 
the violence must be physically attempted or men- 
aced. A mere threatening in words is not an offering 
of violence in the sense of this article. 
(b)  Execution of  ofice. An officer is in the exe- 
cution of office when engaged in any act or service 
required or authorized by treaty, statute, regulation, 
the order of a superior, or military usage. In general, 
any striking or use of violence against any superior 
officer by a person over whom it is the duty of that 
officer to maintain discipline at the time, would be 
striking or using violence against the officer in  the 
execution of office. The commanding officer on 
board a ship or the commanding officer of a unit in 
the field is generally considered to be on duty at all 
times. 
(c)  Knowledge. If the accused did not know the 
officer was the accused's superior commissioned of- 
ficer, the accused may not be convicted of this of- 
fense. Knowledge may be proved by circumstantial 
evidence. 
(d) Defenses.  In a prosecution for striking or 
assaulting a superior commissioned officer in viola- 
tion of this article, it is a defense that the accused ac- 
ted in the proper discharge of some duty, or that the 
victim behaved in a manner toward the accused such 
as to lose the protection of this article (see paragraph 
13c(5)). For example, if the victim initiated an un- 
lawful attack on the accused, this would deprive the 
victim of the protection of this article, and, in addi- 
tion, could excuse any lesser included offense of as- 
sault as done in  self-defense, depending on the cir- 
cumstances (see paragraph 54c; R.C.M. 9  16(e)). 
(2) Disobeying superior commissioned oficer. 
(a)  Lawfulness of  the order. 
(i)  Inference of lawfulness. An order requir- 
ing the performance of a military duty or act may be 
inferred to be lawful and it is disobeyed at the peril 
of the subordinate. This inference does not apply to 
a patently illegal order, such as one that directs the 
commission of a crime. 
(ii)  The commissioned officer issuing the or- 
der must have authority to give such an order. Au- 
thorization may be based on law, regulation, or cus- 
tom of the service. 
(iii)  The order must relate to military duty, 
which includes all activities reasonably necessary to 
accomplish a military mission, or safeguard or pro- 
mote the morale, discipline, and usefulness of mem- 
bers of a command and directly connected with the 
maintenance of good order in the service. The order 
may not, without such a valid military purpose, in- 
terfere with private rights or personal affairs. How- 
ever, the dictates of a person's  conscience, religion, 
or personal philosophy cannot justify or excuse the 
disobedience of an otherwise lawful order. Disobedi- 
ence of an order which has for its sole object the at- 
tainment of some private end, or which is given for 
the sole purpose of increasing the penalty for an of- 
fense which it is expected the accused may commit, 
is not punishable under this article. 
(iv)  The order must not conflict with the 
statutory or constitutional rights of the person re- 
ceiving the order. 
(b) Personal nature of  the order.  The order 
must be directed specifically to the subordinate. Vio- 
lations of regulations, standing orders or directives, 
or failure to perform previously established duties 
are not punishable under this article, but may violate 
Article 92. 
(c)  Form and transmission of  the order. As long 
as the order is understandable, the form of the order 
is immaterial, as is the method by which it is trans- 
mitted to the accused. 
(d) Specificity of  the order. The order must be a 
specific mandate to do or not to do a specific act. An 
exhortation to "obey the law"  or to perform one's military duty does not constitute an order under this 
article. 
(e)  Knowledge. The accused must have actual 
knowledge of the order and of the fact that the per- 
son issuing the order was the accused's superior 
commissioned officer. Actual knowledge may be 
proved by circumstantial evidence. 
(f) Nature of the disobedience. "Willful disobe- 
dience" is an intentional defiance of authority. Fail- 
ure to comply with an order through heedlessness, 
remissness, or forgetfulness is not a violation of this 
article but may violate Article 92. 
(g)  Time  for  compliance. When an order re- 
quires immediate compliance, an accused's declared 
intent not to obey and the failure to make any move 
to comply constitutes disobedience. If an order does 
not indicate the time within which it is to be com- 
plied with, either expressly or by implication, then a 
reasonable delay in compliance does not violate this 
article. If an order requires performance in the fu- 
ture, an accused's present statement of intention to 
disobey the order does not constitute disobedience of 
that order, although carrying out that intention 
may. 
(3)  Civilians and discharged prisoners.  A dis- 
charged prisoner or other civilian subject to military 
law (see Article 2) and under the command of a 
commissioned officer is subject to the provisions of 
this article. 
d. Lesser included oflenses. 
(1)  Striking superior commissioned ofJicer in exe- 
cution of ofJice. 
(a)  Article 904rawing  or lifting up a weapon 
or offering violence to superior commissioned officer 
in execution of office 
(b) Article 128-assault;  assault consummated 
by a battery; assault with a dangerous weapon 
(c)  Article  128-assault  or assault consum- 
mated by a battery upon commissioned officer not in 
the execution of office 
(d)  Article 80-attempts 
(2)  Drawing or lifting up a weapon or offering vi- 
olence to superior commissioned officer in execution 
of office. 
(a)  Article 128-assault,  assault with danger- 
ous weapon 
(b)  Article 128-assault  upon a commissioned 
officer not in the execution of office 
(c)  Article 80-attempts 
(3)  Willfully disobeying lawful order of  superior 
commissioned officer. 
(a)  Article 92-failure  to obey lawful order 
(b)  Article 894isrespect to superior commis- 
sioned officer 
(c)  Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Striking, drawing, or lifting up any weapon or 
oflering any violence to superior commissioned ofJicer 
in the execution of ofJice. Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 10 years. 
(2)  Willfully disobeying a lawful order of superior 
commissioned  ofJicer. Dishonorable discharge, for- 
feiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement 
for 5 years. 
(3)  In time of war. Death or sudh other punish- 
ment as a court-martial may direct. 
f.  Sample specifications. 
(1)  Striking superior commissioned ofJicer. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on  or about 
19  , (a time of 
war) strike  ,his/her  superior com- 
missioned  officer,  then known  by  the said 
to be his/her  superior commis- 
sioned officer, who was then in the execution of his/ 
her office, (in) (on) the  with  (a) 
(hidher) 
(2)  Drawing or lifting up a weapon against supe- 
rior commissioned ofJicer. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , (a time of 
war)  (draw) lift  up)  a  weapon,  to wit:  a 
,against  ,his/her 
superior commissioned officer, then known by  the 
said  to be his/her  superior com- 
missioned officer, who was then in the execution of 
his/her  office. 
(3)  Oflering violence to superior commissioned of- 
ficer. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , (a time of 
war) offer violence against  , his/ her superior commissioned officer, then known by 
the said  to be hidher superior 
commissioned officer, who was then in the execution 
of hisher office, by 
(4) Willful disobedience of superior commissioned 
ofice. 
In that 	 (personal jurisdiction 
data), having received  a lawful command from 
,his/her  superior commissioned 
officer, then known by the said 	 to 
be his/her  superior commissioned  officer,  to 
,or words to that effect, did, (at/on 
board-location),  on or about 
19  ,willfully disobey the same. 
15.  Article 91-Insubordinate  conduct 
toward warrant officer, noncommissioned 
officer, or petty officer 
a. 	Text. 
"Any warrant officer or enlisted member who- 
(1) strikes or assaults a warrant officer, non- 
commissioned officer, or petty officer, while that of- 
ficer is in the execution of his office; 
(2) willfully disobeys the lawful order of a war- 
rant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty of- 
ficer; or 
(3) treats with contempt or is disrespectful in 
language or deportment toward a warrant officer, 
noncommissioned officer, or petty officer while that 
officer is in the execution of his office; shall be pun- 
ished as a court-martial may direct." 
b. 	Elements. 
(1)  Striking or assaulting warrant, noncommis- 
sioned, or petty officer. 
(a) That the accused was a warrant officer or 
enlisted member; 
(b) That the accused struck or assaulted a cer- 
tain warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer; 
(c) That the striking or assault was committed 
while the victim was in the execution of office; and 
(d) That the accused then knew that the person 
struck or assaulted was a warrant, noncommis- 
sioned, or petty officer. 
[Note: If the victim was the superior noncommis- 
sioned or petty officer of the accused, add the follow- 
ing elements] 
(e) That the victim was the superior noncom- 
missioned, or petty officer of the accused; and 
(0 That the accused then knew that the person 
struck or assaulted was the accused's superior non- 
commissioned, or petty officer. 
(2)  Disobeying a warrant, noncommissioned,  or 
petty officer. 
(a) That the accused was a warrant officer or 
enlisted member; 
(b) That the accused received a certain lawful 
order from a certain warrant, noncommissioned, or 
petty officer; 
(c) That the accused then knew that the person 
giving the order was a warrant, noncommissioned, 
or petty officer; 
(d)  That the accused had a duty to obey the or- 
der; and 
(e) That the accused willfully disobeyed the or- 
der. 
(3) Treating with contempt or being disrespectful 
in language or deportment toward a warrant, non- 
commissioned, or petty officer. 
(a)  That the accused was a warrant officer or 
enlisted member; 
(b)  That the accused did or omitted certain 
acts, or used certain language; 
(c)  That such behavior or language was used 
toward and within sight or hearing of a certain war- 
rant, noncommissioned, or petty officer; 
(d)  That the accused then knew that the person 
toward whom the behavior or language was directed 
was a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer; 
(e)  That the victim was then in the execution of 
office; and 
(0 That under the circumstances the accused, 
by such behavior or language, treated with contempt 
or was disrespectful to said warrant, noncommis- 
sioned, or petty officer. 
[Note: If the victim was the superior noncommis- 
sioned, or petty officer of the accused, add the fol- 
lowing elements] 
(g)  That the victim was the superior noncom- 
missioned, or petty officer of the accused; and 
(h) That the accused then knew that the person 
toward whom the behavior or language was directed 
was the accused's  superior noncommissioned, or 
petty officer. 
c. 	Explanation. 
(1)  In general. Article 91 has the same general 
objects with respect to warrant, noncommissioned, 
and petty officers as Articles 89 and 90 have with re- spect to commissioned officers, namely, to ensure 
obedience to their lawful orders, and to protect them 
from violence, insult, or disrespect. Unlike Articles 
89 and 90, however, this article does not require a 
superior-subordinate relationship as an element of 
any of the offenses denounced. This article does not 
protect an acting noncommissioned officer or acting 
petty officer, nor does it protect military police or 
members of the shore patrol who are not warrant, 
noncommissioned, or petty officers. 
(2)  Knowledge. All of the offenses prohibited by 
Article 91 require that the accused have actual 
knowledge that the victim was a warrant, noncom- 
missioned, or petty officer. Actual knowledge may 
be proved by circumstantial evidence. 
(3)  Striking or assaulting a warrant, noncommis- 
sioned, or petty oficer. For a discussion of "strikes" 
and "in  the execution of  office," see paragraph  14c. 
For a discussion of "assault,"  see paragraph 54c. An 
assault by  a prisoner who has been discharged from 
the service, or by any other civilian subject to mili- 
tary law, upon a warrant, noncommissioned, or 
petty officer should be charged under Article 128 or 
134. 
(4)  Disobeying a warrant, noncommissioned, or 
petty oficer. See paragraph  14c(2) for a discussion of 
lawfulness, personal nature, form, transmission, and 
specificity of the order, nature of the disobedience, 
and time for compliance with the order. 
(5)  Treating with contempt or being disrespectful 
in language or deportment toward a warrant, non- 
commissioned, or petty  oficer. "Toward"  requires 
that the behavior and language be within the sight or 
hearing of the warrant, noncommissioned,  or petty 
officer concerned. For a discussion of "in  the execu- 
tion of his office,"  see paragraph 14c. For a discus- 
sion of disrespect, see paragraph  13c. 
d. Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Striking or assaulting warrant, noncommis- 
sioned, or petty oficer in the execution of ofice. 
(a) Article 128-assault;  assault consummated 
by a battery; assault with a dangerous weapon 
(b) Article 128-assault  upon warrant, non- 
commissioned, or petty officer not in the execution 
of office 
(c)  Article 80-attempts 
(2)  Disobeying  a warrant, noncommissioned, or 
petty oficer. 
(a) Article 92-failure  to obey a lawful order 
(b)  Article 80-attempts 
(3)  Treating with contempt or being disrespectful 
in language or deportment toward warrant, noncom- 
missioned, or petty oficer in the execution of ofice. 
(a)  Article 117-using  provoking or reproach- 
ful speech 
(b)  Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum  punishment. 
(1)  Striking or assaulting warrant oficer. Dishon-
orable discharge, forfeiture of  all pay and al- 
lowances, and confinement for 5 years. 
(2)  Striking or assaulting superior noncommis- 
sioned or petty  oficer. Dishonorable discharge, for- 
feiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement 
for 3 years. 
(3)  Striking or assaulting other noncommissioned 
or petty oficer. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of 
all pay and allowances, and confinement for 1 year. 
(4)  Willfully  disobeying the lawful order of a war- 
rant oficer. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all 
pay and allowances, and confinement for 2 years. 
(5)  Willfully  disobeying the lawful order of a non- 
commissioned or petty  oficer. Bad-conduct dis- 
charge, forfeiture of  all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 1 year. 
(6)  Contempt or disrespect to warrant oficer. Bad-
conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and al- 
lowances, and confinement for 9 months. 
(7)  Contempt or disrespect to superior noncommis- 
sioned or petty oficer. Bad-conduct discharge, forfei- 
ture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 6 
months. 
(8)  Contempt or disrespect to other noncommis- 
sioned  or petty oficer. Forfeiture of two-thirds pay 
per month for 3 months, and confinement for 3 
months. 
f.  Sample specifications. 
(1)  Striking or assaulting warrant, noncommis- 
sioned, or petty oficer. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , (strike) (as- 
sault)  ,a  officer, 
then known to the said  to be a (su- 
perior)  officer who was then in the 
execution of hidher office, by 
him/her  (in) (on) (the  ) with (a) 
(hidher) (2)  Willful disobedience of warrant, noncommis- 
sioned, or petty  oficer. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), having  received  a  lawful order from 
, a  officer, then 
known  by  the said  to be  a 
officer, t  o  ,  an or- 
der which it was hidher duty to obey, did (at/on 
board-location),  on  or about 
19  ,willfully disobey the same. 
(3)  Contempt or disrespect  toward warrant, non- 
commissioned, or petty oficer. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data) (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  , (did treat 
with disrespectful in (language) (deportment) to- 
ward)  ,a  officer, 
then known by the said  to be a (su- 
perior)  officer, who was then in the 
execution of hidher office, by (saying to him/her, 
'6  ," or words to that effect) (spit- 
ting at hidher feet) (  ) 
16.  Article 92-Failure  to obey order or 
regulation 
a. 	Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who- 
(1) violates or fails to obey any lawful general 
order or regulation; 
(2) having knowledge of any other lawful order 
issued by a member of the armed forces, which it is 
his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or 
(3) is derelict in the performance of his duties; 
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct." 
b. 	Elements. 
(1)  Violation of or failure  to obey a lawful general 
order or regulation. 
(a)  That there was in  effect a certain lawful 
general order or regulation; 
(b) That the accused had a duty to obey it; and 
(c)  That the accused violated or failed to obey 
the order or regulation. 
(2)  Failure to obey other lawful order. 
(a)  That a member of the armed forces issued a 
certain lawful order; 
(b)  That the accused had knowledge of the or- 
der; 
(c)  That the accused had a duty to obey the or- 
der; and 
(d)  That the accused failed to obey the order. 
(3)  Dereliction in the performance of duties. 
(a)  That the accused had certain duties; 
(b) That the accused knew or reasonably 
should have known of the duties; and 
(c)  That the accused was (willfully) (through 
neglect or culpable inefficiency) derelict in the per- 
formance of those duties. 
c. 	Explanation. 
(1)  Violation of or failure  to obey a lawful general 
order or regulation. 
(a)  Authority to issue general orders and regula- 
tions. General orders or regulations are those orders 
or regulations generally applicable to an armed force 
which are properly published by the President or the 
Secretary of Defense, of Transportation, or of a mili- 
tary department, and those orders or regulations 
generally applicable to the command of the officer is- 
suing them throughout the command or a particular 
subdivision thereof which are issued by: 
(i)  an officer having general court-martial ju- 
risdiction; 
(ii)  a general or flag officer in command; or 
(iii) a commander superior to (i) or (ii). 
(b)  Effect of change of command on validity of 
order. A general order or regulation issued by a com- 
mander with authority under Article 92(1) retains 
its character as a general order or regulation when 
another officer takes command, until it expires by its 
own terms or is rescinded by separate action, even if 
it is issued by an officer who is a general or flag of- 
ficer in command and command is assumed by an- 
other officer who is not a general or flag officer. 
(c) Lawfulness. A general order or regulation is 
lawful unless it is contrary to the Constitution, the 
laws of the United States, or lawful superior orders 
or for some other reason is beyond the authority of 
the official issuing it. See the discussion of lawfulness 
in paragraph  14c(2)(a). 
(d) Knowledge. Knowledge of a general order 
or regulation need  not be alleged or proved, as 
knowledge is not an element of this offense and a 
lack of knowledge does not constitute a defense. 
(e)  Enforceability. Not all provisions in general 
orders or regulations can be enforced under Article 
92(1). Regulations which only supply general guide- 
lines or advice for conducting military functions 
may not be enforceable under Article 92(1). nl6c.(2) 
(2)  Violation of or failure  to obey other lawful or- 
der. 
(a)  Scope. Article 92(2) includes all other law- 
ful orders which may be issued by a member of the 
armed forces, violations of which are not chargeable 
under Article 90, 91, or 92(1). It includes the viola- 
tion of written regulations which are not general reg- 
ulations. See also subparagraph (l)(e) above as ap- 
plicable. 
(b) Knowledge. In order to be guilty of this of- 
fense, a person must have had actual knowledge of 
the order or regulation. Knowledge of the order may 
be proved by circumstantial evidence. 
(c)  Duty to obey order. 
(i)  From a superior. A member of one armed 
force who is senior in rank to a member of another 
armed force is the superior of that member with au- 
thority to issue orders which that member has a duty 
to obey under the same circumstances as a commis- 
sioned officer of one armed force is the superior com- 
missioned  officer of a member of another armed 
force for the purposes of Articles 89 and 90. See par-
agraph 13c(l). 
(ii)  Failure to obey the lawful order of one 
not a superior is an offense under Article 92(2), pro- 
vided the accused had a duty to obey the order, such 
as one issued by a sentinel or a member of the armed 
forces police. See paragraph  15b(2) if the order was 
issued by  a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty of- 
ficer in the execution of office. 
(3) Dereliction  in the performance of duties. 
(a) Duty. A duty may be imposed by treaty, 
statute, regulation, lawful order, standard operating 
procedure, or custom of the service. 
(b) Knowledge. Actual knowledge of duties 
may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Actual 
knowledge need not be  shown if the individual rea- 
sonably should have known of the duties. This may 
be demonstrated by regulations, training or operat- 
ing manuals, customs of the service, academic litera- 
ture or testimony, testimony of persons who have 
held similar or superior positions, or similar evi- 
dence. 
(c) Derelict. A person is derelict in the per- 
formance of duties when that person willfully  or 
negligently fails to perform that person's  duties or 
when that person performs them in a culpably ineffi- 
cient manner. "Willfully" means intentionally. It re- 
fers to the doing of an act knowingly and purposely, 
specifically intending the natural and probable con- 
sequences of the act. "Negligently"  means an act or 
omission of a person who is under a duty to use due 
care which exhibits a lack of that degree of care 
which a reasonably prudent person would have exer- 
cised  under  the same or  similar circum-
stances."Culpable  inefficiency"  is inefficiency for 
which there is no reasonable or just excuse. 
(d)  Ineptitude. A person is not derelict in the 
performance of duties if the failure to perform those 
duties is caused by ineptitude rather than by willful- 
ness, negligence, or culpable inefficiency, and may 
not be charged under this article, or otherwise pun- 
ished. For example, a recruit who has tried earnestly 
during rifle training and throughout record firing is 
not derelict in the performance of duties if the re- 
cruit fails to qualify with the weapon. 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 8kattempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Violation or failure  to obey lawful general  or- 
der or regulation. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture 
of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 2 
years. 
(2)  Violation of failure  to obey other lawful order. 
Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and al- 
lowances, and confinement for 6 months. 
[Note: For (1) and (2), above, the punishment set 
forth does not apply in the following cases: if in the 
absence of the order or regulation which was vio- 
lated or not obeyed the accused would on the same 
facts be subject to conviction for another specific of- 
fense for which a lesser punishment is prescribed; or 
if  the violation or failure to obey is a breach of re- 
straint imposed as a result of an order. In these in- 
stances, the maximum punishment is that specifi- 
cally prescribed  elsewhere for that particular 
offense.] 
(3)  Dereliction  in the performance of duties. 
(A)  Through neglect or culpable ineflciency. 
Forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for 3 months 
and confinement for 3 months. 
(B) Willful. Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture 
of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 6 
months. 
f. Sample specijkations. 
(1)  Violation or failure  to obey lawful general or- 
der or regulation. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
IV-24 jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,(violate) (fail 
to obey) a lawful general (order) (regulation), to wit: 
(paragraph  , (Army) (Air Force) 
Regulation  dated 
19  )  (Article 
, U.S. Navy Regulations, dated 
19  ) (General Or- 
der No.  , U.S.  Navy,  dated 
19  ) 
(  )9  by  (wrongfully) 
(2)  Violation or failure  to obey other lawful writ- 
ten order. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), having knowledge of a lawful order issued by 
,  to  wit:  (paragraph 
9  (  the Combat 
Group Regulation No.  ) (uss 
, Instruction  ), 
dated  ) (  ), an or- 
der which it was hidher duty to obey, did, (at/on 
board-location)  (subject-matter jurisdiction  data, 
if  required),  on  or  about 
19  , fail to obey  the same by 
(wrongfully) 
(3) Failure to obey other lawful order. 
In that  ,(personal jurisdiction 
data) having knowledge of a lawful order issued by 
(to submit to certain medical 
treatment)  (to  )  (not  to 
)  (  ),  an  order 
which it was hidher duty to obey, did (at/on 
board-location)  (subject-matter jurisdiction  data, 
if  required),  on  or  about 
19  , fail  to obey the same (by 
(wrongfully)  .) 
(4) Dereliction in the performance  of duties. 
In that  ,(personal jurisdiction 
data), who (knew) (should have known) of hidher 
duties (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter juris- 
diction  data,  if  required),  (on  or  about 
19  ) (from about 
19  to about 
19  ), was derelict 
in  the performance of those duties in  that he/she 
(negligently) (willfully) (by culpable inefficiency) 
failed  ,as it was hidher duty to do. 
17. Article 93-Cruelty  and maltreatment 
a. 	Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who is guilty 
of cruelty toward, or oppression or maltreatment of, 
any person subject to his orders shall be punished as 
a court-martial may direct." 
b. 	Elements. 
(1)  That a certain person  was subject to the or- 
ders of the accused; and 
(2)  That the accused was cruel toward, or op- 
pressed, or maltreated that person. 
c. 	Explanation. 
(1)  Nature of victim. "Any  person subject to his 
orders"  means not only those persons under the di- 
rect or immediate command of  the accused but ex- 
tends to all persons, subject to the code or not, who 
by reason of some duty are required to obey the law- 
ful orders of the accused, regardless whether the ac- 
cused is in the direct chain of command over the per- 
son. 
(2)  Nature of act. The cruelty, oppression, or mal- 
treatment, although not necessarily physical, must 
be measured by an objective standard. Assault, im- 
proper punishment, and sexual harassment  may 
constitute this offense. Sexual harassment includes 
influencing, offering to influence, or threatening the 
career, pay, or job of another person in exchange for 
sexual favors, and deliberate or repeated offensive 
comments or gestures of a sexual nature. The impo- 
sition of necessary or proper duties and the exaction 
of their performance does not constitute this offense 
even though the duties are arduous or hazardous or 
both. 
d. 	Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 1 year. 
f. 	Sample specijkation. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter juris- 
diction  data,  if  required),  on  or  about 
19  , (was cruel 
toward)  (did  (oppress)  (maltreat)) 
, a person  subject to hidher or- 
ders, by (kicking him/her  in the stomach) (confining 
him/her  for twenty-four hours without water) 
(  ). 18.  Article 94-Mutiny  and sedition 
a. 	Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who- 
(1) with intent to usurp or override lawful mili- 
tary authority, refuse, in concert with any other per- 
son, to obey orders or otherwise do his duty or cre- 
ates any violence or disturbance is guilty of mutiny; 
(2) with intent to cause the overthrow or de- 
struction of lawful civil authority, creates, in concert 
with any other person, revolt, violence, or other dis- 
turbance against that authority is guilty of sedition; 
(3) fails to do his utmost to prevent and sup- 
press a mutiny or sedition being committed in his 
presence, or fails to take all reasonable means to in- 
form his superior commissioned  officer or com- 
manding officer of a mutiny or sedition which he 
knows or has reason to believe is taking place, is 
guilty of  a failure to suppress or report a mutiny or 
sedition. 
(b) A person who is found guilty of attempted mu- 
tiny, mutiny, sedition, or failure to suppress or re- 
port a mutiny or sedition shall be punished by death 
or such other punishment as a court-martial may di- 
rect." 
b. 	Elements. 
(1)  Mutiny by creating violence or disturbance. 
(a)  That the accused created violence or a dis- 
turbance; and 
(b)  That the accused created this violence or 
disturbance with intent to usurp or override lawful 
military authority. 
(2) Mutiny by refusing to obey orders or perform 
duty. 
(a) That the accused refused to obey orders or 
otherwise do the accused's duty; 
(b) That the accused in refusing to obey orders 
or perform duty acted in concert with another per- 
son or persons; and 
(c) That the accused did so with intent to usurp 
or override lawful military authority. 
(3)  Sedition. 
(a) That the accused created revolt, violence, 
or disturbance against lawful civil authority; 
(b) That the accused acted in concert with an- 
other person or persons; and 
(c) That the accused did so with the intent to 
cause the overthrow or destruction of that authority. 
(4)  Failure to prevent  and suppress a mutiny or se- 
dition. 
(a)  That an offense of mutiny or sedition was 
committed in the presence of the accused; and 
(b) That the accused failed to do the accused's 
utmost to prevent and suppress the mutiny or sedi- 
tion. 
(5) Failure to report a mutiny or sedition. 
(a)  That an offense of mutiny or sedition oc- 
curred; 
(b) That the accused knew or had reason to be- 
lieve that the offense was taking place; and 
(c)  That the accused failed to take all reasona- 
ble means to inform the accused's superior commis- 
sioned officer or commander of the offense. 
(6) Attempted mutiny. 
(a)  That the accused committed a certain overt 
act; 
(b) That the act was done with specific intent 
to commit the offense of mutiny; 
(c)  That the act amounted to more than mere 
preparation; and 
(d) That the act apparently tended to effect the 
commission of the offense of mutiny. 
c. 	Explanation. 
(1)  Mutiny. Article 94(a)(l) defines two types of 
mutiny, both requiring an intent to usurp or over- 
ride military authority. 
(a)  Mutiny by creating violence or disturbance. 
Mutiny by creating violence or disturbance may be 
committed by one person  acting alone or by more 
than one acting together. 
(b)  Mutiny by refusing to obey orders or per- 
form  duties. Mutiny by refusing to obey orders or 
perform duties requires collective insubordination 
and necessarily includes some combination of two or 
more persons in resisting lawful military authority. 
This concert of insubordination need not be precon- 
ceived, nor is it necessary that the insubordination 
be active or violent. It may consist simply of a persis- 
tent and concerted refusal or omission to obey or- 
ders, or to do duty, with an insubordinate intent, 
that is, with an intent to usurp or override lawful 
military authority. The intent may be declared in 
words or inferred from acts, omissions, or surround- 
ing circumstances. 
(2)  Sedition. Sedition requires a concert of action 
in resistance to civil authority. This differs from mu- 
tiny by creating violence or disturbance. See subpar-
agraph c(l)(a) above. (3)  Failure toprevent and suppress a mutiny or se- 
dition. "Utmost"  means taking those measures to 
prevent and suppress a mutiny or sedition which 
may properly be called for by the circumstances, in- 
cluding the rank, responsibilities, or employment of 
the person concerned. "Utmost"  includes the use of 
such force, including deadly force, as may be reason- 
ably necessary under the circumstances to prevent 
and suppress a mutiny or sedition. 
(4)  Failure to report  a mutiny or sedition. Failure 
to "take all reasonable means to inform"  includes 
failure to take the most expeditious means available. 
When the circumstances known to the accused 
would have caused a reasonable person in similar 
circumstances to believe that a mutiny or sedition 
was occurring, this may establish that the accused 
had such"reason to believe" that mutiny or sedition 
was occurring. Failure to report an impending mu- 
tiny or sedition is not an offense in violation of Arti- 
cle 94. But see  paragraph 16c(3) (dereliction of 
duty). 
(5) Attempted  mutiny. For a discussion of at- 
tempts, see paragraph 4. 
d. Lesser included offenses. 
(1) Mutiny by creating violence or disturbance. 
(a) Article 90-assault  on commissioned of- 
ficer 
(b) Article 9 1-assault  on warrant, noncom- 
missioned, or petty officer 
(c)  Article 9Lattempted mutiny 
(d) Article 116-riot;  breach of peace 
(e) Article 128-assault 
(f)  Article 134-disorderly conduct 
(2)  Mutiny by refusing to obey orders or perform 
duties. 
(a) Article 90-willful  disobedience of com- 
missioned officer 
(b) Article 91-willful  disobedience of war- 
rant, noncommissioned, or petty officer 
(c) Article 92-failure  to obey lawful order 
(d) Article 94-attempted  mutiny 
(3)  Sedition. 
(a) Article 1  16-riot;  breach of peace 
(b) Article 128-assault 
(c)  Article 134-disorderly  conduct 
(d) Article 8kattempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  For all offenses under 
Article 94, death or such other punishment as a 
court-martial may direct. 
f.  Sample specifications. 
(1) Mutiny by creating violence or disturbance. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), with intent to (usurp) (override) (usurp and 
override) lawful military authority, did, (at/on 
board-location)  (subject-matter jurisdiction  data, 
if  required),  on  or  about 
19  , create (violence) (a distur- 
bance) by (attacking the officers of the said ship) 
(barricading himself/herself  in Barracks T7, firing 
his/her  rifle at  , and exhorting 
other persons to join  him/her  in  defiance of 
) (  ). 
(2)  Mutiny by refusing to obey orders or perform 
duties. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), with intent to (usurp) (override) (usurp and 
override) lawful military authority, did, (at/on 
board-location)  on or about 
19  , refuse,  in  concert  with 
(and  ) (others 
whose names are unknown), to (obey the orders of 
to  )  (perform 
his/her  duty as  ). 
(3)  Sedition. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), with intent to cause the (overthrow) (destruc- 
tion) (overthrow and destruction) of lawful civil au- 
thority, to wit:  , did, (at/on 
board-location)  (subject-matter jurisdiction  data, 
if  required),  on  or  about 
19  ,  in  concert  with 
(  ) and (  ) (others 
whose names are unknown), create (revolt) (vio- 
lence) (a disturbance) against such authority by (en- 
tering the Town Hall of  and de- 
stroying property and records therein) (marching 
upon and compelling the surrender of the police of 
) (  ). 
(4)  Failure toprevent and suppress a mutiny or se- 
dition. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,fail to do his/ 
her utmost to prevent and suppress a (mutiny) (sedi- 
tion) among the (soldiers) (sailors) (airmen) 
(marines) (  ) of  , 
which (mutiny) (sedition) was being committed in hidher presence, in that (he/she  took no means to 
compel the dispersal of the assembly) (he/she made 
no effort to assist  who was at- 
tempting to quell the mutiny) (  ). 
(5) Failure to report a mutiny or sedition. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required),  on or about 
19  ,  fail to take 
all reasonable means to inform hidher superior 
commissioned officer or hidher commander of a 
(mutiny) (sedition) among the (soldiers) (sailors) 
(airmen)  (marines)  (  >  of 
,which (mutiny) (sedition) he/she, 
the said  (knew) (had reason to be- 
lieve) was taking place. 
(6) Attempted mutiny. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), with intent to (usurp) (override) (usurp and 
override) lawful military authority, did, (at/on 
board-location)  (subject-matter jurisdiction data, 
if  required),  on  or about 
19  ,attempt to (create (violence) (a 
disturbance)  by  ) 
19.  Article 95-Resistance,  breach of arrest, 
and escape 
a.  Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who resists 
apprehension or breaks arrest or who escapes from 
custody or confinement shall be punished as a court- 
martial may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Resisting apprehension. 
(a) That a certain person attempted to appre- 
hend the accused; 
(b) That said person was authorized to appre- 
hend the accused; and 
(c) That the accused actively resisted the ap- 
prehension. 
(2)  Breaking arrest. 
(a) That a certain person ordered the accused 
into arrest; 
(b)  That said person was authorized to order 
the accused into arrest; and 
(c) That the accused went beyond the limits of 
arrest before being released from that arrest by 
proper authority. 
(3)  Escape from custody. 
(a)  That a certain person apprehended the ac- 
cused; 
(b)  That said person was authorized to appre- 
hend the accused; and 
(c)  That the accused freed himself or herself 
from custody before being released by proper au- 
thority. 
(4) Escape from confinement. 
(a)  That a certain person ordered the accused 
into confinement; 
(b)  That said person was authorized to order 
the accused into confinement; and 
(c)  That the accused freed himself or herself 
from confinement before being released by proper 
authority. 
[Note: If the escape was post-trial confinement, add 
the following element] 
(d)  That the confinement was the result of a 
court-martial conviction. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Resisting apprehension. 
(a) Apprehension. Apprehension is the taking 
of a person into custody. See R.C.M. 302. 
(b) Authority to apprehend. See R.C.M. 302(b) 
concerning who may apprehend. Whether the status 
of a person authorized that person to apprehend the 
accused is a question of law to be decided by the mil- 
itary judge.  Whether the person who attempted to 
make an apprehension had such a status is a ques- 
tion of fact to be decided by the factfinder. 
(c)  Nature of  the resistance. The resistance 
must be active, such as assaulting the person at- 
tempting to apprehend or flight. Mere words of op- 
position, argument, or abuse, and attempts to escape 
from custody after the apprehension is complete, do 
not constitute the offense of resisting apprehension 
although they may constitute other offenses. 
(d)  Mistake. It is a defense that the accused 
held a reasonable belief that the person attempting 
to apprehend did not have authority to do so. How- 
ever, the accused's belief at the time that no basis ex- 
ists for the apprehension is not a defense. 
(e)  Illegal  apprehension. A person may not be 
convicted of resisting apprehension if the attempted 
apprehension  is illegal, but may be convicted of 
other offenses, such as assault, depending on all the 
circumstances. An attempted apprehension by a 
person authorized to apprehend is presumed to be legal in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Or- 
dinarily the legality of an apprehension is a question 
of law to be decided by the military judge. 
(2)  Breaking arrest. 
(a) Arrest. There are two type of arrest: pretrial 
arrest under Article 9 (see R.C.M. 304) and arrest 
under Article 15 (see paragraph 5c(3), Part V). This 
article prohibits breaking any arrest. 
(b) Authority to order arrest. See R.C.M. 
304(b) and paragraphs 2 and 5b, Part V concerning 
authority to order arrest. 
(c)  Nature of restraint imposed by arrest. In ar- 
rest, the restraint is moral restraint imposed by or- 
ders fixing the limits of arrest. 
(d) Breaking. Breaking arrest is committed 
when the person in arrest infringes the limits set by 
orders. The reason for the infringement is immate- 
rial. For example, innocence of the offense with re- 
spect to which an arrest may have been imposed is 
not a defense. 
(e) Illegal  arrest. A person may not be con- 
victed of breaking arrest if the arrest is illegal. An ar- 
rest ordered by one authorized to do so is presumed 
to be legal in the absence of some evidence to the 
contrary. Ordinarily, the legality of an arrest is a 
question of law to be decided by the military judge. 
(3)  Escape from custody. 
(a)  Custody. "Custody"  is restraint of free lo- 
comotion imposed by lawful apprehension. The re- 
straint may be physical or, once there has been a 
submission to apprehension or a forcible taking into 
custody, it may consist of control exercised in the 
presence of the prisoner by official acts or orders. 
Custody is temporary restraint intended to continue 
until other restraint (arrest, restriction, confine- 
ment) is imposed or the person is released. 
(b) Authority to apprehend. See subparagraph 
(l)(b) above. 
(c)  Escape. For a discussion of escape, see sub-
paragraph c(4)(c), below. 
(d) Illegal custody. A person may not be con- 
victed of  this offense if the custody was illegal. An 
apprehension effected by one authorized to appre- 
hend is presumed to be lawful in the absence of evi- 
dence to the contrary. Ordinarily, the legality of an 
sapprehension is a question of law to be decided by 
the military judge. 
(e)  Correctional custody. See paragraph 70. 
(4)  Escape from confinement. 
(a)  Confinement. Confinement is physical re- 
straint imposed under R.C.M. 305; 1101; or para- 
graph 5b, Part V. For purposes of the element of 
post-trial confinement (subparagraph b(4)(d), 
above) and increased punishment therefor (subpara- 
graph e(4), below), the confinement must have been 
imposed pursuant to an adjudged sentence of  a 
court-martial and not as a result of pretrial restraint 
or nonjudicial punishment. 
(b)  Authority to order confinement. See R.C.M. 
304(b); 1101; and paragraphs 2 and 5b, Part V con- 
cerning who may order confinement. 
(c)  Escape. An escape may be either with or 
without force or artifice, and either with or without 
the consent of the custodian. However, where a pris- 
oner is released by one with apparent authority to do 
so, the prisoner may not be convicted of escape from 
confinement. See also paragraph 20c(l)(b). Any 
completed casting off of the restraint of confinement, 
before release by proper authority, is an escape, and 
lack of effectiveness of the restraint imposed is im- 
material. An escape is not complete until the pris- 
oner is momentarily free from the restraint. If the 
movement toward escape is opposed, or before it is 
completed, an immediate pursuit follows, there is no 
escape until opposition is overcome or pursuit is 
shaken off. 
(d)  Status when temporarily outside confine- 
ment facility.  A prisoner who is temporarily es- 
corted outside a confinement facility for a work de- 
tail or other reason by a guard, who has both the 
duty and means to prevent that prisoner from escap- 
ing, remains in confinement. 
(e)  Legality of confinement. A person may not 
be convicted of escape from confinement if the con- 
finement is illegal. Confinement ordered by one au- 
thorized to do so is presumed to be lawful in the ab- 
sence of evidence to the contrary. Ordinarily, the 
legality of confinement is a question of law to be de- 
cided by the military judge. 
d. Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Resisting apprehension. Article 128-assault; 
assault consummated by a battery 
(2)  Breaking arrest. 
(a)  Article 13Lbreaking  restriction 
(b)  Article 80-attempts 
(3)  Escape from custody. Article 80-attempts 
(4)  Escape from confinement. Article 80-at- 
tempts e. 	Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Resisting  apprehension. Bad-conduct dis- 
charge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 1 year. 
(2)  Breaking arrest. Bad-conduct discharge, for- 
feiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement 
for 6 months. 
(3)  Escape from custody, pretrial  confinement, or 
confinement on bread and water or diminished ra- 
tions imposed pursuant  to Article  15. Dishonorable 
discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 1 year. 
(4)  Escape from post-trial confinement. Dishonor-
able discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 
and confinement for 5 years. 
f. 	Sample specifications. 
(1) 	Resisting apprehension. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  resist being 
apprehended by  ,  (an armed force 
policeman) (  ), a person authorized 
to apprehend the accused. 
(2) Breaking arrest. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), having been placed in arrest (in quarters) (in 
hidher company area) (  ) by a per- 
son authorized to order the accused into arrest, did, 
(at/on  board-location)  on  or  about 
19  , break said 
arrest. 
(3) 	Escape from custody. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on  or about 
19  ,escape from 
the custody of  ,a person author- 
ized to apprehend the accused. 
(4) 	Escape from confinement. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), having been placed in (post-trial) confinement 
in (place of confinement), by a person authorized to 
order accused  into confinement did, (at/on 
board-location)  (subject-matter jurisdiction  data, 
if 	 required),  on  or  about 
,escape from confinement. 
20.  Article 96-Releasing  prisoner without 

proper authority 

a. 	Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who, without 
proper authority, releases any prisoner committed 
to his charge, or who through neglect or design suf- 
fers any such prisoner to escape, shall be punished as 
a court-martial may direct, whether or not the pris- 
oner was committed in strict compliance with law." 
b. 	Elements. 
(1)  Releasing a prisoner without proper authority. 
(a)  That a certain prisoner was committed to 
the charge of the accused; and 
(b) That the accused released  the prisoner 
without proper authority. 
(2)  Suffering a prisoner to escape through neglect. 
(a)  That a certain prisoner was committed to 
the charge of the accused; 
(b)  That the prisoner escaped; 
(c)  That the accused did not take such care to 
prevent the escape as a reasonably careful person, 
acting in the capacity in which the accused was act- 
ing, would have taken in the same or similar circum- 
stances; and 
(d) That the escape was the proximate result of 
the neglect. 
(3)  Suffering a prisoner to escape through design. 
(a)  That a certain prisoner was committed to 
the charge of the accused; 
(b)  That the design of the accused was to suffer 
the escape of that prisoner; and 
(c)  That the prisoner escaped as a result of the 
carrying out of the design of the accused. 
c. 	Explanation. 
(1)  Releasing a prisoner without proper authority. 
(a)  Prisoner.  "Prisoner"  includes a civilian or 
military person who has been confined. 
(b)  Release. The release of a prisoner  is re- 
moval of restraint by the custodian rather than by 
the prisoner. 
(c)  Authority to release. See R.C.M. 305(g) as 
to who may release pretrial prisoners. Normally, the 
lowest authority competent to order release of a 
post-trial prisoner is the commander who convened 
the court-martial which sentenced the prisoner or 
the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdic- 
tion over the prisoner. See also R.C.M. 1101. 
(d)  Committed. Once a prisoner has been con- 
fined, the prisoner  has been  "committed"  in  the  19 cia1 pay under 37 U.S.C. 5  310) (during a time of 
war). 
(4)  Wrongful importation or exportation of con- 
trolled substance. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data) did, (at/on  board-location)  on or about 
,  19  , wrongfully 
(import)  (export)  (grams) 
(ounces)  (pounds)  (  >  of 
(a Schedule (  1 
controlled substance) (into the customs territory of) 
(from) the United States (while on board a vessel/ 
aircraft used by the armed forces or under the con- 
trol of the armed forces, to wit:  1 
(during time of war). 
38.  Article 113-Misbehavior  of sentinel or 

lookout 

a.  Text. 
"Any sentinel or look-out who is found drunk or 
sleeping upon his post, or leaves it before he is regu- 
larly relieved, shall be punished, if the offense is 
committed in time of war, by death or such other 
punishment as a court-martial may direct, but if the 
offense is committed at any other time, by such pun- 
ishment other than death as a court-martial may di- 
rect." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused was posted or on post as a 
sentinel or lookout; 
(2)  That the accused was found drunk while on 
post, was found sleeping while on post, or left post 
before being regularly relieved. 
[Note: If the offense  was committed in time of war or 
while the accused was receiving special pay under 37 
U.S.C. 5 3  10, add the following element] 
(3) That the offense was committed (in time of 
war) (while the accused was receiving special pay 
under 37 U.S.C. 5 3  10). 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  In  general. This article defines three kinds of 
misbehavior committed by sentinels or lookouts: be- 
ing found drunk or sleeping upon post, or leaving it 
before being regularly relieved. This article does not 
include an officer  or enlisted person of the guard, or 
of a ship's watch, not posted or performing the du- 
ties of a sentinel or lookout, nor does it include a per- 
son whose duties as a watchman or attendant do not 
require constant alertness. 
(2)  Post. "Post"  is the area where the sentinel or 
lookout is required to be for the performance of du- 
ties. It is not limited by an imaginary line, but in- 
cludes, according to orders or circumstances, such 
surrounding area as may be necessary for the proper 
performance of the duties for which the sentinel or 
lookout was posted. The offense of leaving post is 
not committed when a sentinel or lookout goes an 
immaterial distance from the post, unless it is such a 
distance that the ability to fully perform the duty for 
which posted is impaired. 
(3)  On post.  A sentinel or lookout becomes "on 
post"  after having been given a lawful order to go 
"on  post"  as a sentinel or lookout and being for- 
mally or informally posted. The fact that a sentinel 
or lookout is not posted in the regular way is not a 
defense. It is sufficient, for example, if the sentinel or 
lookout has taken the post in accordance with 
proper instruction, whether or not formally given. A 
sentinel or lookout is on post within the meaning of 
the article not only when at a post physically de- 
fined, as is ordinarily the case in garrison or aboard 
ship, but also, for example, when stationed in obser- 
vation against the approach of an enemy, or detailed 
to use any equipment designed to locate friend, foe, 
or possible danger, or at a designated place to main- 
tain internal discipline, or to guard stores, or to 
guard prisoners while in confinement or at work. 
(4)  Sentinel or lookout. A sentinel or a lookout is 
a person whose duties include the requirement to 
maintain constant alertness, be vigilant, and remain 
awake, in order to observe for the possible approach 
of the enemy, or to guard persons, property, or a 
place and to sound the alert, if necessary. 
(5) Drunk. For an explanation of "drunk,"  see 
paragraph 35c(3). 
(6)  Sleeping. As used in this article, "sleeping"  is 
that condition of insentience which is sufficient sen- 
sibly to impair the full exercise of the mental and 
physical faculties of a sentinel or lookout. It is not 
necessary to show that the accused was in a wholly 
comatose condition. The fact that the accused's 
sleeping resulted from a physical incapacity caused 
by disease or accident is an affirmative defense. See 
R.C.M. 9 16(i). 
d.  Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Drunk on post. 
(a) Article 112-drunk  on duty 
(b) Article 92-dereliction  of duty (a)  Article 112a-wrongful  possession of con- 
trolled substance 
(b)  Article 80-attempts 
(5)  Wrongful introduction of controlled sub- 
stance. 
(a)  Article 112a-wrongful  possession of con- 
trolled substance 
(b) Article 80-attempts 
(6) Wrongful possession,  manufacture, or intro- 
duction of a controlled substance with intent to dis- 
tribute. 
(a)  Article 1  12a-wrongful  possession, manu- 
facture, or introduction of controlled substance 
(b)  Article 80-attempts 
(7)  Wrongful importation or exportation of a con- 
trolled substance. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishments. 
(1)  Wrongful use, possession, manufacture, or in- 
troduction of controlled substance. 
(a)  Amphetamine, cocaine, heroin, lysergic 
acid diethylamide, marijuana (except possession of 
less than 30 grams or use  of  marijuana), 
methamphetamine,  opium,  phencyclidine, 
secobarbital, and Schedule I, 11, I11 controlled sub- 
stances. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay 
and allowances, and confinement 5 years. 
(b) Marijuana (possession of  less than 30 
grams or use), phenobarbital, and Schedule IV and 
V controlled substances. Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 2 years. 
(2)  Wrongful distribution, possession, manufac- 
ture, or introduction of controlled substance with in- 
tent to distribute, or wrongful importation or expor- 
tation of a controlled substance. 
(a) Amphetamine, cocaine, heroin, lysergic 
acid diethylamide, marijuana, methamphetamine, 
opium, phencyclidine, secobarbital, and Schedule I, 
11, and I11 controlled substances. Dishonorable dis- 
charge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 15 years. 
(b)  Phenobarbital and Schedule IV and V con- 
trolled substances. Dishonorable discharge, forfei- 
ture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 
10 years. 
When any offense under paragraph 37 is committed; 
while the accused is on duty as a sentinel or lookout; 
on board a vessel or aircraft used by  or under the 
control of the armed forces; in or at a missile launch 
facility used by or under the control of the armed 
forces; while receiving special pay under 37 U.S.C. 4 
3 10; in time of war; or in a confinement facility used 
by or under the control of the armed forces, the max- 
imum period of confinement authorized for such of- 
fense shall be increased by 5 years. 
f.  Sample specijications. 
(1)  Wrongful possession,  manufacture, or distri- 
bution of controlled substance. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data) did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
, 19  ,wrongfully 
(possess)  (distribute)  (manufacture) 
(grams) (ounces)  (pounds) 
(  of  (a schedule 
(  ) controlled substance), (with the 
intent to distribute the said controlled substance) 
(while on duty as a sentinel or lookout) (while (on 
board a vessel/aircraft)  (in or at a missile launch fa- 
cility) used by the armed forces or under the control 
of the armed forces, to wit:  ) (while 
receiving special pay under 37 U.S.C. 5 3  10) (during 
time of war). 
(2)  Wrongful use of controlled substance. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on  or about 
,  19  , wrongfully 
use  (a Schedule 
controlled substance) (while on duty as a sentinel or 
lookout) (while (on board a vessel/aircraft)  (in or at 
a missile launch facility) used by the armed forces or 
under the control of  the armed forces, to wit: 
) (while receiving special pay 
under 37 U.S.C. 5 3 10) (during time of war). 
(3)  Wrongful introduction of controlled sub- 
stance. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data) did, (at/on  board-location)  on or about 
, 19  , wrongfully 
introduce  (grams) (ounces) 
(pounds) (  of  (a 
Schedule (  ) controlled substance) 
onto a vessel, aircraft, vehicle, or installation used by 
the armed forces or under control of the armed 
forces, to wit:  (with the intent to 
distribute the said controlled substance) (while on 
duty as a sentinel or lookout) (while receiving spe- item in a locker or car to which that person may re- 
turn to retrieve it. Possession,must be knowing and 
conscious. Possession inherently includes the power 
or authority to preclude control by  others. It is pos- 
sible, however, for more than one person to possess 
an item simultaneously, as when several people 
share control of an item. An accused may not be 
convicted of possession of a controlled substance if 
the accused did not know that the substance was 
present under the accused's control. Awareness of 
the presence of  a controlled substance may be in- 
ferred from circumstantial evidence. 
(3)  Distribute. "Distribute"  means to deliver to 
the possession of another. "Deliver"  means the ac- 
tual, constructive, or attempted transfer of an item, 
whether or not there exists an agency relationship. 
(4)  Manufacture. "Manufacture"  means the pro- 
duction, preparation, propagation, compounding, or 
processing of a drug or other substance, either di- 
rectly or indirectly or by extraction from substances 
of natural origin, or independently by  means of 
chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction 
and chemical synthesis, and includes any packaging 
or repackaging of such substance or labeling or re- 
labeling of its container. "Production,"  as used in 
this subparagraph, includes the planting, cultivat- 
ing, growing, or harvesting of a drug or other sub- 
stance. 
(5)  Wrongfulness.To be punishable under Article 
11  2a, possession, use, distribution, introduction, or 
manufacture of a controlled substance must be 
wrongful. Possession, use, distribution, introduc- 
tion, or manufacture of a controlled substance is 
wrongful if it is without legal justification or authori- 
zation. Possession, distribution, introduction, or 
manufacture of a controlled substance is not wrong- 
ful if such act or acts are: (A) done pursuant to legiti- 
mate law enforcement activities (for example, an in-
formant who receives drugs as part of an undercover 
operation is not in wrongful possession); (B) done by 
authorized personnel in the performance of medical 
duties; or (C) without knowledge of the contraband 
nature of  the substance (for example, a person who 
possesses  cocaine, but actually believes it to be 
sugar, is  not  guilty of wrongful possession  of co- 
caine). Possession, use, distribution, introduction, or 
manufacture of a controlled substance may be in- 
ferred to be wrongful in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary. The burden of going forward with evi- 
dence with respect to any such exception in any 
court-martial or other proceeding under the code 
shall be upon the person claiming its benefit. If such 
an issue is raised by the evidence presented, then the 
burden of proof is upon the United States to estab- 
lish that the use, possession, distribution, manufac- 
ture, or introduction was wrongful. 
(6) Intent  to distribute. Intent to distribute may 
be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Examples 
of evidence which may tend to support an inference 
of intent to distribute are: possession of a quantity of 
substance in excess of that which one would be likely 
to have for personal use; market value of the sub- 
stance; the manner in which the substance is pack- 
aged; and that the accused is not a user of the sub- 
stance. On the other hand, evidence that the accused 
is addicted to or is a heavy user of the substance may 
tend to negate an inference of intent to distribute. 
(7)  Certain amount. When a specific amount of a 
controlled substance is believed to have been pos- 
sessed, distributed, introduced, or manufactured by 
an accused, the specific amount should ordinarily be 
alleged in the specification. It is not necessary to al- 
lege a specific amount, however, and a specification 
is sufficient if it alleges that an accused possessed, 
distributed, introduced, or manufactured "some," 
"traces of,"  or "an  unknown quantity of' a con- 
trolled substance. 
(8)  Missile launch facility.  A "missile launch fa- 
cility"  includes the place from which missiles are 
fired and launch control facilities from which the 
launch of a missile is initiated or controlled after 
launch. 
(9) Customs territory of the  United States. "Cus-
toms territory of the United States"  includes only 
the States, the District of  Columbia, and Puerto 
Rico. 
d. Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Wrongful possession  of controlled substance. 
Article 80-attempts 
(2)  Wrongful use of controlled substance. 
(a)  Article 1  12a-wrongful  possession of con- 
trolled substance 
(b)  Article 80-attempts 
(3)  Wrongful distribution of controlled substance. 
Article 80-attempts 
(4)  Wrongful manufacture of controlled sub- 
stance. d. Lesser included offense. Article 134-drunk  on 
station 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Bad-conduct discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 9 months. 
f. 	Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), was, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  ,found drunk 
while on duty as 
37.  Article 112a-Wrongful  use, possession, 
etc., of controlled substances 
a.  Text. 
"(a)  Any person subject to this chapter who 
wrongfully uses, possesses, manufactures, distrib- 
utes, imports into the customs territory of the 
United States, exports from the United States, or in- 
troduces into an installation, vessel, vehicle, or air- 
craft used by  or under the control of the armed 
forces a substance described in subsection (b) shall 
be punished as a court-martial may direct. 
(b) The substances referred to in subsection (a) are 
the following: 
(1) opium, heroin, cocaine, amphetamine, 
lysergic acid diethylamide, methamphetamine, 
phencyclidine, barbituric acid, and marijuana, and 
any compound or derivative of any such substance. 
(2) Any substance not specified in clause (1) 
that is listed on a schedule of controlled substances 
prescribed by the President for the purposes of this 
article. 
(3) Any other substance not specified in clause 
(I)  or contained on a list prescribed by the President 
under clause (2) that is listed in Schedules I through 
V of section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act 
(21 U.S.C. 812)" 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Wrongful possession  of controlled substance. 
(a) That the accused possessed  a  certain 
amount of a controlled substance; and 
(b) That the possession by the accused was 
wrongful. 
(2) 	Wrongful use of controlled substance. 
(a) That the accused used a controlled sub- 
stance; and 
(b) That the use by the accused was wrongful. 
(3) 	 Wrongful distribution of controlled substance. 
(a) That the accused distributed  a certain 
amount of a controlled substance; and 
(b)  That the distribution by the accused was 
wrongful. 
(4)  Wrongful introduction of a controlled sub- 
stance. 
(a)  That the accused introduced onto a vessel, 
aircraft, vehicle, or installation used by the armed 
forces or under the control of the armed forces a cer- 
tain amount of a controlled substance; and 
(b)  That the introduction was wrongful. 
(5) Wrongful manufacture of a controlled sub- 
stance. 
(a)  That the accused manufactured a certain 
amount of a controlled substance; and 
(b) That the manufacture was wrongful. 
(6) Wrongful possession,  manufacture, or intro- 
duction of a controlled substance with intent to dis- 
tribute. 
(a)  That the accused (possessed) (manufac- 
tured) (introduced) a certain amount of a controlled 
substance; 
(b)  That the (possession) (manufacture) (intro- 
duction) was wrongful; and 
(c)  That the (possession) (manufacture) (intro- 
duction) was with the intent to distribute. 
(7)  Wrongful importation or exportation of a con- 
trolled substance. 
(a)  That the accused (imported into the cus- 
toms territory of) (exported from) the United States 
a certain amount of a controlled substance; and 
(b) That the (importation) (exportation) was 
wrongful. 
[Note: When any of the aggravating circumstances 
listed in subparagraph e is alleged, it must be listed 
as an element.] 
c. Explanation. 
(1) Controlled substance. "Controlled  substance" 
means amphetamine, cocaine, heroin, lysergic acid 
dietylamide, marijuana, methamphetamine, opium, 
phencyclidine, and barbituric acid, including pheno- 
barbital and secobarbital."Controlled  substance" 
also means any substance which is included in 
Schedules I through V established by the Controlled 
Substances Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 8  12). 
(2)  Possess. ''Possess"  means to exercise control 
of something. Possession may be direct physical cus- 
tody like holding an item is one's hand, or it may be 
constructive, as in the case of a person who hides an -  - 
(6)  Separate offenses. While the same course of 
conduct may constitute both drunken and reckless 
driving, this article proscribes these as separate of- 
fenses, and both offenses may be charged. However, 
as recklessness is a relative matter, evidence of all 
the surrounding circumstances which made the op- 
eration dangerous, whether alleged or not, may be 
admissible. Thus, on a charge of reckless driving, ev- 
idence of drunkenness might be admissible as estab- 
lishing one of recklessness, and evidence that the ve- 
hicle exceeded a safe speed, at a relevant prior point 
and time, might be admissible as corroborating 
other evidence of the specific recklessness charged. 
Similarly, on a charge of drunken driving, relevant 
evidence of recklessness might have probative value 
as corroborating other proof of drunkenness. 
d.  Lesser included offenses. Drunken driving. 
(1) Article 112--drunk  on duty 
(2) Article 134-drunk  on station 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Resulting in personal  injury. Dishonorable 
discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 18 months. 
(2)  No personal  injury involved. Bad-conduct dis- 
charge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 6 months. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did (at/onboard-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if required), on or about 
19  ,(in the motor 
pool  area)  (near  the Officer's  Club)  (on 
Street between 
and  Avenues) (  1 
operate a vehicle, to wit: (a truck) (a passenger car) 
(  ), (while drunk) (while impaired 
by  ) (in a (reckless) (wanton) man- 
ner by (attempting to pass another vehicle on a 
sharp curve) (driving at a speed in excess of 50 miles 
per hour on the sidewalk and wrong side of said 
street) (  )) (and did thereby cause 
said vehicle to (strike and) injure  1. 
36.  Article 112-Drunk  on duty 
a.  Text. 
"Any  person subject to this chapter other than 
sentinel or look-out, who is found drunk on duty, 
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused was on a certain duty; and 
(2)  That the accused was found drunk while on 
this duty. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Drunk. See paragraph 35c(3). 
(2)  Duty."Dutyfl as used in this article means 
military duty. Every duty which an officer or en- 
listed person may legally be required by superior au- 
thority to execute is necessarily a military duty. 
Within the meaning of this article, when in the ac- 
tual exercise of command, the commander of a post, 
or of a command, or of a detachment in the field is 
constantly on duty, as is the commanding officer on 
board a ship. In the case of other officers or enlisted 
persons, "on duty" relates to duties or routine or de- 
tail, in garrison, at a station, or in the field, and does 
not relate to those periods when, no duty being re- 
quired of them by orders or regulations, officers and 
enlisted persons occupy the status of leisure known 
as "off  duty"  or "on  liberty." In a region of active 
hostilities, the circumstances are often such that all 
members of a command may properly be considered 
as being continuously on duty within the meaning of 
this article. So also, an officer of the day and mem- 
bers of the guard, or of the watch, are on duty during 
their entire tour within the meaning of this article. 
(3)  Nature of offense. It is necessary that the ac- 
cused be found drunk while actually on the duty al- 
leged, and the fact the accused became drunk before 
going on duty, although material in extenuation, 
does not affect the question of guilt. If, however, the 
accused does not undertake the responsibility or 
enter upon the duty at all, the accused's conduct 
does not fall within the terms of this article, nor does 
that of a person who absents himself or herself from 
duty and is found drunk while so absent. Included 
within the article is drunkenness while on duty of an 
anticipatory nature such as that of an aircraft crew 
ordered to stand by for flight duty, or of an enlisted 
person ordered to stand by for guard duty. 
(4)  Defenses. If the accused is known by superior 
authorities to be drunk at the time a duty is assigned, 
and the accused is thereafter allowed to assume that 
duty anyway, or if the drunkenness results from an 
accidental overdosage administered for medicinal 
purposes, the accused will have a defense to this of- 
fense. But see paragraph 76 (incapacitation for 
duty). the  position, obtained and plotted 
by him/her,  to the position of  ,and 
well  knowing  the  difficulty  of  sighting 
,from a safe distance after sunset, 
did then and there negligently hazard the said vessel 
by  failing and neglecting  to advise his/her  com-
manding officer to lay a safe course for said ship to 
the northward before continuing on  a westerly 
course, as it was the duty of said  to 
do; in consequence of which the said ship was, at 
about  hours on  the day above 
mentioned, run upon  bank in the 
Sea,  about  latitude 
degrees,  min-
utes, north, and longitude  degrees, 
minutes, west, and seriously in- 
jured. 
(3)  Suffering a vessel to be hazarded, negligently. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), while serving as combat intelligence center of- 
ficer on board the  ,making passage 
from Boston to Philadelphia, and having, between 
and  hours on 
,  19  , been duly 
informed of decreasing radar ranges and constant 
radar  bearing  indicating  that  the  said 
was upon a collision course ap- 
proaching a radar target, did then and there negli- 
gently suffer the said vessel to be hazarded by failing 
and neglecting to report said collision course with 
said radar target to the officer of the deck, as it was 
his/her  duty to do, and he/she,  the said 
,through negligence, did cause the 
said  to  collide  with  the 
at or  about 
hours on said date, with resultant damage to both 
vessels. 
35.  Article 11  1-Drunken  or reckless driving 
a.  Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who operates 
any vehicle while drunk, or in a reckless or wanton 
manner, or while impaired by a substance described 
in section 912a(b) of this title (article 112a(b)), shall 
be punished as a court-martial may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused was operating a vehicle; and 
That the accused was drunk while operating the 
vehicle, that the accused operated the vehicle in a 
reckless or wanton manner, or that the accused was 

impaired by a substance described in article 112a(b) 

while operating the vehicle. 

[Note: If injury resulted add the following element] 

(2)  That the accused thereby caused the vehicle to 
injure a person. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Vehicle. See 1U.S.C.5 4. Drunken or reckless 
operation of water and air transportation may be al- 
leged under other articles of the code, as appropri- 
ate. 
(2)  Operating. Operating a vehicle includes not 
only driving or guiding it while in motion, either in 
person or through the agency of  another, but also 
the manipulation of its controls so as to cause the 
particular vehicle to move, or the setting of its mo- 
tive power in action. 
(3) Drunk or impaired. "Drunk"  and "impaired" 
mean any intoxication which is sufficient sensibly to 
impair the rational and full exercise of the mental or 
physical faculties. Whether the drunkenness or im- 
pairment was caused by liquor cu  drugs is immate- 
rial. 
(4)  Reckless. The operation of a vehicle is "reck- 
less" when it exhibits a culpable disregard of foresee- 
able consequences to others from the act or omission 
involved. Recklessness is not determined solely by 
reason of the happening of an injury, or the invasion 
of the rights of another, nor by proof alone of exces- 
sive speed or erratic operation, but all these factors 
may be admissible and relevant as bearing upon the 
ultimate question; whether, under all the circum- 
stances, the accused's manner of operation of the ve- 
hicle was of that heedless nature which made it actu- 
ally or imminently dangerous to occupants, or to the 
rights or safety of others. It is driving with such a 
high degree of negligence that if death were caused, 
the accused would have committed involuntary 
manslaughter, at least. The condition of  the surface 
on which the vehicle is operated, the time of day or 
night, the traffic, and the condition of the vehicle are 
often matters of importance in  the proof of an of- 
fense charged under this article, and, where they are 
of importance, may properly be alleged. 
(5)  Wanton. "Wanton"  includes "reckless,"  but 
in describing the operation of a vehicle, it may, in a 
proper case, connote willfulness, or a disregard of 
probable consequences, and thus describe a more ag- 
gravated offense. doing of something which such a person would not 
have done under the circumstances. No person is re- 
lieved of culpability who fails to perform such duties 
as are imposed by the general responsibilities of that 
person's grade or rank, or by the customs of the ser- 
vice for the safety and protection of vessels of the 
armed forces, simply because these duties are not 
specifically enumerated in a regulation or order. 
However, a mere error in judgment that a reasona- 
bly able person might have committed under the 
same circumstances does not constitute an offense 
under this article. 
(4) Suffer. "To suffer" means to allow or permit. 
A ship is willfully suffered to be hazarded by one 
who, although not in direct control of the vessel, 
knows a danger to be imminent but takes no steps to 
prevent it, as by a plotting officer of a ship under way 
who fails to report to the officer of the deck a radar 
target which is observed to be on a collision course 
with, and dangerously close to, the ship. A suffering 
through neglect implies an omission to take such 
measures as were appropriate under the circum- 
stances to prevent a foreseeable danger. 
d.  Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Willfully and wrongfully hazarding a vessel. 
(a)  Article 1  lo-negligently  hazarding a vessel 
(b)  Article 80-attempts 
(2)  Willfully and wrongfully suffering  a vessel to 
be hazarded. 
(a)  Article 1  10-negligently  suffering a vessel 
to be hazarded 
(b)  Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Hazarding or suffering to 
be hazarded any vessel of the armed forces: 
(1)  Willfully  and wrongfully. Death or such other 
punishment as a court-martial may direct. 
(2)  Negligently. Dishonorable discharge, forfei- 
ture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 2 
years. 
f.  Sample specifications. 
(1)  Hazarding or suffering to be hazarded any ves- 
sel, willfully and wrongfully. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, on  19  , 
while serving as  aboard the 
in  the  vicinity  of 
,willfully and wrongfully (hazard 
the said vessel) (suffer the said vessel to be hazarded) 
by  (causing the said vessel to collide with 
) (allowing the said vessel to run 
aground) (  1. 
(2)  Hazarding of vessel, negligently. 
(a)  Example I. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), on  19  , 
while serving in command of the  , 
making entrance to (Boston  Harbor), did negli- 
gently hazard the said vessel by failing and neglect- 
ing to maintain or cause to be maintained an accu- 
rate running plot of the true position of said vessel 
while making said approach, as a result of which 
neglect the said  , at or about 
, hours on the day aforesaid, be- 
came stranded in the vicinity of  (Channel Buoy 
Number Three). 
(b)  Example 2. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), on  19  , 
while serving as navigator of the  , 
cruising on special service in the 
Ocean off  the coast of  ,  notwith-
standing the fact that at about midnight, 
19  ,  the north- 
east point of  Island bore abeam 
and was about six miles distant, the said ship being 
then under way and making a speed of about ten 
knots, and well knowing the position of the said ship 
at the time stated, and that the charts of the locality 
were unreliable and the currents thereabouts uncer- 
tain, did then and there negligently hazard the said 
vessel by failing and neglecting to exercise proper 
care and attention in navigating said ship while ap- 
proaching  Island, in that he/she 
neglected and failed to lay a course that would carry 
said ship clear of the last aforesaid island, and to 
change the course in due time to avoid disaster; and 
the said ship, as a result of said negligence on the 
part of said  ,  ran upon a rock off 
the southwest coast of  Island, at 
about  hours,  , 
19  , in consequence of which the 
said  was lost. 
(c)  Example 3. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), on  19  , 
while serving as navigator of the 
and well knowing that at about sunset of said day the 
said ship had nearly run her estimated distance from another. The terms "wastes"  and "spoils"  as used in 
this article refer to such wrongful acts of voluntary 
destruction of or permanent damage to real property 
as burning down buildings, burning piers, tearing 
down fences, or cutting down trees. This destruction 
in punishable whether done willfully, that is inten- 
tionally, or recklessly, that is through a culpable dis- 
regard of the foreseeable consequences of some vol- 
untary act. 
(2)  Destroying or damaging non-militalyproperty. 
This portion of Article 109 proscribes the willful and 
wrongful destruction or damage of  the personal 
property of another. To be destroyed, the property 
need not be completely demolished or annihilated, 
but must be sufficiently injured to be useless for its 
intended purpose. Damage consists of any physical 
injury to the property. To constitute an offense 
under this section, the destruction or damage of the 
property must have been willful and wrongful. As 
used in this section "willfully"  means intentionally 
and "wrongfully"  means contrary to law, regula- 
tion, lawful order, or custom. Willfulness may be 
proved by circumstantial evidence, such as the man- 
ner in which the acts were done. 
(3)  Value and damage. In the case of destruction, 
the value of the property destroyed controls the 
maximum punishment which may be adjudged. In 
the case of damage, the amount of the damage con- 
trols. As a general rule, the amount of damage is the 
estimated or actual cost of repair by artisans em- 
ployed in this work who are available to the commu- 
nity wherein the owner resides, or the replacement 
cost, whichever is less. See also paragraph 46c(l)(g). 
d.  Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Wasting, spoiling, de- 
stroying, or damaging any property other than mili- 
tary property of the United States of a value or dam- 
age. 
(1)  Of  $100.00 or less. Bad-conduct discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 1 year. 
(2)  Of  more than $100.00. Dishonorable dis- 
charge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 5 years. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction data, if  required), on or about 
19  , ((willfully) 
recklessly) waste) ((willfully) (recklessly) spoil) 
(willfully and wrongfully (destroy) (damage) by 
1  , (of a value of 
(about) $  ) (the amount of said 
damage  being  in  the  sum  of  (about 
$  )  the  property  of 
34.  Article 110-Improper  hazarding of 
vessel 
a.  Text. 
"(a) Any person subject to this chapter who will- 
fully and wrongfully hazards or suffers to be haz- 
arded any vessel of the armed forces shall suffer 
death or such other punishment as a court-martial 
may direct. 
(b) Any person subject to this chapter who negli- 
gently hazards or suffers to be hazarded any vessel of 
the armed forces shall be punished as a court-martial 
may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That a vessel of the armed forces was haz- 
arded in a certain manner; and 
(2)  That the accused by certain acts or omissions, 
willfully and wrongfully, or qegligently, caused or 
suffered the vessel to be hizardd: 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Hazard. "Hazard"  means to put in danger of 
loss or injury. Actual damage to, or loss of, a vessel 
of the armed forces by collision, stranding, running 
upon a shoal or a rock, or by any other cause, is con- 
clusive evidence that the vessel was hazarded but not 
of the fact of culpability on the part of any particular 
person. "Stranded"  means run aground so that the 
vessel is fast for a time. If-the vessel "touches and 
goes,"  she is not stranded; if  she "touches  and 
sticks," she is. A shoal is a sand, mud, or gravel bank 
or bar that makes the water shallow. 
(2)  Willfully and wrongfully. As used in this arti- 
cle, "willfully"means  intentionally and "wrong- 
fully" means contrary to law, regulation, lawful or- 
der, or custom. 
(3)  Negligence. "Negligence"  as used in this arti- 
cle means the failure to exercise the care, prudence, 
or attention to duties, which the interests of the gov- 
ernment require a prudent and reasonable person to 
exercise under the circumstances. This negligence 
may consist of the omission to do something the pru- 
dent and reasonable person would have done, or the (b)  Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Selling or otherwise disposing of military prop- 
erty. 
(a)  Of a value of $100.00 or less. Bad-conduct 
discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowance, and 
confinement for 1 year. 
(b)  Of a value of more than $100.00 or anyfire- 
arm or explosive. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture 
of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 10 
years. 
(2)  Through neglect damaging, destroying, or los- 
ing, or through neglect suffering to be lost, damaged, 
destroyed, sold, or wrongfully disposed oJ  military 
property. 
(a)  Of a value or damage of $100.00  or less. 
Confinement for 6 months, and forfeiture of two- 
thirds pay per month for 6 months. 
@)  Of a value or damage of more than $100.00. 
Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and al- 
lowances, and confinement for l year. 
(3)  Willfully damaging, destroying, or losing, or 
willfully suffering to be lost, damaged, destroyed, 
sold, or wrongfully disposed oJ  military property. 
(a)  Of a value or damage of $100.00 or less. 
Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and al- 
lowances, and confinement for l year. 
(b)  Of a value or damage of more than $100.00, 
or of any firearm or explosive. Dishonorable dis- 
charge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 10 years. 
f.  Sample specifications. 
(1)  Selling or disposing of military property. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  without 
proper authority, (sell to  ) (dispose 
of by  )  ,((a fire- 
arm) (an explosive)) of  a  value of (about) 
$  ,  military property of the United 
States. 
(2)  Damaging, destroying, or losing military prop- 
erty. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  without 
proper authority, ((willfully) (through neglect)) 
((damage  by  )  (destroy  by 
)) (lose))  (of a 
value of (about) $  ,) military prop- 
erty of the United States (the amount of said damage 
being in the sum of (about) $  ). 
(3)  Suffering military property  to be lost, dam- 
aged, destroyed, sold, or wrongfully disposed oj 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction data, if  required),  on or about 
19  ,  without 
proper authority, (willfully) (through neglect) suffer 
,  ((a firearm) (an explosive)) (of a 
value of (about) $  ) military prop- 
erty of the United States, to be (lost) (damaged by 
) (destroyed by  ) 
(sold to  ) (wrongfully disposed of 
by  ) (the amount of said damage 
being in the sum of (about $  ). 
33.  Article 109-Property  other than military 
property of the United States-waste, 
spoilage, or destruction 
a.  Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who willfully 
or recklessly wastes, spoils, or otherwise willfully 
and wrongfully destroys or damages any property 
other than military property of the United States 
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Wasting or spoiling of non-military property. 
(a) That the accused willfully or recklessly 
wasted or spoiled certain real property in a certain 
manner; 
@)  That the property was that of another per- 
son; and 
(c)  That the property was of a certain value. 
(2) Destroying or damaging non-military property. 
(a)  That the accused willfully and wrongfully 
destroyed or damaged certain personal property in a 
certain manner; 
(b) That the property was that of another per- 
son; and 
(c) That the property was of a certain value or 
the damage was of a certain amount. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Wasting or spoiling non-military property. 
This portion of Article 109 proscribes willful or 
reckless waste or spoilation of the real property of (c) That the loss, damage, destruction, sale, or 
wrongful disposition was suffered by the accused, 
without proper authority, through a certain omis- 
sion of duty by the accused; 
(d) That the omission was willful or negligent; 
and 
(e) That the property was of a certain value or 
the damage was of a certain amount. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Military property.  Military property is all 
property, real or personal, owned, held, or used by 
one of the armed forces of the United States. If is im- 
material whether the property sold, disposed, de- 
stroyed, lost, or damaged had been issued to the ac- 
cused, to someone else, or even issued at all. If it is 
proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence 
that items of individual issue were issued to the ac- 
cused, it may be inferred, depending on all the evi- 
dence, that the damage, destruction, or loss proved 
was due to the neglect of the accused. Retail mer- 
chandise of service exchange stores is not military 
property under this article. 
(2)  Suffering  military property  to be lost, dam- 
aged, destroyed, sold, or wrongfully disposed 05  "To 
suffer" means to allow or permit. The willful or neg- 
ligent sufferance specified by this article includes: 
deliberate violation or intentional disregard of some 
specific law, regulation, or order; reckless or unwar- 
ranted personal use of the property; causing or al- 
lowing it to remain exposed to the weather, inse- 
curely housed, or not guarded; permitting it to be 
consumed, wasted, or injured by other persons; or 
loaning it to a person, known to be irresponsible, by 
whom it is damaged. 
(3)  Value and damage. In the case of loss, de- 
struction, sale, or wrongful disposition, the value of 
the property controls the maximum punishment 
which may be adjudged. In the case of damage, the 
amount of  damage controls. As a general rule, the 
amount of damage is the estimated or actual cost of 
repair by  the government agency normally em- 
ployed in  such work, or the cost of replacement, as 
shown by  government price lists or otherwise, 
whichever is less. 
d.  Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Sale or disposition of militaryproperty. 
(a)  Article 80-attempts 
(b)  Article 134-sale  or disposition of non-mil- 
itary government property 
V32d.(g)(a) 
(2)  Willfully damaging military property. 
(a) Article 108-damaging  military property 
through neglect 
(b)  Article 109-willfully  damaging non-mili- 
tary property 
(c)  Article 80-attempts 
(3)  Willfully suffering military property  to be 
damaged. 
(a)  Article 108-through  neglect suffering mil- 
itary property to be damaged 
(b)  Article 80-attempts 
(4) Willfully  destroying military property. 
(a) Article  108-through  neglect destroying 
military property 
(b)  Article 109-willfully  destroying non-mili- 
tary property 
(c)  Article 108-willfully  damaging military 
property 
(d)  Article 109-willfully  damaging non-mili- 
tary property 
(e) Article  108-through  neglect damaging 
military property 
(0 Article 80-attempts 
(5) Willfully suffering military property  to be de- 
stroyed. 
(a) Article 108-through  neglect suffering mil- 
itary property to be destroyed 
(b)  Article 108-willfully  suffering military 
property to be damaged 
(c)  Article 108-through  neglect suffering mil- 
itary property to be damaged 
(d)  Article 80-attempts 
(6) Willfully losing military property. 
(a)  Article  108-through  neglect, losing mili- 
tary property 
(b)  Article 80-attempts 
(7)  Willfully suffering military property  to be lost. 
(a) Article 108-through  neglect, suffering 
military property to be lost 
(b) Article 80-attempts 
(8)  Willfully suffering military property to be sold. 
(a)  Article 108-through  neglect, suffering 
military property to be sold 
(b) Article 80-attempts 
(9)  Willfully suffering military property  to be 
wrongfully disposed 05 
(a) Article  108-through  neglect, suffering 
military property to be wrongfully disposed of in the 
manner alleged 
IV-47 (2)  Status of victim of the deception. The rank of 
any person intended to be deceived is immaterial if 
that person was authorized in the execution of a par- 
ticular duty to require or receive the statement or 
document from the accused. The government may 
be the victim of this offense. 
(3)  Intent to deceive. The false representation 
must be made with the intent to deceive. It is not 
necessary that the false statement be material to the 
issue inquiry. If, however, the falsity is in respect to a 
material matter, it may be considered as some evi- 
dence of the intent to deceive, while immateriality 
may tend to show an absence of this intent. 
(4)  Material gain. The expectation of material 
gain is'not an element of this offense. Such expecta- 
tion or lack of it, however, is circumstantial evidence 
bearing on the element of intent to deceive. 
(5)  Knowledge that the document or statement 
was false.  The false representation must be one 
which the accused actually knew was false. Actual 
knowledge may .be proved by  circumstantial evi- 
dence. An honest, although erroneous, belief that a 
statement made is true, is a defense. 
(6) Statements made during an interrogation. 
(a)  Person without an independent duty or obli- 
gation to speak. A statement made by an accused or 
suspect during an interrogation is not an official 
statement within the meaning of the article if that 
person did not have an independent duty or obliga- 
tion to speak. But see paragraph 79 (false swearing). 
(b)  Person with an independent duty or obliga- 
tion to speak. If a suspect or accused does have an in- 
dependent duty or obligation to speak, as in the case 
of a custodian who is required to account for prop- 
erty, a statement made by that person during an in- 
terrogation into the matter is official. While the per- 
son could remain silent (Article 31 (b)), if the person 
chooses to speak, the person must do so truthfully. 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 5 years. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , with intent 
to deceive, (sign an official (record) (return) 
(  ), to wit:  ) (make 
to  , an official statement, to wit: 
), which  (record) (return) (state- 
ment) (  ) was (totally false) (false in 
that  ), and was then known by the 
said  to be so false. 
32.  Article 108-Military  property of the 
United States-sale,  loss, damage, 
destruction, or wrongful disposition 
a.  Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who, without 
proper authority- 
(1) sells or otherwise disposes of; 
(2) willfully or through neglect damages, de- 
stroys, or loses; or 
(3) willfully or through neglect suffers to be 
lost, damaged, destroyed, sold, or wrongfully dis- 
posed of, any military property of the United States, 
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Selling or otherwise disposing of military prop- 
erty. 
(a) That the accused sold or otherwise dis- 
posed of certain property (which was a firearm or ex- 
plosive); 
(b) That the sale or disposition was without 
proper authority; 
(c) That the property was military property of 
the United States; and 
(d)  That the property was of a certain value. 
(2)  Damaging, destroying, or losing military prop- 
erty. 
(a) That the accused, without proper author- 
ity, damaged or destroyed certain property in a cer- 
tain way, or lost certain property; 
(b)  That the property was military property of 
the United States; 
(c)  That the damage, destruction, or loss was 
willfully caused by  the accused or was the result of 
neglect by the accused; and 
(d)  That the property was of a certain value or 
the damage was of a certain amount. 
(3)  Suffering military property  to be lost, dam- 
aged, destroyed, sold, or wrongfully disposed 05 
(a)  That certain property (which was a firearm 
or explosive) was lost, damaged, destroyed, sold, or 
wrongfully disposed of; 
(b) That the property was military property of 
the United States; (d) That the act apparently tended to bring 
about the offense of espionage. 
(3)  Espionage as a capital offense. 
(a) That the accused committed espionage or 
attempted espionage; and 
(b)  That the offense directly concerned (1) nu- 
clear weaponry, military spacecraft or satellites, 
early warning systems, or other means of defense or 
retaliation against large scale attack, (2) war plans, 
(3) communications intelligence or cryptographic 
information, or (4) any other major weapons system 
or major element of defense strategy. 
c. 	Explanation. 
(1) Intent. "Intent or reason to believe"  that the 
information "is to be used to the injury of the United 
States or to the advantage of a foreign nation" means 
that the accused acted in bad  faith or otherwise 
without authority with respect to information that is 
not lawfully accessible to the public. 
(2)  National  defense information. "Instrument, 
appliance, or information relating to the national de- 
fense" includes the full range of modern technology 
and matter that may be developed in the future, in- 
cluding chemical or biological agents, computer 
technology, and other matter related to the national 
defense. 
(3)  Espionage as a capital offense. Capital punish- 
ment is authorized if the government alleges and 
proves that the offense directly concerned (1) nu- 
clear weaponry, military spacecraft or satellites, 
early warning systems, or other means of defense or 
retaliation against large scale attack, (2) war plans, 
(3) communications intelligence or cryptographic 
information, or (4) any other major weapons system 
or major element of defense strategy. See R.C.M. 
1004 concerning sentencing proceedings in capital 
cases. 
d. Lesser included offense. Although no lesser in- 
cluded offenses are set forth in the Code, federal ci- 
vilian offenses on this matter may be incorporated 
through the third clause of Article 134. 
e. 	Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Espionage as a capital offense. Death or such 
other punishment as a court-martial may direct. See 
R.C.M. 1003. 
(2)  Espionage or attempted espionage. Any pun- 
ishment, other than death, that a court-martial may 
direct. See R.C.M. 1003. 
f. 	Sample specijcation. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  ,  with intent 
or reason to believe it would be used to the injury of 
the  United  States  or  to  the  damage  of 
, a foreign  nation, (attempt to) 
(communicate)  (deliver)  (transmit) 
(description of item), (a docu- 
ment) (a writing) (a code book) (a sketch) (a photo- 
graph) (a photographic negative) (a blueprint) (a 
plan) (a map) (a model) (a note) (an instrument) (an 
appliance) (information) relating to the national de- 
fense, ((which directly concerned (nuclear weap- 
onry) (military spacecraft) (military satellites) (early 
warning systems) (  ,a means of de- 
fense or retaliation against a large scale attack) (war 
plans) (communications intelligence) (crypto- 
graphic information) (  , a major 
weapons system) (  ,a major ele- 
ment of defense strategy)) to  ((a 
representative of) (an officer of) (an agent of) (an em- 
ployee of) (a subject of) (a citizen of)) ((a foreign 
government) (a faction within a foreign country) (a 
party within a foreign country) (a military force 
within a foreign country) (a naval force within a for- 
eign country)) (indirectly by  ). 
31.  Article 107-False  official statements 
a. 	Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who, with in- 
tent to deceive, signs any false record, return, regula- 
tion, order, or other official document, knowing it to 
be false, or makes any other false official statement 
knowing it to be false, shall be punished as a court- 
martial may direct." 
b. 	Elements. 
(1)  That the accused signed a certain official doc- 
ument or made a certain official statement; 
(2) That the document or statement was false in 
certain particulars; 
(3)  That the accused knew it to be false at the 
time of signing it or making it; and 
(4)  That the false document or statement was 
made with the intent to deceive. 
c. 	Explanation. 
(1)  OfJicial documents and statements.  Official 
documents and official statements include all docu- 
ments and statements made in the line of duty. 730a 
30a.  Article 106a-Espionage 
a. 	Text. 
"(a)(l) Any person subject to this chapter who, 
with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to 
the injury of the United States or to the advantage of 
a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or trans- 
mits, or attempts to communicate, deliver, or trans- 
mit, to any entity described in paragraph (2), either 
directly or indirectly, anything described in para- 
graph (3) shall be punished as a court-martial may 
direct, except that if the accused is found guilty of an 
offense that directly concerns (A) nuclear weaponry, 
military spacecraft or satellites, early warning sys- 
tems, or other means of defense or retaliation against 
large scale attack, (B) war plans, (C) communica- 
tions intelligence or cryptographic information, or 
(D) any other major weapons system or major ele- 
ment of defense strategy, the accused shall be pun- 
ished by death or such other punishment as a court- 
martial may direct. 
(2) An entity referred to in paragraph (1) is- 
(A) a foreign government; 
(B) a faction or party or military or naval 
force within a foreign country, whether recognized 
or unrecognized by the United States; or 
(C) a representative, officer, agent, employee, 
subject, or citizen of such a government, faction, 
party, or force. 
(3) A thing referred to in paragraph (1) is a doc- 
ument, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, pho- 
tograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, 
map, model, note, instrument, appliance, or infor- 
mation relating to the national defense. 
(b)(l) No person may be sentenced by court-mar- 
tial to suffer death for an offense under this section 
(article) unless- 
(A) the members of the court-martial unani- 
mously find at least one of the aggravating factors 
set out in subsection (c); and 
(B) the members unanimously determine 
that any extenuating or mitigating circumstances 
are substantially outweighed by any aggravating cir- 
cumstances, including the aggravating factors set 
out under subsection (c). 
(2) Findings under this subsection may be 
based on- 
(A) evidence introduced on the issue of guilt 
or innocence; 
(B) evidence introduced during the sentenc- 
ing proceeding; or 
(C) all such evidence. 
(3) The accused shall be given broad latitude to 
present matters in extenuation and mitigation. 
(c) A sentence of  death may be adjudged by  a 
court-martial for an offense under this section (arti- 
cle) only if the members unanimously find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, one or more of the following ag- 
gravating factors: 
(1) The accused has been convicted of another 
offense involving espionage or treason for which ei- 
ther a sentence of death or imprisonment for life was 
authorized by statute. 
(2) In the commission of the offense, the ac- 
cused knowingly created a grave risk of substantial 
damage to the national security. 
(3) In the commission of the offense, the ac- 
cused knowingly created a grave risk of death to an- 
other person. 
(4) Any other factor that may be prescribed by 
the President by regulations under section 836 of 
this title (Article 36)." 
b. 	Elements. 
(1)  Espionage. 
(a)  That the accused communicated, delivered, 
or transmitted any document, writing, code book, 
signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic neg- 
ative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, instrument, 
appliance, or information relating to the national de- 
fense; 
(b) That this matter was communicated, deliv- 
ered, or transmitted to any foreign government, or 
to any faction or party or military or naval force 
within a foreign country, whether recognized or un- 
recognized by the United States, or to any represen- 
tative, officer, agent, employee, subject or citizen 
thereof, either directly or indirectly; and 
(c)  That the accused did so with intent or rea- 
son to believe that such matter would be used to the 
injury of the United States or to the advantage of a 
foreign nation. 
(2) Attempted espionage. 
(a)  That the accused did a certain overt act; 
(b)  That the act was done with the intent to 
commit the offense of espionage; 
(c)  That the act amounted to more than mere 
preparation; and 
IV-44 ers at  ) (  ), mal-
treat the said  by (depriving him/ 
her of  ) (  ), with-
out justifiable cause. 
30.  Article 106-Spies 
a.  Text. 
"Any person who in time of war is found lurking 
as a spy or acting as a spy in or about any place, ves- 
sel, or aircraft, within the control or jurisdiction  of 
any of the armed forces, or in or about any shipyard, 
any manufacturing or industrial plant, or any other 
place or institution engaged in work in aid of the 
prosecution of the war by the United States, or else- 
where, shall be tried by a general court-martial or by 
a military commission and on conviction shall be 
punished by death." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused was found in, about, or in 
and about a certain place, vessel, or aircraft within 
the control or jurisdiction of an armed force of the 
United States, or a shipyard, manufacturing or in- 
dustrial plant, or other place or institution engaged 
in work in aid of the prosecution of the war by  the 
United States, or elsewhere; 
(2) That the accused was lurking, acting 
clandestinely or under false pretenses; 
(3)  That the accused was collecting or attempting 
to collect certain information; 
(4)  That the accused did so with the intent to con- 
vey this information to the enemy; and 
(5)  That this was done in time of war. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  In time of war. See R.C.M. 103(19). 
(2)  Enemy. For a discussion of "enemy," see par-
agraph 23c(l)(b). 
(3)  Scope  of offense. The words "any  person" 
bring within the jurisdiction of general courts-mar- 
tial and military commissions all persons of 
whatever nationality or status who commit spying. 
(4)  Nature of offense. A person can be a spy only 
when, acting clandestinely or under false pretenses, 
that person obtains or seeks to obtain information 
with the intent to convey it to a hostile party. It is 
not essential that the accused obtain the information 
sought or that it be communicated. The offense is 
complete with lurking or acting clandestinely or 
under false pretenses with intent to accomplish these 
objects. 
(5) Intent. It is necessary to prove an intent to 
convey information to the enemy. This intent may 
be inferred from evidence of a deceptive insinuation 
of the accused among our forces, but evidence that 
the person had come within the lines for a compara- 
tively innocent purpose, as to visit family or to reach 
friendly lines by assuming a disguise, is admissible to 
rebut this inference. 
(6) Persons not included under "spying". 
(a) Members of a military organization not 
wearing a disguise, dispatch drivers, whether mem- 
bers of a military organization or civilians, and per- 
sons in ships or aircraft who carry out their missions 
openly and who have penetrated enemy lines are not 
spies because, while they may have resorted to con- 
cealment, they have not acted under false pretenses. 
(b)  A spy who, after rejoining the armed forces 
to which the spy belongs, is later captured by the en- 
emy incurs no responsibility for previous acts of es- 
pionage. 
(c)  A person living in occupied territory who, 
without lurking, or acting clandestinely  or under 
false pretenses, merely reports what is seen or heard 
through agents to the enemy may be charged under 
Article 104 with giving intelligence to or communi- 
cating with the enemy, but may not be charged 
under this article as being a spy. 
d. Lesser included offenses. None. 
e.  Mandatory punishment. Death 
f. 	Sample specijcation. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), was, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  , a  time of 
war, found (lurking) (acting) as a spy (in) (about) (in 
and about)  ,(a (fortification) (port) 
(base) (vessel) (aircraft) (  ) within 
the (control)(iurisdiction) (control and jurisdiction) 
of an armed force of the United  States, to wit: 
) (a (shipyard) (manufacturing 
plant) (industrial plant) (  ) engaged 
in work in aid of the prosecution of the war by  the 
United States) (  ), for the purpose 
of (collecting) (attempting to collect) information in 
regard to the ((numbers) (resources) (operations) 
(  ) of the armed forces of the United 
States) ((military production) (  ) of 
the United States) (  ), with intent to 
impart the same to the enemy. 29.  Article 105-Misconduct  as a prisoner 
a.  Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who, while in 
the hands of the enemy in time of war- 
(1) for the purpose of securing favorable treat- 
ment by his captors acts without proper authority in 
a manner contrary to law, custom, or regulation, to 
the detriment of others of whatever nationality held 
by the enemy as civilian or military prisoners; or 
(2) while in a position  of authority over such 
persons maltreats them without justifiable  cause; 
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Acting without authority to the detriment of 
another for  the purpose  of securing favorable  treat- 
ment. 
(a)  That without proper authority the accused 
acted in a manner contrary to law, custom, or regu- 
lation; 
(b) That the act was committed while the ac- 
cused was in the hands of the enemy in time of war; 
(c) That the act was done for the purpose of se- 
curing favorable treatment of the accused by  the 
captors; and 
(d) That other prisoners held by the enemy, ei- 
ther military or civilian, suffered some detriment be- 
cause of the accused's act. 
(2)  Maltreatingprisoners while in a position of au- 
thority. 
(a) That the accused maltreated a prisoner 
held by the enemy; 
(b) That the act occurred while the accused 
was in the hands of the enemy in time of war; 
(c) That the accused held a position of author- 
ity over the person maltreated; and 
(d) That the act was without justifiable cause. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Enemy. For a discussion of "enemy,"  see par-
agraph 23c(l)(b). 
(2)  In  time of war. See R.C.M. 103(19). 
(3)  Acting  without authority to the detriment of 
another for  the purpose of securing favorable  treat-
ment. 
(a) Nature of offense. Unauthorized conduct by 
a prisoner of war must be intended to result in  im- 
provement by the enemy of the accused's condition 
and must operate to the detriment of other prisoners 
either by way of closer confinement, reduced rations, 
physical punishment, or other harm. Examples of 
this conduct include reporting plans of escape being 
prepared by others or reporting secret food caches, 
equipment, or arms. The conduct of the prisoner 
must be contrary to law, custom, or regulation. 
(b)  Escape. Escape from the enemy is author- 
ized by custom. An escape or escape attempt which 
results in closer confinement or other measures 
against fellow prisoners still in the hands of the en- 
emy is not an offense under this article. 
(4) Maltreatingprisoners while in a position of au- 
thority. 
(a)  Authority. The source of authority is not 
material. It may arise from the military rank of the 
accused or-despite  service regulations or customs 
to the contrary-designation  by the captor authori- 
ties, or voluntary election or selection by other pris- 
oners for their self-government. 
(b)  Maltreatment. The maltreatment must be 
real, although not necessarily physical, and it must 
be without justifiable cause. Abuse of an inferior by 
inflammatory and derogatory words may, through 
mental anguish, constitute this offense. 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Any punishment other 
than death that a court-martial may direct. See 
R.C.M. 1003. 
f.  Sample specifications. 
(1)  Acting without authority to the detriment of 
another for  the purpose of securing favorable  treat-
ment. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), while in the hands of the enemy, did, (at/on 
board-location)  on or about 
19  ,  a time of war, without proper 
authority and for the purpose of securing favorable 
treatment by  his/her  captors, (report to the com- 
mander of Camp  the preparations 
by  ,a prisoner at said camp, to es- 
cape, as a  result  of  which report the said 
was placed  in  solitary confine- 
ment) (  ). 
(2)  Maltreating prisoner while in a position  of au- 
thority. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  , a  time of 
ward, while in the hands, of the enemy and in a posi- 
tion of authority o  v  e  r  ,  a prisoner 
a  t  ,  as (officer in charge of prison- subsistence, quarters, and other comforts or aid to 
which they are lawfully entitled. 
(4)  Harboring or protecting  the enemy. 
(a)  Nature of offense. An enemy is harbored or 
protected when, without proper authority, that en- 
emy is shielded, either physically or by use of any ar- 
tifice, aid, or representation from any injury or mis- 
fortune which in the chance of war may occur. 
(b)  Knowledge. Actual knowledge is required, 
but may be proved by circumstantial evidence. 
(5) Giving intelligence to the enemy. 
(a) Nature of offense. Giving intelligence to the 
enemy is a particular case of corresponding with the 
enemy made more serious by the fact that the com- 
munication contains intelligence that may be useful 
to the enemy for any of the many reasons that make 
information valuable to belligerents. This intelli- 
gence may be conveyed by direct or indirect means. 
(b) Intelligence.  "Intelligence"  imports that 
the information conveyed is true or implies the 
truth, at least in part. 
(c) Knowledge. Actual knowledge is required 
but may be proved by circumstantial evidence. 
(6) Communicating with the enemy. 
(a) Nature of the offense. No unauthorized 
communication, correspondence, or intercourse 
with the enemy is permissible. The intent, content, 
and method of the communication, correspondence, 
or intercourse are immaterial. No response or re- 
ceipt by the enemy is required. The offense is com- 
plete the moment the communication, correspon- 
dence, or intercourse issues from the accused. The 
communication, correspondence, or intercourse 
may be conveyed directly or indirectly. A prisoner 
of war may violate this Article by engaging in unau- 
thorized communications with the enemy. See also 
paragraph 29c(3). 
(b) Knowledge. Actual knowledge is required 
but may be proved by circumstantial evidence. 
(c)  Citizens of neutral powers. Citizens of neu- 
tral powers resident in or visiting invaded or occu- 
pied territory can claim no immunity from the cus- 
tomary laws of war relating to communication with 
the enemy. 
d. Lesser included offense. For harboring or protect- 
ing the enemy, giving intelligence to the enemy, or 
communicating with the enemy. Article 80-at- 
tempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Death or such other pun- 
ishment as a court-martial or military commission 
may direct. 
f.  Sample specifications. 
(1) Aiding or attempting to aid the enemy. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location),  on or about 
19  , (attempt to) 
aid the enemy with (arms) (ammunition) (supplies) 
(money) (  ), by (furnishing and de- 
livering to  ,members of the en- 
emy's  armed  forces  ) 
(2) 	Harboring or  protecting the enemy. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  ,  without 
proper authority, knowingly (harbor) (protect) 
,an enemy, by (concealing the said 
in hidher house) 
(3) 	Giving intelligence to the enemy. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  ,  without 
proper authority, knowingly give intelligence to the 
enemy, by (informing a patrol of the enemy's forces 
of the whereabouts of a military patrol of the United 
States forces) (  ). 
(4)  Communicating with the enemy. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location),  on or about 
19  ,  without 
proper authority, knowingly (communicate with) 
(correspond with) (hold intercourse with) the enemy 
(by writing and transmitting secretly through the 
lines to one  , whom he/she,  the 
said  ,knew to be (an officer of the 
enemy's armed forces) (  ) a com- 
munication in words and figures substantially as fol- 
lows, to wit:  )) ((indirectly by pub- 
lishing in  ,  a newspaper published 
at  ,a communication in words and 
figures as follows, to wit:  ,  which 
communication was intended to reach the enemy)) 
((  )). (1)  Failing  to secure public property  taken from 
the enemy. 
In that 	 (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  ,fail to secure 
for the service of the United States certain public 
property  taken  from  the  enemy,  to  wit: 
,  of  a  value  of  (about) 
(2)  Failing to report and turn over captured  or 
abandoned property. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  ,  fail to give 
notice and turn over to proper authority without de- 
lay certain (captured) (abandoned) property which 
had come into hidher (possession) (custody) (con- 
trol), to wit:  ,of a value of (about), 
(3) 	Dealing in captured or abandoned property. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  ,  (buy) (sell) 
(trade) (deal in) (dispose of) (  ) cer-
tain (captured) (abandoned) property, to wit: 
,  of  a  value  of  (about) 
$  ,thereby (receiving) (expecting) a 
(profit) (benefit) (advantage) to (himself/herself) 
(  ,  hidher  accomplice) 
(  ,hidher brother) 
(  1. 
(4) 	Looting or pillaging. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  , engage in 
(looting) (pillage) (looting and pillaging) by unlaw- 
fully (seizing) (appropriating)  , 
(property which had been left behind) (the property 
of  ),  (an  inhabitant  of 
28.  Article 104--Aiding  the enemy 
a. 	Text. 
"Any person who- 
(1) aids, or attempts to aid, the enemy with 
arms, ammunition, supplies, money, or other things; 
or 
(2) without proper authority, knowingly 
harbors or protects or gives intelligence to or com- 
municates or corresponds with or holds any inter- 
course with the enemy, either directly or indirectly; 
shall suffer death or such other punishment as a 
court-martial or military commission may direct." 
b. 	Elements. 
(1) Aiding the enemy. 
(a)  That the accused aided the enemy; and 
(b) That the accused did so with certain arms, 
ammunition, supplies, money, or other things. 
(2) Attempting to aid the enemy. 
(a)  That the accused did a certain overt act; 
(b)  That the act was done with the intent to aid 
the enemy with certain arms, ammunition, supplies, 
money, or other things; 
(c)  That the act amounted to more than mere 
preparation; and 
(d)  That the act apparently tended to bring 
about the offense of aiding the enemy with certain 
arms, ammunition, supplies, money, or other things. 
(3)  Harboring or protecting  the enemy. 
(a)  That the accused, without proper author- 
ity, harbored or protected a person; 
(b)  That the person so harbored or protected 
was the enemy; and 
(c)  That the accused knew that the person so 
harbored or protected was an enemy. 
(4)  Giving intelligence to the enemy. 
(a)  That the accused, without proper author- 
ity, knowingly gave intelligence information to the 
enemy; and 
(b)  That the intelligence information was true, 
or implied the truth, at least in part. 
(5) Communicating with the enemy. 
(a)  That the accused, without proper author- 
ity, communicated, corresponded, or held inter- 
course with the enemy, and; 
(b)  That the accused knew that the accused 
was communicating, corresponding, or holding in- 
tercourse with the enemy. 
c. 	Explanation. 
(1)  Scope of Article 104. This article denounces 
offenses by all persons whether or not otherwise sub- 
ject to military law. Offenders may be tried by court- 
martial or by military commission. 
(2) Enemy. For a discussion of "enemy,"  see par-
agraph 23c(l)(b). 
(3) Aiding or attempting to aid the enemy. It is not 
a violation of this article to furnish prisoners of war (a)  That certain public property was taken 
from the enemy; 
(b) That this property was of a certain value; 
and 
(c)  That the accused failed to do what was rea- 
sonable under the circumstances to secure this prop- 
erty for the service of the United States. 
(2)  Failing to report and turn over captured or 
abandoned property. 
(a)  That certain captured or abandoned public 
or private property came into the possession, cus- 
tody, or control of the accused; 
(b)  That this property was of a certain value; 
and 
(c) That the accused failed to give notice of its 
receipt and failed to turn over to proper authority, 
without delay, the captured or abandoned public or 
private property. 
(3)  Dealing in captured or abandoned property. 
(a) That the accused bought, sold, traded, or 
otherwise dealt in or disposed of certain public or 
private captured or abandoned property; 
(b) That this property was of certain value; and 
(c)  That by so doing the accused received or 
expected some profit, benefit, or advantage to the ac- 
cused or to a certain person or persons connected di- 
rectly or indirectly with the accused. 
(4) Looting or pillaging. 
(a)  That the accused engaged in looting, pillag- 
ing, or looting and pillaging by unlawfully seizing or 
appropriating certain public or private property; 
(b)  That this property was located in enemy or 
occupied territory, or that it was on board a seized 
or captured vessel; and 
(c) That this property was: 
(i)  left behind, owned by, or in the custody of 
the enemy, an occupied state, an inhabitant of an oc- 
cupied state, or a person under the protection of the 
enemy or occupied state, or who, immediately prior 
to the occupation of the place where the act oc- 
curred, was under the protection of the enemy or oc- 
cupied state; or 
(ii)  part of the equipment of a seized or cap- 
tured vessel; or 
(iii) owned by, or in the custody of the of- 
ficers, crew, or passengers on board a seized or cap- 
tured vessel. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Failing to secure public property  taken from 
the enemy. 
(a)  Nature of property. Unlike the remaining 
offenses under this article, failing to secure public 
property taken from the enemy involves only public 
property. Immediately upon its capture from the en- 
emy public property becomes the property of the 
United States. Neither the person who takes it nor 
any other person has any private right in this prop- 
erty. 
(b)  Nature of duty. Every person subject to 
military law has an immediate duty to take such 
steps as are reasonably within that person's power to 
secure public property for the service of the United 
States and to protect it from destruction or loss. 
(2)  Failing to report and turn over captured or 
abandoned property. 
(a)  Reports. Reports of receipt of captured or 
abandoned property are to be made directly or 
through such channels as are required by  current 
regulations, orders, or the customs of the service. 
(b)  Proper authority. "Proper authority" is any 
authority competent to order disposition of the 
property in question. 
(3)  Dealing in captured or abandoned property. 
"Disposed  of' includes destruction or abandon- 
ment. 
(4)  Looting or pillaging.  "Looting  or pillaging" 
means unlawfully seizing or appropriating property 
which is located in enemy or occupied territory. 
(5)  Enemy. For a discussion of "enemy,"  see par- 
agraph 23c(l)(b). 
d.  Lesser included offense. Article 8Gattempts 
e.  Maximum  punishment. 
(1)  Failing to secure public property  taken from 
the enemy;  failing to secure, give notice and turn over, 
selling, or otherwise wrongfully dealing in or dispos- 
ing of captured or abandoned property: 
(a)  of a value of $100.00 or less. Bad-conduct 
discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 6 months. 
(b)  of a value of more than $100.00. Dishonor- 
able discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 
and confinement for 5 years. 
(2)  Looting or pillaging. Any punishment, other 
than death, that a court-martial may direct. See 
R.C.M. 1003. 
f.  Sample specifications. In that 	 (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  , a  time of 
war, disclose the (parole) (countersign), to wit: 
, to 	 , a  person 
who was not entitled to receive it. 
(2)  Giving a parole or countersign different from 
that authorized. 
In that 	 (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  , a  time of 
war, give to 	 ,  a person entitled to 
receive and use the (parole) (countersign), a (parole) 
(countersign), namely: ' 	 which was 
different from that which, to his/her  knowledge, he/ 
she was authorized and required to give, to wit: 
26.  Article 102-Forcing  a safeguard 
a. 	Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who forces a 
safeguard shall suffer death or such other punish- 
ment as a court-martial may direct." 
b. 	Elements. 
(1)  that a safeguard had been issued or posted for 
the protection of a certain person or persons, place, 
or property; 
(2)  That the accused knew or should have known 
of the safeguard; and 
(3)  That the accused forced the safeguard. 
c. 	Explanation. 
(1)  Safeguard. A safeguard is a detachment, 
guard, or detail posted by a commander for the pro- 
tection of persons, places, or property of the enemy, 
or of a neutral affected by the relationship of bellig- 
erent forces in their prosecution of war or during cir- 
cumstances amounting to a state of belligerency. 
The term also includes a written order left by a com- 
mander with an enemy subject or posted upon en- 
emy property for the protection of that person or 
property. A safeguard is not a device adopted by  a 
belligerent to protect its own property or nationals 
or to ensure order within its own forces, even if those 
forces are in a theater of combat operations, and the 
posting of guards or of off-limits signs does not es- 
tablish a safeguard unless a commander takes those 
actions to protect enemy or neutral persons or prop- 
erty. The effect of a safeguard is to pledge the honor 
of the nation that the person or property shall be 
respected by the national armed forces. 
(2)  Forcing a safeguard. "Forcing a safeguard" 
means to perform an act or acts in violation of the 
protection of the safeguard. 
(3)  Nature of offense. Any trespass on the protec- 
tion of the safeguard will constitute an offense under 
this article, whether the safeguard was imposed in 
time of war or in circumstances amounting to a state 
of belligerency short of a formal state of war. 
(4) Knowledge. Actual knowledge of the safe- 
guard is not required. It is sufficient if an accused 
should have known of the existence of the safeguard. 
d. 	Lesser included offense. Article 8kattempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Death or such other pun- 
ishment as a court-martial may direct. 
f. 	Sample specificstion. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  ,force a safe- 
guard, (known by him/her  to have been placed over 
the premises occupied by  at 
by  (overwhelming the guard 
posted for the protection of the same) 
(  )) (  ). 
27.  Article 103-Captured 
property 
a.  Text. 
or abandoned 
"(a) All persons subject to this chapter shall se- 
cure all public property taken from the enemy for 
the service of the United States, and shall give notice 
and turn over to the proper authority without delay 
all captured or abandoned property in their posses- 
sion, custody, or control. 
(b) Any person subject to this chapter who- 
(1) fails to carry out the duties prescribed in 
subsection (a); 
(2) buys, sells, trades, or in any way deals in or 
disposes of captured or abandoned property, 
whereby he receives or expects any profit, benefit, or 
advantage to himself or another directly or indi- 
rectly connected with himself; or 
(3) engages in looting or pillaging; shall be pun- 
ished as a court-martial may direct." 
b. 	Elements. 
(1)  Failing to secure public property  taken from 
the enemy. not necessary that an engagement with the enemy be 
in progress. It is unnecessary to prove that the offer 
was received by the enemy or that it was rejected or 
accepted. The sending of an emissary charged with 
making the offer or surrender is an act sufficient to 
prove the offer, even though the emissary does not 
reach the enemy. 
(4)  Enemy. For a discussion of "enemy,"  see par-
agraph 23c(l)(b). 
d. Lesser included offense. Striking the colors or 
flag. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  All offenses under Arti- 
cle 100. Death or such other punishment as a court- 
martial may direct. 
f. 	Sample specijications. 
(1)  Compelling surrender or attempting to compel 
surrender. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on-board  location), on or about 
19  ,  (attempt to) 
compel  , the commander of 
,  (to give up to the enemy) (to 
abandon)  said  by 9 
(2) 	Striking the colors orjlag. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location),  on or about 
19  ,  without 
proper authority, offer to surrender to the enemy by 
(striking the (colors)(flag)) (  ). 
25.  Article 101-Improper  use of countersign 
a. 	Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who in time of 
war discloses the parole or countersign to any per- 
son not entitled to receive it or who gives to another 
who is entitled to receive and use the parole or coun- 
tersign a different parole or countersign from that 
which, to his knowledge, he was authorized and re- 
quired to give, shall be punished by death or such 
other punishment as a court-martial may direct." 
b. 	Elements. 
(1)  Disclosing  the parole or countersign to one not 
entitled to receive it. 
(a) That, in time of war, the accused disclosed 
the parole or countersign to a person, identified or 
unidentified; and 
(b) That this person was not entitled to receive 
it. 
(2)  Giving a parole  or countersign different from 
that authorized. 
(a)  That, in time of war, the accused knew that 
the accused was authorized and required to give a 
certain parole or countersign; and 
(b)  That the accused gave to a person entitled 
to receive and use this parole or countersign a differ- 
ent parole or countersign from that which the ac- 
cused was authorized and required to give. 
c. 	Explanation. 
(1)  Countersign. A countersign is a word, signal, 
or procedure given from the principal headquarters 
of a command to aid guards and sentinels in their 
scrutiny of persons who apply to pass the lines. It 
consists of a secret challenge and a password, signal, 
or procedure. 
(2)  Parole. A parole is a word used as a check on 
the countersign; it is given only to those who are en- 
titled to inspect guards and to commanders of 
guards. 
(3)  Who may receive countersign. The class of 
persons entitled to receive the countersign or parole 
will expand and contract under the varying circum- 
stances of war. Who these persons are will be deter- 
mined largely, in any particular case, by the general 
or special orders under which the accused was act- 
ing. Before disclosing such a word, a person subject 
to military law must determine at that person's peril 
that the recipient is a person authorized to receive it. 
(4)  Intent, motive, negligence, mistake, ignorance 
not defense. The accused's  intent or motive in dis- 
closing the countersign or parole is immaterial to the 
issue of guilt, as is the fact that the disclosure was 
negligent or inadvertent. It is no defense that the ac- 
cused did not know that the person to whom the 
countersign or parole was given was not entitled to 
receive it. 
(5)  How accused received countersign or parole. It 
is immaterial whether the accused had received the 
countersign or parole in the regular course of duty 
or whether it was obtained in some other way. 
(6) In time of war. See R.C.M. 103(19). 
d. 	Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Death or such other pun- 
ishment as a court-martial may direct. 
f. 	Sample specijications. 
(1)  Disclosing the parole or countersign to one not 
entitled to receive it. it was hidher duty to do, (certain enemy troops 
which were in retreat) (  1. 
(9) 	Failing to afford relief and assistance. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  , (before) (in 
the presence of) the enemy, fail to afford all practica- 
ble  relief  and  assistance  to  (the  USS 
,which was engaged in battle and 
had run aground, in that he/she  failed to take her in 
tow) (certain troops of  the ground forces of 
,which were engaged in battle and 
were pinned down by  enemy fire, in that he/she 
failed to furnish air cover) (  ) as he/ 
she properly should have done. 
24.  Article 100-Subordinate  compelling 
surrender 
a.  Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who compels 
or attempts to compel the commander of any place, 
vessel, aircraft, or other military property, or of any 
body of members of the armed forces, to give it up to 
an enemy or to abandon it, or who strikes the colors 
or flag to an enemy without proper authority, shall 
be punished by death or such other punishment as a 
court-martial may direct." 
b. 	Elements. 
(1)  Compelling surrender. 
(a) That a certain person was in command of a 
certain place, vessel, aircraft, or other military prop- 
erty or of a body of members of the armed forces; 
(b)  That the accused did an overt act which 
was intended to and did compel that commander to 
give it up to the enemy or abandon it; and 
(c)  That the place, vessel, aircraft, or other mil- 
itary property or body of members of the armed 
forces was actually given up to the enemy or aban- 
doned. 
(2) Attempting to compel surrender. 
(a)  That a certain person was in command of a 
certain place, vessel, aircraft, or other military prop- 
erty or of a body of members of the armed forces; 
(b)  That the accused did a certain overt act; 
(c)  That the act was done with the intent to 
compel that commander to give up to the enemy or 
abandon the place, vessel, aircraft, or other military 
property or body of members of the armed forces; 
(d) That the act amounted to more than mere 
preparation; and 
(e)  That the act apparently tended  to bring 
about the compelling of surrender or abandonment. 
(3)  Striking the colors orjag. 
(a)  That there was an offer of surrender to an 
enemy; 
(b) That this offer was made by striking the 
colors or flag to the enemy or in some other manner; 
(c)  That the accused made or was responsible 
for the offer; and 
(d) That the accused did not have proper au- 
thority to make the offer. 
c. 	Explanation. 
(1)  Compelling surrender. 
(a)  Nature of offense. The offenses under this 
article are similar to mutiny or attempted mutiny 
designed to bring about surrender or abandonment. 
Unlike some cases of mutiny, however, concert of 
action is not an essential element of the offenses 
under this article. The offense is not complete until 
the place, military property, or command is actually 
abandoned or given up to the enemy. 
(b)  Surrender. "Surrender"  and "to give it up 
to an enemy" are synonymous. 
(c)  Acts required. The surrender or abandon- 
ment must be compelled  or attempted to be com- 
pelled by acts rather than words. 
(2) Attempting  to compel surrender. The offense 
of attempting to compel a surrender or abandon- 
ment does not require actual abandonment or sur- 
render, but there must be some act done with this 
purpose in view, even if  it does not accomplish the 
purpose. 
(3)  Striking the colors orjag. 
(a)  In general. To "strike the colors or flag" is 
to haul down the colors or flag in the face of the en- 
emy or to make any other offer of surrender. It is 
traditional wording for an act of surrender. 
(b)  Nature of offense. The offense is committed 
when one assumes the authority to surrender a mili- 
tary force or position when not authorized to do so 
either by competent authority or by the necessities of 
battle. If continued battle has become fruitless and it 
is impossible to communicate with higher authority, 
those facts will constitute proper authority to sur- 
render. The offense may be committed whenever 
there is sufficient contact with the enemy to give the 
opportunity of making an offer of surrender and it is (2)  Shamefully abandoning, surrendering, or de- 
livering up command. Article 80-attempts 
(3)  Endangering safety of a command, unit, place, 
ship, or military property. 
(a)  Through disobedience of order. Article 
92-failure  to obey lawful order 
(b)  Article 8kattempts 
(4)  Casting away arms  or ammunition. 
(a) Article  108-military  property of  the 
United States-loss,  damage, destruction, or wrong- 
ful disposition. 
(b)  Article 8kattempts 
(5)  Cowardly conduct. 
(a)  Article 85-desertion  with intent to avoid 
hazardous duty or important service 
(b)  Article 86-absence  without authority 
(c)  Article 99-running  away 
(d) Article 8kattempts 
(6)  Quitting place of duty to plunder or pillage. 
(a)  Article 86(2)-going  from appointed place 
of duty 
(b)  Article 8kattempts 
(7)  Causing false alarms. Article 8kattempts 
(8)  Willfully  failing  to do utmost to encounter en- 
emy. Article 8kattempts 
(9)  Failing to afford relief and assistance. Article 
8kattempts 
e.  Maximum  punishment.  A11  offenses under Arti- 
cle 99. Death or such other punishment as a court- 
martial may direct. 
f. 	Sample specifications. 
(1) 	Running away. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location),  on or about 
19  ,  (before) (in 
the presence of) the enemy, run away (from hidher 
company) (and hide) (  ), (and did 
not return until after the engagement had been con- 
cluded) (  ). 
(2)  Shamefully abandoning, surrendering, or de- 
livering up command. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  , (before) (in 
the presence of) the enemy, shamefully (abandon) 
(surrender) (deliver up)  ,  which it 
was hidher duty to defend. 
(3)  Endangering safety of a command, unit,  place, 
ship, or military property. 
In that 	 (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location),  on or about 
19  , (before) (in 
the presence of) the enemy, endanger the safety of 
,  which it was hidher duty to de- 
fend, by (disobeying an order from 
to engage the enemy)(neglecting hidher duty as a 
sentinel by engaging in a card game while on hidher 
post) (intentional misconduct in that he/she became 
drunk and fired flares, thus revealing the location of 
hidher unit) (  1. 
(4) 	Casting away arms or ammunition. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  , (before) (in 
the presence of) the enemy, cast away hidher (rifle) 
(ammunition) (  1. 
(5) 	Cowardly conduct. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  , (before) (in 
the presence of) the enemy, was guilty of cowardly 
conduct as a result of fear, in that 
(6) Quitting place of duty to plunder or pillage. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  , (before) (in 
the presence of) the enemy, quit his/her  place of 
duty for the purpose of (plundering) (pillaging) 
(plundering and pillaging). 
(7) 	Causing  false alarms. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  , (before) (in 
the presence of) the enemy, cause a false alarm in 
(Fort  ) (the said ship) (the camp) 
(  ) by (needlessly and without au- 
thority (causing the call to arms to be sounded) 
(sounding the general alarm)) (  1. 
(8)  Willfully  failing  to do utmost to encounter en- 
emy. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), being (before) (in the presence of) the enemy, 
did, (at/on  board-location),  on  or about 
19  ,by, (ordering 
his/her troops to halt their advance) 
(  ), willfully fail to do hidher ut- 
most to (encounter) (engage) (capture) (destroy), as (1)  Running away. 
(a)  Running away. "Running away" means an 
unauthorized departure to avoid actual or impend- 
ing combat. It need not, however, be the result of 
fear, and there is no requirement that the accused lit- 
erally run. 
(b) Enemy. "Enemy"  includes organized 
forces of the enemy in time of war, any hostile body 
that our forces may be opposing, such as a rede~~ious 
mob or a band of renegades, and includes civilians as 
well as members of military organizations. "Enemy" 
is not restricted  to the enemy government or its 
armed forces. All the citizens of one belligerent are 
enemies of the government and all the citizens of the 
other. 
(c) Before  the enemy. Whether a person is 
"before the enemy" is a question of tactical relation, 
not distance. For example, a member of an antiair- 
craft gun crew charged with opposing anticipated 
attack from the air, or a member of a unit about to 
move into combat may be before the enemy al- 
though miles from the enemy lines. On the other 
hand, an organization some distance from the front 
or immediate area of combat which is not a part of a 
tactical operation then going on or in immediate 
prospect is not "before or in the presence of the en- 
emy" within the meaning of this article. 
(2) Shamefully abandoning, surrendering,  or de- 
livering up of command. 
(a) Scope. This provision concerns primarily 
commanders chargeable with responsibility for de- 
fending a command, unit, place, ship or military 
property. Abandonment by a subordinate would or- 
dinarily be charged as running away. 
(b) Shameful. Surrender or abandonment 
without justification is shameful within the meaning 
of this article. 
(c) Surrender; deliver up. "Surrender"  and 
"deliver  up"  are synonymous for the purposes of 
this article. 
(d) Justification. Surrender or abandonment of 
a command, unit, place, ship, or military property 
by a person charged with its can be justified only by 
the utmost necessity or extremity. 
(3)  Endangering safety of a command, unit, place, 
ship, or military property. 
(a)  Neglect. "Neglect"  is the absence of con- 
duct which would have been taken by a reasonably 
careful person in the same or similar circumstances. 
(b)  Intentional  misconduct. "Intentional mis- 
conduct" does not include a mere error in judgment. 
(4)  Casting away arms or ammunition. Self-ex-
planatory. 
(5)  Cowardly conduct. 
(a)  Cowardice. "Cowardice"  is misbehavior 
motivated by fear. 
(b)  Fear. Fear is a natural feeling of apprehen- 
sion when going into battle. The mere display of ap- 
prehension does not constitute this offense. 
(c)  Nature of offense. Refusal or abandonment 
of a performance of duty before or in the presence of 
the enemy as a result of fear constitutes this offense. 
(d)  Defense. Genuine and extreme illness, not 
generated by cowardice, is a defense. 
(6)  Quitting place  of duty to plunder or pillage. 
(a)  Place of duty. "Place of duty" includes any 
place of duty, whether permanent or temporary, 
fixed or mobile. 
(b) Plunder or pillage.  "Plunder  or pillage" 
means to seize or appropriate public or private prop- 
erty unlawfully. 
(c)  Nature of offense. The essence of this of- 
fense is quitting the place of duty with intent to plun- 
der or pillage. Merely quitting with that purpose is 
sufficient, even if  the intended misconduct is not 
done. 
(7) Causing false  alarms. This provision  covers 
spreading of false or disturbing rumors or reports, as 
well as the false giving of established alarm signals. 
(8)  Willfully  failing  to do utmost to encounter en- 
emy. Willfully refusing a lawful order to go on a 
combat patrol may violate this provision. 
(9) Failing to afford relief and assistance. 
(a) All practicable  relief and assistance. "All 
practicable relief and assistance" means all relief and 
assistance which should be afforded within the limi- 
tations imposed upon a person by reason of that per- 
son's own specific tasks or mission. 
(b)  Nature of offense. This offense is limited to 
a failure to afford relief and assistance to forces "en- 
gaged in battle." 
d.  Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Running away. 
(a)  Article 85-desertion  with intent to avoid 
hazardous or important service 
(b)  Article 86-absence  without authority; go- 
ing from appointed place of duty 
(c)  Article 8kattempts (7) causes false alarms in any command, unit, 
or place under control of the armed forces; 
(8) willfully fails to do his utmost to encounter, 
engage, capture, or destroy any enemy troops, com- 
batants, vessels, aircraft, or any other thing, which it 
is his duty so to encounter, engage, capture, or de- 
stroy; or 
(9) does not afford all practicable relief and as- 
sistance to any troops, combatants, vessels, or air- 
craft of the armed forces belonging to the United 
States or their allies when engaged in battle; shall be 
punished by death or such other punishment as a 
court-martial may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1) Running away. 
(a) That the accused was before or in the pres- 
ence of the enemy; 
(b) That the accused misbehaved by running 
away; and 
(c) That the accused intended to avoid actual 
or impending combat with the enemy by  running 
away. 
(2) Shamefully abandoning, surrendering,  or de- 
livering up command. 
(a) That the accused was charged by orders or 
circumstances with the duty to defend a certain 
command, unit, place, ship, or military property; 
(b) That, without justification,  the accused 
shamefully abandoned, surrendered, or delivered up 
that command, unit, place, ship, or military prop- 
erty; and 
(c) That this act occurred while the accused 
was before or in the presence of the enemy. 
(3)  Endangering safety of a command, unit, place, 
ship, or military property. 
(a) That it was the duty of the accused to de- 
fend a certain command, unit, place, ship, or certain 
military property; 
(b) That the accused committed certain diso- 
bedience, neglect, or intentional misconduct; 
(c) That the accused thereby endangered the 
safety of the command, unit, place, ship, or military 
property; and 
(d) That this act occurred while the accused 
was before or in the presence of the enemy. 
(4)  Casting away arms or ammunition. 
(a) That the accused was before or in the pres- 
ence of the enemy; and 
(b)  That the accused cast away certain arms or 
ammunition. 
(5) Cowardly conduct. 
(a)  That the accused committed an act of cow- 
ardice; 
(b)  That this conduct occurred while the ac- 
cused was before or in the presence of the enemy; 
and 
(c) That this conduct was the result of fear. 
(6)  Quitting place of duty to plunder or pillage. 
(a)  That the accused was before or in the pres- 
ence of the enemy; 
(b) That the accused quit the accused's place of 
duty; and 
(c) That the accused's intention in quitting was 
to plunder or pillage public or private property. 
(7)  Causing  false  alarms. 
(a)  That an alarm was caused in a certain com- 
mand, unit, or place under control of the armed 
forces of the United States; 
(b) That the accused caused the alarm; 
(c)  That the alarm was caused without any rea- 
sonable or sufficient justification or excuse; and 
(d) That this act occurred while the accused 
was before or in the presence of the enemy. 
(8)  Willfully  failing  to do utmost to encounter en- 
emy. 
(a) That the accused was serving before or in 
the presence of the enemy; 
(b) That the accused had a duty to encounter, 
engage, capture, or destroy certain enemy troops, 
combatants, vessels, aircraft, or a certain other 
thing; and 
(c)  That the accused willfully failed to do the 
utmost to perform that duty. 
(9)  Failing to afford relief and assistance. 
(a)  That certain troops, combatants, vessels, or 
aircraft of the armed forces belonging to the United 
States or an ally of the United States were engaged in 
battle and required relief and assistance; 
(b)  That the accused was in a position and able 
to render relief and assistance to these troops, com- 
batants, vessels, or aircraft, without jeopardy to the 
accused's mission; 
(c) That the accused failed to afford all practi- 
cable relief and assistance; and 
(d)  That, at the time, the accused was before or 
in the presence of the enemy. 
c.  Explanation. (1) is responsible for unnecessary delay in the 
disposition of any case of a person accused of an of- 
fense under this chapter; or 
(2) Knowingly and intentionally fails to enforce 
or comply with any provision of this chapter regu- 
lating the proceedings before, during, or after trial of 
an accused; shall be punished as a court-martial may 
direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Unnecessary delay in disposing of case. 
(a)  That the accused was charged with a cer- 
tain duty in connection with the disposition of a case 
of a person accused of an offense under the code; 
(b)  That the accused knew that the accused 
was charged with this duty; 
(c)  That delay occurred in the disposition of 
the case; 
(d) That the accused was responsible for the 
delay; and 
(e)  That, under the circumstances, the delay 
was unnecessary. 
(2) Knowingly and intentionally failing  to enforce 
or comply with provisions of the code. 
(a)  That the accused failed to enforce or com- 
ply with a certain provision of the code regulating a 
proceeding before, during, or after a trial; 
(b)  That the accused had the duty of enforcing 
or complying with that provision of the code; 
(c) That the accused knew that the accused 
was charged with this duty; and 
(d) That the accused's  failure to enforce or 
comply with that provision was intentional. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Unnecessary delay in disposing of case. The 
purpose of section (1) of Article 98 is to ensure expe- 
ditious disposition of cases of persons accused of of- 
fenses under the code. A person may be responsible 
for delay in the disposition of a case only when that 
person's duties require action with respect to the dis- 
position of that case. 
(2) Knowingly and intentionally failing  to enforce 
or comply with provisions  of the code. Section (2) of 
Article 98 does not apply to errors made in good 
faith before, during, or after trial. It is designed to 
punish intentional failure to enforce or comply with 
the provisions of the code regulating the proceedings 
before, during, and after trial. Unlawful command 
influence under Article 37 may be prosecuted under 
this Article. See also Article 3 1 and R.C.M. 104. 
d. Lesser included ofense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Unnecessary delay in disposing of case. Bad-
conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay  and al- 
lowances, and confinement for 6 months. 
(2)  Knowingly and intentionally failing  to enforce 
or comply with provisions  of the code. Dishonorable 
discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 5 years. 
f.  Sample specifications. 
(1)  Unnecessary delay in disposing of case. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), being charged with the duty of ((investigating) 
(taking immediate steps to determine the proper dis- 
position  of)  charges  preferred  against 
,  a person accused of an offense 
under the Uniform Code of  Military Justice) 
(  ), was, (at/on board-location), 
on or about  19  , 
responsible for unnecessary delay in (investigating 
said charges) (determining the proper disposition of 
said charges (  ), in that he/she  (did 
)  (failed  to  ) 
(  >. 
(2)  Knowingly and intentionally failing  to enforce 
or comply with provisions of the code. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data),  being  charged  with  the  duty  of 
,  did, (at/on board-location),  on 
or about  19  , 
knowingly and intentionally fail to (enforce) (com- 
ply with) Article  ,Uniform Code 
of Military Justice, in that he/she 
23.  Article 99-Misbehavior  before the 
enemy 
a.  Text. 
"Any member of the armed forces who before or 
in the presence of the enemy- 
(I) runs away; 
(2) shamefully abandons, surrenders, or deliv- 
ers up any command, unit, place, or military prop- 
erty which it is his duty to defend; 
(3) through disobedience, neglect, or inten- 
tional misconduct endangers the safety of any such 
command, unit, place, or military property; 
(4) casts away his arms or ammunition; 
(5) is guilty of cowardly conduct; 
(6) quits his place of duty to plunder or pillage; sense of Article 96, and only a competent authority 
(see subparagraph (c))may order release, regardless 
of failure to follow procedures prescribed by  the 
code, this Manual, or other law. 
(2)  Suffering a prisoner to escape through neglect. 
(a)  Suffer. "Suffer"  means to allow or permit; 
not to forbid or hinder. 
(b)  Neglect. "Neglect"  is a relative term. It is 
the absence of conduct which would have been taken 
by a reasonably careful person in the same or similar 
circumstances. 
(c) Escape. Escape is defined in paragraph 
19c(4)(c). 
(d) Status of prisoner after escape not a defense. 
After escape, the fact that a prisoner returns, is cap- 
tured, killed, or otherwise dies is not a defense. 
(3)  Suffering a prisoner  to escape through design. 
An escape is suffered through design when it is in- 
tended. Such intent may be inferred from conduct so 
wantonly devoid of care that the only reasonable in- 
ference which may be drawn is that the escape was 
contemplated as a probable result. 
d. 	Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Releasing a prisoner  without proper authority. 
Article 80-attempts 
(2)  Suffering a prisoner  to escape through neglect. 
None 
(3)  Suffering a prisoner  to escape through design. 
(a) Article 96-suffering  a prisoner to escape 
through neglect 
(b) Article 8yattempts 
e.  Maximum punisdment. 
(1)  Releasing a prisoner without proper authority. 
Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and al- 
lowances, and confinement for 2 years. 
(2)  Suffering a prisoner to escape through neglect. 
Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and al- 
lowances, and confinement for l year. 
(3)  Suffering a prisoner  to escape through design. 
Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and al- 
lowances, and confinement for 2 years. 
f. 	Sample specifications. 
(1) 	Releasing a prisoner  without proper authority. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  ,  without 
proper authority, release  , a pris- 
oner committed to hidher charge. 
(2)  Suffering a prisoner  to escape through neglect 
or design. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  ,  through 
(neglect) (design), suffer  , a pris- 
oner committed to hidher charge, to escape. 
21. 	Article 97-Unlawful  detention 
a. 	Text. 
"Any  person subject to this chapter who, except 
as provided by law, apprehends, arrests, or confines 
any person shall be punished as a court-martial may 
direct." 
b. 	Elements. 
(1)  That the accused apprehended, arrested, or 
confined a certain person; and 
(2) That the accused unlawfully exercised the ac- 
cused's authority to do so. 
c. 	Explanation. 
(1)  Scope. This article prohibits improper acts by 
those empowered by  the code to arrest, apprehend, 
or confine. See Articles 7 and 9; R.C.M. 302, 304, 
305, and 1101, and paragraphs 2 and 5b, Part V. It 
does not apply to private acts of false imprisonment 
or unlawful restraint of another's freedom of move- 
ment by  one not acting under such a delegation of 
authority under the code. 
(2)  No force  required. The apprehension, arrest, 
or confinement must be against the will of the person 
restrained, but force is not required. 
(3)  Defense. A reasonable belief held by  the per- 
son imposing restraint that it is lawful is a defense. 
d. 	 Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 3 years. 
f. 	Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  , unlawfully 
(apprehend 	 1  (place 
in  arrest)  (confine 
22.  Article 98-Noncompliance  with 
procedural rules 
a. 	Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who- (c)  Article 134-drunk on station 
(d) Article 134-drunk in uniform in a public 
place 
(2) Sleeping on post. 
(a) Article 924ereliction of duty 
(b)  Article 134-loitering  or wrongfully sitting 
down on post 
(3)  Leaving post. 
(a)  Article 924ereliction of duty 
(b)  Article 86-going  from appointed place of 
duty 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1)  In time of war. Death or such other punish- 
ment as a court-martial may direct. 
(2)  While receiving special pay under 3 7 U.S.  C. J 
310. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay 
and allowances, and confinement for 10 years. 
(3)  In all other places.  Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 1 year. 
f.  Sample specifica  tion. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), on or about  (a time of war) 
(at/on  board-location),  (while receiving special 
pay under 37 U.S.C. ec. 310), being (posted) (on 
post) as a (sentinel) (lookout) at (warehouse no. 7) 
(post  no.  11)  (for  radar  observation) 
(  ) (was found (drunk) (sleeping) 
upon hidher post) (did leave hidher post before he/ 
she was regularly relieved). 
39.  Article 114-Dueling 
a.  Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who fights 
or promotes, or is concerned in or connives at fight- 
ing a duel, or who, having knowledge of a challenge 
sent or about to be sent, fails to report the fact 
promptly to the proper authority, shall be punished 
as a court-martial may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Dueling. 
(a) That the accused fought another person 
with deadly weapons; 
(b) That the combat was for private reasons; 
and 
(c)  That the combat was by prior agreement. 
(2)  Promoting a duel. 
(a) That the accused promoted a duel between 
certain persons; and 
(b)  That the accused did so in a certain man- 
ner. 
(3)  Conniving atfighting a duel. 
(a)  That certain persons intended to and were 
about to engage in a duel; 
(b) That the accused had knowledge of the 
planned duel; and 
(c)  That the accused connived at the fighting of 
the duel in a certain manner. 
(4) Failure to report a duel. 
(a)  That a challenge to fight a duel had been 
sent or was about to be sent; 
(b) That the accused had knowledge of this 
challenge; and 
(c)  That the accused failed to report this fact 
promptly to proper authority. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Duel. A duel is combat between two persons 
for private reasons fought with deadly weapons by 
prior agreement. 
(2)  Promoting a duel. Urging or taunting another 
to challenge or to accept a challenge to duel, acting 
as a second or as carrier of a challenge or accept- 
ance, or otherwise furthering or contributing to the 
fighting of a duel are examples of promoting a duel. 
(3)  Conniving atfighting a duel. Anyone who has 
knowledge that steps are being taken or have been 
taken toward arranging or fighting a duel and who 
fails to take reasonable preventive action thereby 
connives at the fighting of a duel. 
d.  Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  For all Article 114 of- 
fenses: dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay 
and allowances, and confinement for 1 year. 
f.  Sample specifications. 
(1)  Dueling. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data)  (and  ),  did,  (at/on 
board-location)  (subject-matter jurisdiction  data, 
if  required),  on  or  about 
19  ,  fight  a  duel  (with 
), using as weapons therefor (pis- 
tols) (swords) (  ). 
(2)  Promoting a duel. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , promote a 
duel  between  and by (telling said 
he/she  would be a coward if  he/she  failed to chal- 
lenge said  to a duel) (knowingly 
carrying from said  to said 
a challenge to fight a duel). 
(3) 	Conniving atfighting a duel. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), having knowledge that  and 
were about to engage in a duel, did 
(at/on board-location)  (subject-matter jurisdiction 
data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,connive at the fighting of said 
duel by (failing to take reasonable preventive action) 
(4)  Failure to report a duel. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), having knowledge that a challenge to fight a 
duel (had been  sent) (was about to be sent) by 
to  , did, (at/on 
board-location)  (subject-matter jurisdiction  data, 
if  required),  on  or  about 
19  fail to report that fact promptly 
to the proper authority. 
40.  Article 115-Malingering 
a.  Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who for the 
purpose of avoiding work, duty, or servicev- 
(1)  feigns illness, physical disablement, mental 
lapse or derangement; or 
(2)  intentionally inflicts self-injury; shall be pun- 
ished as a court-martial may direct. 
b. 	Elements. 
(1) That the accused was assigned to, or was 
aware of  prospective assignment to, or availability 
for, the performance of work, duty, or service; 
(2)  That the accused' feigned illness, physical dis- 
ablement, mental lapse or derangement, or inten- 
tionally inflicted injury upon himself or herself; and 
(3)  That the accused's purpose or intent in doing 
so was to avoid the work, duty, or service. 
[Note: If the offense was committed in time of war or 
in a hostile fire pay zone, add the following element] 
(4)  That the offense was committed (in time of 
war) (in a hostile fire pay zone). 
c. 	Explanation. 
(1)  Nature of offense. The essence of this offense 
is the design  to avoid performance of any work, 
duty, or service which may properly or normally be 
expected of one in the military service. Whether to 
avoid all duty, or only a particular job, it is the pur- 
pose to shirk which characterizes the offense. Hence, 
the nature or permanency of a self-inflicted injury is 
not material on the question of guilt, nor is the seri- 
ousness of a physical or mental disability which is a 
sham. Evidence of the extent of the self-inflicted in- 
jury or feigned disability may, however, be relevant 
as a factor indicating the presence or absence of the 
purpose. 
(2)  How injury inflicted. The injury may be in- 
flicted by nonviolent as well as by violent means and 
may be accomplished by any act or omission which 
produces, prolongs, or aggravates any sickness or 
disability. Thus, voluntary starvation which results 
in debility is a self-inflicted injury and when done for 
the purpose of avoiding work, duty, or service con- 
stitutes a violation of this article. 
d. Lesser included offenses. 
(1) Article  134-self-injury  without intent to 
avoid service 
(2)  Article 8Gattempts 
e. 	Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Feigning illness, physical  disablement, mental 
lapse, or derangement. Dishonorable discharge, for- 
feiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement 
for 1 year. 
(2)  Feigning illness, physical  disablement, mental 
lapse, or derangement in a hostilefire pay zone or in 
time of war. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all 
pay and allowances, and confinement for 3 years. 
(3) Intentional self-inflicted injury. Dishonorable 
discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 5 years. 
(4)  Intentional self-inflicted injury in a hostilefire 
pay zone or in time of war. Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 10 years. 
f. 	Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (in a hostile fire 
pay zone) (subject-matter jurisdiction  data, if re- 
quired)  (on  or  about 
19  ) (from about 
19  to about 
19  ), (a time of war) for the purpose 
of avoiding (his/her duty as officer of the day) (his/ 
her duty as aircraft mechanic) (work in the mess 
hall)  (service  as  an  enlisted  person) (  ) (feign (a headache) (a sore back) 
(illness) (mental lapse) (mental derangement) 
(  )) (intentionally injure himself/ 
herself by  ). 
41.  Article 116-Riot  or breach of peace 
a.  Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who causes 
or participates in any riot or breach of the peace 
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Riot. 
(a) That the accused was a member of an as- 
sembly of three or more persons; 
(b) That the accused and at least two other 
members of this group mutually intended to assist 
one another against anyone who might oppose them 
in doing an act for some private purpose; 
(c)  That the group or some of its members; in 
furtherance of such purpose, unlawfully committed 
a tumultuous disturbance of the peace in a violent or 
turbulent manner; and 
(d) That these acts terrorized the public in gen- 
eral in that they caused or were intended to cause 
public alarm or terror. 
(2)  Breach of the peace. 
(a) That the accused caused or participated in 
a certain act of a violent or turbulent nature; and 
(b) That the peace was thereby unlawfully dis- 
turbed. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Riot. "Riot"  is a tumultuous disturbance of 
the peace by three or more persons assembled to- 
gether in furtherance of a common purpose to exe- 
cute some enterprise of a private nature by concerted 
action against anyone who might oppose them, com- 
mitted in such a violent and turbulent manner as to 
cause or be calculated to cause public terror. The 
gravamen of the offense of riot is terrorization of the 
public. It is immaterial whether the act intended was 
lawful. Furthermore, it is not necessary that the 
common purpose be determined before the assem- 
bly. It is sufficient if the assembly begins to execute 
in a tumultuous manner a common purpose formed 
after it assembled. 
(2)  Breach of the peace. A "breach  of the peace" 
is an unlawful disturbance of the peace by an out- 
ward demonstration of a violent or turbulent nature. 
The acts or conduct contemplated by this article are 
those which disturb the public tranquility or im- 
pinge upon the peace and good order to which the 
community is entitled. Engaging in an affray and un- 
lawful discharge of firearms in a public street are ex- 
amples of conduct which may constitute a breach of 
the peace. Loud speech and unruly conduct may 
also constitute a breach of the peace by the speaker. 
A speaker may also by guilty of causing a breach of 
the peace if the speaker uses language which can rea- 
sonably be expected to produce a violent or turbu- 
lent response and a breach of the peace results. The 
fact that the words are true or used under provoca- 
tion is not a defense, nor is tumultuous conduct ex- 
cusable because incited by others. 
(3)  Community and public.  "Community"  and 
"public"  include a military organization, post, 
camp, ship, aircraft, or station. 
d. Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Riot. 
(a)  Article 116-breach  of the peace 
(b) Article 134-disorderly conduct 
(c)  Article 80-attempts 
(2)  Breach of the peace. 
(a)  Article 13Gdisorderly conduct 
(b)  Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Riot. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all 
pay and allowances, and confinement for 10 years. 
(2) Breach of  the peace.  Confinement for 6 
months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month 
for 6 months. 
f.  Sample specifications. 
(1)  Riot. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  (cause) (par- 
ticipate in) a riot by unlawfully assembling with 
(and  )  (and) 
(others to the number of about 
whose names are unknown) for the purpose of (re- 
sisting the police of  ) (assaulting 
passers-by)  (  ), and in furtherance 
of said purpose did (fight with said police) (assault 
certain  persons,  to  wit:  ) 
(  ), to the terror and disturbance of 
(2)  Breach of the peace. 
IV-59 In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,(cause) (par- 
ticipate in) a breach of the peace by (wrongfully en- 
gaging in  a  fist fight in the dayroom with 
) (using the following provoking 
language  (toward  ),  to wit: 
'6  ,"or words to that effect) (wrong- 
fully shouting and singing in a public place, to wit: 
42.  Article 117-Provoking  speeches or 
gestures 
a.  Text. 
"Any  person subject to this chapter who uses 
provoking or reproachful words or gestures towards 
any other person subject to this chapter shall be pun- 
ished as a court-martial may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused wrongfully used words or 
gestures toward a certain person; 
(2)  That the words or gestures used were provok- 
ing or reproachful; and 
(3)  That the person toward whom the words or 
gestures were used was a person subject to the code. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  In general. As used in this article, "provok- 
ing" and"reproachfu1"  describe those words or ges- 
tures which are used in the presence of the person to 
whom they are directed and which a reasonable per- 
son would expect to induce a breach of the peace 
under the circumstances. These words and gestures 
do not include reprimands, censures, reproofs and 
the like which may properly be administered in the 
interests of training, efficiency, or discipline in the 
armed forces. 
(2)  Knowledge. It is not necessary that the ac- 
cused have knowledge that the person toward whom 
the words or gestures are directed is a person subject 
to the code. 
d. Lesser included offenses. Article 80-attempts 
e. Maximum punishment. Confinement for 6 
months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month 
for 6 months. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , wrongfully 
use (provoking) (reproachful) (words, to wit; 
'6  :" or words to that effect) (and) 
(gestures, to wit:  ) towards (Ser- 
geant  ,  U.S.  Air  Force) 
43.  Article 118-Murder 
a.  Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who, with- 
out justification or excuse, unlawfully kills a human 
being, when he-" 
(1)  has a premeditated design to kill; 
(2)  intends to kill or inflict great bodily harm; 
(3)  is engaged in an act which is inherently dan- 
gerous to others and evinces a wanton disregard of 
human life; or 
(4) is engaged in the perpetration or attempted 
perpetration of burglary, sodomy, rape, robbery, or 
aggravated arson; is guilty of murder, and shall suf- 
fer such punishment as a court-martial may direct, 
except that if found guilty under clause (1) or (4), he 
shall suffer death or imprisonment for life as a court- 
martial may direct. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Premeditated murder. 
(a)  That a certain named or described person is 
dead; 
(b)  That the death resulted from the act or 
omission of the accused; 
(c)  That the killing was unlawful; and 
(d) That, at the time of the killing, the accused 
had a premeditated design to kill. 
(2)  Intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. 
(a)  That a certain named or described person is 
dead; 
(b) That the death resulted  from the act or 
omission of the accused; 
(c)  That the killing was unlawful; and 
(d) That, at the time of the killing, the accused 
had the intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm 
upon a person. 
(3) Act inherently dangerous to others. 
(a)  That a certain named or described person is 
dead; 
(b) That the death resulted from the inten- 
tional act of the accused; (c)  That this act was inherently dangerous to 
others and showed a wanton disregard for human 
life; 
(d)  That the accused knew that death or great 
bodily harm was a probable consequence of the act; 
and 
(e) That the killing was unlawful. 
(4)  During certain offenses. 
(a)  That a certain named or described person is 
dead; 
(b) That the death resulted  from the act or 
omission of the accused; 
(c)  That the killing was unlawful; and 
(d)  That, at the time of the killing, the accused 
was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpe- 
tration of burglary, sodomy, rape, robbery, or aggra- 
vated arson. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  In general. Killing a human being is unlawful 
when done without justification  or excuse. See 
R.C.M. 916. Whether an unlawful killing consti- 
tutes murder or a lesser offense depends upon the 
circumstances. The offense is committed at the place 
of the act or omission although the victim may have 
died elsewhere. Whether death occurs at the time of 
the accused's act or omission, or at some time there- 
after, it must have followed from an injury received 
by the victim which resulted from the act or omis- 
sion. 
(2)  Premeditated murder. 
(a)  Premeditation. A murder is not premedi- 
tated unless the thought of taking life was con- 
sciously conceived and the act or omission by which 
it was taken was intended. Premeditated murder is 
murder committed after the formation of a specific 
intent to kill someone and consideration of the act 
intended. It is not necessary that the intention to kill 
have been entertained for any particular or consider- 
able length of time. When a fixed purpose to kill has 
been deliberately formed, it is immaterial how soon 
afterwards it is put into execution. The existence of 
premeditation may be inferred from the circum- 
stances. 
(b)  Transferred premeditation.  When an ac- 
cused with a premeditated design attempted to un- 
lawfully kill a certain person, but, by mistake or in- 
advertence, killed another person, the accused is still 
criminally responsible for a premeditated  murder, 
because the premeditated design to kill is transferred 
from the intended victim to the actual victim. 
(c)  Intoxication. Voluntary intoxication (see 
R.C.M. 916(1)(2)) not amounting to legal insanity 
may reduce premeditated murder (Article 1  18(l))  to 
unpremeditated murder (Article 1  18(2) or (3)) but it 
does not reduce either premeditated murder or un- 
premeditated murder to manslaughter (Article 1  19) 
or any other lesser offense. 
(3)  Intent to kill or injlict great bodily harm. 
(a)  Intent. An unlawful killing without pre- 
meditation is also murder when the accused had ei- 
ther an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. It 
may be inferred that a person intends the natural 
and probable consequences of an act purposely 
done. Hence, if  a person does an intentional act 
likely to result in death or great bodily injury, it may 
be inferred that death or great bodily injury was in- 
tended. The intent need not be directed toward the 
person killed, or exist for any particular time before 
commission of the act, or have previously existed at 
all. It is sufficient that it existed at the time of the act 
or omission (except if death is inflicted in the heat of 
a sudden passion caused by adequate provoca- 
tion-see  paragraph 44). For example, a person 
committing housebreaking who strikes and kills the 
householder attempting to prevent  flight can be 
guilty of murder even if the householder was not 
seen until the moment before striking the fatal blow. 
(b)  Great bodily harm. "Great bodily harm" 
means serious injury; it does not include minor inju- 
ries such as a black eye or a bloody nose, but it does 
include fractured or dislocated bones, deep cuts, 
torn members of the body, serious damage to inter- 
nal organs, and other serious bodily injuries. It is sy- 
nonymous with the term "grievous bodily harm." 
(c)  Intoxication. Voluntary intoxication  not 
amounting to legal insanity does not reduce unpre- 
meditated murder to manslaughter (Article 119) or 
any other lesser offense. 
(4) Act inherently dangerous to others. 
(a)  Wanton disregard of human life. Intention-
ally engaging in an act inherently dangerous to 
others-although  without an intent to cause the 
death of or great bodily harm to any particular per- 
son, or even with a wish that death will  not be 
caused-may  also constitute murder if the act shows 
wanton disregard of human life. Such disregard is 
characterized by heedlessness of the probable conse- quences of the act or omission, or indifference to the 
likelihood of death or great bodily harm. Examples 
include throwing a live grenade toward others in jest 
or flying an aircraft very low over a crowd to make it 
scatter. 
(b)  Knowledge. The accused must know that 
death or great bodily harm was a probable conse- 
quence of the inherently dangerous act. Such knowl- 
edge may be proved by circumstantial evidence. 
(5) During certain offenses. 
(a)  In general. The commission or attempted 
commission of any of the offenses listed in Article 
118(4) is likely to result in homicide, and when an 
unlawful killing occurs as a consequence of the per- 
petration or attempted perpetration of one of these 
offenses, the killing is murder. Under these circum- 
stances it is not a defense that the killing was unin- 
tended or accidental. 
(b)  Separate offenses. The perpetration or at- 
tempted perpetration of the burglary, sodomy, rape, 
robbery, or aggravated arson may be charged sepa- 
rately from the homicide. 
d.  Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Premeditated murder and murder during cer- 
tain offenses. Article 1  18(2) and (3)-murder 
(2)  All murders under Article 118. 
(a)  Article 1  19-involuntary  manslaughter 
(b)  Article 128-assault;  assault consummated 
by a battery; aggravated assault 
(c)  Article 134-negligent  homicide 
(3)  Murder as defined in Article  118(1), (2), and 
(4). 
(a) Article 80-attempts 
(b) Article 1  19-voluntary  manslaughter 
(c) Article 134-assault  with intent to commit 
murder 
(d) Article 134-assault  with intent to commit 
voluntary manslaughter 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Article 1  18(1) or (4)-death.  Mandatory min- 
imum-imprisonment  for life. 
(2)  Article 1  18(2) or (3)-such  punishment other 
than death as a court-martial may direct. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required),  on or about 
19  , (with pre- 
meditation) (while (perpetrating) (attempting to 
perpetrate)  )  murder 
by  means of (shooting him/her 
with a rifle) (  ). 
44.  Article 119-Manslaughter 
a. Text. 
"(a)  Any person subject to this chapter who, 
with an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, un- 
lawfully kills a human being in the heat of sudden 
passion caused by adequate provocation is guilty of 
voluntary manslaughter and shall be punished as a 
court-martial may direct." 
(b) Any person subject to this chapter who, 
without an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, 
unlawfully kills a human being- 
(1) by culpable negligence; or 
(2) while perpetrating or attempting to per- 
petrate an offense, other than those named in clause 
(4) of section 9 18 of this title (article 1  18), directly 
affecting the person; is guilty of involuntary man- 
slaughter and shall be punished as a court-martial 
may direct. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Voluntary manslaughter. 
(a)  That a certain named or described person is 
dead; 
(b) That the death resulted  from the act or 
omission of the accused; 
(c)  That the killing was unlawful; and 
(d) That, at the time of the killing, the accused 
had the intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm 
upon the person killed. 
(2)  Involuntary manslaughter. 
(a)  That a certain named or described person is 
dead; 
(b)  That the death resulted from the act or 
omission of the accused; 
(c)  That the killing was unlawful; and 
(d)  That this act or omission of the accused 
constituted culpable negligence, or occurred while 
the accused was perpetrating or  attempting to perpe- 
trate an offense directly affecting the person other 
than burglary, sodomy, rape, robbery, or aggravated 
arson. 
c. Explanation. 
(1)  Voluntary manslaughter. 
(a)  Nature of offense. An unlawful killing, al- 
though done with an intent to kill or inflict great 
bodily  harm, is not murder but voluntary man- slaughter if committed in the heat of sudden passion 
caused by adequate provocation. Heat of passion 
may result from fear or rage. A person may be  pro- 
voked to such an extent that in the heat of sudden 
passion caused by the provocation, although not in 
necessary defense of life or to prevent bodily harm, a 
fatal blow may be struck before self-control has re- 
turned. Although adequate provocation does not ex- 
cuse the homicide, it does preclude conviction of 
murder. 
(b) Nature of provocation.  The provocation 
must be adequate to excite uncontrollable passion in 
a reasonable person, and the act of killing must be 
committed under and because of the passion. How- 
ever, the provocation must not be sought or induced 
as an excuse for killing or doing harm. If, judged by 
the standard of a reasonable person, sufficient cool- 
ing time elapses between the provocation and the 
killing, the offense is murder, even if the accused's 
passion persists. Examples of acts which may, de- 
pending on the circumstances, constitute adequate 
provocation are the unlawful infliction of great bod- 
ily harm, unlawful imprisonment, and the sight by 
one spouse of an act of adultery committed by  the 
other spouse. Insulting or abusive words or gestures, 
a slight blow with the hand or fist, and trespass or 
other injury to property are not, standing alone, ade- 
quate provocation. 
(2)  Involuntary manslaughter. 
(a) Culpable negligence. 
(i)  Nature of culpable negligence. Culpable 
negligence is a degree of carelessness greater than 
simple negligence. It is a negligent act or omission 
accompanied by a culpable disregard for the foresee- 
able consequences to others of that act or omission. 
Thus, the basis of  a charge of involuntary man- 
slaughter may be a negligent act or omission which, 
when  viewed  in the light of human experience, 
might foreseeably result in the death of another, 
even though death would not necessarily be a natu- 
ral and probable consequence of the act or omission. 
Acts which may amount to culpable negligence in- 
clude negligently conducting target practice so that 
the bullets go in the direction of an inhabited house 
within range; pointing a pistol in jest at another and 
pulling the trigger, believing, but without taking rea- 
sonable precautions to ascertain, that it would not be 
dangerous; and carelessly leaving poisons or danger- 
ous drugs where they may endanger life. 
(ii)  Legal duty required. When there is no le- 
gal duty to act there can be no neglect. Thus, when a 
stranger makes no effort to save a drowning person, 
or a person allows a beggar to freeze or starve to 
death, no crime is committed. 
(b)  Offense directly affecting the person. An 
"offense directly affecting the person" means one af- 
fecting some particular person as distinguished from 
an offense affecting society in general. Among of- 
fenses directly affecting the person are the various 
types of assault, battery, false imprisonment, volun- 
tary engagement in an affray, and maiming. 
d. Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Voluntary manslaughter. 
(a)  Article 119-involuntary  manslaughter 
(b)  Article 128-assault;  assault consummated 
by a battery; aggravated assault 
(c)  Article 134-assault  with intent to commit 
voluntary manslaughter 
(d)  Article 134-negligent  homicide 
(e)  Article 80-attempts 
(2)  Involuntary manslaughter. 
(a)  Article 128-assault;  assault consummated 
by a battery 
(b)  Article 134-negligent  homicide 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Voluntary manslaughter. Dishonorable dis- 
charge, forfeiture of  all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 10 years. 
(2)  Involuntary manslaughter. Dishonorable dis- 
charge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 3 years. 
f.  Sample specifications. 
(1)  Voluntary manslaughter. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,willfully and 
unlawfully  kill  b Y 
him/her  (in)  (on)  the 
with a 
(2)  Involuntary manslaughter. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , (by culpable 
negligence) (while (perpetrating) (attempting to per- 
petrate) an offense directly affecting the person of 
, to wit: (maiming) (a battery) (  >>  unlawfully  kill 
by  him/her  (in) 
(on) the  with a 
45.  Article 120-Rape  and carnal knowledge 
a.  Text. 
"(a)  Any person subject to this chapter who 
commits an act of sexual intercourse with a female 
not his wife, by force and without her consent, is 
guilty of rape and shall be punished by death or such 
other punishment as a court-martial may direct." 
(b) "Any  person subject to this chapter who, 
under circumstances not amounting to rape, com- 
mits an act of sexual intercourse with a female not 
his wife who has not attained the age of sixteen 
years, is guilty of carnal knowledge and shall be pun- 
ished as a court-martial may direct." 
(c) "Penetration,  however slight, is sufficient to 
complete either of these offenses." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Rape. 
(a) That the accused committed an act of sex- 
ual intercourse with a certain female; 
(b) That the female was not the accused's wife; 
and 
(c) That the act of sexual intercourse was done 
by force and without her consent. 
(2)  Carnal knowledge. 
(a) That the accused committed an act of sex- 
ual intercourse with a certain female; 
(b)  That the female was not the accused's wife; 
and 
(c)  That at the time of the sexual intercourse 
the female was under 16 years of age. 
c. Explanation. 
(1)  Rape. 
(a) Nature of offense. Rape is sexual inter- 
course by  a person with a female not his wife, by 
force and without her consent. It may be committed 
on a female of any age. Any penetration, however 
slight, is sufficient to complete the offense. 
(b)  Force and lack of consent. Force and lack of 
consent are necessary to the offense. Thus, if the fe- 
male consents to the act, it is not rape. The lack of 
consent required, however, is more than mere lack 
of acquiescence. If a woman in possession  of her 
mental and physical faculties fails to make her lack 
of consent reasonably manifest by taking such mea- 
sures of resistance as are called for by  the circum- 
stances, the inference may be drawn that she did 
consent. Consent, however, may not be inferred if 
resistance would have been futile, where resistance is 
overcome by threats of death or great bodily harm, 
or where the female is unable to resist because of the 
lack of mental or physical faculties. In such a case 
there is no consent and the force involved in penetra- 
tion will suffice. All the surrounding circumstances 
are to be considered in determining whether a wo- 
man gave her consent, or whether she failed or 
ceased to resist only because of a reasonable fear of 
death or grievous bodily harm. If there is actual con- 
sent, although obtained by fraud, the act is not rape, 
but if to the accused's  knowledge the woman is of 
unsound mind or unconscious to an extent rendering 
her incapable of giving consent, the act is rape. Like- 
wise, the acquiescence of a child of such tender years 
that she is incapable of understanding the nature of 
the act is not consent. 
(c)  Character of victim. See Mil.R.Evid. 412 
concerning rules of evidence relating to an alleged 
rape victim's character. 
(2)  Carnal knowledge. "Carnal  knowledge"  is 
sexual intercourse under circumstances not amount- 
ing to rape, with a female who is not the accused's 
wife and who has not attained the age of  16 years. 
Any penetration, however  slight, is sufficient to 
complete the offense. It is no defense that the ac- 
cused is ignorant or misinformed as to the true age 
of the female, or that she was of prior unchaste char- 
acter; it is the fact of the girl's age and not his knowl- 
edge or belief which fixes his criminal responsibility. 
Evidence of these matters should, however, be con- 
sidered in determining an appropriate sentence. 
d. Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Rape. 
(a)  Article 128-assault;  assault consummated 
by a battery 
(b)  Article 134-assault  with intent to commit 
rape 
(c)  Article 134-indecent  assault 
(d) Article 8kattempts 
(e)  Article 120(6)-carnal  knowledge 
(2)  Carnal knowledge. 
(a)  Article 134-indecent  acts or liberties with 
a person under 16 
(b)  Article 8kattempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. (1) Rape. Death or such other punishment as a 
court-martial may direct. 
(2)  Carnal knowledge. Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 15 years. 
f.  Sample specijcations. 
(1)  Rape. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  rape 
,(a person who had not attained 
the age of  16 years). 
(2)  Carnal knowledge. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , commit the 
offense of carnal knowledge with 
46.  Article 121-Larceny  and wrongful 
appropriation 
a.  Text. 
"(a)  Any person subject to this chapter who 
wrongfully takes, obtains, or withholds, by  any 
means, from the possession of the owner or of any 
other person any money, personal property, or arti- 
cle of value of any kind-" 
(1) with intent permanently to deprive or de- 
fraud another person of the use and benefit of prop- 
erty or to appropriate it to his own use or the use of 
any person other than the owner, steals that prop- 
erty and is guilty of larceny; or 
(2) with intent temporarily to deprive or de- 
fraud another person of the use and benefit of prop- 
erty or to appropriate it to his own use or the use of 
any person other than the owner, is guilty or wrong- 
ful appropriation. 
(b) Any person found guilty of larceny or 
wrongful appropriation shall be punished as a court- 
martial may direct. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Larceny. 
(a)  That the accused wrongfully  took, ob- 
tained, or withheld certain property from the posses- 
sion of the owner or of any other person; 
(b)  That the property belonged to a certain 
person; 
(c)  That the property was of a certain value, or 
of some value; and 
(d) That the taking, obtaining, or withholding 
by the accused was with the intent permanently to 
deprive or defraud another person of the use and 
benefit of the property or permanently to appropri- 
ate the property for the use of the accused or for any 
person other than the owner. 
[Note: If the property is alleged to be military prop- 
erty, as defined in paragraph 32c(l), add the follow- 
ing element] 
(e)  That the property was military property. 
(2)  Wrongful appropriation. 
(a) That the accused wrongfully took, ob- 
tained, or withheld certain property from the posses- 
sion of the owner or of any other person; 
(b)  That the property belonged to a certain 
person; 
(c)  That the property was of a certain value, or 
of some value; and 
(d) That the taking, obtaining, or withholding 
by the accused was with the intent temporarily to 
deprive or defraud another person of the use and 
benefit of the property or temporarily to appropriate 
the property for the use of the accused or for any 
person other than the owner. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Larceny. 
(a)  In general. A wrongful taking with intent 
permanently to  deprive includes the common law of- 
fense of larceny; a wrongful obtaining with intent 
permanently to defraud includes the offense for- 
merly known as obtaining by false pretense; and a 
wrongful withholding with intent permanently to 
appropriate includes the offense formerly known as 
embezzlement. Any of the various types of larceny 
under Article 121 may be charged and proved under 
a specification alleging that the accused "did  steal" 
the property in question. 
(b)  Taking, obtaining, or withholding. There 
must be a taking, obtaining, or withholding of the 
property by the thief. For instance, there is no taking 
if the property is connected to a building by a chain 
and the property has not been disconnected from the 
building; property is not"obtained"  by  merely ac- 
quiring title thereto without exercising some posses- 
sory control over it. As a general rule, however, any 
movement of the property or any exercise of domin- 
ion over it is sufficient if accompanied by the requi- site intent. Thus, if an accused enticed another's 
horse into the accused's stable without touching the 
animal, or procured a railroad company to deliver 
another's trunk by changing the check on it, or ob- 
tained the delivery of another's goods to a person or 
place designated by the accused, or had the funds of 
another transferred to the accused's bank account, 
the accused is guilty of larceny if the other elements 
of the offense have been proved. A person may "ob- 
tain"  the property of another by acquiring posses- 
sion without title, and one who already has posses- 
sion of the property of another may "obtain"  it by 
later acquiring title to it. A "withholding" may arise 
as a result of a failure to return, account for, or de- 
liver property to its owner when a return, account- 
ing, or delivery is due, even if the owner has made no 
demand for the property, or it may arise as a result 
of devoting property to a use not authorized by its 
owner. Generally, this is so whether the person with- 
holding the property acquired it lawfully or unlaw- 
fully. See subparagraph c(l)(f)  below. However, acts 
which constitute the offense of unlawfully receiving, 
buying, or concealing stolen property or of being an 
accessory after the fact are not included within the 
meaning of "withholds."  Therefore, neither a re- 
ceiver of stolen property nor an accessory after the 
fact can be convicted of larceny on that basis alone. 
The taking, obtaining, or withholding must be of 
specific property. A debtor does not withhold spe- 
cific property from the possession of a creditor by 
failing or refusing to pay a debt, for the relationship 
of debtor and creditor does not give the creditor a 
possessory right in any specific money or other prop- 
erty of the debtor. 
(c)  Ownership of the property. 
(i)  In general. Article 121 requires that the 
taking, obtaining, or withholding be from the pos- 
session of  the owner or of any other person. Care, 
custody, management, and control are among the 
definitions of possession. 
(ii)  Owner. "Owner"  refers to the person 
who, at the time of the taking, obtaining, or with- 
holding, had the superior right to possession of the 
property in the light of  all conflicting interests 
therein which may be involved in the particular case. 
For instance, an organization is the true owner of its 
funds as against the custodian of the funds charged 
with the larceny thereof. 
(iii)  Any ~ther  person.  "Any  other person" 
means any person-even  a person who has stolen 
the property-who  has possession or a greater right 
to possession than the accused. In pleading a viola- 
tion of this article, the ownership of the property 
may be alleged to have been in any person, other 
than the accused, who at the time of the theft was a 
general owner or a special owner thereof. A general 
owner of property is a person who has title to it, 
whether or not that person has possession of it; a 
special owner, such as a borrower or hirer, is one 
who does not have title but who does have posses- 
sion, or the right of possession, of the property. 
(iv)  Person. "Person,"  as used in referring to 
one from whose possession property has been taken, 
obtained, or withheld, and to any owner of property, 
includes (in addition to a natural person) a govern- 
ment, a corporation, an association, an organization, 
and an estate. Such a person need not be a legal en- 
tity. 
(d)  Wrongfulness of the taking, obtaining, or 
withholding. The taking, obtaining, or withholding 
of the property must be wrongful. As a general rule, 
a taking or withholding of property from the posses- 
sion of another is wrongful if done without the con- 
sent of the other, and an obtaining of property from 
the possession of another is wrongful if the obtaining 
is by false pretense. However, such an act is not 
wrongful if it is authorized by law or apparently law- 
ful superior orders, or, generally, if done by a person 
who has a right to the possession of the property ei- 
ther equal to or greater than the right of one from 
whose possession the property is taken, obtained, or 
withheld. An owner of property who takes or with- 
holds it from the possession of another, without the 
consent of the other, or who obtains it therefrom by 
false pretense, does so wrongfully if the other has a 
superior right-such  as a lien-to  possession of the 
property. A person who takes, obtains, or withholds 
property as the agent of another has the same rights 
and liabilities as does the principal, but may not be 
charged with a guilty knowledge or intent of the 
principal which that person does not share. 
(e)  False pretense. With respect to obtaining 
property by false pretense, the false pretense may be 
made by means of any act, word, symbol, or token. 
The pretense must be in fact false when made and 
when the property is obtained, and it must be know- 
ingly false in the sense that it is made without a belief in its truth. A false pretense is a false representation 
of past or existing fact. In addition to other kinds of 
facts, the fact falsely represented by a person may be 
that person's or another's power, authority, or inten- 
tion. Thus, a false representation by a person that 
that person presently intends to perform a certain 
act in the future is a false representation of an ex- 
isting fact-the  intention-and  thus a false pretense. 
Although the pretense need not be the sole cause in- 
ducing the owner to part with the property, it must 
be an effective and intentional cause of the obtaining. 
A false representation made after the property was 
obtained will not result in a violation of Article 121. 
A larceny is committed when a person obtains the 
property of another by false pretense and with intent 
to steal, even though the owner neither intended nor 
was requested to part with title to the property. 
Thus, a person who gets another's watch by pretend- 
ing that it will be borrowed briefly  and then re- 
turned, but who really intends to sell it, is guilty of 
larceny. 
(f) Intent. 
(i)  In general. The offense of larceny requires 
that the taking, obtaining, or withholding by the 
thief be accompanied by an intent permanently to 
deprive or defraud another of the use and benefit of 
property or permanently to appropriate the property 
to the thief s own use or the use of any person other 
than the owner. These intents are collectively called 
an intent to steal. Although a person gets property 
by a taking or obtaining which was not wrongful or 
which was without a concurrent intent to steal, a lar- 
ceny is nevertheless committed if an intent to steal is 
formed after the taking or obtaining and the prop- 
erty is wrongfully withheld with that intent. For ex- 
ample, if  a person rents another's  vehicle, later de- 
cides to keep it permanently, and then either fails to 
return it at the appointed time or uses it for a pur- 
pose not authorized by the terms of the rental, lar- 
ceny has been committed, even though at the time 
the vehicle was rented, the person intended to return 
it after using it according to the agreement. 
(ii)  Inference of intent. An intent to steal 
may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Thus, if a 
person secretly takes property, hides it, and denies 
knowing anything about it, an intent to steal may be 
inferred; if the property was taken openly and re- 
turned, this would tend to negate such an intent. 
Proof of  sale of the property may show an intent to 
steal, and therefore, evidence of such a sale may be 
introduced to support a charge of larceny. An intent 
to steal may be inferred from a wrongful and inten- 
tional dealing with the property of another in a man- 
ner likely to cause that person to suffer a permanent 
loss thereof. 
(iii)  Special situations. 
(A)  Motive does not negate intent. The ac- 
cused's purpose in taking an item ordinarily is irrele- 
vant to the accused's guilt as long as the accused had 
the intent required under subparagraph c(l)(f)(i) 
above. For example, if the accused wrongfully took 
property as a "joke" or "to teach the owner a lesson" 
this would not be a defense, although if the accused 
intended to return the property, the accused would 
be guilty of wrongful appropriation, not larceny. 
When a person takes property intending only to re- 
turn it to its lawful owner, as when stolen property is 
taken from a thief in order to return it to its owner, 
larceny or wrongful appropriation is not committed. 
(B)  Intent topay  for or replaceproperty not 
a defense. An intent to pay for or replace the stolen 
property is not a defense, even if  that intent existed 
at the time of the theft. If, however, the accused 
takes money or a negotiable instrument having no 
special value above its face value, with the intent to 
return an equivalent amount of money, the offense of 
larceny is not committed although wrongful appro- 
priation may be. 
(C) Return of property not a defense. Once 
a larceny is committed, a return of the property or 
payment for it is no defense. See subparagraph c(2) 
below when the taking, obtaining, or withholding is 
with the intent to return. 
(g)  Value. 
(i)  In general. Value is a question of fact to 
be determined on the basis of all of the evidence ad- 
mitted. 
(ii)  Government property. When the stolen 
property is an item issued or procured from Govern- 
ment sources, the price listed in an official publica- 
tion for that property at the time of the theft is ad- 
missible as evidence of its value. See Mil.R.Evid. 
803(17). However, the stolen item must be shown to 
have been, at the time of the theft, in the condition 
upon which the value indicated in the official price 
list is based. The price listed in the official publica- 
tion is not conclusive as to the value of the item, and other evidence may be admitted on the question of 
its condition and value. 
(iii)  Other property. As a general rule, the 
value of other stolen property is its legitimate mar- 
ket value at the time and place of the theft. If this 
property, because of its character or the place where 
it was stolen, had no legitimate market value at the 
time and place of the theft or if  that value cannot 
readily be ascertained, its value may be determined 
by its legitimate market value in the United States at 
the time of the theft, or by its replacement cost at 
that time, whichever is less. Market value may be es- 
tablished by proof of the recent purchase price paid 
for the article in the legitimate market involved or 
by testimony or other admissible evidence from any 
person who is familiar through training or experi- 
ence with the market value in question. The owner 
of the property may testify as to its market value if 
familiar with its quality and condition. The fact that 
the owner is not an expert of the market value of the 
property goes only to the weight to be given that tes- 
timony, and not to its admissibility. See Mil.R.Evid. 
701. When the character of the property clearly ap- 
pears in evidence-for  instance, when it is exhibited 
to the court-martial-the  court-martial, from its 
own experience, may infer that it has some value. If 
as a matter of common knowledge the property is 
obviously of a value substantially in excess of 
$100.00, the court-martial may find a value of more 
than $100.00. Writings representing value may be 
considered to have the value-even  though contin- 
gent-which  they represented  at the time of the 
theft. 
(iv)  Limited interest in property.  If an owner 
of property or someone acting in the owner's behalf 
steals it from a person who has a superior, but lim- 
ited, interest in the property, such as a lien, the value 
for punishment purposes shall be that of the limited 
interest. 
(h) Miscellaneous considerations. 
(i)  Lost property.  A taking or withholding of 
lost property by the finder is larceny if accompanied 
by an intent to steal and if a clue to the identity of the 
general or special owner, or through which such 
identity may be traced, is furnished by the character, 
location, or marketing of the property, or by other 
circumstances. 
(ii)  Multiple article larceny. When a larceny 
of several articles is committed at substantially the 
same time and place, it is a single larceny even 
though the articles belong to different persons. Thus, 
if a thief steals a suitcase containing the property of 
several persons or goes into a room and takes prop- 
erty belonging to various persons, there is but one 
larceny, which should be alleged in but one specifi- 
cation. 
(iii)  Special kinds of property  which may also 
be the subject of larceny. Included in property which 
may be the subject of larceny is property which is 
taken, obtained, or withheld by severing it from real 
estate and writings which represent value such as 
commercial paper. 
(iv)  Services. Theft of services may not be 
charged under this paragraph, but see paragraph 78. 
(v)  Mail. As to larceny of mail, see also para-
graph 93. 
(2)  Wrongful appropriation. 
(a) In general. Wrongful appropriation re- 
quires an intent to temporarily-as  opposed to per- 
manently4eprive the owner of the use and benefit 
of, or appropriate to the use of another, the property 
wrongfully taken, withheld, or obtained. In all other 
respects wrongful appropriation and larceny are 
identical. 
(b)  Examples. Wrongful appropriation in- 
cludes: taking another's automobile without permis- 
sion or lawful authority with intent to drive it a short 
distance and then return it or cause it to be returned 
to the owner; obtaining a service weapon by falsely 
pretending to be about to go on guard duty with in- 
tent to use it on a hunting trip and later return it; and 
while driving a government vehicle on a mission to 
deliver supplies, withholding the vehicle from gov- 
ernment service by deviating from the assigned route 
without authority, to visit a friend in a nearby town 
and later restore the vehicle to its lawful use. An in- 
advertent exercise of control over the property of an- 
other will not result in wrongful appropriation. For 
example, a person who fails to return a borrowed 
boat at the time agreed upon because the boat inad- 
vertently went aground is not guilty of this offense. 
d.  Lesser included ofenses. 
(1)  Larceny. 
(a)  Article 12  1-wrongful  appropriation 
(b)  Article 80-attempts 
(2)  Larceny of military property. 
(a)  Article 12 1-wrongful  appropriation (b) Article 121-larceny  of property other 
than military property 
(c)  Article 8kattempts 
(3) Wrongful appropriation. Article 8kattempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Larceny. 
(a) Military property of a value of $100 or less. 
Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and al- 
lowances, and confinement for l year. 
(b) Property other than military property of a 
value of $100 or less. Bad-conduct discharge, forfei- 
ture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 6 
months. 
(c)  Military property of a value of more than 
$100 or of any military motor vehicle, aircraft, ves- 
sel, firearm, or explosive. Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 10 years. 
(d) Property other than military property of a 
value of more than $100 or any motor vehicle, air- 
craft, vessel, firearm, or explosive not included in 
subparagraph e(l)(c). Dishonorable discharge, for- 
feiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement 
for five years. 
(2)  Wrongful appropriation. 
(a) Of a value of $100.00 or less. Confinement 
for 3 months, and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per 
month for 3 months. 
(b) Of a value of more than $100.00. Bad-con- 
duct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 
and confinement for 6 months. 
(c) Of any motor vehicle, aircraft, vessel, fire- 
arm, or explosive. Dishonorable discharge, forfei- 
ture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 2 
years. 
f.  Sample specifications. 
(1)  Larceny. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  steal 
,(military property), of a value of 
(about) $  , the property  of 
(2)  Wrongful appropriation. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , wrongfully 
appropriate  ,of a value of (about) $ 
,the property of 
47.  Article 122-Robbery 
a.  Text. 
"Any  person subject to this chapter who with 
intent to steal takes anything of value from the per- 
son or in the presence of another, against his will, by 
means of force or violence or fear of immediate or 
future injury to his person or property or to the per- 
son or property of a relative or member of his family 
or of anyone in his company at the time of the rob- 
bery, is guilty of robbery and shall be punished as a 
court-martial may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused wrongfully  took certain 
property from the person or from the possession and 
in the presence of a person named or described; 
(2)  That the taking was against the will of that 
person; 
(3)  That the taking was by means of force, vio- 
lence, or force and violence, or putting the person in 
fear of immediate or future injury to that person, a 
relative, a member of the person's family, anyone ac- 
companying the person at the time of the robbery, 
the person's  property, or the property of a relative, 
family member, or anyone accompanying the person 
at the time of the robbery; 
(4) That the property belonged to a person 
named or described; 
(5)  That the property was of a certain or of some 
value; and 
(6)  That the taking of the property by the accused 
was with the intent permanently to deprive the per- 
son robbed of the use and benefit of the property. 
[Note: If the robbery was committed with a firearm, 
add the following element)] 
(7)  That the means of force or violence or of put- 
ting the person in fear was a firearm. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Taking in the presence  of the victim. It is not 
necessary that the property taken be located within 
any certain distance of the victim. If persons enter a 
house and force the owner by  threats to disclose the 
hiding place of valuables in an adjoining room, and, 
leaving the owner tied, go into that room and steal 
the valuables, they have committed robbery. 
(2)  Force or violence. For a robbery to be commit- 
ted by force or violence, there must be actual force or violence to the person, preceding or accompany- 
ing the taking against the person's will, and it is im- 
material that there is no fear engendered in the vic- 
tim. Any amount of force is enough to constitute 
robbery if the force overcomes the actual resistance 
of the person robbed, puts the person in such a posi- 
tion that no resistance is made, or suffices to over- 
come the resistance offered by a chain or other fast- 
ening by which the article is attached to the person. 
The offense is not robbery if an article is merely 
snatched from the hand of another or a pocket is 
picked by stealth, no other force is used, and the 
owner is not put in fear. But if resistance is overcome 
in snatching the article, there is sufficient violence, 
as when an earring is torn from a person's ear. There 
is sufficient violence when a person's attention is di- 
verted by being jostled by a confederate of a pick- 
pocket, who is thus enabled to steal the person's 
watch, even though the person had no knowledge of 
the act; or when a person is knocked insensible and 
that person's pockets rifled; or when a guard steals 
property from the person of a prisoner in the guard's 
charge after handcuffing the prisoner on the pretext 
of preventing escape. 
(3)  Fear. For a robbery to be committed by put- 
ting the victim in fear, there need be no actual force 
or violence, but there must be a demonstration of 
force or menace by which the victim is placed in 
such fear that the victim is warranted in making no 
resistance. The fear must be a reasonable apprehen- 
sion of present or future injury, and the taking must 
occur while the apprehension exists. The injury ap- 
prehended may be death or bodily injury to the per- 
son or to a relative or family member, or to anyone 
in the person's company at the time, or it may be the 
destruction of the person's habitation or other prop- 
erty or that of a relative or family member or anyone 
in the person's  company at the time of sufficient 
gravity to warrant giving up the property demanded 
by the assailant. 
(4)  Larceny by taking. Robbery includes "taking 
with intent to steal"; hence, a larceny by taking is an 
integral part of a charge of robbery and must be 
proved at the trial. See paragraph 46c(l). 
(5)  Multiple-victim robberies. Robberies of differ- 
ent persons at the same time and place are separate 
offenses and each such robbery should be alleged in a 
separate specification. 
d. 	 Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Article 121-larceny 
(2)  Article 12  1-wrongful  appropriation 
(3)  Article 128-assault;  assault consummated 
by a battery 
(4) Article  128-assault  with  a  dangerous 
weapon 
(5)  Article 128-assault  intentionally inflicting 
grievous bodily harm 
(6)  Article 134-assault  with intent to rob 
(7)  Article 8Gattempts 
[Note: More than one lesser included offense may be 
found in an appropriate case because robbery is a 
compound offense. For example, a person may be 
found not guilty of robbery but guilty of wrongful 
appropriation and assault.] 
e. 	Maximum  punishment. 
(1)  When committed with a firearm.  Dishonora-
ble discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 
and confinement for 15 years. 
(2)  Other cases. Dishonorable discharge, forfei- 
ture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 
10 years. 
f. 	Sample specifications. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  by means of 
(force) (violence) (force and violence) (and) (putting 
him/her in fear) (with a firearm) steal from the (per- 
son) (presence) of  ,against hidher 
will,  (a watch) (  ) of value of 
(about)  $  , the property  of 
48.  Article 123-Forgery 
a. 	Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who, with in- 
tent to defraud-" 
"(1) falsely makes or alters any signature to, or 
any part of, any writing which would, if genuine, ap- 
parently impose a legal liability on another or 
change his legal right or liability to his prejudice; or" 
"(2)  utters, offers, issues, or transfers such a 
writing, known by  him to be so made or altered; is 
guilty of forgery and shall be punished as a court- 
martial may direct." 
b. 	Elements. 
(1)  Forgery-making  or altering. (a)  That the accused falsely made or altered a 
certain signature or writing; 
(b)  That the signature or writing was of a na- 
ture which would, if genuine, apparently impose a 
legal liability on another or change another's legal 
rights or liabilities to that person's prejudice; and 
(c)  That the false making or altering was with 
the intent to defraud. 
(2)  Forgevuttering. 
(a)  That a certain signature or writing was 
falsely made or altered; 
(b)  That the signature or writing was of a na- 
ture which would, if genuine, apparently impose a 
legal liability on another or change another's  legal 
rights or liabilities to that person's prejudice; 
(c)  That the accused uttered, offered, issued, or 
transferred the signature or writing; 
(d)  That at such time the accused knew that 
the signature or writing had been falsely made or al- 
tered; and 
(e)  That the uttering, offering, issuing or trans- 
ferring was with the intent to defraud. 
c. 	Explanation. 
(1)  In general. Forgery may be committed either 
by falsely making a writing or by knowingly uttering 
a falsely made writing. There are three elements 
common to both aspects of forgery: a writing falsely 
made or altered; and apparent capability of the writ- 
ing as falsely made or altered to impose a legal liabil- 
ity on another or to change another's legal rights or 
liabilities to that person's prejudice; and an intent to 
defraud. 
(2)  False. "False"  refers not to the contents of the 
writing or to the facts stated therein but to the mak- 
. 	ing or altering of it. Hence, forgery is not committed 
by  the genuine making of a false instrument even 
when made with intent to defraud. A person who, 
with intent to defraud, signs that person's  own sig- 
nature as the maker of a check drawn on a bank in 
which that person does not have money or credit 
does not commit forgery. Although the check falsely 
represents the existence of the account, it is what it 
purports to be, a check drawn by the actual maker, 
and therefore it is not falsely made. See, however, 
paragraph 49. Likewise, if a person makes a false sig- 
nature of  another to an instrument, but adds the 
word "by"  with that person's own signature thus in- 
dicating authority to sign, the offense is not forgery 
even if no such authority exists. False recitals of fact 
in a genuine document, as an aircraft flight report 
which is "padded"  by the one preparing it, do not 
make the writing a forgery. But see paragraph 31 
concerning false official statements. 
(3)  Signatures. Signing the name of another to an 
instrument having apparent legal efficacy without 
authority and with intent to defraud is forgery as the 
signature is falsely made. The distinction is that in 
this case the falsely made signature purports to be 
the act of one other than the actual signer. Likewise, 
a forgery may be committed by a person signing that 
person's own name to an instrument. For example, 
when a check payable to the order of a certain per- 
son comes into the hands of another of the same 
name, forgery is committed if, knowing the check to 
be another's, that person indorses it with that per- 
son's own name intending to defraud. Forgery may 
also be committed by signing a fictitious name, as 
when Roe makes a check payable to Roe and signs it 
with a fictitious name-Doe-as  drawer. 
(4)  Nature of writing. The writing must be one 
which would, if genuine, apparently impose a legal 
liability on another, as a check or promissory note, 
or change that person's  legal rights or liabilities to 
that person's prejudice, as a receipt. Some other in- 
struments which may be the subject of forgery are 
orders for the delivery of money or goods, railroad 
tickets, and military orders directing travel. A writ- 
ing falsely "made"includes  an instrument that may 
be partially or entirely printed, engraved, written 
with a pencil, or made by photography or other de- 
vice. A writing may be falsely "made"  by materially 
altering an existing writing, by  filling in a paper 
signed in blank, or by signing an instrument already 
written. With respect to the apparent legal efficacy 
of the writing falsely made or altered, the writing 
must appear either on its face or from extrinsic facts 
to impose a legal liability on another, or to change a 
legal right or liability the prGudice of another. If 
under all the circumstances the instrument has 
neither real nor apparent legal efficacy, there is no 
forgery. Thus, the false making with intent to de- 
fraud of an instrument affirmatively invalid on its 
face is not forgery nor is the false making or altering, 
with intent to defraud, of a writing which could not 
impose a legal liability, as a mere letter of introduc- 
tion. However, the false making of another's signa- 
ture on an instrument with intent to defraud is for- gery, even if there is no resemblance to the genuine 
signature and the name is misspelled. 
(5)  Intent to defraud.  See paragraph 49c(14). The 
intent to defraud need not be directed toward any- 
one in particular nor be for the advantage of the of- 
fender. If is immaterial that nobody was actually de- 
frauded, or that no further step was made toward 
carrying out the intent to defraud other than the 
false making or altering of a writing. 
(6) Alteration. The alteration must effect a mate- 
rial change in the legal tenor of the writing. Thus, an 
alteration which apparently increases, diminishes, 
or discharges any obligation is material. Examples of 
material alterations in the case of a promissory note 
are changing the date, amount, or place of payment. 
If a genuine writing has been delivered to the ac- 
cused and while in the accused's possession is later 
found to be altered, it may be inferred that the writ- 
ing was altered by the accused. 
(7)  Uttering. See paragraph 49c(4). 
d.  Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 5 years. 
f.  Sample specifications. 
(1)  Forgery-making  or altering. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , with intent 
to defraud, falsely (make (in its entirety) (the signa- 
ture of  as an indorsement to) (the 
signature of  to) 
(  ) a  certain (check) (writing) 
(  ) in the following words and 
figures, to wit:  (alter a certain 
(check) (writing) (  ) in the follow- 
ing words and figures, to wit:  by 
(adding  thereto  ) 
(  ) in  the following words and 
figures, to wit:  ,would, if genuine, 
apparently operate to the legal harm of another 
(*and which  (could be) (was) used 
to the legal harm of  , in that 
1. 
[Note: This allegation should be used when the doc- 
ument specified is not one which by its nature would 
clearly operate to the legal prejudice of another-for 
example, an insurance application. The manner in 
which the document could be or was used  to 
prejudice the legal rights of another should be al- 
leged in the last blank.] 
(2) Forgery-uttering. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,with intent 
to defraud, (utter) (offer) (issue) (transfer) a certain 
(check) (writing) ( 	 ) in the follow- 
ing words and figures, to wit: 	 ,a 
writing which would, if genuine, apparently operate 
to the legal harm of  another, (which said 
(check)(writing) ( 	 )) (the signature 
to which said (check) (writing)(  )) 
( 	 )  was,  as he/she,  the said 
, then well knew, falsely (made) 
(altered) (*and which  (could be) 
(was) used to the legal harm of  ,in 
that  1. 
[Note: See the note following (I), above] 
49.  Article 123a-Making,  drawing, or 
uttering check, draft, or order without 
sufficient funds 
a.  Text. 

"Any person subject to this chapter who-" 

(1)  "for the procurement of any article or thing of 
value, with intent to defraud; or" 
(2)  "for the payment of any past due obligation, 
or for any other purpose, with intent to deceive; 
makes, draws, utters, or delivers any check, draft, or 
order for the payment of money upon any bank or 
other depository, knowing at the time that the 
maker or drawer has not or will not have sufficient 
funds in, or credit with, the bank or other depository 
for the payment of that check, draft, or order in full 
upon its presentment, shall be punished as a court- 
martial may direct. The making, drawing, uttering, 
or delivering by a maker or drawer of a check, draft, 
or order, payment of which is refused by the drawee 
because of insufficient funds of the maker or drawer 
in the drawee's possession or control, is prima facie 
evidence of his intent to defraud or deceive and of 
his knowledge of insufficient funds in, or credit with, 
that bank or other depository, unless the maker or 
drawer pays the holder the amount due within five 
days after receiving notice, orally or in writing, that 
the check, draft, or order was not paid on present- ment. In this section, the word 'credit' means an ar- 
rangement or understanding, express or implied, 
with the bank or other depository for the payment of 
that check, draft, or order." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  For the procurement of any article or thing of 
value, with intent to defraud. 
(a) That the accused made, drew, uttered, or 
delivered a check, draft, or order for the payment of 
money payable to a named person or organization; 
(b)  That the accused did so for the purpose of 
procuring an article or thing of value; 
(c)  That the act was committed with intent to 
defraud; and 
(d) That at the time of making, drawing, utter- 
ing, or delivery of the instrument the accused knew 
that the accused or the maker or drawer had not or 
would not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the 
bank or other depository for the payment thereof 
upon presentment. 
(2)  For the payment of any past due obligation, 
or for any other purpose, with intent to deceive. 
(a)  That the accused made, drew, uttered, or 
delivered a check, draft, or order for the payment of 
money payable to a named person or organization; 
(b) That the accused did so for the purpose or 
purported purpose of effecting the payment of a past 
due obligation or for some other purpose; 
(c)  That the act was committed with intent to 
deceive; and 
(d) That at the time of making, drawing, utter- 
ing, or delivering of the instrument, the accused 
knew that the accused or the maker or drawer had 
not or would not have sufficient funds in, or credit 
with, the bank or other depository for the payment 
thereof upon presentment. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Written instruments. The written instruments 
covered by this article include any check, draft (in- 
cluding share drafts), or order for the payment of 
money drawn upon any bank or other depository, 
whether or not the drawer bank or depository is ac- 
tually in existence. It may be inferred that every 
check, draft, or order carries with it a representation 
that the instrument will be paid in full by the bank or 
other depository upon presentment by  a holder 
when due. 
(2)  Bank or other depository. "Bank or other de- 
pository"  includes any business regularly but not 
necessarily exclusively engaged in public banking 
activities. 
(3)  Making or drawing. "Making"  and "draw- 
ing" are synonymous and refer to the act of writing 
and signing the instrument. 
(4)  Uttering or delivering. "Uttering"  and "deliv- 
ering"  have similar meanings. Both mean transfer- 
ring the instrument to another, but "uttering"  has 
the additional meaning of offering to transfer. A per- 
son need not personally be the maker or drawer of 
an instrument in order to violate this article if that 
person utters or delivers it. For example, if a person 
holds a check which that person knows is worthless, 
and utters or delivers the check to another, that per- 
son may be guilty of an offense under this article de- 
spite the fact that the person did not personally draw 
the check. 
(5)  For the procurement.  "For the procurement" 
means for the purpose of obtaining any article or 
thing of value. It is not necessary that an article or 
thing of value actually be obtained, and the purpose 
of the obtaining may be for the accused's own use or 
benefit or for the use or benefit of another. 
(6) For the payment. "For the payment"  means 
for the purpose or purported purpose of satisfying in 
whole or in part any past due obligation. Payment 
need not be legally effected. 
(7)  For any other purpose.  "For  any other pur- 
pose" includes all purposes other than the payment 
of a past due obligation or the procurement of any 
article or thing of value. For example, it includes 
paying or purporting to pay an obligation which is 
not yet past due. The check, draft, or order, whether 
made or negotiated for the procurement of an article 
or thing of value or for the payment of a past due ob- 
ligation or for some other purpose, need not be in- 
tended or represented as payable immediately. For 
example, the making of a postdated check, delivered 
at the time of entering into an installment purchase 
contract and intended as payment for a future in- 
stallment, would, if made with the requisite intent 
and knowledge, be a violation of this article. 
(8) Article or thing of value. "Article or thing of 
value"  extends to every kind of right or interest in 
property, or derived from contract, including inter- 
ests and rights which are intangible or contingent or 
which mature in the future. 
(9)  Past due obligation. A "past due obligation" is 
an obligation to pay money, which obligation has le- gally matured before making, drawing, uttering, or 
delivering the instrument. 
(10)  Knowledge. The accused must have knowl- 
edge, at the time the accused makes, draws, utters, 
or delivers the instrument, that the maker or drawer, 
whether the accused or another, has not or will not 
have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the bank or 
other depository for the payment of the instrument 
in full upon its presentment. Such knowledge may be 
proved by circumstantial evidence. 
(11)  SufJicient funds.  "Sufficient funds"  refers to 
a condition in which the account balance of the 
maker or drawer in the bank or other depository at 
the time of the presentment of the instrument for 
payment is not less than the face amount of the in- 
strument and has not been rendered unavailable for 
payment by garnishment, attachment, or other legal 
procedures. 
(12)  Credit. "Credit"  means an arrangement or 
understanding, express or implied, with the bank or 
other depository for the payment of the check, draft, 
or order. An absence of credit includes those situa- 
tions in which an accused writes a check on a nonex- 
istent bank or on a bank in which the accused has no 
account. 
(13)  Upon its presentment.  "Upon  its present- 
ment"  refers to the time the demand for payment is 
made upon presentation  of the instrument to the 
bank or other depository on which it was drawn. 
(14)  Intent to defraud. "Intent to defraud" means 
an intent to obtain, through a misrepresentation, an 
article or thing of value and to apply it to one's own 
use and benefit or to the use and benefit of another, 
either permanently or temporarily. 
(15)  Intent  to deceive. "Intent to deceive" means 
an intent to mislead, cheat, or trick another by 
means of a misrepresentation made for the purpose 
of gaining an advantage for oneself or for a third per- 
son, or of bringing about a disadvantage to the inter- 
ests of the person to whom the representation was 
made or to interests represented by that person. 
(16)  The relationship of time and intent. Under 
this article, two times are involved: (a) when the ac- 
cused makes, draws, utters, or delivers the instru- 
ment; and (b) when the instrument is presented to 
the bank or other depository for payment. With re- 
spect to (a), the accused must possess the requisite 
intent and must know that the maker or drawer does 
not have or will not have sufficient funds in, or credit 
with, the bank or the depository for payment of the 
instrument in full upon its presentment when due. 
With respect to (b), if it can otherwise be shown that 
the accused possessed  the requisite intent and 
knowledge at the time the accused made, drew, ut- 
tered, or delivered the instrument, neither proof of 
presentment nor refusal of payment is necessary, as 
when the instrument is one drawn on a nonexistent 
bank. 
(17)  Statutory rule of evidence. The provision of 
this article with respect to establishing prima facie 
evidence of knowledge and intent by proof of notice 
and nonpayment within 5 days is a statutory rule of 
evidence. The failure of an accused who is a maker 
or drawer to pay the holder the amount due within 5 
days after receiving either oral or written notice 
from the holder of a check, draft, or order, or from 
any other person having knowledge that such check, 
draft, or order was returned unpaid because of insuf- 
ficient funds, is prima facie evidence (a) that the ac- 
cused had the intent to defraud or deceive as alleged; 
and (b) that the accused knew at the time the ac- 
cused made, drew, uttered, or delivered the check, 
draft, or order that the accused did not have or 
would not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the 
bank or other depository for the payment of such 
check, draft, or order upon its presentment for pay- 
ment. Prima facie evidence is that evidence from 
which the accused's intent to defraud or deceive and 
the accused's  knowledge of insufficient funds in or 
credit with the bank or other depository may be in- 
ferred, depending on all the circumstances. The fail- 
ure to give notice referred to in the article, or pay- 
ment by the accused, maker, or drawer to the holder 
of the amount due within 5 days after such notice 
has been given, precludes the prosecution from using 
the statutory rule of evidence but does not preclude 
conviction of this offense if all the elements are oth- 
erwise proved. 
(18) AfJirmative defense. Honest mistake is an af- 
firmative defense to offenses under this article. See 
R.C.M. 9160). 
d. Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Article 134-making,  drawing, uttering or 
delivering a check, draft, or order, and thereafter 
wrongfully and dishonorably failing to maintain suf- 
ficient funds 
(2)  Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. (1)  For the procurement of any article or thing of 
value, with intent to defraud, in the face amount of: 
(a) $100.00 or less. Bad-conduct discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 6 months. 
(b)  More than $100.00. Dishonorable dis- 
charge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 5 years. 
(2)  For the payment of any past due obligation, 
or for any other purpose, with intent to deceive. 
Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and al- 
lowances, and confinement for 6 months. 
f.  Sample specifications. 
(1)  For the procurement  of any article or thing of 
value, with intent to defraud. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  with intent 
to defraud and for the procurement of (lawful cur- 
rency) (and) (  (an article) (a thing) 
of value), wrongfully and unlawfully ((make (draw)) 
(utter) (deliver) to  ,) a certain 
(check)  (draft)  (money  order)  upon  the 
d a n k ) (  deposi-
tory) in  words and figures as follows, to wit: 
, then knowing that (he/she) 
(  ), the (maker) (drawer) thereof, 
did not or would not have sufficient funds in or 
credit with such (bank) (depository) for the payment 
of the said (check) (draft) (order) in full upon its pre- 
sentment. 
(2)  For the payment  of any past  due obligation, or 
for  any other purpose,  with intent to deceive. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , with intent 
to deceive and for the payment of a past due obliga- 
tion, to wit:  (for the purpose 
o  f  ) wrongfully and unlawfully 
((make)  (draw))  (utter)  (deliver)  to 
,  a certain (check) (draft) (money 
order) for the payment of money upon 
(  Bank) (  deposi-
tory), in  words and figures as follows, to wit: 
, then knowing that (he/she) 
(  ), the (maker) (drawer) thereof, 
did not or would not have sufficient funds in or 
credit with such (bank) (depository) for the payment 
of the said (check) (draft) (order) in full upon its pre- 
sentment. 
50.  Article 124-Maiming 
a. Text. 

"Any person subject to this chapter who, with intent 

to injure, disfigure, or disable, inflicts upon the per- 

son of another an injury which-" 

(1)  "seriously disfigures his person by any mutila- 
tion thereof;" 
(2)  "destroys or disables any member or organ of 
his body; or" 
(3)  "seriously  diminishes his physical vigor by 
the injury of  any member or organ; is guilty of 
maiming and shall be punished as a court-martial 
may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused inflicted a certain injury 
upon a certain person; 
(2) That this injury seriously disfigured the per- 
son's body, destroyed or disabled an organ or mem- 
ber, or seriously diminished the person's physical 
vigor by the injury to an organ or member; and 
(3) That the accused inflicted this injury with an 
intent to cause some injury to a person. 
c. Explanation 
(1)  Nature of offense. It is maiming to put out a 
person's eye, to cut off a hand, foot, or finger, or to 
knock out a tooth, as these injuries destroy or dis- 
able those members or organs. It is also maiming to 
injure an internal organ so as to seriously diminish 
the physical vigor of a person. Likewise, it is maim- 
ing to cut off an ear or to scar a face with acid, as 
these injuries seriously disfigure a person. A disfig- 
urement need not mutilate any entire member to 
come within the article, or be of any particular type, 
but must be such as to impair perceptibly and mate- 
rially the victim's  comeliness. The disfigurement, 
diminishment of vigor, or destruction or disable- 
ment of any member or organ must be a serious in- 
jury of a substantially permanent nature. However, 
the offense is complete if  such an injury is inflicted 
even though there is a possibility that the victim may 
eventually recover the use of the member or organ, 
or that the disfigurement may be cured by surgery. 
(2)  Means of inflicting injury. To prove the of- 
fense it is not necessary to prove the specific means by which the injury was inflicted. However, such ev- 
idence may be considered on the question of intent. 
(3)  Intent. Maiming requires a specific intent to 
injure generally but not a specific intent to maim. 
Thus, one commits the offense who intends only a 
slight injury, if in fact there is infliction of an injury 
of the type specified in this article. Infliction of the 
type of injuries specified in this article upon the per- 
son of another may support an inference of the in- 
tent to injure, disfigure, or disable. 
(4)  Defenses.  If the injury is done under circum- 
stances which would justify or excuse homicide, the 
offense of maiming is not committed. See R.C.M. 
916. 
d. Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Article 128-assault;  assault consummated 
by a battery 
(2) Article  128-assault  with a  dangerous 
weapon 
(3)  Article  128-assault  intentionally inflicting 
grievous bodily harm 
(4)  Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 7 years. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction data), 
did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter juris- 
diction  data,  if  required)  on  or  about 
19  ,  maim 
by (crushing his/her  foot with a 
sledge hammer) (  ). 
51.  Article 125-Sodomy 
a.  Text. 
"(a) Any person subject to this chapter who engages 
in unnatural carnal copulation with another person 
of the same or opposite sex or with an animal is 
guilty of  sodomy. Penetration, however slight, is suf- 
ficient to complete the offense. 
(b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall by 
punished as a court-martial may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused engaged in unnatural carnal 
copulation with a certain other person or with an 
animal. 
(Note: Add either or both of the following elements, 
if applicable) 
(2)  That the act was done with a child under the 
age of 16. 
(3)  That the act was done by force and without 
the consent of the other person. 
c.  Explanation. It is unnatural carnal copulation for 
a person to take into that person's mouth or anus the 
sexual organ of another person or of an animal; or to 
place that person's sexual organ in the mouth or 
anus of another person or of an animal; or to have 
carnal copulation in any opening of the body, except 
the sexual parts, with another person; or to have car- 
nal copulation with an animal. 
d. Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  With  a child under the age of 16. 
(a) Article 125-forcible  sodomy (and offenses 
included therein; see subparagraph (2) below) 
(b)  Article 134-indecent  acts with a child 
under 16 
(c)  Article 80-attempts 
(2)  Forcible sodomy. 
(a) Article 125-sodomy  (and offenses in- 
cluded therein; see subparagraph (3) below) 
(b)  Article 134-assault  with intent to commit 
sodomy 
(c) Article 134-indecent  assault 
(d) Article 80-attempts. 
(3) Sodomy. 
(a)  Article 134-indecent  acts with another 
(b)  Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1)  By force  and without consent. Dishonorable 
discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 20 years. 
(2)  With  a child under the age of 16 years. Dis-
honorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and al- 
lowances, and confinement for 20 years. 
(3)  Other cases. Dishonorable discharge, forfei- 
ture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 5 
years. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction data), 
did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter juris- 
diction  data,  if  required),  on  or  about 
19  ,commit sod- 
omy with  (a child under the age of 
16 years) (by force and without the consent of the 
said  1. 52.  Article 126-Arson 
a.  Text. 
"(a) Any person subject to this chapter who willfully 
and maliciously burns or sets on fire an inhabited 
dwelling, or any other structure, movable or immov- 
able, wherein to the knowledge of the offender there 
is at the time a human being, is guilty of aggravated 
arson and shall be punished as a court-martial may 
direct. 
(b) Any person subject to this chapter who will- 
fully and maliciously burns or sets fire to the prop- 
erty of another, except as provided in subsection (a), 
is guilty of simple arson and shall be punished as a 
court-martial may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Aggravated arson. 
(a)  Inhabited dwelling. 
(i)  That the accused burned or set on fire an 
inhabited dwelling; 
(ii) That this dwelling belonged to a certain 
person and was of a certain value; and 
(iii)  That the act was willful and malicious. 
(b) Structure. 
(i)  That the accused burned or set on fire a 
certain structure; 
(ii)  That the act was willful and malicious; 
(iii)  That there was a human being in the 
structure at the time; 
(iv)  That the accused knew that there was a 
human being in the structure at the time; and 
(v)  That this structure belonged to a certain 
person and was of a certain value. 
(2)  Simple arson. 
(a) That the accused burned or set fire to cer- 
tain property of another; 
(b) That the property was of a certain value; 
and 
(c) That the act was willful and malicious. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  In general. In aggravated arson, danger to 
human life is the essential element; in simple arson, 
it is injury to the property of another. In either case, 
it is immaterial that no one is, in fact, injured. It 
must be shown that the accused set the fire willfully 
and maliciously, that is, not merely by negligence or 
accident. 
(2)  Aggravated arson. 
(a)  Inhabited dwelling. An inhabited dwelling 
includes the outbuildings that form part of the clus- 
n52e.(2) 
ter of buildings used as a residence. A shop or store 
is not an inhabited dwelling unless occupied as such, 
nor is a house that has never been occupied or which 
has been temporarily abandoned. A person may be 
guilty of aggravated arson of the person's dwelling, 
whether as owner or tenant. 
(b)  Structure. Aggravated arson may also be 
committed by burning or setting on fire any other 
structure, movable or immovable, such as a theater, 
church, boat, trailer, tent, auditorium, or any other 
sort of shelter or edifice, whether public or private, 
when the offender knows that there is a human being 
inside at the time. It may be that the offender had 
this knowledge when the nature of the structure-as 
a department store or theater during hours of busi- 
ness, or other circumstances-are  shown to have 
been such that a reasonable person would have 
known that a human being was inside at the time. 
(c)  Damage to property. It is not necessary that 
the dwelling or structure be consumed or materially 
injured; it is enough if fire is actually communicated 
to any part thereof. Any actual burning or charring 
is sufficient, but a mere scorching or discoloration by 
heat is not. 
(d)  Value and ownership of property. For the 
offense of aggravated arson, the value and ownership 
of the dwelling or other structure are immaterial, 
but should ordinarily be alleged and proved to per- 
mit the finding in an appropriate case of the included 
offense of simple arson. 
(3) Simple arson. "Simple  arson"  is the willful 
and malicious burning or setting fire to the property 
of another under circumstances not amounting to 
aggravated arson. The offense includes burning or 
setting fire to real or personal property of someone 
other than the offender. See also paragraph 67 
(Burning with intent to defraud). 
d. Lesser included offenses. 
(1) Aggravated arson. 
(a)  Article 126-simple  arson 
(b) Article 80-attempts 
(2)  Simple arson. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1) Aggravated arson. Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 20 years. 
(2)  Simple arson, where the property is- 
IV-77 (a)  Of a value of $100.00 or less. Dishonorable 
discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 1 year. 
(b) Of a value of more than $100.00. Dishonor- 
able discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 
and confinement for 5 years. 
f.  Sample specifications. 
(1)  Aggravated arson. 
(a)  Inhabited dwelling. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if required), on or about 
19  ,willfully and 
maliciously (burn) (set on fire) an inhabited dwell- 
ing, to wit: (the residence of  1 
( 	 )  (the  property  of 
)  of  a  value  of  (about) 
(b)  Structure. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction data), 
did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter juris- 
diction data, if required), on or  19 
,willfully and maliciously (burn) 
(set on fire), knowing that a human being was 
therein  at  the  time,  (the  Post  Theater) 
( 	 ,  the  property  of 
),  of  a  value  of  (about) 
$ 
(2)  Simple arson. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction data), 
did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter juris- 
diction  data,  if  required),  on  or  about 
19  ,willfully and 

maliciously  (burn) (set fire to) (an automobile) 

(  ),  the  property  of 

,  of  a  value  of  (about) 

53.  Article 127-Extortion 
a.  Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who communi- 
cates threats to another person with the intention 
thereby to obtain anything of value or any acquit- 
tance, advantage, or immunity is guilty of extortion 
and shall be punished as a court-martial may di- 
rect." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused communicated a certain 
threat to another; and 
(2)  That the accused intended to unlawfully ob- 
tain something of value, or any acquittance, advan- 
tage, or immunity. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1) In general. Extortion is complete upon com- 
munication of the threat with the requisite intent. 
The actual or probable success of the extortion need 
not be proved. 
(2)  Threat. A threat may be communicated by 
any means but must be received by the intended vic- 
tim. The threat may be: a threat to do any unlawful 
injury to the person or property of the person 
threatened or to any member of that person's family 
or any other person held dear to that person; a threat 
to accuse the person threatened, or any member of 
that persons's family or any other person held dear 
to that person, of any crime; a threat to expose or 
impute any deformity or disgrace to the person 
threatened or to any member of that person's family 
or any other person held dear to that person; a threat 
to expose any secret affecting the person threatened 
or any member of that person's family or any other 
person held dear to that person; or a threat to do any 
other harm. 
(3) Acquittance. An "acquittance"  is a release or 
discharge from an obligation. 
(4) Advantage or immunity. Unless it is clear 
from the circumstances, the advantage or immunity 
sought should be described in the specification. An 
intent to make a person do an act against that per- 
son's will is not, by itself, sufficient to constitute ex- 
tortion. 
d.  Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Article 134--communicating  a threat 
(2)  Article 8kattempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 3 years. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction data), 
did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter juris- 
diction  data,  if  required),  on  or  about 
19  , with intent 
unlawfully to obtain (something of value) (an ac- 
quittance) (an advantage, to wit 
(an immunity, to wit  ), communi-
cate to  a threat to (here describe 
the threat). 
1 54.  Article 128-Assault 
a.  Text. 
"(a)  Any person subject to this chapter who at- 
tempts or offers with unlawful force or violence to 
do bodily harm to another person, whether or not 
the attempt or offer is consummated, is guilty of as- 
sault and shall be punished as a court-martial may 
direct. 
(b) Any person subject to this chapter who- 
(1)  commits an assault with a dangerous weapon 
or other means or force likely to produce death or 
grievous bodily harm; or 
(2)  commits an assault and intentionally inflicts 
grievous bodily harm with or without a weapon; is 
guilty of aggravated assault and shall be punished as 
a court-martial may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1) Simple assault. 
(a) That the accused attempted or offered to do 
bodily harm to a certain person; and 
(b) That the attempt or offer was done with un- 
lawful force or violence. 
(2) Assault consummated by a battery. 
(a) That the accused did bodily harm to a cer- 
tain person; and 
(b) That the bodily harm was done with unlaw- 
ful force or violence. 
(3)  Assaults permitting  increased punishment 
based on status of victim. 
(a) Assault upon a commissioned, warrant, non- 
commissioned; or petty oficer. 
(i)  That the accused attempted to do, offered 
to do, or did bodily harm to a certain person; 
(ii)  That the attempt, offer, or bodily harm 
was done with unlawful force or violence; 
(iii)  That the person was a commissioned, 
warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer; and 
(iv)  That the accused then knew that the 
person was a commissioned, warrant, noncommis- 
sioned, or petty officer. 
(b) Assault upon a sentinel or lookout in the ex- 
ecution of duty, or upon a person in the execution of 
law enforcement duties. 
(i)  That the accused attempted to do, offered 
to do, or did bodily harm to a certain person; 
(ii)  That the attempt, offer, or bodily harm 
was done with unlawful force or violence; 
(iii)  That the person was a sentinel or look- 
out in the execution of duty or was a person who 
then had and was in the execution of security police, 
military police, shore patrol, master at arms, or 
other military or civilian law enforcement duties; 
and 
(iv)  That the accused then knew that the 
person was a sentinel or lookout in the execution of 
duty or was a person who then had and was in the 
execution of security police, military police, shore 
patrol, master at arms, or other military or civilian 
law enforcement duties. 
(c) Assault consummated by a battery upon a 
child under 16 years. 
(i)  That the accused did bodily harm to a 
certain person; 
(ii)  That the bodily harm was done with un- 
lawful force or violence; and 
(iii)  That the person was then a child under 
the age of 16 years. 
(4) Aggravated assault. 
(a) Assault  with a dangerous weapon or other 
means of force  likely to produce  death or grievous 
bodily harm. 
(i)  That the accused attempted to do, offered 
to do, or did bodily harm to a certain person; 
(ii)  That the accused did so with a certain 
weapon, means, or force; 
(iii)  That the attempt, offer, or bodily harm 
was done with unlawful force or violence; and 
(iv)  That the weapon, means, or force was 
used in a manner likely to produce death or grievous 
bodily harm. 
(Note: When a loaded firearm was used, add the 
following element) 
(v)  That the weapon was a loaded firearm. 
(b)  Assault in which grievous bodily harm is in- 
tentionally inflicted. 
(i)  That the accused assaulted a certain per- 
son; 
(ii)  That grievous bodily harm was thereby 
inflicted upon such person; 
(iii)  That the grievous bodily harm was done 
with unlawful force or violence; and 
(iv)  That the accused, at the time, had the 
specific intent to inflict grievous bodily harm. 
(Note: When a loaded firearm was used, add the 
following element) 
(v) That the injury was inflicted with a loaded 
firearm. 
c.  Explanation. (1) Simple assault. 
(a) Definition of assault. An "assault"  is an at- 
tempt or offer with unlawful force or violence to do 
bodily harm to another, whether or not the attempt 
or offer is consummated. It must be done without le- 
gal justification or excuse and without the lawful 
consent of the person affected."Bodily harm" means 
any offensive touching of another, however slight. 
(b)  Difference between  "attempt"  and  "offer" 
type assaults. 
(i) Attempt type assault. An "attempt"  type 
assault requires a specific intent to inflict bodily 
harm, and an overt act-that  is, an act that amounts 
to more than mere preparation and apparently tends 
to effect the intended bodily harm. An attempt type 
assault may be committed even though the victim 
had no knowledge of the incident at the time. 
(ii)  Offer type assault. An "offer"  type as- 
sault is an unlawful demonstration of violence, ei- 
ther by an intentional or by a culpably negligent act 
or omission, which creates in the mind of another a 
reasonable apprehension of receiving immediate 
bodily harm. Specific intent to inflict bodily harm is 
not required. 
(iii)  Examples. 
(A)  If Doe swings a fist at Roe's head intending 
to hit Roe but misses, Doe has committed an at- 
tempt type assault, whether or not Roe is aware of 
the attempt. 
(B)  If Doe swings a fist in the direct of Roe's 
head either intentionally or as a result of  culpable 
negligence, and Roe sees the blow coming and is 
thereby put in apprehension of being struck, Doe 
has committed an offer type assault whether or not 
Doe intended to hit Roe. 
(C) If Doe swings at Roe's head, intending to 
hit it, and Roe sees the blow coming and is thereby 
put in apprehension of being struck, Doe has com- 
mitted both on offer and an attempt type assault. 
(D) If Doe swings at Roe's  head  simply to 
frighten Roe, not intending to hit Roe, and Roe does 
not see the blow and is not placed in fear, then no as- 
sault of any type has been committed. 
(c) Situations not amounting to assault. 
(i)  Mere preparation.  Preparation not 
amounting to an overt act, such as picking up a stone 
without any attempt or offer to throw it, does not 
constitute an assault. 
(ii)  Threatening words. The use of threaten- 
ing words alone does not constitute an assault. How- 
ever, if the threatening words are accompanied by  a 
menacing act or gesture, there may be an assault, 
since the combination constitutes a demonstration 
of violence. 
(iii)  Circumstances negating intent to harm. 
If the circumstances known to the person menaced 
clearly negate an intent to do bodily harm there is no 
assault. Thus, if  a person accompanies an apparent 
attempt to strike another by  an unequivocal an- 
nouncement in some form of an intention not to 
strike, there is no assault. For example, if Doe raises 
a stick and shakes it at Roe within striking distance 
saying, "If  you weren't an old man, I would knock 
you down,"  Doe has committed no assault. How- 
ever, an offer to inflict bodily injury upon another in- 
stantly if  that person does not comply with a de- 
mand which the assailant has no lawful right to 
make is an assault. Thus, if Doe points a pistol at 
Roe and says, "If  you don't hand over your watch, I 
will shoot you," Doe has committed an assault upon 
Roe. See also paragraph 47 (robbery) of this part. 
(d)  Situations not constituting defenses to as- 
sault.-
(i) Assault  attempts fails.  It is not a defense 
to a charge of assault that for some reason unknown 
to the assailant, an assault attempt was bound to fail. 
Thus, if a person loads a rifle with what is believed to 
be a good cartridge and, pointing it at another, pulls 
the trigger, that person may be guilty of assault al- 
though the cartridge was defective and did not fire. 
Likewise, if a person in a house shoots through the 
roof at a place where a policeman is believed to be, 
that person may be guilty of assault even though the 
policeman is at another place on the roof. 
(ii)  Retreating victim. An assault is complete 
if there is a demonstration of violence and an appar- 
ent ability to inflict bodily injury causing the person 
at whom it was directed to reasonably apprehend 
that unless the person retreats bodily harm will be 
inflicted. This is true even though the victim re- 
treated and was never within actual striking distance 
of the assailant. There must, however, be an appar- 
ent present ability to inflict the injury. Thus, to aim a 
pistol at a person at such a distance that it clearly 
could not injure would not be an assault. 
(2) Battery. (a) In general. A "battery"  is an assault in 
which the attempt or offer to do bodily harm is con- 
summated by the infliction of that harm. 
(b)  Application of force.  The force applied in a 
battery may have been directly or indirectly applied. 
Thus, a battery can be committed by inflicting bod- 
ily injury on a person through striking the horse on 
which the person is mounted causing the horse to 
throw the person, as well as by  striking the person 
directly. 
(c)  Examples of battery. It may be a battery to 
spit on another, push a third person against another, 
set a dog at another which bites the person, cut an- 
other's  cloths while the person is wearing them 
though without touching or intending to touch the 
person, shoot a person, cause a person to take 
poison, or drive an automobile into a person. A per-
son who, although excused in using force, uses more 
force than is required, commits a battery. Throwing 
an object into a crowd may be a battery on anyone 
whom the object hits. 
(d) Situations not constituting battery. If bodily 
harm is inflicted unintentionally and without culpa- 
ble negligence, there is no battery. It is also not a bat- 
tery to touch another to attract the other's attention 
or to prevent injury. 
(3)  Assaults permitting  increased punishment 
based on status of victims. 
(a) Assault upon a commissioned, warrant, non- 
commissioned, or petty oficer. The maximum pun- 
ishment is increased when assault is committed 
upon a commissioned officer of the armed forces of 
the United States, or of a friendly foreign power, or 
upon a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer 
of the armed forces of the United States. Knowledge 
of the status of the victim is an essential element of 
the offense and may be proved by circumstantial evi- 
dence. It is not necessary that the victim be superior 
in rank or command to the accused, that the victim 
be in the same armed force, or that the victim be in 
the execution of office at the time of the assault. 
(b) Assault upon a sentinel or lookout in the ex- 
ecution of duty, or upon a person  in the execution of 
law enforcement duties. The maximum punishment 
is increased when assault is committed upon a senti- 
nel or lookout in the execution of duty or upon a per- 
son who was then performing security police, mili- 
tary police, shore patrol, master at arms, or other 
military or civilian law enforcement duties. Knowl- 
edge of the status of the victim is an essential ele- 
ment of this offense and may be proved by circum- 
stantial evidence. See paragraph 38c(4) for the 
definition of "sentinel or lookout." 
(c)  Assault consummated by a battery upon a 
child under 16 years of age. The maximum punish- 
ment is increased when assault consummated by a 
battery is committed upon a child under 16 years of 
age. Knowledge that the person assaulted was under 
16 years of age is not an element of this offense. 
(4) Aggravated assault. 
(a) Assault  with a dangerous weapon or other 
means or  force  likely to produce  death or grievous 
bodily harm. 
(i)  Dangerous weapon. A weapon is danger- 
ous when used in a manner likely to produce death 
or grievous bodily harm. 
(ii)  Other means or force.  The phrase "other 
means or force" may include any means or instru- 
mentality not normally considered a weapon. When 
the natural and probable consequence of a particular 
use of any means or force would be death or grievous 
bodily harm, it may be inferred that the means or 
force is "likely"  to produce that result. The use to 
which a certain kind of instrument is ordinarily put 
is irrelevant to the question of its method of employ- 
ment in a particular case. Thus, a bottle, beer glass, a 
rock, a bunk adaptor, a piece of pipe, a piece of 
wood, boiling water, drugs, or a rifle butt may be 
used in a manner likely to inflict death or grievous 
bodily harm. On the other hand, an unloaded pistol, 
when presented as a firearm and not as a bludgeon, is 
not a dangerous weapon or a means of force likely to 
produce grievous bodily harm, whether or not the 
assailant knew it was unloaded. 
(iii)  Grievous bodily harm. "Grievous bodily 
harm"  means serious bodily injury. It does not in- 
clude minor injuries, such as a black eye or a bloody 
nose, but does include fractured or dislocated bones, 
deep cuts, torn members of the body, serious dam- 
age to internal organs, and other serious bodily inju- 
ries. 
(iv)  Death or injury not required. It is not 
necessary that death or grievous bodily harm be ac- 
tually inflicted to prove assault with a dangerous 
weapon or means likely to produce grievous bodily 
harm. 
(b)  Assault in which grievous bodily harm is in- 
tentionally inflicted. (i)  In general. It must be proved that the ac- 
cused specifically intended to and did inflict grievous 
bodily harm. Culpable negligence will not suffice. 
(ii)  Proving  intent. Specific intent may be 
proved by circumstantial evidence. When grievous 
bodily harm has been inflicted by means of inten- 
tionally using force in a manner likely to achieve 
that result, it may be inferred that grievous bodily 
harm was intended. On the other hand, that infer- 
ence might not be drawn if a person struck another 
with a fist in a sidewalk fight even if the victim fell so 
that the victim's head hit the curbstone and a skull 
fracture resulted. It is possible, however, to commit 
this kind of aggravated assault with the fists, as when 
the victim is held by one of several assailants while 
the others beat the victim with their fists and break a 
nose, jaw, or rib. 
(iii)  Grievous bodily harm. See subparagraph 
(4)(a)(iii). 
d. Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Simple assault. None 
(2)  Assault consummated  by a battery. Article 
128-simple  assault 
(3) Assault upon a commissioned, warrant, non- 
commissioned, or petty  oficer. Article 128-simple 
assault; assault consummated by a battery 
(4)  Assault upon a sentinel or lookout in the execu- 
tion of duty, or upon a person in the execution of po- 
lice duties. Article 128-simple  assault; assault con- 
summated by a battery 
(5) Assault consummated  by a battery upon a 
child under 16 years.  Article 128-simple  assault; 
assault consummated by a battery 
(6) Assault  with a dangerous weapon or other 
means or force  likely to produce  death or grievous 
bodily harm. Article 128-simple  assault; assault 
consummated by a battery 
(7) Assault in which grievous bodily harm is infan- 
tically inflicted. Article 128-assault  with a danger- 
ous weapon; simple assault; assault consummated by 
a battery 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Simple assault. Confinement for 3 months and 
forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for 3 months. 
(2)  Assault consummated by a battery. Bad con- 
duct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 
and confinement for 6 months. 
(3)  Assault upon a commissioned  oficer of the 
armed forces of the United States or of a friendly for- 
eign power,  not in the execution of ofice. Dishonora-
ble discharge, forfeiture of  all pay and allowances, 
and confinement for 3 years. 
(4)  Assault upon a warrant oficer, not in the exe- 
cution of ofice. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of 
all pay and allowances, and confinement for  18 
months. 
(5)  Assault upon a noncommissioned or petty  of- 
jcer, not in the execution of ofice. Bad-conduct dis- 
charge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 6 months. 
(6)  Assault upon a sentinel or lookout in the execu- 
tion of duty, or upon any person who, in the execution 
of ofice, is pegorming security police, military police, 
shorepatrol, master at arms, or other military or civil- 
ian law enforcement duties. Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 3 years. 
(7) Assault consummated by a battery upon a 
child under 16 years. Dishonorable discharge, forfei- 
ture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 2 
years. 
(8) Assault with a dangerous weapon or other 
means of force  to produce  death or grievous bodily 
harm. 
(a)  When committed with a loaded firearm. 
Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and al- 
lowances, and confinement for 8 years. 
(b)  Other cases. Dishonorable discharge, forfei- 
ture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 3 
years. 
(9)  Assault in which grievous bodily harm is inten- 
tionally inflicted. 
(a)  When the injury is inflicted with a loaded 
jrearm. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all 
pay and allowances, and confinement for 10 years. 
(b)  Other cases. Dishonorable discharge, forfei- 
ture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 5 
years. 
f.  Sample specijca tions. 
(1)  Simple assault. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location),  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  assault 
by  (striking at him/her  with a 
1(  1. 
(2)  Assault consummated by a battery. In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  unlawfully 
(strike) (  1  (on) 
(in) the  with 
(3)  Assault upon a commissioned ofJicer. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  assault 
, who then was and was then 
known by the accused to be a commissioned officer 
of (  ,a friendly foreign power) (the 
United States (Army) (Navy) (Marine Corps) (Air 
Force) (Coast Guard)) by 
(4) Assault upon a warrant, noncommissioned, or 
petty ofJicer. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  assault 
, who then was and was then 
known by the accused to be a (warrant) (noncom- 
missioned) (petty) officer  of  the United States 
(Army) (Navy) (Marine Corps) (Air Force) (Coast 
Guard), by 
(5) Assault upon a sentinel or lookout. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  assault 
, who then was and was then 
known by the accused to be a (sentinel) (lookout) in 
the execution of hidher duty, ((in) (on) the 
by 
(6) Assault upon a person  in the execution of law 
enforcement duties. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  assault 
, who then was  and was then 
known by  the accused to be a person  then having 
and in the execution of (Air Force security police) 
(military police) (shore patrol) (master at arms) 
((military) (civilian) law enforcement)) duties, by 
(7) Assault consummated  by a  battery upon a 
child under 16 years. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  unlawfully 
(strike) (  )  a child 
under  the age of  16 years,  (in)  (on) the 
with 
(8) Assault, aggravated-with  a  dangerous 
weapon, means, or force. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , commit an 
assault upon  by (shooting) (point- 
ing) (striking) (cutting) (  ) (at him/ 
her) (him/her)  (in) (on) (the  ) with 
(a dangerous weapon) (a (means) (force) likely to 
produce death or grievous bodily harm), to wit: a 
(loaded  firearm) (pickax) (bayonet) (club) 
(9)  Assault, aggravated-inflicting  grievous bodily 
harm. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , commit an 
assault upon  by (shooting) (strik- 
ing) (cutting) (  ) (him/her) (on) the 
with  a  (loaded firearm) (club) 
(rock) (brick) (  and did thereby in- 
tentionally inflict grievous bodily harm upon him/ 
her, to wit: a (broken leg) (deep cut) (fractured skull) 
55.  Article 129-Burglary 
a.  Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who, with intent 
to commit an offense punishable under sections 9 18- 
928 of this title (articles 118-128),  breaks and enters, 
in the nighttime, the dwelling house of another, is 
guilty of burglary and shall be punished as a court- 
martial may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused unlawfully broke and en- 
tered the dwelling house of another; 
(2) That both the breaking and entering were 
done in the nighttime; and (3)  That the breaking and entering were done 
with the intent to commit an offense punishable 
under Article 118 through 128, except Article 123a. 
c. Explanation. 
(1)  In general. "Burglary"  is the breaking and en- 
tering in the nighttime of the dwelling house of an- 
other, with intent to commit an offense punishable 
under Articles 1  18 through 128, except 123a. In ad- 
dition, an intent to commit an offense which, al- 
though not covered by Article 11  8 through 128, nec- 
essarily includes an offense within one of these 
articles, satisfies the intent element of this article. 
This includes, for example, assaults punishable 
under Article 134 which necessarily include simple 
assault under Article 128. 
(2)  Breaking. There must be a breaking, actual or 
constructive. Merely to enter through a hole left in 
the wall or roof or through an open window or door 
will not constitute a breaking; but if a person moves 
any obstruction to entry of the house without which 
movement the person could not have entered, the 
person has committed a "breaking."  Opening a 
closed door or window or other similar fixture, 
opening wider a door or window already partly open 
but insufficient for the entry, or cutting out the glass 
of a window or the netting of a screen is a sufficient 
breaking. The breaking of an inner door by one who 
has entered the house without breaking, or by a per- 
son lawfully within the house who has no authority 
to enter the particular room, is a sufficient breaking, 
but unless such a breaking is followed by an entry 
into the particular room with the requisite intent, 
burglary is not committed. There is a constructive 
breaking when the entry is gained by a trick, such as 
concealing oneself in a box; under false pretense, 
such as impersonating a gas or telephone inspector; 
by intimidating the occupants through violence or 
threats into opening the door; through collusion 
with a confederate, an occupant of the house; or by 
descending a chimney, even if only a partial descent 
is made and no room is entered. 
(3)  Entry. An entry must be effected before the 
offense is complete, but the entry of any part of the 
body, even a finger, is sufficient. Insertion into the 
house of a tool or other instrument is also a sufficient 
entry, unless the insertion is solely to facilitate the 
breaking or entry. 
(4)  Nighttime. Both the breaking and entry must 
be in the nighttime."Nighttime7' is the period be- 
tween sunset and sunrise when there is not sufficient 
daylight to discern a person's face. 
(5)  Dwelling house of another. To constitute bur- 
glary the house must be the dwelling house of an- 
other. "Dwelling  house"  includes outbuildings 
within the common inclosure, farmyard, or cluster 
of buildings used as a residence. Such an area is the 
"curtilage."  A store is not a dwelling house unless 
part of, or also used as, a dwelling house, as when 
the occupant uses another part of the same building 
as a dwelling, or when the store in habitually slept in 
by family members or employees. The house must be 
used as a dwelling at the time of the breaking and en- 
tering. It is not necessary that anyone actually be in 
it at the time of the breaking and entering, but if the 
house has never been occupied at all or has been left 
without any intention of returning, it is not a dwell- 
ing house. Separate dwellings within the same build- 
ing, such as a barracks room, apartment, or a room 
in a hotel, are subjects of burglary by other residents 
or guests, and in general by the owner of the build- 
ing. A tent is not a subject of burglary. 
(6) Intent to commit offense. Both the breaking 
and entry must be done with the intent to commit in 
the house an offense punishable under Articles 11  8 
through 128, except 123a. If, after the breaking and 
entering, the accused commits one or more of these 
offenses, it may be inferred that the accused intended 
to commit the offense or offenses at the time of the 
breaking and entering. If the evidence warrants, the 
intended offense may be separately charged. It is im- 
material whether the offense intended is committed 
or even attempted. If the offense is intended, it is no 
defense that its commission was impossible. 
(7)  Separate offense. If the evidence warrants, the 
intended offense in the burglary specification may be 
separately charged. 
d. Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Article 130-housebreaking 
(2)  Article 134-unlawful  entry 
(3)  Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 10 years. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, at  ,(subject-matter juris- 
diction  data,  if  required),  on  or  about 
19  ,in the night- time, unlawfully break and enter the (dwelling 
house) (  within the curtilage) of 
,  with intent to commit (murder) 
(larceny) (  ) therein. 
56.  Article 130-Housebreaking 
a.  Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who unlawfully 
enters the building or structure of another with in- 
tent to commit a criminal offense therein is guilty of 
housebreaking and shall be punished as a court-mar- 
tial may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused unlawfully entered a certain 
building or structure of a certain other person; and 
(2)  That the unlawful entry was made with the 
intent to commit a criminal offense therein. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Scope of offense.  The offense of housebreaking 
is broader than burglary in that the place entered is 
not required to be a dwelling house; it is not neces- 
sary that the place be occupied; it is not essential 
that there be a breaking; the entry may be either in 
the night or in the daytime; and the intent need not 
be to commit one of the offenses made punishable 
under Articles 1  18 through 128. 
(2)  Intent. The intent to commit some criminal 
offense is an essential element of housebreaking and 
must be alleged and proved to support a conviction 
of this offense. If, after the entry the accused com- 
mitted a criminal offense inside the building or 
structure, it may be inferred that the accused in- 
tended to commit that offense at the time of the en- 
try. 
(3)  Criminal offense. Any act or omission which 
is punishable by courts-martial, except an act or 
omission constituting a purely military offense, is a 
"criminal offense." 
(4)  Building, structure. "Building"  includes a 
room, shop, store, office, or apartment in a building. 
"Structure" refers only to those structures which are 
in the nature of a building or dwelling. Examples of 
these structures are a stateroom, hold, or other com- 
partment of a vessel, an inhabitable trailer, an inc- 
losed truck or freight car, a tent, and a houseboat. It 
is not necessary that the building or structure be in 
use at the time of the entry. 
(5)  Entry. See paragraph 55c(3). 
(6)  Separate offense. If the evidence warrants, the 
intended offense in the housebreaking specification 
may be separately charged. 
d. Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Article 134-unlawful  entry 
(2) Article 8Gattempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of  all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 5 years. 
f.  Sample specijcation. 
In that  , (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction data, if  required), on or about 
19  , unlawfully 
enter a (dwelling) (room) (bank) (store) (warehouse) 
(shop) (tent) (stateroom) (  ),  the 
property of  ,with intent to commit 
a criminal offense, to wit:  ,therein. 
57.  Article 131-Perjury 
a.  Text. 
"Any person subject to this chapter who in a judicial 
proceeding or in a course of justice willfully and cor- 
ruptly-
(1) upon a lawful oath or in any form allowed by 
law to be substituted for an oath, gives any false tes- 
timony material to the issue or matter of inquiry; or 
(2)  in any declaration, certificate, verification, or 
statement under penalty of perjury as permitted 
under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, 
subscribes any false statement material to the issue 
or matter of inquiry; is guilty of perjury and shall be 
punished as a court-martial may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Giving false  testimony. 
(a) That the accused took an oath or affirma- 
tion in a certain judicial proceeding or course of jus- 
tice; 
(b)  That the oath or affirmation was adminis- 
tered to the accused in a matter in which an oath or 
affirmation was required or authorized by law; 
(c)  That the oath or affirmation was adminis- 
tered by a person having authority to do so; 
(d)  That upon the oath or affirmation that ac- 
cused willfully gave certain testimony; 
(e) That the testimony was material; 
(f)  That the testimony was false; and 
(g)  That the accused did not then believe the 
testimony to be true. (2)  Subscribing false  statement. 
(a) That the accused subscribed a certain state- 
ment in a judicial proceeding or course of justice; 
(b) That in the declaration, certification, verifi- 
cation, or statement under penalty of perjury, the ac- 
cused declared, certified, verified, or stated the truth 
of that certain statement; 
(c)  That the accused willfully subscribed the 
statement; 
(d)  That the statement was material; 
(e) That the statement was false; and 
(0 That the accused did not then believe the 
statement to be true. 
c. Explanation. 
(1)  In general. "Judicial  proceeding"  includes a 
trial by court-martial and "course  of justice"  in-
cludes an investigation conducted under Article 32. 
If the accused is charged with having committed 
perjury before a court-martial, it must be shown that 
the court-martial was duly constituted. 
(2)  Giving  false  testimony. 
(a)  Nature. The testimony must be false and 
must be willfully and corruptly given; that is, it must 
be proved that the accused gave the false testimony 
willfully and did not believe it to be true. A witness 
may commit perjury by  testifying to the truth of a 
matter when in fact the witness knows nothing 
about it at all or is not sure about it, whether the 
thing is true or false in fact. A witness may also com- 
mit perjury in testifying falsely as to a belief, remem- 
brance, or impression, or as to a judgment or opin- 
ion. It is no defense that the witness voluntarily 
appeared, that the witness was incompetent as a wit- 
ness, or that the testimony was given in response to 
questions that the witness could have declined to an- 
swer. 
(b)  Material matter. The false testimony must 
be with respect to a material matter, but that matter 
need not be the main issue in the case. Thus, perjury 
may be committed by giving false testimony with re- 
spect to the credibility of a material witness or in an 
affidavit in support of a request for a continuance, as 
well as by giving false testimony with respect to a 
fact from which a legitimate inference may be drawn 
as to the existence or nonexistence of a fact in issue. 
Whether the allegedly false testimony was with re- 
spect to a material matter is a question of law to be 
determined as an interlocutory question. 
(c)  Pro08  The falsity of the allegedly perjured 
statement cannot be proved by circumstantial evi- 
dence alone, except with respect to matters which by 
their nature are not susceptible of direct proof. The 
falsity of the statement cannot be proved by the testi- 
mony of a single witness unless that testimony di- 
rectly contradicts the statement and is corroborated 
by  other guidance either direct or circumstantial, 
tending to prove the falsity of the statement. How- 
ever, documentary evidence directly disproving the 
truth of the statement charged to have been perjured 
need not be corroborated if: the document is an offi- 
cial record shown to have been well known to the ac- 
cused at the time the oath was taken; or the docu- 
mentary evidence originated from the accused-or 
had in any manner been recognized by the accused 
as containing the truth-before  the allegedly per- 
jured statement was made. 
(d)  Oath. The oath must be one recognized or 
authorized by law and must be duly administered by 
one authorized to administer it. When a form of oath 
has been prescribed, a literal following of that form 
is not essential; it is sufficient if the oath adminis- 
tered conforms in substance to the prescribed form. 
"Oath" includes an affirmation when the latter is au- 
thorized in lieu of an oath. 
(e)  Belief of accused. The fact that the accused 
did not believe the statement to be true may be 
proved by testimony of one witness without corrobo- 
ration or by circumstantial evidence. 
(3)  Subscribing false  statement. See subpara-
graphs (1) and (2), above, as applicable. Section 
1746 of title 28, United States Code, provides for 
subscribing to the truth of a document by signing it 
expressly subject to the penalty for perjury. The 
signing must take place in a judicial proceeding or 
course of justice-for  example, if a witness signs 
under penalty of perjury summarized testimony 
given at an Article 32 investigation. It is not re- 
quired that the document be  sworn before a third 
party. Section 1746 does not change the requirement 
that a deposition be given under oath or alter the sit- 
uation where an oath is required to be taken before a 
specific person. 
d. Lesser included offense.  Article 80-attempts. 
e.  Maximum punishment. Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 5 years. 
f.  Sample specifications. (1)  Giving  false  testimony. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), having taken a lawful (oath) (affirmation) in a 
(trial  by  court-martial  of 
) (trial by a court of competent ju- 
risdiction,  to  wit:  o f 
) (deposition for use in a trial by 
of  1 
(  ) that he/she  would (testify) (de- 
pose) truly, did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-
matter jurisdiction  data, if required), on or about 
19  , willfully, 
corruptly, and contrary to such (oath) (affirmation), 
(testify) (depose) falsely in substance that 
, which (testimony) (deposition) 
was upon a material matter and which he/she  did 
not then believe to be true. 
(2)  Subscribing false  statement. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,in a (judicial 
proceeding) (course of justice),  and in a (declara- 
tion) (certification) (verification) (statement) under 
penalty of perjury pursuant to section  1746 of title 
28, United States Code, willfully and corruptly sub- 
scribed a false statement material to the (issue) (mat- 
ter of inquiry), to wit:  ,  which 
statement was false in that  , and 
which statement he/she  did not then believe to be 
true. 
58.  Article 132-Frauds  against the United 
States 
a.  Text. 

"Any person subject to this chapter-" 

(1)  "who,  knowing it to be false of fraudulent-" 
(a)  "makes any claim against the United States 
or any officer thereof; or" 
(b)  "presents to any person in the civil or mili- 
tary service thereof, for approval or payment, any 
claim against the United States or any officer 
thereof;" 
(2)  "who,  for the purpose of obtaining the ap- 
proval, allowance, or payment of any claim against 
the United States or any officer thereof-" 
(a)  "makes or uses any writing or other paper 
knowing it to contain any false or fraudulent state- 
ments;" 
(b)  "makes any oath to any fact or to any writ- 
ing or other paper knowing the oath to be false; or" 
(c)  "forges or counterfeits any signature upon 
any writing or other paper, or uses any such signa- 
ture knowing it to be forged or counterfeited;" 
(3)  "who, having charge, possession, custody, or 
control of any money, or other property of the 
United States, furnished or intended for the armed 
forces thereof, knowingly delivers to any person 
having authority to receive it, any amount thereof 
less than that for which he receives a certificate or 
receipt; or" 
(4)  "who,  being authorized to make or deliver 
any paper certifying the receipt of any property of 
the United States furnished or intended for the 
armed forces thereof, makes or delivers to any per- 
son such writing without having full knowledge of 
the truth of the statements therein contained and 
with intent to defraud the United States; shall, upon 
conviction, be punished as a court-martial may di- 
rect." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Making a false or  fraudulent claim. 
(a) That the accused made a certain claim 
against the United States or an officer thereof; 
(b)  That the claim was false or fraudulent in 
certain particulars; and 
(c)  That the accused then knew that the claim 
was false or fraudulent in these particulars. 
(2)  Presenting for  approval or payment  a false  or 
fraudulent claim. 
(a)  That the accused presented for approval or 
payment to a certain person in the civil or military 
service of the United States having authority to ap- 
prove or pay it a certain claim against the United 
States or an officer thereof; 
(b)  That the claim was false or fraudulent in 
certain particulars; and 
(c)  That the accused then knew that the claim 
was false or fraudulent in these particulars. 
(3)  Making or using a false  writing or other paper 
in connection with claims. 
(a)  That the accused made or used a certain 
writing or other paper; 
(b)  That certain material statements in the 
writing or other paper were false or fraudulent; 
(c)  That the accused then knew the statements 
were false or fraudulent; and (d)  That the act of the accused was for the pur- 
pose of obtaining the approval, allowance, or pay- 
ment of a certain claim or claims against the United 
States or an officer thereof. 
(4) False oath in connection with claims. 
(a)  That the accused made an oath to a certain 
fact or to a certain writing or other paper; 
(b)  That the oath was false in certain particu- 
lars; 
(c)  That the accused then knew it was false; 
and 
(d) That the act was for the purpose of  ob- 
taining the approval, allowance, or payment of a cer- 
tain claim or claims against the United States or an 
officer thereof. 
(5) Forgery of signature in connection with claims. 
(a)  That the accused forged or counterfeited 
the signature of a certain person on a certain writing 
or other paper; and 
(b)  That the act was for the purpose of ob- 
taining the approval, allowance, or payment of a cer- 
tain claim against the United States or an officer 
thereof. 
(6) Using forged  signature in connection with 
claims. 
(a) That the accused used the forged or coun- 
terfeited signature of a certain person; 
(b)  That the accused then knew that the signa- 
ture was forged or counterfeited; and 
(c)  That the act was for the purpose of ob- 
taining the approval, allowance, or payment of a cer- 
tain claim against the United States or an officer 
thereof. 
(7) Delivering  less than amount called for  by re- 
ceipt. 
(a)  That the accused had charge, possession, 
custody, or control of certain money or property of 
the United States furnished or intended for the 
armed forces thereof; 
(b)  That the accused obtained a certificate or 
receipt for a certain amount or quantity of that 
money or property; 
(c)  That for the certificate or receipt the ac- 
cused knowingly delivered to a certain person hav- 
ing authority to receive it an amount or quantity of 
money or property less than the amount or quantity 
thereof specified in the certificate or receipt; and 
(d) That the undelivered money or property 
was of a certain value. 
(8)  Making or delivering receipt without having 
full  knowledge that it is true. 
(a)  That the accused was authorized to make 
or deliver a paper certifying the receipt from a cer- 
tain person of certain property of the United States 
furnished or intended for the armed forces thereof; 
(b)  That the accused made or delivered to that 
person a certificate or receipt; 
(c) That the accused made or delivered the cer- 
tificate without having full knowledge of the truth of 
a certain material statement or statements therein; 
(d) That the act was done with intent to de- 
fraud the United States; and 
(e)  That the property certified as being re- 
ceived was of a certain value. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1) Making a false  or fraudulent  claim. 
(a)  Claim. A "claim" is a demand for a transfer 
of ownership of money or property and does not in- 
clude requisitions for the mere use of property. This 
article applies only to claims against the United 
States or any officer thereof as such, and not to 
claims against an officer of the United States in that 
officer's private capacity. 
(b)  Making a claim. Making a claim is a dis- 
tinct act from presenting it. A claim may be made in 
one place and presented in another. The mere writ- 
ing of a paper in the form of a claim, without any 
further act to cause the paper to become a demand 
against the United States or an officer thereof, does 
not constitute making a claim. However, any act 
placing the claim in official channels constitutes 
making a claim, even if that act does not amount to 
presenting a claim. It is not necessary that the claim 
be allowed or paid or that it be made by the person to 
be benefited by the allowance or payment. See also 
subparagraph (2), below. 
(c)  Knowledge. The claim must be made with 
knowledge of its fictitious or dishonest character. 
This article does not proscribe claims, however 
groundless they may be, that the maker believes to 
be valid, or claims that are merely made negligently 
or without ordinary prudence. 
(2)  Presenting for  approval or payment  a false  or 
fraudulent  claim. 
(a)  False and fraudulent. False and fraudulent 
claims include not only those containing some mate- 
rial false statement, but also claims which the claim- 
ant knows to have been paid or for some other rea- son the claimant knows the claimant is not 
authorized to present or upon which the claimant 
knows the claimant has no right to collect. 
(b)  Presenting a  claim. The claim must be 
presented, directly or indirectly, to some person hav- 
ing authority to pay it. The person to whom the 
claim is presented may be identified by position or 
authority to approve the claim, and need not be 
identified by name in the specification. A false claim 
may be tacitly presented, as when a person who 
knows that there is no entitlement to certain pay ac- 
cepts it nevertheless without disclosing a disqualifi- 
cation, even though the person may not have made 
any representation of entitlement to the pay. For ex- 
ample, a person cashing a pay check which includes 
an amount for a dependency allowance, knowing at 
the time that the entitlement no longer exists be- 
cause of a change in that dependency status, has tac- 
itly presented a false claim. See also subparagraph 
(I), above. 
(3)  Making or using a false  writing or other paper 
in connection with claims. The false or fraudulent 
statement must be material, that is, it must have a 
tendency to mislead governmental officials in their 
consideration or investigation of the claim. The of- 
fense of making a writing or other paper known to 
contain a false or fraudulent statement for the pur- 
pose of obtaining the approval, allowance, or pay- 
ment of a claim is complete when the writing or pa- 
per is made for that purpose, whether or not any use 
of the paper has been attempted and whether or not 
the claim has been presented. See also the explana- 
tion in subparagraph (1) and (2), above. 
(4)  False oath in connection with claims. See sub-
paragraphs (1) and (2), above. 
(5)  Forgery of signature in connection with claims. 
Any fraudulent making of the signature of another is 
forging or counterfeiting, whether or not an attempt 
is made to imitate the handwriting. See paragraph 
48(c) and subparagraph (1) and (2), above. 
(6)  Delivering less than amount called for  by re-
ceipt. It is immaterial by what means-whether  de-
ceit, collusion, or otherwise-the  accused effected 
the transaction, or what was the accused's purpose. 
(7) Making or delivering  receipt  without having 
full  knowledge that it is true. When an officer or 
other person subject to military law is authorized to 
make or deliver any paper certifying the receipt of 
any property of the United States furnished or in- 
tended for the armed forces thereof, and a receipt or 
other paper is presented for signature stating that a 
certain amount of supplies has been furnished by a 
certain contractor, it is that person's duty before 
signing the paper to know that the full amount of 
supplies therein stated to have been furnished has in 
fact been furnished, and that the statements con- 
tained in the paper are true. If the person signs the 
paper with intent to defraud the United States and 
without that knowledge, that person is guilty of a vi- 
olation of this section of the article. If the person 
signs the paper with knowledge that the full amount 
was not received, it may be inferred that the person 
intended to defraud the United States. 
d.  Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1) Article  132(1) and (2). Dishonorable dis- 
charge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 5 years. 
(2)  Article 132(3) and (4). 
(a)  When amount is $100.00 or less. Bad-con-
duct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 
and confinement for 6 months. 
(b)  When amount is over $100.00. Dishonora-
ble discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 
and confinement for 5 years. 
f.  Sample specijications. 
(1)  Making false  claim. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on  or about 
19  ,  (by prepar- 
ing (a voucher) (  ) for presentation 
for approval or payment) (  ), make 
a claim against the (United States) (finance officer at 
) (  ) in the amount 
of $  for (private property alleged to 
have been (lost) (destroyed) in the military service) 
(  ), which claim was (false) (fraudu- 
lent) (false and fraudulent) in the amount of 
$  i  n  that  and was 
then known by the said  to be (false) 
(fraudulent) (false and fraudulent). 
(2)  Presenting false  claim. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,by presenting 
(a voucher) (  ) to  , an officer of the United States duly authorized to 
(approve) (pay) (approve and pay) such claim, pre- 
sent for (approval) (payment) (approval and pay- 
ment) a claim against the (United States) (finance of- 
ficer at  > (  ) in the 
amount of $  for (services alleged to 
have been  rendered to the United States by 
during  ) 
(  ), which claim was (false) (fraudu- 
lent) (false and fraudulent) in the amount of 
$  in  that  , and 
was then known by the said  to be 
(false) (fraudulent) (false and fraudulent). 
(3)  Making or using false  writing. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), for the purpose of  obtaining the (approval) 
(allowance) (payment) (approval, allowance, and 
payment), of a claim against the United States in the 
amount  of  $  ,  did  (at/on 
board-location)  (subject-matter jurisdiction data, 
if  required),  on  or  about 
19  ,  (make) (use) (make and use) a 
certain (writing) (paper), to wit:  , 
which said (writing) (paper), as he/she,  the said 
,then knew, contained a statement 
that  ,  which statement was (false) 
(fraudulent)  (false and fraudulent) in that 
,and was then known by  the said 
to be (false) (fraudulent) (false and 
fraudulent). 
(4) Making false  oath. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), for the purpose of obtaining the (approval) 
(allowance) (payment) (approval, allowance, and 
payment) of a claim against the United States, did, 
(at/on board-location)  (subject-matter jurisdiction 
data, if required),  on or about 
19  ,  make an oath (to the fact that 
) (to a certain (writing) (paper), to 
wit:  ,  to  the  effect  that 
), which said oath was false in that 
,  and was then known by  the said 
to be false. 
(5)  Forging or counterfeiting signature. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), for the purpose of obtaining the (approval) 
(allowance) (payment) (approval, allowance, and 
payment) of a claim against the United States, did 
(at/on board-location)  (subject-matter jurisdiction 
data, if required), on or about 
19  ,(forge) (counterfeit) (forge and 
counterfeit) the signature of  upon 
a  in words and figures as follows: 
(6) Using forged  signature. 
In that  ,  for the purpose of  ob- 
taining the (approval)(allowance)  (payment) (ap- 
proval, allowance, and payment) of a claim against 
the United States, did, (at/on  board-location) 
(subject-matter jurisdiction data, if  required), on or 
about  19  ,use the 
signature of  on a certain (writing) 
(paper), to wit:  , then knowing 
such signature to be (forged) (counterfeited) (forged 
and counterfeited). 
(7)  Paying amount less than called for  by receipt. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), having (charge)(possession)  (custody) (con- 
trol) of (money) (  ) of  the United 
States, (furnished) (intended) (furnished and in- 
tended) for the armed forces thereof, did, (at/on 
board-location)  (subject-matter jurisdiction  data, 
if  required),  on  or  about 
19  ,  knowingly  deliver  to 
,the said  having 
authority to receive the same, (an amount) 
(  )  which,  as  he/she, 
,  then  knew,  was 
($  1 (  ) less than 
the (amount) (  ) for which he/she 
received a (certificate) (receipt) from the said 
(8)  Making receipt without knowledge of the  facts. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), being authorized to (make) (deliver) (make 
and deliver) a paper certifying the receipt of prop- 
erty of the United States (furnished) (intended) (fur- 
nished and intended) for the armed forces thereof, 
did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter juris- 
diction  data,  if  required),  on  or  about 
19  ,  without hav- 
ing full knowledge of the statement therein con- 
tained and with intent to defraud the United States, 
(make)  (deliver)  (make  and  deliver)  to 
, such a writing, in  words and 
figures as follows:  ,  the property 
therein certified as received being of a value of about 59.  Article 133-Conduct  unbecoming an 
officer and gentleman 
a.  Text. 
"Any  commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman 
who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer 
and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial 
may direct." 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused did or omitted to do certain 
acts; and 
(2) That, under the circumstances, these acts or 
omissions constituted conduct unbecoming an of- 
ficer and gentleman. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Gentleman. As used  in this article, "gen- 
tleman"  includes both male and female commis- 
sioned officers, cadets, and midshipmen. 
(2)  Nature of offense. Conduct violative of this ar- 
ticle is action or behavior in an official capacity 
which, in dishonoring or disgracing the person as an 
officer, seriously compromises the officer's character 
as a gentleman, or action or behavior in an unofficial 
or private capacity which, in dishonoring or dis- 
gracing the officer personally, seriously com- 
promises the person's standing as an officer. There 
are certain moral attributes common to the ideal of- 
ficer and the perfect gentleman, a lack of which is in- 
dicated by acts of dishonesty, unfair dealing, inde- 
cency, indecorum, lawlessness, injustice, or cruelty. 
Not everyone is or can be expected to meet unrealis- 
tically high moral standards, but there is a limit of 
tolerance based on customs of the service and mili- 
tary necessity below which the personal standards of 
an officer, cadet, or midshipman cannot fall without 
seriously compromising the person's standing as an 
officer, cadet, or midshipman or the person's charac- 
ter as a gentleman. This article prohibits conduct by 
a commissioned officer,  cadet, or midshipman 
which, taking all the circumstances into considera- 
tion, is thus compromising. This article includes acts 
made punishable by any other article, provided these 
acts amount to conduct unbecoming an officer and a 
gentleman. Thus, a commissioned officer who steals 
property violates both this article and Article 121. 
Whenever the offense charged is the same as a spe- 
cific offense set forth in this Manual, the elements of 
proof are the same as those set forth in the para- 
graph which treats that specific offense, with the ad- 
ditional requirement that the act or omission consti- 
tutes conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. 
(3) Examples of offenses. Instances of violation of 
this article include knowingly making a false official 
statement; dishonorable failure to pay a debt; cheat- 
ing on an exam; opening and reading a letter of an- 
other without authority; using insulting or defama- 
tory language to another officer in that officer's 
presence or about that officer to other military per- 
sons; being drunk and disorderly in a public place; 
public association with known prostitutes; commit- 
ting or attempting to commit a crime involving 
moral turpitude; and failing without good cause to 
support the officer's family. 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Dismissal, forfeiture of 
all pay and allowances, and confinement for a period 
not in excess of that authorized for the most analo- 
gous offense for which a punishment is prescribed in 
this Manual, or, if none is prescribed, for 1 year. 
f.  Sample speci$cations. 
(1)  Copying or using examination paper. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  ,while under- 
going a written examination on the subject of 
,wrongfully and dishonorably (re- 
ceive) (request) unauthorized aid by ((using) (copy- 
ing) the examination paper of  1) 
(  ). 
(2)  Drunk or disorderly. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), was, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  , in a public 
place, to wit:  ,(drunk) (disorder1  y) 
(drunk and disorderly) while in uniform, to the dis- 
grace of the armed forces. 
60.  Article 134-General  article 
a.  Text. 
"Though  not specifically mentioned in this chapter, 
all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good 
order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct 
of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, 
and crimes and offenses not capital, of which per- 
sons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be 
taken cognizance of by a general, special, or sum- 
mary court-martial, according to the nature and de- gree of the offense, and shall be punished at the dis- 
cretion of that court." 
b.  Elements. The proof required for conviction of an 
offense under Article 134 depends upon the nature 
of the misconduct charged. If the conduct is pun- 
ished as a crime or offense not capital, the proof 
must establish every element of the crime or offense 
as required by  the applicable law. If the conduct is 
punished as a disorder or neglect to the prejudice of 
good order and discipline in the armed forces, or of a 
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, then 
the following proof is required: 
(1)  That the accused did or failed to do certain 
acts; and 
(2)  That, under the circumstances, the accused's 
conduct was to the prejudice of good order and dis- 
cipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  In general. Article 134 makes punishable acts 
in three categories of offenses not specifically cov- 
ered in any other article of the code. These are re- 
ferred to as "clauses  1, 2, and 3"  of Article  134. 
Clause 1 offenses involved disorders and neglects to 
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the 
armed forces. Clause 2 offenses involve conduct of a 
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
Clause 3 offenses involve noncapital crimes or of- 
fenses which violate Federal law including law made 
applicable through the Federal Assimilative Crimes 
Act, see subsection (4) below. If any conduct of this 
nature is specifically made punishable by another ar- 
ticle of the code, it must be charged as a violation of 
that article. See subparagraph (5)(a) below. How- 
ever, see paragraph 59c for offenses committed by 
commissioned officers, cadets, and midshipmen. 
(2)  Disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good 
order and discipline in the armed forces  (clause I). 
(a)  TO  the prejudice of good and discipline. "To 
the prejudice of good order and discipline"  refers 
only to acts directly prejudicial to good order and 
discipline and not to acts which are prejudicial only 
in a remote or indirect sense. Almost any irregular 
or improper act on the part of a member of the mili- 
tary service could be regarded as prejudicial in some 
indirect or remote sense; however, this article does 
not include these distant effects. It is confined to 
cases in which the prejudice is reasonably direct and 
palpable. An act in violation of a local civil law or of 
a foreign law may be punished if it constitutes a dis- 
order or neglect to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces. However, see R.C.M. 
203 concerning subject-matter  jurisdiction. 
(b)  Breach of custom of the service. A breach of 
a custom of the service may result in a violation of 
clause 1 of Article 134. In its legal sense, "custom" 
means more than a method of procedure or a mode 
of conduct or behavior which is merely of frequent 
or usual occurrence. Custom arises out of long es- 
tablished practices which by common usage have at- 
tained the force of law in the military or other com- 
munity affected by them. No custom may be 
contrary to existing law or regulation. A custom 
which has not been adopted by existing statute or 
regulation ceases to exist when its observance has 
been generally abandoned. Many customs of the ser- 
vice are now set forth in regulations of the various 
armed forces. Violations of these customs should be 
charged under Article 92 as violations of the regula- 
tions in which they appear if the regulation is puni- 
tive. See paragraph 16c. 
(3)  Conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the 
armed  forces  (clause 2). "Discredit"  means to injure 
the reputation of. This clause of Article 134 makes 
punishable conduct which has a tendency to bring 
the service into disrepute or which tends to lower it 
in public esteem. Acts in violation of a local civil law 
or a foreign law may be punished if they are of a na- 
ture to bring discredit upon the armed forces. How- 
ever, see R.C.M. 203 concerning subject-matter ju- 
risdiction. 
(4)  Crimes and offenses not capital (clause 3). 
(a)  In general. State and foreign laws are not 
included within the crimes and offenses not capital 
referred to in this clause of Article 134 and viola- 
tions thereof may not be prosecuted as such except 
when State law becomes Federal law of local appli- 
cation under section 13 of title 18 of the United 
States Code (Federal Assimilative Crimes Act-see 
subparagraph (4)(c) below).  For the purpose of 
court-martial jurisdiction,  the laws which may be 
applied under clause 3 of Article  134 are divided 
into two groups: crimes and offenses of unlimited ap- 
plication (crimes which are punishable regardless 
where they may be committed), and crimes and of- 
fenses of local application (crimes which are punish- 
able only if committed in areas of federal jurisdic- 
tion). (b)  Crimes and offenses of unlimited applica- 
tion. Certain noncapital crimes and offenses prohi- 
bited by the United States Code are made applicable 
under clause 3 of Article 134 to all persons subject to 
the code regardless where the wrongful act or omis- 
sion occurred. Examples include: counterfeiting (1 8 
U.S.C.  5 471), and various frauds against the Gov- 
ernment not covered by Article 132. 
(c)  Crimes and offenses  of local application. 
(i)  In general. A person subject to the code 
may not be punished under clause 3 of Article 134 
for an offense that occurred in a place where the law 
in question did not apply. For example, a person 
may not be punished under clause 3 of Article 134 
when the act occurred in a foreign country merely 
because that act would have been an offense under 
the United States Code had the act occurred in the 
United States. Regardless where committed, such an 
act might be punishable under clauses 1 or 2 of Arti- 
cle 134. There are two types of congressional enact- 
ments of local application: specific federal statutes 
(defining particular crimes), and a general federal 
statute, the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act (which 
adopts certain state criminal laws). 
(ii)  Federal Assimilative  Crimes Act  (18 
U.S.C. 8 13). The Federal Assimilative Crimes Act 
is an adoption by Congress of state criminal laws for 
areas of exclusive or concurrent federal jurisdiction, 
provided federal criminal law, including the UCMJ, 
has not defined an applicable offense for the miscon- 
duct committed. The Act applies to state laws val- 
idly existing at the time of the offense without regard 
to when these laws were enacted, whether before or 
after passage of the Act, and whether before or after 
the acquisition of the land where the offense was 
committed. For example, if a person committed an 
act on a military installation in the United States at a 
certain location over which the United States had ei- 
ther exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction, and it was 
not an offense specifically defined by federal law (in- 
cluding the UCMJ), that person could be punished 
for that act by a court-martial if it was a violation of 
a noncapital offense  under the law of the State where 
the military installation was located. This is possible 
because the Act adopts the criminal law of the state 
wherein the military installation is located and ap- 
plies it as though it were federal law. The text of the 
Act is as follows: Whoever within or upon any of the 
places now existing or hereafter reserved or acquired 
as provided in section 7 of this title, is guilty of any 
act or omission which, although not made punisha- 
ble by any enactment of Congress, would be punish- 
able if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction 
of the State, Territory, Possession, or District in 
which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in 
force at the time of such act or omission, shall be 
guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punish- 
ment. 
(5) Limitations on Article 134. 
(a)  Preemption  doctrine. The preemption doc- 
trine prohibits application of Article 134 to conduct 
covered by Articles 80 through  132. For example, 
larceny is covered in Article 121, and if an element 
of  that offense is lacking-for  example, in- 
tent-there  can be no larceny or larceny-type of- 
fense, either under Article 121 or, because of pre- 
emption, under Article  134. Article  134 cannot be 
used to create a new kind of larceny offense, one 
without the required intent, where Congress has al- 
ready set the minimum requirements for such an of- 
fense in Article 12 1. 
(b)  Capital offense. A capital offense may not 
be tried under Article 134. 
(6) Drafting specijcations for Article 134 offenses. 
(a)  In general. A specification alleging a viola- 
tion of Article 134 need not expressly allege that the 
conduct was "a  disorder or neglect," that it was "of 
a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces," 
or that it constituted "a  crime or offense not capi- 
tal." The same conduct may constitute a disorder or 
neglect to the prejudice of good order and discipline 
in the armed forces and at the same time be of a na- 
ture to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
(b)  Specijcations under clause 3. When alleg- 
ing a clause 3 violation, each element of the federal 
or assimilated statute must be alleged expressly or 
by necessary implication. In addition, the federal or 
assimilated statute should be identified. 
(c)  Specijcations for  clause 1 or 2 offenses not 
listed. If conduct by an accused does not fall under 
any of the listed offenses  for violations of Article 134 
in this Manual (paragraphs 6 1 through 1  13 of this 
Part) a specification not listed in this Manual may be 
used to allege the offense. 
61.  Article 134-(Abusing  public animal) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. (1)  That the accused wrongfully abused a certain 
public animal; and 
(2) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c. Explanation. A public animal is any animal 
owned or used by the United States; and animal 
owned or used by a local or State government in the 
United States, its territories or possessions; or any 
wild  animal located on any public lands in the 
United States, its territories or possessions. This 
would include, for example, drug detector dogs used 
by the government. 
d. Lesser included offenses. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Confinement for 3 
months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month 
for 3 months. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , wrongfully 
(kick a public drug detector dog in the nose) 
62.  Article 134-(Adultery) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused wrongfully had sexual inter- 
course with a certain person; 
(2)  That, at the time, the accused or the other 
person was married to someone else; and 
(3)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. Adultery is not a lesser included of- 
fense of rape. 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 1 year. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), (a married man/a  married woman), did, (at/ 
on board-location)  (subject-matter jurisdiction 
data, if required),  on or about 
19  , wrongfully have sexual inter- 
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course with  ,a (married) (woman/ 
man) not (his wife) (her husband). 
63.  Article 134-(Assault-indecent) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1) That the accused assaulted a certain person 
not the spouse of the accused in a certain manner; 
(2) That the acts were done with the intent to 
gratify the lust or sexual desires of the accused; and 
(3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. See paragraph 54c for a discussion 
of assault. Specific intent is an element of this of- 
fense. For a definition of "indecent",  see paragraph 
90c. 
d. Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Article 128-assault  consummated by a bat- 
tery; assault 
(2)  Article 134-indecent  acts 
(3)  Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 5 years. 
f. Sample spec$cation. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did (at/on  board-location),  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  commit an 
indecent assault upon  a person not 
hidher wife/husband  by  ,with in- 
tent to gratify hidher (lust) (sexual desires). 
64.  Article 134-(Assault-with  intent to 
commit murder, voluntary manslaughter, 
rape, robbery, sodomy, arson, burglary, or 
housebreaking) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1) That the accused assaulted a certain person; 
(2) That, at the time of the assault, the accused 
intended to kill (as required for murder or voluntary 
manslaughter) or intended to commit rape, robbery, 
sodomy, arson, burglary, or housebreaking; and 
(3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  In general. An assault with intent to commit 
any of the offenses mentioned above is not necessa- 
rily the equivalent of an attempt to commit the in- 
tended offense, for an assault can be committed with 
intent to commit an offense without achieving that 
proximity to consummation of an intended offense 
which is essential to an attempt. See paragraph 4. 
(2)  Assault with intent to murder. Assault with in- 
tent to commit murder is assault with specific intent 
to kill. Actual infliction of injury is not necessary. To 
constitute an assault with intent to murder with a 
firearm, it is not necessary that the weapon be dis- 
charged. When the intent to kill exists, the fact that 
for some unknown reason the actual consummation 
of the murder by the means employed is impossible 
is not a defense if the means are apparently adapted 
to the end in view. The intent to kill need not be di- 
rected against the person assaulted if the assault is 
committed with intent to kill some person. For ex- 
ample, if  a person, intending to kill Jones, shoots 
Smith, mistaking Smith for Jones, that person is 
guilty of assaulting Smith with intent to murder. If a 
person fires into a group with intent to kill anyone in 
the group, that person is guilty of and assault with 
intent to murder each member of the group. 
(3)  Assault  with intent to commit voluntary man- 
slaughter. Assault with intent to commit voluntary 
manslaughter is an assault committed with a specific 
intent to kill under such circumstances that, if death 
resulted therefrom, the offense of voluntary man- 
slaughter would have been committed. There can be 
no assault with intent to commit involuntary man- 
slaughter, for it is not a crime capable of being inten- 
tionally committed. 
(4)  Assault  with intent to commit rape. In assault 
with intent to commit rape, the accused must have 
intended to overcome any resistance by force, and to 
complete the offense. Any lesser intent will not suf- 
fice. No actual touching is necessary, but indecent 
advances and importunities, however earnest, not 
accompanied by such an intent, do not constitute 
this offense, nor do mere preparations to rape not 
amounting to an assault. Once an assault with intent 
to commit rape is made, it is no defense that the ac- 
cused voluntarily desisted. 
(5) Assault with intent to rob. For assault with in- 
tent to rob, the fact that the accused intended to take 
money and that the person the accused intended to 
rob had none is not a defense. 
(6) Assault with intent to commit sodomy. Assault 
with intent to commit sodomy is an assault against a 
human being and must be committed with a specific 
intent to commit sodomy. Any lesser intent, or dif- 
ferent intent, will not suffice. 
d. Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Assault with intent to murder. 
(a)  Article 128-assault;  assault consummated 
by a battery; assault with a dangerous weapon; as- 
sault intentionally inflicting grievous bodily harm 
(b)  Article 134-assault  with intent to commit 
voluntary manslaughter; willful or careless dis- 
charge of a firearm 
(2)  Assault with intent to commit voluntary man- 
slaughter. 
(a)  Article 128-assault;  assault consummated 
by a battery; assault with a dangerous weapon; as- 
sault intentionally inflicting grievous bodily harm 
(b)  Article 134-willful  or careless discharge 
of a firearm 
(3) Assault with intent to commit rape or sodomy. 
(a)  Article 128-assault;  assault consummated 
by a battery; assault with a dangerous weapon 
(b)  Article 134-indecent  assault 
(4) Assault with intent to commit burglary. 
(a)  Article 128-assault;  assault consummated 
by a battery; assault with a dangerous weapon 
(b)  Article 134-assault  with intent to commit 
housebreaking 
(5) Assault  with intent  to commit robbery, arson, 
or housebreaking. Article 128-assault;  assault con- 
summated by a battery; assault with a dangerous 
weapon 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1) Assault with intent to commit murder or rape. 
Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and al- 
lowances, and confinement for 20 years. 
(2)  Assault  with intent to commit voluntary man- 
slaughter, robbery, sodomy, arson, or burglary. Dis-
honorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and al- 
lowances, and confinement for 10 years. 
(3) Assault  with intent to commit housebreaking. 
Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and al- 
lowances, and confinement for 5 years. 
f.  Sample specification. In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if required), on or about 
19  , with intent 
to commit (murder) (voluntary manslaughter) 
(rape) (robbery) (sodomy) (arson) (burglary) 
(housebreaking),  commit an assault upon 
65.  Article 134-(Bigamy) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused had a living lawful spouse; 
(2)  That while having such spouse the accused 
wrongfully married another person; and 
(3)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. Bigamy is contracting another mar- 
riage by one who already has a living lawful spouse. 
If a prior marriage was void, it will have created no 
status of "lawful  spouse."  However, if it was only 
voidable and has not been voided by a competent 
court, this is no defense. A belief that a prior mar- 
riage has been terminated by divorce, death of the 
other spouse, or otherwise, constitutes a defense 
only if the belief  was reasonable. See R.C.M. 
9 15(1)(1). 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 2 years. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, at  ,(subject-matter ju- 
risdiction  data, if  required),  on  or about 
19  ,  wrongfully 
m  a  r  r  y  ,  having at the time of his/ 
her said marriage to -- a lawful wife/ 
husband then living, to wit: 
66.  Article 134-(Bribery  and graft) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Asking, accepting, or receiving. 
(a) That the accused wrongfully  asked, ac- 
cepted, or received a thing of value from a certain 
person or organization; 
(b)  That the accused then occupied a certain 
official position or had certain official duties; 
(c)  That the accused asked, accepted, or re- 
ceived this thing of value (with the intent to have the 
accused's decision or action influenced with respect 
to a certain matter)* (as compensation for or in rec- 
ognition of services rendered, to be rendered, or 
both, by the accused in relation to a certain mat- 
ter)**; 
(d)  That this certain matter was an official mat- 
ter in which the United States was and is interested; 
and 
(e)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct 
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
(*Note: This element is required for bribery.) 
(**Note: This element is required for graft.) 
(2)  Promising, offering, or giving. 
(a)  That the accused wrongfully promised, of- 
fered, or gave a thing of value to a certain person; 
(b)  That this person then occupied a certain of- 
ficial position or had certain official duties; 
(c)  That this thing of value was promised, of- 
fered, or given (with the intent to influence the deci- 
sion or action of this person)* (as compensation for 
or in recognition of services rendered, to be ren- 
dered, or both, by this person in relation to a certain 
matter)**; 
(d)  That this matter was an official matter in 
which the United States was and is interested; and 
(e)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct 
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
(*Note: This element is required for bribery.) 
(**Note: This element is required for graft.) 
c.  Explanation. Bribery requires an intent to influ- 
ence or be influenced in an official matter; graft does 
not. Graft involves compensation for services per- 
formed in an official matter when no compensation 
is due. 
d. Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Bribery. Article 134-graft 
(2)  Bribery and graft. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Bribery. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of 
all pay and allowances, and confinement for 5 years. (2)  Graft. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of 
all pay and allowances, and confinement for 3 years. 
f.  Sample specifications. 
(1)  Asking, accepting, or receiving. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), being at the time (a contracting officer for 
)  (the  personnel  officer  of 
1 (  ),  did, (at/on 
board-location)  (subject-matter jurisdiction data, 
if  required),  on  or  about 
19  ,wrongfully (ask) (accept) (re- 
ceive) from  ,(a contracting com- 
pany)  engaged  in 
(  ), (the sum of  $  ) 
(  ,  of  a  value  of  (about) 
$  ) (  ), (with intent 
to have hidher (decision) (action) influenced with 
respect to*) ((as compensation for) (in recognition 
of)) service (rendered) (to be rendered) (rendered 
and  to be  rendered) by  him/her  the said 
in relation to**) an official matter 
in which the United States was and is interested, to 
wit: (the purchasing of military supplies from 
) (the transfer of 
to duty with  1(  ). 
(*Note: This language should be used to allege 
bribery.) 
(**Note: This language should be used to allege 
graft.) 
(2)  Promising, offering, or giving. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required),  on or about 
19  ,  wrongfully 
(promise) (offer) (give) to  ,(his/ 
her commanding officer) (the claims officer  of 
) (  ), (the sum of 
$  ) (  ,  of a value of 
(about $  ) (  ,  (with 
intent to influence the (decision) (action) of the said 
with respect to*) ((as compensa- 
tion for) (in recognition of)) services (rendered) (to 
be rendered) (rendered and to be rendered) by the 
said  in relation to**) an official 
matter in which the United States was and is inter- 
ested,  to  wit:  (the  granting  of  leave  to 
) (the processing of a claim against 
the United States in favor of  ) 
(  ). 
(*Note: This language should be used to allege 
bribery.) 
(**Note: This language should be used to allege 
graft.) 
67.  Article 134-(Burning  with intent to 
defraud) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused willfully and maliciously 
burned or set fire to certain property owned by a cer- 
tain person or organization; 
(2)  That such burning or setting on fire was with 
the intent to defraud a certain person or organiza- 
tion; and 
(3)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. See paragraph 49c(14) for a discus- 
sion of "intent to defraud." 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 8kattempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 10 years. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction data, if  required),  on  or about 
19  ,willfully and 
maliciously (burn) (set fire to) (a dwelling) (a barn) 
(an automobile), the property of  , 
with intent to defraud (the insurer thereof, to wit: 
68.  Article 134-(Check,  worthless, making 
and uttering-by  dishonorably failing to 
maintain funds) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused made and uttered a certain 
check; 
(2) That the check was made and uttered for the 
purchase of a certain thing, in payment of a debt, or 
for a certain purpose; 
(3) That the accused subsequently failed to place 
or maintain sufficient funds in or credit with the 
drawee bank for payment of the check in full upon 
its presentment for payment; (4)  That this failure was dishonorable; and 
(5)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. This offense differs from an Article 
123a offense (paragraph 49) in that there need be no 
intent to defraud or deceive at the time of making, 
drawing, uttering, or delivery, and that the accused 
need not know at that time that the accused did not 
or would not have sufficient funds for payment. The 
gist of the offense lies in the conduct of the accused 
after uttering the instrument. Mere negligence in 
maintaining one's bank balance is insufficient for 
this offense, for the accused's conduct must reflect 
bad faith or gross indifference in this regard. As in 
the offense of dishonorable failure to pay debts (see 
paragraph 7 l), dishonorable conduct of the accused 
is necessary, and the other principles discussed in 
paragraph 7 1 also apply here. 
d. Lesser included offenses. None. 
e.  Maximum punishment. Bad-conduct discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 6 months. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required),  on or about 
19  ,make and ut- 
ter to  a certain check, in words 
and figures as follows, to wit:  ,  (for 
the purchase of  ) (in payment of a 
debt) (for the purpose of  ), and did 
thereafter dishonorably fail to (place) (maintain) 
sufficient funds in the  Bank for 
payment of such check in full upon its presentment 
for payment. 
69.  Article 134-(Cohabitation,  wrongful) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That, during a certain period of time, the ac- 
cused and another person openly and publicly lived 
together as husband and wife, holding themselves 
out as such; 
(2)  That the other person was not the spouse of 
the accused; 
(3)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c. Explanation. This offense differs from adultery 
(see paragraph 62) in that it is not necessary to prove 
that one of the partners was married or that sexual 
intercourse took place. Public knowledge of the 
wrongfulness of the relationship is not required, but 
the partners must behave in a manner, as exhibited 
by conduct or language, that leads others to believe 
that a martial relationship exists. 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Confinement for 4 
months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month 
for 4 months. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required),  from about 
19  , to about 
19  , wrongfully cohabit with 
,(a woman not his wife) (a man not 
her husband). 
70.  Article 134-(Correctional 
custody-offenses  against) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1) Escape from correctional custody. 
(a)  That the accused was placed in correctional 
custody by a person authorized to do so; 
@)  That, while in such correctional custody, 
the accused was under physical restraint; 
(c)  That the accused freed himself or herself 
from the physical restraint of this correctional cus- 
tody before being released therefrom by proper au- 
thority; and 
(d)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct 
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
(2)  Breach of correctional custody. 
(a)  That the accused was placed in correctional 
custody by a person authorized to do so; 
(b)  That, while in correctional custody, a cer- 
tain restraint was imposed upon the accused; 
(c)  That the accused went beyond the limits of 
the restraint imposed before having been released 
from the correctional custody or relieved of the re- 
straint by proper authority; and (d) That, under the circumstances, the conduct 
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Escape from  correctional custody. Escape 
from correctional custody is the act of a person un- 
dergoing the punishment of correctional custody 
pursuant to Article 15, who, before being set at lib- 
erty by proper authority, casts off any physical re- 
straint imposed by the custodian or by the place or 
conditions of custody. 
(2)  Breach of correctional  custody. Breach of re- 
straint during correctional custody is the act of a 
person undergoing the punishment who, in the ab- 
sence of physical restraint imposed by a custodian or 
by the place or conditions of custody, breaches any 
form of restraint imposed during this period. 
(3)  Authority to impose correctional  custody. See 
Part V concerning who may impose correctional 
custody. Whether the status of a person authorized 
that person to impose correctional custody is a ques- 
tion of law to be decided by the military judge. 
Whether the person who imposed correctional cus- 
tody had such a status is a question of fact to be de- 
cided by the factfinder. 
d.  Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Escape from correctional custody. Dishonora-
ble discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 
and confinement for 1 year. 
(2)  Breach of correctional custody. Bad-conduct 
discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 6 months. 
f.  Sample specijcations. 
(1)  Escape from correctional custody. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), while undergoing the punishment of correc- 
tional custody imposed by a person authorized to do 
so, did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  ,escape from 
correctional custody. 
(2)  Breach of correctional custody. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), while duly undergoing the punishment of cor- 
rectional custody imposed by a person authorized to 
do so, did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  , breach the 
restraint imposed thereunder by 
71. Article 134-(Debt,  dishonorably failing 
to pay) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused was indebted to a certain 
person or entity in a certain sum; 
(2)  That this debt became due and payable on or 
about a certain date; 
(3) That while the debt was still due and payable 
the accused dishonorably failed to pay this debt; and 
(4) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. More than negligence in nonpay- 
ment is necessary. The  failure to pay must be charac- 
terized by deceit, evasion, false promises, or other 
distinctly culpable circumstances indicating a delib- 
erate nonpayment or grossly indifferent attitude to- 
ward one's just  obligations. For a debt to form the 
basis of this offense, the accused must not have had a 
defense, or an equivalent offset or counterclaim, ei- 
ther in fact or according to the accused's belief, at 
the time alleged. The offense should not be charged 
if there was a genuine dispute between the parties as 
to the facts or law relating to the debt which would 
affect the obligation of the accused to pay. The of- 
fense is not committed if the creditor or creditors in- 
volved are satisfied with the conduct of the debtor 
with respect to payment. The length of the period of 
nonpayment and any denial of indebtedness which 
the accused may have made may tend to prove that 
the accused's conduct was dishonorable, but the 
court-martial may convict only if it finds from all of 
the evidence that the conduct was in fact dishonora- 
ble. 
d. Lesser included offenses. None. 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Bad-conduct discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 6 months. 
f.  Sample specijcation. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), being indebted to  in the sum 
of  $  for  , which 
amount became due and payable (on) (about) (on or 
about)  19  , did 
(at/on  board-location)(subject-matter  jurisdiction 
data,  if  required),  from 
19  ,  to 19  ,  dishonorably fail to pay said 
debt. 
72.  Article 134-(Disloyal  statements) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused made a certain statement; 
(2)  That the statement was communicated to an- 
other person; 
(3)  That the statement was disloyal to the United 
States; 
(4)  That the statement was made with the intent 
to promote disloyalty or disaffection toward the 
United States by any member of the armed forces or 
to interfere with or impair the loyalty to the United 
States or good order and discipline of any member of 
the armed forces; and 
(5)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. Certain disloyal statements by mili- 
tary personnel may not constitute an offense under 
18 U.S.C. $5 2385, 2387, and 2388, but may, under 
the circumstances, be punishable under this article. 
Examples include praising the enemy, attacking the 
war aims of the United States, or denouncing our 
form of government with the intent to promote dis- 
loyalty or disaffection among members of the armed 
services. A declaration of personal belief can amount 
to a disloyal statement if it disavows allegiance owed 
to the United States by the declarant. The disloyalty 
involved for this offense must be to the United States 
as a political entity and not merely to a department 
or other agency that is a part of its administration. 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e. Maximum punishment.  Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 3 years. 
f. 	Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  ,  with intent 
to (promote (disloyalty) (disaffection) (disloyalty 
and disaffection)) ((interfere with) (impair) the (loy- 
alty) (good order and discipline)) of any member of 
the armed forces of the United States communicate 
to  ,  the following statement, to wit: 
6'  ," or words to that effect, which 
statement was disloyal to the United States. 
73.  Article 134-(Disorderly  conduct, 

drunkenness) 

a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused was drunk, disorderly, or 
drunk and disorderly on board ship or in some other 
place; and 
(2)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1) Drunkenness. See paragraph 35c(3) for a dis- 
cussion of intoxication. 
(2)  Disorderly. Disorderly conduct is conduct of 
such a nature as to affect the peace and quiet of per- 
sons who may witness it and who may be disturbed 
or provoked to resentment thereby. It includes con- 
duct that endangers public morals or outrages public 
decency and any disturbance of a contentious or tur- 
bulent character. 
(3)  Service discrediting. Unlike most offenses 
under Article 134,"conduct of a nature to bring dis- 
credit upon the armed forces" must be included in 
the specification and proved in order to authorized 
the higher maximum punishment when the offense 
is service discrediting. 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Disorderly conduct. 
(a)  Under such circumstances as to bring dis- 
credit upon the military service. Confinement for 4 
months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month 
for 4 months. 
(b)  Other cases. Confinement for 1 month and 
forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for 1 month. 
(2)  Drunkenness. 
(a)  Aboard ship or under such circumstances as 
to bring discredit upon the military service. Confine-
ment for 3 months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay 
per month for 3 months. 
(b)  Other cases. Confinement for 1 month and 
forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for 1 month. 
(3)  Drunk and disorderly. (a)  Aboard ship. Bad-conduct discharge, forfei- 
ture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 6 
months. 
(b)  Under such circumstances as to bring dis- 
credit upon the military service. Confinement for 6 
months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month 
for 6 months. 
(c)  Other cases. Confinement for 3 months and 
forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for 3 months. 
f. Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), was, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,(drunk) (dis- 
orderly) (drunk and disorderly) (which conduct was 
of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces). 
74.  Article 134-(Drinking  liquor with 
prisoner) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1) That the accused was a sentinel or in another 
assignment in charge of a prisoner; 
(2)  That, while in such capacity, the accused un- 
lawfully drank intoxicating liquor with a prisoner; 
(3)  That the prisoner was under the charge of the 
accused; 
(4)  That the accused knew that the prisoner was a 
prisoner under the accused's charge; and 
(5) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Prisoner.  A "prisoner"  is a person who is in 
confinement or custody imposed under R.C.M. 302, 
304, or 305, or under sentence of a court-martial 
who has not been set free by proper authority. 
(2)  Liquor. For the purposes of this offense, "li- 
quor" includes any alcoholic beverage. 
d.  Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Confinement for 3 
months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month 
for 3 months. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), a (sentinel) (  ) in charge of 
prisoners, did, (at/on board-location),  on or about 
,  unlawfully drink intoxicating 
liquor with  ,a prisoner under his/ 
her charge. 
75.  Article 134--(Drunk  prisoner) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1) That the accused was a prisoner; 
(2) That while in such status the accused was 
found drunk; and 
(3)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Prisoner. See paragraph 74c(l). 
(2)  Drunk. See paragraph 35c(3) for a discussion 
of intoxication. 
d.  Lesser included offenses. None. 
e. Maximum punishment. Confinement for 3 
months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month 
for 3 months. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), a prisoner, was (at/on board-location),  on or 
about  19  ,found 
drunk. 
76.  Article 
134-(Drunkenness-incapacitation  for 
performance of duties through prior 
wrongful indulgence in intoxicating liquor or 
any drug) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused had certain duties to per- 
form; 
(2)  That the accused was incapacitated for the 
proper performance of such duties; 
(3)  That such incapacitation was the result of 
previous wrongful indulgence in intoxicating liquor 
or any drug; and 
(4) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature of 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Liquor. See paragraph 74c(2). 
(2)  Incapacitated. Incapacitated means unfit or 
unable to perform properly. A person is "unfit"  to  19 perform duties if at the time the duties are to com- 
mence, the person is drunk, even though physically 
able to perform the duties. Illness resulting from 
previous overindulgence is an example of be- 
ing6'unable" to perform duties. For a discussion of 
"drunk"  see paragraph 3543). 
(3) AfJirmative  defense. The accused's  lack of 
knowledge of the duties assigned is an affirmative de- 
fense to this offense. 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Confinement for 3 
months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month 
for 3 months. 
f. 	Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), was, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  ,  as a result of 
wrongful previous overindulgence in intoxicating li- 
quor or drugs incapacitated for the proper perform- 
ance of his/her  duties. 
77.  Article 134-(False  or unauthorized pass 
offenses) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Wrongful making, altering, counterfeiting, or 
tampering with a military or ofJicial pass, permit, dis- 
charge certijcate, or identijcation card. 
(a) That the accused wrongfully and falsely 
made, altered, counterfeited, or tampered with a cer- 
tain military or official pass, permit, discharge certif- 
icate, or identification card; and 
(b) That, under the circumstances, the conduct 
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
(2) Wrongful sale, gift, loan, or disposition of a 
military or ofJicial pass, permit,  discharge certificate, 
or ident8cation card. 
(a) That the accused wrongfully sold, gave, 
loaned, or disposed of a certain military or official 
pass, permit, discharge certificate, or identification 
card; 
(b) That the pass, permit, discharge certificate, 
or identification card was false or unauthorized; 
(c)  That the accused then knew that the pass, 
permit, discharge certificate, or identification card 
was false or unauthorized; and 
(d) That, under the circumstances, the conduct 
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
(3)  Wrongful use or possession  of a false  or unau- 
thorized military or ofJicial pass, permit, discharge 
certijcate, or identijcation card. 
(a) That the accused wrongfully used or pos- 
sessed a certain military or official pass, permit, dis- 
charge certificate, or identification card; 
@)  That the pass, permit, discharge certificate, 
or identification card was false or unauthorized; 
(c) That the accused then knew that the pass, 
permit, discharge certificate, or identification card 
was false or unauthorized; and 
(d) That, under the circumstances, the conduct 
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
[Note: When there is intent to defraud or deceive, 
add the following element after (c) above: That the 
accused used or possessed the pass, permit, dis- 
charge certificate, or identification card with an in- 
tent to defraud or deceive.] 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  In general. "Military or official pass, permit, 
discharge certificate, or identification card"  in- 
cludes, as well as the more usual forms of these doc- 
uments, all documents issued by any governmental 
agency for the purpose of identification  and copies 
thereof. 
(2)  Intent to defraud or deceive. See paragraph 
49c(14) and (15). 
d.  Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Wrongful use orpossession of false  or unautho- 
rized military or ofJicial pass, permit, discharge certif- 
icate, or identification card, with the intent to defraud 
or deceive. Article 134-same  offenses, except with- 
out the intent to defraud or deceive. 
(2) All false or unauthorized pass offenses. Article 
80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Possessing or using with intent to defraud or 
deceive, or making, altering, counterfeiting, tamper- 
ing with, or selling. Dishonorable discharge, forfei- 
ture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 3 
years. (2) All other cases. Bad-conduct discharge, forfei- 
ture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 6 
months. 
f.  Sample specifications. 
(1) Wrongful making, altering, counterfeiting, 
or tampering with military or official pass, permit, 
discharge certificate, or identification  card. In that 
(personal jurisdiction data), did, 
(at/on board-location)  (subject-matter jurisdiction 
data, if  required), on or about 
1  9  ,  wrongfully and falsely (make) 
(forge) (alter by  ) (counterfeit) 
(tamper with by  ) (a certain instru- 
ment purporting to be) (a) (an) (another's)  (naval) 
(military) (official) (pass)(permit) (discharge certifi- 
cate) (identification  card) (  ) in 
words and figures as follows: 
(2)  Wrongful sale, gift,  loan, or disposition of a 
military or oficial pass, permit, discharge certificate, 
or identification card. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , wrongfully 
(sell to  ) (give to  ) 
(loan  to  )  (dispose  of  by 
) (a certain instrument purporting 
to be)(a) (an) (another's)  (naval) (military) (official) 
(pass) (permit)(discharge certificate) (identification 
card) (  ) inwords and figures as fol- 
lows:  ,  he/she,  the  said 
,then well knowing the same to be 
(false) (unauthorized). 
(3)  Wrongful use or possession of a false or unau- 
thorized military or official pass, permit, discharge 
certificate, or identification card. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , wrongfully 
(use) (possess) (with intent to (defraud)(deceive)) (a 
certain instrument purporting to be) (a) (an) (an- 
other's)(naval)  (military) (official) (pass) (permit) 
(discharge certificate)(identification  card) 
( 	 )  he/she,  the  said 
,then well knowing the same to be 
(false) (unauthorized). 
78.  Article 134-(False  pretenses, obtaining 

services under) 

a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused wrongfully obtained certain 
services; 
(2)  That the obtaining was done by using false 
pretenses; 
(3)  That the accused then knew of the falsity of 
the pretenses; 
(4) That the obtaining was with intent to defraud; 
(5)  That the services were of a certain value; and 
(6) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. This offense is similar to the offenses 
of larceny and wrongful appropriation by false pre- 
tenses, except that the object of the obtaining is ser- 
vices (for example, telephone service) rather than 
money, personal property, or articles of value of any 
kind as under Article 121. See paragraph 46c. See 
paragraph 49c(14) for a definition of "intent to de- 
fraud." 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Obtaining services under 
false pretenses. 
(1)  Of a value of $100.00or less. Bad-conduct dis- 
charge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 6 months. 
(2)  Of a value of more than $100.00. Dishonora-
ble discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 
and confinement for 5 years. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , with intent 
to defraud, falsely pretend to  that 
, then knowing that the pretenses 
were false, and by means thereof did wrongfully ob- 
tain from  services, of a value of 
(about)  $  ,  to  wit: 
79.  Article 134-(False  swearing) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused took an oath or equivalent; 
IV-103 (2)  That the oath or equivalent was administered 
to the accused in a matter in which such oath or 
equivalent was required or authorized by law; 
(3)  That the oath or equivalent was administered 
by a person having authority to do so; 
(4)  That upon this oath or equivalent the accused 
made or subscribed a certain statement; 
(5)  That the statement was false; 
(6)  That the accused did not then believe the 
statement to be true; and 
(7)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline'irl' the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Nature of offense. False swearing is the mak- 
ing under a lawful oath or equivalent of any false 
statement, oral or written, not believing the state- 
ment to be true. It does not include such statements 
made in a judicial proceeding or course ofjustice, as 
these are under Article 13  1, perjury (see paragraph 
57). Unlike a false official statement under Article 
107 (see paragraph 3  1) there is no requirement that 
the statement be made with an intent to deceive or 
that the statement be official. See paragraphs 57c(l), 
c(2)(c) and c(2)(e) concerning "judicial proceeding 
or course of justice,"  proof of the falsity, and the be- 
lief of the accused, respectively. 
(2)  Oath. See Article 136 and R.C.M. 807 as to 
the authority to administer oaths, and see Section IX 
of Part I11 (Military Rules of Evidence) concerning 
proof of the signatures of persons authorized to ad- 
minister oaths. An oath includes an affirmation 
when authorized in lieu of an oath. 
d.  Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 3 years. 
f. 	Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on  or about 
19  ,  (in an affida- 
vit) (in  ),  wrongfully and unlaw- 
fully (make) (subscribe) under lawful (oath) (affir- 
mation) a false statement in substance as follows: 
,  which statement he/she  did not 
then believe to be true. 
80.  Article 134-(Firearm, 
discharging-through  negligence) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1) That the accused discharged a firearm; 
(2)  That such discharge was caused by the negli- 
gence of the accused; and 
(3)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. For a discussion of negligence, see 
paragraph 85c(2). 
d. Lesser included offenses. None 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Confinement for 3 
months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month 
for 3 months. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,through neg- 
ligence,  discharge  a  (service  rifle) 
(  ) in the (squadron) (tent) (bar- 
racks) (  of 
81.  Article 134-(Firearm, 
discharging-willfully,  under such 
circumstances as to endanger human life) 
a. Text.  See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused discharged a firearm; 
(2)  That the discharge was willful and wrongful; 
(3)  That the discharge was under circumstances 
such as to endanger human life; and 
(4)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. "Under  circumstances such as to 
endanger human life9'refers to a reasonable potenti- 
ality for harm to human beings in general. The test is 
not whether the life was in fact endangered but 
whether, considering the circumstances surround- 
ing the wrongful discharge of the weapon, the act 
was unsafe to human life in general. 
d. Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Article 134-firearm,  discharging-through 
negligence (2)  Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 1 year. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required),  on or about 
19  ,  wrongfully 
and  willfully  discharge a  firearm, to wit: 
,  (in  the  mess  hall  of 
) (  ),  under cir- 
cumstances such as to endanger human life. 
82.  Article 134-(Fleeing  scene of accident) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Driver. 
(a) That the accused was the driver of a vehi- 
cle; 
(b)  That while the accused was driving the ve- 
hicle was involved in an accident; 
(c) That the accused knew that the vehicle had 
been in an accident; 
(d) That the accused left the scene of the acci- 
dent without (providing assistance to the victim who 
had been struck (and injured) by the said vehicle) or 
(providing identification); 
(e) That such leaving was wrongful; and 
(0 That, under the circumstances, the conduct 
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
(2) Senior passenger. 
(a) That the accused was a passenger in a vehi- 
cle which was involved in an accident; 
(b)  That the accused knew that said vehicle 
had been in an accident; 
(c) That the accused was the superior commis- 
sioned or noncommissioned officer of the driver, or 
commander of the vehicle, and wrongfully and un- 
lawfully ordered, caused, or permitted the driver to 
leave the scene of the accident without (providing 
assistance to the victim who had been struck (and in- 
jured) by the said vehicle) (or) (providing identifica- 
tion); and 
(d) That, under the circumstances, the conduct 
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Nature of offense. This offense covers "hit and 
run"  situations where there is damage to property 
other than the driver's vehicle or injury to someone 
other than the driver or a passenger in the driver's 
vehicle. It also covers accidents caused by the ac- 
cused, even if the accused's vehicle does not contact 
other people, vehicles, or property. 
(2)  Knowledge. Actual knowledge that an acci- 
dent has occurred is an essential element of this of- 
fense. Actual knowledge may be proved by circum- 
stantial evidence. 
(3)  Passenger. A passenger other than a senior 
passenger may also be liable under this paragraph. 
See paragraph 1 of this Part. 
d. Lesser included offense.  Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Bad-conduct discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 6 months. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), (the driver of) (a passenger in*) (the senior 
officer/noncommissioned  officer  in) 
(  in) a vehicle at the time of an ac- 
cident in which said vehicle was involved, and hav- 
ing  knowledge  of  said  accident,  did,  at 
(subject-matter jurisdiction data, 
if  required),  on  or  about 
19  (wrongful1  y  leave)  (by 
,assist the driver of the said vehicle 
in wrongfully leaving*) (wrongfully order, cause, or 
permit the driver to leave) the scene of the accident 
without (providing assistance to  , 
who had been struck (and injured) by the said vehi- 
cle) (making his/her  (the driver's) identity known). 
[Note: This language should be used when the ac- 
cused was a passenger and is charged as a principal. 
See paragraph 1 of this part.] 
83.  Article 134-(Fraternization) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1) That the accused was a commissioned or war- 
rant officer; 
(2)  That the accused fraternized on terms of mili- 
tary equality with one or more certain enlisted mem- 
ber(~)  in a certain manner; (3)  That the accused then knew the person(s) to 
be (an) enlisted member(s); 
(4)  That such fraternization violated the custom 
of the accused's service that officers shall not frater- 
nize with enlisted members on terms of military 
equality; and 
(5) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  In general. The gist of this offense is a viola- 
tion of the custom of the armed forces against frater- 
nization. Not all contact or association between of- 
ficers and enlisted persons is an offense. Whether the 
contact or association in question is an offense de- 
pends on the surrounding circumstances. Factors to 
be considered include whether the conduct has com- 
promised the chain of command, resulted in the ap- 
pearance of partiality, or otherwise undermined 
good order, discipline, authority, or morale. The 
acts and circumstances must be such as to lead a rea- 
sonable person experienced in the problems of mili- 
tary leadership to conclude that the good order and 
discipline of the armed forces has been prejudiced by 
their tendency to compromise the respect of enlisted 
persons for the professionalism, integrity, and obli- 
gations of an officer. 
(2)  Regulations. Regulations, directives, and or- 
ders may also govern conduct between officer and 
enlisted personnel on both a service-wide and a local 
basis. Relationships between enlisted persons of dif- 
ferent ranks, or between officers of different ranks 
may be similarly covered. Violations of such regula- 
tions, directives, or orders may be punishable under 
Article 92. See paragraph  16. 
d. Lesser included ofense. Article 80-attempts 
e. Maximum punishment.  Dismissal, forfeiture of 
all pay and allowances, and confinement for 2 years. 
f. 	Sample specijcation. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
, knowingly fraternize with 
, an enlisted person, on terms of 
military equality, to wit:  ,in viola- 
tion of the custom of  (the Naval Service of the 
United States) (the United States Army) (the United 
States Air Force) (the United States Coast Guard) 
that officers shall not fraternize with enlisted per- 
sons on terms of military equality. 
84.  Article 134-(Gambling  with subordinate) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused gambled with a certain ser- 
vicemember; 
(2)  That the accused was then a noncommis- 
sioned or petty officer; 
(3)  That the servicemember was not then a non- 
commissioned or petty officer and was subordinate 
to the accused; 
(4) That the accused knew that the ser-
vicemember was not then a noncommissioned or 
petty officer and was subordinate to the accused; and 
(5)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. This offense can only be committed 
by  a noncommissioned  or petty officer gambling 
with an enlisted person of less than noncommis- 
sioned or petty officer rank. Gambling by an officer 
with an enlisted person may be a violation of Article 
133.See also paragraph 83. 
d.  Lesser included ofense. Article 80-attempts 
e. Maximum punishment.  Confinement for 3 
months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month 
for 3 months. 
f. 	Sample specijcation. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , gamble with 
, then knowing  that the said 
was not a noncommissioned or 
petty officer and was subordinate to the said 
85.  Article 134-(Homicide,  negligent) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That a certain person is dead; 
(2)  That this death resulted from the act or fail- 
ure to act of the accused; 
(3)  That the killing by the accused was unlawful; (4)  That the act or failure to act of the accused 
which caused the death amounted to simple negli- 
gence; and 
(5)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1) Nature of offense. Negligent homicide is any 
unlawful homicide which is the result of simple neg- 
ligence. An intent to kill or injure is not required. 
(2)  Simple negligence. Simple negligence is the 
absence of due care, that is, an act or omission of a 
person who is under a duty to use due care which ex- 
hibits a lack of that degree of care of the safety of 
others which a reasonably careful person would 
have exercised under the same or similar circum- 
stances. Simple negligence is a lesser degree of care- 
lessness than culpable negligence. See paragraph 
44c(2)(a). 
d.  Lesser included offenses. None 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Bad-conduct discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 1 year. 
f. 	Sample speci$cation. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , unlawfully 
kill  ,  (by  negligently 
the said  (in) (on) 
the  with a  ) (by 
driving a (motor vehicle) (  ) against 
the said 	 in a negligent manner) 
86.  Article 134-(Impersonating  a 
commissioned, warrant, noncommissioned, 
or petty officer, or an agent or official) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1) That the accused impersonated a commis- 
sioned, warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer, 
or an agent of superior authority of one of the armed 
forces of the United States, or an official of a certain 
government, in a certain manner; 
(2)  That the impersonation was wrongful and 
willful; and 
(3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
[Note 1: If intent to defraud is in issue, add the fol- 
lowing additional element after (2), above: That the 
accused did so with the intent to defraud a certain 
person or organization in a certain manner;]. 
[Note 2: If the accused is charged with impersonat- 
ing an official of a certain government without an in- 
tent to defraud, use the following additional element 
after (2) above: That the accused committed one or 
more acts which exercised or asserted the authority 
of the office the accused claimed to have;]. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Nature of offense. Impersonation does not de- 
pend upon the accused deriving a benefit from the 
deception or upon some third party being misled, al- 
though this is an aggravating factor. 
(2)  Willfulness. "Willful"  means with the knowl- 
edge that one is falsely holding one's self out as such. 
(3)  Intent to defraud. See paragraph 49c(14). 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Impersonating a com- 
missioned, warrant, noncommissioned,  or petty of- 
ficer, or an agent or official. 
(1)  With intent to defraud. Dishonorable dis- 
charge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 3 years. 
(2) All other cases. Bad-conduct discharge, forfei- 
ture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 6 
months. 
f.  Sample specijication. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  wrongfully 
and willfully impersonate (a (commissioned officer) 
(warrant officer) (noncommissioned officer) (petty 
officer) (agent of superior authority) of the (Army) 
(Navy) (Marine Corps) (Air Force) (Coast Guard)) 
(an official of the Government of  ) 
by (publicly wearing the uniform and insignia of 
rank of  a  (lieutenant of  the  ) 
(  )) (showing the credentials of 
) (  ) (with intent 
to defraud  by  *) 
(and (exercised) (asserted) the authority of 
by  **). (*See subsection b note 1.) 

(**See subsection b note 2.) 

87.  Article 134-(Indecent  acts or liberties 

with a child) 

a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Physical contact. 
(a)  That the accused committed a certain act 
upon or with the body of a certain person; 
@)  That the person was under 16 years of age 
and not the spouse of the accused; 
(c)  That the act of the accused was indecent; 
(d)  That the accused committed the act with 
intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust, pas- 
sions, or sexual desires of the accused, the victim, or 
both; and 
(e)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct 
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
(2)  No physical  contact. 
(a)  That the accused committed a certain act; 
(b)  That the act amounted to the taking of in- 
decent liberties with a certain person; 
(c)  That the accused committed the act in the 
presence of this person; 
(d)  That this person was under 16 years of age 
and not the spouse of the accused; 
(e)  That the accused committed the act with 
the intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust, 
passions, or sexual desires of the accused, the victim, 
or both; and 
(0 That, under the circumstances, the conduct 
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Consent. Lack of consent by the child to the 
act or conduct is not essential to this offense; consent 
is not a defense. 
(2)  Indecent liberties. When a person is charged 
with taking indecent liberties, the liberties must be 
taken in the physical presence of the child, but phys- 
ical contact is not required. Thus, one who with the 
requisite intent exposes one's private parts to a child 
under 16 years of age may be found guilty of this of- 
fense. An indecent liberty may consist of communi- 
cation of indecent language as long as the communi- 
cation is made in the physical presence of the child. 
(3)  Indecent. See paragraph 89c and 90c. 
d. Lesser included offense. 
(1)  Article 134-indecent  acts with another 
(2)  Article 128-assault;  assault consummated 
by a battery 
(3)  Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 7 years. 
f. Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , (take (inde- 
cent) liberties with) (commit an indecent act (upon) 
(with) the body of)  ,  a (female) 
(male) under  16 years of age, not the (wife) (hus- 
band) of the said  ,by (fondling 
(her) (him) and placing his/her  hands upon (her) 
(his) leg and private parts) (  ), with 
intent to (arouse) (appeal to) (gratify) the (lust) (pas- 
sion)  (sexual  desires)  of  the  said 
(and  ). 
88.  Article 134-(Indecent  exposure) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused exposed a certain part of the 
accused's body to public view in an indecent man- 
ner; 
(2)  That the exposure was willful and wrongful; 
and 
(3)  That, under the circumstances, the accused's 
conduct was to the prejudice of good order and dis- 
cipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. "Willful"  means an intentional ex- 
posure to public view. Negligent indecent exposure 
is not punishable as a violation of the code. See para-
graph 90c concerning "indecent." 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Bad-conduct discharge, 
forfeiture of  all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 6 months. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  while (at a 
barracks window) (  ) willfully and 
wrongfully expose in an indecent matter to public 
view his or her 
89.  Article 134-(Indecent  language) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused orally or in writing commu- 
nicated to another person certain language; 
(2) That such language was indecent; and 
(3)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
[Note: In appropriate cases add the following ele- 
ment after element (1): That the person to whom the 
language was communicated was a child under the 
age of  16;).] 
c.  Explanation. "Indecent"  language is that which 
is grossly offensive to modesty, decency, or propri- 
ety, or shocks the moral sense, because of its vulgar, 
filthy, or disgusting nature, or its tendency to incite 
lustful thought. The language must violate commu- 
nity standards. See paragraph 87 if the communica- 
tion was made in the physical presence of a child. 
d.  Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Article 117-provoking  speeches 
(2)  Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Indecent or insulting lan- 
guage. 
(1)  Communicated to any child under the age of 
16 years.  Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all 
pay and allowances, and confinement for 2 years. 
(2)  Other cases. Bad-conduct discharge; forfei- 
ture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 6 
months. 
f.  Sample specijication. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  (orally) (in 
writing) communicate to  ,(a child 
under the age of  16 years), certain indecent lan- 
guage, to wit: 
90.  Article 134-(Indecent  acts with another) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused committed a certain wrong- 
ful act with a certain person; 
(2)  That the act was indecent; and 
(3)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. "Indecent"  signifies that form of 
immorality relating to sexual impurity which is not 
only grossly vulgar, obscene, and repugnant to com- 
mon propriety, but tends to excite lust and deprave 
the morals with respect to sexual relations. 
d.  Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 5 years. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  wrongfully 
commit an indecent act with  by 
91.  Article 134-(Jumping  from vessel into 
the water) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused jumped from a vessel in use 
by the armed forces into the water; 
(2)  That such act by the accused was wrongful 
and intentional; and 
(3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. "In use by"  means any vessel oper- 
ated by or under the control of the armed forces. 
This offense may be committed at sea, at anchor, or 
in port. 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Bad-conduct discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 6 months. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, on board  ,at (location), 
on or about  19  , wrongfully  and  intentionally  jump  from 
, a  vessel in use by  the armed 
forces, into the (sea) (lake) (river). 
92.  Article 134-(Kidnapping) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused seized, confined, inveigled, 
decoyed, or carried away a certain person; 
(2) That the accused then held such person 
against that person's will; 
(3) That the accused did so willfully and wrong- 
fully; and 
(4)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Inveigle, decoy. "Inveigle" means to lure, lead 
astray, or entice by false representations or other de- 
ceitful means. For example, a person who entices an- 
other to ride in a car with a false promise to take the 
person to a certain destination has inveigled the pas- 
senger into the car. "Decoy"  means to entice or lure 
by means of some fraud, trick, or temptation. For 
example, one who lures a child into a trap with 
candy has decoyed the child. 
(2)  Held. "Held"  means detained. The holding 
must be more than a momentary or incidental deten- 
tion. For example, a robber who holds the victim at 
gunpoint while the victim hands over a wallet, or a 
rapist who throws his victim to the ground, does not, 
by such acts, commit kidnapping. On the other 
hand, if, before or after such robbery or rape, the vic- 
tim is involuntarily transported some substantial 
distance, as from a housing area to a remote area of 
the base or post, this may be kidnapping, in addition 
to robbery or rape. 
(3)  Against  the will. "Against  that person's will" 
means that the victim was held involuntarily. The 
involuntary nature of the detention may result from 
force, mental or physical coercion, or from other 
means, including false representations. If the victim 
is incapable of having a recognizable will, as in the 
case of a very young child or a mentally incompetent 
person, the holding must be against the will of the 
victim's parents or legal guardian. Evidence of the 
availability or nonavailability to the victim of means 
of exit or escape is relevant to the voluntariness of 
the detention, as is evidence of threats or force, or 
lack thereof, by the accused to detain the victim. 
(4)  Willfully. The accused must have specifically 
intended to hold the victim against the victim's will 
to be guilty of kidnapping. An accidental detention 
will not suffice. The holding need not have been for 
financial or personal gain or for any other particular 
purpose. It may be an aggravating circumstance that 
the kidnapping was for ransom, however. See 
R.C.M. 1001(b)(4). 
(5) Wrongfully. "Wrongfully"  means without 
justification or excuse. For example, a law enforce- 
ment official may justifiably apprehend and detain, 
by force if necessary (see R.C.M. 302(d)(3)), a per- 
son reasonably believed to have committed an of- 
fense. An official who unlawfully uses the official's 
authority to apprehend someone is not guilty of kid- 
napping, but may be guilty of unlawful detention. 
See paragraph 21. It is not wrongful under this para- 
graph and therefore not kidnapping for a parent or 
legal guardian to seize and hold that parent's or legal 
guardian's minor child. 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for life. 
f.  Sample specijication. 
In that  ,(personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,willfully and 
wrongfully (seize) (confine) (inveigle)(decoy) (carry 
away) and hold  (a minor whose 
parent or legal guardian the accused was not) (a per- 
son not a minor) against his/her  will. 
93.  Article 134-(Mail:  taking, opening, 
secreting, destroying, or stealing) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Taking. 
(a)  That the accused took certain mail matter; 
(b) That such taking was wrongful; 
(c)  That the mail matter was taken by the ac- 
cused before it was delivered to or received by the 
addressee; 
(d) That such taking was with the intent to ob- 
struct the correspondence or pry into the business or 
secrets of any person or organization; and (e) That, under the circumstances, the conduct 
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
(2)  Opening, secreting, destroying, or stealing. 
(a) That the accused opened, secreted, de- 
stroyed, or stole certain mail matter; 
(b) That such opening, secreting, destroying, 
or stealing was wrongful; 
(c) That the mail matter was opened, secreted, 
destroyed, or stolen by the accused before it was de- 
livered to or received by the addressee; and 
(d) That, under the circumstances, the conduct 
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. These offenses are intended to pro- 
tect the mail and mail system. "Mail matter" means 
any matter deposited in a postal system of any gov- 
ernment or any authorized depository thereof or in 
official mail channels of the United States or an 
agency thereof including the armed forces. The 
value of the mail matter is not an element. See para-
graph 46c(l) concerning "steal." 
d. 	Lesser included offenses. 
(1) Article 12 1-larceny;  wrongful appropriation 
(2)  Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 5 years. 
f. 	Sample specifications. 
(1) 	Taking. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  wrongfully 
take certain mail matter, to wit: (a) (letter(s)) (postal 
card(s)) 	 (package(s)),  addressed  to 
, (out of  the ( 
Post Office  ) (orderly room of 
)  (unit  mail  box  of 
1  (  ))  (from 
) before (it) (they) (was) (were) 
(delivered) (actually received) (to) (by) the (ad- 
dressee) with intent to (obstruct the correspon- 
dence) (pry into the (business) (secrets)) of 
(2)  Opening, secreting, destroying, or stealing. 
In that 	 (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,(wrongfully 
(open) (secret) (destroy)) (steal) certain mail matter, 
to wit: (a) (letter(s)) (postal card(s)) (package(s)) ad- 
dressed to 	 ,which said (letter(s)) 
(  ) (was) (were) then (in the 
(  Post Office 	 ) 
(orderly room of 	 ) (unit mail box of 
) 	(custody of  ) 
(  )) (had previously been commit- 
ted  to 	 , (a representative of 
,) (an official agency for the trans- 
mission of communications)) before said (letter(s)) 
(  ) (was) (were) (delivered) (actu- 
ally received) (to) (by) the (addressee). 
94.  Article 134-(Mails:  depositing or causing 
to be deposited obscene matters in) 
a. 	Text. See paragraph 60. 
b. 	Elements. 
(1)  That the accused deposited or caused to be de- 
posited in the mails certain matter for mailing and 
delivery; 
(2) That the act was done wrongfully and know- 
ingly; 
(3)  That the matter was obscene; and 
(4) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. Whether something is obscene is a 
question of fact. "Obscene" is synonymous with "in- 
decent" as the latter is defined in paragraph 89c. The 
matter must violate community standards of de- 
cency or obscenity and must go beyond customary 
limits of expression. "Knowingly"  means the ac- 
cused deposited the material with knowledge of its 
nature. 
d. 	Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 5 years. 
f. 	Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , wrongfully and knowingly (deposit) (cause to be deposited) in 
the (United States) (  ) mails, for 
mailing  and  delivery  a  (letter)  (picture) 
(  ) (containing) (portraying) (sug- 
gesting) (  ) certain obscene matters, 
to wit: 
95.  Article 134-(Misprision  of serious 

offense) 

a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1) That a certain serious offense was committed 
by a certain person; 
(2) That the accused knew that the said person 
had committed the serious offense; 
(3)  That, thereafter, the accused concealed the se- 
rious offense and failed to make it known to civilian 
or military authorities as soon as possible; 
(4) That the concealing was wrongful; and 
(5)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  In general. Misprision of a serious offense is 
the offense of concealing a serious offense committed 
by another but without such previous concert with 
or subsequent assistance to the principal as would 
make the accused an accessory. See paragraph 3. An 
intent to benefit the principal is not necessary to this 
offense. 
(2)  Serious offense. For purposes of this para- 
graph, a "serious offense" is any offense punishable 
under the authority of the code by death or by con- 
finement for a term exceeding 1 year. 
(3)  Positive act of concealment. A mere failure or 
refusal to disclose the serious offense without some 
positive act of concealment does not make one guilty 
of this offense. Making a false entry in an account 
book for the purpose of concealing a theft commit- 
ted by another is an example of a positive act of con- 
cealment. 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 3 years. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), having knowledge that  had 
actually committed a serious offense to wit: (the 
murder of  ) (  )9 
did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter juris- 
diction  data,  if  required  from  about 
19  , to about 
19  , wrongfully 
conceal such serious offense by 
and fail to make the same known to the civil or mili- 
tary authorities as soon as possible. 
96.  Article 134-(Obstructing  justice) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1) That the accused wrongfully did a certain act; 
(2)  That the accused did so in the case of a certain 
person against whom the accused had reason to be- 
lieve there were or would be criminal proceedings 
pending; 
(3)  That the act was done with the intent to influ- 
ence, impede, or otherwise obstruct the due adminis- 
tration of justice; and 
(4) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. This offense may be based on con- 
duct that occurred before preferral of charges. Ac- 
tual obstruction of justice is not an element of this 
offense. For purposes of  this paragraph "criminal 
proceedings" includes nonjudicial punishment pro- 
ceedings under Part V of this Manual. Examples of 
obstruction of justice  include wrongfully influenc- 
ing, intimidating, impeding, or injuring a witness, a 
person acting on charges under this chapter, an in- 
vestigating officer under R.C.M. 406, or a party; and 
by means of bribery, intimidation, misrepresenta- 
tion, or force or threat of force delaying or prevent- 
ing communication of information relating to a vio- 
lation of any criminal statute of the United States to 
a person authorized by  a department, agency, or 
armed force of the United States to conduct or en- 
gage in investigations or prosecutions of such of- 
fenses; or endeavoring to do so. See also paragraph 
22 and Article 37. 
d.  Lesser included offenses. None. 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 5 years. 
f.  Sample specification. In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , wrongfully 
(endeavor to) (impede (a trial by court-martial) (an 
investigation) (  )) [influence the ac- 
tions of  ,  (a trial counsel of the 
court-martial) (a defense counsel of the court-mar- 
tial) (an officer responsible for making a recommen- 
dation concerning disposition  of  charges) 
(  )] [(influence) (alter) the testi- 
mony of  as a witness before a 
(court-martial)  (an  investigating  officer) 
(  )] in the case of 
by  [(promising) (offering)  (giving) to the said 
,  (the sum of  $  1 
(  ,  of  a  value  of  about 
$  )] [communicating to the said 
a  threat  to  1 
[  1, (if) (unless) he/she,  the said 
,  would [recommend dismissal of 
the charges against said  1 [(wrong-
fully refuse to testify) (testify falsely concerning 
1 (  )I  [(at such 
trial)  (before such investigating  officer)] 
96a.  Art 134 (Wrongful interference  with an 
adverse administrative proceeding) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused wrongfully did a certain act; 
(2)  That the accused did so in the case of a certain 
person against whom the accused had reason to be- 
lieve there were or would be an adverse administra- 
tive proceeding pending; 
(3)  That the act was done with the intent to influ- 
ence, impede, or obstruct the conduct of such ad- 
ministrative proceeding, or otherwise obstruct the 
due administration of justice; 
(4)  That under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. For purposes of this paragraph "ad- 
verse administrative proceeding"  includes any ad- 
ministrative proceeding or action, initiated against a 
servicemember, that could lead to discharge, loss of 
special or incentive pay, administrative reduction in 
grade, loss of a security clearance, bar to reenlist- 
ment, or reclassification. Examples of wrongful in- 
terference include wrongfully influencing, intimidat- 
ing, impeding, or injuring a witness, an investigator, 
or other person acting on an adverse administrative 
action; by means of bribery, intimidation, misrepre- 
sentation, or force or threat of force delaying or 
preventing communication of information relating 
to such administrative proceeding; and, the wrong- 
ful destruction or concealment of information rele- 
vant to such adverse administrative proceeding. 
d. Lesser included offenses. None. 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 5 years. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did (at/on board-location) (subject-matter ju- 
risdiction data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  (wrongfully 
endeavor to) [impede (an adverse administrative 
proceeding) (an investigation) (  11 
[influence the actions of  ,  (an of- 
ficer responsible for making a recommendation con- 
cerning the adverse administrative action)(an indi- 
vidual responsible for making a decision concerning 
an adverse administrative proceeding) (an individ- 
ual responsible for processing an adverse adminis- 
trative proceeding)  (  )I  [(influ- 
ence)(alter) the testimony of  a 
witness before (a board established to consider an 
administrative proceeding or elimination) (an inves- 
tigating officer) (  )] in the case of 
,by ](promising) (offering) (giving) 
to  the  said  , (the  sum  of 
$  1 (  ,  of a value of 
about $  )] [communicating to the 
said  a threat to  1 
[  1,  (if)  (unless)  the  said 
,,  would [recommend dismissal of 
the action against said  1 [(wrong-
fully refuse to testify) (testify falsely concerning 
1 (  )I  [(at such ad- 
ministrative proceeding) (before such investigating 
officer)  (before  such administrative board)] 
97.  Article 134--(Pandering and prostitution) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. b.  Elements. 
(1)  Prostitution. 
(a)  That the accused had sexual intercourse 
with another person not the accused's spouse; 
(b)  That the accused did so for the purpose of 
receiving money or other compensation; 
(c)  That this act was wrongful; and 
(d)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct 
of the accused was to the prejudice of  good order 
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
(2)  Pandering by compelling, inducing, enticing, 
or procuring  act of prostitution. 
(a)  That the accused compelled, induced, en- 
ticed, or procured a certain person to engage in an 
act of sexual intercourse for hire and reward with a 
person to be directed to said person by the accused; 
(b)  That this compelling, inducing, enticing, or 
procuring was wrongful; and 
(c)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct 
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
(3)  Pandering by arranging or receiving considera- 
tion for arranging for sexual intercourse or sodomy. 
(a)  That the accused arranged for, or received 
valuable consideration for arranging for, a certain 
person to engage in sexual intercourse or sodomy 
with another person; 
(b)  That the arranging (and receipt of consid- 
eration) was wrongful; and 
(c)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct 
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. Prostitution may be committed by 
males or females. Sodomy for money or compensa- 
tion is not included in subparagraph b(1). Sodomy 
may be charged under paragraph 5  1. Evidence that 
sodomy was for money or compensation may be a 
matter in aggravation. See R.C.M. 1001(b)(4). 
d.  Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Prostitution. Dishonorable discharge, forfei- 
ture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 1 
year. 
(2)  Pandering. Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture 
of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 5 
years. 
f.  Sample specifications. 
(1)  Prostitution. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required),  on or about 
19  , wrongfully 
engage in (an act) (acts) of sexual intercourse with 
,a person not hidher spouse, for 
the  purpose  of  receiving  (money) 
(  1. 
(2)  Compelling, inducing, enticing, or procuring 
act of prostitution. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction data, if  required), on or about 
19  , wrongfully 
(compel)  (induce)  (entice)  (procure) 
to engage in (an act) (acts) of (sex- 
ual intercourse for hire and reward) with persons to 
be directed to himher  by the said 
(3)  Arranging, or receiving consideration for  ar-
ranging for sexual intercourse or sodomy. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  wrongfully 
(arrange for) (receive valuable consideration, to wit: 
on account of  arranging for) 
to engage in (an act) (acts) of (sex- 
ual intercourse) (sodomy) with 
98.  Article 134-(Perjury:  subornation of) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused induced and procured a cer- 
tain person to take an oath or its equivalent and to 
falsely testify, depose, or state upon such oath or its 
equivalent concerning a certain matter; 
(2)  That the oath or its equivalent was adminis- 
tered to said person in a matter in which an oath or 
its equivalent was required or authorized by law; 
(3)  That the oath or its equivalent was adminis- 
tered by a person having authority to do so; 
(4)  That upon the oath or its equivalent said per- 
son willfully made or subscribed a certain statement; 
(5) That the statement was material; 
(6)  That the statement was false; 
(7) That the accused and the said person did not 
then believe that the statement was true; and (8)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. See paragraph 57c for applicable in- 
tercourse "Induce and procure" means to influence, 
persuade, or cause. 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 8kattempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 5 years. 
f. 	Sample specijication. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  procure 
to commit perjury by inducing 
him/her, the said  ,to take a lawful 
(oath) (affirmation) in a (trial by court-martial of 
) (trial by a court of competent ju- 
risdiction,  to  wit:  o f 
) (deposition for use in a trial by 
of  1 
(  )  that  he/she,  the  said 
,  would  (testify)  (depose) 
(  ) truly, and to (testify) (depose) 
(  ) willfully,  corruptly, and con- 
trary to such (oath) (affirmation) in substance that 
, which (testimony) (deposition) 
(  ) was upon a material matter and 
which the accused and the said  did 
not then believe to be true. 
99.  Article 134-(Public  record: altering, 
concealing, removing, mutilating, 
obliterating, or destroying) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused altered, concealed, re- 
moved, mutilated, obliterated, destroyed, or took 
with the intent to alter, conceal, remove, mutilate, 
obliterate, or destroy, a certain public record; 
(2)  That the act of the accused was willful and 
unlawful; and 
(3)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. "Public records"  include records, 
reports, statements, or data compilations, in any 
form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth the 
activities of the office or agency, or matters observed 
pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which mat- 
ters there was a duty to report. "Public records" in- 
cludes classified matters. 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 8kattempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 3 years. 
f.  Sample specijcation. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,willfully and 
unlawfully ((alter) (conceal) (remove) (mutilate) 
(obliterate) (destroy)) (take with intent to (al- 
ter)(conceal) (remove) (mutilate) (obliterate) (de- 
stroy)) a public record, to wit: 
100. Article 134-(Quarantine:  medical, 
breaking) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That a certain person  ordered the accused 
into medical quarantine; 
(2)  That the person was authorized to order the 
accused into medical quarantine; 
(3)  That the accused knew of this medical quar- 
antine and the limit thereof; 
(4)  That the accused went beyond the limits of 
the medical quarantine before being released there- 
from by proper authority; and 
(5) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. None. 
d. Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Article 134-breaking  restriction 
(2)  Article 8kattempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Confinement for 6 
months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month 
for 6 aonths. 
f.  Sample specijcation. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data) having been placed in medical quarantine by a 
person authorized to order the accused into medical quarantine, did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-
matter jurisdiction  data, if required), on or about 
19  , break  said 
medical quarantine. 
101.  Article 134-(Requesting  commission 
of an offense) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1) That the accused communicated certain lan- 
guage; 
(2)  That the language advised, directed, re- 
quested, or suggested to certain person(s) to commit 
an offense under the code; 
(3)  That the communication was wrongful; and 
(4)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. This offense differs from solicitation 
to commit an offense (see paragraphs 6 and 105) in 
that for this offense the accused need not have specif- 
ically intended that the offense advised, directed, re- 
quested, or suggested by committed. Advice or a di- 
rection, request, or suggestion is wrongful if it is 
made in a manner or under circumstances which the 
accused could reasonably expect the persons to 
whom it was made to take seriously and act upon. 
d. Lesser included offenses. None. 
e. Maximum punishment. Confinement for 4 
months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month 
for 4 months. 
f.  Sample spec$cation. 
In that  did (personal jurisdic- 
tion data), (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , wrongfully 
communicate  certain  language,  to  wit: 
, to  ,which lan- 
guage (advised) (directed) (requested) (suggested to) 
the  said  ,  to  commit 
,an offense under the code. 
102.  Article 134-(Restriction,  breaking) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That a certain person ordered the accused to 
be restricted to certain limits; 
(2) That said person was authorized to order said 
restriction; 
(3) That the accused knew of the restriction and 
the limits thereof; 
(4) That the accused went beyond the limits of 
the restriction before being released therefrom by 
proper authority; and 
(5)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. Restriction is the moral restraint of 
a person imposed by an order directing a person to 
remain within certain specified limits."Restriction" 
includes restriction under R.C.M. 304(a)(2), restric- 
tion resulting from imposition of either nonjudicial 
punishment (see Part V) or the sentence of a court- 
martial (see R.C.M. 1003(b)(6)), and administrative 
restriction in the interest of training, operations, se- 
curity, or safety. 
d. Lesser included offenses. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Confinement for 1  month 
and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for 1 
month. 
f.  Sample specijication. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), having been  restricted to the limits of 
,by a person authorized to do so, 
did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  ,break said re- 
striction. 
103.  Article 134-(Seizure:  destruction, 
removal, or disposal of property to prevent) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1) That one or more persons authorized to make 
searches and seizures were seizing, about to seize, or 
endeavoring to seize certain property; 
(2) That the accused destroyed, removed, or oth- 
erwise disposed of that property with intent to pre- 
vent the seizure thereof; 
(3)  That the accused then knew that person(s) au- 
thorized to make searches were seizing, about to 
seize, or endeavoring to seize the property; and 
(4) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. c.  Explanation. See Mil. R. Evid. 3  16(e) concerning 
military personnel who may make seizures. It is not 
a defense that a search or seizure was technically de- 
fective. 
d. 	Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 1 year. 
f. 	Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,with intent 
to prevent its seizure, (destroy) (remove) (dispose of) 
, ,  property  which,  as 
then knew, (a) person(s) author- 
ized to make searches and seizures were (seizing) 
(about to seize) (endeavoring to seize). 
104.  Article 134--(Sentinel or lookout: 
offenses against or by) 
a. 	Text. See paragraph 60. 
b. 	Elements. 
(1)  Disrespect to a sentinel or lookout. 
(a) That a certain person was a sentinel or 
lookout; 
(b)  That the accused knew that said person was 
a sentinel or lookout; 
(c) That the accused used certain disrespectful 
language or behaved in a certain disrespectful man- 
ner; 
(d) That such language or behavior was 
wrongful; 
(e)  That such language or behavior was di- 
rected toward and within the sight or hearing of the 
sentinel or lookout; 
(f) That said person was at the time in the exe- 
cution of duties as a sentinel or lookout; and 
(g)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct 
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
(2)  Loitering or wrongfully sitting on post by a sen- 
tinel or lookout. 
(a) That the accused was posted as a sentinel or 
lookout; 
(b)  That while so posted, the accused loitered 
or wrongfully sat down on post; and 
(c)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct 
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
[Note: If the offense was committed in time of war or 
while the accused was receiving special pay under 37 
U.S.C.  4 3 10, add the following element after ele- 
ment (a): That the accused was so posted (in time of 
war) (while receiving special pay under 37 U.S.C. 4 
3  lo)).] 
c. 	Explanation. 
(1)  Disrespect. For a discussion of "disrespect," 
see paragraph 13c(3). 
(2)  Loitering or wrongfully sitting on post. 
(a) In general. The discussion set forth in para- 
graph 38c applies to loitering or sitting down while 
posted as a sentinel or lookout as well. 
(b) Loiter. "Loiter"  means to stand around, to 
move about slowly, to linger, or to lay behind when 
that conduct is in violation of known instructions or 
accompanied by a failure to give complete attention 
to duty. 
d. 	Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Disrespect  to a sentinel or lookout. Article 
80-attempts 
(2)  Loitering or wrongfully sitting on post by a sen- 
tinel or lookout. Article 80-attempts 
e. 	Maximum punishment. 
(1)  Disrespect to a sentinel or lookout. Confine-
ment for 3 months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay 
per month for 3 months. 
(2)  Loitering or wrongfully sitting on post by a sen- 
tinel or lookout. 
(a)  In time of war or while receiving special pay 
under 37 U.S.C. 8 310. Dishonorable discharge, for- 
feiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement 
for 2 years. 
(b) Other cases. Bad-conduct discharge, forfei- 
ture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 6 
months. 
f. 	Sample specifications. 
(1) 	Disrespect  to a sentinel or lookout. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location),  on or about 
19  ,then know- 
ing that  was a sentinel or lookout, 
(wrongfully use the following disrespectful language 
'6  ," or words to that effect, to 
) (wrongfully behave in a disre- spectful manner toward  by 9 
) a (sentinel) (lookout) in the exe- 
cution of hidher duty. 
(2)  Loitering or wrongfully sitting down on post by 
a sentinel or lookout. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), while posted as a (sentinel) (lookout), did, (at/ 
on board-location)  (while receiving special pay 
under  37  U.S.C.  5  310)  on  or  about 
19  , (a time of 
war) (loiter) (wrongfully sit down) on hidher post. 
105.  Article 134--(Soliciting  another to 

commit an offense) 

a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused solicited or advised a certain 
person or persons to commit a certain offense under 
the code other than one of the four offenses named in 
Article 82; 
(2)  That the accused did so with the intent that 
the offense actually be committed; and 
(3)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. See paragraph 6c. If the offense 
solicited actually committed, see also paragraph 1. 
d.  Lesser included offenses. Article 80 -attempts. 
(1)  Article 13GRequesting another to commit 
an offense, wrongful communication of language 
(2)  Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Any person subject to the 
code who is found guilty of soliciting or advising an- 
other person to commit an offense which, if commit- 
ted by one subject to the code, would be punishable 
under the code, shall be subject to the maximum 
punishment authorized for the offense solicited or 
advised, except that in no case shall the death pen- 
alty be imposed nor shall the period of confinement 
in any case, including offenses for which life impris- 
onment may be adjudged, exceed 5 years. However, 
any person subject to the code who is found guilty of 
soliciting or advising another person to commit the 
offense of espionage (Article 106a) shall be subject to 
any punishment, other than death, that a court-mar- 
tial may direct. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction data, if  required),  on or about 
19  ,  wrongfully 
(solicit) (advise)  (to disobey a gen- 
eral regulation, to wit:  ) (to steal 
,  of  a  value  of  (about) 
$  ,  the  property  of 
)  (to  by 9 
106.  Article 134-(Stolen  property: 

knowingly receiving, buying, concealing) 

a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1) That the accused wrongfully received, 
bought, or concealed certain property of some value; 
(2)  That the property belonged to another per- 
son; 
(3)  That the property had been stolen; 
(4)  That the accused then knew that the property 
had been stolen; and 
(5)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c. Explanation. 
(1)  In general. The actual thief is not criminally 
liable for receiving the property stolen; however a 
principle to the larceny (see paragraph l), when not 
the actual thief, may be found guilty of  knowingly 
receiving the stolen property but may not be found 
guilty of both the larceny and receiving the property. 
(2)  Knowledge. Actual knowledge that the prop- 
erty was stolen is required. Knowledge may be 
proved by circumstantial evidence. 
(3)  Wrongfulness. Receiving stolen property is 
wrongful if it is without justification or excuse. For 
example, it would not be wrongful for a person to re- 
ceive stolen property for the purpose of returning it 
to its rightful owner, or for a law enforcement officer 
to seize it as evidence. 
d.  Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Stolen property, know- 
ingly receiving, buying, or concealing. 
(1)  Of a value of $100.00or less. Bad-conduct dis- 
charge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 6 months. (2)  Of  a value of more than $100.00. Dishonora-
ble discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 
and confinement for 3 years. 
f. 	Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  wrongfully 
(receive) (buy) (conceal)  ,  of a 
value of (about) $  ,the property of 
,  which property, as he/she,  the 
said  ,then knew, had been stolen. 
107.  Article 134-(Straggling) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused, while accompanying the ac- 
cuse's organization on a march, maneuvers, or simi- 
lar exercise, straggled; 
(2)  That the straggling was wrongful; and 
(3)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation.  "Straggle"  means to wander away, 
to stray, to become separated from, or to lag or lin- 
ger behind. 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Confinement for 3 
months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month 
for 3 months. 
f. Sample specifics tion. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, at  , on or about 
19  ,while accom- 
panying hidher organization on (a march) (maneu- 
vers) (  ), wrongfully straggle. 
108.  Article 134-(Testify:  wrongful refusal) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused was in the presence of  a 
court-martial, board of officer(s), military commis- 
sion, court of inquiry, an officer conducting an inves- 
tigation under Article 32, or an officer taking a depo- 
sition, of or for the United States, at which a certain 
person was presiding; 
(2)  That the said person presiding directed the 
accused to qualify as a witness or, having so quali- 
fied, to answer a certain question; 
(3)  That the accused refused to qualify as a wit- 
ness or answer said question; 
(4)  That the refusal was wrongful; and 
(5)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. To "qualify  as a witness"  means 
that the witness declares that the witness will testify 
truthfully. See R.C.M. 807; Mil. R. Evid. 603. A 
good faith but legally mistaken belief in the right to 
remain silent does not constitute a defense to a 
charge of wrongful to testify. See also Mil. R. Evid. 
301 and Section V. 
d. Lesser included offenses.  None: 
e.  Maximum punishment. Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 5 years. 
f. Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), being in the presence of (a) (an) ((general) 
(special) (summary) court-martial) (board of of- 
ficer(~))  (military commission) (court of inquiry) (of- 
ficer conducting an investigation under Article 32, 
Uniform Code of Military Justice) (officer taking a 
deposition) (  ) (of) (for) the United 
States, of which  was  (military 
judge) (president), (  ), (and having 
been directed by the said  to qualify 
as a witness) (and having qualified as a witness and 
having been directed by the said  to 
answer the following question(s) put to him/her  as a 
witness,  "  "),  did,  (at/on 
board-location),  on or about 
19  ,wrongfully refuse (to qualify as 
a witness) (to answer said question(s)). 
109.  Article 134-(Threat  or hoax: bomb) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  Bomb threat. 
(a) That the accused communicated certain 
language; 
(b) That the language  communicated 
amounted to a threat; (c) That the harm threatened was to be done by 
means of an explosive; 
(d)  That the communication was wrongful; 
and 
(e)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct 
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
(2)  Bomb hoax. 
(a)  That the accused communicated or con- 
veyed certain information; 
(b)  That the language or information con- 
cerned an attempt being made or to be made by 
means of an explosive to unlawfully kill, injure, or 
intimidate a person or to unlawfully damage or de- 
stroy certain property; 
(c) That the information communicated by the 
accused was false and that the accused then knew it 
was false; 
(d)  That the communication of  the informa- 
tion by the accused was malicious; and 
(e)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct 
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c. 	Explanation. 
(1)  Threat. A "threat"  is an expressed present de- 
termination or intent to kill, injure, or intimidate a 
person or to damage or destroy certain property 
presently or in the future. Proof that the accused ac- 
tually intended to kill, injure, intimidate, damage, or 
destroy is not required. See also paragraph 110. 
(2)  Malicious. A communication is "malicious"  if 
the accused believed  that the information would 
probably interfere with the peaceful use of the build- 
ing, vehicle, aircraft, or other property concerned, 
or would cause fear or concern to one or more per- 
sons. 
(3)  Explosive. See R.C.M. 103(11). 
d. 	Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Bomb threat. 
(a)  Article 13~communicating  a threat 
(b) Article 80-attempts 
(2)  Bomb hoax. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Bomb threat and bomb 
hoax: Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay 
and allowances, and confinement for 5 years. 
f. 	Sample specijications. 
(1)  Bomb threat. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data) did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required) on or about 
1'9  ,  wrongfully 
communicate  certain  language,  to  wit: 
, which language constituted a 
threat to harm a person or property by means of an 
explosive. 
(2) 	Bomb hoax. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data) did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required) on or about 
19  ,maliciously 
(communicate) (convey) certain information con- 
cerning an attempt being made or to be made to un- 
lawfully  ((kill)  (injure)  (intimidate) 
)  ((damage)  (destroy) 
) by means of an explosive, to wit: 
,which information was false and 
which  then knew to be false. 
110. Article 134--(Threat,  communicating) 
a. 	Text. See paragraph 60. 
b. 	Elements. 
(1)  That the accused communicated certain lan- 
guage expressing a present determination or intent 
to wrongfully injure the person, property, or reputa- 
tion of another person, presently or in the future; 
(2)  That the communication was made known to 
that person or to a third person; 
(3)  That the communication was wrongful; and 
(4)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. To establish the threat it is not nec- 
essary that the accused actually intended to do the 
injury threatened. However, a declaration made 
under circumstances which reveal it to be in jest or 
for an innocent or legitimate purpose, or which con- 
tradict the expressed intent to commit the act, does 
not constitute this offense. Nor is the offense com- 
mitted by the mere statement of intent to commit an 
unlawful act not involving injury to another. See also 
paragraph 109 concerning bomb threat. 
d. 	Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Article 1  17-provoking  speeches or gestures 
(2) Article 80-attempts e.  Maximum punishment. Dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 3 years. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , wrongfully 
communicate to  a threat (injure 
by  )  (accuse 
of having committed the offense of 
) (  ). 
11  1.  Article 134-(Unlawful  entry) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused entered the real property of 
another or certain personal property of another 
which amounts to a structure usually used for 
habitation or storage; 
(2)  That such entry was unlawful; and 
(3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c. Explanation. See paragraph 55 for a discussion of 
'6 entry." An entry is "unlawful" if made without the 
consent of any person authorized to consent to entry 
or without other lawful authority. No specific intent 
or breaking is required for this offense. See para-
graph 56 for a discussion of housebreaking. The 
property protected against unlawful entry includes 
real property and the sort of personal property 
which amounts to a structure usually used for 
habitation or storage. It would usually not include 
an aircraft, automobile, tracked vehicle, or a per- 
son's locker, even though used for storage purposes. 
However, depending on the circumstances, an intru- 
sion into such property may be prejudicial to good 
order and discipline. 
d. Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Bad-conduct discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 6 months. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required), on or about 
19  , unlawfully 
enter the (dwelling house) (garage) (warehouse) 
(tent) (vegetable garden) (orchard) (stateroom) 
112.  Article 134-(Weapon:  concealed, 

carrying) 

a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused carried a certain weapon 
concealed on or about the accused's person; 
(2)  That the carrying was unlawful; 
(3)  That the weapon was a dangerous weapon; 
and 
(4)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. 
(1)  Concealed weapon. A weapon is concealed 
when it is carried by a person and intentionally cov- 
ered or kept from sight. 
(2) Dangerous weapon. For purposes of this para- 
graph, a weapon is dangerous if it was specifically 
designed for the purpose of doing grievous bodily 
harm, or it was used or intended to be used by the ac- 
cused to do grievous bodily harm. 
(3)  On or about. "On  or about"  means the 
weapon was carried on the accused's person or was 
within the immediate reach of the accused. 
d.  Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment. Bad-conduct discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 1 year. 
f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction data, if  required), on or about 
19  ,  unlawfully 
carry on or about his/her  person a concealed 
weapon, to wit: a 
113. Article 134-(Wearing  unauthorized 
insignia, decoration, badge, ribbon, device, 
or lapel button) 
a.  Text. See paragraph 60. 
b.  Elements. 
(1)  That the accused wore a certain insignia, dec- 
oration, badge, ribbon, device, or lapel button upon 
the accused's uniform or civilian clothing; (2)  That the accused was not authorized to wear 
the item; 
(3)  That the wearing was wrongful; and 
(4)  That, under the circumstances, the conduct of 
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. None. 
d.  Lesser included offense. Article 80-attempts 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Bad-conduct discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine- 
ment for 6 months. 
f. 	Sample specijcation. 
In that  (personal jurisdictiqn 
data), did, (at/on board-location),  on or about 
19  ,  wrongful1  y 
and without authority wear upon hisher (uniform) 
(civilian clothing) (the insignia or grade of a (master 
sergeant of  ) (chief gunner's mate 
of  )) (Combat Infantryman Badge) 
(the Distinguished Service Cross) (the ribbon repre- 
senting the Silver Star) (the lapel button represent- 
ing the Legion of Merit) (  ). PART V 

NONJUDlClAL PUNISHMENT PROCEDURE 

1.  General 
a.  Authority. Nonjudicial punishment in the United 
States Armed Forces is authorized by Article 15. 
b.  Nature. Nonjudicial punishment is a disciplinary 
measure more serious than the administrative cor- 
rective measures discussed in paragraph lg, but less 
serious than trial by court-martial. 
c.  Purpose. Nonjudicial punishment provides com- 
manders with an essential and prompt means of 
maintaining good order and discipline and also pro- 
motes positive behavior changes in servicemembers 
without the stigma of a court-martial conviction. 
d. Policy. 
(1)  Commander's responsibility. Commanders are 
responsible for good order and discipline in their 
commands. Generally, discipline can be maintained 
through effective leadership including, when neces- 
sary, administrative corrective measures. Nonjudi- 
cia1 punishment is ordinarily appropriate when ad- 
ministrative corrective measures are inadequate due 
to the nature of the minor offense or the record of 
the servicemember, unless it is clear that only trial 
by court-martial will meet the needs of justice and 
discipline. Nonjudicial punishment shall be consid- 
ered on an individual basis. Commanders consider- 
ing nonjudicial punishment should consider the na- 
ture of the offense, the record of the servicemember, 
the needs for good order and discipline, and the ef- 
fect of nonjudicial punishment  on the ser-
vicemember and the senicemember's record. 
(2)  Commander's discretion. A commander who 
is considering a case for disposition under Article 15 
will exercise personal discretion in evaluating each 
case, both as to whether nonjudicial punishment is 
appropriate, and, if so, as to the nature and amount 
of punishment appropriate. No superior may direct 
that a subordinate authority impose nonjudicial 
punishment in a particular case, issue regulations, 
orders, or "guides" which suggest to subordinate au- 
thorities that certain categories of minor offenses be 
disposed of by nonjudicial punishment instead of by 
court-martial or administrative corrective measures, 
or that predetermined kinds or amounts of punish- 
ments be imposed for certain classifications of of- 
fenses that the subordinate considers appropriate for 
disposition by nonjudicial punishment. 
(3)  Commander's suspension authority. Com-
manders should consider suspending all or part of 
any punishment selected under Article 15, particu- 
larly in the case of first offenders or when significant 
extenuating or mitigating matters are present. Sus- 
pension provides an incentive to the offender and 
gives an opportunity to the commander to evaluate 
the offender during the period of suspension. 
e.  Minor offenses. Nonjudicial punishment may be 
imposed for acts or omissions that are minor of- 
fenses under the punitive articles (see Part IV). 
Whether an offense is minor depends on several fac- 
tors: the nature of the offense and the circumstances 
surrounding its commission; the offender's age, 
rank, duty assignment, record and experience; and 
the maximum sentence impossible for the offense if 
tried by general court-martial. Ordinarily, a minor 
offense is an offense which the maximum sentence 
impossible would not include a dishonorable dis- 
charge or confinement for longer than 1 year if tried 
by general court-martial. The decision whether an 
offense is "minor"  is a matter of discretion for the 
commander imposing nonjudicial punishment, but 
nonjudicial punishment for an offense other than a 
minor offense (even though thought by  the com- 
mander to be minor) is not a bar to trial by court- 
martial for the same offense.  See  R.C.M. 
907(b)(2)(D)(iv). However, the accused may show 
at trial that nonjudicial punishment was imposed, 
and if the accused does so, this fact must be consid- 
ered in determining an appropriate sentence. See Ar-
ticle 15(f);  R.C.M. 1001(c)(l)(B). 
f.  Limitations on nonjudicial punishment. 
(1) Double punishment prohibited.  When nonju- 
dicial punishment has been imposed for an offense, 
punishment may not again be imposed for the same 
offense under Article 15. But see paragraph le con- 
cerning trial by court-martial. 
(2)  Increase in punishment prohibited. Once non- 
judicial punishment has been imposed, it may not be 
increased, upon appeal or otherwise. 
(3)  Multiple punishment prohibited. When a com- 
mander determines that nonjudicial punishment is 
appropriate for a particular servicemember, all 
known offenses determined to be appropriate for dis- 
position by nonjudicial punishment and ready to be considered at that time, including all such offenses 
arising from a single incident or course of conduct, 
shall ordinarily be considered together, and not 
made the basis for multiple punishments. 
(4)  Statute of limitations. Except as provided in 
Article 43(d), nonjudicial punishment may not be 
imposed for offenses which were committed more 
than 2 years before the date of imposition. See Arti-
cle 43(c). 
(5) Civilian courts. Nonjudicial punishment may 
not be imposed for an offense tried by a court which 
derives its authority from the United States. Nonju- 
dicial punishment may not be imposed for an offense 
tried by a State or foreign court unless authorized by 
regulations of the Secretary concerned. 
g.  Relationship of nonjudicial punishment  to admin- 
istrative corrective measures. Article 15 and Part V of 
this Manual do not apply to include, or limit use of 
administrative corrective measures that promote ef- 
ficiency and good order and discipline such as coun- 
seling, admonitions, reprimands, exhortations, dis- 
approvals, criticisms, censures, reproofs, rebukes, 
extra military instruction, and administrative with- 
holding of privileges. See also R.C.M. 306. Adminis- 
trative corrective measures are not punishment, and 
they may be used for acts or omissions which are not 
offenses under the code and for acts or omissions 
which are offenses under the code. 
h.  Effect of errors. Failure to comply with any of the 
procedural provisions of Part V of this Manual shall 
not invalidate a punishment imposed under Article 
15, unless the error materially prejudiced a substan- 
tial right of the servicemember on whom the punish- 
ment was imposed. 
2.  Who may impose nonjudicial punishment 
The following persons may serve as a nonjudicial 
punishment authority for the purposes of adminis- 
tering nonjudicial punishment proceedings under 
this Part: 
a.  Commander. Unless otherwise provided by regu- 
lations of  the Secretary concerned, a commander 
may impose nonjudicial punishment upon any mili- 
tary personnel of that command. "Commander" 
means a commissioned or warrant officer who, by 
virtue of rank and assignment, exercises primary 
command authority over a military organization or 
prescribed territorial area, which under pertinent of- 
ficial directives is recognized as a "command."  Sub- 
ject  to subparagraph  ld(2) and any regulations of 
the Secretary concerned, the authority of a com- 
mander to impose nonjudicial punishment as to cer- 
tain types of offenses, certain categories of persons, 
or in specific cases, or to impose certain types of pun- 
ishment, may be limited or withheld by a superior 
commander or by the Secretary concerned. 
b.  OfJicer in charge. If authorized by regulations of 
the Secretary concerned, an officer in charge may 
impose nonjudicial punishment upon enlisted per- 
sons assigned to that unit. 
c.  Principal assistant. If authorized by regulations of 
the Secretary concerned, a commander exercising 
general court-martial jurisdiction or an officer of 
general or flag rank in command may delegate that 
commander's powers under Article 15 to a principal 
assistant. The Secretary concerned may define 
"principal assistant." 
3.  Right to demand trial 
Except in the case of a person attached to or em- 
barked in a vessel, punishment may not be imposed 
under Article 15 upon any member of the armed 
forces who has, before the imposition of nonjudicial 
punishment, demanded trial by court-martial in lieu 
of nonjudicial punishment. This right may also be 
granted to a person attached to or embarked in a 
vessel if so authorized by  regulations of the Secre- 
tary concerned. A  person  is  "attached  to" 
orC'embarked  in"  a vessel if, at the time nonjudicial 
punishment is imposed, that person is assigned or at- 
tached to the vessel, is on board for passage, or is as- 
signed or attached to an embarked staff, unit, de- 
tachment, squadron, team, air group, or other 
regularly organized body. 
4.  Procedure 
a. Notice. If, after a preliminary inquiry (see R.C.M. 
303), the nonjudicial punishment authority deter- 
mines that disposition by  nonjudicial punishment 
proceedings is appropriate (see R.C.M. 306: para- 
graph 1 of this Part), the nonjudicial punishment au- 
thority shall cause the servicemember to be notified. 
The notice shall include: 
(1)  a statement that the nonjudicial punishment 
authority is considering the imposition of nonjudi- 
cia1 punishment; (2)  a  statement describing the alleged of- 
fenses-including  the article of the code-which  the 
member is alleged to have committed; 
(3)  a brief summary of the information upon 
which the allegations are based or a statement that 
the member may, upon request, examine available 
statements and evidence; 
(4)  a statement of the rights that will be accorded 
to the servicemember under subparagraphs 4c(l) 
and (2) of this Part; 
(5)  unless the right to demand trial is not applica- 
ble (see paragraph 3 of this Part), a statement that 
the member may demand trial by court-martial in 
lieu of nonjudicial punishment, a statement of the 
maximum punishment which the nonjudicial pun- 
ishment authority may impose by nonjudicial pun- 
ishment; a statement that, if trial by court-martial is 
demanded, charges could be referred for trial by 
summary, special, or general court-martial; that the 
member may not be tried by summary court-martial 
over the member's objection; and that at a special or 
general court-martial the member has the right to be 
represented by counsel. 
b. Decision by  servicemember. 
(1) Demand for trial by court-martial. If the ser- 
vicemember demands trial by court-martial (when 
this right is applicable), the nonjudicial proceedings 
shall be terminated. It is within the discretion of the 
commander whether to forward or refer charges for 
trial by  court-martial (see R.C.M. 306; 307; 
401407) in such a case, but in no event may nonju- 
dicial punishment be imposed for the offenses af- 
fected unless the demand is voluntarily withdrawn. 
(2)  No demand for trial by court-martial. If the 
servicemember does not demand trial by court-mar- 
tial within a reasonable time after notice under para- 
graph 4a of this Part, or if the right to demand trial 
by court-martial is not applicable, the nonjudicial 
punishment authority may proceed under para- 
graph 4c of this Part. 
c. Nonjudicial punishment accepted. 
(1)  Personal appearance requested;  procedure. 
Before nonjudicial punishment may be imposed, the 
servicemember shall be entitled to appear personally 
before the nonjudicial punishment authority who of- 
fered nonjudicial punishment, except when appear- 
ance is prevented by the unavailability of the nonju- 
dicial punishment authority or by extraordinary 
circumstances, in which case the servicemember 
shall be entitled to appear before a person designated 
by the nonjudicial punishment authority who shall 
prepare a written summary of any proceedings 
before that person and forward it and any written 
matter submitted by the servicemember to the non- 
judicial punishment authority. If the servicemember 
requests personal appearance, the servicemember 
shall be entitled to: 
(A) Be informed in accordance with Article 
3  1  (b); 
(B)  Be accompanied by a spokesperson pro- 
vided or arranged for by the member unless the pun- 
ishment to be imposed will not exceed extra duty for 
14 days, restriction for 14 days, and an oral repri- 
mand. Such a spokesperson need not be qualified 
under R.C.M. 502(d); such spokesperson is not enti- 
tled to travel or similar expenses, and the proceed- 
ings need not be delayed to permit the presence of a 
spokesperson; the spokesperson may speak for the 
servicemember, but may not question witnesses ex- 
cept as the nonjudicial punishment authority may 
allow as a matter of discretion; 
(C)  Be informed orally or in writing of the in- 
formation against the servicemember and relating to 
the offenses alleged; 
(D)  Be allowed to examine documents or phys- 
ical objects against the member which the nonjudi- 
cia1 punishment authority has examined in connec- 
tion with the case and on which the nonjudicial 
punishment authority intends to rely in deciding 
whether and how much nonjudicial punishment to 
impose; 
(E)  Present matters in defense, extenuation, 
and mitigation orally, or in writing, or both; 
(F) Have present witnesses, including those 
adverse to the servicemember, upon request if  their 
statements will be relevant and they are reasonably 
available. For purposes of this subparagraph, a wit- 
ness is not reasonably available if the witness re- 
quires reimbursement by  the United States for any 
cost incurred in appearing, cannot appear without 
unduly delaying the proceedings, or, if a military 
witness, cannot be excused from other important du- 
ties; 
(G) Have the proceeding open to the public 
unless the nonjudicial punishment authority deter- 
mines that the proceeding should be closed for good 
cause, such as military exigencies or security inter- 
ests, or unless the punishment to be imposed will not exceed extra duty for 14 days, restriction for 14 
days, and an oral reprimand; however, nothing in 
this subparagraph requires special arrangements to 
be made to facilitate access to the proceeding. 
(2)  Personal appearance waived; procedure.  Sub-
ject to the approval of the nonjudicial punishment 
authority, the servicemember may request not to ap- 
pear personally under subparagraph 4c(l) of this 
Part. If such request is granted, the servicemember 
may submit written for consideration by the nonju- 
dicial punishment authority before such authority's 
decision under subparagraph 4c(4) of this Part. The 
servicemember shall be informed of the right to re- 
main silent and that matters submitted may be used 
against the member in a trial by court-martial. 
(3)  Evidence. The Military Rules of Evidence 
(Part 111), other than with respect to privileges, do 
not apply at nonjudicial punishment proceedings. 
Any relevant matter may be considered, after com- 
pliance with subparagraphs 4c(l)(C) and (D) of this 
Part. 
(4)  Decision. After considering all relevant mat- 
ters presented, if the nonjudicial punishment author- 
ity-
(A) Does not conclude that the servicemember 
committed the offenses alleged, the nonjudicial pun- 
ishment authority shall so inform the member and 
terminate the proceedings; 
(B)  Concludes that the servicemember com- 
mitted one or more of the offenses alleged, the non- 
judicial punishment authority shall: 
(i)  so inform the servicemember; 
(ii)  inform the servicemember of the punish- 
ment imposed; and 
(iii) inform the servicemember of the right to 
appeal (see paragraph 7 of this Part). 
d.  Nonjudicial punishment  based on record of court 
of inquiry or other investigative body. Nonjudicial 
punishment may be based on the record of a court of 
inquiry or other investigative body, in which pro- 
ceeding the member was accorded the rights of a 
party. No additional proceeding under subpara- 
graph 4c(l) of  this Part is required. The ser- 
vicemember shall be informed in writing that nonju- 
dicial punishment is being considered based on the 
record of the proceedings in question, and given the 
opportunity, if applicable, to refuse nonjudicial pun- 
ishment. If the servicemember does not demand trial 
by  court-martial or has no option, the ser-
vicemember may submit, in writing, any matter in 
defense, extenuation, or mitigation, to the officer 
considering imposing nonjudicial punishment, for 
consideration by that officer to determine whether 
the member committed the offenses in question, and, 
if so, to determine an appropriate punishment. 
5.  Punishments 
a.  General limitations. The Secretary concerned 
may limit the power granted by  Article  15 with re- 
spect to the kind and amount of the punishment au- 
thorized. Subject to paragraphs 1 and 4 of this Part 
and to regulations of the Secretary concerned, the 
kinds and amounts of punishment authorized by Ar- 
ticle 15(b) may be imposed upon servicemembers as 
provided in this paragraph. 
b.  Authorized maximum punishments. In addition 
to or in lieu of admonition or reprimand, the follow- 
ing disciplinary punishments subject to the limita- 
tion of paragraph 5d of this Part, be imposed upon 
servicemembers: 
(1)  Upon commissioned oficers and warrant of- 
ficers-
(A) By any commanding officer-restriction  to 
specified limits, with or without suspension from 
duty for not more than 30 consecutive days; 
(B)  If imposed by an officer exercising general 
court-martial jurisdiction, an officer of general or 
flag rank in command, or a principal assistant as de- 
fined in paragraph 2c of this Part- 
(i)  arrest in quarters for not more than 30 
consecutive days; 
(ii)  forfeiture of not more than one-half of 
one month's pay per month for 2 months; 
(iii)  restriction to specified limits, with or 
without suspension from duty, for not more than 60 
consecutive days; 
(2)  Upon other military personnel  of  the com- 
mand-
(A) By  any nonjudicial punishment  author- 
ity-
(i)  if imposed upon a person attached to or 
embarked in a vessel, confinement on bread and 
water or diminished rations for not more than 3 con- 
secutive days; 
(ii) correctional custody for not more than 7 
consecutive days; 
(iii) forfeiture of not more than 7 days' pay; (iv)  reduction to the next inferior grade, if 
the grade from which demoted is within the promo- 
tion authority of the officer imposing the reduction 
or any officer subordinate to the one who imposes 
the reduction; 
(v)  extra duties, including fatigue or other 
duties, for not more than 14 consecutive days; 
(vi)  restriction to specified limits, with or 
without suspension from duty, for not more than 14 
consecutive days; 
(B)  If imposed by a commanding officer of the 
grade of major or lieutenant commander or above or 
a principal assistant as defined in paragraph 2c of 
this Part- 
(i)  if imposed upon a person attached to or 
embarked in a vessel, confinement on bread and 
water or diminished rations for not more than 3 con- 
secutive days; 
(ii)  correctional custody for not more than 
30 consecutive days; 
(iii)  forfeiture of not more than one-half of 1 
month's pay per month for 2 months; 
(iv)  reduction to the lowest or any interme- 
diate pay grade, if the grade from which demoted is 
within the promotion authority of the officer impos- 
ing the reduction or any officer subordinate to the 
one who imposes the reduction, but enlisted mem- 
bers in pay grades above E-4 may not be reduced 
more than one pay grade, except that during time or 
war or national emergency this category of persons 
may be reduced two grades if  the Secretary con- 
cerned determines that circumstances require the re- 
moval of this limitation; 
(v)  extra duties, including fatigue or other 
duties, for not more than 45 consecutive days; 
(vi)  restriction to specified limits, with or 
without suspension from duty, for not more than 60 
consecutive days. 
c.  Nature of punishment. 
(1)  Admonition and reprimand. Admonition and 
reprimand are two forms of censure intended to ex- 
press adverse reflection upon or criticism of a per- 
son's conduct. A reprimand is a more severe form of 
censure than an admonition. When imposed as non- 
judicial punishment, the admonition or reprimand is 
considered to be punitive, unlike the nonpunitive ad- 
monition and reprimand provided for in paragraph 
If of this Part. In the case of commissioned officers 
and warrant officers, admonitions and reprimands 
given as nonjudicial punishment must be adminis- 
tered in writing. In other cases, unless otherwise pre- 
scribed by the Secretary concerned, they may be ad- 
ministered either orally or in writing. 
(2)  Restriction. Restriction is the least severe 
form of deprivation of liberty. Restriction involves 
moral rather than physical restraint. The severity of 
this type of restraint depends on its duration and the 
geographical limits specified when the punishment is 
imposed. A person undergoing restriction may be re- 
quired to report to a designated place at specified 
times if reasonably necessary to ensure that the pun- 
ishment is being properly executed. Unless other- 
wise specified by the nonjudicial punishment author- 
ity, a person in restriction may be required to 
perform any military duty. 
(3)  Arrest in quarters. As in the case of restriction, 
the restraint involved in arrest in quarters is en- 
forced by a moral obligation rather than by physical 
means. This punishment may be imposed only on of- 
ficers. An officer undergoing this punishment may 
be required to perform those duties prescribed by the 
Secretary concerned. However, an officer so pun- 
ished is required to remain within that officer's 
quarters during the period of punishment unless the 
limits of arrest are otherwise extended by appropri- 
ate authority. The quarters of an officer may consist 
of a military residence, whether a tent, stateroom, or 
other quarters assigned, or a private residence when 
government quarters have not been provided. 
(4)  Correctional custody. Correctional custody is 
the physical restraint of a person during duty or 
nonduty hours, or both, imposed as a punishment 
under Article 15, and may include extra duties, fa- 
tigue duties, or hard labor as an incident of correc- 
tional custody. A person may be required to serve 
correctional custody in a confinement facility, but if 
practicable, not in immediate association with per- 
sons awaiting trial or held in confinement pursuant 
to trial by court-martial. A person undergoing cor- 
rectional custody may be required to perform those 
regular military duties, extra duties, fatigue duties, 
and hard labor which may be assigned by the au- 
thority charged with the administration of the pun- 
ishment. The conditions under which correctional 
custody is served shall be prescribed by the Secre- 
tary concerned. In addition, the Secretary concerned 
may limit the categories of enlisted members upon 
whom correctional custody may be imposed. The authority competent to order the release of a person 
from correctional custody shall be as designated by 
the Secretary concerned. 
(5)  Confinement on bread  and water or dimin- 
ished rations. Confinement on bread and water or di- 
minished rations involves confinement in places 
where the person so confined may communicate 
only with authorized personnel. The ration to be fur- 
nished a person undergoing a punishment of con- 
finement on bread and water or diminished rations is 
that specified by the authority charged with the ad- 
ministration of the punishment, but the ration may 
not consist solely of bread and water unless this pun- 
ishment has been specifically imposed. When pun- 
ishment of confinement on bread and water or di- 
minished rations is imposed, a signed certificate of a 
medical officer containing an opinion that no serious 
injury to the health of the person to be confined will 
be caused by that punishment, must be obtained 
before the punishment is executed. The categories of 
enlisted personnel upon whom this type of punish- 
ment may be imposed may be limited by the Secre- 
tary concerned. 
(6)  Extra duties. Extra duties involve the per- 
formance of duties in addition to those normally as- 
signed to the person undergoing the punishment. 
Extra duties may include fatigue duties. Military du- 
ties of any kind may be assigned as extra duty. How- 
ever, no extra duty may be imposed which consti- 
tutes a known safety or health hazard to the member 
or which constitutes cruel or unusual punishment or 
which is not sanctioned by customs of the service 
concerned. Extra duties assigned as punishment of 
noncommissioned  officers, petty officers, or any 
other enlisted persons of equivalent grades or posi- 
tions designated by the Secretary concerned, should 
not be of a kind which demeans their grades or posi- 
tions. 
(7) Reduction in grade. Reduction in grade is one 
of the most severe forms of nonjudicial punishment 
and it should be used with discretion. As used in Ar- 
ticle  15, the phrase "if  the grade from which de- 
moted is within the promotion authority of the of- 
ficer imposing the reduction or any officer 
subordinate to the one who imposes the reduction" 
does not refer to the authority to promote the person 
concerned but to the general authority to promote to 
the grade held by the person to be punished. 
(8)  Forfeiture of pay.  Forfeiture means a perma- 
nent loss of entitlement to the pay forfeited. "Pay," 
as used with respect to forfeiture of pay under Arti- 
cle 15, refers to the basic pay of the person or, in the 
case of reserve component personnel on inactive- 
duty, compensation for periods of inactive-duty 
training, plus any sea or foreign duty pay. "Basic 
pay"inc1udes no element of pay other than the basic 
pay fixed by statute for the grade and length of ser- 
vice of the person concerned and does not include 
special pay for a special qualification, incentive pay 
for the performance of hazardous duties, proficiency 
pay, subsistence and quarters allowances, and simi- 
lar types of compensation. If the punishment in- 
cludes both reduction, whether or not suspended, 
and forfeiture of pay, the forfeiture must be based on 
the grade to which reduced. The amount to be for- 
feited will be expressed in whole dollar amounts only 
and not in a number of day's  pay or fractions of 
monthly pay. If the forfeiture is to be applied for 
more than 1 month, the amount to be forfeited per 
month and the number of months should be stated. 
Forfeiture of pay may not extend to any pay accrued 
before the date of its imposition. 
d.  Limitations on combination of punishments. 
(1)  Arrest in quarters may not be imposed in 
combination with restriction; 
(2)  Confinement on bread and water or dimin- 
ished rations may not be imposed in combination 
with correctional custody, extra duties, or restric- 
tion; 
(3)  Correctional custody may not be imposed in 
combination with restriction or extra duties; 
(4)  Restriction and extra duties may be combined 
to run concurrently, but the combination may not 
exceed the maximum impossible for extra duties; 
(5)  Subject to the limits in subparagraphs d(1) 
through (4) all authorized punishments may be im- 
posed in a single case in the maximum amounts. 
e.  Punishments imposed on reserve component per- 
sonnel while on inactive-duty training. When a pun- 
ishment under Article  15 amounting to a depriva- 
tion of liberty (for example, restriction, correctional 
custody, extra duties, or arrest in quarters) is im- 
posed on a member of a reserve component during a 
period  of inactive-duty training, the punishment 
may be served during one or both of the following: 
(1)  a normal period of inactive-duty training; or (2)  a subsequent period of active duty (not in- 
cluding a period of active duty under Article 2(d)(l), 
unless such active duty was approved by the Secre- 
tary concerned). 
Unserved punishments may be carried over to subse- 
quent periods of inactive-duty training or active 
duty. A sentence to forfeiture of pay may be col- 
lected from active duty and inactive-duty training 
pay during subsequent periods of duty. 
f.  Punishments imposed on reserve component per- 
sonnel when ordered to active duty for  disciplinary 
purposes.  When a punishment under Article 15 is 
imposed on a member of a reserve component dur- 
ing a period of active duty to which the reservist was 
ordered pursuant to R.C.M. 204 and which consti- 
tutes a deprivation of liberty (for example, restric- 
tion, correctional custody, extra duties, or arrest in 
quarters), the punishment may be served during any 
or all of the following: 
(1)  that period of active duty to which the reserv- 
ist was ordered pursuant to Article 2(d), but only 
where the order to active duty was approved by the 
Secretary concerned; 
(2)  a subsequent normal period of inactive-duty 
training; or 
(3)  a subsequent period of active duty (not in- 
cluding a period of active duty pursuant to R.C.M. 
204 which was not approved by  the Secretary con- 
cerned). 
Unserved punishments may be carried over to subse- 
quent periods of inactive-duty training or active 
duty. A sentence to forfeiture of pay may be col- 
lected from active duty and inactive-duty training 
pay during subsequent periods of duty. 
g.  Effective date and execution of punishments. Re-
duction and forfeiture of pay, if unsuspended, take 
effect on the date the commander imposes the pun- 
ishments. Other punishments, if unsuspended, will 
take effect and be carried into execution as pre- 
scribed by the Secretary concerned. 
6.  Suspension, mitigation, remission, and 
setting aside 
a. Suspension. The nonjudicial punishment author- 
ity who imposes nonjudicial punishment, the com- 
mander who imposes nonjudicial punishment, or a 
successor in command over the person punished, 
may, at any time, suspend any part or amount of the 
unexecuted punishment imposed and may suspend a 
reduction in grade or a forfeiture, whether or not ex- 
ecuted, subject to the following rules: 
(1)  An executed punishment of reduction or for- 
feiture of pay may be suspended only within a period 
of 4 months after the date of execution. 
(2)  Suspension of a punishment may not be for a 
period longer than 6 months from the date of the 
suspension, and the expiration of the current enlist- 
ment or term of service of the servicemember in- 
volved automatically terminates the period of sus- 
pension. 
(3)  Unless the suspension is sooner vacated, sus- 
pended portions of the punishment are remitted, 
without further action, upon the termination of the 
period of suspension. 
(4)  Unless otherwise stated, an action suspending 
a punishment includes a condition that the ser- 
vicemember not violate any punitive article of the 
code. The nonjudicial punishment authority may 
specify in writing additional conditions of the sus- 
pension. 
(5)  A suspension may be vacated by any nonjudi- 
cia1 punishment authority or commander competent 
to impose upon the servicemember concerned pun- 
ishment of the kind and amount involved in the va- 
cation of suspension. Vacation of suspension may be 
based only on a violation of the conditions of suspen- 
sion which occurs within the period of suspension. 
Before a suspension may be vacated, the ser- 
vicemember ordinarily shall be notified and given an 
opportunity to respond. Although a hearing is not 
required to vacate a suspension,if the punishment is 
of the kind set forth in Article 15(e)(l)-(7), the ser- 
vicemember should, unless impracticable, be given 
an opportunity to appear before the officer author- 
ized to vacate suspension of the punishment to pre- 
sent any matters in defense, extenuation, or mitiga- 
tion of the violation on which the the vacation action 
is to be based. Vacation of a suspended nonjudicial 
punishment is not itself nonjudicial punishment, and 
additional action to impose nonjudicial punishment 
for a violation of a punitive article of the code upon 
which the vacation action is based is not precluded 
thereby. 
b.  Mitigation. Mitigation is a reduction in either the 
quantity or quality of a punishment, its general na- 
ture remaining the same. Mitigation is appropriate 
when the offender's later good conduct merits a re- 
duction in the punishment, or when it is determined that the punishment imposed was disproportionate. 
The nonjudicial punishment authority who imposes 
nonjudicial punishment, the commander who im- 
poses nonjudicial punishment, or a successor in 
command may, at any time, mitigate any part or 
amount of the unexecuted portion of the punish- 
ment imposed. The nonjudicial punishment author- 
ity who imposes nonjudicial punishment, the com- 
mander who imposes nonjudicial punishment, or a 
successor in command may also mitigate reduction 
in grade, whether executed or unexecuted, to forfei- 
ture of pay, but the amount of the forfeiture may not 
be greater than the amount that could have been im- 
posed by the officer who initially imposed the nonju- 
dicial punishment. Reduction in grade may be miti- 
gated to forfeiture of pay only within 4 months after 
the date of execution. 
When mitigating- 
(1) Arrest in quarters to restriction; 
(2)  Confinement on bread and water or dimin- 
ished rations to correctional custody; 
(3)  Correctional custody or confinement on bread 
and water or diminished rations to extra duties or re- 
striction, or both; or 
(4)  Extra duties to restriction, the mitigated pun- 
ishment may not be for a greater period than the 
punishment mitigated. As restriction is the least se- 
vere form of deprivation of liberty, it may not be mit- 
igated to a lesser period of another form of depriva- 
tion of liberty, as that would mean an increase in the 
quality of the punishment. 
c.  Remission. Remission is an action whereby any 
portion of the unexecuted punishment is cancelled. 
Remission is appropriate under the same circum- 
stances as mitigation. The nonjudicial punishment 
authority who imposes punishment, the commander 
who imposes nonjudicial punishment, or a successor 
in command may, at any time, remit any part or 
amount of the unexecuted portion of the punish- 
ment imposed. The expiration of the current enlist- 
ment or term of service of the servicemember auto- 
matically remits any unexecuted  punishment 
imposed under Article 15. 
d. Setting aside. Setting aside is an action whereby 
the punishment or any part or amount thereof, 
whether executed or unexecuted, is set aside and any 
property, privileges, or rights affected by the portion 
of the punishment set aside are restored. The nonju- 
dicial punishment authority who imposed punish- 
ment, the commander who imposes nonjudicial pun- 
ishment, or a successor in command may set aside 
punishment. The power to set aside punishments 
and restore rights, privileges, and property affected 
by the executed portion of a punishment should or- 
dinarily be exercised only when the authority con- 
sidering the case believes that, under all circum- 
stances of the case, the punishment has resulted in 
clear injustice. Also, the power to set aside an exe- 
cuted punishment should ordinarily be exercised 
only within a reasonable time after the punishment 
has been executed. In this connection, 4 months is a 
reasonable time in the absence of unusual circum- 
stances. 
7.  Appeals 
a. In general. Any servicemember punished under 
Article 15 who considers the punishment to be un- 
just or disproportionate to the offense may appeal 
through the proper channels to the next superior au- 
thority. 
b.  Who  may act on appeal. A "superior authority," 
as prescribed by the Secretary concerned, may act 
on an appeal. When punishment has been imposed 
under delegation of a commander's authority to ad- 
minister nonjudicial punishment (see paragraph 2c 
of this Part), the appeal may not be directed to the 
commander who delegated the authority. 
c.  Format of appeal. Appeals shall be in writing and 
may include the appellant's  reasons for regarding 
the punishment as unjust or disproportionate. 
d.  Time limit. An appeal shall be submitted within 5 
days of imposition of punishment, or the right to ap- 
peal shall be waived in the absence of good cause 
shown. A servicemember who has appealed may be 
required to undergo any punishment imposed while 
the appeal is pending, except that if action is not 
taken on the appeal within 5 days after the appeal 
was submitted, and if the servicemember so re- 
quests, any unexecuted punishment involving re- 
straint or extra duty shall be stayed until action on 
the appeal is taken. 
e.  Legal review. Before acting on an appeal from any 
punishment of the kind set forth in Article 15(e)(l)- 
(7), the authority who is to act on the appeal shall re- 
fer the case to a judge advocate or to a lawyer of the 
Department of Transportation for consideration 
and advice, and may so refer the case upon appeal 
from any punishment imposed under Article 15. When the case is referred, the judge advocate or law- 
yer is not limited to an examination of any written 
matter comprising the record of proceedings and 
may make any inquiries and examine any additional 
matter deemed necessary. 
f.  Action by superior authority. 
(1)  In general. In acting on an appeal, the supe- 
rior authority may exercise the same power with re- 
spect to the punishment imposed as may be exer- 
cised under Article 15(d) and paragraph 6 of this 
Part by  the officer who imposed the punishment. 
The superior authority may take such action even if 
no appeal has been filed. 
(2)  Matters considered. When reviewing the ac- 
tion of an officer who imposed nonjudicial punish- 
ment, the superior authority may consider the re- 
cord of the proceedings, any matters submitted by 
the servicemember, any matters considered during 
the legal review, if any, and any other appropriate 
matters. 
(3)  Additional proceedings. If the superior au- 
thority sets aside a nonjudicial punishment due to a 
procedural error, that authority may authorize addi- 
tional proceedings under Article 15, to be conducted 
by the officer who imposed the nonjudicial punish- 
ment, the commander, or a successor in command, 
for the same offenses involved in the original pro- 
ceedings. Any punishment imposed as a result of 
these additional proceedings may be no more severe 
than that originally imposed. 
(4)  Notification.  Upon completion of action by 
the superior authority, the servicemember upon 
whom punishment was imposed shall be promptly 
notified of the result. 
(5)  Delegation to principal assistant. If authorized 
by regulation of the Secretary concerned a superior 
authority who is a commander exercising general 
court-martial jurisdiction, or is an officer of general 
or flag rank in command, may delegate the power 
under Article 15(e) and this paragraph to a principal 
assistant. 
8.  Records of nonjudicial punishment 
The content, format, use,  and disposition of 
records of nonjudicial punishment may be pre- 
scribed by regulations of the Secretary concerned. APPENDIX 1 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES-1787 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more per- 
fect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide 
for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure 
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain 
and establish this Constitution of the United States of America. 
ARTICLE l 
Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested 
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate 
and a House of Representatives. 
Section 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of 
Members chosen every second year by the people of the several 
states, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications 
requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State 
Legislature. 
No person shall be a Representative who shall not have at- 
tained to the Age of twenty-five Years, and been seven Years a 
Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be 
an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen. 
1 Representative and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among 
the several States which may be included within this Union, ac- 
cording to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined 
by  adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those 
bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not 
taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration 
shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the 
Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term 
of ten Years in such Manner as they shall by  Law direct. The 
Number of Representative shall not exceed one for every thirty 
Thousand, but each state shall have at Least one Representative; 
and until such enumeration shall be made, the state of New 
Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, Massachusetts eight, 
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, 
New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware 
one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Caro- 
lina five, and Georgia three. 
When vacancies happen in the Representation from any state, 
the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to 
fill such Vacancies. 
The House of  Representatives shall choose the Speaker and 
other officers; and shall have the sole power of Impeachment. 
Section 3.  2The Senate of the United States shall be composed 
of  two Senators from each State chosen by  the Legislature 
thereof, for six Years and each Senator shall have one Vote. 
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of 
the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into 
three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be 
vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class 
1 This clause has been affected by the 14th and 16th amendments. 
2This section has been affected by the 17th amendment 
3 This clause has been affected by the 20th amendment 
at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the 
Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen 
every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by  Resignation, or 
otherwise during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the 
Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the 
next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacan- 
cies. 
No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the 
Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United 
States, who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State 
for which he shall be chosen. 
The Vice-President of the United States shall be President of 
the Senate, but shall have no Vote unless they be equally divided. 
The Senate shall choose their other Officers, and also a Presi- 
dent pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice-President, or when 
he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States. 
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. 
When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirma- 
tion. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief 
Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without 
the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present. 
Judgement in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further 
than to removal from Office and disqualification  to hold and enjoy 
any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States; but 
the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to In- 
dictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. 
Section 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections 
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State 
by  the Legislature thereof: but the Congress may at any time by 
Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of 
choosing Senators. 
'The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and 
such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless 
they shall by Law appoint a different Day. 
Section 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Re- 
turns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of 
each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller 
Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to 
compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and 
under such Penalties as each House may provide. 
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, pun- 
ish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and with the Concur- 
rence of two-thirds, expel a Member. 
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from 
time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may  in 
their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the 
Members either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one 
fifth of those Present be entered on the Journal. ~ ~ 
l ~ , 
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Neither House, during the Session of Congress shall, without 
the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to 
any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting. 
Section 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a 
Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and 
paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all 
Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privi- 
leged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their 
respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; 
and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be 
questioned in any other Place. 
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which 
he is elected, be appointed to any Civil Office under the Authority 
of the United States, which shall have been created, or theEmolu- 
ments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no 
Person  holding any Office under  the United States,  shall be a 
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office. 
Section 7.  All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the 
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur 
with Amendments as on other Bills. 
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representa- 
tives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented 
to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, 
but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in 
which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at 
large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such 
Reconsideration two-thirds of that House shall agree to pass the 
Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other 
House, by which is shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved 
by two-thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such 
Cases the Votes of Both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and 
Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting  for and against the 
Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If 
any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days 
(sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the 
Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless 
the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which 
Case it shall not be a Law. 
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of 
the Senate and House of Representative may be necessary (except 
on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President 
of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall 
be  him,0r being  him,  be re-
passed  thirds  the Senate and 
according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a 
Bill. 
Section 8. The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide 
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States. 
To borrow Money on the credit of the United States; To regu- 
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes; 
To establish an uniform rule of Naturalization, and uniform 
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
States; 
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign 
Coin'and fix the Standard Of  Weights and Measures; 
TO  provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities 
and current Coin of the United States; 
Post Offices and post Roads; 
promote  the  Scienceand  Arts*  secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right  their  Writings and Discoveries; 
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court; 
TO  define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the 
high Seas' and Offenses against the Law of Nations; 
Warygrant  Letters of Marque and  and 
make  concerning Captures On  Land and Water; 
raise and support  but no  of 
to that use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; 
To provide and maintain a Navy; 
To  make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land 
and naval Forces; 
To provide for calling forth the Militiato execute the Laws of 
the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.; 
T~ provide for organizing,  arming, and disciplining, the ~ili- 
tia, and for governing such  part of them as may be employed in 
the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respec- 
tively, the ~~~~i~~~~~~ of the officers,  and the ~~th~~it~  of 
training the ~ili~i~  according to the discipline prescribed by con-
gress; 
~  ~whatsoever,  over  i T~ exercise exclusive ~  ~  in all icases  l  ~  ~ 
such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession 
of  States, and the Acceptance of Congress,become the 
seat ofthe ~~~~~~~~t  ofthe united states, and to exercise like 
Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legis- 
lature of the States in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of 
~  ~  ~  t ~  ~  ,dock-Yards, and other needful  ~  ~  ~  ~ hfagazines,  ~ 
~~ildi~~~; ~,,d 
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for car- 
rying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers 
vested  by the Constitution in the Government of  the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. 
section 9.  The Migration or Importation of such Persons as 
any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall 
not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand 
eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on 
such Importation,  not exceeding ten dollars for each person, 
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, 
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety 
require it. 
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. 
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Pro- 
portion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be 
taken. 
No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any 
State. 
No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce 
or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor CONSTITUTION  Art. 11,  6 2 
shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, 
clear, or pay Duties in another. 
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Conse- 
quence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement 
and Account of  the Receipts and Expenditures of all public 
Money shall be published from time to time. 
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And 
no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, 
without the Consent of  the Congress, accept of any present, 
Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever,  from any 
King, Prince, or foreign State. 
Section 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or 
Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal;  coin 
Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver 
Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex 
post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or 
grant any Title of Nobility. 
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any 
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be ab- 
solutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws; and the net 
Produce of  all Duties and Imports, laid by  any State on Imports 
or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United 
States; all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control 
of the Congress. 
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty 
of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter 
into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a for- 
eign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such 
imminent Danger as will not admit of delay. 
ARTICLE II 
Section 1. The executive  Power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States and, together with the Vice President,chosen 
for the same Term, be elected as follows. 
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature 
thereof may direct, r. Number of Electors, equal to the whole 
Number of  Senators and Representatives to which the State may 
be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or 
Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United 
States, shall be appointed an Elector. 
4 The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by 
Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an In- 
habitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a 
List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for 
each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to 
the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the 
President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the 
Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
Certificates,  and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person hav- 
ing the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such 
Number be  a Majority of the whole Number of Electors ap- 
pointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, 
and have an equal Number of Electors appointed; and if there be 
more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Num- 
ber of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately 
This clause has been affected by the 12th amendment. 
choose by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have 
a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House 
shall in like Manner choose the President. But in choosing the 
President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation 
from each State having one Vote; a quorum for this Purpose shall 
consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, 
and a Majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. In 
every case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having 
the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice 
President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal 
Votes, the Senate shall choose from them by Ballot the Vice Presi- 
dent. 
The Congress may determine the Time of the choosing the 
Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which 
Day shall be the same throughout the United States. 
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of  the 
United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, 
shall be eligible to the Office of Presidentpeither shall any Person 
be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of 
thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the 
United States. 
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or his 
Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Du- 
ties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice Presi- 
dent, and the Congress may by  Law provide for the Case of Re- 
moval, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and 
Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, 
and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be re- 
moved, or a President be elected. 
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services,a 
Com~ensation,  which shall neither be increased nor diminished 
during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he 
shall not receive within a Period any other Emolument from the 
United States, or any of them. 
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the 
following Oath or Affirmation: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) 
that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United 
States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and de- 
fend the Constitution of the United States." 
Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the sev- 
eral States, when called into the actual Service of the United 
States; he may require the Opinion, in writing of the principal Of- 
ficer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject re- 
lating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have 
power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the 
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. 
He shall have Power, by  and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur; and he shall nominate, and by  and with the Ad- 
vice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,other 
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of  the supreme Court, and 
all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are 
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established 
by  Law. But the Congress may by  law vest the Appointment of 
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such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, 
in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may 
happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions 
which shall expire at the End of their Session. 
Section 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress In- 
formation of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Con- 
sideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedi- 
ent; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, 
or either of them, and in Case of  Disagreement between them, 
with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them 
to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassa- 
dors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of 
the United States. 
Section 4. The President, Vice President and all civil Officers 
of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeach- 
ment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors. 
ARTICLE Ill 
Section 1. The judicial  Power of the United States shall be 
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The 
Judges, both of the Supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their 
Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive 
for their Services a Compensation which shall not be diminished 
during their Continuance in Office. 
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law 
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the 
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers, and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime 
Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be 
a Party; to Controversies between two or more States, between a 
State and Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different 
States, between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under 
Grants of different States, and between a State or the Citizens 
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects. 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme 
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases 
before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate Juris- 
diction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions and under 
such Regulations as the Congress shall make. 
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,shall 
be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said 
Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed 
within any State the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the 
Congress may by  Law have directed. 
Section 3. Treason against the United States shall consist only 
in levying War against them, or in  adhering to their Ene- 
mies,giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted 
of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same 
overt Act, or on Confession in open Court. 
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of 
Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of 
Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attained. 
ARTICLE IV 
Section 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to 
the public Act, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other 
State. And the Congress may, by  general Laws, prescribe the 
Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be 
proved, and the Effect thereof. 
Section 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. 
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other 
Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, 
shall, on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from 
which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having 
Jurisdiction of the Crime. 
No Person held to Service or Labor in one State, under the 
Lzws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any 
Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or 
Labor, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom 
such Service or Labor may be due. 
Section 3. New States may be admitted by  the Congress into 
this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the 
Jurisdiction of any other State, nor any State be formed by  the 
Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the 
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of 
the Congress. 
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all 
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Con- 
stitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the 
United States, or of any particular State. 
Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect 
each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legisla- 
ture, or of the Executive (when  the Legislature cannot be con- 
vened), against domestic Violence. 
ARTICLE V 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both House shall deem it 
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on 
the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several 
States, shall call a Convention  for proposing  Amendments, 
which, in either Case, shall be valid, to all intents and Purposes, as 
Part of this Constitution, when ratified by  the Legislatures of 
three fourths of  the several States, or by  Conventions in three 
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may 
be proposed  by  the Congress; Provided that no Amendment 
which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hun- 
dred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth 
Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, CONS 
without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the 
Senate. 
ARTICLE VI 
All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into,before the 
Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United 
States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation. 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made,or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, Anything in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the 
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and 
judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several 
States, shall be bound, by  Oath or Affirmation, to support this 
Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required  as a 
Qualification  to any Office or public Trust under the United 
States. 
ARTICLE VII 
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be suffi- 
cient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the 
States so ratifying the Same. 
Articles in Addition to, and Amendment of; the Constitution of 
the United States of America, Proposed by Congress, and Ratified 
by the Legislatures of the Several States Pursuant  to the Fifth Arti- 
cle of the Original Constitution 
AMENDMENT l 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig- 
ion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the free- 
dom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably 
to assemble, and to petition  the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
AMENDMENT ll 
A well-regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed. 
AMENDMENT Ill 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner; nor in time of war, but in a 
manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT lV 
The right of  the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa- 
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,  and particularly describ- 
ing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infa- 
mous, crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service, in time of War, or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject, for the same offence, to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any crim- 
inal case to be a witness against himself nor be deprived of life, lib- 
erty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by  an impartial jury of the State and dis- 
trict wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district 
shall have been previously ascertained by law; and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for ob- 
taining witnesses in his favor; and to have the Assistance of Coun- 
sel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall ex- 
ceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; 
and no fact, tried by  a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any 
Court of the United States than according to the rules of the com- 
mon law. 
AMENDMENT Vlll 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. 
AMENDMENT lX 
The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. 
AMENDMENT X 
The powers not delegated to the United States by  the Constitu- 
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively or to the people. 
AMENDMENT XI The Judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com- 
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by  Citizens 
of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XI1 
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by  bal- 
lot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall 
not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; they shall 
name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in dis- 
tinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President; and they shall 
make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all 
persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes 
for each, which lists they shall sign, and certify, and transmit, 
sealed, to the seat of the government of the United States, directed 
to the President of the Senate; the President of the Senate shall, in 
the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives, open 
all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted; the person 
having the greatest number of  votes for President shall be the Arndt. XI1  APPENDIX 1 
President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of 
Electors appointed; and if no person have such a majority, then, 
from the persons having the highest numbers, not exceeding 
three, on the list of those voted for a President, the House of Rep- 
resentatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. 
But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, 
the representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for 
this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two- 
thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be neces- 
sary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not 
choose a President, whenever the right of choice shall devolve 
upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, the 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in case of death, or other 
constitutional disability  of the President. The person having the 
greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-Pres- 
ident, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Elec- 
tors appointed; and if no person have a majority, then, from the 
two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice- 
President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of 
the whole number of Senators; a majority of the whole number 
shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally inel- 
igible to the office of President shall be eligible to that Vice-Presi- 
dent of the United States. 
AMENDMENT Xlll 
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as 
a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place sub- 
ject to their jurisdiction. 
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor 
deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Section2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the sev- 
eral States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of 
electors for President and Vice-President  of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers 
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to 
any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty one years 
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, 
except for participation in rebellion  or other crime, the basis of 
representation  therein shall be reduced in the proportion which 
the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number 
of male citizens twenty one years of age in such State. 
Section 3.  No person shall be a Senator or Representative in 
Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any 
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any 
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a Member of Con- 
gress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any 
State legislature, or as an executive or  judicial officer of any State, 
to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have en- 
gaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or 
comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of 
two thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, 
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pen- 
sions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or re- 
bellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor 
any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in 
aid of insurrection or rebellion  against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, 
obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro- 
priate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any 
State on account of race, color, or  previous condition of servitude. 
Section 2.  The Congress shall have power to enforce this arti- 
cle by appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XVl 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on in- 
comes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment 
among the  several States and without regard to any census or  enu- 
meration. 
AMENDMENT XVll 
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Sena- 
tors from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; 
and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State 
shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most nu- 
merous branch of the State legislatures. 
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in 
the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs 
of election to fill such vacancies. Provided, That the legislature of 
any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary 
appointment until the people fill the vacancies by election as the 
legislature may direct. 
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the elec- 
tion or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part 
of the Constitution. CONSTITUTION  Amdt. XXIII, 6 1 
5AMENDMENTXVlll 
Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the 
manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors 
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof 
from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited. 
Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have con- 
current power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. 
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have 
been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legisla- 
tures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within 
seven years of the date of the submission hereof to the States by 
Congress. 
AMENDMENT XIX ~h~ right of citizens of the united states 
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by 
any State on account of sex. 
Congressshall have power to enforce this article by appropri-

ate legislation. 

AMENDMENT XX 
Section 1. The terms of the President and Vice President shall 
end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators 
and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the 
years in which such terms would have ended if this article had not 
been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin. 
Section 2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every 
year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of Janu- 
ary, unless they shall by law appoint a different day. 
Section 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of 
the President, the President-elect shall have died, the Vice Presi- 
dent-elect shall become President. If a President shall not have 
been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or 
if  the President-elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice 
President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have 
qualified; and the Congress may bylaw  provide for the case 
wherein neither a President-elect nor a Vice President-elect shall 
have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the 
manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such per- 
son shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall 
have qualified. 
Section 4. The Congress may by  law provide for the case of the 
death of any of the persons from whom the House of Representa- 
tives may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall 
have devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of 
This article was replaced by the 21st amendment 
the persons from whom the Senate may choose a Vice President 
whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them. 
Section 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of 
October following the ratification of this article. 
Section 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have 
been  ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by  three 
fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its 
submission. 
AMENDMENT XXI 
Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Consti- 
tution of the United States is hereby repealed. 
Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, 
Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use 
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is 
hereby prohibited. 
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have 
been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions 
in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven 
years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the 
Congress. 
AMENDMENT XXll 
Section 1. No person shall be elected to the office of the Presi- 
dent more than twice, and no person who has held the office of 
President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term 
to which some other person was elected President shall be elected 
to the office of the President more than once. But this Article shall 
not apply to any person holding the office of President when this 
Article was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any 
person who may be holding the office of President, or acting as 
President, during the term within which his Article becomes op- 
erative from holding the office of President or acting as President 
during the remainder of such term. 
Section 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have 
been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legisla- 
tures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from 
the date of its submission to the States by the Congress. 
AMENDMENT XXlll 
Section 1. The District constituting the seat of Government of 
the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress 
may direct: 
A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to 
the whole number of Senators and Representative in Congress to 
which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no 
event more than the least populous State; they shall be consid- 
ered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice Presi- 
dent, to be electors appointed by a State; and they shall meet in 
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the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth 
article of amendment. 
Section 2. ~h~ congress shall have power to enforce this arti- 
cle by appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XXlV 
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in 
any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for 
electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Repre- 
sentative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax 
or other tax. 
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this arti- 
cle by appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XXV 
Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or 
of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become Presi- 
dent. 
Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice 
President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who 
shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both 
Houses of Congress. 
Section 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President 
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speakers of the House of Rep- 
resentatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge 
the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them 
a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties 
shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President. 
Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of ei- 
ther the principal officers of the Executive departments or of such 
other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the Presi- 
dent pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives their written declaration that the President is un- 
able to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice Pres- 
ident shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office 
as Acting President. 
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro 
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Represent- 
atives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall re- 
sume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President 
and a majority of either principal officers of the executive depart- 
ment or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, 
transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Sen- 
ate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written 
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers 
and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the is- 
sue, assembling within forty eight hours for that purpose if not in 
session. If the Congress, within twenty one days after Congress is 
required to assemble, determines by  two thirds vote of both 
Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and 
duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge 
the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall re- 
sume the powers and duties of his office. 
AMENDMENT XXVl 
Section 1.  The right of citizens of the United States, who are 
eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by  any State on account of age. 
Section 2.  The Congress shall have the power to enforce this 
article by appropriate legislation. APPENDIX 2 
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SUBCHAPTER 1.  GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Art. 
1. 	 Definitions. 
2. 	 Persons subject to this chapter. 
3. 	 Jurisdiction to try certain personnel. 
4. 	 Dismissed officer's right to trial by court-martial 
5. 	 Territorial applicability of this chapter. 
6. 	 Judge advocates and legal officers. 
6a. 	Investigations and disposition of matters 
pertaining to the fitness of military judges. 
5 801. Art. 1. Definitions. 
In this chapter. 
(1)  The  term "Judge Advocate General" means, severally, the 
Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and, 
except when the Coast Guard is operating as a service in the 
Navy, the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation. 
(2)  The  Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard when it 
is operating as a service in the Navy, shall be considered as one 
armed force. 
(3)  The term "commanding  officer"  includes only commis- 
sioned officers. 
(4)  The  term "officer in charge" means a member of the Navy, 
the Marine Corps, or the Coast Guard designated as such by ap- 
propriate authority. 
(5)  The term "superior  commissioned officer" means a com- 
missioned officer superior in rank or command. 
(6)  The term "cadet"  means a cadet of the United States Mili- 
tary Academy, the United States Air Force Academy, or the 
United States Coast Guard Academy. 
(7)  The term "midshipman"  means a midshipman of the 
United States Naval Academy and any other midshipman on ac- 
tive duty in the naval service. 
(8)  The term "military"  refers to any or all of the armed forces. 
(9)  The term "accuser"  means a person who signs and swears 
to charges, any person who directs that charges nominally be 
signed and sworn to by another, and any other person who has an 
interest other than an official interest in the prosecution of the ac- 
cused. 
(10)  The term "military judge"  means an official of a general 
or special court-martial detailed in accordance with section 826 of 
this title (article 26). 
(11)  The term "law  specialist"  means a commissioned officer 
of the Coast Guard designated for special duty (law). 
(12)  The term "legal officer"  means any commissioned officer 
of the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard designated  to per- 
form legal duties for a command. 
(13)  The  term "judge advocate" means- 
(A)  an officer of the Judge Advocate General's Corps of the 
Army or the Navy; 
(B)  an officer of the Air Force or the Marine Corps who is 
designated as a judge advocate; or 
(C)  an officer of the Coast Guard who is designated as a law 
specialist. 
(14)  The term "record",  when used  in connection with the 
proceedings of a court-martial, means -
(A)  an official written transcript, written summary, or other 
writing relating to the proceedings; or 
(B)  an official audiotape, videotape, or similar material from 
which sound, or sound and visual images, depicting the proceed- 
ings may be reproduced. 
5 802. Art. 2.  Persons subject to this chapter 
(a)  The  following persons are subject to this chapter: 
(1)  Members of a regular component of the armed forces, in- 
cluding those awaiting discharge after expiration of their terms of 
enlistment; volunteers from the time of their muster or accept- 
ance into the armed forces; inductees from the time of their actual 
induction into the armed forces; and other persons lawfully called 
or ordered into, or to duty in or for training in, the armed forces, 
from the dates when they are required by the terms of the call or 
order to obey it. 
(2)  Cadets, aviation cadets, and midshipmen. 
(3)  Members of a reserve component while on inactive-duty 
training, but in the case of members of the Army National Guard 
of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United 
States only when in Federal service. 
(4)  Retired members of a regular component of  the armed 
forces who are entitled to pay. 
(5)  Retired members of a reserve component who are receiving 
hospitalization from an armed force. 
(6)  Members of the Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine Corps Re- 
serve. 
(7)  Persons in custody of the armed forces serving a sentence 
imposed by a court-martial. 
(8)  Members of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad- 
ministration, Public Health Service, and other organizations, 
when assigned to and serving with the armed forces. Q  802. Art. 2.(a)(9)  APPENDIX 2 
(9)  Prisoners of war in custody of the armed forces. 
(10)  In time of war, persons serving with or accompanying an 
armed force in the field. 
(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United 
States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international 
law, persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the 
armed forces outside the United States and outside the Common- 
wealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. 
(12)  Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United 
States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international 
law, persons within an area leased by or otherwise reserved or ac- 
quired for the use of the United States which is under the control 
of the Secretary concerned and which is outside the United States 
and outside the Canal Zone, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
Guam, and the Virgin Islands. 
(b)  The voluntary enlistment of any person who has the capacity 
to understand the significance of enlisting in the armed forces 
shall be valid for purposes ofjurisdiction under subsection (a) and 
a change of status from civilian to member of the armed forces 
shall be effective upon the taking of the oath of enlistment. 
(c)  Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person serving 
with an armed force who -
(1)  submitted voluntarily to military authority; 
(2) met the mental competence and minimum age qualifica- 
tions of sections 504 and 505 of this title at the time of voluntary 
submission to military authority; 
(3)  received military pay or allowances; and 
(4)  performed military duties; 
is subject to this chapter until such person's  active service has 
been terminated in accordance with law or regulations promul- 
gated by the Secretary concerned. 
(d)(l) A member of a reserve component who is not on active 
duty and who is made the subject of proceedings under section 
815 (article 15) or section 830 (article 30) with respect to an of- 
fense against this chapter may be ordered to active duty involun- 
tarily for the purpose of 
(A) investigation under section 832 of this title (article 32); 
(B) trial by court-martial; or 
(C) nonjudicial punishment under section 815 of this title 
(article 15). 
(2)  A member of a reserve component may not be ordered to 
active duty under paragraph (1) except with respect to an offense 
committed while the member was 
(A) on active duty; or 
(B) on inactive-duty training, but in the case of members of 
the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air Na- 
tional Guard of the United States only when in Federal service. 
(3)  Authority to order a member to active duty under para- 
graph (1) shall be exercised under regulations prescribed by  the 
President. 
(4) A member may be ordered to active duty under paragraph 
(1) only by  a person empowered to convene general courts-mar- 
tial in a regular component of the armed forces. 
(5)  A member ordered to active duty under paragraph (I), un- 
less the order to active duty was approved by the Secretary con- 
cerned, may not 
(A) be  sentenced to confinement; or 
(B) be  required to serve a punishment consisting of any re- 
striction on liberty during a period other than a period of inactive- 
duty training or activeduty (other than active duty ordered under 
paragraph (1)). 
5 803. Art. 3. Jurisdiction to try certain personnel 
(a)  Subject to section 843 of this title (article 43), a person who is 
in a status in which the person is subject to this chapter and who 
committed an offense against this chapter while formerly in a sta- 
tus in which the person was subject to this chapter is not relieved 
from amenability to the jurisdiction of this chapter for that of- 
fense by reason of a termination of that person's former status. 
(b)  Each person discharged from the armed forces who is later 
charged with having fraudulently obtained his discharge is, sub- 
ject to section 843 of this title (article 43), subject to trial by court- 
martial on that charge and is after apprehension subject to this 
chapter while in the custody of the armed forces for that trial. 
Upon conviction of that charge he is subject to trial by court-mar- 
tial for all offenses under this chapter committed before the fraud- 
ulent discharge. 
(c)  No person who has deserted from the armed forces may be re- 
lieved from amenability to the jurisdiction of this chapter by  vir- 
tue of a separation from any later period of service. 
(d)  A member of a reserve component who is subject to this 
chapter is not, by  virtue of the termination of a period of active 
duty or inactive-duty training, relieved from amenability to the 
jurisdiction  of  this chapter for an offense against this chapter 
committed during such period of active duty or inactive-duty 
training. 
5 804. Art. 4. Dismissed officer's right to trial by 
court-martial 
(a)  If any commissioned officer, dismissed by  order of the Presi- 
dent, makes a written application for trial by court-martial setting 
forth, under oath, that he has been  wrongfully dismissed, the 
President, as soon as practicable, shall convene a general court- 
martial to try that officer on the charges on which he was dis- 
missed. A court-martial so convened has jurisdiction  to try the 
dismissed officer on those charges, and he shall be considered to 
have waived the right to plead any statute of limitations applica- 
ble to any offense with which he is charged. The court-martial 
may, as part of its sentence, adjudge the affirmance of the dismis- 
sal, but if the court-martial acquits the accused or if the sentence 
adjudged, as finally approved or affirmed, does not include dis- 
missal or death, the Secretary concerned shall substitute for the 
dismissal ordered by the President a form of discharge authorized 
for administrative issue. 
(b)  If the President fails to convene a general court-martial 
within six months from the preparation of an application for trial 
under this article, the Secretary concerned shall substitute for the 
dismissal order by  the President a form of discharge authorized 
for administrative issue. 
(c)  If a discharge is substituted for a dismissal under this article, 
the President alone may reappoint the officer to such commis- 
sioned grade and with such rank as, in the opinion of the Presi- 
dent, that former officer would have attained had he not been dis- 
missed. The reappointment of such a former officer shall be 
without regard to the existence of a vacancy and shall affect the 
promotion status of other officers only insofar as the President 
may direct. All time between the dismissal and the reappointment UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE  Q  810. Art. 10. 
shall be considered as actual service for all purposes, including 
the right to pay and allowances. 
(d)  If an officer is discharged from any armed force by  adminis- 
trative action or is dropped from the rolls by order of the Presi- 
dent, he has no right to trial under this article. 
8 805. Art. 5. Territorial applicability of this chapter 
This chapter applies in all places. 
8 806. Art. 6. Judge Advocates and legal officers 
(a)  The assignment for duty of judge advocates of the Army, 
Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard shall be made upon the rec- 
ommendation of the Judge Advocate General of the armed force 
of which they are members. The assignment for duty ofjudge ad- 
vocates of the Marine Corps shall be made by  direction of the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps. The  Judge Advocate General 
or senior members of his staff shall make frequent inspection in 
the field in supervision of the administration of military justice. 
(b) Convening authorities shall at all times communicate directly 
with their staff judge advocates or legal officers in matters relating 
to the administration of military justice; and the staff judge advo- 
cate or legal officer of any command is entitled to communicate 
directly with the staff judge advocate or legal officer of a superior 
or subordinate command, or with the Judge Advocate General. 
(c)  No person who has acted as member, military judge,  trial 
counsel, assistant trial counsel, defense counsel, assistant defense 
counsel, or investigating officer in any case may later act as a staff 
judge advocate or legal officer to any reviewing authority upon 
the same case. 
(d)(l)  A judge advocate who is assigned or detailed to perform 
the functions of a civil office in the Government of the United 
States under section 973(b)(2)(B) of this title may perform such 
duties as may be requested by the agency concerned, including 
representation of the United States in civil and criminal cases. 
(2)  The  Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transporta- 
tion with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a 
service in the Navy, shall prescribe regulations providing that re- 
imbursement may be a condition of assistance by judge advocates 
assigned or detailed under section 973(b)(2)(B) of this title. 
8 806a. Art. 6a. Investigation and disposition of 
matters pertaining to the fitness of military judges 
(a)  The President shall prescribe procedures for the investigation 
and disposition of charges, allegations, or information pertaining 
to the fitness of a military judge or military appellate judge to per- 
form the duties of the judge's  position. To  the extent practicable, 
the procedures shall be uniform for all armed forces. 
(b)  The President shall transmit a copy of the procedures pre- 
scribed pursuant to this section to the Committees on Armed Ser- 
vices of the Senate and the House of Representatives. 
SUBCHAPTER II. APPREHENSION AND 
RESTRAINT 
Sec.  Art. 
807.  7.  Apprehension 
808.  8.  Apprehension of deserters. 
809.  9.  Imposition of restraint. 
Sec.  Art. 
810.  10.  Restraint of persons charged with offenses, 
81 1,  11,  R~~~~~~ and receiving ofprisoners. 
812.  12.  Confinement with enemy prisoners prohibited. 
8  13.  13.  Punishment prohibited before trial. 
814.  14.  Delivery of offenders  to civil authorities, 
8 807. Art. 7. Apprehension 
(a)  Apprehension is the taking of a person into custody. 
(b)  Any person authorized under regulations governing the 
armed forces to apprehend persons subject to this chapter or to 
trial thereunder may do so upon reasonable belief that an offense 
has been committed and that the person apprehended committed 
It. 
(c)  Commissioned officers, warrant officers, petty officers, and 
noncommissioned officers have authority to quell quarrels, frays 
and disorders among persons subject to this chapter and to appre- 
hend persons subject to this chapter who take part therein. 
8 808. Art. 8. Apprehension of deserters 
Any civil officer having authority to apprehend offenders under 
the laws of the United States or of a State, Territory, Common- 
wealth, or possession, or the District of Columbia may summarily 
apprehend a deserter from the armed forces and deliver him into 
the custody of those forces. 
8 809. Art. 9.  Imposition of restraint 
(a)  Arrest is the restraint of a person by an order, not imposed as 
a punishment for an offense, directing him to remain within cer- 
tain specified limits. Confinement is the physical restraint of a 
person. 
(b)  An enlisted member may be ordered into arrest or confine- 
ment by any commissioned officer by an order, oral or written, de- 
livered in person or through other persons subject to this chapter. 
A commanding officer may authorize warrant officers, petty of- 
ficers, or noncommissioned officers to order enlisted members of 
his command or subject to his authority into arrest or confine- 
ment. 
(c)  A commissioned officer, a warrant officer, or a civilian subject 
to this chapter or to trial thereunder may be ordered into arrest or 
confinement only by a commanding officer to whose authority he 
is subject, by an order, oral or written, delivered in person or by 
another commissioned officer. The authority to order such per- 
sons into arrest or confinement may not be delegated. 
(d)  No person may be ordered into arrest or confinement except 
for probable cause. 
(e)  Nothing in this article limits the authority of persons author- 
ized to apprehend offenders to secure the custody of an alleged of- 
fender until proper authority may be notified. 
8 810. Art. 10. Restraint of persons charged with 
offenses 
Any person subject to this chapter charged with an offense under 
this chapter shall be ordered into arrest or confinement, as cir- 
cumstances may require; but when charged only with an offense 
normally tried by  a summary court-martial, he shall not ordina- 5 810. Art. 10.  APPENDIX 2 
rily be placed in confinement. When any person subject to this 
chapter is placed in arrest or confinement prior to trial, immedi- 
ate steps shall be taken to inform him of  the specific wrong of 
which he is accused and to try him or to dismiss the charges and 
release him. 
5 81  1. Art. 11. Reports and receiving of prisoners 
(a)  No provost marshal, commander or a guard, or master at 
arms may refuse to receive or keep any prisoner committed to his 
charge by  a commissioned officer of the armed forces, when the 
committing officer furnishes a statement, signed by him, of the of- 
fense charged against the prisoner. 
(b)  Every commander of a guard or master at arms to whose 
charge a prisoner is committed shall, within twenty-four hours af-
ter that commitment or as soon as he is relieved from guard, re- 
port to the commanding officer the name of the prisoner, the of- 
fense charged against him, and the name of the person who 
ordered or authorized the commitment. 
5 812. Art. 12. Confinement with enemy prisoners 
prohibited 
No member of the armed forces may be placed in confinement in 
immediate association with enemy prisoners or other foreign na- 
tionals not members of the armed forces. 
5 813. Art. 13. Punishment prohibited before trial 
No person, while being held for trial, may be subjected to punish- 
ment or penalty other than arrest or confinement upon the 
charges pending against him, nor shall the arrest or confinement 
imposed upon him be any more rigorous than the circumstances 
required to insure his presence, but he may be subjected to minor 
punishment during that period for infractions of discipline. 
5 814. Art. 14. Delivery of offenders to civil 
authorities 
(a) Under such regulations as the Secretary concerned may pre- 
scribe, a member of the armed forces accused of an offense against 
civil authority may be delivered, upon request, to the civil author- 
ity for trial. 
(b)  When delivery under this article is made to any civil author- 
ity of a person undergoing sentence of a court-martial, the deliv- 
ery, if followed by conviction in a civil tribunal, interrupts the ex- 
ecution of the sentence of the court-martial, and the offender after 
having answered to the civil authorities for his offense shall, upon 
the request of competent military authority, be returned to mili- 
tary custody for the completion of his sentence. 
SUBCHAPTER Ill. NON-JUDICIAL PUNISHMENT 
5 815. Art. 15. Commanding Officer's non-judicial 
punishment 
(a)  Under such regulations as the President may prescribe, and 
under such additional regulations as may be prescribed by  the 
Secretary concerned, limitations may be placed on the powers 
granted by  this article with respect to the kind and amount of 
punishment authorized, the categories of  commanding officers 
and warrant officers exercising command authorized to exercise 
those powers, the applicability of this article to an accused who 
demands trial by court-martial, and the kinds of courts-martial to 
which the case may be referred upon such a demand. However, 
except in the case of a member attached to or embarked in a ves- 
sel, punishment  may not be imposed upon any member of the 
armed forces under this article if the member has, before the im- 
position of such punishment, demanded trial by court-martial in 
lieu of such punishment. Under similar regulations, rules may be 
prescribed with respect to the suspension of punishments author- 
ized hereunder. If authorized by regulations of the Secretary con- 
cerned, a commanding officer exercising general court-martial ju- 
risdiction or an officer of general or flag rank in command may 
delegate his powers under this article to a principal assistant. 
(b)  Subject to subsection (a) any commanding officer may, in ad- 
dition to or in lieu of admonition or reprimand, impose one or 
more of the following disciplinary punishments for minor offenses 
without the intervention of a court-martial- 
(1) upon officers of his command 
(A) restriction to certain specified limits, with or without 
suspension from duty, for not more than 30 consecutive days; 
(B)  if imposed by an officer exercising general court-martial 
jurisdiction or an officer of general or flag rank in command 
(i)  arrest in quarters for not more than 30 consecutive 
days; 
(ii)  forfeiture of not more than one-half of one month's 
pay per month for two months; 
(iii)  restriction to certain specified limits, with or with- 
out suspension from duty, for not more than 60 consecutive days; 
(iv)  detention of not more than one-half of one 
month's pay per month for three months; 
(2)  upon other personnel of his command- 
(A)  if imposed upon a person attached to or embarked in a 
vessel, confinement on bread and water or diminished rations for 
not more than three consecutive days; 
(B) correctional custody for not more than seven consecu- 
tive days; 
(C) forfeiture of not more than seven days' pay; 
(D) reduction  to the next inferior pay grade, if the grade 
from which demoted is within the promotion authority of the of- 
ficer imposing the reduction or any officer subordinate to the one 
who imposes the reduction; 
(E) extra duties, including fatigue or other duties, for not 
more than 14 consecutive days; 
(F) restriction to certain specified limits, with or without 
suspension from duty, for not more than 14 consecutive days; 
(G)  detention of not more than 14 days' pay; 
(H) if imposed by an officer of the grade of major or lieuten- 
ant commander, or above 
(i)  the punishment authorized under clause (A); 
(ii)  correctional custody for not more than 30 consecu- 
tive days; 
(iii)  forfeiture of not more than one-half of one 
month's pay per month for two months; 
(iv)  reduction  to the lowest or any intermediate pay 
grade, if the grade from which demoted is within the promotion 
authority of the officer imposing the reduction or any officer 
subordinate to the one who imposes the reduction, but an enlisted 
member in a pay grade above E4 may not be reduced more than 
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(v)  extra duties, including fatigue or other duties, for 
not more than 45 consecutive days; 
(vi)  restriction to certain specified limits, with or with- 
out suspension from duty, for not more than 60 consecutive days; 
(vii) detention of not more than one-half of one month's pay per 
month for three months. 
(vii)  detention of not more than one-half of one 
month's pay per month for three months. 
Detention of pay shall be for a stated period of not more than one 
year but if the offender's term of service expires earlier, the deten- 
tion shall terminate upon that expiration. No two or more of the 
punishments of arrest in quarters, confinement on bread and 
water or diminished rations, correctional custody, extra duties, 
and restriction may be combined to run consecutively in the max- 
imum amount imposable for each. Whenever any of those punish- 
ments are combined to run consecutively, there must be an appor- 
tionment. In addition, forfeiture of pay may not be combined with 
detention of pay without an apportionment. For the purpose of 
this subsection, "correctional custody" is the physical restraint of 
a person during duty or nonduty hours and may include extra du- 
ties, fatigue duties, or hard labor. If practicable, correctional cus- 
tody will not be served in immediate association with persons 
awaiting trial or held in confinement pursuant  to trial by  court- 
martial. 
(c) An officer in charge may impose upon enlisted members as- 
signed to the unit of which he is in charge-such of the punish- 
ments authorized under subsection (b)(2)(A)-(G) as the Secretary 
concerned may specifically prescribe by regulation. 
(d) The officer who imposes the punishment authorized in sub- 
section (b), or his successor in command, may, at any time, sus- 
pend probationally any part or amount of the unexecuted punish- 
ment imposed and may suspend probationally  a reduction in 
grade or a forfeiture imposed under subsection (b), whether or not 
executed. In addition, he may, at any time, remit or mitigate any 
part or amount of the unexecuted punishment imposed and may 
set aside in whole or in part the punishment, whether executed or 
unexecuted, and restore all rights, privileges and property af- 
fected. He may also mitigate reduction in grade to forfeiture or 
detention of pay. When mitigating -
(1) arrest in quarters to restriction; 
(2) confinement on bread and water or diminished rations to 
correctional custody; 
(3)  correctional custody or confinement on bread and water or 
diminished rations to extra duties or restriction, or both; or 
(4) extra duties to restriction; the mitigated punishment shall 
not be for a greater period than the punishment mitigated. When 
mitigating forfeiture of pay to detention of pay, the amount of the 
detention shall not be greater than the amount of the forfeiture. 
When mitigating reduction in grade to forfeiture or detention of 
pay, the amount of the forfeiture or detention shall not be greater 
than the amount that could have been imposed initially under this 
article by  the officer who imposed the punishment mitigated. 
(e)  A person punished under this article who considers his pun- 
ishment unjust or disproportionate to the offense may, through 
the proper channel, appeal to the next superior authority. The ap- 
peal shall be promptly forwarded and decided, but the person 
punished may in the meantime be required to undergo the punish- 
ment adjudged. The superior authority may exercise the same 
powers with respect to the punishment imposed as may be exer- 
cised under subsection (d) by the officer who imposed the punish- 
ment. Before acting on an appeal from a punishment of -
(1) arrest in quarters for more than seven days; 
(2) correctional custody for more than seven days; 
(3) forfeiture of more than seven days' pay; 
(4) reduction of one or more pay grades from the fourth or a 
higher pay grade; 
(5) extra duties for more than 14 days; 
(6)  restriction for more than 14 days; or 
(7)  detention of more than 14 days' pay; 
the authority who is to act on the appeal shall refer the case to a 
judge advocate or a lawyer of the Department of Transportation 
for consideration and advice, and may so refer the case upon ap- 
peal from any punishment imposed under subsection (b). 
(f) The imposition and enforcement of disciplinary punishment 
under this article for any act or omission is not a bar to trial by 
court-martial for a serious crime or offense growing out of the 
same act or omission, and not properly punishable under this arti- 
cle; but the fact that a disciplinary punishment has been enforced 
may be shown by the accused upon trial, and when so shown shall 
be considered in determining the measure of punishment to be ad- 
judged in the event of a finding of guilty. 
(g) The Secretary concerned may, by regulation, prescribe the 
form of records to be kept of proceedings under this article and 
may also prescribe that certain categories of those proceedings 
shall be in writing. 
SUBCHAPTER IV. COURT-MARTIAL 
JURISDICTION 
Sec.  Art. 
8  16.  16.  Courts-martial classified. 
817.  17.  Jurisdiction of courts-martial in general. 
8  18.  18.  Jurisdiction of general courts-martial. 
819.  19.  Jurisdiction of special courts-martial. 
820.  20.  Jurisdiction of summary courts-martial. 
82 1.  2 1.  Jurisdiction of courts-martial not exclusive. 
5 816. Art. 16. Courts-martial classified 
The three kinds of courts-martial in each of the armed forces 
are-
(1)  general courts-martial, consisting of- 
(A) a military judge and not less than five members; or 
(B) only a military judge, if before the court is assembled the 
accused, knowing the identity of the military judge and after con- 
sultation with defense counsel, requests orally on the record or in 
writing a court composed only of a military judge and the military 
judge approves; 
(2)  special courts-martial, consisting,of- 
(A) not less than three members; or 
(B) a military judge and not less than three members; or 
(C) only a military judge, if one has been detailed to the court, 
and the accused under the same conditions as those prescribed in 
clause (l)(B) so requests; and 
(3)  summary courts-martial, consisting of one commissioned of- 
ficer. APPENDIX 2 
Q 817. Art. 17. Jurisdiction of courts-marital in 
general 
(a)  Each armed force has court-martial jurisdiction over all per- 
sons subject to this chapter. The exercise of jurisdiction  by one 
armed force over personnel of another armed force shall be in ac- 
cordance with regulations prescribed by  the President. 
(b) In all cases, departmental review after that by the officer with 
authority to convene a general court-marital for the command 
which held the trial, where that review is required under this 
chapter, shall be carried out by the department that includes the 
armed force of which the accused is a member. 
Q 818. Art. 18. Jurisdiction of general courts- 
martial 
Subject to section 817 of this title (article 17), general courts-mar- 
tial have jurisdiction to try persons subject to this chapter for any 
offense made punishable by this chapter and may, under such lim- 
itations as the President may prescribe, adjudge any punishment 
not forbidden by  this chapter, including the penalty of death 
when specifically authorized by this chapter. General courts-mar- 
tial also have jurisdiction to try any person who by the law of war 
is subject to trial by a military tribunal and may adjudge any pun- 
ishment permitted by the law of war. However, a general court- 
marital of the kind specified in section 8  16(1)(B) of this title (arti- 
cle 16(1)(B))  shall not have jurisdiction to try any person for any 
offense for which the death penalty may be adjudged unless the 
case has been previously referred to trial as a noncapital case. 
5 819. Art. 19. Jurisdiction of special courts-martial 
Subject to section 817 of this title (article 17), special courts-mar- 
tial have jurisdiction to try persons subject to this chapter for any 
noncapital offense made punishable by this chapter and, under 
such regulations as the President may prescribe, for capital of- 
fenses. Special courts-martial may, under such limitations as the 
President may prescribe, adjudge any punishment not forbidden 
by  this chapter except death, dishonorable discharge, dismissal, 
confinement for more than six months, hard labor without con- 
finement for more than three months, forfeiture of pay exceeding 
two-thirds pay per month, or forfeiture of pay for more than six 
months. A bad-conduct discharge may not be adjudged unless a 
complete record of the proceedings and testimony has been made, 
counsel having the qualifications prescribed under section 827(b) 
of this title (article 27(b)) was detailed to represent the accused, 
and a military judge was detailed to the trial, except in any case in 
which a military judge could not be detailed to  the trial because of 
physical conditions or military exigencies. In any such case in 
which a military judge was not detailed to  the trial, the convening 
authority shall make a detailed written statement, to be appended 
to the record, stating the reason or reasons a military judge could 
not be detailed. 
5 820. Art. 20. Jurisdiction of summary courts- 
martial 
Subject to section 817 of this title (article 17), summary courts- 
martial have jurisdiction to try persons subject to this chapter, ex- 
cept officers, cadets, aviation cadets, and midshipmen, for any 
noncapital offense made punishable by this chapter. No person 
with respect to whom summary courts-martial have jurisdiction 
may be brought to trial before a summary court-martial if he ob- 
jects thereto. If objection to trial by summary court-martial is 
made by an accused, trial may be ordered by special or general 
court-martial as may be appropriate. Summary courts-martial 
may, under such limitations as the President may prescribe, ad- 
judge any punishment not forbidden by this chapter except death, 
dismissal, dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, confinement 
for more than one month, hard labor without confinement for 
more than 45 days, restriction  to specified limits for more than 
two months, or forfeiture of more than two-thirds of one month's 
Pay. 
5 821. Art. 21. Jurisdiction of courts-martial not 
exclusive 
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction  upon 
courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost 
courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with 
respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war 
may be tried by  military commissions, provost courts, or other 
military tribunals. 
SUBCHAPTER V. COMPOSITION OF COURTS- 
MARTIAL 
Sec.  Art. 
822.  22. 	Who may convene general courts-martial. 
823.  23.  Who may convene special courts-martial. 
824.  24. 	Who may convene summary courts-martial. 
825.  25. 	Who may serve on courts-martial. 
826. 	 26.  Military judge of a general or special courts- 
martial. 
827.  27.  Detail of trial counsel and defense counsel. 
828. 	 28.  Detail or employment of reporters and 
interpreters. 
829.  29. 	Absent and additional members. 
5 822. Art. 22. Who may convene general courts- 
martial 
(a)  General courts-martial may be convened by- 
(1)  the President of the United States; 
(2) the Secretary of Defense; 
(3)  the commanding officer of a unified or specified combatant 
command; 
(4) the Secretary concerned; 
(5) the commanding officer of a Territorial Department, an 
Army Group, an Army. an Army Corps. a division. a separate 
brigade. or a corresponding unit of the Army or Marine Corps; 
(6) the commander in chief of a fleet; the commanding officer 
of a naval station or larger shore activity of the Navy beyond the 
United States; 
(7)  the commanding officer of an air command, an air force, an 
air division, or a separate wing of the Air Force or Marine Corps; 
(8)  any other commanding officer designated by  the Secretary 
concerned; or 
(9) any other commanding officer in  any of the armed forces 
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(b)  If any such commanding officer is an accuser, the court shall 
be convened by superior competent authority. and may in any 
case be convened by such authority if considered desirable by 
him. 
5 823. Art. 23. Who may convene special courts- 
martial 
(a)  Special courts-martial may be convened by- 
(1)  any person who may convene a general court-martial; 
(2)  the commanding officer of a district. garrison. fort, camp. 
station. Air Force base, auxiliary air field, or other place where 
members of the Army or the Air Force are on duty; 
(3)  the commanding officer of a brigade. regiment. detached 
battalion, or corresponding unit of the Army; 
(4)  the commanding officer of a wing, group. or separate 
squadron of the Air Force; 
(5)  the commanding officer of any naval or Coast Guard ves- 
sel, shipyard. base, or station; the commanding officer of any 
Marine brigade, regiment, detached battalion, or corresponding 
unit; the commanding officer of any Marine barracks, wing. 
group. separate squadron, station, base, auxiliary air field, or 
other place where members of the Marine Corps are on duty; 
(6) the commanding officer of any separate or detached com- 
mand or group of detached units of any of the armed forces 
placed under a single commander for this purpose; or 
(7)  the commanding officer or officer in charge of any other 
command when empowered by the Secretary concerned. 
(b)  If any such officer is an accuser, the court shall be convened 
by superior competent authority, and may in any case be con- 
vened by such authority if considered advisable by him. 
5 824. Art. 24. Who may convene summary courts- 
martial 
(a)  Summary courts-martial may be convened by- 
(1) any person  who may convene a general or special court- 
martial; 
(2)  the commanding officer of a detached company or other 
detachment of the Army; 
(3)  the commanding officer of a detached squadron or other 
detachment of the Air Force; or 
(4)  the commanding officer or officer in charge of any other 
command when empowered by the Secretary concerned. 
(b)  When only one commissioned officer is present with a com- 
mand or detachment he shall be the summary court-martial of 
that command or detachment and shall hear and determine all 
summary court-martial cases brought before him. Summary 
courts-martial may. however, be convened in any case by superior 
competent authority when considered desirable by him. 
5 825. Art. 25. Who may serve on courts-martial 
(a)  Any commissioned officer on active duty is eligible to serve on 
all courts-martial for the trial of any person who may lawfully be 
brought before such courts for trial. 
(b)  Any warrant officer on active duty is eligible to serve on gen- 
eral and special courts-martial for the trial of any person, other 
than a commissioned officer, who may lawfully be brought before 
such courts for trial. 
(c)(l)  Any enlisted member of an armed force on active duty 
who is not a member of the same unit as the accused is eligible to 
serve on general and special courts-martial for the trial of any en- 
listed member of an armed force who may lawfully be brought 
before such courts for trial, but he shall serve as a member of a 
court only if, before the conclusion of a session called by the mili- 
tary judge under section 839(a) of this title (article 39(a)) prior to 
trial or, in the absence of such a session, before the court is assem- 
bled for the trial of the accused, the accused personally has re- 
quested orally on the record or in writing that enlisted members 
serve on it. After such a request, the accused may not be tried by a 
general or special court-marital the membership of which does 
not include enlisted members in a number comprising at least 
one-third of the total membership of the court, unless eligible en- 
listed members cannot be obtained on account of physical condi- 
tions or military exigencies. If such members cannot be obtained, 
the court may be assembled and the trial held without them, but 
the convening authority shall make a detailed written statement, 
to be appended to the record, stating why they could not be ob- 
tained. 
(2)  In this article, "unit"  means any regularly organized body 
as defined by  the Secretary concerned, but in no case may it be a 
body larger than a company, squadron, ship's crew, or body cor- 
responding to one of them. 
(d)(l)  When it can be avoided, no member of an armed force 
may be tried by a court-martial any member of which is junior to 
him in rank or grade. 
(2)  When convening a court-martial, the convening authority 
shall detail as members thereof such members of the armed forces 
as, in his opinion, are best qualified for the duty by reason of age, 
education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial 
temperament. No member of an armed force is eligible to serve as 
a member of a general or  special court-martial when he is the ac- 
cuser or a witness for the prosecution or has acted as investigating 
officer or as counsel in the same case. 
(e)  Before a court-martial is assembled for the trial of a case, the 
convening authority may excuse a member of the court from par- 
ticipating in the case. Under such regulations as the Secretary 
concerned may prescribe, the convening authority may delegate 
his authority under this subsection to his staff judge advocate or 
legal officer or to any other principal assistant. 
5 826. Art. 26. Military Judge of a general or 
special court-martial 
(a)  A military judge shall be detailed to each general court-mar- 
tial. Subject to regulations of the Secretary concerned, a military 
judge may be detailed to any special court-martial. The Secretary 
concerned shall prescribe regulations providing for the manner in 
which military judges are detailed for such courts-martial and for 
the persons who are authorized to detail military judges for such 
courts-martial. The military judge shall preside over each open 
session of the court-martial to which he has been detailed. 
(b)  A mi1it;;ry judge shall be a commissioned officer of the armed 
forces who is a member of the bar of a Federal court or a member 
of the bar of the highest court of a State and who is certified to be 
qualified for duty as a military judge by the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral of the armed force of which such military judge is a member. 
(c)  The military judge of a general court-martial shall be desig- 
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armed force of which the military judge is a member for detail in 
accordance with regulations prescribed under subsection (a). Un- 
less the court-martial was convened by the President or the Secre- 
tary concerned, neither the convening authority nor any member 
of his staff shall prepare or review any report concerning the effec- 
tiveness, fitness, or efficiency of the military judge so detailed, 
which relates to his performance of duty as a military judge. A 
commissioned officer who is certified to be qualified for duty as a 
military judge of a general court-martial may perform such duties 
only when he is assigned and directly responsible to the Judge 
Advocate General, or his designee, of the armed force of which 
the military judge is a member and may perform duties of a judi- 
cial or nonjudicial nature other than those relating to his primary 
duty as a military judge of a general court-martial when such du- 
ties are assigned to him by or with the approval of that Judge Ad- 
vocate General or his designee. 
(d) No person is eligible to act as military judge in a case if he is 
the accuser or a witness for the prosecution or has acted as inves- 
tigating officer or a counsel in the same case. 
(e) The military judge of a court-martial may not consult with 
the members of the court except in the presence of the accused, 
trial counsel, and defense counsel, nor may he vote with the mem- 
bers of the court. 
5 827. Art. 27. Detail of trial counsel and defense 
counsel 
(a)(l) Trial counsel and defense counsel shall be detailed for each 
general and special court-martial. Assistant trial counsel and as- 
sistant and associate defense counsel may be detailed for each 
general and special court-martial. The Secretary concerned shall 
prescribe regulations providing for the manner in which counsel 
are detailed for such courts-martial and for the persons who are 
authorized to detail counsel for such courts-martial. 
(2)  No person who has acted as investigating officer, military 
judge, or court member in any case may act later as trial counsel, 
assistant trial counsel, or, unless expressly requested by  the ac- 
cused, as defense counsel or assistant or associate defense counsel 
in the same case. No person who has acted for the prosecution 
may act later in the same case for the defense, nor may any person 
who has acted for the defense act later in the same case for the 
prosecution. 
@)  Trial counsel or defense counsel detailed for a general court- 
martial-
(1) must be a judge advocate who is a graduate of an accredited 
law school or is a member of the bar of a Federal court or of the 
highest court of a State; or must be a member of the bar of a Fed- 
eral court or of the highest court of a State; and 
(2) must be certified as competent to perform such duties by 
the Judge Advocate General of the armed force of  which he is a 
member. 
(c)  In the case of a special court-martial- 
(1) the accused shall be afforded the opportunity to be repre- 
sented at the trial by counsel having the qualifications prescribed 
under section 827(b) of this title (article 27@)) unless counsel 
having such qualifications cannot be obtained on account of phys- 
ical conditions or military exigencies. If counsel having such qual- 
ifications cannot be obtained, the court may be convened and the 
trial held but the convening authority shall make a detailed writ- 
ten statement, to be appended to the record, stating why counsel 
with such qualifications could not be obtained; 
(2)  if the trial counsel is qualified to act as counsel before a gen- 
eral court-martial, the defense counsel detailed by the convening 
authority must be a person similarly qualified; and 
(3)  if the trial counsel is a judge advocate or a member of the 
bar of a Federal court or the highest court of a State, the defense 
counsel detailed by the convening authority must be one of the 
foregoing. 
5 828. Art. 28. Detail or employment of reporters 
and Interpreters 
Under such regulations as the Secretary concerned may pre- 
scribe, the convening authority of a court-martial, military com- 
mission, or court of inquiry shall detail or employ qualified court 
reporters,  who shall record the proceedings of and testimony 
taken before that court or commission. Under like regulations the 
convening authority of a court-martial, military commission, or 
court of inquiry may detail or employ interpreters who shall in- 
terpret for the court or commission. 
5 829. Art. 29. Absent and additional members 
(a)  No member of  a general or special court-martial may be ab- 
sent or excused after the court has been assembled for the trial of 
the accused unless excused as a result of a challenge, excused by 
the military judge for physical disability or other good cause, or 
excused by  order of the convening authority for good cause. 
(b) Whenever a general court-martial, other than a general court- 
martial composed of a military judge only, is reduced below five 
members, the trial may not proceed unless the convening author- 
ity details new members sufficient in number to provide not less 
than five members. The trial may proceed with the new members 
present after the recorded evidence previously introduced before 
the members of the court has been read to the court in the pres- 
ence of the military judge, the accused, and counsel for both sides. 
(c)  Whenever a special court-martial, other than a special court- 
martial composed of a military judge only, is reduced below three 
members, the trial may not proceed unless the convening author- 
ity details new members sufficient in number to provide not less 
than three members. The trial shall proceed with the new mem- 
bers present as if no evidence had previously been introduced at 
the trial, unless a verbatim record of the evidence previously in- 
troduced before the members of the court or a stipulation thereof 
is read to the court in the presence of the military judge, if any, the 
accused and counsel for both sides. 
(d)  If the military judge of a court-martial composed of a military 
judge only is unable to proceed with the trial because of physical 
disability, as a result of a challenge, or for other good cause, the 
trial shall proceed, subject to any applicable conditions of section 
8 16(1)(B) or (2)(C) of this title (article 16(1)(B) or (2)(C)), after 
the detail of a new military judge as if no evidence had previously 
been introduced, unless a verbatim record of the evidence previ- 
ously introduced or a stipulation thereof is read in court in the 
presence of the new military judge, the accused, and counsel for 
both sides. 
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5 830. Art. 30. Charges and specifications 
(a)  Charges and specifications shall be signed by a person subject 
to this chapter under oath before a commissioned officer of the 
armed forces authorized to administer oaths and shall state -
(1)  that the signer has personal knowledge of, or has investi- 
gated, the matters set forth therein; and 
(2)  that they are true in fact to the best of his knowledge and 
belief. 
(b)  Upon the preferring of charges, the proper authority shall 
take immediate steps to determine what disposition should be 
made thereof in the interest of justice and discipline, and the per- 
son accused shall be informed of the charges against him as soon 
as practicable. 
5 831. Art. 31. Compulsory self-incrimination 
prohibited 
(a)  No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to 
incriminate himself or to answer any question the answer to 
which may tend to incriminate him. 
(b)  No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request 
any statement from an accused or a person suspected of an offense 
without first informing him of the nature of the accusation and 
advising him that he does not have to make any statement regard- 
ing the offense of which he is accused or suspected and that any 
statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a 
trial by court-martial. 
(c)  No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to 
make a statement or produce evidence before any military tribu- 
nal if the statement or evidence is not material to the issue and 
may tend to degrade him. 
(d)  No statement obtained from any person in violation of this 
article, or through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or un- 
lawful inducement may be received in evidence against him in a 
trial by court-martial. 
5 832. Art. 32. Investigation 
(a)  No charge or specification may be referred to a general court- 
martial for trial until a thorough and impartial investigation of all 
the matters set forth therein has been made. This investigation 
shall include inquiry as to the truth of the matter set forth in the 
charges, consideration of the form of charges, and a recommenda- 
tion as to the disposition which should be made of the case in the 
interest of justice and discipline. 
(b)  The accused shall be advised of the charges against him and 
of his right to be represented at that investigation by counsel. The 
accused has the right to be represented at that investigation as 
provided in section 838 of this title (article 38) and in regulations 
prescribed under that section. At that investigation full opportu- 
nity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses 
against him if they are available and to present anything he may 
desire in his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the 
investigation officer shall examine available witnesses requested 
by the accused. If the charges are forwarded after the investiga- 
tion, they shall be accompanied by a statement of the substance of 
the testimony taken on both sides and a copy thereof shall be 
given to the accused. 
(c)  If an investigation of the subject matter of an offense has been 
conducted before the accused is charged with the offense, and if 
the accused was present at the investigation and afforded the op- 
portunities for representation, cross-examination,  and presenta- 
tion prescribed in subsection (b), no further investigation of that 
charge is necessary under this article unless it is demanded by the 
accused after he is informed of the charge. A demand for further 
investigation entitles the accused to recall witnesses for further 
cross-examination  and to offer any new evidence in his own be- 
half. 
(d)  The  requirements of this article are  binding on all persons ad- 
ministering this chapter but failure to follow them does not con- 
stitute jurisdictional error. 
5 833. Art. 33. Forwarding of charges 
When a person is held for trial by general court-martial the com- 
manding officer shall, within eight days after the accused is or- 
dered into arrest or confinement, if practicable, forward the 
charges, together with the Investigation and allied papers, to the 
officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction.  If that is not 
practicable, he shall report in writing to that officer the reasons 
for delay. 
5 834. Art. 34. Advice of staff Judge advocate and 
reference for trial 
(a)  Before directing the trial of any charge by general court-mar- 
tial, the convening authority shall refer it to his staff judge advo- 
cate for consideration and advice. The convening authority may 
not refer a specification under a charge to a general court-martial 
for trial unless he has been advised in writing by the staffjudge ad- 
vocate that- 
(1)  the specification alleges an offense under this chapter; 
(2)  the specification is warranted by the evidence indicated in 
the report of investigation under section 832 of this title (article 
32) (if there is such a report); and 
(3)  a court-martial would have jurisdiction  over the accused 
and the offense. 
(b)  The advice of the staff judge advocate under subsection (a) 
with respect to a specification under a charge shall include a writ- 
ten and signed statement by the staffjudge advocate 
(1)  expressing his conclusions with respect to each matter set 
forth in subsection (a); and 
(2)  recommending action that the convening authority take re- 
garding the specification. 
If the specification is referred for trial, the recommendation of the 
staff judge advocate shall accompany the specification. 
(c)  If the charges or specifications are not formally correct or do 
not conform to the substance of the evidence contained in the re- 
port of the investigating officer, formal corrections, and such g 834. Art. 34.(c) 	 APPENDIX 2 
changes in the charges and specifications as are needed to make 
them conform to the evidence, may be made. 
Q 835. Art. 35. Service of charges 
The trial counsel to whom court-martial charges are referred for 
trial shall cause to be served upon the accused a copy of the 
charges upon which trial is to be had. In time of peace no person 
may, against his objection, be brought to trial or be required to 
participate by himself or counsel in a session called by the mili- 
tary judge under section 839(a) of this title (article 39(a)), in a 
general court-martial case within a period of five days after the 
service of charges upon him or in a special court-martial within a 
period of three days after the service of the charges upon him. 
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Q 838. Art. 36. President may prescribe rules 
(a)  Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of 
proof, for cases arising under this chapter triable in courts-mar- 
tial, military commissions and other military tribunals, and pro- 
cedures for courts of inquiry, may be prescribed by the President 
by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, ap- 
ply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recog- 
nized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district 
courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this 
chapter. 
(b)  All rules and regulations made under this article shall be uni- 
form insofar as practicable. 
Q  837. Art. 37. Unlawfully influencing action of 
court 
(a)  No authority convening a general, special, or summary court- 
martial, nor any other commanding officer, may censure, repri- 
mand, or admonish the court or any member, military judge, or 
counsel thereof, with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged 
by the court, or with respect to any other exercises of its or his 
functions in the conduct of the proceedings. No person subject to 
this chapter may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized 
means, influence the action of a court-martial or any other mili- 
tary tribunal or any member thereof, in reaching the findings or 
sentence in any case, or the action of any convening, approving, 
or reviewing authority with respect to his judicial acts. The fore- 
going provisions of the subsection shall not apply with respect to 
(1) general instructional or informational courses in military jus- 
tice if such courses are designed solely for the purpose of in- 
structing members of a command in the substantive and procedu- 
ral aspects of courts-martial, or (2) to statements and instructions 
given in open court by  the military judge, president of a special 
court-martial, or counsel. 
(b)  In the preparation of an effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency re- 
port or any other report or document used in whole or in part for 
the purpose of determining whether a member of the armed 
forces is qualified to be advanced, in grade, or in determining the 
assignment or transfer of a member of the armed forces or in de- 
termining whether a member of the armed forces should be re- 
tained on active duty, no person subject to this chapter may, in 
preparing any such report (1) consider or evaluate the perform- 
ance of duty of any such member of a court-martial, or (2) give a 
less favorable rating or evaluation of any member of the armed 
forces because of the zeal with which such member, as counsel, 
represented any accused before a court-martial. 
Q 838. Art. 38. Duties of trial counsel and defense 
counsel 
(a) The trial counsel of a general or special court-martial shall 
prosecute in the name of the United States, and shall, under the 
direction of the court, prepare the record of the proceedings. 
(b)(l) The accused has the right to be represented in his defense 
before a general or special court-martial or at an investigation 
under section 832 of this title (article 32) as provided in this sub- 
section. 
(2) The accused may be represented by civilian counsel if pro- 
vided by him. 
(3) The accused may be represented- 
(A) by military counsel detailed under section 827 of this ti- 
tle (article 27); or 
(B) by military counsel of his own selection if that counsel is 
reasonably available (as determined under regulations prescribed 
under paragraph (7)). 
(4) If the accused is represented by  civilian counsel, military 
counsel detailed or selected under paragraph (3) shall act as asso- 
ciate counsel unless excused at the request of the accused. 
(5)  Except as provided under paragraph (6),if  the accused is 
represented by  military counsel of his own selection under para- 
graph (3)(B),  any military counsel detailed under paragraph 
(3)(A) shall be excused. 
(6) The accused is not entitled to be represented by more than 
one military counsel. However, the person authorized under reg- UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE  5 841. Art. 41.(c) 
ulations prescribed under section 827 of this title (article 27) to 
detail counsel in his sole discretion- 
(A)  may detail additional military counsel as assistant de- 
fense counsel; and 
(B) if the accused is represented by  military counsel of his 
own selection under paragraph (3)(B), may approve a request 
from the accused that military counsel detailed under paragraph 
(3)(A) act as associate defense counsel. 
(7) The Secretary concerned shall, by  regulation, define "rea- 
sonably available" for the purpose of paragraph (3)(B) and estab- 
lish procedures for determining whether the military counsel se- 
lected by  an accused  under that paragraph  is reasonably 
available. Such regulations may not prescribe any limitation 
based on the reasonable availability of counsel solely on the 
grounds that the counsel selected by the accused is from an armed 
force other than the armed force of  which the accused is a mem- 
ber. To the maximum extent practicable, such regulations shall 
establish uniform policies among the armed forces while recog- 
nizing the differences in the circumstances and needs of the vari- 
ous armed forces. The Secretary concerned shall submit copies of 
regulations prescribed under this paragraph to the Committees 
on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives. 
(c)  In any court-martial proceeding resulting in a conviction, the 
defense counsel- 
(1)  may forward for attachment to the record of proceedings a 
brief of such matters as he determines should be considered in be- 
half of the accused on review (including any objection to the con- 
tents of  the record which he considers appropriate); 
(2) may assist the accused in the submission of any matter 
under section 860 of this title (article 60); and 
(3)  may take other action authorized by this chapter. 
(d)  An assistant trial counsel of a general court-martial may, 
under the direction of the trial counsel or when he is qualified to 
be a trial counsel as required by section 827 of this title (article 
27), perform any duty imposed by law, regulation, or the custom 
of the service upon the trial counsel of the court. An assistant trial 
counsel of a special court-martial may perform any duty of the 
trial counsel. 
(e) An assistant defense counsel of a general or special court- 
martial may, under the direction of the defense counsel or when 
he is qualified to be the defense counsel as required by section 827 
of this title (article 27), perform any duty imposed by law, regula- 
tion, or the custom of the service upon counsel for the accused. 
Q  839. Art. 39. Sessions 
(a) At any time after the service of charges which have been re- 
ferred for trial to a court-martial composed of a military judge 
and members, the military judge may, subject to section 835 of 
this title (article 39,  call the court into session without the pres- 
ence of the members for the purpose of- 
(1) hearing and determining motions raising defenses or objec- 
tions which are capable of determination without trial of the is- 
sues raised by  a plea of not guilty; 
(2)  hearing and ruling upon any matter which may be ruled 
upon by  the military judge under this chapter, whether or not the 
matter is appropriate for later consideration or decision by  the 
members of  the court; 
(3)  if permitted by  regulations of the Secretary concerned, 
holding the arraignment and receiving the pleas of the accused; 
and 
(4) performing any other procedural function which may be 
performed by the military judge under this chapter or under rules 
prescribed pursuant to section 836 of this title (article 36) and 
which does not require the presence of the members of the court. 
These proceedings shall be conducted in the presence of the ac- 
cused, the defense counsel, and the trial counsel and shall be made 
a part of the record. These proceedings may be conducted not- 
withstanding the number of members of the court and without re- 
gard to section 829 of this title (article 29). 
(b)  When the members of a court-martial deliberate or vote, only 
the members may be present. All other proceedings, including 
any other consultation of the members of the court with counsel 
or the military judge, shall be made a part of the record and shall 
be in the presence of the accused, the defense counsel, the trial 
counsel, and in cases in which a military judge has been detailed 
to the court, the military judge. 
Q 840. Art. 40. Continuances 
The military judge or a court-martial without a military judge 
may, for reasonable cause, grant a continuance to any party for 
such time, and as often, as may appear to be just. 
Q  841. Art. 41. Challenges 
(a)(l) The military judge and members of a general or special 
court-martial may be challenged by the accused or the trial coun- 
sel for cause stated to the court. The military judge, or, if none, 
the court, shall determine the relevance and validity of challenges 
for cause, and may not receive a challenge to more than one per- 
son at a time. Challenges by  the trial counsel shall ordinarily be 
presented and decided before those by the accused are offered. 
(2) If exercise of a challenge for cause reduces the court below 
the minimum number of members required by section 816 of this 
title (article 16), all parties shall (notwithstanding section 829 of 
this title (article 29)) either exercise or waive any challenge for 
cause then apparent against the remaining members of the court 
before additional members are detailed to the court. However, 
peremptory challenges shall not be exercised at that time. 
(b)(l) Each accused and the trial counsel are entitled initially 
to one peremptory challenge of the members of the court. The 
military judge may not be challenged except for cause. 
(2) If exercise of a peremptory challenge reduces the court be- 
low the minimum number of members required by section 816 of 
this title (article 16), the parties shall (notwithstanding section 
829 of this title (article 29)) either exercise or waive any remain- 
ing peremptory challenge (not previously waived) against the re- 
maining members of the court before additional members are de- 
tailed to the court. 
(c)  Whenever additional members are detailed to the court, 
and after any challenges for cause against such additional mem- 
bers are presented and decided, each accused and the trial counsel 
are entitled to one peremptory  challenge against members not 
previously subject to peremptory challenge. 
(As amended Nov. 5, 1990, Pub.L.  101-510,  Div. A, Title V, 
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Q 842. Art. 42. Oaths 
(a)  Before performing their respective duties, military judges, 
members of general and special courts-martial, trial counsel, as- 
sistant trial counsel, defense counsel, assistant or associate de- 
fense counsel, reporters, and interpreters shall take an oath to 
perform their duties faithfully. The form of the oath, the time and 
place of the taking thereof, the manner of recording the same, and 
whether the oath shall be taken for all cases in which these duties 
are to be performed or for a particular case, shall be as prescribed 
in regulations of the Secretary concerned. These regulations may 
provide that an oath to perform faithfully duties as a military 
judge, trial counsel, assistant trial counsel, defense counsel, or as- 
sistant or associate defense counsel may be taken at any time by 
any judge advocate or other person certified to be qualified or 
com~etent  for the dutv. and if such an oath is taken it need not  ., 
again be taken at the time the judge advocate, or other person is 
detailed to that duty. 
(b)  Each witness before a court-martial shall be examined on 
oath. 
Q 843. Art. 43. Statute of limitations 
(a)  A person charged with absence without leave or missing 
movement in time of war, or with any offense punishable by 
death, may be tried and punished at any time without limitation. 
(b)(l)  Except as otherwise provided in this section (article), a 
person charged with an offense is not liable to be tried by  court- 
martial if  the offense was committed more than five years before 
the receipt of sworn charges and specifications  by an officer exer- 
cising summary court-martial jurisdiction over the command. 
(2) A person charged with an offense is not liable to be punished 
under section 815 of this title (article 15) if the offense was com- 
mitted more than two years before the imposition of punishment. 
(c) Periods in which the accused is absent without authority or 
fleeing from justice shall be excluded in computing the period of 
limitation prescribed in this section (article). 
(d) Periods in which the accused was absent from territory in 
which the United States has the authority to apprehend him, or in 
the custody of civil authorities, or in the hands of the enemy, shall 
be excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed in 
this article. 
(e) For an offense the trial of which in time of war is certified to 
the President by  the Secretary concerned to be detrimental to the 
prosecution of the war or inimical to the national security, the pe- 
riod of limitation prescribed in this article is extended to six 
months after the termination of hostilities as proclaimed by the 
President or by a joint resolution of Congress. 
(f)  When the United States is at war, the running of any statute of 
limitations applicable to any offense under this chapter -
(1)  involving fraud or attempted fraud against the United 
States or any agency thereof in any manner, whether by  conspir- 
acy or not; 
(2) committed in connection with the acquisition, care, han- 
dling, custody, control, or disposition of any real or personal 
property of  the United States; or 
(3)  committed in connection with the negotiation, procure- 
ment, award, performance, payment, interim financing, cancella- 
tion, or other termination or settlement, of any contract, subcon- 
tract, or purchase order which is connected with or related to the 
prosecution of the war, or with any disposition of termination in- 
ventory by any war contractor or Government agency; 
is suspended until three years after the termination of hostilities 
as proclaimed by the President or by  a joint resolution of Con- 
gress. 
(g)(l)  If charges or specifications  are dismissed as defective or 
insufficient for any cause and the period prescribed by the appli- 
cable statute of limitations- 
(A)  has expired; or 
(B) will expire within 180 days after the date of dismissal of 
the charges and specifications, trial and punishment under new 
charges and specifications  are not barred by the statute of limita- 
tions if the conditions specified in paragraph (2) are met. 
(2)  The conditions referred to in paragraph (1) are that the 
new charges and specifications  must- 
(A) be received by an officer exercising summary court-mar- 
tial jurisdiction over the command within 180 days after the dis- 
missal of the charges or specifications; and 
(B)  allege the same acts or omissions that were alleged in the 
dismissed charges or specifications (or allege acts or omissions 
that were included in the dismissed charges or specifications). 
Q 844. Art. 44. Former jeopardy 
(a)  No person may, without his consent, be tried a second time 
for the same offense. 
(b)  No proceeding in which an accused has been found guilty by 
court-martial upon any charge or specification is a trial in the 
sense of this article until the finding of guilty has become ha1  af- 
ter review of the case has been fully completed. 
(c) A proceeding which, after the introduction of evidence but 
before a finding, is dismissed or terminated by the convening au- 
thority or on motion of the prosecution for failure of available evi- 
dence or witnesses without any fault of the accused is a trial in the 
sense of this article. 
845. Art. 45. Pleas of the accused 
(a)  If an accused after arraignment makes an irregular pleading, 
or after a plea of guilty sets up matter inconsistent with the plea, 
or if it appears that he has entered the plea of guilty improvidently 
or through lack of understanding of its meaning and effect, or if 
he fails or refuses to plead, a plea of not guilty shall be entered in 
the record, and the court shall proceed as though he had pleaded 
not guilty. 
(b) A plea of guilty by the accused may not be received to any 
charge or specification alleging an offense for which the death 
penalty may be adjudged. With respect to any other charge or 
specification to which a plea of guilty has been made by  the ac- 
cused and accepted by  the military judge or by a court-martial 
without a military judge, a finding of guilty of the charge or speci- 
fication may, if permitted by  regulations of the Secretary con- 
cerned, be entered immediately without vote. This finding shall 
constitute the finding of the court unless the plea of guilty is with- 
drawn prior to announcement of the sentence, in which event the 
proceedings shall continue as though the accused had pleaded not 
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Q  846. Art. 46. Opportunity to obtain witnesses and 
other evidence 
The trial counsel, the defense counsel, and the court-martial shall 
have equal opportunity to obtain witnesses and other evidence in 
accordance with such regulations as the President may prescribe. 
Process issued in court-martial cases to compel witnesses to ap- 
pear and testify and to compel the production of other evidence 
shall be similar to that which courts of the United States having 
criminal jurisdiction may lawfully issue and shall run to any part 
of the United States, or the Territories, Commonwealths, and 
possessions. 
Q  647. Art. 47. Refusal to appear or testify 
(a) Any person not subject to this chapter who- 
(1) has been duly subpoenaed to appear as a witness before a 
court-martial, military commission,  court of inquiry, or any other 
military court or board, or before any military or civil officer des- 
ignated to take a deposition to be read in evidence before such a 
court, commission, or board; 
(2) has been duly paid or tendered the fees and mileage of a 
witness at the rates allowed to witnesses attending the courts of 
the United States; and 
(3) willfully neglects or refuses to appear, or refuses to qualify 
as a witness or to testify or to produce any evidence which that 
person may have been legally subpoenaed to produce; 
is guilty of an offense against the United States. 
(b)  Any person who commits an offense named in subsection (a) 
shall be tried on information in a United States district court or in 
a court of original criminal jurisdiction in any of the Territories, 
Commonwealths, or possessions of the United States, and juris- 
diction is conferred upon those courts for that purpose. Upon 
conviction, such a person shall be punished by a fine of not more 
than $500, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or 
both. 
(c) The United States attorney or the officer prosecuting for the 
United States in any such court of original criminal jurisdiction 
shall, upon the certification of the facts to him by the military 
court, commission, court of inquiry, or board, file an information 
against and prosecute any person violating this article. 
(d) The fees and mileage of witnesses shall be advanced or paid 
out of the appropriations for the compensation of witnesses. 
Q  848. Art. 48. Contempts 
A court-martial, provost court, or military commission may pun- 
ish for contempt any person who uses any menacing word, sign, 
or gesture in its presence, or who disturbs its proceedings by any 
riot or disorder, The punishment may not exceed confinement for 
30 days or a fine of $100, or both. 
Q  849. Art. 49. Depositions 
(a) At any time after charges have been signed as provided in sec- 
tion 830 of this title (article 30), any party may take oral or writ- 
ten depositions unless the military judge or court-martial without 
a military judge hearing the case or, if the case is not being heard, 
an authority competent to convene a court-martial for the trial of 
those charges forbids it for good cause. If a deposition is to be 
taken before charges are referred for trial, such an authority may 
designate commissioned officers to represent the prosecution and 
the defense and may authorize those officers to take the deposi- 
tion of any witness. 
(b)  The party at whose instance a deposition is to be taken shall 
give to every other party reasonable written notice of the time and 
place for taking the deposition. 
(c)  Depositions may be taken before and authenticated by any 
military or civil officer authorized by the laws of the United States 
or by the laws of the place where the deposition is taken to admin- 
ister oaths. 
(d) A duly authenticated  deposition taken upon reasonable no- 
tice to the other parties, so far as otherwise admissible under the 
rules of evidence, may be read in evidence or, in the case of audi- 
otape, videotape, or similar material, may be played in evidence 
before any military court or commission in any case not capital, 
or in any proceeding before a court of inquiry or military board, if 
it appears 
(1) that the witness resides or is beyond the State, Territory, 
Commonwealth, or District of  Columbia in which the court, 
commission, or board is ordered to sit, or beyond 100 miles from 
the place of trial or hearing; 
(2) that the witness by reason of death, age, sickness, bodily in- 
firmity, imprisonment, military necessity, nonamenability to pro- 
cess, or other reasonable cause, is unable or refuses to appear and 
testify in person at the place of trial or hearing; or 
(3) that the present whereabouts of the witness is unknown. 
(e) Subject to subsection (d), testimony by  deposition may be 
presented by the defense in capital cases. 
(f)  Subject to subsection (d), a deposition may be read in evidence 
or, in the case of audiotape, videotape, or similar material, may be 
played in evidence in any case in which the death penalty is au- 
thorized but is not mandatory, whenever the convening authority 
directs that the case be treated as not capital, and in such a case a 
sentence of death may not be adjudged by the court-martial. 
Q  850. Art. 50. Admissibility of records of courts of 
inquiry 
(a)  In any case not capital and not extending to the dismissal of a 
commissioned officer, the sworn testimony, contained in the duly 
authenticated record of proceedings  of acourt of inquiry, of a per- 
son whose oral testimony cannot be obtained, may, if  otherwise 
admissible under the rules of evidence, be read in evidence by any 
party before a court-martial or military commission if the accused 
was a party before the court of inquiry and if the same issue was 
involved or  if the accused consents to the introduction of such evi- 
dence. 
(b) Such  may be read in evidence  the defense 
in capital cases or cases extending to the dismissal of a commis- 
sioned officer. 
(c) Such testimony may also be read in evidence before a court of 
inquiry or a military board. 
Q  850a. Art. 50a. Defense of lack of mental 
responsibility 
(a)  It is an affirmative defense in a trial by  court-martial that, at 
the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the 
accused, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was una- 
ble to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of the 5 850a. Art. 50a.(a)  APPENDIX 2 
acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a de- 
fense. 
(b)  The accused has the burden of proving the defense of lack of 
mental responsibility by clear and convincing evidence. 
(c)  Whenever lack of mental responsibility of the accused with 
respect to an offense is properly at issue, the military judge, or the 
president of a court-martial without a military judge,  shall in- 
struct the members of the court as to the defense of lack of mental 
responsibility under this section and shall charge them to find the 
accused-
(1)  guilty; 
(2)  not guilty; or 
(3) not guilty only by reason of lack of mental responsibility, 
Subsection (c) does not apply to a court-martial  of 
a militawjudge only.  the case ofa court-martial  ofa 
military judge only, whenever lack of mental responsibility of the 
accused with respect to an offenseis properly at issue, the military 
judge shall find the accused- 
(1)  guilty; 
(2) not guilty; or 
(3) not guilty only by reason of lack of mental responsibility. 
(e)  Notwithstanding the provisions of section 852 of this title (ar- 
ticle 52), the accused shall be found not guilty only by  reason of 
lack of mental responsibility if- 
(1)  a majority of the members of the court-martial present at 
the time the vote is taken determines that the defense of lack of 
mental responsibility has been established; or 
(2) in the case of court-martial composed of a military judge 
only, the military judge determines that the defense of lack of 
mental responsibility has been established. 
§ 851. Art. 51. Voting and rulings 
(a) Voting by members of a general or special court-martial on 
the findingsand On the sentence, and  members  a 
tial withaut a military judge upon questions of challenge, shall be 
by  secret written ballot. The junior member of the court shall 
count the votes.  he count shall be checked by the president, who 
shall forthwith announce the result of the ballot to the members 
of the court. 
(b)  The military Judge and, except for questions of challenge, the 
president of a court-martial without a military judge shall rule 
upon all questions of law and all interlocutory questions arising 
during the proceedings. Any such ruling made by the military 
judge  upon any question of law or any  interlocutor^ question 
other than the factual issue of  mental responsibility  of the ac- 
cused, or by  the president of a court-martial without a military 
Judge upon any question of law other than a motion for a finding 
of not guilty, is final and constitutes the ruling of the court. How- 
ever, the military judge or the president of a court-martial with- 
out a military judge may change his ruling at any time during the 
trial. Unless the ruling is final,-if any member objects thereti the 
court shall be cleared and closed and the question decided by a 
voice vote as orovided in section g52 of this title (article 52), be-
ginning with the junior in rank. 
(c)  Before a vote is taken on the findings, the military judge or the 
president of a court-martial without a military judge shall, in the 
presence of  the accused and counsel, instruct the members of the 
court as to the elements of the offense and charge them- 
(1)  that the accused must be presumed to be innocent until his 
guilt is established by legal and competent evidence beyond rea- 
sonable doubt; 
(2) that in the case being considered, if there is a reasonable 
doubt as to the guilt of the accused, the doubt must be resolved in 
favor of the accused and he must be acquitted; 
(3)  that, if there is reasonable doubt as to the degree of guilt, 
the finding must be in a lower degree as to which there is no rea- 
sonable doubt; and 
(4)  that the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused 
beyond reasonable doubt is upon the United States. 
(d) Subsections (a), (b), and (c) do not apply to a court-martial 
composed of a military judge only.  he military judge of such a 
court-martial shall determine all questions of law and fact arising 
during the proceedings and, if the accused is convicted, adjudge 
an appropriate sentence. The military judge of such a court-mar- 
tial shall make a general finding and shall in addition on request 
find the facts specially. If an opinion or memorandum of decision 
is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact appear therein. 
5852- Art. 52. Number of votes required 
(a)(l) No person may be convicted of an offense for which the 
death penalty is made  law,  the 
rence of all the members of the court-martial present at the time 
the  is taken. 
(2)  NO  person may be convicted of any other offense,  except as 
provided in section 845(b) of this title (article 45(b)) or by the 
concurrence of two-thirds of the members present at the time the 
'Ote  is taken' 
(b)(l)  No person may be sentenced to suffer death, except by 
the concurrence of all the members of the court-martial present at 
the time the vote is taken and for an offense in this chapter ex- 
pressly made punishable by death. 
(2)  No person may be sentenced to life imprisonment or to 
confinement for more than ten years, except by the concurrence 
of three-fourths of the members present at the time the vote is 
taken. 
(3) ~11 other sentences shall be determined by the concurrence 
of two-thirds of the members present at the time the vote is taken, 
(c)  A11  other questions to be decided by the members of a general 
or special court-martial shall be determined by  a majority vote, 
but a determination to reconsider a finding  ofguilty or to recon-
sider a sentence, with a view toward decreasing it, may be made 
by any lesser vote which indicates that the reconsideration is not 
opposed by the number of votes required for that finding or sen- 
tence. A ti,  vote on a  disqualifies the member c.al-
lenged, A tie vote on a motion for a finding of not guilty or on a 
motion relating to the question of the accused's sanity is a deter- 
mination against the accused, A tie vote on any other question is a 
determination in favor ofthe  accused, 
853' Art' 53' Court to announce action 
A court-martial shall announce its findings and sentence to the 
parties as soon as determined. 
5854. Art. 54. Record Of  trial 
(a) Each general court-martial shall keep a separate record of the 
proceedings in each case brought before it, and the record shall be UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 	 5 858a. Art. 58a.(a) 
authenticated by the signature of the military judge. If the record 
cannot be authenticated by  the military judge by reason of his 
death, disability, or absence, it shall be authenticated by the signa- 
ture of the trial counsel or by that of a member if the trial counsel 
is unable to authenticate it by reason of his death, disability, or 
absence. In a court-martial consisting of only a military judge the 
record shall be authenticated by the court reporter under the 
same conditions which would impose such a duty on a member 
under the subsection. 
(b)  Each special and summary court-martial shall keep a sepa- 
rate record of the proceedings in each case, and the record shall be 
authenticated in the manner required by such regulations as the 
President may prescribe. 
(c)(l)  A complete record of the proceedings and testimony 
shall be prepared- 
(A)  in each general court-martial case in which the sentence 
adjudged includes death, a dismissal, a discharge, or (if the sen- 
tence adjudged does not include a discharge) any other punish- 
ment which exceeds that which may otherwise be adjudged by  a 
special court-martial; and 
(B)  in each special court-martial case in which the sentence 
adjudged includes a bad-conduct discharge. 
(2) In all other court-martial cases, the record shall contain 
such matters as may be prescribed by regulations of the President. 
(d) A copy of the record of the proceedings of each general and 
special court-martial shall be given to the accused as soon as it is 
authenticated. 
SUBCHAPTER VIII. SENTENCES 
Sec.  Art. 
855.  55. 	 Cruel and unusual punishments prohibited. 
856.  56.  Maximum limits. 
*857.  57.  Effective date of sentences. 
858.  58.  Execution of confinement. 
858a 	 58a. Sentences:  reduction in enlisted grade upon 
approval. 
5 855. Art. 55. Cruel and unusual punishments 
prohibited 
Punishment by flogging, or by branding, marking, or tattooing on 
the body, or any other cruel or unusual punishment, may not be 
adjudged by  a court-martial or inflicted upon any person subject 
to this chapter. The use of irons, single or double, except for the 
purpose of safe custody, is prohibited. 
5 856. Art. 56. Maximum limits 
The punishment which a court-martial may direct for an offense 
may not exceed such limits as the President may prescribe for that 
offense. 
5 857. Art. 57. Effective date of sentences 
+(a)  No forfeiture may extend to any pay or allowances accrued 
before the date on which the sentence is approved by the person 
acting under section 860(c) of this title (article 60(c)). 
(b) Any period of confinement included in a sentence of a court- 
martial begins to run from the date the sentence is adjudged by 
the court-martial, but periods during which the sentence to con- 
finement is suspended or deferred shall be excluded in computing 
the service of the term of confinement. 
(c) All other sentences of courts-martial are effective on the date 
ordered executed. 
(d)  On application by  an accused who is under sentence to con- 
finement that has not been ordered executed, the convening au- 
thority or, if the accused is no longer under his jurisdiction, the 
officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the com- 
mand to which the accused is currently assigned, may in his sole 
discretion defer service of the sentence to confinement. The defer- 
ment shall terminate when the sentence is ordered executed. The 
deferment may be rescinded  at any time by  the officer who 
granted it or, if the accused is no longer under his jurisdiction, by 
the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction  over the 
command to which the accused is currently assigned. 
(e)(l) In any case in which a court-martial sentences a person 
referred to in paragraph (2) to confinement, the convening au- 
thority may postpone the service of the sentence to confinement, 
without the consent of that person, until after the person has been 
permanently released to the armed forces by  a state or foreign 
country referred to in that paragraph. 
(2) Paragraph (1) applies to a person subject to this chapter 
wh-
(A) While in the custody of a state or foreign country is tem- 
porarily returned by that state or foreign country to the armed 
forces for trial by court-martial; and 
(B)  After the court-martial, is returned to that state or for- 
eign country under the authority of a mutual agreement or treaty, 
as the case may be. 
(3) In this subsection, the term 'state'  means a state of the 
united States, the District of  Columbia, a territory, or a posses- 
sion of the United States. 
5 858. Art. 58. Execution of confinement 
(a)  Under such instructions as the Secretary concerned may pre- 
scribe, a sentence of confinement adjudged by  a court-martial or 
other military tribunal, whether or not the sentence includes dis- 
charge or dismissal, and whether or not the discharge or dismissal 
has been executed, may be carried into execution by  confinement 
in any place of confinement under the control of any of the armed 
forces or in any penal or correctional institution under the control 
of the United States, or which the United States may be allowed 
to use. Persons so confined in a penal or correctional institution 
not under the control of one of the armed forces are subject to the 
same discipline and treatment as persons confined or committed 
by the courts of the United States or of the State, Territory, Dis- 
trict of Columbia, or place in which the institution is situated. 
(b) The omission of the words "hard labor" from any sentence of 
a court-martial  adjudging confinement does not deprive the au- 
thority executing that sentence of the power to require hard labor 
as a part of the punishment. 
5 858a. Art. 58a. Sentences: reduction in enlisted 
grade upon approval 
(a)  Unless otherwise provided in regulations to be prescribed by 
the Secretary concerned, a court-martial sentence of an enlisted 5 858a. Art. 58a.(a) 	 APPE 
member in a pay grade above E-I,  as approved by the convening 

authority, that includes- 

(1)  a dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge; 
(2)  confinement; or 
(3)  hard labor without confinement; 
reduces that member to pay grade E-I, effective on the date of 

that approval. 

(b)  If the sentence of a member who is reduced in pay grade 

under subsection (a) is set aside or disapproved, or, as finally ap- 

proved, does not include any punishment named in subsection 

(a)(l), (2), or (3), the rights and privileges of which he was de- 

prived because of that reduction shall be restored to him and he is 

entitled to the pay and allowances to which he would have been 

entitled for the period the reduction was in effect, had he not been 

so reduced. 

SUBCHAPTER IX. POST-TRIAL PROCEDURE AND 

REVIEW OF COURTS-MARTIAL 

Sec.  Art. 
859.  59.  Error of law; lesser included offense. 
860.  60. 	Action by the convening authority. 
861.  61.  Waiver or withdrawal of appeal. 
862.  62.  Appeal by the United States. 

*863.  63.  Rehearings. 

864.  64.  Review by a judge advocate. 
865.  65.  Disposition of records. 
866.  66. 	Review by Court of Military Review. 
867.  67.  Review by the Court of Military Appeals. 
867a.  67a. Review by the Supreme Court. 
868.  68.  Branch offices. 
869. 	 69.  Review in the office of the Judge Advocate 

General. 

870.  70.  Appellate counsel. 
87  1.  7  1.  Execution of sentence; suspension of sentence. 
872.  72.  Vacation of suspension. 
873.  73.  Petition for a new trial. 
874.  74.  Remission and suspension. 
875.  75. 	Restoration. 
876.  76.  Finality of proceedings, findings, and sentences. 
876a. 	 76a. Leave required to be taken pending review of 
certain court-martial convictions. 
5859. Art. 59. Error of law; lesser included offense 
(a)  A finding or sentence of court-martial may not be held incor- 
rect on the ground of an error of law unless the error materially 
prejudices the substantial rights of the accused. 
(b)  Any reviewing authority with the power to approve or affirm 
a finding of guilty may approve or affirm, instead, so much of the 
finding as includes a lesser included offense. 
5860. Art. 60. Action by the Convening authority 
(a)  The findings and sentence of a court-martial shall be reported 
promptly to the convening authority after the announcement of 
the sentence. 
(b)(l)  The accused may submit to the convening authority mat- 
ters for consideration by the convening authority with respect to 
the findings and the sentence. Except in a summary court-martial 
case, such a submission shall be made within 10 days after the ac- 
cused has been given an authenticated record of trial and, if appli- 
cable, the recommendation of the staff judge advocate or legal of- 
ficer under subsection (d). In a summary court-martial case, such 
a submission shall be made within seven days after the sentence is 
announced. 
(2)  If the accused shows that additional time is required for the 
accused to submit such matters, the convening authority or other 
person taking action under this section, for good cause, may ex- 
tend the applicable period under paragraph (1) for not more than 
an additional 20 days. 
(3)  In a summary court-martial case, the accused shall be 
promptly provided a copy of the record of trial for use in prepar- 
ing a submission authorized by paragraph (1). 
(4)  The accused may waive his right to make a submission to 
the convening authority under paragraph (1). Such a waiver must 
be made in writing and may not be revoked. For the purposes of 
subsection (c)(2), the time within which the accused may make a 
submission under this subsection shall be deemed to have expired 
upon the submission of such a waiver to the convening authority. 
(c)(l)  The  authority under this section to modify the findings and 
sentence of a court-martial is a matter of command prerogative 
involving the sole discretion of the convening authority. Under 
regulations of the Secretary concerned, a commissioned  officer 
commanding for the time being, a successor in command, or any 
person exercising general court-martial jurisdiction may act 
under this section in place of the convening authority. 
(2)  Action on the sentence of a court-martial shall be taken by 
the convening authority or by another person authorized to act 
under this section. Subject to regulations of the Secretary con- 
cerned, such action may be taken only after consideration of any 
matters submitted by the accused under subsection (b) or after the 
time for submitting such matters expires, whichever is earlier. 
The convening authority or other person taking such action, in 
his sole discretion, may approve, disapprove, commute, or sus- 
pend the sentence in whole or in part. 
(3)  Action on the findings of a court-martial by the convening 
authority or other person acting on the sentence is not required. 
However, such person, in his sole discretion, may- 
(A)  dismiss any charge or specification by setting aside a 
finding of guilty thereto; or 
(B)  change a finding of guilty to a charge or specification to 
a finding of guilty to an offense that is a lesser included offense of 
the offense stated in the charge or specification. 
(d)  Before acting under this section on any general court-martial 
case or any special court-martial case that includes a bad-conduct 
discharge, the convening authority or other person taking action 
under this section shall obtain and consider the written recom- 
mendation of his staff judge advocate or legal officer. The  conven- 
ing authority or other person taking action under this section 
shall refer the record of trial to his staffjudge advocate or legal of- 
ficer, and the staffjudge advocate or legal officer shall use such re- 
cord in the preparation of his recommendation. The recommen- 
dation of the staff judge advocate or legal officer shall include 
such matters as the President may prescribe by regulation and 
shall be served on the accused, who may submit any matter in re- UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE  5 864. Art. 64.(a)(2) 
sponse under subsection (b). Failure to object in the response to 
the recommendation or to any matter attached to the recommen- 
dation waives the right to object thereto. 
(e)(l)  The convening authority or other person taking action 
under this section, in his sole discretion, may order a proceeding 
in revision or a rehearing. 
(2)  A proceeding in revision may be ordered if there is an ap- 
parent error or omission in the record or if the record shows im- 
proper or inconsistent action by a court-martial with respect to 
the findings or sentence that can be rectified without material 
prejudice to the substantial rights of the accused. In no case, how- 
ever, may a proceeding in revision -
(A)  reconsider a finding of not guilty of any specification or 
a ruling which amounts to a finding of not guilty; 
(B)  reconsider a finding of not guilty of any charge, unless 
there has been a finding of guilty under a specification laid under 
that charge, which sufficiently alleges a violation of some article 
of this chapter; or 
(C)  increase the severity of some article of the sentence un- 
less the sentence prescribed for the offense is mandatory. 
(3)  A rehearing may be ordered by the convening authority or 
other person taking action under this section if he disapproves the 
findings and sentence and states the reasons for disapproval of the 
findings. If such person disapproves the findings and sentence and 
does not order a rehearing, he shall dismiss the charges. A rehear- 
ing as to the findings may not be ordered where there is a lack of 
sufficient evidence in the record to support the findings. A rehear- 
ing as to the sentence may be ordered if the convening authority 
or other person taking action under this subsection disapproves 
the sentence. 
Q 861. Art. 61. Waiver or withdrawal of appeal 
(a)  In each case subject to appellate review under section 866 or 
869(a) of this title (article 66 or 69(a)), except a case in which the 
sentence as approved under section 860(c) of this title (article 
60(c)) includes death, the accused may file with the convening au- 
thority a statement expressly waiving the right of the accused to 
such review. Such a waiver shall be signed by both the accused 
and by defense counsel and must be filed within 10 days after the 
action under section 860(c) of this title (article 60(c)) is served on 
the accused or on defense counsel. The convening authority or 
other person taking such action, for good cause, may extend the 
period for such filing by not more than 30 days. 
(b)  Except in a case in which the sentence as approved under sec- 
tion 860(c) of this title (article 60(c)) includes death, the accused 
may withdraw an appeal at any time. 
(c)  A waiver of the right to appellate review or the withdrawal of 
an appeal under this section bars review under section 866 or 
869(a) of this title (article 66 or 69(a)). 
Q 862. Art. 62. Appeal by the United States 
(a)(l) In a trial by court-martial in which a military judge pre- 
sides and in which a punitive discharge may be adjudged, the 
United States may appeal an order or ruling of the military judge 
which terminates the proceedings with respect to a charge or 
specification or which excludes evidence that is substantial proof 
of a fact material in the proceeding. However, the United States 
may not appeal an order or ruling that is, or that amounts to, a 
finding of not guilty with respect to the charge or specification. 
(2)  An appeal of an order or ruling may not be taken unless the 
trial counsel provides the military judge with written notice of ap- 
peal from the order or ruling within 72 hours of the order or rul- 
ing. Such notice shall include a certification by  the trial counsel 
that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay and (if the or- 
der or ruling appealed is one which excludes evidence) that the 
evidence excluded is substantial proof of a fact material in the 
proceeding. 
(3)  An appeal under this section shall be diligently prosecuted 
by appellate Government counsel. 
(b)  An appeal under this section shall be forwarded by a means 
prescribed under regulations of the President directly to the 
Court of Military Review and shall, whenever practicable, have 
priority over all other proceedings before that court. In ruling on 
an appeal under this section, the Court of Military Review may 
act only with respect to matters of law, notwithstanding section 
866(c) of this title (article 66(c)). 
(c)  Any period of delay resulting from an appeal under this sec- 
tion shall be excluded in deciding any issue regarding denial of a 
speedy trial unless an appropriate authority determines that the 
appeal was filed solely for the purpose of delay with the knowl- 
edge that it was totally frivolous and without merit. 
Q  863. Art. 63. Rehearings 
Each rehearing under this chapter shall take place before a court- 
martial composed of members not members of the court-martial 
which first heard the case. Upon a rehearing the accused may not 
be tried for any offense of which he was found not guilty by the 
first court-martial, and no sentence in excess of or more severe 
than the original sentence may be approved, unless the sentence is 
based upon a finding of guilty of an offense not considered upon 
the merits in the original proceedings, or unless the sentence pre- 
scribed for the offense is mandatory. If the sentence approved af- 
ter the first court-martial was in accordance with a pretrial agree- 
ment and the accused at the rehearing changes his plea with 
respect to the charges or specifications upon which the pretrial 
agreement was based, or otherwise does not comply with the pre- 
trial agreement, the approved sentence as to those charges or 
specifications may include any punishment not in excess of that 
lawfully adjudged at the first court-martial. 
Q  864. Art. 64. Review by a judge advocate 
(a)  Each case in which there has been a finding of guilty that is 
not reviewed under section 866 or 869(a) of this title (article 66 or  . . 
69(a)) shall be reviewed by a judge advocate under regulations of 
the Secretary concerned. A judge advocate may not review a case 
under this subsection if he has acted in the same case as an ac- 
cuser, investigating officer, member of the court, military judge, 
or counsel or has otherwise acted on behalf of the prosecution or 
defense. The  judge advocate's review shall be in writing and shall 
contain the following: 
(1)  Conclusions as to whether- 
(A) the court had jurisdiction  over the accused and the of- 
fense; 
(B)  the charge and specification stated an offense; and 
(C) the sentence was within the limits prescribed as a matter 
of law. 
(2)  A response to each allegation of error made in writing by 
the accused. g 864. Art. 64.(a)(3)  APPE 
(3)  If the case is sent for action under subsection (b),  a recom- 
mendation as to the appropriate action to be taken and an opinion 
as to whether corrective action is required as a matter of law. 
(b)  The record of trial and related documents in each case re- 
viewed under subsection (a) shall be sent for action to the person 
exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the accused at 
the time the court was convened (or to that person's successor in 
command) if- 
(1)  the judge advocate who reviewed the case recommends 

corrective action; 

(2)  the sentence approved under section 860(c) of this title (ar- 
ticle 60(c)) extends to dismissal, a bad-conduct or dishonorable 
discharge, or confinement for more than six months; or 
(3) such action is otherwise required by regulations of the Sec- 
retary concerned. 
(c)(l)  The person to whom the record of trial and related doc- 
uments are sent under subsection (b) may-
(A) disapprove or approve the findings or sentence, in whole 
or in part, 
(B)  remit, commute, or suspend the sentence in whole or in 
part; 
(C) except where the evidence was insufficient at the trial to 
support the findings, order a rehearing on the findings, on the sen- 
tence, or on both; or 
(D)  dismiss the charges. 
(2) If a rehearing is ordered but the convening authority finds a 
rehearing impracticable, he shall dismiss the charges. 
(3) If the opinion of the judge advocate in the judge advocate's 
review under subsection (a) is that corrective action is required as 
a matter of  law and if the person required to take action under 
subsection (b) does not take action that is at least as favorable to 
the accused as that recommended by the judge advocate, the re- 
cord of trial and action thereon shall be sent to Judge Advocate 
General for review under section 869(b) of this title (article 
690)). 
Q  865. Art. 65. Disposition of records 
(a) In a case subject to appellate review under section 866 or 
869(a) of this title (article 66 or 69(a)) in which the right to such 
review is not waived, or an appeal is not withdrawn, under section 
861 of this title (article 61), the record of trial and action thereon 
shall be transmitted to the Judge Advocate General for appropri- 
ate action. 
(b) Except as otherwise required by this chapter, all other 
records of trial and related documents shall be transmitted and 
disposed of as the Secretary concerned may prescribe by  regula- 
tion. 
Q 866. Art. 66. Review by Court of Military Review 
(a)  Each Judge Advocate General shall establish a Court of Mili- 
tary Review which shall be composed of one or more panels, and 
each such panel shall be composed of not less than three appellate 
military judges. For the purpose of reviewing court-martial cases, 
the court may sit in panels or as a whole in accordance with rules 
prescribed under subsection (f). Any decision of a panel may be 
reconsidered by  the court sitting as a whole in accordance with 
such rules. Appellate military judges who are assigned to a Court 
of  Military Review may be commissioned officers or civilians, 
each of whom must be a member of a bar of a Federal court or the 
highest court of a State. The Judge Advocate General shall desig- 
nate as chief judge one of the appellate military judges of the 
Court of  Military Review established by him. The chief judge 
shall determinate on which panels of  the court the appellate 
judges assigned to the court will serve and which military judge 
assigned to the court will act as the senior judge on each panel. 
(b)  The Judge Advocate General shall refer to a Court of Mili- 
tary Review the record in each case of trial by court-martial- 
(1) in which the sentence, as approved, extends to death, dis- 
missal of a commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman, dishon- 
orable or bad-conduct discharge, or confinement for one year or 
more; and 
(2) except in the case of  a sentence extending to death, the 
right to appellate review has not been waived or  an appeal has not 
been withdrawn under section 861 of this title (article 61). 
(c)  In a case referred to it, the Court of Military Review may act 
only with respect to the findings and sentence as approved by the 
convening authority. It may affirm only such findings of guilty 
and the sentence or such part or  amount of the sentence, as it finds 
correct in law and fact and determines, on the basis of the entire 
record, should be approved. In considering the record, it may 
weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and deter- 
mine controverted questions of fact, recognizing that the trial 
court saw and heard the witnesses. 
(d) If the Court of Military Review sets aside the findings and 
sentence, it may, except where the setting aside is based on lack of 
sufficient evidence in the record to support the findings, order a 
rehearing. If it sets aside the findings and sentence and does not 
order a rehearing, it shall order that the charges be dismissed. 
(e) The Judge Advocate General shall, unless there is to be fur- 
ther action by  the President, the Secretary concerned, the Court 
of Military Appeals, or the Supreme Court, instruct the conven- 
ing authority to take action in accordance with the decision of the 
Court of Military Review. If the Court of Military Review has or- 
dered a rehearing but the convening authority finds a rehearing 
impracticable, he may dismiss the charges. 
(f)  The Judge Advocates General shall prescribe uniform rules of 
procedure for Courts of Military Review and shall meet periodi- 
cally to formulate policies and procedure in regard to review of 
court-martial cases in the office of the Judge Advocates General 
and by  Courts of Military Review. 
(g)  No member of a Court of Military Review shall be required, 
or on his own initiative be permitted, to prepare, approve, disap- 
prove, review, or submit, with respect to any other member of the 
same or another Court of Military Review, an effectiveness, fit- 
ness, or efficiency report, or any other report documents used in 
whole or in part for the purpose of determining whether a mem- 
ber of the armed forces is qualified to be advanced in grade, or in 
determining the assignment or transfer of a member of the armed 
forces, or in determining whether a member of the armed forces 
shall be retained on active duty. 
(h) No member of a Court of Military Review shall be eligible to 
review the record of any trial if such member served as investigat- 
ing officer in the case or served as a member of the court-martial 
before which such trial was conducted, or served as military 
judge, trial or defense counsel, or reviewing officer of such trial. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE  § 869. Art. 69.(d)(2) 
Q 867. Art. 67. Review by the Court of Military 
Appeals 
(a)  The Court of Military Appeals shall review the record in- 
(1) all cases in which the sentence, as affirmed by a Court of 
Military Review, extends to death; 
(2)  all cases reviewed by a Court of Military Review which the 
Judge Advocate General orders sent to the Court of Military Ap- 
peals for review; and 
(3)  all cases reviewed by a Court of Military Review in which, 
upon petition of the accused and on good cause shown, the Court 
of Military Appeals has granted a review. 
(b)  The accused may petition the Court of Military Appeals for 
review of a decision of a Court of Military Review within 60 days 
from the earlier of- 
(1)  the date on which the accused is notified of the decision of 
the Court of Military Review; or 
(2)  the date on which a copy of the decision of the Court of 
Military Review, after being served on appellate counsel of record 
for the accused (if any), is deposited in the United States mails for 
delivery by  first class certified mail to the accused at an address 
provided by the accused or, if no such address has been provided 
by the accused, at the latest address listed for the accused in his 
official service record. The Court of Military Appeals shall act 
upon such a petition promptly in accordance with the rules of the 
court. 
(c)  In any case reviewed by it, the Court of Military Appeals may 
act only with respect to the findings and sentence as approved by 
the convening authority and as affirmed or set aside as incorrect 
in law by the Court of Military Review. In a case which the Judge 
Advocate General orders sent to the Court of Military Appeals, 
that action need be taken only with respect to the issues raised by 
him. In a case reviewed upon petition of the accused, that action 
need be taken only with respect to issues specified in the grant of 
review. The Court of Military Appeals shall take action only with 
respect to matters of law. 
(d) If the Court of Military Appeals sets aside the findings and 
sentence, it may, except where the setting aside is based on lack of 
sufficient evidence in the record to support the findings, order a 
rehearing. If it sets aside the findings and sentence and does not 
order a rehearing, it shall order that the charges be dismissed. 
(e)  After it has acted on a case, the Court of Military Appeals 
may direct the Judge Advocate General to return the record to 
the Court of Military Review for further review in accordance 
with the decision of the Court. Otherwise, unless there is to be 
further action by the President or the Secretary concerned, the 
Judge Advocate General shall instruct the convening authority to 
take action in accordance with that decision. If the court has or- 
dered a rehearing, but the convening authority finds a rehearing 
impracticable, he may dismiss the charges. 
Q  867a. Art. 67a. Review by the Supreme Court 
(a)  Decisions of the United States Court of Military Appeals are 
subject to review by  the Supreme Court by  writ of certiorari as 
provided in section 1259 of title 28. The Supreme Court may not 
review by a writ of certiorari under this section any action of the 
Court of Military Appeals in refusing to grant a petition for re- 
view. 
(b)  The accused may petition  the Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari without prepayment of fees and costs or security there- 
for and without filing the affidavit required by section 1915(a) of 
title 28. 
Q  868. Art. 68. Branch offices 
The Secretary concerned may direct the Judge Advocate General 
to establish a branch office with any command. The branch office 
shall be under an Assistant Judge Advocate General who, with 
the consent of the Judge Advocate General, may establish a Court 
of Military Review with one or more panels. That Assistant Judge 
Advocate General and any Court of Military Review established 
by him may perform for that command under the general supervi- 
sion of the Judge Advocate General, the respective duties which 
the Judge Advocate General and a Court of Military Review es- 
tablished by the Judge Advocate General would otherwise be re- 
quired to perform as to all cases involving sentences not requiring 
approval by the President. 
Q  869. Art. 69. Review in the office of the Judge 
Advocate General 
(a)  The record of trial in each general court-martial that is not 
otherwise reviewed under section 866 of this title (article 66) shall 
be examined in the office of the Judge Advocate General if there is 
a finding of guilty and the accused does not waive or withdraw his 
right to appellate review under section 861 of this title (article 61). 
If any part of the findings or sentence is found to be unsupported 
in law or if reassessment of the sentence is appropriate, the Judge 
Advocate General may modify or set aside the findings or sen- 
tence or both. 
(b)  The findings or sentence, or both, in a court-martial case not 
reviewed under subsection (a) or under section 866 of this title 
(article 66) may be modified or set aside, in whole or in part, by 
the Judge Advocate General on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence, fraud on the court, lack of jurisdiction over the accused 
or the offense, error prejudicial to the substantial rights of the ac- 
cused, or the appropriateness of the sentence. If such a case is 
considered upon application of the accused, the application must 
be filed in the office of the Judge Advocate General by the accused 
on or before the last day of the two-year period beginning on the 
date the sentence is approved under section 860(c) of this title (ar- 
ticle 60(c)), unless the accused establishes good cause for failure 
to file within that time. 
(c)  If the Judge Advocate General sets aside the findings or sen- 
tence, he may, except when the setting aside is based on lack of 
sufficient evidence in the record to support the findings, order a 
rehearing. If he sets aside the findings and sentence and does not 
order a rehearing, he shall order that the charges be dismissed. If 
the Judge Advocate General orders a rehearing but the convening 
authority finds a rehearing impractical, the convening authority 
shall dismiss the charges. 
(d) A Court of Military Review may review, under section 866 of 
this title (article 66)- 
(1) any court-martial case which (A) is subject to action by the 
Judge Advocate General under this section, and (B) is sent to the 
Court of Military Review by  order of the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral; and, 
(2) any action taken by the Judge Advocate General under this 
section in such case. 5 869. Art. 69.(e)  APP 
(e)  Notwithstanding section 866 of this title (article 66), in any 
case reviewed by a Court of Military Review under this section, 
the Court may take action only with respect to matters of law. 
Q  870. Art. 70. Appellate counsel 
(a) The Judge Advocate General shall detail in his office one or 
more commissioned officers as appellate Government counsel, 
and one or more commissioned officers as appellate defense coun- 
sel, who are qualified under section 827(b)(l) of this title (article 
27(b)(l)). 
(b)  Appellate Government counsel shall represent the United 
States before the Court of Military Review or the Court of Mili- 
tary Appeals when directed to do so by the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral. Appellate Government counsel may represent the United 
States before the Supreme Court in cases arising under this chap- 
ter when requested to do so by the Attorney General. 
(c) Appellate defense counsel shall represent the accused before 
the Court of Military Review, the Court of Military Appeals, or 
the Supreme Court- 
(1) when requested by the accused; 
(2) when the United States is represented by counsel; or 
(3) when the Judge Advocate General has sent the case to the 
Court of Military Appeals. 
(d) The accused has the right to be represented before the Court 
of Military Review, the Court of Military Appeals, or the Su- 
preme Court by  civilian counsel if provided by him. 
(e) Military appellate counsel shall also perform such other func- 
tions in connection with the review of court-martial cases as the 
Judge Advocate General directs. 
Q 871. Art. 71. Execution of sentence; suspension 
of sentence 
(a)  If the sentence of the court-martial extends to death, that part 
of the sentence providing for death may not be executed until ap- 
proved by the President. In such a case, the President may com- 
mute, remit, or suspend the sentence, or any part thereof, as he 
sees fit. That part of the sentence providing for death may not be 
suspended. 
(b)  If in the case of a commissioned officer, cadet, or midship- 
man, the sentence of a court-martial extends to dismissal, that 
part of the sentence providing for dismissal may not be executed 
until approved by  the Secretary concerned or such Under Secre- 
tary or Assistant Secretary as may be designated by the Secretary 
concerned. In such a case, the Secretary, Under Secretary or As- 
sistant Secretary, as the case may be, may commute, remit, or sus- 
pend the sentence, or any part of  the sentence, as he sees fit. In 
time of war or national emergency he may commute a sentence of 
dismissal to reduction to any enlisted grade. A person so reduced 
may be required to serve for the duration of the war or emergency 
and six months thereafter. 
(c)(l) If a sentence extends to death, dismissal, or a dishonora- 
ble or bad-conduct discharge and if the right of the accused to ap- 
pellate review is not waived, and an appeal is not withdrawn, 
under section 861 of this title (article 61), that part of the sentence 
extending to death, dismissal, or a dishonorable or bad-conduct 
discharge may not be executed until there is a final judgment as to 
the legality of the proceedings (and with respect to death or dis- 
missal, approval under subsection (a) or (b), as appropriate). A 
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judgment  as to legality of the proceedings is final in such cases 
when review is completed by  a Court of Military Review and- 
(A)  the time for the accused to file a petition for review by 
the Court of Military Appeals has expired and the accused has 
not filed a timely petition for such review and the case is not oth- 
erwise under review by that Court; 
(B) such a petition is rejected by the Court of Military Ap- 
peals; or 
(C) review is completed in accordance with the judgment of 
the Court of Military Appeals and- 
(i)  a petition for a writ of certiorari is not filed within 
the time limits prescribed by  the Supreme Court; 
(ii)  such a petition is rejected by the Supreme Court; or 
(iii)  review is otherwise completed in accordance with 
the judgment of the Supreme Court. 
(2) If a sentence extends to dismissal or a dishonorable or bad- 
conduct discharge and if the right of the accused to appellate re- 
view is waived, or an appeal is withdrawn, under section 861 of 
this title (article 61), that part of the sentence extending to dismis- 
sal or a bad-conduct or dishonorable discharge may not be exe- 
cuted until review of the case by a judge advocate (and any action 
of that review) under section 864 of this title (article 64) is com- 
pleted. Any other part of a court-martial sentence may be ordered 
executed by the convening authority or other person acting on the 
case under section 860 of this title (article 60) when approved by 
him under that section. 
(d) The convening authority or other person acting on the case 
under section 860 of this title (article 60) may suspend the execu- 
tion of any sentence or part thereof, except a death sentence. 
Q 872. Art. 72. Vacation of suspension 
(a)  Before the vacation of the suspension of a special court-mar- 
tial sentence which as approved includes a bad-conduct dis- 
charge, or of any general court-martial sentence, the officer hav- 
ing special court-martial jurisdiction  over the probationer shall 
hold a hearing on the alleged violation of probation. The proba- 
tioner shall be represented at the hearing by counsel if he so 
desires. 
(b)  The record of the hearing and the recommendation of the of- 
ficer having special court-martial jurisdiction shall be sent for ac- 
tion to the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction 
over the probationer. If he vacates the suspension, any unexe- 
cuted part of the sentence, except a dismissal, shall be executed, 
subject to applicable restrictions in section 871(c) of this title (ar- 
ticle 71(c)). The vacation of the suspension of a dismissal is not ef- 
fective until approved by the Secretary concerned. 
(c) The suspension of any other sentence may be vacated by  any 
authority competent to convene, for the command in which the 
accused is serving or assigned, a court of the kind that imposed 
the sentence. 
Q 873. Art. 73. Petition  for a new trial 
At any time within two years after approval by  the convening au- 
thority of a court-martial sentence, the accused may petition the 
Judge Advocate General for a new trial on the grounds of newly 
discovered evidence or fraud on the court. If the accused's case is 
pending before a Court of Military Review or before the Court of 
Military Appeals, the Judge Advocate General shall refer the pe- UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE  SUBCHAPTER X. PUNITIVE 
tition to the appropriate court for action. Otherwise the Judge 
Advocate General shall act upon the petition. 
5 874. Art. 74. Remission and suspension 
(a) The Secretary concerned and, when designated by him, any 
Under Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Judge Advocate General, 
or commanding officer may remit or suspend any part or amount 
of the unexecuted part of any sentence, including all uncollected 
forfeitures other than a sentence approved by the President. 
(b) The Secretary concerned may, for good cause, substitute an 
administrative form of discharge for a discharge or dismissal exe- 
cuted in accordance with the sentence of a court-martial. 
5 875. Art. 75. Restoration 
(a)  Under such regulations as the President may prescribe, all 
rights, privileges, and property affected by an executed part of a 
court-martial sentence which has been set aside or disapproved, 
except an executed dismissal or discharge, shall be restored unless 
a new trial or rehearing is ordered and such executed part is in- 
cluded in a sentence imposed upon the new trial or rehearing. 
@)  If a previously executed sentence of dishonorable or bad-con- 
duct discharge is not imposed on a new trial, the Secretary con- 
cerned shall substitute therefor a form of discharge authorized for 
administrative issuance unless the accused is to serve out the re- 
mainder of this enlistment. 
(c)  If a previously executed sentence of dismissal is not imposed 
on a new trial, the Secretary concerned shall substitute therefor a 
form of  discharge authorized for administrative issue, and the 
commissioned officer dismissed by  the sentence may be reap- 
pointed by  the President alone to such commissioned grade and 
with such rank as in the opinion of the President that former of- 
ficer would have attained had he not been dismissed. The reap- 
pointment of such a former officer shall be without regard to the 
existence of a vacancy and shall affect the promotion status of 
other officers only insofar as the President may direct. All time 
between the dismissal and the reappointment shall be considered 
as actual service for all purposes, including the right to pay and 
allowances. 
5 876. Art. 76. Finality of proceedings, findings, 
and sentences 
The appellate review of records of trial provided by this chapter, 
the proceedings, findings, and sentences of courts-martial as ap- 
proved, reviewed, or affirmed as required by this chapter, and all 
dismissals and discharges carried into execution under sentences 
by courts-martial following approval, review, or affirmation as re- 
quired by this chapter, are final and conclusive. Orders publishing 
the proceedings of courts-martial and all action taken pursuant to 
those proceedings are binding upon all departments, courts, agen- 
cies, and officers of the United States, subject only to action upon 
a petition for a new trial as provided in section 873 of this title (ar- 
ticle 73) and to action by  the Secretary concerned as provided in 
section 874 of this title (article 74), and the authority of the Presi- 
dent. 
5 876a. Art. 76a. Leave required to be taken 
pending review of certain court-martial 
convictions 
Under regulations prescribed by  the Secretary concerned, an ac- 
cused who has been sentenced by a court-martial may be required 
to take leave pending completion of action under this subchapter 
if the sentence, as approved under section 860 of this title (article 
60), includes an unsuspended dismissal or an unsuspended dis- 
honorable or bad-conduct discharge. The accused may be re- 
quired to begin such leave on the date on which the sentence is ap- 
proved under section 860 of this title (article 60) or at any time 
after such date, and such leave may be continued until the date 
which action under this subchapter is completed or may be termi- 
nated at any earlier time. 
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5 877. Art. 77. Principals 
Any person punishable under this chapter who 
(1)  commits an offense punishable by this chapter, or aids, abets, 
counsels, commands, or procures its commission; or 
(2)  causes an act to be done which if directly performed by  him 
would be punishable by  this chapter; is a principal. 
5 878. Art. 78. Accessory after the fact 
Any person subject to this chapter who, knowing that an offense 
punishable by  this chapter has been committed. receives, com- 
forts, or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his ap- 
prehension, trial, or punishment shall be punished as a court-mar- 
tial may direct. 
8 879. Art. 79. Conviction of lesser included 
offense 
An accused may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included 
in the offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the of- 
fense charged or an offense necessarily included therein. 
5 880. Art. 80. Attempts 
(a)  An act, done with specific intent to commit an offense under 
this chapter. amounting to more than mere preparation and tend- 
ing, even though failing, to effect its commission, is an attempt to 
commit that offense. 
(b)  Any person subject to this chapter who attempts to commit 
any offense punishable by  this chapter shall be punished  as a 
court-martial may direct, unless otherwise specifically prescribed. 
(c)  Any person subject to this chapter may be convicted of an at- 
tempt to commit an offense although it appears on the trial that 
the offense was consummated. 
5 881. Art. 81. Conspiracy 
Any person subject to this chapter who conspires with any other 
person to commit an offense under this chapter shall. if one or 
more of the conspirators does an act to effect the object of the con- 
spiracy, be punished as a court-martial may direct. 
5 882. Art. 82. Solicitation 
(a)  Any person subject to this chapter who solicits or advises an- 
other or others to desert in violation of section 885 of this title (ar- 
ticle 85) or mutiny in violation of section 894 of this title (article 
94) shall, if the offense solicited or advised is attempted or com- 
mitted, be punished with the punishment provided for the com- 
mission of the offense, but, if the offense solicited or advised is not 
committed or attempted, he shall be punished as a court-martial 
may direct. 
(b)  Any person subject to this chapter who solicits or advises an- 
other or others to commit an act of misbehavior before the enemy 
in violation of section 899 of this title (article 99) or sedition in vi- 
olation of section 894 of this title (article 94) shall, if  the offense 
solicited or advised is committed, be punished with the punish- 
ment provided for the commission of the offense, but, if  the of- 
fense solicited or advised is not committed, he shall be punished 
as a court-martial may direct. 
5 883. Art. 83. Fraudulent enlistment, appointment, 
or separation 
Any person who 
(1)  procures his own enlistment or appointment in the armed 
forces by  knowingly false representation  or deliberate conceal- 
ment as to his qualifications for the enlistment or appointment 
and receives pay or allowances thereunder: or 
(2)  procures his own separation from the armed forces by  know- 
ingly false representation or deliberate concealment as to his eligi- 
bility for that separation; shall be punished as a court-martial may 
direct 
5 884. Art. 84. Unlawful enlistment, appointment, 
or separation 
Any person subject to this chapter who effects an enlistment or 
appointment in or a separation from the armed forces of any per- 
son who is known to him to be ineligible for that enlistment, ap- 
pointment, or separation because it is prohibited by  law, regula- 
tion, or order shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE  5 894. Art. 94.(b) 
5 885. Art. 85. Desertion 
(a) Any member of the armed forces who- 
(1)  without authority goes or remains absent from his unit, or- 
ganization, or place of duty with intent to remain away therefrom 
permanently; 
(2) quits his unit. organization. or place of duty with intent to 
avoid hazardous duty or to shirk important service; or 
(3) without being regularly separated from one of the armed 
forces enlists or accepts an appointment in the same or another 
one of the armed forces without fully disclosing the fact that he 
has not been regularly separated, or enters any foreign armed ser- 
vice except when authorized by the United States; is guilty of de- 
sertion. 
(b) Any commissioned officer of the armed forces who, after 
tender of his resignation and before notice of its acceptance, quits 
his post or proper duties without leave and with intent to remain 
away therefrom permanently is guilty of desertion. 
(c)  Any person found guilty of desertion or attempt to desert 
shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by 
death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, 
but if the desertion or attempt to desert occurs at any other time, 
by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may di- 
rect. 
Q  886. Art. 86. Absence without leave 
Any member of the armed forces who, without authority- 
(1)  fails to go to his appointed place of duty at the time pre- 
scribed; 
(2) goes from that place; or 
(3) absents himself or remains absent from his unit, organization, 
or place of duty at which he is required to be at the time pre- 
scribed; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 
Q  887. Art. 87. Missing movement 
Any person subject to this chapter who through neglect or design 
misses the movement of a ship, aircraft, or unit with which he is 
required in the course of duty to move shall be punished  as a 
court-martial may direct. 
5 888. Art. 88. Contempt toward officials 
Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against 
the President, the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of De- 
fense, the Secretary of a military department, the Secretary of 
Transportation, or the Governor or legislature of any State, Terri- 
tory. Commonwealth, or possession in which he is on duty or pre- 
sent shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 
5 889. Art. 89 Disrespect toward superior 
commissioned  officer 
Any person subject to this chapter who behaves with disrespect 
toward his superior commissioned officer shall be punished as a 
court-martial may direct. 
Q 890. Art. 90. Assaulting or willfully disobeying 
superior commissioned officer 
Any person subject to this chapter who- 
(1) strikes his superior commissioned officer or draws or lifts up 

any weapon or offers any violence against him while he is in the 

execution of his office; or 

(2) willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commis- 

sioned officer; 

shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by 

death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, 

and if the offense is committed at any other time, by such punish- 

ment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct. 

Q  891. Art. 91. Insubordinate conduct toward 
warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or 
petty officer 
Any warrant officer or enlisted member who 
(1) strikes or assaults a warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, 

or petty officer, while that officer is in the execution of his office; 

(2) willfully disobeys the lawful order of a warrant officer, non- 

commissioned officer, or petty officer; or 

(3) treats with contempt or is disrespectful in language or deport- 

ment toward a warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty 

officer while that officer is in the execution of his office; 

shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 

Q  892. Art. 92. Failure to obey order or regulation 
Any person subject to this chapter who- 
(1) violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regula- 
tion; 
(2) having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a mem- 
ber of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey 
the order; or 
(3) is derelict in the performance of his duties; 
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 
Q  893. Art. 93. Cruelty and maltreatment 
Any person subject to this chapter who is guilty of cruelty to- 
ward, or oppression or maltreatment of, any person subject to his 
orders shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 
Q  894. Art. 94. Mutiny or sedition 
(a)  Any person subject to this chapter who- 
(1) with intent to usurp or override lawful military authority, 
refuses, in concert with any other person, to obey orders or other- 
wise do his duty or creates any violence or disturbance is guilty of 
mutiny; 
(2) with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of lawful 
civil authority, creates, in concert with any other person, revolt, 
violence, or other disturbance against that authority is guilty of 
sedition; 
(3) fails to do his utmost to prevent and suppress a mutiny or 
sedition being committed in his presence, or fails to take all rea- 
sonable means to inform his superior commissioned officer or 
commanding officer of a mutiny or sedition which he knows or 
has reason to believe is taking place, is guilty of a failure to sup- 
press or report a mutiny or sedition. 
(b)  A person who is found guilty of attempted mutiny, mutiny, 
sedition, or failure to suppress or report a mutiny or sedition shall 
be punished by  death or such other punishment as a court-martial 
may direct. APPENDIX 2 
Q 895. Art. 95. Resistance, breach of arrest, and 
escape 
Any person subject to this chapter who resists apprehension or 
breaks arrest or who escapes from custody or confinement shall 
be punished as a court-martial may direct. 
Q 896. Art. 96. Releasing prisoner without proper 
authority 
Any person subject to this chapter who, without proper author- 
ity, releases any prisoner committed to his charge, or who 
through neglect or design suffers any such prisoner to escape, 
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct, whether or not 
the prisoner was committed in strict compliance with law. 
Q 897. Art. 97. Unlawful detention 
Any person subject to this chapter who, except as provided by 
law, apprehends, arrests, or confines any person shall be punished 
as a court-martial may direct. 
Q 898. Art. 98. Noncompliance  with procedural 
rules 
Any person subject to this chapter who 
(1)  is responsible for unnecessary delay in the disposition of any 
case of a person accused of an offense under this chapter; or 
(2)  knowingly and intentionally fails to enforce or comply with 

any provision of this chapter regulating the proceedings before, 

during, or after trial of an accused; 

shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 

Q 899. Art. 99. Misbehavior before the enemy 
Any person subject to this chapter who before or in the presence 
of the enemy- 
(1)  runs away; 
(2)  shamefully abandons, surrenders, or  delivers up any com- 
mand, unit, place, or military property which it is his duty to de- 
fend; 
(3)  through disobedience, neglect, or intentional misconduct en- 
dangers the safety of any such command, unit, place, or military 
property; 
(4) casts away his arms or ammunition; 
(5)  is guilty of cowardly conduct; 
(6) quits his place of duty to plunder or pillage; 
(7)  causes false alarms in ally command, unit, or  place under con- 
trol of the armed forces; 
(8) willfully fails to do his utmost to encounter, engage, capture, 
or  destroy any enemy troops, combatants, vessels, aircraft, or any 
other thing, which it is his duty so to encounter, engage, capture, 
or destroy; or 
(9) does not afford all practicable relief and assistance to any 
troops, combatants, vessels, or aircraft of the armed forces be- 
longing to the United States or their allies when engaged in battle; 
shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court- 
martial may direct. 
Q 900. Art. 100. Subordinate compelling surrender 
Any person subject to this chapter who compels or attempts to 
compel the commander of any place, vessel, aircraft, or other mil- 
itary property, or of any body of members of the armed forces, to 
give it up to an enemy or to abandon it, or who strikes the colors 
or flag to any enemy without proper authority, shall be punished 
by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct. 
Q 901. Art. 101. Improper use of countersign 
Any person subject to this chapter who in time of war discloses 
the parole or countersign to any person not entitled to receive it or 
who gives to another who is entitled to receive and use the parole 
or countersign a different parole or countersign from that which, 
to his knowledge, he was authorized and required to give, shall be 
punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial 
may direct. 
Q902. Art. 102. Forcing a safeguard 
Any person subject to this chapter who forces a safeguard shall 
suffer death or  such other punishment as a court-martial may di- 
rect. 
Q 903. Art. 103. Captured or abandoned property 
(a)  All persons subject to this chapter shall secure all public 
property taken from the enemy for the service of the United 
States, and shall give notice and turn over to the proper authority 
without delay all captured or abandoned property in their posses- 
sion, custody, or control. 
(b)  Any person subject to this chapter who- 
(1)  fails to carry out the duties prescribed in subsection (a); 
(2)  buys, sells, trades, or in any way deals in or disposes of cap- 
tured or abandoned property, whereby he receives or expects any 
profit, benefit, or advantage to himself or another directly or indi- 
rectly connected with himself; or 
(3)  engages in looting or pillaging; 
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 
Q 904. Art. 104. Aiding the enemy 
Any person who- 
(1)  aids, or attempts to aid, the enemy with arms, ammunition, 
supplies, money, or other things; or 
(2)  without proper authority, knowingly harbors or protects or 
gives intelligence to or communicates or corresponds with or 
holds any intercourse with the enemy, either directly or indi- 
rectly; 
shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial or 
military commission may direct. 
Q905. Art. 105. Misconduct as prisoner 
Any person subject to this chapter who, while in the hands of the 
enemy in time of war- 
(1) for the purpose of securing favorable treatment by his captors 
acts without proper authority in a manner contrary to law, cus- 
tom, or regulation, to the detriment of others of whatever nation- 
ality held by the enemy as civilian or military prisoners; or 
(2)  while in a position of authority over such persons maltreat 
them without justifiable cause; 

shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 
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5 906. Art. 106. Spies 
Any person who in time of war is found lurking as a spy or acting 
as a spy in or about any place, vessel, or aircraft, within the con- 
trol or  jurisdiction of any of the armed forces, or in or about any 
shipyard, any manufacturing or industrial plant, or any other 
place or institution engaged in work in aid of the prosecution of 
the war by the United States, or elsewhere, shall be tried by a gen- 
eral court-martial or by a military commission and on conviction 
shall be punished by death. 
5 906a. Art. 106a. Espionage 
(a)(l)  Any person subject to this chapter who, with intent or rea- 
son to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States 
or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, 
or transmits, or attempts to communicate, deliver, or transmit, to 
any entity described in paragraph (2), either directly or indirectly, 
any thing described in paragraph (3) shall be punished as a court- 
martial may direct, except that if the accused is found guilty of an 
offense that directly concerns (A) nuclear weaponry, military 
spacecraft or satellites, early warning systems, or other means of 
defense or retaliation against large scale attack, (B) war plans, (C) 
communications intelligence or cryptographic information, or 
(D) any other major weapons system or major element of defense 
strategy, the accused shall be punished by death or such other 
punishment as a court-marital may direct. 
(2)  An entity referred to in paragraph (1) is- 
(A)  a foreign government; 
(B)  a faction or party or military or naval force within a for- 
eign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the United 
States; or 
(C)  a representative, officer, agent, employee, subject, or cit- 
izen of such a government, faction, party, or force. 
(3)  A thing referred to in paragraph (1) is a document, writing, 
code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic nega- 
tive, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, instrument, appliance, or 
information relating to the national defense. 
@)(I)  No person may be sentenced by court-martial to suffer 
death for an offense under this section (article) unless- 
(A)  the members of the court-martial unanimously  find at 
least one of the aggravating factors set out in subsection (c); and 
(B)  the members unanimously determine that any extenuat- 
ing or mitigating circumstances are substantially outweighed by 
any aggravating circumstances, including the aggravating factors 
set out under subsection (c). 
(2)  Findings under this subsection may be based on- 
(A)  evidence introduced on the issue of guilt or innocence; 
(B)  evidence introduced during the sentencing proceeding; 
or 
(C)  all such evidence. 
(3)  The accused shall be given broad latitude to present mat- 
ters in extenuation and mitigation. 
(c)  A sentence of death may be adjudged by a court-martial for 
an offense under this section (article) only if the members unani- 
mously find, beyond a reasonable doubt, one or more of the fol- 
lowing aggravating factors: 
(1)  The accused has been convicted of another offense involv- 
ing espionage or treason for which either a sentence of death or 
imprisonment for life was authorized by statute. 
(2)  In the commission of the offense, the accused knowingly 
created a grave risk of substantial damage to the national security. 
(3)  In the commission of the offense, the accused knowingly 
created a grave risk of death to another person. 
(4)  Any other factor that may be prescribed by the President 
by regulations under section 836 of this title (Article 36). 
5 907. Art. 107. False official statements 
Any person subject to this chapter who, with intent to deceive, 
signs any false record, return, regulation, order, or other official 
document, knowing it to be false, or makes any other false official 
statement knowing it to be false, shall be punished as a court-mar- 
ital may direct. 
5 908. Art. 108. Military property of United States -
Loss, damage, destruction, or wrongful 
disposition 
Any person subject to this chapter who, without proper author- 
ity-
(1)  sells or otherwise disposes of; 
(2)  willfully or through neglect damages, destroys, or loses; or 
(3)  willfully or through neglect suffers to be lost, damaged, sold, 
or wrongfully disposed of; 

any military property of the United States, shall be punished as a 

court-martial may direct. 

5 909. Art. 109. Property other than military 
property of United States -Waste, spoilage, or 
destruction 
Any person subject to this chapter who willfully or recklessly 
wastes, spoils, or otherwise willfully and wrongfully destroys or 
damages any property other than military property of the United 
States shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 
5 910. Art. 110. Improper hazarding  of vessel 
(a)  Any person subject to this chapter who willfully and wrong- 
fully hazards or suffers to be hazarded any vessel of the armed 
forces shall suffer death or such punishment as a court-martial 
may direct. 
(b)  Any person subject to this chapter who negligently hazards 
or suffers to be hazarded any vessel of the armed forces shall be 
punished as a court-martial may direct. 
5 91  1. Art. 11  1. Drunken or reckless operation of a 
vehicle, aircraft or vessel 
Any person subject to this chapter whe- 
(1)  operates or physically controls any vehicle, aircraft, or vessel 
in a reckless or wanton manner or while impaired by a substance 
described in section 912a(b) of this title (article 112a(b)), or 
(2)  operates or is in actual physical control of any vehicle, air- 
craft, or vessel while drunk or when the alcohol concentration in 
the person's  blood or breath is 0.10 grams of alcohol per 100 
mililiters of blood or 0.10 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of 
breath, as shown by chemical analysis, 
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 5 912. Art. 112.  APPENDIX 2 
5 912. Art. 112. Drunk on duty 
Any person subject to this chapter other than a sentinel or look- 
out, who is found drunk on duty, shall be punished as a court- 
martial may direct. 
5 912a. Art 11  2a. Wrongful use, possession, etc., 
of controlled substances 
(a)  Any person subject to this chapter who wrongfully uses, pos- 
sesses, manufactures, distributes, imports into the customs terri- 
tory of the United States, exports from the United States, or in- 
troduces into an installation, vessel, vehicle, or aircraft used by or 
under the control of the armed forces a substance described in 
subsection (b) shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 
(b)  The substances referred to in subsection (a) are the following: 
(1)  Opium, heroin,  cocaine, amphetamine, lysergic acid 
diethylamide, methamphetamine, phencyclidine, barbituric acid, 
and marijuana and any compound or derivative of any such sub- 
stance. 
(2)  Any substance not specified in clause (1) that is listed on a 
schedule of controlled substances prescribed by the President for 
the purposes of this article. 
(3) Any other substance not specified in clause (1) or contained 
on a list prescribed by the President under clause (2) that is listed 
in schedules I through V of section 202 of the Controlled Sub- 
stances Act (21 U.S.C. 8 12). 
5 913. Art. 113. Misbehavior of sentinel 
Any sentinel or lookout who is found drunk or sleeping upon his 
post or leaves it before being regularly relieved, shall be punished, 
if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other 
punishment as a court-martial may direct, but if the offense is at 
any other time, by such punishment other than death as a court- 
martial may direct. 
5 914. Art 114. Dueling 
Any person subject to this chapter who fights or promotes, or is 
concerned in or connives at fighting a duel, or who, having knowl- 
edge of a challenge sent or about to be sent, fails to report the fact 
promptly to the proper authority, shall be punished as a court- 
martial may direct. 
5 915. Art. 115. Malingering 
Any person subject to this chapter who for the purpose of avoid- 
ing work, duty, or service- 
(1) feigns illness, physical disablement, mental lapse, or derange- 
ment; or 
(2) intentionally inflicts self-injury; 

shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 

5 916. Art 116. Riot or breach of peace 
Any person subject to this chapter who causes or participates in 
any riot or breach of the peace shall be punished as a court-mar- 
tial may direct. 
5 917. Art. 117. Provoking speeches or gestures 
Any person subject to this chapter who uses provoking or re- 
proachful words or gestures towards any other person subject to 
this chapter shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 
5 918. Art. 118. Murder 
Any person subject to this chapter who, without justification or 
excuse, unlawfully kills a human being, when he- 
(1) has a premeditated design to kill; 
(2)  intends to kill or inflict great bodily harm; 
(3) is engaged in an act which is inherently dangerous to another 
and evinces a wanton disregard of human life; or 
(4) is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of 
burglary, sodomy, rape, robbery, or aggravated arson; 
is guilty of murder, and shall suffer such punishment as a court- 
martial may direct, except that if found guilty under clause (1) or 
(4), he shall suffer death or imprisonment for life as a court-mar- 
tial may direct. 
5 919. Art. 119. Manslaughter 
(a)  Any person subject to this chapter who, with an intent to kill 
or inflict great bodily harm, unlawfully kills a human being in the 
heat of sudden passion caused by adequate provocation is guilty 
of voluntary manslaughter and shall be punished as a court-mar- 
tial may direct. 
(b)  Any person subject to this chapter who, without an intent to 
kill or inflict great bodily harm, unlawfully kills a human being -
(1)  by culpable negligence; or 
(2)  while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate an offense, 
other than those named in clause (4) of section 918 of this title (ar- 
ticle 118), directly affecting the person; 
is guilty of involuntary manslaughter and shall be punished as a 
court-martial may direct. 
5 920. Art. 120. Rape and carnal knowledge 
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who commits an act of sex- 
ual intercourse, by force and without consent, is guilty of rape and 
shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court- 
martial may direct. 
(b) Any person subject to this chapter who, under circumstances 
not amounting to rape, commits an act of sexual intercourse with 
a female not his wife who has not attained the age of sixteen years, 
is guilty of carnal knowledge and shall be punished as a court- 
martial may direct. 
(c)  Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete either of 
these offenses. 
5 921. Art. 121. Larceny and wrongful 
appropriation 
(a)  Any person subject to this chapter who wrongfully takes, ob- 
tains, or withholds, by  any means, from the possession of the 
owner or of any other person any money, personal property, or 
article of value of any kind -
(1)  with intent permanently to deprive or defraud another per- 
son of  the use and benefit of property or to appropriate it to his 
own use or the use of any person other than the owner, steals that 
property and is guilty of larceny; or UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE  5 930. Art. 130. 
(2) with intent temporarily to deprive or defraud another per- 
son of the use and benefit of property or to appropriate it to his 
own use or  the use of any person other than the owner, is guilty of 
wrongful appropriation. 
(b)  Any person found guilty of larceny or wrongful appropria- 
tion shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 
Q 922. Art. 122. Robbery 
Any person subject to this chapter who with intent to steal takes 
anything of value from the person or in the presence of another, 
against his will, by means of force or violence or fear of immediate 
or  future injury to his person or property or to the person or prop- 
erty of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his com- 
pany at the time of the robbery, is guilty of robbery and shall be 
punished as a court-martial may direct. 
Q923. Art. 123. Forgery 
Any person subject to this chapter who, with intent to defraud- 
(1) falsely makes or alters any signature, to, or any part of, any 

writing which would, if genuine, apparently impose a legal liabil- 

ity on another or change his legal right or liability to his prejudice; 

or 

(2) utters, offers, issues, or transfers such a writing, known by 

him to be so made or altered; 

is guilty of forgery and shall be punished as a court-martial may 

direct. 

Q 923a. Art. 123a. Making, drawing, or uttering 
check, draft, or order without sufficient funds 
Any person subject to this chapter who- 
(1)  for the procurement of any article or thing of value, with in- 
tent to defraud; or 
(2) for the payment of any past due obligation, or for any other 
purpose, with intent to deceive; 
makes, draws, utters, or delivers any check, draft, or order for the 
payment of money upon any bank or other depository, knowing 
at the time that the maker or drawer has not or will not have suffi- 
cient funds in, or credit with, the bank or other depository for the 
payment of that check, draft, or order in full upon its present- 
ment, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. The mak- 
ing, drawing, uttering, or delivering by  a maker or drawer of a 
check, draft or order, payment of which is refused by the drawee 
because of  insufficient funds of the maker or drawer in the 
drawee's possession or control, is prima facie evidence of his in- 
tent to defraud or deceive and of his knowledge of insufficient 
funds in, or credit with, that bank or other depository, unless the 
maker or drawer pays the holder the amount due within five days 
after receiving notice, orally or in writing, that the check, draft, or 
order was not paid on presentment. In this section, the word 
"credit" means an arrangement or understanding, express or im- 
plied, with the bank or other depository for the payment of that 
check, draft, or order. 
Q 924. Art. 124. Maiming 
Any person subject to this chapter who, with intent to injure, dis- 
figure, or disable, inflicts upon the person of another an injury 
which 
(1) seriously disfigures his person by  a mutilation thereof; 
(2) destroys or disables any member or organ of his body; or 
(3)  seriously diminishes his physical vigor by  the injury of any 

member or organ; 

is guilty of maiming and shall be punished as a court-martial may 

direct. 

Q 925. Art. 125. Sodomy 
(a)  Any person subject to this chapter who engages in unnatural 
carnal copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex 
or with an animal is guilty of sodomy. Penetration, however 
slight, is sufficient to complete the offense. 
(b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall be punished as a 
court-martial may direct. 
Q 926. Art. 126. Arson 
(a)  Any person subject to this chapter who willfully and mali- 
ciously bums or sets on fire an inhabited dwelling, or any other 
structure, movable or immovable, wherein to the knowledge of 
the offender there is at the time a human being, is guilty of aggra- 
vated arson and shall be punished as court-martial may direct. 
(b)  Any person subject to this chapter who willfully and mali- 
ciously burns or sets fire to the propeGy of another, except as pro- 
vided in subsection (a), is guilty of simple arson and shall be pun- 
ished as a court-martial may direct. 
Q 927. Art. 127. Extortion 
Any person subject to this chapter who communicates threats to 
another person with the intention thereby to obtain anything of 
value or any acquittance, advantage, or immunity is guilty of ex- 
tortion and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 
Q 928. Art. 128. Assault 
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who attempts or offers 
with unlawful force or violence to do bodily harm to another per- 
son, whether or not the attempt or offer is consummated, is guilty 
of assault and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 
(b)  Any person subject to this chapter who- 
(1)  commits an assault with  a dangerous weapon or other 
means or force likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm; 
or 
(2) commits an assault and intentionally inflicts grievous bod- 
ily harm with or without a weapon; 
is guilty of aggravated assault and shall be punished as a court- 
martial may direct. 
Q 929. Art. 129. Burglary 
Any person subject to this chapter who, with intent to commit an 
offense punishable under section 918-928  of this title (article 
118-128), breaks and enters, in the nighttime, the dwelling house 
of another, is guilty of burglary and shall be punished as a court- 
martial may direct. 
Q 930. Art. 130. Housebreaking 
Any person subject to this chapter who unlawfully enters the 
building or structure of another with intent to commit a criminal 
offense therein is guilty of housebreaking and shall be punished as 
a court-martial may direct. 5 931. Art. 131.  APPENDIX 2 
9931. Art. 131. Perjury 
Any person subject to this chapter who in a judicial proceeding or 
in a course ofjustice willfully and cormptly- 
(1) upona lawful oath or in any form allowed by law to be substi- 

tuted for an oath, gives any false testimony material to the issue or 

matter of inquiry; or 

(2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under 

penalty or perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, 

United States Code, subscribes any false statement material to the 

issue or matter of inquiry; 

is guilty of pe  jury and shall be punished as a court-martial may 

direct. 

Q  932. Art. 132. Frauds against the United States 
Any person subject to this chapter- 
(1) who, knowing it to be false or fraudulent- 
(A)  makes any claim against the United States or any 0ficer 
thereof; or 
(B)  Presents to any PerSon in the civil or military service 
thereof, for approval or payment, any claim against the United 
States or any officer thereof; 
(2) who, for the Purpose of obtaining the approval, allowance, or 
payment of any claim against the United  States or any officer 
thereof -
(A) makes or uses any writing or other paper knowing it to 
contain any false or fraudulent statements; 
makes any oath  any fact Or  any writing or other paper 
knowing the oath to be false; or 
(c)  forges or counterfeits any signature upon any writing or 
other paper, or uses any such signature knowing it to be forged or 
counterfeited; 
(3)  who, having charge, possession, custody, or control of any 
money, or other property of the United States, furnished or in- 
tended for the armed forces thereof, knowingly delivers to any 
having authority to receive it, any amount thereof less 
than that for which he receives a certificate or receipt; or 
(4) who, being authorized to make or  deliver any paper certifying 
the receipt of any property of the United States furnished or in- 
tended for the armed forces thereof, makes or delivers to any per- 
son such writing without having full knowledge of the truth of the 
statements therein contained and with  intent to defraud the 
United States; 
shall, upon conviction, be punished as a court-martial may direct. 
Q  933. Art. 133. Conduct unbecoming an officer 
and a gentleman 
Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is con- 
victed of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be 
punished as a court-martial may direct. 
Q  934. Art. 134. General article 
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders 
and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the 
armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the 
armed forces, and crimes and offenses  not capital, of which per- 
sons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cogni- 
zance of by  a general, special or summary court-martial, accord- 
ing to the nature and degree of the offense,  and shall be punished 
at the discretion of that court. 
SUBCHAPTER XI. MlSCELLANEOUS PROVlSlONS 
Sec.  Art. 
935.  135. Courts of inquiry. 
936.  136.Authority to administer oaths and to act as 
notary. 
937.  137.Articles to be explained. 
938.  138. Complaints of wrongs. 
939.  139. Redress of injuries to property. 
940.  140. Delegation by the President. 
§ 935. Art. 135. Courts of inquiry 
(a)  Courts of inquiry to investigate any matter may be convened 
by any person authorized to convene a general court-martial or by 
any other person designated by the Secretary concerned for that 
purpose, whether or not the persons involved have requested such 
an inquiry, 
(b) A court of inquiry consists of three or more commissioned of- 
ficers.  For each court of inquiry the convening authority shall also 
appoint counsel for the court, 
(c) Any person subject to this chapter whose conduct is subject to 
inquiry shall be designated as a party. Any person subject to this 
chapter or employed by the Department of Defense who has a di- 
rect interest in the subject of inquiry has the right to be designated 
as a party upon request to the court. Any person designated as a 
party shall be given due notice and has the right to be present, to 
be represented by  counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, and to in- 
troduce evidence. 
(d) Members of a court of inquiry may be challenged by a party, 
but only for cause stated to the court. 
(e)  The members,  the reporter, and 
courts of inquiry shall take an oath to faithfully perform their du- 
ties. 
(9 Witnesses may be  to appear and  and be ex- 
amined before courts of  as provided for courts-martial. 
(8) Courts of inquiry shall make findings of fact but may not ex- 
press opinions or make recommendations unless required to do so 
by the convening authority. 
(h) Each court of inquiry shall keep a record of its proceedings, 
which shall be authenticated by  the signatures of the president 
and counsel for the court and forwarded to the convening author- 
ity. If the record cannot be authenticated by the president, it shall 
be signed by a member in lieu of the president. If the record can- 
not be authenticated by the counsel for the court, it shall be signed 
by a member in lieu of the counsel, 
Q  936. Art. 136. Authority to administer oaths and 
to act as notary 
(a) The following Persons on active duty or ~erformin~  inactive-
training may administer oaths for the purposes of military 
justice: 
(1) All Judge advocates. 
(2) All summary courts-martial. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE  5 942. Art. 142.(b)(2) 
(3)  All adjutants, assistant adjutants, acting adjutants, and 
personnel adjutants. 
(4)  All commanding officers of the Navy, Marine Corps, and 
Coast Guard. 
(5)  All staffjudge advocates and legal officers, and acting or  as- 
sistant staff judge advocates and legal officers. 
(6)  All other persons designated by regulations of the armed 
forces or by statute. 
(b)  The following persons on active duty or performing inactive- 
duty training may administer oaths necessary in the performance 
of their duties: 
(1) The president, military judge, trial counsel, and assistant 
trial counsel for all general and special courts-martial. 
(2) The president and the counsel for the court of any court of 
inquiry. 
(3) All officers designated to take a deposition. 
(4) All persons detailed to conduct an investigation. 
(5) All recruiting officers. 
(6) All other persons designated by regulations of the armed 
forces or by statute. 
5 937. Art. 137. Articles to be explained 
(a)(l) The sections of this title (articles of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice) specified in paragraph (3) shall be carefully ex- 
plained to each enlisted member at the time of (or within six days 
after)-
(A) the member's initial entrance on active duty; or 
(B) the member's initial entrance into a duty status with a re- 
serve component. 
(2) Such sections (articles) shall be explained again -
(A) after the member has completed six months of active duty 
or, in the case of a member of a reserve component, after the 
member has completed basic or recruit training; and 
(B) at the time when the member reenlists. 
(3) This subsection applies with respect to sections 802, 803, 
807-815,  825, 827, 831, 837, 838, 855, 877-934,  and 937-939  of 
this title (articles 2,  3, 7-15,  25, 27, 31, 38, 55, 77-134,  and 
137-139). 
(b)  The text of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and of the 
regulations prescribed by  the President under such Code shall be 
made available to a member on active duty or to a member of a re- 
serve component, upon request by the member, for the member's 
personal examination. 
5 938. Art. 138. Complaints of wrongs 
Any member of the armed forces who believes himself wronged  -
by his commanding officer, and who, upon due application to that 
commanding officer, is refused redress, may complain to any su- 
perior commissioned officer, who shall forward the complaint to 
the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the 
officer against whom it is made. The officer exercising general 
court-martial jurisdiction shall examine into the complaint and 
take proper measures for redressing the wrong complained of; 
and he shall, as soon as possible, send to the Secretary concerned 
a true statement of that complaint, with the proceedings had 
thereon. 
5 939. Art. 139. Redress of injuries to property 
(a) Whenever complaint is made to any commanding officer that 
willful damage has been done to the property of any person or 
that his property has been wrongfully taken by members of the 
armed forces, he may, under such regulations as the Secretary 
concerned may prescribe, convene a board to investigate the com- 
plaint. The board shall consist of from one to three commissioned 
officers and, for the purpose of that investigation, it has power to 
summon witnesses and examine them upon oath, to receive depo- 
sitions or other documentary evidence, and to assess the damages 
sustained against the responsible parties. The assessment of dam- 
ages made by  the board is subject to the approval of the com- 
manding officer, and in the amount approved by  him shall be 
charged against the pay of the offenders. The order of the com- 
manding officer directing charges herein authorized is conclusive 
on any disbursing officer for the payment by him to the injured 
parties of the damages as assessed and approved. 
(b)  If the offenders cannot be ascertained, but the organization or 
detachment to which they belong is known, charges totaling the 
amount of damages assessed and approved may be made in such 
proportion as may be considered just upon the individual mem- 
bers thereof who are shown to have been present at the scene at 
the time the damages complained of were inflicted, as determined 
by the approved findings of the board. 
5 940. Art. 140. Delegation by the President 
The President may delegate any authority vested in him under 
this chapter, and provide for the subdelegation of any such au- 
thority. 
SUBCHAPTER XI1 - COURT OF MILITARY 
APPEALS 
Sec.  Art. 
941.  141.Status. 
942.  142. Judges. 
943.  143. Organization and employees. 
944.  144. Procedure. 
945.  145. Annuities for judges and survivors. 
946.  146.  Code committee. 
5 941. Art. 141. Status 
There is a court of record known as the United States Court of 
Military Appeals. The court is established under article I of the 
Constitution. The court is located for administrative purposes 
only in the Department of Defense. 
5 942. Art. 142. Judges 
(a)  Number. The United States Court of Military Appeals con- 
sists of five judges. 
(b)  Appointment; qualification. 
(1) Each judge of the court shall be appointed from civilian life 
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Sen- 
ate, for a specified term determined under paragraph (2). A judge 
may serve as a senior judge as provided in subsection (e). 
(2)  The term of a judge shall expire as follows: 5 942. Art. 142.(b)(2)(A)  APPENDIX 2 
(A) In the case of a judge who is appointed after March 31 
and before October 1  of any year, the term shall expire on Septem- 
ber 30 of the year in which the fifteenth anniversary of the ap- 
pointment occurs. 
(B) In the case of a judge who is appointed after September 
30 of any year and before April 1 of the following year, the term 
shall expire fifteen years after such September 30. 
(3)  Not more than three of the judges of the court may be ap- 
pointed from the same political party, and no person may be ap- 
pointed to be a judge of the court unless the person is a member of 
the bar of a Federal court or the highest court of a State. 
(4)  For purposes of appointment of judges to the court, a per- 
son retired from the armed forces after 20 or more years of active 
service (whether or not such person is on the retired list) shall not 
be considered to be in civilian life. 
(c)  Removal. Judges of the court may be removed from office by 
the President, upon notice and hearing, for- 
(1)  neglect of duty; 
(2)  misconduct; or 
(3) mental or physical disability. 
A judge may not be removed by the President for any other cause. 
(d)  Pay and allowances. Each judge of the court is entitled to the 
same salary and travel allowances as are, and from time to time 
may be, provided for judges of the United States Courts of Ap- 
peals. 
(e)  Senior judges. 
(l)(A) A former judge of the court who is receiving retired pay 
or an annuity under section 945 of this title (article 145) or under 
subchapter I11 of chapter 83 or chapter 84 of title 5 shall be a se- 
nior judge. The chiefjudge of the court may call upon an individ- 
ual who is a senior judge of the court under this subparagraph, 
with the consent of the senior judge, to perform judicial  duties 
with the court- 
(i)  during a period a judge of the court is unable to perform 
his duties because of illness or other disability; 
(ii) during a period in which a position ofjudge of the court 
is vacant; or 
(iii) in any case in which a  judge of the court recuses himself. 
(B)  If, at the time the term of a judge expires, no successor to 
that judge has been appointed, the chief judge of the court may 
call upon that judge (with the judge's consent) to continue to per- 
form judicial duties with the court until the vacancy is filled. A 
judge who, upon the expiration of the judge's  term, continues to 
perform judicial duties with the court without a break in service 
under this subparagraph shall be a senior judge while such service 
continues. 
(2)  A senior judge shall be paid for each day on which he per- 
forms judicial duties with the court an amount equal to the daily 
equivalent of the annual rate of pay provided for a judge of the 
court. Such pay shall be in lieu of retired pay and in lieu of an an- 
nuity under section 945 of this title (Article 145), subchapter I11 
of chapter 83 or subchapter I1 of chapter 84 of title 5, or any other 
retirement system for employees of the Federal Government. 
(3)  A senior  judge, while performing duties referred to in para- 
graph (2), shall be provided with such office space and staff assis- 
tance as the chiefjudge considers appropriate and shall be entitled 
to the per diem, travel allowances, and other allowances provided 
for judges of the court. 
(4)  A senior judge shall be considered to be an officer or em- 
ployee of the United States with respect to his status as a senior 
judge, but only during periods the senior judge is performing du- 
ties referred to in paragraph  (2). For the purposes of section 205 
of title 18, a senior judge shall be considered to be a special Gov- 
ernment employee during such periods. Any provision of law that 
prohibits or limits the political or business activities of an em- 
ployee of the United States shall apply to a senior judge only dur- 
ing such periods. 
(5) The court shall prescribe rules for the use and conduct of 
senior judges of the court. The chiefjudge of the court shall trans- 
mit such rules, and any amendments to such rules, to the Com- 
mittees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Repre- 
sentatives not later than 15 days after the issuance of such rules or 
amendments, as the case may be. 
(6)  For purposes of subchapter I11 of chapter 83 of title 5 (re- 
lating to the Civil Service Retirement and Disability System) and 
chapter 84 of such title (relating to the Federal Employees' Re- 
tirement System) and for purposes of any other Federal Govern- 
ment retirement system for employees of the Federal Govern- 
ment-
(A) a period during which a senior judge performs duties re- 
ferred to in paragraph  (1) shall not be considered creditable ser- 
vice; 
(B) no amount shall be withheld from the pay of a senior 
judge as a retirement contribution under section 8334, 8343, 
8422, or 8432 of title 5 or under other such retirement system for 
any period during which the senior judge performs duties referred 
to in paragraph (1); 
(C) no contribution shall be made by the Federal Govern- 
ment to any retirement system with respect to a senior judge for 
any period during which the senior judge performs duties referred 
to in paragraph (1); and 
(D) a senior judge shall not be considered to be a reem- 
ployed annuitant for any period during which the senior judge 
performs duties referred to in paragraph (1). 
(f)  Service of article I11judges. 
(1) The Chief Justice of the United States, upon the request of 
the chief judge of the court, may designate a judge of a United 
States court of appeals or of a United States district court to per- 
form the duties of judge of the United States Court of Military 
Appeals-
(A) during a period a judge of the court is unable to perform 
his duties because of illness or other disability; or 
(B) in any case in which a judge of the court recuses himself; 
or 
(C)  during a period when there is a vacancy on the court and 
in the opinion of the chiefjudge of the court such a designation is 
necessary for the proper dispatch of the business of the court. 
(2) The chiefjudge of the court may not request that a designa- 
tion be made under paragraph (1) unless the chiefjudge has deter- 
mined that no person is available to perform judicial duties with 
the court as a senior judge under subsection (e). 
(3)  A designation under paragraph (1) may be made only with 
the consent of the designated judge and the concurrence of the 
chiefjudge of the court of appeals or district court concerned. 
(4)  Per diem, travel allowances, and other allowances paid to 
the designated judge in connection with the performance of duties UNIFORM CODE OF : MILITARY JUSTICE  5 945. Art. 145.(c) 
for the court shall be paid from funds available for the payment of 
per diem and such allowances for judges of the court. 
(g)  Effect of vacancy on court. A vacancy on the court does not 
impair the right of the remaining judges to exercise the powers of 
the court. 
8 943. Art. 143. Organization and employees 
(a)  Chiefjudge. --(I) The chief judge of the United States Court 
of Military Appeals shall be the judge of the court in regular ac- 
tive service who is senior in commission among the judges of the 
court who- 
(A) have served for one or more years as judges of the court; 
and 
(B) have not previously served as chief judge. 
(2) In any case in which there is no  judge of the court in regular 
active service who has served as a judge of the court for at least 
one year, the  judge of the court in regular active service who is se- 
nior in commission and has not served previously as chief judge 
shall act as the chief judge. 
(3) Except as provided in  paragraph (4), a judge of the court 
shall serve as the chiefjudge under paragraph (1) for a term of five 
years. If no other judge is eligible under paragraph (1) to serve as 
chiefjudge upon the expiration of that term, the chief judge shall 
continue to serve as chiefjudge until another judge becomes eligi- 
ble under that paragraph to serve as chief judge. 
(4)(A) The term of a chief judge shall be terminated before the 
end of five years if- 
(i) The chief judge leaves regular active service as a judge of 
the court; or 
(ii) The chief judge notifies the other judges of the court in 
writing that such judge desires to be relieved of his duties as chief 
judge. 
(B) The effective date of a termination of the term under sub- 
paragraph (A) shall be the date on which the chief judge leaves 
regular active service or the date of the notification under subpar- 
agraph (A)@), as the case may be. 
(5) If a chief judge,is temporarily unable to perform his duties 
as a chief judge, the duties shall be performed by the judge of the 
court in active service who is present, able and qualified to act, 
and is next in precedence. 
(b)  Precedence of judges.  The chief judge of the court shall have 
precedence and preside at any session that he attends. The other 
judges shall have precedence and preside according to the senior- 
ity of their original commissions. Judges whose commissions  bear 
the same date shall have precedence according to seniority in age. 
(c)  Status of attorney positions. 
(1)  Attorney positions of employment under the Court of Mili- 
tary Appeals are excepted from the competitive service. Appoint- 
ments to such positions shall be made by  the court, without the 
concurrence of any other officer or employee of the executive 
branch, in the same manner as appointments are made to other 
executive branch positions of a confidential or policy-determining 
character for which it is not practicable to examine or to hold a 
competitive examination. Such positions shall not be counted as 
positions of that character for purposes of any limitation on the 
number of positions of that character provided in law. 
(2) In making appointments to the positions described in para- 
graph (I), preference shall be given, among equally qualified per- 
sons, to persons who are preference eligibles (as defined in section 
2108(3) of title 5). 
8 944. Art. 144. Procedure 
The United States Court of Military Appeals may prescribe its 
rules of procedure and may determine the number of judges re- 
quired to constitute a quorum. 
8 945. Art. 145. Annuities for judges and survivors 
(a)  Retirement annuities forjudges. 
(1) A person who has completed a term of service for which he 
was appointed as a judge of the United States Court of Military 
Appeals is eligible for an annuity under this section upon separa- 
tion from civilian service in the Federal Government. A person 
who continues service with the court as a senior judge under sec- 
tion 943(e)(l)(B) of this title (art. 143(e)(l)(B)) upon the expira- 
tion of the judge's term shall be considered to have been separated 
from civilian service in the Federal Government only upon the 
termination of that continuous service. 
(2) A person who is eligible for any annuity under this section 
shall be paid that annuity if, at the time he becomes eligible to re- 
ceive that annuity, he elects to receive that annuity in lieu of any 
other annuity for which he may be eligible at the time of such 
election (whether an immediate or a deferred annuity) under sub- 
chapter I11 of chapter 83 or subchapter I1 of chapter 84 of title 5 
or any other retirement system for civilian employees of the Fed- 
eral Government. Such an election may not be revoked. 
(3)(A) The Secretary of Defense shall notify the Director of 
the Office of Personnel Management whenever an election under 
paragraph (2) is made affecting any right or interest under sub- 
chapter I11 of chapter 83 or subchapter 11 of chapter 85 of title 5 
based on service as a judge of the United States Court of Military 
Appeals. 
(B) Upon receiving any notification under subparagraph 
(A) in the case of a person making an election under (2), the Di- 
rector shall determine the amount of the person's lump-sum 
credit under subchapter 11  1 of chapter 83 or subchapter I1 of 
chapter 84 of title 5, as applicable, and shall request the Secretary 
of the Treasury to transfer such amount from the Civil Service 
Retirement and Disability Fund to the Department of Defense 
Military Retirement Fund. The Secretary of the Treasury shall 
make any transfer so requested. 
(C) In determining the amount of a lump-sum credit under 
section 8331(8) of title 5 for purposes of this paragraph -
(i)  interest shall be computed using the rates under sec- 
tion 8334(e)(3) of such title; and 
(ii) the completion of 5 years of civilian service (or 
longer) shall not be a basis for excluding interest. 
@)  Amount of annuity. The annuity payable under this section to 
a person who makes an election under subsection (a)(2) is 80 per- 
cent of the rate of pay for a judge in active service on the United 
States Court of Military Appeals as of the date on which the per- 
son is separated from civilian service. 
(c) Relation  to thrift savings plan.  Nothing in this section affects 
any right of any person to participate in the thrift savings plan 
under section 8351 of title 5 of subchapter 111 of chapter 84 of 
such title. 5 945. Art. 145.(d)  APPE 
(d)  Survivor annuities. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe 
by regulation a program to provide annuities for survivors and 
former spouses of persons receiving annuities under this section 
by reason of elections made by such persons under subsection 
(a)(2).  That program shall, to the maximum extent practicable, 
provide benefits and establish terms and conditions that are simi- 
lar to those provided under survivor and former spouse annuity 
programs under other retirement systems for civilian employees 
of the Federal Government. The  program may include provisions 
for the reduction in the annuity paid the person as a condition for 
the survivor annuity. An election by a judge (including a senior 
judge) or former judge to receive an annuity under this section 
terminates any right or interest which any other individual may 
have to a survivor annuity under any other retirement system for 
civilian employees of the Federal Government based on the ser- 
vice of that judge or former judge as a civilian officer or employee 
of the Federal Government (except with respect to an election 
under subsection (g)(l)(B)). 
(e)  Cost-of-living increases. The Secretary of Defense shall peri- 
odically increase annuities and survivor annuities paid under this 
section in order to take account of changes in the cost of living. 
The Secretary shall prescribe by regulation procedures for in- 
creases in annuities under this section. Such system shall, to the 
maximum extent appropriate, provide cost-of-living adjustments 
that are similar to those that are provided under other retirement 
systems for civilian employees of the Federal Government. 
(f)  Dual compensation. A person who is receiving an annuity 
under this section by reason of service as a judge of the court and 
who is appointed to a position in the Federal Government shall, 
during the period of such person's service in such position, be en- 
titled to receive only the annuity under this section or the pay for 
that position, whichever is higher. 
(g)  Election ofjudicial retirement benefits. 
(1)  A person who is receiving an annuity under this section by 
reason of service as a judge of the  court and who later is appointed 
as a justice or  judge of the United States to hold office during  good 
behavior and who retires from that office, or from regular active 
service in that office, shall be paid either -
(A)  the annuity under this section, or 
(B)  the annuity or salary to which he is entitled by reason of 
his service as such a justice or  judge of the United States, as deter- 
mined by an election by that person at the time of his retirement 
from the office, or from regular active service in the office, of jus- 
tice or judge of the United States. Such an election may not be re- 
voked. 
(2)  An election by a person to be paid an annuity or salary pur- 
suant to paragraph (l)(B) terminates (A) any election previously 
made by such person to provide a survivor annuity pursuant to 
subsection (d), and (B) any right of any other individual to receive 
a survivor annuity pursuant to subsection (d) on the basis of the 
service of that person. 
(h)  Source ofpayment of annuities. Annuities and survivor annui- 
ties paid under this section shall be paid out of the Department of 
Defense Military Retirement Fund. 
(i)  Eligibility to elect between retirement systems. -(I)  This sub- 
section applies with respect to any person who- 
(A) prior to being appointed as a judge of the United States 
Court of Military Appeals, performed civilian service of a type 
making such person subject to the Civil Service Retirement Sys- 
tem; and 
(B) would be eligible to make an election under section 
301(a)(2)  of the Federal Employees'  Retirement System Act of 
1986, by virtue of being appointed as such a judge, but for the fact 
that such person has not had a break in service of a sufficient du- 
ration to be considered someone who is being reemployed by  the 
Federal Government. 
(2) Any person with respect to whom this subsection applies 
shall be eligible to make an election under section 301(a)(2) of the 
Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of  1986 to the same 
extent and in the same manner (including subject to the condition 
set forth in section 301(d) of such Act) as if such person's  appoint- 
ment constituted reemployment with the Federal Government. 
(Added Pub.L. 101-189,  Div. A, Title XIII, 5 1301(c), Nov. 29, 
1989, 103 Stat. 1572, and amended Pub.L. 102-190,  Div. A, Title 
X, 9 1061(b)(l)(C), Dec. 5, 1991, 105 Stat. 1474; Pub.L. 102-484, 
Div. A, Title X, 99 1052(1 l), 1062(a)(l), Oct. 23, 1992, 106 Stat. 
2499, 2504.) 
5 946. Art. 146. Code committee 
(a) Annual survey. A committee shall meet at least annually and 
shall make an annual comprehensive survey of the operation of 
this chapter. 
(b)  Composition of committee. The committee shall consist of- 
(1)  the  judges of the United States Court of Military Appeals; 
(2)  the Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force, the Chief Counsel of the Coast Guard, and the Staff Judge 
Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and 
(3)  two members of the public appointed by the Secretary of 
Defense. 
(c)  Reports. 
(1)  After each such survey, the committee shall submit a re- 
port-
(A)  to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and 
House of Representatives; and 
(B)  to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the mili- 
tary departments, and the Secretary of Transportation. 
(2)  Each report under paragraph (1) shall include the follow- 
ing: 
(A)  Information on the number and status of pending cases. 
(B)  Any recommendation of the committee relating to- 
(i)  uniformity of policies as to sentences; 
(ii)  amendments to this chapter; and 
(iii)  any other matter the committee considers appro- 
priate. 
(d)  Qualifications and  terms of appointed members. Each mem- 
ber of the committee appointed by the Secretary of Defense under 
subsection (b)(3) shall be a recognized authority in military jus- 
tice or criminal law. Each such member shall be appointed for a 
term of three years. 
(e)  Applicability of Federal Advisory  Committee Act. The Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C.App.  1) shall not apply to the 
committee. -  - 
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Department of Defense 
DIRECTIVE 
January 22, 1985 
NUMBER 5525.7 
GC/IG, DoD 
SUBJECT: 
Implementation of the Memorandum of Under- 
standing Between the Department of Justice and the 
Department of Defense Relating to the Investigation 
and Prosecution of Certain Crimes 
References: 
(a) DoD Directive  1355.1, "Relationships  with 
the Department of Justice on Grants of Immunity 
and the Investigation and Prosecution of Certain 
Crimes," July 21, 198  1 (hereby canceled) 
(b) Memorandum of Understanding Between the 
Department Relating to the Investigation and Pros- 
ecution of Certain Crimes, August 1984 
(c) Title 18, United State Code 
(d) Title 10, United States Code, Sections 801-940 
(Articles 1-140), "Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ)" 
(e) Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 
1984 (R.C.M. 704) 
A. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE 
This Directive reissues reference (a), updates pol- 
icy and procedures, assigns responsibilities, and im- 
plements the 1984 Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) between the Department of Justice (DoJ) 
and the Department of Defense (DoD). 
6.APPLICABILITY 
This Directive applies to the Office of the Secre- 
tary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Of- 
fice of Inspector General, DoD, the Organization of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Agencies, and 
Unified and Specified Commands (hereafter referred 
to collectively as "DoD  Components").  The 
term6'DoD  criminal investigative organizations," as 
used herein, refers collectively to the United States 
Army  Criminal  Investigation  Command 
(USACIDC); Naval Investigative Service (NIS); 
U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations 
(AFOSI), and Defense Criminal Investigative Ser- 
vice (DCIS), Office of the Inspector General, DoD. 
C. POLICY 
It is DoD policy to maintain effective working re- 
lationships with the DoJ in the investigation and 
prosecution of crimes involving the programs, oper- 
ations, or personnel of the Department of Defense. 
D. PROCEDURES 
With respect to inquiries for which the DoJ has 
assumed investigative responsibility based on the 
MOU, DoD investigative agencies should seek to 
participate jointly with DoJ investigative agencies 
whenever the inquiries relate to the programs, oper- 
ations, or personnel of the Department of Defense. 
This applies to cases referred to the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) under paragraph C. 1.a. of the 
attached MOU (see enclosure 1) as well as to those 
cases for which a DoJ investigative agency is as- 
signed primary investigative responsibility by a DoJ 
prosecutor. DoD components shall comply with the 
terms of the MOU and DoD Supplemental Gui- 
dance (see enclosure 1). 
E. RESPONSIBILITIES 
1. The inspector General, Department of  Defense 
(IG, DoD), shall: 
a. Establish procedures to implement the inves- 
tigative policies set forth in this Directive. 
b. Monitor compliance by DoD criminal inves- 
tigative organizations to the terms of the MOU. 
c. Provide specific guidance regarding investi- 
gative matters, as appropriate. 
2. The General Counsel, Department of  Defense, 
shall: 
a. Establish procedures to implement the 
prosecutive policies set forth in this Directive. 
b. Monitor compliance by the DoD Compo- 
nents regarding the prosecutive aspects of the MOU. 
c. Provide specific guidance, as appropriate. 
d. Modify the DoD Supplemental Guidance at 
enclosure 1, with the concurrence of the IG, DoD, 
after requesting comments from affected DoD Com- 
ponents. 
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3. The Secretaries of  the Military Departments 
shall establish procedures to implement the policies 
set forth in this Directive. 
F. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION 
This Directive is effective immediately. The Mili- 
tary Departments shall forward two copies of imple- 
menting documents to the Inspector General, De- 
partment of  Defense, within 90 days. Other DoD 
Components shall disseminate this Directive to ap- 
propriate personnel. 
Signed by William H. Taft, IV 
Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Enclosure-1 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the De- 
partments of Justice And Defense Relating to the 
Investigation and Prosecution of Certain Crimes 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS OF JUSTICE 
AND DEFENSE 
This enclosure contains the verbatim text of the 
1984 Memorandum of  Understanding Between the 
Departments of Justice and Defense Relating to the 
Investigation and Prosecution of Certain Crimes 
(reference (b)). Matter that is identified as "DoD 
Supplemental Guidance" has been added by the De- 
partment of  Defense. DoD Components shall com- 
ply with the MOU and the DoD Supplemental Gui- 
dance. 
MEMORANDUM OR UNDERSTANDING 
BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS OF 
JUSTICE AND DEFENSE RELATING TO 
THE INVESTIGATION AND 
PROSECUTION OF CERTAIN CRIMES 
A.  PURPOSE, SCOPE AND AUTHORITY 
This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) estab- 
lishes policy for the Department of Justice and the 
Department of Defense with regard to the investiga- 
tion and prosecution of criminal matters over which 
the two Departments have jurisdiction. This memo- 
randum is not intended to confer any rights, benefits, 
privileges or form of due process procedure upon in- 
dividuals, associations, corporations or other per- 
sons or entities. 
This Memorandum applies to all components and 
personnel of  the Department of Justice and the De- 
partment of Defense. The statutory bases for the De- 
partment of Defense and the Department of Justice 
investigation and prosecution responsibilities in- 
clude, but are not limited to: 
1.  Department of Justice: Titles 18,21 and 28 of the 
United States Code; and 
2.  Department of Defense: The Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, Title 10, United States Code, Sec- 
tions 801-940; the Inspector General Act of  1978, 
Title 5 United States Code, Appendix 3; and Title 5 
United States Code, Section 30 1. 
B.  POLICY 
The Department of Justice has primary responsibil- 
ity for enforcement of  federal laws in the United 
States District Courts. The Department of Defense 
has responsibility for the integrity of its programs, 
operations and installations and for the discipline of 
the Armed Forces. Prompt administrative actions 
and completion of investigations within the two (2) 
year statute of limitations under the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice require the Department of De- 
fense to assume an important role in federal criminal 
investigations. To encourage joint and coordinated 
investigative efforts, in appropriate cases where the 
Department of Justice assumes investigative respon- 
sibility for a matter relating to the Department of 
Defense, it should share information and conduct 
the inquiry jointly with the interested Department of 
Defense investigative agency. 
It is neither feasible nor desirable to establish in- 
flexible rules regarding the responsibilities of the De- 
partment of  Defense and the Department of Justice 
as to each matter over which they may have concur- 
rent interest. Informal arrangements and agree- 
ments within the spirit of this MOU are permissible 
with respect to specific crimes or investigations. 
C.  INVESTIGATIVE AND PROSECUTIVE 
JURISDICTION 
1. CRIMES ARISING FROM THE DEPART- 
MENT OF DEFENSE OPERATIONS 
a.  Corruption Involving the Department of  De- 
fense Personnel The Department of Defense investigative agencies 
will refer to the FBI on receipt all significant allega- 
tions of bribery and conflict of interest involving mil- 
itary or civilian personnel of the Department of De- 
fense. In all corruption matters the subject of a 
referral to the FBI, the Department of Defense shall 
obtain the concurrence of the Department of Justice 
prosecutor or the FBI before initiating any indepen- 
dent investigation preliminary to any action under 
the Uniform code of Military Justice. If the Depart- 
ment of Defense is not satisfied with the initial deter- 
mination, the matter will be reviewed by the Crimi- 
nal Division of the Department of Justice. 
The FBI will notify the referring agency promptly 
regarding whether they accept the referred matters 
for investigation. The FBI will attempt to make such 
decision in one (1) working day of receipt in such 
matters. 
DoD Supplemental Guidance 
A. Certain bribery and conflict of interest allega- 
tions (also referred to as 66corruption,, offensesin the 
MOU) are to be referred immediately to the FBI. 
B. For the purposes of this section, bribery and 
conflict of interest allegations are those which 
would, if proven, violate  18 U.S.C., Sections 201, 
203, 205,208, 209, or 219 (reference (c)).  .  .  . ,, 
C. Under paragraph C. l.a., DoD criminal investi- 
gative organizations shall refer to the FBI those 
"significant" allegations of bribery and conflict of in- 
terest that implicate directly military or civilian per- 
sonnel of the Department of Defense, including alle- 
gations of bribery or conflict of  interest that arise 
during the course of an ongoing investigation. 
1. All bribery and conflict of interest allegations 
against present, retired, or former General or Flag 
officers and civilians in grade GS-16 and above, the 
Senior Executive Service and the Executive Level 
will be considered"significant" for purposes of refer- 
ral to the FBI. 
2. In cases not covered by subsection C. 1  ., above, 
the determination of whether the matter is "signifi- 
cant" for purposes of referral to the FBI should be 
made in light of the following factors: sensitivity of 
the DoD program, involved, amount of money in 
the alleged bribe, number of DoD personnel impli- 
cated, impact on the affected DoD program, and 
with respect to military personnel, whether the mat- 
ter normally would be handled under the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (reference (d)). Bribery and 
conflicts of interest allegations warranting consider- 
ation of Federal prosecution, which were not re- 
ferred to the FBI based on the application of these 
guidelines and not otherwise disposed of under ref- 
erence (d), will be developed and brought to the at- 
tention of the Department of Justice through the 
"conference"  mechanism described in paragraph 
C.1.b. of the MOU (reference (b)). 
D. Bribery and conflict of interest allegations 
when military or DoD civilian personnel are not 
subjects of the investigation are not covered by the 
referral requirement of paragraph C. 1  .a of reference 
(b). Matters in which the suspects are solely DoD 
contractors and their subcontractors, such as com- 
mercial bribery between a DoD subcontractor and a 
DoD prime contractor, do not require referral upon 
receipt to the FBI. The "conference" procedure de- 
scribed in paragraph C. 1.b. of reference (b) shall be 
used in these types of cases. 
E. Bribery and conflict of interest allegations that 
arise from events occurring outside the United 
States, its territories, and possessions, and requiring 
investigation outside the United States, its territo- 
ries, and possessions need not be referred to the FBI. 
b.  Frauds Against the Department of Defense 
and Theft and Embezzlement of Government Prop- 
erty 
The Department of Justice and the Department of 
Defense have investigative responsibility for frauds 
against the Department of Defense and theft and 
embezzlement of Government property from the 
Department of Defense. The Department of Defense 
will investigate frauds against the Department of 
Defense and theft of government property from the 
Department of Defense. Whenever a Department of 
Defense investigative agency identifies a matter 
which, if developed by investigation, would warrant 
federal prosecution, it will confer .with the United 
States Attorney or the Criminal Division, the De- 
partment of Justice, and the FBI field office. At the 
time of this initial conference, criminal investigative 
responsibility will be determined by the Department 
of Justice in consultation with the Department of 
Defense. 
DoD Supplemental Guidance 
A. Unlike paragraph C. 1.a. of the MOU (refer- 
ence (b)), paragraph C.1.b. does not have an auto- APPENDIX 3 
matic referral requirement. Under paragraph C. 1  .b., 
DoD criminal investigative organizations shall con- 
fer with the appropriate federal prosecutor and the 
FBI on matters which, if developed by investigation, 
would warrant Federal prosecution. This "confer- 
ence" serves to define the respective roles of DoD 
criminal investigative organizations and the FBI on 
a case-by-case  basis. Generally, when a conference is 
warranted, the DoD criminal investigative organiza- 
tion shall arrange to meet with the prosecutor and 
shall provide notice to the FBI that such meeting is 
being held. Separate conferences with both the pros- 
ecutor and the FBI normally are not necessary. 
B. When investigations are brought to the atten- 
tion of the Defense Procurement Fraud Unit 
(DPFU), such contact will satisfy the "conference" 
requirements of paragraph C. 1.b. (reference (b)) as 
to both the prosecutor and the FBI. 
C. Mere receipt by DoD criminal investigative or- 
ganizations of raw allegations of fraud or theft does 
not require conferences with the DoJ and the FBI. 
Sufficient evidence should be developed before the 
conference to allow the prosecutor to make an in- 
formed judgment  as to the merits of a case depen- 
dent upon further investigation.  However, DoD 
criminal investigative organizations should avoid 
delay in scheduling such conferences, particularly in 
complex fraud cases, because an early judgment by a 
prosecutor can be of assistance in focusing the inves- 
tigation on those matters that most likely will result 
in criminal prosecution. 
2.  CRIMES COMMITTED ON MILITARY IN- 
STALLATIONS 
a.  Subject(s) can be Tried by Court-Martial or are 
Unknown 
Crimes (other than those covered by paragraph 
C.1.) committed on a military installation will be in- 
vestigated by  the Department of Defense investiga- 
tive agency concerned and, when committed by a 
person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Jus- 
tice, prosecuted by  the Military Department con- 
cerned. The Department of Defense will provide im- 
mediate notice to the Department of Justice of 
significant cases in which an individual subject/vic- 
tim is other than a military member or dependent 
thereof. 
b.  One or More Subjects cannot be Tried by 
Court-Martial 
When a crime (other than those covered by para- 
graph C.  1.)  has occurred on a military installation 
and there is reasonable basis to believe that it has 
been committed by a person or persons, some or all 
of whom are not subject to the Uniform Code of Mil- 
itary Justice, the Department of Defense investiga- 
tive agency will provide immediate notice of the 
matter to the appropriate Department of Justice in- 
vestigative agency unless the Department of Justice 
has relieved the Department of Defense of the re- 
porting requirement for that type or class of crime. 
DoD Supplemental Guidance 
A. Subsection C.2. of the MOU (reference (b)) ad-
dresses crimes committed on a military installation 
other than those listed in paragraphs C. 1  .a. (bribery 
and conflict of interest) and C. 1  .b. (fraud, theft, and 
embezzlement against the Government). 
B. Unlike paragraph C. 1  .a. of reference (b), which 
requires "referral"  to the FBI of certain cases, and 
paragraph C. 1  .b., which requires"conferences"  with 
respect to certain cases, subsection C.2. requires 
only that "notice"  be given to DoJ of certain cases. 
Relief from the reporting requirement of subsection 
C.2. may be granted by the local U.S. attorney as to 
types or classes of cases. 
C. For purposes of  paragraph C.2.a.  (when the 
subjects can be tried by court-martial or are un- 
known), an allegation is "significant" for purposes of 
required notice to the DoJ only if the offense falls 
within the prosecutorial guidelines of the local U.S. 
attorney. Notice should be given in other cases when 
the DoD Component believes that Federal prosecu- 
tion is warranted or otherwise determines that the 
case may attract significant public attention. 
3. CRIMES COMMITTED OUTSIDE MILI- 
TARY INSTALLATIONS BY PERSONS WHO 
CAN BE TRIED BY COURT-MARTIAL 
a. Offense is Normally Tried by Court-Martial 
Crimes (other than those covered by paragraph 
C.1.) committed outside a military installation by 
persons subject to the Uniform Code of Military Jus- 
tice which, normally, are tried by court-martial will 
be investigated and prosecuted by the Department 
of Defense. The Department of Defense will provide 
immediate notice of significant cases to the appropri- 
ate Department of Justice investigative agency. The 
Department of Defense will provide immediate no- 
tice in all cases where one or more subjects is not MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS  OF JUSTICE AND DEFENSE 
under military jurisdiction unless the Department of 
Justice has relieved the Department of Defense of 
the reporting requirement for that type or class of 
crime. 
DoD Supplemental Guidance 
For purposes of this paragraph, an allegation is 
"significant"  for purposes of required notice to the 
DoJ only if the offense falls within prosecutorial 
guidelines of the local U.S. attorney. Notice should 
be given in other cases when the DoD Component 
believes that Federal prosecution is warranted, or 
otherwise determines that the case may attract sig- 
nificant public attention. 
b.  Crimes Related to Scheduled Military Activi- 
ties 
Crimes related to scheduled Military activities 
outside of a military installation, such as organized 
maneuvers in which persons subject to the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice are suspects, shall be 
treated as if committed on a military installation for 
purposes of this Memorandum. The FBI or other 
Department of Justice investigative agency may as- 
sume jurisdiction  with the concurrence of the 
United States Attorney or the Criminal Division, 
Department of Justice. 
c.  Offense is not Normally Tried by Court-Mar- 
'tial 
When there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
a Federal crime (other than those covered by para- 
graph C.1.) normally not tried by court-martial, has 
been committed outside a military installation by a 
person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Jus- 
tice, the Department of Defense investigative agency 
will immediately refer the case to the appropriate 
Department of Justice investigative agency unless 
the Department of Justice has relieved the Depart- 
ment of Defense of the reporting requirement for 
that type or class of crime. 
D.  REFERRALS AND INVESTIGATIVE 
ASSISTANCE 
1.  REFERRALS 
Referrals, notices, reports, requests and the gen- 
eral transfer of information under this Memoran- 
dum normally should be between the FBI or other 
Department of Justice investigative agency and the 
appropriate Department of Defense investigative 
agency at the field level. 
If a Department of Justice investigative agency 
does not accept a referred matter and the referring 
Department of Defense investigative agency then, or 
subsequently, believes that evidence exists support- 
ing prosecution before civilian courts, the Depart- 
ment of Defense agency may present the case to the 
United States Attorney or the Criminal Division, 
Department of Justice, for review. 
2.  INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE 
In cases where a Department of Defense or De- 
partment of Justice investigative agency has primary 
responsibility and it requires limited assistance to 
pursue outstanding leads, the investigative agency 
requiring assistance will promptly advise the appro- 
priate investigative agency in the other Department 
and, to the extent authorized by law and regulations, 
the requested assistance should be provided without 
assuming responsibility for the investigation. 
E.  PROSECUTION  OF CASES 
1. With the concurrence of the Department of De- 
fense, the Department of Justice will designate such 
Department of Defense attorneys as it deems desira- 
ble to be Special Assistant United States Attorneys 
for use where the effective prosecution of cases may 
be facilitated by the Department of Defense attor- 
neys. 
2.  The Department of Justice will institute civil ac- 
tions expeditiously in United States District Courts 
whenever appropriate to recover monies lost as a re- 
sult of crimes against the Department of Defense; 
the Department of Defense will provide appropriate 
assistance to facilitate such actions. 
3.  The Department of Justice prosecutors will so- 
licit the views of the Department of Defense prior to 
initiating action against an individual subject to the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
4.  The Department of Justice will solicit the views 
of the Department of Defense with regard to its De- 
partment of Defense-related cases and investigations 
in order to effectively coordinate the use of civil, 
criminal and administrative remedies. 
DoD Supplemental Guidance 
Prosecution of Cases and Grants of Immunity 
A. The authority of court-martial convening au- 
thorities to refer cases to trial, approve pretrial 
agreements, and issue grants of immunity under the 
UCMJ (reference (d)) extends only to trials by APPENDIX 3 
court-martial. In order to ensure that such actions 
do not preclude appropriate action by Federal civil- 
ian authorities in cases likely to be prosecuted in the 
U.S. district courts, court-martial convening author- 
ities shall ensure that appropriate consultation as re- 
quired by this enclosure has taken place before trial 
by court-martial, approval of a pretrial agreement, 
or issuance of a grant of immunity in cases when 
such consultation is required. 
B. Only a general court-martial convening au- 
thority may grant immunity under the UCMJ (refer- 
ence (d)), and may do so only in accordance with 
R.C.M. 704 (reference (e)). 
1. Under reference (d), there are two types of im- 
munity in the military justice system: 
a.  A person may be granted transactional im- 
munity from trial by court-martial for one or more 
offenses under reference (d). 
b.  A person may be granted testimonial immu- 
nity, which is immunity from the use of testimony, 
statements, and any information directly or indi- 
rectly derived from such testimony or statements by 
that person in a later court-martial. 
2.  Before a grant of immunity under reference 
(d), the general court-martial convening authority 
shall ensure that there has been appropriate consul- 
tation with the DoJ with respect to offenses in which 
consultation is required by this enclosure. 
3.  A proposed grant of immunity in a case involv- 
ing espionage, subversion, aiding the enemy, sabo- 
tage, spying, or violation  of rules or statutes con- 
cerning classified information or the foreign 
relations of the United States shall be forwarded to 
the General Counsel of the Department of Defense 
for the purpose of consultation with the DoJ. The 
General Counsel shall obtain the views of other ap- 
propriate elements of the Department of Defense in 
furtherance of such consultation. 
C. The authority of court-martial convening au- 
thorities extends only to grants of immunity from 
action under reference (d). Only the Attorney Gen- 
eral or other authority designated under 18 U.S.C. 
Secs. 6001-6005 (reference (c)) may authorize action 
to obtain a grant of immunity with respect to trials 
in the U.S. district courts. 
F.  MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS 
1. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AD- 
MINISTRATIVE ACTIONS 
Nothing in this Memorandum limits the Depart- 
ment of Defense investigations conducted in support 
of administrative actions to be taken by the Depart- 
ment of Defense. However, the Department of De- 
fense investigative agencies will coordinate all such 
investigations with the appropriate Department of 
Justice prosecutive agency and obtain the concur- 
rence of the Department of Justice prosecutor or the 
Department of Justice investigative agency prior to 
conducting any administrative investigation during 
the pendency of the criminal investigation or prose- 
cution. 
2.  SPECIAL UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY 
JUSTICE FACTORS 
In situations where an individual subject to the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice is a suspect in any 
crime for which a Department of Justice investiga- 
tive agency has assumed jurisdiction,  if a Depart- 
ment of Defense investigative agency believes that 
the crime involves special factors relating to the ad- 
ministration and discipline of the Armed Forces that 
would justify  its investigation, the Department of 
Defense investigative agency will advise the appro- 
priate Department of Justice investigative agency or 
the Department of Justice prosecuting authorities of 
these factors. Investigation of such a crime may be 
undertaken by the appropriate Department of De- 
fense investigative agency with the concurrence of 
the Department of Justice. 
3.  ORGANIZED CRIME 
The Department of Defense investigative agencies 
will provide to the FBI all information collected 
during the normal course of agency operations per- 
taining to the element generally known as "organ- 
ized crime"  including both traditional (La Cosa 
Nostra) and nontraditional organizations whether 
or not the matter is considered prosecutable. The 
FBI should be notified of any investigation involving 
any element of organized crime and may assume ju- 
risdiction of the same. 
4.  DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE NOTIFICA- 
TIONS TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN- 
VESTIGATIVE AGENCIES 
a. The Department of Justice investigative agen- 
cies will promptly notify the appropriate Depart- 
ment of Defense investigative agency of the initia- 
tion  of  the Department of  Defense related 
investigations which are predicated on other than a 
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instances where notification might endanger agents 
or adversely affect the investigation. The Depart- 
ment of Justice investigative agencies will also notify 
the Department of Defense of dl  allegations of the 
Department of Defense related crime where investi- 
gation is not initiated by the Department of Justice. 
b.  Upon request, the Department of Justice inves- 
tigative agencies will provide timely status reports 
on all investigations relating to the Department of 
Defense unless the circumstances indicate such re- 
porting would be inappropriate. 
c.  The Department of Justice investigative agen- 
cies will promptly furnish investigative results at the 
conclusion of an investigation and advise as to the 
nature of judicial  action, if any, taken or contem- 
plated. 
d. If judicial  or administrative action is being 
considered by  the Department of Defense, the De- 
partment of Justice will, upon written request, pro- 
vide existing detailed investigative data and docu- 
ments (less any federal grand jury  material, 
disclosure of  which would be prohibited by  Rule 
6(e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure), as well 
as agent testimony for use in judicial or administra- 
tive proceedings, consistent with Department of Jus- 
tice and other federal regulations. The ultimate use 
of the information shall be subject to the concur- 
rence of the federal prosecutor during the pendency 
of any related investigation or prosecution. 
5. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
a.  The Department of Justice will provide to the 
Department of Defense all technical services nor- 
mally available to federal investigative agencies. 
b.  The Department of Defense will provide assis- 
tance to the Department of Justice in matters not re- 
lating to the Department of Defense as permitted by 
law and implementing regulations. 
6.  JOINT INVESTIGATIONS 
a. To the extent authorized by law, the Depart- 
ment of Justice investigative agencies and the De- 
partment of Defense investigative agencies may 
agree to enter into joint investigative endeavors, in- 
cluding undercover operations, in appropriate cir- 
cumstances. However, all such investigations will be 
subject to Department of Justice guidelines. 
b.  The Department of Defense, in the conduct of 
any investigation that might lead to prosecution in 
Federal District Court, will conduct the investiga- 
tion consistent  with any Department of Justice 
guidelines. The Department of Justice shall provide 
copies of all relevant guidelines and their revisions. 
DoD Supplemental Guidance 
When DoD procedures concerning apprehension, 
search and seizure, interrogation, eyewitnesses, or 
identification differ from those of DoJ, DoD proce- 
dures will be used, unless the DoJ prosecutor has di- 
rected that DoJ procedures be used instead. DoD 
criminal investigators should bring to the attention 
of the DoJ prosecutor, as appropriate, situations 
when use of DoJ procedures might impede or pre- 
clude prosecution under the UCMJ (reference (d)). 
7.  APPREHENSION OF  SUSPECTS 
To the extent authorized by law, the Department 
of Justice and the Department of Defense will each 
promptly deliver or make available to the other sus- 
pects, accused individuals and witnesses where au- 
thority to investigate the crimes involved is lodged in 
the other Department. This MOU neither expands 
nor limits the authority of either Department to per- 
form apprehensions, searches, seizures, or custodial 
interrogations. 
G. EXCEPTION 
This Memorandum shall not affect the investiga- 
tive authority now fixed by the 1979 "Agreement 
Governing the Conduct of the Defense Department 
Counter intelligence Activities in Conjunction with 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation"  and the 1983 
Memorandum of Understanding between the De- 
partment of Defense, the Department of Justice and 
the FBI concerning "Use of Federal Military Force 
in Domestic Terrorist Incidents." APPENDIX 3.1 

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS OF JUS- 

TICE AND TRANSPORTATION (COAST GUARD) RELATING TO THE INVESTI- 

GATIONS AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMES OVER WHICH THE TWO DEPART- 

MENTS HAVE CONCURRENT JURISDICTION. 

Whereas, certain crimes committed by Coast Guard 
personnel subject to the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice may be prosecuted by Coast Guard tribunals 
under the Code or by civilian authorities in the Fed- 
eral Courts; and 
Whereas, it is recognized that although the ad- 
ministration and discipline of the Coast Guard re- 
quires that certain types of crimes committed by its 
personnel be investigated by that service and prose- 
cuted before Coast Guard military tribunals other 
types of crimes committed by such military person- 
nel should be investigated by civil authorities and 
prosecuted before civil tribunals; and 
Whereas, it is recognized that it is not feasible to 
impose inflexible rules to determine the respective 
responsibility of the civilian and Coast Guard mili- 
tary authorities as to each crime over which they 
may have concurrent jurisdiction and that informal 
arrangements and agreements may be necessary 
with respect to specific crimes or investigations; and 
Whereas, agreement between the Department of 
Justice and the Department of Transportation 
(Coast Guard) as to the general areas in which they 
will investigate and prosecute crimes to which both 
civil and military jurisdiction attach will, neverthe- 
less, tend to make the investigation and prosecution 
of crimes more expeditious and efficient and give ap- 
propriate effect to the policies of civil government 
and the requirements of the United States Coast 
Guard; 
It is hereby agreed and understood between the 
Department of Justice and the Department of 
Transportation (Coast Guard) as follows: 
1.  Crimes committed on military installations (in- 
cluding aircraft and vessels). Except as hereinafter 
indicated, all crimes committed on a military instal- 
lation by Coast Guard personnel subject to the Uni- 
form Code of Military Justice shall be investigated 
and prosecuted by the Coast Guard if  the Coast 
Guard makes a determination that there is a reason- 
able likelihood that only Coast Guard personnel 
subject to the Uniform Code of Military justice are 
involved in such crimes as principles or accessories, 
and except in extraordinary cases, that there is no 
victim other than persons who are subject to the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice or who are bo- 
nafide dependents or members of a household of mil- 
itary or civilian personnel residing on the installa- 
tion. Unless such a determination is made, the Coast 
Guard shall promptly advise the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation of any crime committed on a military 
installation if such crime is within the investigative 
authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall investi- 
gate any serious crime of  which it has been so ad- 
vised for the purpose of prosecution in the civil 
courts unless the Department of Justice determines 
that investigation and prosecution  may be con- 
ducted more efficiently and expeditiously by the 
Coast Guard. Even if the determination provided for 
in the first sentence of this paragraph is made by the 
Coast Guard, it shall promptly advise the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation of any crime committed on 
a military installation in which there is a victim who 
is not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Jus- 
tice or a bona fide dependent or member of the 
household of military or civilian personnel residing 
on the installation and that the Coast Guard is inves- 
tigating the crime because it has been determined to 
be extraordinary. The Coast Guard shall promptly 
advise the Federal Bureau of Investigation whenever 
the crime, except in minor offenses, involves fraud 
against the government, misappropriation, robbery, 
or theft of government property of funds, or is of a 
similar nature. All such crimes shall be investigated 
by the Coast Guard unless it receives prompt advise 
that the Department of Justice has determined that 
the crime should be investigated by the Federal Bu- 
reau of Investigation and that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation will undertake the investigation for the 
purpose of prosecution in the civil courts. 
2.  Crimes committed outside of military installa- 
tions. Except as hereinafter indicated, all crimes 
committed outside of military installations, which 
fall within the investigative jurisdiction of the Fed- 
eral Bureau of Investigation and in which there is in- APPENDIX 3 
volved as a suspect an individual subject to the Uni- 
form Code of Military Justice, shall be investigated 
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the pur- 
pose of prosecution in civil courts, unless the De- 
partment of Justice determines that investigation 
and prosecution may be conducted more efficiently 
and expeditiously by other authorities. All such 
crimes which come first to the attention of Coast 
Guard authorities shall be referred promptly by 
them to the Federal Bureau of  Investigation, unless 
relieved of this requirement by the Federal Bureau 
of  Investigation as to particular types or classes of 
crime. However, whenever Coast Guard military 
personnel are engaged in scheduled military activi- 
ties outside of military installations such as organ- 
ized maneuvers or organized movement, the provi- 
sions of  paragraph  1 above shall apply, unless 
persons not subject to the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice are involved as principals, accessories or vic- 
tims. 
If, however, there is involved as a suspect or as an 
accused in any crime committed outside of a mili- 
tary installation and falling within the investigative 
authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, an 
individual who is subject to the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice and if the Coast Guard authorities 
believe that the crime involves special factors relat- 
ing to the administration and discipline of the Coast 
Guard which would justify investigation by them for 
the purpose of prosecution before a Coast Guard 
military tribunal, they shall promptly advise the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation of the crime and in- 
dicate their views on the matter. Investigation of 
such a crime may be undertaken by the Coast Guard 
military authorities if the Department of Justice 
agrees. 
3.  Transfer of investigative authority. An investiga- 
tive body of the Coast Guard which has initiated an 
investigation pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof, 
shall have exclusive investigative authority and may 
proceed therewith to prosecution. If, however, any 
Coast Guard investigative body comes to the view 
that effectuation of those paragraphs requires the 
transfer of  investigative authority over a crime, in- 
vestigation of which has already been  initiated by 
that or by  any other investigative body, it shall 
promptly advise the other interested investigative 
body of its views. By agreement between the Depart- 
ments of Justice and Transportation (Coast Guard), 
investigative authority may then be transferred. 
4. Administrative action. Exercise of exclusive inves- 
tigative authority by the Federal Bureau of Investi- 
gation pursuant to this agreement shall not preclude 
Coast Guard military authorities from making in- 
quiries for the purpose of administrative action re- 
lated to the crime being investigated. The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation will make the results of its 
investigations available to Coast Guard military au- 
thorities for use in connection with such action. 
Whenever possible, decisions with respect to the 
application in particular cases of the provisions of 
this Memorandum of Understanding will be made at 
the local level, that is, between the Special Agent in 
Charge of the local office of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the local Coast Guard military 
commander. 
5.  Surrender of suspects. To the extent of the legal 
authority conferred upon them, the Department of 
Justice and Coast Guard military authorities will 
each deliver to the other promptly suspects and ac- 
cused individuals if  authority to investigate the 
crimes in which such accused individuals and sus- 
pects are involved is lodged in the other by 
paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof. 
Nothing in this memorandum shall prevent the 
Coast Guard from prompt arrest and detention of 
any person subject to the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice whenever there is knowledge or reasonable 
basis to believe that such a person has committed an 
offense in violation of such code and detaining such 
person until he is delivered to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation if such action is required pursuant to 
this memorandum. 
APPROVED: 
/s/  Ramsy Clark  /s/  Alan S. Boyd 
Ramsy Clark  Alan S. Boyd 
Attorney General  Secretary of Transportation 
Date: 9 October 1967  Date: 24 October 1967 CHARGE SHEET 
--- I.  PERSONAL DATA 
.  NAME OF ACCUSED (Lul.  Cinl. MI)  I.  SSN  3  GRADE OR RANK 1. PAY ORADE 
James.  Reiben J.  111-11-1111  PFC  E-3 
.  UNIT OR ORGANIZ4TION  6.  CURRCNT SIRV'ICE 
SPECIFICATION  In that Private Firt Class Reuben  J. James,  U.S.  Army.  Company  A.  61st 
Battalion,  1st Infantry Brigade,  Fort  Blank,  Missouri,  on  active duty,  did, on or about 
IS July 1984,  without  authority, absent himself  from his unit,  to wit:  Company  A,  1st 
Battalion,  61st  Infantry Brigade,  located  at Fort  Blank.  Missouri,  and did remain  so 
absent until on or about  30  July 1984. 
$500 
Charge  11:  Violation of  the UCKJ,  Article ll2a 
b.  TERM 
3years Co  A,  1st Battalion,  61st  Inf  Bde,  Fort  Blank,  MO 
Specification:  In that F'rivate  First Class Reuben  J. James.  U.S.  Army.  Company  A,  1st 
Battalion,  1st Infantry Brigade,  Fort  Blank.  Missouri,  on active duty, did at Fort  Blank, 
Missouri.  on or about  12 July 1984.  wrongfully possess  10 grams  of  marijuana. 
a.  INITIAL DATE 
1April 1983 
11.  CHARGES ANDSPECIFICATIONS 
0  CHARGE.  1  VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ.  ARTICLE 86 
None 
Ill. PREFERRAL 
1.  NAME OF ACCVIER  (L~I, nnt.  MI,  [b. QRAOE  Jc. ORGANIZATION OF ACCUSER 
.  PAY PER MONTH  a. NANRE  OF .~TRAIHI OF -D 
a.  BASIC  b  SEAIFOREIGN DUTY  c.  TOTAL 
I  I 
Richards,  Jonathan  E.  \captain  ~CO A,  1st Bn.  61st  Inf  Bde 
SIGNATURE OF ACCUSER  I  DATE 
D.  DATEIS)  IMPOSED 
$500 
AFFIDAVIT:  Bclere  me, the  nderriuned. authorized  y  law  to administer  aths in  cuu  of thin character, peonally appeared the 
mbove nmmed  .oeuwr  this  ._LA day of 6 , 39  .and aigriad tha foregoing augr and apecificatiom 
under oath that he*  is  a penon aubject ta  the  'form Code of Milituy  Juticc mnd  that haw  tither hu  penond knowledge of 
or hrs invmtlgakd the matten et  forth therein and that the ume  uc  true to the best of hislln  knowledge and belief 
Will M.  Wilson  61st Bn,  1st  Inf Bde 
Typmd Nome of Offlcrr  ormnednon or onic*? 
Restriction 
Captain  Adjutant 
On&  OKlcloJ Camcltr #oAdmmuar Oalh 
(S..  R.C.M. JO7(b)--mlur bc eammb#lon*d o1fic.n 
1 August  1984 
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12. 
On  2  August  , 19 84,  the accu~d vu  informed of the  charges ngairut himw  and of  the name(.)  of 
the accuser(r)  known to  me (See R.C.M. 308 (a)).  (See R.C.M. 308 ifnotification cannol be made.) 
Jonathan  E.  Richards  Co  A,  1st Rn,  61st  Inf  Bde 
Typed  Nome of immediate Commander  Or#anl~~tlon of lmmcdiab Commander 
Captain 
Glade 
f.  R U 
Si#notur. 
IV. RECEIPT BY SUMMARY COURT.MARTIAL CONVENING AUTHORITY 
13. 
1100
The sworn charges were received at - hours.  2  August  ,,lst  Battalion.  1st Inf  Bripade 
De#i#nalion of  Camnlond or 
Officer E.rerculn,  sum mar^. Court.Mnrtia1 Jurbdicfion lSeI R.C.M.  4031 
FOR T,,E1  CllMMANDFR 
Will  M.  Wilson  Adjutant 
Typed Name of 0Mc.r  OfficIa1 Copoclty of  Officer Slgnlnn 
Captain 
Grade 
3~rh.u?~ 
Si"n.zlurr 
V. REFERRAL: SERVICE OF CHARGES 
s  DATE 
7  Aueust  1984 
la..  OESIGNATION OF  COMMAND OF CONVENING AUTHORITY 
1st  Infantry  Brigade 
Referred for trial to  the  court.martial  convened by  number  12 dated 
--
1  Aueust  19 k. subject to  the following instruction~:~  None 
.W  Command or Ordr- pr 
Carl  E.  Nevins  Commander,  1st  Inf  Brigade 
T~rrd Nome ofOfficrr  Official Ca~ocitl of Officer Slnninu 
Colonel 
Grade 
E. &,&.,+ 
Sinnature 
15. 
8  August
On  84 . 19 -- .Ileaused to  bdserved  a copy hereof on'--."the  above named accused. 
Hamilton  Burger  Captain.  JAGC 
Typed Name of Triol Counrrl  Crode or Ranh of Trial Counrel 
-
FOOTNOTES:  1- When an appropriate commander signs pornonally, inapplicable words are atricken. 
2 -See  R.C.M. 601(e)  concerning inatructionr. If none. ro  rtate. 
D.  PLACE 
Fort  Blank,  Missouri APPENDIX 5 
INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT 
(Of Charges Under Article 32,  UCMJand R.C.M. 405.  Manual for  Courts-Martial) 
I Adamson,  Adam A.  [Major  I  1st Bn, 6lst Inf Bde  1  1  Sep 1993 
1..  FROM:  (Nome ofInue.ng.tlng  Officer -
hl. Fht.  MI1 
I Benson.  Ben B.  ~PVT  I 111-11-1111  1  Co A,  1st Bn, 6lst Inf  1  24  Aug  1993 
d.  DATE OF REPORl b.  GRADE 
c.  ORGANIZATION 2..  TO:  (Nome or  Ol(leer who dlrrcted the 
Inw#H#onon-Lart. Ftnt. MI1 
Harrison,  Harry A. 
3.. NAME OF ACCUSED (Lwt, First. MI1 
c.  OROANIZATION 
b.  TITLE 
I  I  I  I 
(Check appropriate amwer)  I  YES  I  NO 
1st Bn,  61st  Inf, Fort Cutts,  Texas 
d.  ORGANIZATION  . DATE OF CHARGE 
Commanding Officer 
4.  IN  ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 32.  UCMJ.  AND R.C.M.  405. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL. 
I HAVE INVESTIGATED THE CHARGES APPENDED HERETO IExhlbl1 1) 
5.  THE ACCUSED WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL Ilf  not. 1.. 9 balow) 
6.  COUNSEL WHO REPRESENTED THE ACCUSED WAS QUALIFIED UNDER R.C.M.  4061d)IZ).  502ld) 
7..  NAME OF DEFENSE COUNSEL (Lat. Fint. MI1  Ib.  ORADE  I8a. NAME OF ASSISTANT DEFENSE COUNSEL (Honrl 
b. GRADE 
x 
I 
x  I 
x  I 
b. GRADE 
Carlson,  Carl  C.  CPT 
c  ORGANIZATION  (Ir~pr~phk~ 
TDS  w/Duty 
Fort Cutts,  Texas 
d.  ADDRESS  (IloppmprloteJ 
I 
I HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF MY RIGHT TO  BE  REPRESENTED IN  THlS INVESTIGATION BY  COUNSEL.  INCLUDING MY RlGHT TO 
CIVILIAN OR MILITARY COUNSEL OF MY  CHOICE IF REASONABLY AVAILABLE.  I WAIVE MY RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN  THIS INVESTI-
GATION. 
s. SIGNATURE OF ACCUSE0 
s.  SSN 
C.  ORGANIZATION  (IJ.PP~OP~.~J 
d.  ADDRESS (lropproprlote) 
1 
9.  (To k .inned  by accused Ifaec-d  woivr.  coun.el.  Maceu.ed  do..  not sign. lnue.ti#oling  omear will  explain in  detotl in Item 21.) 
10.  ATTHE BEGINNING OF THE INVESTIGATION IINFORMED THE ACCUSED OF:  IChcch oppropriote onaurrr1  YES  NO 
a.  THE CHARGEW UNDER INVESTIGATION  1x1 
b.  THE IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSER  1x1 
a. PLACE  b.  DATE 
c.  THE RIGHT AGAINSTSELF-INCRIMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 31 
d.  THE PURPOSE OF THE INVESTIGATION 
..  THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE 
f.  THE WITNESSES AND DTHER EVIDENCE KNOWN TO ME WHICH IEXPECTED TO PRESENT 
0.  THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES 
h.  THE RIGHT TO HAVE AVAILABLE WITNESSES AN0 EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
I.  THE RIGHT TO PRESENT ANYTHING IN DEFENSE. EXTENUATION. OR MITIGATION 
b.  STATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND DESCRIBE THE PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED IN  THE ABSENCE OF ACCUSED OR COUNSEL 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
1.  THE RIGHT TO MAKE ASWORN OR UNSWORN STATEMENT.  ORALLY OR  IN WRITING  1x1 
NOTE:  If additional rp- 11  rwuirmd for any itam. antar 1ha additional malerlel in  Itam 21 or on a rparatm haat. IdantiW rush material with thm  promr 
numariul and,  if appropri~te,lettarad hudino (Example:  "le".)  S.curely  attach any additional hwn  to  the form and add a not# in  tha appropriate itmm 
of thm  tom: "Sm additional shet." 
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lla. THE ACCUSED AND ACCUSED'S COUNSEL WERE PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE (If the aeewrd 
or envrurl were absent during an? Part or  the prp.pntation  ofeuidense,  ~arnplete b below.)  X APPENDIX 5 
HE FOLLOWING WITNESSES TESTIFIED UhDER OATH  (Cheek oPPropnole onrber) 
NAME IL-t.  Flnl. MI)  ]GRADE (Ifany) I  0RGANlZAT.OhlADDRESS (R'hteheuer 18 appropnotol  I  YES  I NO 
I  I  I  I 
Dodson.  Dodd  D.  1  Captain  1  Co A.  1st Bn,  61st Inf  X 
Evanson,  Evan  E. 
Fordson,  Ford F. 
Statement of Gregg Greggson 
CID Lab Report 
(fingerprint analysis) 
Sergeant 
Sergeant 
b.  EACH ITEM CONSIDERED.)RACOPY OR RECITAL  OF THESUBSTANCE  OR NATURE THEREOF. IS ATTACHED  IX  I 
b.  THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TESTIMDNY OF THESE WITNESSES  HAS BEEN REDUCED TO WRITING AND IS ATTACHED. 
13..  THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS. DOCUMENTS. OR MATTERS WERE CONSIDERED; THE ACCUSED WAS PERMITTED TO 
EXAMINE EACH 
CID,  Bldg 10,  Fort Cutts,  Texas 
CID,  Bldg 10,  Fort Cutts,  Texas 
14.  THERE ARE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT THE ACCUSED WAS  NDT MENTALLY RESPONSIBLE  FOR THE OFFENSEISI 
OR  NOT COMPETENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEFENSE.  (See  R.C.M. 909.  9181k1.1 
--
-HE  DEFENSE DID REOUEST OBJECTIONS TO BE NOTED IN  THIS REPORT (If Ye*. #pecn/y  In  Item 21 below.) 
16.  ALL ESSENTIAL  WITNESSES WILL BE AVAILABLE IN THE EVENT OF TRIAL 
17.  THE CHARGES AND  SPECIFICATIONS ARE IN  PROPER FORM 
18.  REASONABLE GROUNDS EXIST TO BELIEVE THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE OFFENSEIS) ALLEGED 
a.  TRIAL BY  SUMMARY  SPECIAL  [pl GENERAL COURT.MARTIAL 
Co A,  1st Bn,  61st  Inf 
400th MP  Co. 
DESCRIPTIDN OF ITEM 
X 
X 
X 
x 
x 
x' 
x 
19.  1 AM  NOT AWARE OF ANY GROUNDSWHICH WOULD DISOUALIFY ME FROM ACTING AS INVESTIGATING OFFICER. 
(Sw R.C.M. 406(d)(l). 
b.  OTHER (Swcilr in Item 21 klowl 
21.  REMARKS (Include, a# noee#aary, explamtton /or any deioyr  in  the inue,lIgalion.  and erplonotion /or any  "no" amwen  obove.) 
X 
X 
LOCATION DF ORIGINAL (IInotottaehed) 
x 
Examples of other matters which may be  discussed  here are: 
1.  Discussion of evidence,  credibility of witnesses,  and  sufficiency of proof. 
2.  Recommendations  to dismiss or change  any  specifications. 
3.  Statement of any  anticipated offenses or of any  anticipated difficulties in  proving 
any  specification on which trial  is  recommended. 
4.  Any other matter which sh~uld be  known to the convening  authority or subsequent 
reviewing authorities. 
:  1 
20. IRECOMMEND: 
11..  TYPED NAME OF INVESTIGATING OFFICER  b.  GRADE  c.  ORGANIZATION 
Adam A.  Adamson  Maj  or  1st Bn,  61st Inf Bde APPENDIX 6 

FORMS FOR ORDERS CONVENING COURTS-MARTIAL 

a. General and special court-martial convening orders 
(1) Convening orders. 
[Note 1. See R.C.M. 504(d)] 

(Date) 

(Designation of command of officer convening court-martial) 
[Pursuant to (para.  General Order No.  ,  Department of the 
,  19)  (SECNAV ltr ser  of  ) a] (A) (general) (spe- 
cial) court-martial is convened with the following members (and shall meet at  ,unless other- 
wise directed): 
(Captain) (Colonel) 
(Commander) (Lieutenant Colonel) 
(Lieutenant Commander) (Major) 
(Lieutenant) (Captain) 
(Lieutenant, j.g.) (First Lieutenant) 
[Note 2. The name, rank, and position of the convening authority should be shown. The order may 
be authenticated by the signature of the convening authority or a person acting under the direction of the con- 
vening authority.] 
[Note 3. The language in brackets or parentheses in the foregoing samples should be used when ap- 
propriate. The Secretary concerned may prescribe additional requirements for convening orders. See R.C.M. 
504(d)(3). Service regulations should be consulted when preparing convening orders.] 
[Note 4. When a new court-martial is convened to replace one in existence, the following should be 
added below the names of the personnel of the court-martial and before the authentication line:] 
All cases referred to the (general) (special) court-martial convened by order no. 
this (headquarters) (ship) (  ), dated  19,  in which the proceedings 
have not begun, will be brought to trial before the court-martial hereby convened. 
(2) Order amending convening orders. 
[Note 5. The same heading and authentication used on convening order should be used on amend- 
ing orders.] 
[Note 6. A succession of amending orders may result in error. Care should be used in amending con- 
vening orders.] 
(a)Adding members. 
[Note 7. Members may be added in specific cases or for all cases.] 
The following members are detailed to the (general) (special) court-martial convened by order no. 
, this (headquarters) (ship) (  ),  dated  1  9  (for the 
trial of  only). 
(b)  Replacing members. 
[Note 8. Members may be replaced in specific cases or for all cases.] App. 6, Note  APPENDIX 6 
(Captain) (Colonel)  ,is detailed as a member of the (general) (special) court-mar- 
tial convened by order no.  ,  this (headquarters)  (ship) (  ),  dated 
19,  relieved (for the case of  only). 
b. Summary court-martial convening orders 
(Date) 
(Designation of command of officer convening court-martial) 
[Pursuant to (para.  ,  General Order No.  ,  Department of the 
,19,)  (SECNAV ltr ser  of  19,)]  (Lieutenant 
Commander) (Major)  is detailed a  summary court-martial (and shall sit at 
,unless otherwise directed). 
[Note 9. The name, rank, and position of the convening authority should be shown. The order may 
be authenticated by the signature of the convening authority or a person acting under the direction of the con- 
vening authority.] 
[Note 10. The summary court-martial convening order may be a separate page or a notation on the 
charge sheet. See R.C.M. 504(d)(2) and 1302(c).] APPENDIX 7 
SUBPOENA 
The President of the United States. to  Mr.  James  E.  pinelli 
(Name and Title of Person being Subpoenaed)  I 
You are hereby summoned and required to appear on the l"t day of  Oc tobe=  ,1997 .at  9 
Blde 13. Rm 4.  US  Naval  I -. 
oveloeb  A  .~.,~t Station. Oak~on.  FL ,--
(Phce of RoceedlnrJ  (Name and Title of Ueprultton Offleer)  I 
jh '  .  lda~damrilit(a  court-martial of the United Stata&WiUKPmMw, appointed  I 
by eneralNo, 10  ,dated  1  September
(Idcnnfleation of Conuenlnp Order or Conveninp Authortty)  I 
19 97. to testify .s a witness in the matter of Il"ited States - Rpber 
(Name of  C-el  I 
Failure to  appear and teatify is puniehable by a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for a period not more than six montha, 
or both. 10 U.S.C.  5 847. Failure to appear may also reeult in your being taken into custody and brought before the court-martial 
g~vvvvv~vvv~gunder a Warrant of  Attachment (DD Form 454).  Manual for Courts-Martial R.C.M.  703(e)(2HG). I 
Bring thin subpoena with you and do not depart from the proceeding without proper permission.  I 
dat Naval Station, Oakton.  FL  this  1st  of  September 
(Sipnatun (See  R.C.M. 703te)l2J(CJJ 
I 
The witneaa ia requested to sign one copy of this subpoena and to  return the signed copy to  the peraon serving the aubpoena.  I
I 
I hereby accept service of the above subpoena.  I
I 
Signature of Witneu 
NOTE:  If the witness does not sign, complete the following:  I
I 
Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority.  I
I
who. being first duly sworn according to  law, deposes and says that at  , on  I
I
19 ,  he personally delivered to  in person a duplicate of this subpoena.  I 
Subscribed and sworn to before me at  - .this - day of 
1 9 . 
Grade 
Ofrielnl stah"  signature 
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TRAVEL ORDER 
Payment  of  travel  allowances  iq  authorized  pursusnt  LO  10  U.S.C.  5:  847  and  28  U.S.C.  5  1821.  You  should  travel  from 
Smithbk%,.Ge!%I%- .- ..--in  sufficient time to arrive at  1's  N!v.%l ?tation,  Oakton,  FL 
on the date and at the time specified.  You will  be wid fees and expenses for attendance at the specified hewing and travel directly 
to and from that place.  You may travel by  Orail,  commercial or  military aircraft.  bus, or aprivately owned automobile. 
You  0have  Uhave not been given a "Government  Transportation Request" to  exchange for commercial tickets. No mileage will 
be paid  for any transportation provided by the Government in kind or by Government Transportation Request. If a Government Trans-
portation  Request is not given  to you and you travel  by commercial carrier at personal expense. reimbursement for your cost of trans-
portation will be limited to: 
a.  The  least costly regularly scheduled air service butween the points involved; or 
b.  The cost of the rail  fare and a  lower berth.  or the lowest first-clash. rail accommodation available at the time reservations 
were made: or 
c.  Actual cost of commercial bus fare. 
If you travel by private automobile. you will be reimbursed at the rate of Curentv cenb $.now 111 a mile, plus the 
cat  of necesary parking  fees, bridge, ferry. and other highway  talh incurred while traveling under thin travel orda.  The total reim-
bursement wlll  be limited to the cast of travel by the usual mode of common carrier, including per diem. Receipts and ticket stub  will 
be required to support your claim for cost of transportation and subsistence for each item in excess of fr!s.oof---- . 
You will be traveling to  a high-cost area. 
The travel  regulations  designate certain cities as  high  cost areas. Because your attendance requires travel to  one of these cities, you 
will be  authorized  an actual expense allowance instead of a  per diem allowance.  ~bu will  be reimbursed for the actual expenses in. 
curred, not to exceed the maximum amount prescribed for the city involved. The expenses may include lodgings; meala, tipe to  waiters, 
bellboys, maids, porters; pkrsona~ laundry, pressing and dry-cleaning.  local transportation  (including uauoi tip.)  between  places of lodging 
and duty; and other necessary expenses. You must itemlze your daily actual expenses on your claim and receipts for lodging and any 
items over p~s.oq  . .  1  are required. 
You will not be traveling to  a high.cost  area 
Because you are not traveling to a high-cost area, you w~llbe entitled to a  per diem allowance to cover your expenses for lodging. 
meals, and incidentals.  While  traveling and attending the specified hearing within the continental United States, you will be authorized 
a per diem equal to the daily average you pay for lodging. plus pz3.00) .  .Mi  per day for meals and incidentals, rounded off 
to  the next dollar. If the resulting amount is more than the maximum per diem allowahle, which is pso.oo(--~-,  then 
you  will  be reimbursed  only the maximum per diem authorized.  You  are required to state on your reimbursement claim that the per 
diem  claimed is based  on the average  cost to you for lodging while on required  travel  within the continental United States during the 
period covered by the claim. Receipts are required for lodging. The per diem allowance  for travel  overseas is based on rates set by the 
Department  of State or by  the Department ol  Defense, and you will  be reimbursed the amount specified for the particular  overseas 
area involved. 
You are entitled to an attendance fee of p30  Oq  I// 
.per day under 28 U.S.C.  5  1821 
Address any inquiries regarding the matter to: -Lieu tenar~t .Re belle?  ,. Naval  !&gaL.-%e~v&cCOff  ice. 
Huad-ing .13,.Baval_S.tation,.Oakto_n, FL..  :Tel-Ir. (!11)  _l_?_llrllll- . --
This is travel order number  93-7  ..  .  .dated  20  Se~fembe-~.D93.-~, 
iuued by ~h..d~~.~t.~.l -I1S  Naval  Station.  Oakt  onLL 
TDN. Accounting Citation  Xu!  111222 11-XX-0  -- , 
FOR THE COMMANDER APPENDIX 8 
GUIDE FOR GENERAL AND SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL 
[Note 1. This guide outlines the sequence of events ordinarily followed in general and special 
courts-martial, and suggests ways to conduct various procedures prescribed in the Rules for 
Courts-Martial. The guide is not mandatory; it is intended solely as an aid to users of the Manual 
for Courts-Martial.] 
Section I. Opening Session Through Pleas 
[Note 2. See R.C.M. 901-911.1 
[Note 3. When a military judge has been detailed, the proceedings outlined in this section will be 
conducted at an Article 39(a) session. See R.C.M. 901(e). In special courts-martial without a 
military judge, these procedures should be followed in general; the president of a special court- 
martial without a military judge should also carefully examine pertinent Rules for Courts-Martial.] 
Sessions called to order  MJ:  This Article 39(a) session is called to order. (Be seated.) 
Convening orders and referral of 
charges 
TC:  The court-martial is convened by (general) (special) court-martial 
convening order@)  number 
9 
(HQ 
(as amended by 
) (USS  ) ( 
) copies of which have been 
)? 
furnished to the military judge, counsel, and the accused, (and to the 
reporter for insertion at this point in the record) (and which will be 
inserted at this point in the record). (Copies of any written orders 
detailing the military judge and counsel will be inserted at this point 
in the record.) 
[Note 4. When detailed, the reporter records all proceedings verbatim. See R.C.M. 502(e)(3)(B), 
808, and 1103. The reporter should account for the parties to the trial and keep a record of the 
hour and date of each opening and closing of the session, whether a recess, adjournment, or 
otherwise, for insertion in the record. See R.C.M. 813(b) ad 1103. See also Appendices 13 and 14.1 
[Note 5. The military judge should examine the convening order and any amending orders.] 
TC: 	 The charges have been properly referred to this court-martial for 
trial and were served on the accused on 
[Note 6.In time of peace, if less than 5 days have elapsed since service of the charges in a general 
court-martial (3 days in case of a special court-martial), the military judge should inquire whether 
the accused objects to proceeding. If the accused objects, the military judge must grant a 
continuance. See R.C.M. 901(a).] 
TC: 	 (The following corrections are noted on the convening orders: 
[Note 7. Only minor changes, such as typographical errors or changes of grade due to promotion, 
may be made. Any correction which affects the identity of the individual concerned must be made 
by  an amending or correcting order.] 
Accounting for parties  [Note 8. See R.C.M. 813.1 App. 8, Note 	 APPENDIX 8 
TC: 	 The accused and the following persons detailed to this court-martial 
are present:  .  The members and the following 
persons detailed to this court-martial are absent: 
Reporter detailed 	 [Note 9. When a reporter is detailed, the following announcement will be made. See R.C.M. 
813(a)(8).1 
TC:  has been detailed reporter for this court-martial 
and (has previously been sworn) (will now be sworn). 
[Note 10. See R.C.M. 807(b)(2) Discussion (D) concerning the oath to be administered the 
reporter.] 
Detail of trial counsel  TC: 	 ((I) (All members of the prosecution) have been detailed to this 
court-martial by 
Qualifications  of  TC: 	 (I am) (All members of the prosecution are) Prosecution qualified 
and certified under Article 27(b) and sworn under Article 42(a). 
TC: 	 (I have not) (No member of the prosecution has) acted in any 
manner which might tend to disqualify (me) (him) (or) (her) in this 
court-martial (  .) 
Detail of defense counsel  DC: 	 ((I) (All detailed members of the defense) have been detailed to this 
court-martial by  .) 
Qualifications  of defense  DC: 	 (All detailed members of the defense are) (I Counsel am) qualified 
and certified under Article 27(b) and sworn under Article 42(a). 
DC: 	 (I have not) (No member of the defense has) acted in any manner 
which might tend to disqualify (me) (him) (or) (her) in this court- 
martial. ( 
Qualifications  of individual  IDC:  My qualifications are  .I have not acted in any 
counsel when present  manner which might tend to disqualify me in this court-martial. 
[Note 11. If it appears that any counsel may be disqualified, the military judge must decide the 
matter and take appropriate action. See R.C.M. 901(d)(3).] 
Rights to counsel 	 [Note 12. See R.C.M. 506.1 GUIDE FOR GENERAL AND SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL  App. 8, Note 
MJ:  ,you have the right to be represented in this court- 
martial by  (and  ), your detailed 
defense counsel, or you may be represented by military counsel of 
your own selection, if the counsel you request is reasonably 
available. If you are represented by military counsel of your own 
selection, you would lose the right to have  (and 
), your detailed counsel, continue to help in your 
defense. However, you may request that  (and 
,or one of them), your detailed counsel, continue 
to act as associate counsel with the military counsel you select, and 
,the detailing authority, may approve such a 
request. Do you understand? 
ACC: 
MJ: 	 In addition, you have the right to be represented by civilian counsel, 
at no expense to the United States. Civilian counsel may represent 
you alone or along with your military counsel. Do you understand? 
[Note 13. If two or more accused in a joint or common trial are represented by the same counsel, or 
by civilian counsel who are associated in the practice of law, the military judge must inquire into 
the matter. See R.C.M. 901(d)(4)(D).] 
MJ: 	 Do you have any questions about your rights to counsel? 
ACC: 
MJ: 	 Whom do you want to represent you? 
ACC: 
[Note 14. If appropriate, the court-martial should be continued to permit the accused to obtain 
individual military or civilian counsel.] 
MJ: 	 Counsel for the parties have the necessary qualifications, and have 
been sworn (except  ,who will now be sworn.) 
MJ: 	 I have been detailed to this court-martial by 
[Note 15. See R.C.M. 807(b)(2) Discussion (C) concerning the oath to be administered to counsel.] 
General nature of charges  TC: 	 The general nature of the charge(s) in this case is 
The charge(s) were preferred by  ,forwarded with 
recommendations as to disposition by  (,  and 
investigated by  ). (  i  s  also an 
accuser in this case.) 
Challenge of militaryjudge  [Note 16. See R.C.M. 902.1 
TC: 	 Your honor, are you aware of any matter which may be a ground for 
challenge against you? App. 8, Note  APPENDIX 8 
MJ:  (I am aware of none.) ( 
TC:  (The Government has no challenge for cause against the military 
judge.) ( 
DC:  (The defense has no challenge for cause against the military judge.) 
Accused's elections on 
composition of court-martial 
[Note 17. See R.C.M.903. See also R.C.M.5Ol(a) and 503@).] 
MJ:  ,do you understand that you have the right to be 
tried by a court-martial composed of members (including, if you 
request in writing, at least one-third enlisted persons) and that, if 
you are found guilty of any offense, those members would determine 
a sentence? 
ACC: 
MJ:  Do you also understand that you may request in writing or orally 
here in the court-martial trial before me alone, and that if I approve 
such a request, there will be no members and I alone will decide 
whether you are guilty and, if I find you guilty, determine a 
sentence? 
ACC: 
MJ:  Have you discussed these choices with your counsel? 
ACC: 
MJ:  By which type of court-martial do you choose to be tried? 
ACC: 
[Note 18. See R.C.M.903(a) concerning whether the accused may defer a decision on composition 
of court-martial.] 
[Note 19. If the accused chooses trial by court-martial composed of members proceed to 
arraignment below. Any request for enlisted members will be marked as an Appellate Exhibit and 
inserted in the record of trial. See R.C.M. 1103@)(2)(D)(iii). In a special court-martial without a 
military judge, the members should be sworn, and the challenge procedure conducted at this point. 
See Notes 38-1 7 below.] 
Election to be tried by military 
judge alone 
[Note 20. A request for trial by  military judge alone must be written and signed by the accused and 
should identify the military judge by name or it may be made orally on the record. A written 
request will he marked as an Appellate Exhibit and inserted in the record of trial. See R.C.M. 
103@)(2)(D)(iii).] 
MJ:  (I have Appellate Exhibit  ,a request for trial before 
me alone.) (I am (Colonel) (Captain) (  1 
a)  .Have you discussed this 
request and the rights I just described with your counsel? GUIDE FOR GENERAL AND SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL  App. 8, Note 
ACC: 
MJ: 	 If I approve your request for trial by me alone you give up your 
right to trial by a court-martial composed of members (including, if 
you requested, enlisted members). Do you wish to request trial 
hefore me alone? 
ACC: 
MJ: 	 (Your request is approved. The court-martial is assembled.) (Your 
request is disapproved because  .) 
[Note 21. See R.C.M. 903(c)(2)(B) concerning approval or disapproval. See R.C.M. 91 1 concerning 
assembly of the court-martial.] 
Arraignment 	 [Note 22. See R.C.M. 904.1 
MJ: 	 The accused will now be arraigned. 
TC: 	 All parties and the military judge have been furnished a copy of the 
charges and specifications. Does the accused want them read? 
DC: 	 The accused (waives reading of the charges) (wants the charges 
read). 
MJ: 	 (The reading may be omitted.) 
TC: 	 The charges are signed by  ,a person subject to the 
code, as accuser; are properly sworn to before a commissioned 
officer of the armed forces authorized to administer oaths, and are 
properly referred to this court-martial for trial by  , 
the convening authority. 
MJ:  ,how do you plead? Before receiving your pleas, I 
advise you that any motions to dismiss any charge or to grant other 
relief should be made at this time. 
[Note 23. See R.C.M. 801(e), 905-907  concerning motions. See R.C.M. 908 if the Government 
elects to appeal a ruling adverse to it.] 
DC: 	 The defense has (no) (the following) motion(s). (  .) 
[Note 24. After any motions are disposed of pleas are ordinarily entered. See R.C.M. 910.1 
DC: 	 pleads 
[Note 25. If the accused enters any pleas of guilty proceed with the remainder of section I. If no 
pleas of guilty are entered, proceed to section I1 if trial is before members, or section 111 if trial is 
before military judge alone.] App. 8, Note 	 APPENDIX 8 
[Note 26. If trial is before members in a contested case, the military judge should examine the copy 
of the charge(s) to be provided the members, discuss any preliminary instructions with the parties, 
and determine whether other matters should be addressed before the Article 39(a) session is 
ended.] 
Guilty plea inquiry 	 [Note 27. See R.C.M.  910(c), (d), (e), and (f). If a conditional guilty plea is entered, see R.C.M. 
91Wa)(2).1 
Introduction  MJ:  ,your plea of guilty will not be accepted unless you 
understand its meaning and effect. I am going to discuss your plea of 
guilty with you now. If you have any questions, please say so. Do 
you understand? 
ACC: 
MJ: 	 A plea of guilty is the strongest form of proof known to the law. On 
your plea alone, without receiving any evidence, this court-martial 
could find you guilty of the offense(s) to which you are pleading 
guilty. Your plea will not be accepted unless you understand that by 
pleading guilty you admit every element of each offense and you are 
pleading guilty because you really are guilty. If you do not believe 
that you are guilty, you should not plead guilty for any reason. You 
have the right to plead not guilty and place the burden upon the 
prosecution to prove your guilt. Do you understand that? 
ACC: 
Waiver of rights  MJ: 	 By your plea of guilty you waive, or in other words, you give up 
certain important rights. (You give up these rights only as to the 
offense(s) to which you have pleaded guilty. You keep them as to the 
offense(s) to which you have pleaded not guilty). The rights you give 
up are: First, the right against self-incrimination, that is the right to 
say nothing at all about (this) (these) offense@).  Second, the right to 
a trial of the facts by the court-martial, that is, the right to have this 
court-martial decide whether or not you are guilty based on 
evidence presented by the prosecution and, if you chose to do so, by 
the defense. Third, the right to be confronted by the witnesses 
against you, that is to see and hear the witnesses against you here in 
the court-martial and to have them cross-examined, and to call 
witnesses in your behalf. Do you understand these rights? 
ACC: 
MJ: 	 If you plead guilty, there will not be a trial of any kind as to the 
offense(s) to which you are pleading guilty, so by pleading guilty you 
give up the rights I have just described. Do you understand that? 
ACC: GUIDE FOR GENERAL AND SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL  App. 8, Note 
Maximum penalty  MJ: 	 Defense counsel, what advice have you given  as to 
the maximum punishment for the offense(s) to which the accused 
pleaded guilty? 
DC: 
MJ: 	 Trial counsel, do you agree with that? 
TC: 
[Note 28. If there is a question as to the maximum punishment, the military judge must resolve it. 
If the maximum punishment may be subject to further dispute, the military judge should advise the 
accused of the alternative possibilities and determine whether this affects the accused's decision to 
plead guilty.] 
MJ:  ,by your plea of guilty this court-martial could 
sentence you to the maximum authorized punishment, which is 
.  Do you understand that? 
ACC: 
MJ: 	 Do you feel you have had enough time to discuss your case with 
your counsel,  ? 
ACC: 
MJ:  ,do you feel that you have had enough time to 
discuss the case with your client? 
DC: 
MJ:  ,are you satisfied with  (and 
), your defense counsel, and do you believe (his) 
(her) (their) advice has been in your best interest? 
ACC: 
MJ: 	 Are you pleading guilty voluntarily? 
ACC: 
MJ: 	 Has anyone tried to force you to plead guilty? 
ACC: 
Factual basis for plea  [Note 29. The accused will be placed under oath at this point. See R.C.M. 910(e). The military 
judge may inquire whether there is a stipulation in connection with the plea, and may inquire into 
the stipulation at this point. See R.C.M. 81 1.1 App. 8, Note 	 APPENDIX 8 
MJ: 	 In a'moment, you will be placed under oath and we will discuss the 
facts of your case. If what you say is not true, your statements may 
be used against you in a prosecution for perjury or false statement. 
Do you understand? 
ACC: 
TC: 	 Do you (swear) (affirm) that the statements you are about to make 
shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth (so 
help you God)? 
ACC: 
MJ: 	 I am going to explain the elements of the offense(s) to which you 
have entered pleas of guilty. By  "elements"  I mean the facts which 
the Government would have to prove by evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt before you could be found guilty if you pleaded not 
guilty. When I state each of these elements ask yourself if it is true, 
and whether you want to admit that its true. Then be ready to talk 
about these facts with me. 
MJ:  Please look at your copy of the charges and specifications. You have 
pleaded guilty to Charge  ,Specification 
,a violation of Article  of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice. The elements of that offense are 
[Note 30. See subparagraph b of the appropriate paragraph in Part IV. The description of the 
elements should be tailored to the allegations in the specification. Legal terms should be explained.] 
MJ: 	 Do you understand those elements? 
ACC: 
MJ: 	 Do the elements correctly describe what you did? 
ACC: 
Accused's description of  [Note 31.  The military judge should elicit from the accused facts supporting the guilty plea by 
offense(s)  questioning the accused about the offense(s). The questioning should develop the accused's 
description of the offense(s) and establish the existence of each element of the offense(s). The 
military judge should be alert to discrepancies in the accused's description or between the accused's 
description and any stipulation. If the accused's discussion or other information discloses a possible 
defense, the military judge must inquire into the matter, and may not accept the plea if a possible 
defense exists. The military judge should explain to the accused the elements of a defense when the 
accused's description raises the possibility of one. The foregoing inquiry should be repeated as to 
each offense to which the accused has pleaded guilty.] 
Identification of accused  MJ: 	 DO  you admit that you are  ,the accused in this 
case? 
ACC: Jurisdiction 
Pretrial agreement 
GUIDE FOR GENERAL AND SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL  App. 8, Note 
MJ:  On (date of earliest offense) 19  ,were you a 
member of the United States (Army) (Navy) (Air Force) (Marine 
Corps) (Coast Guard) on active duty, and have you remained on 
active duty since then? 
ACC: 
[Note 32. The military judge should determine whether jurisdiction might be affected by  a post- 
offense reenlistment.] 
MJ: 	 Is there a pretrial agreement in this case? 
TC or DC: 
[Note 33. If the answer is yes proceed to note 35; if the answer is no, proceed as follows.] 
MJ:  are you pleading guilty because of any promise by 
the Government that you will receive a sentence reduction or other 
benefit from the Government if you plead guilty? 
ACC: 
[Note 34. If the answer is no, proceed to acceptance of the plea. If the answer is yes, the military 
judge should determine from the accused and counsel whether any agreement exists. If so, the plea 
agreement inquiry should continue. If not, then the military judge should clarify any 
misunderstanding the accused may have, and ascertain whether the accused still wants to plead 
guilty. Once any issue is resolved, if the accused maintains the plea of guilty, proceed to acceptance 
of the plea.] 
[Note 35. If there is a pretrial agreement, the military judge must: (1)  ensure that the entire 
agreement is presented, provided that in trial by military judge alone the military judge ordinarily 
will not examine any sentence limitation at this point; (2) ensure that the agreement complies with 
R.C.M. 705; and (3) inquire to ensure that the accused understands the agreement and that the 
parties agree to it. See R.C.M. 910(f). If the agreement contains any ambiguous or unclear terms, 
the military judge should obtain clarification from the parties.] 
[Note 36. The agreement should be marked as an Appellate Exhibit. If the agreement contains a 
sentence limitation and trial is before military judge alone, the sentence limitation should be 
marked as a separate Appellate Exhibit, if possible.] 
[Note 37. The language below is generally appropriate when trial is before military judge alone. It 
should be modified when trial is before members.] 
MJ: 	 ,I have here Appellate Exhibit  , 
which is part of a pretrial agreement between you and 
,the convening authority. Is this your signature 
which appears (on the bottom of page  >, 
(  ) and did you read this part of the agreement? 
ACC: 
MJ: 	 Did you also read and sign Appellate Exhibit  , 
which is the second part of the agreement? App. 8, Note 	 APPENDIX 8 
ACC: 
MJ: 	 Do you believe that you fully understand the agreement? 
ACC: 
MJ: 	 I don't know, and I don't want to know at this time the sentence 
limitation you have agreed to. However, I want you to read that part 
of the agreement over to yourself once again. 
MJ: 	 [After accused has done so.] Without saying what it is, do you 
understand the maximum punishment the convening authority may 
approve? 
ACC: 
MJ: 	 In a pretrial agreement, you agree to enter a plea of guilty to (some 
of) the charge(s) and specification(s), and, in return, the convening 
authority agrees to (approve no sentence greater than that listed in 
Appellate Exhibit  ,which you have just read) 
(  ). [In addition, (you have agreed to testify against 
) (  ) (the convening authority has 
agreed to withdraw Charge  and its specification) 
(  ). Do you understand that? 
ACC: 
MJ: 	 If the sentence adjudged by this court-martial is greater than the one 
provided in the agreement, the convening authority would have to 
reduce the sentence to one no more severe than the one in your 
agreement. On the other hand, if the sentence adjudged by this 
court-martial is less than the one in your agreement, the convening 
authority cannot increase the sentence adjudged. Do you understand 
that? 
ACC: 
[Note 38. The military judge should discuss the agreement with the accused, and explain any terms 
which the accused may not understand. If the accused does not understand a term, or if the parties 
disagree as to a term, the agreement should not be accepted unless the matter is clarified to the 
satisfaction of the parties. If there are any illegal terms, the agreement must be modified in 
accordance with R.C.M. 705. The trial counsel should be granted a recess on request to secure the 
assent of the convening authority to any material modification in the agreement.] 
MJ: 	 is this agreement, Appellate Exhibit(s) 
(and 	 ) the entire agreement 
between you and the convening authority? In other words, is it 
correct that there are no other agreements or promises in this case? 
ACC: GUIDE FOR GENERAL AND SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL  App. 8, Note 
MJ:  Do counsel agree? 

TC: 

DC: 

MJ:  ,do you understand your pretrial agreement? 

ACC: 

MJ:  Do counsel disagree with my explanation or interpretation of the 

agreement in any respect? 
TC: 
DC: 
MJ:  (To DC), did the offer to make a pretrial agreement originate with 
the defense? 
DC: 
MJ:  are you entering this agreement freely and 
voluntarily? 
AC: 
MJ:  Has anyone tried to force you to enter this agreement? 
ACC: 
MJ:  Have you fully discussed this agreement with your counsel, and are 
you satisfied that (his) (her) advice is in your best interest? 
ACC: 
MJ:  ,although you believe you are guilty, you have a 
legal and a moral right to plead not guilty and to require the 
Government to prove its case against you, if it can, by legal and 
competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. If you were to plead 
not guilty, then you would be presumed under the law to be not 
guilty, and only by introducing evidence and proving your guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt can the Government overcome that 
presumption. Do you understand? 
ACC: 
MJ: 	 Do you have any questions about your plea of guilty, your pretrial 
agreement, or anything we have discussed? 
ACC: 
App. 8, Note 	 APPENDIX 8 
Acceptance of guilty plea 	 MJ:  DO  you still want to plead guilty? 
ACC: 
MJ: 	 I find that the accused has knowingly, intelligently, and consciously 
waived (his) (her) rights against self-incrimination, to a trial of the 
facts by a court-martial, and to be confronted by the witnesses 
against (him) (her); that the accused is, in fact guilty; and (his) (her) 
plea of guilty is accepted. 
MJ:  ,you may request to withdraw your plea of guilty 
any time before the sentence is announced in your case and if you 
have a good reason for your request, I will grant it. Do you 
understand? 
ACC: 
Announcement of findings based 	 [Note 39. Findings of guilty may, and ordinarily should, be entered at this point except when: (1) 
on a guilty plea 	 not permitted by regulations of the Secretary concerned; or (2) the plea is to a lesser included 
offense and the prosecution intends to proceed to trial on the offense as charged. See R.C.M. 
910(g)(l) and (2). See also R.C.M. 910(g)(3) in special courts-martial without a military judge. In 
trials before military judge alone, when some offenses are to be contested, the military judge may 
elect to defer entry of any findings until the end of trial on the merits.] 
[Note 40. See R.C.M.922 and Appendix 10 concerning forms of findings.] 
MJ:  ,in accordance with your plea(s) of guilty, this 
court-martial finds you (of all charges and specifications) (of 
Specification  of Charge  and 
Charge  ): Guilty. 
[Note 41. If trial is before members, and no offenses remain to be contested on the merits, this may 
be an appropriate point for the military judge to inform the accused of the rights to allocution 
under R.C.M. 1001(a)(3).See Note 88 below. In addition, other issues relating to the information 
or evidence to be introduced on sentencing should ordinarily be resolved at this point. If other 
offenses remain to be contested, the military judge should consider, and solicit the views of the 
parties, whether to inform the members only of the offenses to which the accused pleaded not 
guilty. The copy of the charges presented to the members should reflect this decision. See also Note 
26.1 
Section II. Trial With Members; Preliminary Session 
[Note 42. The following procedure is suggested for a trial with members after completion of the 
Article 39(a) session. 
Before calling the court-martial to order, the military judge should examine the convening order 
and any amending orders and ensure that all members required to be present are present. Witnesses 
should be excluded from the courtroom except when they testify. 
When the court-martial is ready to proceed the military judge should direct the bailiff, if any, or 
the trial counsel to call the members. Whenever the members enter the courtroom, all persons 
present except the military judge and reporter should rise. 
The members are seated alternatively to the right and left of the president according to rank.] 
MJ: 	 The court-martial will come to order. You may be seated. GUIDE FOR GENERAL AND SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL  App. 8, Note 
TC: 	 This court-martial is convened by (general) (special) court-martial 
convening order number  (HQ  ) 
(USS  > (  ), as amended by 
), a copy of which has been furnished to each 
member. 
TC: 	 The accused and the following persons named in the convening 
orders are present: 
TC: 	 The following persons named in the convening orders are absent: 
[Note 43. Persons who have been relieved (viced) by written orders need not he mentioned. The 
reason for any other absences should be stated.] 
TC: 	 The prosecution is ready to proceed with the trial in the case of 
United States v.  (who is present). 
Oath of members  MJ:  The members will now be sworn. 
TC: 	 All persons please rise. 
"Do you [name(s) of member(s)] (swear) (affirm) that you will 
answer truthfully the questions concerning whether you should 
serve as a member of this court-martial; that you will faithfully and 
impartially try, according to the evidence, your conscience, and the 
laws applicable to trials by court-martial, the case of the accused 
now before this court; and that you will not disclose or discover the 
vote or opinion of any particular member of the court-martial (upon 
a challenge or) upon the findings or sentence unless required to do 
so in due course of law, (so help you God)?" 
Each member: I do. 
Assembly/ preliminary  MJ:  Be seated please. The court-martial is assembled. 
instructions 
[Note 44. See R.C.M. 91 1 concerning assembly.] 
[Note 45. At this point, the military judge may give the members preliminary instructions. These 
may include instructions on the general nature of the member's duties (see R.C.M. 502(a)(2) and 
Discussion, 922,1006), the duties of the military judge (see R.C.M. 801, 920, 1005; Mil. R. Evid. 
103). and the duties of counsel (see R.C.M. 502(d)(5) and (6)); on voir dire and possible grounds for 
challenge (see R.C.M. 912); on the procedures for questioning witnesses (see Mil. R. Evid. 611, 
614); on taking notes; and such other matters as may be appropriate. The military judge may elect 
to defer giving instructions on some of these matters until after voir dire, or until another 
appropriate point in the proceedings.] 
General nature of charges  [Note 46. Trial counsel should distribute copies of the charges and specifications to the members.] App. 8, Note  APPENDIX 8 
TC:  The general nature of the charge(s) in this case (is) (are) 
.The charge(s) were preferred by 
;forwarded with recommendations as to 
disposition by  (;and investigated by 
Challenges  TC:  The records of this case disclose (no grounds for challenge) (grounds 
for challenge of  ,on the following grounds 
TC:  If any member is aware of any matter which may be a ground for 
challenge by any party, the member should so state. 
[Note 47. In case of a negative response, trial counsel should announce "Apparently not."] 
' 
[Note 48. The military judge and, if permitted by the military judge, counsel may examine the 
members on voir dire. See R.C.M. 912(d) and Discussion. The parties may present evidence 
relating to challenges for cause. See R.C.M. 912(e). Upon completion of voir dire and taking 
evidence, if any, the parties will be called upon to enter challenges for cause. Ordinarily trial 
counsel enters challenges for cause before defense counsel. After any challenges for cause, the 
parties may be called upon to enter peremptory challenges. Ordinarily trial counsel enters a 
peremptory challenge before the defense. The parties must be permitted to enter challenges outside 
the presence of members. See R.C.M. 912(f) and (g). In special courts-martial without a military 
judge, see R.C.M. 912(h).] 
[Note 49. If any members are successfully challenged, they should be excused in open session in the 
presence of the parties. The record should indicate that they withdrew from the courtroom. The 
members who remain after challenges should be reseated according to rank, as necessary.] 
[Note 50. The military judge should ensure that a quorum remains, and, if the court-martial is 
composed with enlisted persons, that at least one-third of the remaining members are enlisted 
persons. See R.C.M. 912(g)(2) Discussion.] 
[Note 51. If the members have not yet been informed of the plea(s), this should now be done.] 
MJ:  Members of the court-martial, at an earlier session the accused was 
arraigned and entered the following pleas: 
[Note 52. In a special court-martial without a military judge, the accused should now be arraigned. 
See Notes 22-39.] 
[Note 53. If the military judge entered findings based on pleas of guilty and no offenses remain to be 
contested, the military judge should give the following instruction and proceed to SECTION IV, 
below.] 
MJ:  I accepted the accused's pleas of guilty and entered findings of guilty 
as to (the) (all) Charge(s) (  ) and Specification(s) 
(  ) and  ). Therefore, we will now 
proceed to determine a sentence in the case. 
[Note 54. If the accused pleaded guilty to some offenses, but others remain to be contested, and the 
members have been informed of the offenses to which the accused pleaded guilty, the military judge 
should instruct as follows.] GUIDE FOR GENERAL AND SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL  App. 8, Note 
MJ: 	 Members, you will not be required to reach findings regarding 
Charge ( )  and Specification(s) (  ) 
(and  ) (and ) . Findings will be 
required, however, as to Charge (  ) and 
Specification(s)(  ) (and  ) (and 
), to which the accused has pleaded not guilty. You 
may not consider the fact that the accused pleaded guilty to (one) 
(some) offense@)  in any way in deciding whether the accused is 
guilty of the offense@)  to which (he) (she) has pleaded not guilty. 
[Note 55. If the accused has pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense and the prosecution intends 
to prove the greater offense, the military judge should instruct as follows.] 
MJ: 	 The accused's plea of guilty to the lesser included offense of 
admits some of the elements of the offense charged 
in (the) Specification (  ) of (the) Charge 
(  ). These elements are, therefore, established by the 
accused's plea without need of further proof. However, the accused's 
plea of guilty to this lesser included offense provides no basis for a 
finding of guilty as charged, because there still remains in issue the 
elements of  . No inference of guilt of such 
remaining elements may be drawn from the accused's plea. Before 
the accused may be found guilty of the offense charged, the 
prosecution must prove the remaining element@)  beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
[Note 56. The military judge may give such additional preliminary instructions as may be 
appropriate at this point.] 
SECTION Ill. TRIAL 
[Note 57. See R.C.M. 913.1 
MJ: 	 Will the prosecution make an opening statement? 
TC: 	 (No) (Yes.  .) 
MJ: 	 Will the defense make an opening statement? 
DC: 	 (No) (The defense will make its statement after the prosecution has 
rested.) (Yes.  .) 
TC: 	 The prosecution calls as its first witness 
Oath of witness  [Note 58. See R.C.M. 807.1 
TC: 	 Do you (swear) (affirm) that the evidence you give in the case now in 
hearing shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, (so help you God)? 
WIT: App. 8, Note 	 APPENDIX 8 
Preliminary questions  TC: 	 (Are you (state name, grade, organization, station, and armed force) 
(state name and address, ifcivilian)?) (Please state your name 
(grade, organization, station, and armed force) (and address). 
WIT: 
[Note 59. The address of witnesses should be omitted in appropriate cases, as where it might 
endanger the witness.] 
[Note 60. Except when an identification is inappropriate (e.g., when the witness is a laboratory 
technician) or where a foundation must be laid, Trial Counsel ordinarily should ask the witness to 
identify the accused.] 
TC: 	 Do you know the accused? 
WIT: 
[Note 61. If the witness answers affirmatively:] 
TC: 	 Please point to the accused and state (his) (her) name. 
WIT: 
TC: 	 Let the record show that the witness pointed to the accused when 
stating (his) (her) name. 
Testimony 	 [Note 62. Trial counsel should now conduct direct examination of the witness. See Mil. R. Evid. 
61 1.1 
TC: 	 No further questions. 
MJ: 	 ,you may cross-examine. 
[Note 63. Defense counsel may cross-examine the witness.] 
DC: 	 No (further) questions. 
[Note 64. The parties should be permitted to conduct such redirect and recross-examination as may 
reasonably be necessary. See Mil. R. Evid. 61 1. After the parties have completed their questioning, 
the military judge and members may ask additional questions. See Mil. R. Evid. 614. The members 
should be instructed on the procedures for questioning. Each member's questions will be collected 
by the bailiff, if any, or trial counsel, marked as an Appellate Exhibit, examined by counsel for each 
side, and given to the military judge. If there are any objections, they should be raised at an Article 
39(a) session or at a side-bar conference.] 
[Note 65. After questioning of a witness is completed, the military judge should determine whether 
the witness will be excused temporarily or permanently. The military judge should advise the 
witness as follows.] Recess, adjournment, or Article 
39(a) session 
Reopening 
Prosecution rests 
Presentation of evidence by 
defense 
Rebuttal and surrebuttal 
GUIDE FOR GENERAL AND SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL  App. 8, Note 
MJ:  thank you. You are (temporarily) excused. (Please 
wait (in the waiting room) (  )). (You are free to go.) 
As long as this trial continues, do not discuss your testimony or 
knowledge of the case with anyone except counsel. If anyone else 
tries to talk to you about the case, stop them and report the matter 
to one of the counsel. 
[Note 66. The witness will withdraw from the courtroom. See Mil. R. Evid. 615.1 
TC:  The prosecution calls as its next witness 
[Note 67. Trial counsel continues to present the prosecution case. If exhibits were admitted at an 
Article 39(a) session, trial counsel may, with the permission of the military judge, read or present 
the evidence to the court-martial.] 
[Note 68. In the event of a recess, continuance, adjournment, or Article 39(a) session the military 
judge should announce when the court-martial will reconvene, and should instruct or remind the 
members not to discuss the case with anyone, not to consult legal references, and to avoid exposure 
to matters relating to the case.] 
[Note 69. When the court-martial is reopened, the following announcement is appropriate.] 
MJ:  The court-martial will come to order. 
TC:  The members, the parties, and the military judge are all present. 
TC:  The prosecution rests. 
[Note 70. A motion for a finding of not guilty may be raised at this point. See R.C.M. 917. Any 
such motion should be made outside the presence of the members. If a motion is made in the 
presence of members, and is denied, the military judge should instruct the members that the 
military judge applies a different standard in ruling on the motion than they must apply in reaching 
their findings, and that the denial must have no effect on their deliberations and findings.] 
[Note 71. Defense counsel may make an opening statement if one was not made previously.] 
DC:  The defense calls as its first witness 
[Note 72. Trial counsel administers the oath to each witness. Defense counsel conducts direct 
examination, and trial counsel cross-examination of each witness. Redirect and recross- 
examination may be conducted as appropriate. The military judge and members may question each 
witness. See note 64.1 
[Note 73. Defense counsel continues to present the defense case. If exhibits were admitted at an 
Article 39(a) session, defense counsel may, with the permission of the military judge, read or 
present the evidence to the court-martial.] 
DC:  The defense rests. 
[Note 74. The parties may present evidence in rebuttal and surrebuttal. See R.C.M. 913(c)(l). After 
the parties complete their presentations, additional evidence may be presented when the military 
judge so directs. See R.C.M. 801(c), 913(c)(l)(F).] 
[Note 75. When a witness is recalled, the following is appropriate.] App. 8, Note  APPENDIX 8 
TC:  Are you the same  who testified earlier in this court 
martial? 
WIT:  I am. 
TC:  You are reminded that you are still under oath. 
[Note 76. If trial is by military judge alone, counsel should be permitted to make closing 
arguments. See R.C.M. 919. After arguments, proceed to announcement of findings.] 
Out of court hearing on findings  [Note 77. Ordinarily the military judge will conducts Article 39(a) session to discuss findings 
instructions  instructions and examine the findings worksheet. See R.C.M. 920,92l(d). If such instructions are 
discussed at a conference, see R.C.M. 802.1 
Closing arguments  [Note 78. See R.C.M. 919.1 
TC: 

DC: 

TC: 

Instructions  [Note 79. See R.C.M. 920.1 
MJ: 

MJ:  Does any member have any questions concerning these instructions? 

MEMBERS: 

MJ:  Do counsel have any objections to these instructions not previously 

raised? 

TC: 

DC: 

[Note 80. See R.C.M. 920(f).] 
[Note 81. Any exhibits which the members are to consider should be given to the president before 
the court-martial closes.] 
Closing  MJ:  The court-martial is closed. 
[Note 82. While the members are deliberating, the military judge may take up certain matters 
which may arise if the accused is found guilty of any offense. The admissibility of evidence during 
sentencing proceedings and advice to the accused about allocution rights may be considered at an 
Article 39(a) session at this point. See R.C.M. 1001. See Note 88 below concerning allocution 
advice.] 
After findings reached  MJ:  The court-martial will come to order. 
TC:  All parties and members and the military judge are present. GUIDE FOR GENERAL AND SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL  App. 8, Note 
MJ: 	 (To president)  have the members reached 
findings? 
PRES: 
MJ: 	 Are the findings on Appellate Exhibit  ? 
PRES: 	 Yes. 
MJ: 	 Would (the bailiff) (trial counsel), without examining it please bring 
me Appellate Exhibit  ? 
MJ: 	 I have examined Appellate Exhibit  .It appears to 
be in proper form. Please return it to the president. 
[Note 83. See R.C.M. 921(d) concerning a findings worksheet, and the procedure to be followed if 
any problems are indicated. See R.C.M. 924 if reconsideration of a finding may be necessary.] 
Announcement of findings  MJ:  ,would you and your counsel stand up please (and 
approach the president). 
MJ: 	 ,announce the findings please. 
PRES: 	 ,this court-martial finds you 
MJ: 	 Please be seated. 
[Note 84. If the accused is found not guilty of all charges and specifications, the court-martial is 
ordinarily adjourned at this point.] 
SECTION IV. PRESENTENCING PROCEDURE 
[Note 85. If the accused pleaded guilty to some specifications  and the members have not yet been 
informed of these, the members should now be given copies of these specifications  and be informed 
of the accused's plea to them. See text following Note 51.1 
Data from charge sheet 	 [Note 86. See R.C.M. 1001(b)(l).] 
MJ: 	 The court-martial will now hear the data concerning the accused 
shown on the charge sheet. 
TC: 
Matters presented by prosecution 	 MJ:  Does the prosecution have other matters to present? 
[Note 87. The prosecution may present certain matters from the accused's personnel records, 
evidence of previous convictions, evidence in aggravation, and evidence of rehabilitative potential. 
See R.C.M. 1001(b)(2) through (5).] 
TC: 	 The prosecution has nothing further. 
Matters presented by  defense 	 [Note 88. If the accused has not previously been advised in accordance with R.C.M. 1001(a)(3), 
such advice should now be given. In trial before members, this advice should be given at an Article 
39(a) session.] App. 8, Note  APPENDIX 8 
MJ:  ,you have the right to present matters in 
extenuation and mitigation, that is, matters about the offense@)  or 
yourself which you want the court-martial to consider in deciding a 
sentence. Included in your right to present evidence are the rights 
you have to testify under oath, to make an unsworn statement, or to 
remain silent. If you testify, you may be cross-examined by the trial 
counsel and questioned by me (and the members). If you decide to 
make an unsworn statement you may not be cross-examined by trial 
counsel or questioned by me (or the members). You may make an 
unsworn statement orally or in writing, personally, or through your 
counsel, or you may use a combination of these ways. If you decide 
to exercise your right to remain silent, that cannot be held against 
you in any way. Do you understand your rights? 
ACC: 
MJ:  Which of these rights do you want to exercise? 
ACC: 
[Note 89. The defense may present matters in rebuttal and extenuation and mitigation. See R.C.M. 
1001(c).] 
DC:  The defense has nothing further. 
Rebuttal  [Note 90. The parties may present additional matters in rebuttal, as appropriate. See R.C.M. 
1001(a)(l)(C).l 
Out of court hearing on 
sentencing instructions 
[Note 91. If trial is by military judge alone, counsel should be permitted to make arguments on 
sentencing. After arguments proceed to announcement of the sentence.] 
[Note 92. Ordinarily the military judge will conduct an Article 39(a) session to discuss sentencing 
instructions and examine the sentence worksheet. See R.C.M. 1005. If such instructions are 
discussed at a conference, see R.C.M. 802.1 
Closing arguments  [Note 93. See R.C.M. 1001(g).] 
TC: 
DC: 
Instructions  [Note 94. See R.C.M. 1005.1 
MJ: 
MJ:  Does any member have any questions concerning these instructions? 
MEMBERS: 
MJ:  Do counsel have any objections concerning these instructions not 
previously raised? 
TC: GUIDE FOR GENERAL AND SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL  App. 8, Note 
DC: 

[Note 95. See R.C.M. 1005(f).] 

[Note 96. Any exhibits which the members are to consider should be given to the president before 

the court-martial closes.] 
Closing  MJ:  The court-martial is closed. 
After sentence reached  MJ:  The court-martial will come to order. 
TC:  All parties and members and the military judge are present. 
MJ:  (To president) 
sentence? 
have the members reached a 
PRES: 
MJ:  Is the sentence on Appellate Exhibit  ? 
PRES:  Yes. 
MJ:  Would (the bailiff) (trial counsel), without examining it, please bring 
me Appellate Exhibit 
MJ:  I have examined Appellate Exhibit 
be in proper form. Please return it to the president. 
. It appears to 
[Note 97. See R.C.M. 1006(e) concerning a sentence worksheet, and the procedure to be followed if 
any problems are indicated. See R.C.M. 1009 if reconsideration of the sentence may be necessary.] 
Announcement of sentence  MJ:  would you and your counsel stand up please (and 
approach the president). 
MJ:  ,would you announce the sentence please. 
PRES:  this court-martial sentences you to: 
MJ:  Please be seated. 
[Note 98. In trial before members, ordinarily the members should be excused at this point. If no 
other matters remain to be considered, the court-martial should be adjourned. If there are 
additional matters to be considered (e.g., punishment limitation in a pretrial agreement in a trial by 
military judge alone, see R.C.M. 910(f)(3) or, if the accused was represented by more than one 
counsel, which counsel will prepare any response to the post-trial review) these matters should be 
addressed before the court-martial is adjourned.] 
Advice of post-trial and appellate  [Note 99. The military judge must advise the accused of the accused's post-trial and appellate 
rights  rights. See R.C.M. 1010.1 
MJ:  ,I will explain to you your post-trial and appellate 
rights. App. 8, Note 	 APPENDIX 8 
MJ: 	 After the record of trial is prepared in your case, 
the convening authority will act on your case. The convening 
authority can approve the sentence (adjudged) (provided in your 
pretrial agreement), or (he) (she) can approve a lesser sentence or 
disapprove the sentence entirely. The convening authority cannot 
increase the sentence. The convening authority can also disapprove 
(some or all of) the findings of guilty. The convening authority is not 
required to review the case for legal errors, but may take action to 
correct legal errors. Do you understand? 
ACC: 
Advice in GCMs and SPCMs in  [Note 100. In cases subject to review by a Court of Military Review, the following advice should be 
which BCD adjudged  given. In other cases proceed to Note 101 or 102 as appropriate.] 
MJ:  ,I will now advise you of your post-trial and 
appellate rights. Remember that in exercising these rights you have 
the right to the advice and assistance of military counsel provided 
free of charge or civilian counsel provided at your own expense. 
You have the right to submit any matters you wish the convening 
authority to consider in deciding whether to approve all, part, or any 
of the findings and sentence in your case. Such matters must be 
submitted within 10 days after you or your counsel receive a copy of 
the record of trial and the recommendation of the (staff judge 
advocate) (legal officer). 
If the convening authority approves the discharge or confinement at 
hard labor for a year or more, your case will be reviewed by a Court 
of Military Review. 
After the Court of Military Review completes its review, you may 
request that your case be reviewed by the Court of Military Appeals; 
if your case is reviewed by that Court, you may request review by 
the United States Supreme Court. 
You also have the right to give up review by the Court of Military 
Review, or to withdraw your case from appellate review at any time 
before such review is completed. 
If you give up your right to review by the Court of Military Review 
or later withdraw your case from appellate review. 
(a) That decision is final and you cannot change your mind later. 
(b) Your case will be reviewed by a military lawyer for legal error. 
It will also be sent to the (general court-martial*) convening 
authority for final action. 
(*Use only for special court-martial.) GUIDE FOR GENERAL AND SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL  App. 8, Note 
(c) Within 2 years after final action is taken on your case, you may 
request The Judge Advocate General to take corrective action. 
Do you have any questions? 
ACC: 
MJ:  The court-martial is adjourned. 
GCM subject to review under  [Note 101. In general courts-martial subject to review under Article 69, the following advice should 
Article 69  be given. In other cases, proceed to Note 102.1 
MJ:  ,I will now advise you of your post-trial and 
appellate rights. Remember that in exercising these rights you have 
the right to the advice and assistance of military counsel provided 
free of charge or civilian counsel provided at your own expense. 
You have the right to submit any matters you wish the convening 
authority to consider in deciding whether to approve all, part, or any 
of the findings and sentence in your case. Such matters must be 
submitted within 10 days after you or your counsel receive a copy of 
the record of trial and the recommendation of the (staff judge 
advocate) (legal officer). If the convening authority approves any 
part of your sentence, your case will be examined in the Office of 
The Judge Advocate General for any legal errors and to determine 
whether your sentence is fair. The Judge Advocate General may 
take corrective action, if appropriate. You also have the right to give 
up examination by The Judge Advocate General or to withdraw 
your case from such examination at any time before such 
examination is completed. If you give up your right to examination 
by The Judge Advocate General or later withdraw your case from 
such examination: 
(a) That decision is final and you cannot change your mind later. 
(b) Your case will be reviewed by a military lawyer for legal error. 
It will also be sent to the convening authority for final action. 
(c) Within 2 years after action is taken on your case, you may 
request The Judge Advocate General to take corrective action. 
Do you have any questions? 
ACC: 
MJ:  The court-martial is adjourned. 
SPCM not involving a BCD  [Note 102. In special courts-martial not involving BCD, the following advice should be given.] App. 8, Note  APPENDIX 8 
MJ:  ,I will now advise you of your post-trial and 
appellate rights. Remember that in exercising these rights, you have 
the right to the advice and assistance of military counsel provided 
free of charge or civilian counsel provided at your own expense. You 
have the right to submit any matters you wish the convening 
authority to consider in deciding whether to approve all, part, or any 
of the findings and sentence in your case. Such matters must be 
submitted within 10 days after you or your counsel receive a copy of 
the record of trial. If the convening authority approves any part of 
the findings or sentence, your case will be reviewed by a military 
lawyer for legal error. It may be sent to the general court-martial 
convening authority for final action on any recommendation by the 
lawyer for corrective action. Within 2 years after final action is taken 
on your case, you may request The Judge Advocate General to take 
corrective action. Do you have any questions? 
ACC: 
MJ:  The court-martial is adjourned. APPENDIX 9 
GUIDE FOR SUMMARY COURTS-MARTIAL 
[General Note to SCM: It is not the purpose of this guide to answer all questions which may arise 
during a trial. When this guide, chapter 13 of the Rules for Courts-Martial, and other legal 
materials available fail to provide sufficient information concerning law or procedure, the summary 
court-martial should seek advice on these matters from a judge advocate. See R.C.M.  1301(b). If 
the accused has obtained, or wishes to obtain, defense counsel, see R.C.M. 1301(e). The SCM 
should examine the format for record of trial at appendix 15. It may be useful as a checklist during 
the proceedings to ensure proper preparation after trial. The SCM should become familiar with this 
guide before using it. Instructions for the SCM are contained in brackets, and should not be read 
aloud. Language in parentheses reflects optional or alternative language. The SCM should read the 
appropriate language aloud.] 
Preliminary Proceeding 
Identity of SCM  SCM: 	 I am  . I have been detailed to conduct a summary 
court-martial (by Summary Court-Martial Convening Order 
(Number  ), Headquarters,  ,  dated 
[see convening order]). 
Referral of charges to trial 	 Charges against you have been referred to me for trial by summary 
court-martial by ([name and title of  convening authority]) on ([date 
of  referrad) [see block IV on page 2 of charge sheet]. 
[Note 1. Hand copy of charge sheet to the accused.] 
Providing the accused with 	 I suggest that you keep this copy of the charge sheet and refer to it 
charge sheet 	 during the trial. The charges are signed by [see first name at top of 
page 2 of charge sheet], a person subject to the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, as accuser, and are properly sworn to before a 
commissioned officer of the armed forces authorized to administer 
oaths. (  ordered the charges to be preferred.) The 
charges allege, in general, violation of Article  ,in 
that you  (and Article  ,in that 
YOU  ). I am now going to tell you about certain 
rights you have in this trial. You should carefully consider each 
explanation because you will soon have to decide whether to object 
to trial by summary court-martial. Until I have completed my 
explanation, do not say anything except to answer the specific 
questions which I ask you. Do you understand that? 
ACC: App. 9, Note 	 APPENDIX 9 
Duties of SCM  SCM: 	 As summary court-martial it is my duty to obtain and examine all 
the evidence concerning any offense(s) to which you plead not 
guilty, and to thoroughly and impartially inquire into both sides of 
the matter. I will call witnesses for the prosecution and question 
them, and I will help you in cross-examining those witnesses. I will 
help you obtain evidence and present the defense. This means that 
one of my duties is to help you present your side of the case. You 
may also represent yourself, and if you do, it is my duty to help you. 
You are presumed to be innocent until your guilt has been proved by 
legal and competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. If you are 
found guilty of an offense, it is also my duty to consider matters 
which might affect the sentence, and then to adjudge an appropriate 
sentence. Do you understand that? 
ACC: 
Right to object to SCM  SCM: 	 You have the absolute right to object to trial by summary court- 
martial. If you object the appropriate authority will decide how to 
dispose of the case. The charges may be referred to a special or 
general court-martial, or they may be dismissed, or the offenses 
charged may be disposed of by (nonjudicial punishment [if not 
previously offered and refused] or) administrative measures. [See 
R.C.M. 306.1 Do you understand that? 
ACC: 
Right to inspect allied papers and  SCM: 	 You may inspect the allied papers and personnel records [Hand 
personnel records. 	 those documents which are available to the accused for examination 
in your presence.] (You may also inspect [identify  personnel records 
or other documents which are not present] which are located at 
.You may have time to examine these if you wish.) 
Witnesses/other evidence for the  SCM:  The following witnesses will probably appear and testify against you: 
government  .The following documents and physical evidence 
will probably be introduced: 
Right to cross-examine 	 After these witnesses have testified in response to my questions, you 
may cross-examine them. If you prefer, I will do this for you after 
you inform me of the matters about which you want the witness to 
be questioned. Do you understand that? 
ACC: 
Right to present evidence  SCM: 	 You also have the right to call witnesses and present other evidence. 
This evidence may concern any or all of the charges. (I have 
arranged to have the following witnesses for you present at the trial.) 
I will arrange for the attendance of other witnesses and the 
production of other evidence requested by you. I will help you in 
any way possible. Do you understand that? GUIDE FOR SUMMARY COURTS-MARTIAL 	 App. 9, Note 
ACC: 
Evidence to be considered  SCM: 	 In deciding this case, I will consider only evidence introduced 
during the trial. I will not consider any other information, including 
any statements you have made to me, which is not introduced in 
accordance with the Military Rules of Evidence during the court- 
martial. Do you understand that? 
ACC: 
Right to remain silent  SCM: 	 You have the absolute right during this trial to choose not to testify 
and to say nothing at all about the offense(s) with which you are 
charged. If you do not testify, I will not hold it against you in any 
way. I will not consider it as an admission that you are guilty. If you 
remain silent, I am not permitted to question you about the 
offense(s). 
Right to testify concerning the  However, if you choose, you may be sworn and testify as a witness 
offense(s)  concerning the offense(s) charged against you. If you do that, I will 
consider your testimony just like the testimony of any other witness. 
[Note 2. Use the following if there is only one specification.] 
If one specification 	 If you decide to testify concerning the offense, you can be questioned 
by me about the whole subject of the offense. Do  you understand 
that? 
ACC: 
[Note 3. Use the following if there is more than one specification.] 
Ifmorethanones~aification  SCM: 	 If you decide to testify, you may limit your testimony to any 
particular offense charged against you and not testify concerning 
any other offense(s) charged against you. If you do this, I may 
question you about the whole subject of the offense about which you 
testify, but I may not question you about any offense(s) concerning 
which you do not testify. Do you understand that? 
ACC: 
Right to testify, remain silent or  SCM:  In addition, if you are found guilty of an offense, you will have the 
make an unsworn statement in  right to testify under oath concerning matters regarding an 
extenuation and mitigation 
appropriate sentence. You may, however, remain silent, and I will 
not hold your silence against you in any way. You may, if you wish, 
make an unsworn statement about such matters. This statement may 
be oral, in writing, or both. If you testify, I may cross-examine you. 
If you make an unsworn statement, however, I am not permitted to 
question you about it, but I may receive evidence to contradict 
anything contained in the statement. Do you understand that? App. 9, Note  APPENDIX 9 
ACC: 
Maximum punishment  SCM:  If I find you guilty (of the offense) (of any of the offenses charged), 
the maximum sentence which I am authorized to impose is: 
[Note 4. For an accused of a pay grade of E-4 or below, proceed as follows.] 
E-4 and below  (1) reduction to lowest enlisted pay grade; and 
(2) forfeiture of two-thirds of 1 month's pay; and 
(3) confinement for 1  month (or, [if the accused is attached to or 
embarked in a vessellto confinement on bread and water or 
diminished rations for 3 days and confinement for 24 days). 
[Note 5. For an accused of a pay grade above E-4,  proceed as follows.] 
E-5 and above  (1) reduction to the next inferior pay grade; and 
(2) forfeiture of two-thirds of 1 month's pay; and 
(3) restriction to specified limits for 2 months. 
SCM:  Do you understand the maximum punishment which this court- 
martial is authorized to adjudge? 
ACC: 
Plea options  SCM:  You may plead not guilty or guilty to each offense with which you 
are charged. You have an absolute right to plead not guilty and to 
require that your guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before 
you can be found guilty. You have the right to plead not guilty even 
if you believe you are guilty. Do you understand that? 
ACC: 
SCM:  If you believe you are guilty of an offense, you may, but are not 
required to, plead guilty to that offense. If you plead guilty to an 
offense, you are admitting that you committed that offense, and this 
court-martial could find you guilty of that offense without hearing 
any evidence, and could sentence you to the maximum penalty I 
explained to you before. Do you understand that? 
ACC: GUIDE FOR SUMMARY COURTS-MARTIAL 	 App. 9, Note 
Lesser included offenses  SCM: 	 [Examine the list of lesser included offenses under each punitive 
article alleged to have been violated. See Part IV. If a lesser included 
offense may be in issue, give the following advice.] You may plead 
not guilty to Charge  ,Specification 
,as it now reads, but plead guilty to the offense of 
,which is included in the offense charged. Of 
course, you are not required to do this. If you do, then I can find you 
guilty of this lesser offense without hearing evidence on it. 
Furthermore, I could still hear evidence on the greater offense for 
purposes of deciding whether you are guilty of it. Do you 
understand that? 
ACC: 
SCM: 	 Do you need more time to consider whether to object to trial by 
summary court-martial or to prepare for trial? 
ACC: 
SCM: 	 [If time is requested or otherwise appropriate.] We will convene the 
court-martial at  .When we convene, I will ask you 
whether you object to trial by summary court-martial. If you do not 
object, I will then ask for your pleas to the charge(s) and 
specification(s), and for you to make any motions you may have. 
Trial Proceedings 
Convene  SCM: 	 This summary court-martial is now in session. 
ObJection/consenttotrialb~  SCM:  DOYOU object to trial by summary court-martial? 
SCM 
ACC: 
Entries on record of trial 	 [Note 6.  If there is an objection, adjourn the court-martial and return the file to the convening 
authority. If the accused does not object, proceed as follows. The accused may be asked to initial 
the notation on the record of trial that the accused did or did not object to trial by  summary court- 
martial. This is not required, however.] 
Readings of the charges  SCM: 	 Look at the charge sheet. Have you read the charge(s) and 
specification(s)? 
ACC: 
SCM: 	 Do you want me to read them to you? 
ACC: 
[If accused requests, read the charge(s) and specification(s).] App. 9, Note 	 APPENDIX 9 
Arraignment  SCM: 	 How do you plead? Before you answer that question, if you have any 
motion to dismiss (the) (any) charge or specification, or for other 
relief, you should make it now. 
ACC: 
Motions 	 [Note 7. If the accused makes a motion to dismiss or to grant other relief, or such a motion is raised 
by the summary court-martial, do not proceed with the trial until the motions have been decided. 
See R.C.M. 905-907,  and R.C.M. 1304(b)(2)(c). After any motions have been disposed of and if 
termination of the trial has not resulted, have the accused enter pleas and proceed as indicated 
below.] 
Pleas  ACC: 	 I plead: 
[Note 8. If the accused refuses to plead to any offense charged, enter pleas of not guilty. If the 
accused refuses to enter any plea, evidence must be presented to establish that the accused is the 
person named in the specification(s) and is subject to court-martial jurisdiction. See R.C.M. 202, 
1301(c).] 
[Note 9. If the accused pleads not guilty to all offenses charged, proceed to the section 
entitled"Procedures-Not  Guilty Pleas."] 
[Note 10. If the accused pleads guilty to one or more offenses, proceed as follows.] 
procedures-guilty pleas  SCM: 	 I will now explain the meaning and effect of your pleas, and question 
you so that I can be sure you understand. Refer to the charge(s) and 
specification(s). I will not accept your pleas of guilty unless you 
understand their meaning and effect. You are legally and morally 
entitled to plead not guilty even though you believe you are guilty, 
and to require that your guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
A plea of guilty is the strongest form of proof known to the law. On 
your pleas of guilty alone, without receiving any evidence, I can find 
you guilty of the offense(s) to which you have pleaded guilty. I will 
not accept your pleas unless you realize that by your pleas you admit 
every element of the offense(s) to which you have pleaded guilty, and 
that you are pleading guilty because you really are guilty. If you are 
not convinced that you are in fact guilty, you should not allow 
anything to influence you to plead guilty. Do you understand that? 
ACC: 
SCM: 	 Do you have any questions? 
ACC: 
SCM: 	 By your pleas of guilty you give up three very important rights. 
(You keep these rights with respect to any offense(s) to which you 
have pleaded not guilty.) The rights which you give up when you 
plead guilty are: GUIDE FOR SUMMARY COURTS-MARTIAL 	 App. 9, Note 
First, the right against self-incrimination. This means you give up 
the right to say nothing at all about (this) (these) offense(s) to which 
you have pleaded guilty. In a few minutes I will ask you questions 
about (this) (these) offense(s), and you will have to answer my 
questions for me to accept your pleas of guilty. 
Second, the right to a trial of the facts by this court-martial. This 
means you give up the right to have me decide whether you are 
guilty based upon the evidence which would be presented. 
Third, the right to be confronted by and to cross-examine any 
witnesses against you. This means you give up the right to have any 
witnesses against you appear, be sworn and testify, and to cross- 
examine them under oath. 
Do you understand these rights? 
ACC: 
SCM: 	 Do you understand that by pleading guilty you give up these rights? 
ACC: 
SCM: 	 On your pleas of guilty alone you could be sentenced to 
[Note 11. Re-read the appropriate sentencing section at notes 4 or 5 above unless the summary 
court-martial is a rehearing or new or other trial, in which case see R.C.M. 810(d).] 
Do you have any questions about the sentence which could be 
imposed as a result of your pleas of guilty? 
ACC: 
SCM: 	 Has anyone made any threat or tried in any other way to force you 
to plead guilty? 
ACC: 
Pretrial agreement  SCM: 	 Are you pleading guilty because of any promises or understandings 
between you and the convening authority or anyone else? 
ACC: 
[Note 12. If the accused answers yes, the summary court-martial must inquire into the terms of 
such promises or understandings in accordance with R.C.M. 910. See Appendix 8, Note 35 
through acceptance of plea.] 
[Note 13. If the accused has pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense, also ask the following 
question.] App. 9, Note  APPENDIX 9 
Effect of guilty pleas to lesser 
in-luded offenses 
SCM:  DOYOU understand that your pleas of guilty to the lesser included 
offense of  confess all the elements of the offense 
charged except  ,and that no proof is necessary to 
establish those elements admitted by your pleas? 
ACC: 
SCM:  The following elements state what would have to be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt before the court-martial could find you guilty if 
you had pleaded not guilty. As I read each of these elements to you, 
ask yourself whether each is true and whether you want to admit 
that each is true, and then be prepared to discuss each of these 
elements with me when I have finished. 
The elements of the offense@)  which your pleas of guilty admit are 
[Note 14. Read the elements of the offense(s) from the appropriate punitive article in Part IV. This 
advice should be specific as to names, dates, places, amounts, and acts.] 
Do you understand each of the elements of the offense(s)? 
ACC: 
SCM:  Do you believe, and admit, that taken together these elements 
correctly describe what you did? 
ACC: 
[Note 15. The summary court-martial should now question the accused about the circumstances of 
the offense(s) to which the accused has pleaded guilty. The accused will he placed under oath for 
this purpose. See oath below. The purpose of these questions is to develop the circumstances in the 
accused's own words, so that the summary court-martial may determine whether each element of 
the offense@)  is established.] 
Oath to accused for guilty plea 
inquiry 
SCM:  DO  you (swear) (affirm) that the statements you are about to make 
shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth (so 
help you God)? 
ACC: 
SCM:  Do you have any questions about the meaning and effect of your 
pleas of guilty? 
ACC: 
SCM:  Do you believe that you understand the meaning and effect of your 
pleas of guilty? 
ACC: Determination of providence of 
pleas of guilty 
Acceptance of guilty pleas 
If any not guilty pleas remain 
Witnesses for the accused 
Calling witnesses 
Witness oath 
GUIDE FOR SUMMARY COURTS-MARTIAL 	 App. 9, Note 
[Note 16.Pleas of guilty may not be accepted unless the summary court-martial finds that they are 
made voluntarily and with understanding of their meaning and effect, and that the accused has 
knowingly, intelligently, and consciously waived the rights against self-incrimination, to a trial of 
the facts by a court-martial, and to be confronted by  the witnesses. Pleas of guilty may be 
improvident when the accused makes statements at any time during the trial which indicate that 
there may be a defense to the offense(s), or which are otherwise inconsistent with an admission of 
guilt. If the accused makes such statements and persists in them after questioning, then the 
summary court-martial must reject the accused's guilty pleas and enter pleas of not guilty for the 
accused. Turn to the section entitled"Procedures-Not Guilty Pleas" and continue as indicated. If 
(the) (any of the) accused's pleas of guilty are found provident, the summary court-martial should 
announce findings as follows.] 
SCM:  I find that the pleas of guilty are made voluntarily and with 
understanding of their meaning and effect. I further specifically find 
that you have knowingly, intelligently, and consciously waived your 
rights against self-incrimination, to a trial of the facts by a court- 
martial, and to be confronted by the witnesses against you. 
Accordingly, I find the pleas are provident, and I accept them. 
However, you may ask to take back your guilty pleas at any time 
before the sentence is announced. If you have a sound reason for 
your request, I will grant it. Do you understand that? 
ACC: 
[Note 17. If no pleas of not guilty remain, go to note 26. If the accused has changed pleas of guilty 
to not guilty, if the summary court-martial has entered pleas of not guilty to any charge(s) and 
specification(s),  or if the accused has pleaded not guilty to any of the offenses or pleaded guilty to a 
lesser included offense, proceed as follows.] 
SCM: 	 If there are witnesses you would like to call to testify for you, give 
me the name, rank, and organization or address of each, and the 
reason you think they should be here, and I will arrange to have 
them present if their testimony would be material. Do you want to 
call witnesses? 
ACC: 
[Note 18. The summary court-martial should estimate the length of the case and arrange for the 
attendance of witnesses. The prosecution evidence should be presented before evidence for the 
defense.] 
SCM: 	 I call as a witness 
SCM: 	 [To the witness, both standing] Raise your right hand. 
Do you swear (or affirm) that the evidence you shall give in the case 
now in hearing shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth (, so help you God)? [Do not use the phrase, "so help you 
God," if the witness prefers to affirm.] 
WIT: App. 9, Note 	 APPENDIX 9 
Recalling witnesses 
Presentation of defense case 
Closing argument 
Deliberations on findings 
SCM:  Be seated. State your full name, rank, organization, and armed force 
([or if a civilian witness] full name, address, and occupation). 
WIT: 
[Note 19. The summary court-martial should question each witness concerning the alleged 
offense(s). After direct examination of each witness, the accused must be given an opportunity to 
cross-examine. If the accused declines to cross-examine the witness, the summary court-martial 
should ask any questions that it feels the accused should have asked. If cross-examination occurs, 
the summary court-martial may ask questions on redirect examination and the accused may ask 
further questions in recross-examination.] 
[Note 20. After each witness has testified, instruct the witness as follows.] 
SCM: 	 Do  not discuss this case with anyone except the accused, counsel, or 
myself until after the trial is over. Should anyone else attempt to 
discuss this case with you, refuse to do so and report the attempt to 
me immediately. Do  you understand that? 
WIT: 
SCM: 	 [To the witness] You are excused. 
[Note 21.  Witnesses may be recalled if necessary. A witness who is recalled is still under oath and 
should be so reminded.] 
[Note 22. After all witnesses against the accused have been called and any other evidence has been 
presented, the summary court-martial will announce the following.] 
SCM: 	 That completes the evidence against you. I will now consider the 
evidence in your favor. 
[Note 23. Witnesses for the accused should now be called to testify and other evidence should be 
presented. Before the defense case is terminated the summary court-martial should ask the accused 
if there are other matters the accused wants presented. If the accused has not testified, the 
summary court-martial should remind the accused of the right to testify or to remain silent.] 
SCM: 	 I have now heard all of the evidence. You may make an argument 
on this evidence before I decide whether you are guilty or not guilty. 
[Note 24. The court-martial should normally close for deliberations. If the summary court-martial 
decides to close, proceed as follows.] 
SCM: 	 The court-martial is closed so that I may review the evidence. Wait 
outside the courtroom until I recall you. 
[Note 25. The summary court-martial should review the evidence and applicable law. It must 
acquit the accused unless it is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence it has received 
in court in the presence of the accused that each element of the alleged offense(s) has been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See R.C.M. 918. It may not consider any facts which were not 
admitted into evidence, such as a confession or admission of the accused which was excluded 
because it was taken in violation of Mil.R.Evid. 304. The summary court-martial may find the 
accused guilty of only the offense(s) charged, a lesser included offense, or of an offense which does 
not change the identity of an offense charged or a lesser included offense thereof.] Announcing the findings 
~ot guilty of all offenses 
Guilty of all offenses 
Guilty of some but not all 
offenses 
Guilty of laser included offense 
or with exceptions and 
substitutions 
Entry of findings 
Procedure if total acquittal 
Procedure if any findings of 
guilty 
Presentence procedure 
GUIDE FOR SUMMARY COURTS-MARTIAL 	 App. 9, Note 
[Note 26. The summary court-martial should recall the accused, who will stand before the court- 
martial when findings are announced. All findings including any findings of guilty resulting from 
guilty pleas, should be announced at this time. The following forms should be used in announcing 
findings.] 
SCM: 	 I find you of (the) (all) Charge@)  and Specification(s):  Not Guilty. 
I find you of (the) (all) Charge@)  and Specification(s):  Guilty. 
I find you of (the) Specification (  ) of (the) Charge 
(  ): Not Guilty; of (the) Specification 
(  ) of (the) Charge (  ): Guilty; of 
(the) Charge (  ): Guilty. 
I find you of (the Specification (  ) of (the) Charge 
(  ): Guilty, except the words 	 and 
;(substituting therefor, respectively, the words 
and 	 ;) of the excepted words: Not 
Guilty; (of the substituted words: Guilty;) of the Charge: (Guilty) 
(Not Guilty, but Guilty of a violation of Article 	 , 
UCMJ, a lesser included offense). 
[Note 27. The summary court-martial shall note all findings on the record of trial.] 
[Note 28. If the accused has been found not guilty of all charges and specifications, adjourn the 
court-martial, excuse the accused, complete the record of trial, and return the charge sheet, 
personnel records, allied papers, and record of trial to the convening authority.] 
[Note 29. If the accused has been found guilty of any offense, proceed as follows.] 
SCM: 	 I will now receive information in order to decide on an appropriate 
sentence. Look at the information concerning you on the front page 
of the charge sheet. Is it correct? 
[Note 30. If the accused alleges that any of the information is incorrect, the summary court-martial 
must determine whether it is correct and correct the charge sheet, if necessary.] 
[Note 3  1. Evidence from the accused's personnel records, including evidence favorable to the 
accused, should now be received in accordance with R.C.M.  1001@)(2). These records should be 
shown to the accused.] 
SCM: 	 Do you know any reason why I should not consider these? 
ACC: 
[Note 32. The summary court-martial shall resolve objections under R.C.M. 1002@)(2) and the 
Military Rules of Evidence and then proceed as follows. See also R.C.M. lM)l(b)(3), (4), and (5) 
concerning other evidence which may be introduced.] App. 9, Note  APPENDIX 9 
Extenuation and mitigation  SCM:  In addition to the information already admitted which is favorable 
to you, and which I will consider, you may call witnesses who are 
reasonably available, you may present evidence, and you may make 
a statement. This information may be to explain the circumstances 
of the offense(s), including any reasons for committing the offense(s), 
and to lessen the punishment for the offense(s) regardless of the 
circumstances. You may show particular acts of good conduct or 
bravery, and evidence of your reputation in the service for efficiency, 
fidelity, obedience, temperance, courage, or any other trait desirable 
in a good servicemember. You may call available witnesses or you 
may use letters, affidavits, certificates of military and civil officers, or 
other similar writings. If you introduce such matters, I may receive 
written evidence for the purpose of contradicting the matters you 
presented. If you want me to get some military records that you 
would otherwise be unable to obtain, give me a list of these 
documents. If you intend to introduce letters, affidavits, or other 
documents, but you do not have them, tell me so that I can help you 
-get  them. Do you understand that? 
ACC: 
Rights of accused to testify, 
remain silent, and make an 
unsworn statement 
SCM:  I informed you earlier of your right to testify under oath, to remain 
silent, and to make an unsworn statement about these matters. 
SCM:  Do  you understand these rights? 
ACC: 
SCM:  Do you wish to call witnesses or introduce anything in writing? 
ACC: 
[Note 33. If the accused wants the summary court-martial to obtain evidence, arrange to have the 
evidence produced as soon as practicable.] 
[Note 34. The summary court-martial should now receive evidence favorable to the accused. If the 
accused does not produce evidence, the summary court-martial may do so if there are matters 
favorable to the accused which should be presented.] 
SCM:  Do you wish to testify or make an unsworn statement? 
ACC: 
Questions concerning pleas of 
guilty 
[Note 35. If as a result of matters received on sentencing, including the accused's testimony or an 
unsworn statement, any matter is disclosed which is inconsistent with the pleas of guilty, the 
summary court-martial must immediately inform the accused and resolve the matter. See Note 16.1 
Argument on sentence  SCM:  You may make an argument on an appropriate sentence. 
ACC: Deliberations prior to 
announcing sentence 
Closing the court-martial 
Announcement of sentence 
Adjourning the court-martial 
Entry on charge sheet 
GUIDE FOR SUMMARY COURTS-MARTIAL 	 App. 9, Note 
[Note 36. After receiving all matters relevant to sentencing, the summary court-martial should 
normally close for deliberations. If the summary court-martial decides to close, proceed as follows.] 
SCM: 	 This court-martial is closed for determination of the sentence. Wait 
outside the courtroom until I recall you. 
[Note 37. See Appendix 11 concerning proper form of sentence. Once the summary court-martial 
has determined the sentence, it should reconvene the court-martial and announce the sentence as 
follows.] 
SCM: 	 Please rise. I sentence YOU to 
[Note 38. If the sentence includes confinement, advise the accused as follows.] 
SCM: 	 You have the right to request in writing that [name of convening 
authority] defer your sentence to confinement. Deferment is not a 
form of clemency and is not the same as suspension of a sentence. It 
merely postpones the running of a sentence to confinement. 
[Note 39. Whether or not the sentence includes confinement, advise the accused as follows.] 
SCM: 	 You have the right to submit in writing a petition or statement to 
the convening authority. This statement may include any matters 
you feel the convening authority should consider, a request for 
clemency, or both. This statement must be submitted within 7 days, 
unless you request and convening authority approves an extension of 
up to 20 days. After the convening authority takes action, your case 
will be reviewed by a judge advocate for legal error. You may 
suggest, in writing, legal errors for the judge advocate to consider. 
If, after final action has been taken in your case, you believe that 
there has been a legal error, you may request review of your case by 
The Judge Advocate General of 
understand these rights? 
.Do you 
ACC: 
SCM:  This court-martial is adjourned. 
[Note 40. Record the sentence in the record of trial, inform the convening authority of the findings, 
recommendations for suspension, if any, and any deferment request. If the sentence includes 
confinement, arrange for the delivery of the accused to the accused's commander, or someone 
designated by  the commander, for appropriate action. Ensure that the commander is informed of 
the sentence. Complete the record of trial and forward to the convening authority.] APPENDIX 10 

FORMS OF FINDINGS 

a. Announcement offindings 
See R.C.M. 922. 
In announcing the findings the president or, in cases tried by military judge alone, the military judge 
should announce: 
"(Name of accused), this court-martial finds you 
9, 
The findings should now be announced following one of the forms in b below, or any necessary mod- 
ification or combination thereof. 
b. Forms 
[Note: The following may, in combination with the format for announcing the findings in a above, be 
used as a format for a findings worksheet, appropriately tailored for the specific case.] 
Forms of Findings 
I. Acquittal of all Charges 
Of all Specifications  and Charges: Not Guilty 
11. Findings of Not Guilty only by Reason of Lack of Mental Responsibility 
Of (the) Specification (  ) of (the) Charge (  ) and of (the) Charge 
(  ): Not Guilty only by Reason of Lack of Mental Responsibility 
111. Conviction of all Charges 
Of all Specifications  and Charges: Guilty 
IV. Conviction of all Specifications of some Charges 
Of all Specification(s)  of Charge I: Guilty 

Of Charge I: Guilty 

Of all Specification(s)  of Charge: Not Guilty 

Of Charge 11:Not Guilty 

V. Conviction of some Specifications of a Charge 
Of Specification(s)  of Charge I: Guilty App. lo, Note 
Of Specification(s) 
APPENDIX 10 
of Charge I: Not Guilty 
Of Charge I: Guilty 
VI. Conviction be exceptions 
Of (the) Specification (  ) of Charge I: Guilty except the words " 
99. 
3 
Of the excepted words: Not Guilty 
Of Charge I: (Guilty) (Not Guilty, but Guilty of a violation of Article  ) 
VII. Conviction by exceptions and substitutions 
Of (the) Specification ( 
ing therefor the words " 
)  of Charge I:Guilty except the words " 
99. , 
,"substitut-
Of the excepted words: Not Guilty 
Of the substituted words: Guilty 
Of Charge I: (Guilty) (Not Guilty, but Guilty of a violation of Article  ) 
VIII. Conviction under one Charge of offenses under different Articles 
Of Specification  1 of (the) Charge (  ): Guilty, of Specification 2 of  (the) Charge 
(  ): Guilty, except the words " 
99 
Of (the) Charge (  ), as to Specification 1: Guilty, as to Specification 2: Not Guilty, but Guilty 
of a violation of Article APPENDIX 11 

FORMS OF SENTENCES 

a. Announcement of  sentence 
See R.C.M. 1007. 
In announcing the sentence, the president or, in cases tried by military judge alone, the military judge 
should announce: 
"(Name of accused), this court-martial sentences you 
9, 
The sentence should now be announced following one of the forms contained in b below, or any nec- 
essary modification or combination thereof. Each of the forms of punishment prescribed in b are separate, 
that is, the adjudging of one form of punishment is not contingent upon any other punishment also being ad- 
judged. The forms in c, however, may be combined and modified so long as the punishments adjudged is not 
forbidden by the code and does not exceed the maximum authorized by this Manual (see R.C.M. 1003 and 
Part IV) in the particular case being tried. In announcing a sentence consisting of combined punishments, the 
president or military judge may, for example, state: 
"To be dishonorably discharged from the service, to be confined for one year, to forfeit all 
pay and allowances, and to be reduced to Private, E-1;"  or 
"To be discharged from the service with a bad-conduct discharge, to be confined for six 
months, and to forfeit $35.00 pay per month for six months;" or 
"To be dismissed from the service, to be confined for one year, and to forfeit all pay and 
allowances;" or 
"To perform hard labor without confinement for one month and to forfeit $25.00 pay per 
month for one month." 
b. Single punishment forms 
[Note: The following may, in combination with the format for announcing the sentence in a above, 
be used as a format for a sentence worksheet, appropriately tailored for the specific case.] 
1. To no punishment 
Reprimand 
2.  To be reprimanded. 
Forfeitures, Etc. 
3. To forfeit $  pay per month for  (months) (years). 
4.  To forfeit all pay and allowances. App.  11, Note  APPENDIX 11 
5. To pay the United States a fine of  $  (and to serve (additional) confinement of 
(days) (months) (years) if the fine is not paid). 
Loss of Numbers, Etc. 
6. To (lose  unrestricted numbers) (be placed at the foot of the  's 
list of  present date and to remain there until you  shall have lost unrestricted numbers) (lose 
unrestricted line officer running mate numbers). 
7.  To lose  month's  seniority in the date of  his warrant (as machinist) 
(  ), and to lose corresponding rank in the list of (machinists) (  ) of the 
(Navy) (  1. 
Reduction of Enlisted Personnel 
8. To be reduced to 
Restraint and Hard Labor 
9. To be restricted to the limits of  for (days) (months). 
10. To perform hard labor without confinement for  (days) (months). 
11. To be confined for  (days) (months) (years) (the length of your natural life). 
12. To be confined on (bread and water) (diminished rations) for  days. 
Punitive Discharge 
13. To be discharged from the service with a bad-conduct discharge (Enlisted Personnel only). 
14. To be dishonorably discharged from the service (Enlisted Personnel and Noncommissioned 
Warrant Officers only). 
15. To be dismissed from the service (Commissioned Officers, Commissioned Warrant Officers, Ca- 
dets, and Midshipmen only). 
Death 
16. To be put to death. 
[Note: A court-martial has no authority to suspend a sentence or any part of a sentence. Numbers 6 
and 7 apply only in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.] APPENDIX 12 

MAXIMUM PUNISHMENT CHART 

This chart was compiled for convenience purposes only and is not the authority for specific punishments. See Part IV and 
R.C.M. 1003 for specific limits and additional information concerning maximum punishments. 
Article  Offense  Discharge  Confinement  Forfeitures 
77  Principals (see Part IV, fi 1 and pertinent offenses) 
78  Accessory after the fact (see Part IV, fi 3.e.) 
79  Lesser included offenses (see Part IV, fi 2 and pertinent offenses) 
80  Attempts (see Part IV, fi 4.e.) 
81  Conspiracy (see Part IV, fi 5.e.) 
82  Solicitation 
If solicited offense committed, or attempted, see Part IV, fi 6.e. 
If solicited offense not committed: 
Solicitation to desert 1  ...................................  DD, BCD  3 yrs. 1  Total 
Solicitation to mutiny 1  ..................................  DD, BCD  10 yrs. 1  Total 
Solicitation to commit act of misbehavior before enemy 1  .......  DD, BCD  10 yrs. 1  Total 
Solicitation to commit act of sedition 1  ......................  DD, BCD  10 yrs. 1  Total 
83  Fraudulent enlistment, appointment  ............................  DD, BCD  2 yrs.  Total 
Fraudulent separation  .......................................  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 
84  Effecting unlawful enlistment, appointment, separation .............  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 
85  Desertion 
Intent to avoid hazardous duty, shirk important service  1  ........  DD, BCD  5 yrs. 1  Total 
Other cases 
Terminatedbyapprehension  ..............................  DD, BCD  3 yrs. 1  Total 
Otherwise terminated  ....................................  DD, BCD  2 yrs. 1  Total 
86  Absence without leave, etc. 
Failure to go, going from place of duty  ........................  None  I mo.  2/3  1 
mo. 
Absence from unit, organization, etc. 
Not more than 3 days ....................................  None  1 mo.  2/3  1 
mo. 
More than 3, not more than 30 days  ........................  None  6 mos.  2/3 6 
mos. 
More than 30 days  ......................................  DD, BCD  1 yr.  Total 
More than 30 days and terminated by apprehension  ...........  DD, BCD  1 yr., 6  Total 
mos. 
Absence from guard or watch  ...............................  None  3 mos.  2/3 3 
mos. 
Absence from guard or watch with intent to abandon  ............  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
Absence with intent to avoid maneuvers, field exercises ...........  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
87  Missing movement 
Throughdesign ...........................................  DD, BCD  2 yrs.  Total 
Throughneglect  ..........................................  BCD  1 yr.  Total 
88  Contempt toward officials  ....................................  Dismissal  1 yr.  Total 
89  Disrespect toward superior commissioned officer  ..................  BCD  1 yr.  Total 
90  Assaulting, willfully disobeying superior commissioned officer 
Striking, drawing or lifting up any weapon or offering any violence 
toward superior commissioned officer execution of duty 1  ......  DD, BCD  10 yrs. I  Total App.  12, Art.  APPENDIX 12 
This chart was compiled for convenience purposes only and is not the authority for specific punishments. See 
R.C.M. 1003 for specific limits and additional information concerning maximum punishments. 
Part IV and 
Confinement 
5 yrs. 1 
5 yrs. 
3 yrs. 
1  yr. 
2 yrs. 
1  yr. 
9 mos. 
6 mos. 
3 mos. 
2 yrs. 

6 mos. 

3 mos. 

6 mos. 

1 yr. 

Life 

1 yr. 

6 mos. 

1 yr. 

5 yrs. 

2 yrs. 

1 yr. 

2 yrs. 

3 yrs. 

6 mos. 

5 yrs. 

Life 

Life 

Life 

Life 

6 mos. 

5 yrs. 

Life 

Life 

Life 

Article  Offense 
Willfully disobeying lawful order of superior commissioned officer 1 
91  Insubordinate conduct toward warrant, noncommissioned, petty officer 
Striking or assaulting: 
Warrantofficer  ......................................... 
Superior noncommissioned officer  .......................... 
Other noncommissioned or petty officer  ..................... 
Willfully disobeying: 
Warrant officer  ......................................... 
Noncommissioned or petty officer  .......................... 
Contempt, disrespect toward: 
Warrantofficer ......................................... 
Superior noncommissioned or petty officer  ................... 
Other noncommissioned or petty officer  ..................... 
92  Failure to obey order, regulation 
Violation, failure to obey general order or regulation 2  ........... 
Violation, failure to obey other order 2  ........................ 
Dereliction in performance of duties 
Through neglect, culpable inefficiency  ....................... 
Willful  ................................................ 

93  Cruelty, maltreatment of subordinates  .......................... 

94  Mutiny & sedition  .......................................... 

95  Resisting apprehension, breach of arrest; escape 

Resisting apprehension ..................................... 

Breakingarrest  ........................................... 

Escape from custody, pretrial confinement, or confinement on bread 

and water or diminished rations  ........................... 

Escape from post-trial confinement ........................... 

96  Releasing prisoner without proper authority  ..................... 

Suffering prisoner to escape through neglect  ...................... 

Suffering prisoner to escape through design  ...................... 

97  Unlawful detention .......................................... 

98  Noncompliance with procedural rules, etc. 

Unnecessary delay in disposition of case  ....................... 

Knowingly, intentionally failing to comply, enforce code  ......... 

99  Misbehavior before enemy  .................................... 

100  Subordinate compelling surrender  .............................. 

101  Improper use of countersign  .................................. 

102  Forcing safeguard ........................................... 

103  Captured, abandoned property; failure to secure, etc. 

Of value of $100.00 or less  .................................. 

Of value of more than $100.00  ................................ 

Looting, pillaging  ........................................... 

104  Aiding the enemy  ........................................... 

105  Misconductasprisoner  ...................................... 

Discharge 
DD, BCD 
DD, BCD 
DD, BCD 
DD, BCD 
DD, BCD 
BCD 
BCD 
BCD 
None 
DD, BCD 

BCD 

None 

BCD 

DD, BCD 

Death, DD, BCD 

BCD 

BCD 

DD, BCD 

DD, BCD 

DD, BCD 

BCD 

DD, BCD 

DD, BCD 

BCD 

DD, BCD 

Death, DD, BCD 

Death, DD, BCD 

Death, DD, BCD 

Death, DD, BCD 

BCD 

DD, BCD 

DD, BCD 

Death, DD, BCD 

DD, BCD 

Forfeitures 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
2/3 3 
mos. 
Total 

Total 

2/3 3 

mos. 

Total 

Total 
Total 
Total 

Total 

Total 

Total 

Total 

Total 

Total 

Total 
Total 

Total 

Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 

Total 

Total 

Total 
Total MAXIMUM PUNISHMENT CHART  App.  12, Art. 
This chart was compiled for convenience purposes only and is not the authority for specific punishments. See 
R.C.M. 1003 for specific limits and additional information concerning maximum punishments. 
Article  Offense 
106  Spying  ................................................. 

106a  Espionage 
Cases listed in Art. 106a(a)(l)(Aj(D)  ......................... 
Othercases  .............................................. 
107  False official statements  ...................................... 
108  Military property; loss, damage, destruction, disposition 
Selling, otherwise disposing 
Of value of $100 or less ................................... 
Of value of more than $100.00 ............................. 
Any firearm, explosive or incendiary device 
Damaging, destroying, losing or suffering to be lost, damaged, 
destroyed, sold, or wrongfully disposed: 
Through neglect, of a value of: 
$100.00 or less ........................................ 
Morethan$100.00  .................................... 

Willfully, of a value of 
$100.00 or less ........................................ 
Morethan$100.00  .................................... 
Any firearm, explosive, or incendiary device 
109  Property other than military property of U.S.: loss, damage, 
destruction, disposition: 
Wasting, spoiling, destroying, or damaging property of a value of: 
$1  00.00orless .......................................... 
More than $100.00  ...................................... 
110  Hazarding a vessel 
Willfully and wrongfully  ................................... 
Negligently  .............................................. 
11  1  Drunken driving 
Resulting in personal injury  ................................. 
Othercases  .............................................. 
112  Drunkonduty  ............................................. 
112a  Wrongful use, possession, etc: of controlled substances  3 
Wrongful use, possession, manufacture, or introduction of: 
Amphetamine, cocaine, heroin, lysergic acid diethylamide, 
marijuana (except possession of less than 30 grams or use), 
methamphetamine, opium, phencyclidine, secobarbital, and 
Schedule I, 11, and 111 controlled substances .................. 
Marijuana (possession of less than 30 grams or use), phenobarbital, 
and Schedule IV and V controlled substances ............... 
Wrongful distribution of, or, with intent to distribute, wrongful 
possession, manufacture, introduction, or wrongful importation of or 
exportation of: 
Amphetamine, cocaine, heroin, lysergic acid diethylamide, 
marijuana, methamphetamine, opium, phencyclidine, secobarbital, 
and Schedule I, 11, and I11 controlled substances  .............. 
Discharge 
Mandatory Death, 

DD, BCD 

Death, DD, BCD 

DD, BCD 

DD, BCD 

BCD 

DD, BCD 

DD. BCD 

None 

BCD 

BCD 

DD, BCD 

DD, BCD 

BCD 

DD, BCD 

Death, DD, BCD 

DD, BCD 

DD, BCD 

BCD 

BCD 

DD, BCD 

DD, BCD 

DD, BCD 

Part IV and 
Confinement 
Not 

applicable 

Life 

Life 

5 yrs. 

1 yr. 

10 yrs. 

10 yrs. 

6 mos. 

1 yr. 

1 yr. 

10 yrs. 

10 yrs. 

1 yr. 

5 yrs. 

Life 

2 yrs. 

1 yr., 6 

mos. 

6 mos. 

9 mos. 

5 yrs. 

2 yrs. 

15 yrs. 

Forfeitures 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
2/3 6 

mos. 

Total 

Total 

Total 

Total 

Total 

Total 

Total 

Total 

Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
A12-3 App.  12, Art. 	 APPENDIX 12 
This chart was compiled for convenience purposes only and is not the authority for specific punishments. See Part IV and 
R.C.M. 1003 for specific limits and additional information concerning maximum punishments. 
Article  Offense  Discharge  Confinement 	 Forfeitures 
Phenobarbital and Schedule IV and V controlled substances  DD, BCD  10 yrs.  Total 
113  Misbehavior of sentinel or lookout 
Intimeofwar ........................................  Death, DD, BCD  Life  Total 
In other time: 
While receiving special pay under 37 U.S.C. 310 '..........  DD, BCD  10 yrs.  Total 

Other places  .......................................  DD, BCD  1 yr.  Total 

114  Dueling  ...................................................  DD, BCD  1 yr.  Total 

1  15 	 Malingering 
Feigning illness, etc. 
In time of war, or while receiving special pay under 37 U.S.C. 310  DD, BCD  3 yrs.  Total 
Other  .................................................  DD, BCD  1 yr.  Total 
Intentional self-inflicted  injury 
In time of war, or while receiving special pay under 37 U.S.C. 3 10  DD, BCD  10 yrs.  Total 
Other  .................................................  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 
116  Riot  ......................................................  DD, BCD  10 yrs.  Total 
Breachofpeace .............................................  None  6 mos.  2/3 6 
mos. 
1  17  Provoking speech, gestures  ...................................  None  6 mos. 	 2/3 6 
mos. 
118  Murder 
Article 118(l) or (4)  ....................... Death, mandatory minimum life, DD, BCD  Life  Total 
Article 118(2) or (3)  .......................................  DD, BCD  Life  Total 
119  Manslaughter 
Voluntary  ...............................................  DD, BCD  10 yrs.  Total 
Involuntary  ..............................................  DD, BCD  3 yrs.  Total 
120 	 Rape  .....................................................  Death,DD,BCD  Life  Total 

Carnalknowledge ...........................................  DD, BCD  15 yrs.  Total 

121  Larceny 
Of military property of a value of $100.00 or less  ................  BCD  1 yr.  Total 
Of property other than military property of a value of $100.00 or less  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
Of military property of a value of more than $100.00 or of any 
military motor vehicle, aircraft, vessel, firearm, or explosive .......  DD, BCD  10 yrs.  Total 
Of property other than military property of a value of more than 
$100.00 or any motor vehicle, aircraft, vessel, firearm, or explosive  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 
Wrongful appropriation 
Of value of $100.00 or less  ..................................  None  3 mos.  2/3  3 
mos. 
Of value of more than $100.00 ...............................  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
Of vehicle, aircraft, vessel ...................................  DD, BCD  2 yrs.  Total 
122  Robbery 
Committed with a firearm  ..................................  DD, BCD  15 yrs.  Total 
Othercases  ..............................................  DD, BCD  10 yrs.  Total 
123  Forgery  ...................................................  DD, BCD  5 yrs. 	 Total 

123a 	 Checks, etc., insufficient funds, intent to deceive 
To procure anything of value of: 
$100.00 or less ..........................................  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
Morethan$100.00  ......................................  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total MAXIMUM PUNISHMENT  CHART  App. 12, Art. 
This chart was compiled for convenience purposes only and is not the authority for specific punishments. See Part IV and 
R.C.M. 1003 for specific limits and additional information concerning maximum punishments. 
Article  Offense  Discharge  Confinement  Forfeitures 
For payment of past due obligation, and other cases  .............  BCD  6 mos.  Total 

124  Maiming  ..................................................  DD, BCD  7 yrs.  Total 

125  Sodomy 
By force and without consent ................................  DD, BCD  20 yrs.  Total 
With child under age of  16 years  .............................  DD, BCD  20 yrs.  Total 
Othercases  ..............................................  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 
126  Arson 
Aggravated  ..............................................  DD, BCD  20 yrs.  Total 
Other cases, where property value is: 
$100.00orless ..........................................  DD, BCD  1 yr.  Total 

Morethan$100.00  ......................................  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 

127  Extortion  ...............................................  DD, BCD  3 yrs.  Total 

128  Assaults 
Simple assault  ............................................  None  3 mos.  2/3 3 
mos. 
Assault consummated by battery  ...........:.................  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
Assault upon commissioned officer of U.S. or friendly power not in 
execution of office  .........................................  DD, BCD  3 yrs.  Total 
Assault upon warrant officer, not in execution of office  ...........  DD, BCD  1 yr., 6  Total 
mos. 
Assault upon noncommissioned or petty officer not in execution of 
office  ...................................................  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
Assault upon, in execution of office, person serving as sentinel, 
lookout, security policeman, military policeman, shore patrol, master 
at arms, or civil law enforcement .............................  DD, BCD  3 yrs.  Total 
Assault consummated by battery upon child under age of 16 years  ..  DD, BCD  2 yrs.  Total 
Assault with dangerous weapon or means likely to produce grievous 
bodily harm or death: 
Committed with loaded firearm  ............................  DD, BCD  8 yrs.  Total 

Othercases  ............................................  DD, BCD  3 yrs.  Total 

Assault in which grievous bodily harm is intentionally inflicted: 
Withaloadedfirearm  ....................................  DD, BCD  10 yrs.  Total 
Othercases  ............................................  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 
129  Burglary  ..................................................  DD, BCD  10 yrs.  Total 

130  Housebreaking  .............................................  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 

131  Perjury  ...................................................  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 

132  Frauds against the United States 
Offenses under article 132(1) or (2)  ...........................  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 
Offenses under article 132(3) or (4) 
$100.00orless ..........................................  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
Morethan$100.00  ......................................  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 
133  Conduct unbecoming officer (see Part IV, para. 59e). ...............  Dismissal  1  yr. or as  Total 
prescribed 
134  Abusing public animal  .......................................  None  3 mos.  2/3 3 
mos. 
Adultery  ..................................................  DD, BCD  1 yr.  Total 
Assault, indecent  ...........................................  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total App. 12, Art.  APPENDIX 12 
This chart was compiled for convenience purposes only and is not the authority for specific punishments. See Part IV and 
R.C.M. 1003 for specific limits and additional information concerning maximum punishments. 
Article  Offense  Discharge  Confinement  Forfeitures 
Assault 
With intent to commit murder or rape  ........................  DD, BCD  20 yrs.  Total 
With intent to commit voluntary manslaughter, robbery, sodomy, 
......................................... arson, or burglary  DD, BCD  10 yrs.  Total 
With intent to commit housebreaking .........................  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 
Bigamy  ...................................................  DD, BCD  2 yrs.  Total 
Bribery  ...................................................  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 
Graft  .....................................................  DD, BCD  3 yrs.  Total 
Burning with intent to defraud  ................................  DD, BCD  10 yrs.  Total 
Check, worthless, making and uttering-by  dishonorably failing to 
maintainfunds  .............................................  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
Cohabitation, wrongful  ......................................  None  4 mos.  2/3 4 
mos. 
Correctional custody, escape from ..............................  DD, BCD  1 yr.  Total 
Correctional custody, breach of  ................................  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
Debt, dishonorably failing to pay  ..............................  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
Disloyal statements  .........................................- DD, BCD  3 yrs.  Total 
Disorderly conduct 
Under such circumstances as to bring discredit  .................  None  4 mos.  2/3 4 
mos. 
Othercases  ..............................................  None  1 mo.  2/3  1 
mo. 
Drunkenness 
Aboard ship or under such circumstances as to bring discredit  .....  None  3 mos.  2/3  3 
mos. 
Othercases  ................................................  None  1 mo.  2/3  1 
mo. 
Drunk and disorderly 
Aboardship  .............................................  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
Under such circumstances as to bring discredit  .................  None  6 mos.  2/3  6 
mos. 
Othercases  ..............................................  None  3 mos.  2/3  3 
mos. 
Drinking liquor with prisoner  .................................  None  3 mos.  2/3  3 
mos. 
Drunkprisoner .............................................  None  3 mos.  2/3  3 
mos. 
Drunkenness-incapacitating  oneself for performance of duties through 
prior indulgence in intoxicating liquor or drugs  ...................  None  3 mos.  2/3  3 
mos. 
False or unauthorized pass offenses 
Possessing or using with intent to defraud or deceive, or making, 
altering, counterfeiting, tampering with, or selling  ...............  DD, BCD  3 yrs.  Total 
All other cases  ...........................................  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
False pretenses, obtaining services under 
Of a value of $100.00 or less .................................  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
Of a value of more than $100.00  .............................  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 
............................................. Falseswearing  DD, BCD  3 yrs.  Total 
Firearm, discharging-through  negligence  .......................  None  3 mos.  2/3  3 
mos. MAXIMUM PUNISHMENT CHART  App.  12, Art. 
This chart was compiled for convenience purposes only and is not the authority for specific punishments. See Part IV and 
R.C.M. 1003 for specific limits and additional information concerning maximum punishments. 
Article  Offense  Discharge  Confinement  Forfeitures 
Firearm, discharging-willfully,  under such circumstances as to 
endangerhumanlife .........................................  DD, BCD  1 yr.  Total 
Fleeing scene of accident  .....................................  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
.............................................. Fraternization  Dismissal  2 yrs.  Total 
.................................. Gambling with subordinates  None  3 mos.  2/3  3 
mos. 
Homicide, negligent  .........................................  BCD  1 yr.  Total 
Impersonation 
With intent to defraud  .....................................  DD, BCD  3 yrs.  Total 
............................................. All other cases  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
............................... Indecent act, liberties with child  DD, BCD  7 yrs.  Total 
Indecentexposure ...........................................  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
Indecent language 
Communicated to child under 16 yrs  .........................  DD, BCD  2 yrs.  Total 
Othercases  ..............................................  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
Indecent acts with another  ....................................  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 
Jumping from vessel into the water  .............................  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
................................................ Kidnapping  DD, BCD  Life  Total 
Mail, taking, opening, secreting, destroying, or stealing .............  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 
Mails, depositing or causing to be deposited obscene matters in  ......  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 
Misprision of serious offense  ..................................  DD, BCD  3 yrs.  Total 
Obstructingjustice  ..........................................  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 
Wrongful interference with an adverse administrative proceeding  . .  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 
Pandering  .................................................  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 
................................................ Prostitution  DD, BCD  1 yr.  Total 
Parole, violation of  ..........................................  BCD  6 mos.  2/3 6 
mos. 
DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 
Public record, altering, concealing, removing, mutilating, obliterating,  DD. BCD  3 yrs.  Total 
............................................... ordestroying 
Quarantine, breaking  ........................................  None  6 mos.  2/3 6 
mos. 
Restriction, breaking  ...................................  None  1 mo.  2/3  1 
mo. 
Seizure, destruction, removal, or disposal of property to prevent  .....  DD, BCD  1 yr.  Total 
Sentinel, lookout 
Disrespect to .............................................  None  3 mos.  2/3  3 
mos. 
Loitering or wrongfully sitting on post by 
In time of war or while receiving special pay  .................  DD, BCD  2 yrs.  Total 
Othercases  ............................................  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
Soliciting another to commit an offense (see Part IV, para. 105e) 
Stolen property, knowingly receiving, buying, concealing 
Of a value of $100.00 or less .................................  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
Ofavalueofmore than $100.00  .............................  DD, BCD  3 yrs.  Total 
Straggling  .................................................  None  3 mos.  2/3 3 
mos. 
Testify, wrongfully refusing to .................................  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total 
Threat, bomb, or hoax  .......................................  DD, BCD  5 yrs.  Total App. 12, Art.  APPENDIX 12 
This chart was compiled for convenience purposes only and is not the authority for specific pun~shments.  See Part IV  and 
R.C.M. 1003 for specific limits and additional information concerning maximum punishments. 
Article  Offense  Discharge  Confinement  Forfeitures 
Threat, communicating  ......................................  DD, BCD  3 yrs.  Total 
Unlawful entry  .............................................  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
Weapon, concealed, carrying ..................................  BCD  1  yr.  Total 
Wearing unauthorized insignia, decoration, badge, ribbon, device, or  BCD  6 mos.  Total 
................................................  lapel button 
Notes: 
1. Suspended in time of war. 
2. See paragraph 16e(1) 8 (2) Note, Part IV 
3. When any offense under paragraph 37, Part IV, is committed: while the accused is on duty as a sentinel or lookout; on board a vessel or aircraft 
used by or under the control of the armed forces; in or at a missile launch facility used by or under the control of the armed forces; while receiving 
special pay under 37 U.S.C.  sec. 310; in time of war; or in a confinement facility used by or under the control of the armed forces, the maximum 
period of confinement authorized  for such offense shall be increased by 5 years. APPENDIX 13 

GUIDE FOR PREPARATION OF RECORD OF TRIAL BY GENERAL COURT- 

MARTIAL AND BY SPECIAL COURT-MARTIAL WHEN A VERBATIM RECORD IS 

NOT REQUIRED 

a.  Record of  trial  tablish lawful jurisdiction  over the accused and the 
Note. See first three notes at beginning of Ap-  offenses. See R.C.M.  1  103(e). 
pendix 14. If a verbatim record is not required (see  This appendix is to be used as a general guide; 
R.C.M. 1103(h)(2)(C) and (c)(2)), a summarized re-  the actual record may depart from it as appropriate. 
port of testimony, objections, and other proceedings  The manner of summarizing several items of proce- 
is permitted. In the event of an acquittal of all  dure is shown in Appendix 14a. 
charges and specifications, or termination of the pro-  Note. All records of trial should begin as fol- 
ceedings prior to findings by withdrawal, mistrial, or  lows: 
dismissal, the record may be further summarized 
and need only contain sufficient information to es- 
Title 
RECORD OF TRIAL 
of 
(Name-lmt. first, middle initial)  (Service No.)  (Grade) 
(Organization and armed force)  (Station or ship) 
by 
COURT-MARTIAL 
Convened by 
(Title of convening authority) 
-
(Command of convening authority) 
Tried at 
on  19 
(Place or places of trial)  @ate or dates of trial) 
COPIES OF RECORD 
Copies of record App. 13 
Receipt for record 
Certificate in lieu of receipt 
APPENDIX 13 
copy of record furnished the accused as per attached certificate 
or receipt.  copy(ies) of record forwarded herewith. 
RECEIPT FOR COPY OF RECORD 
I hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of the above-described record of trial, 
delivered to me at  this  day of 
(Signature of accused or defense counsel) 
(Name of accused or defense counsel) 
Note. See R.C.M. 1104(b)(l) concerning service of record on the accused or defense Counsel 
CERTIFICATE 
19 
(Place)  @ate) 
I certify that on this day delivery of a copy of the above-described record of trial 
was made to the accused, 
at  , by 
(Name of accused)  (Place of  delivery) 
(Means of effecting delivery, i.e., mail messenger, etc.) 
and that the receipt of the accused had not been received on the date this record 
was forwarded to the convening authority. The receipt of the accused will be 
forwarded as soon as it is received. 
(Signature of trial counsel) 
(Name of trial counsel) 
Note. If accused's defense counsel receives the record, the trial counsel must attach an explanation to 
the record. See R.C.M. 1104(b)(l)(C). The following format may be used: 
The accused's defense counsel was served the accused's copy of the record 
because (the accused so requested in a written request, which is attached) (the 
accused so requested on the record at the court-martial) (the accused was 
transferred to  ) (the accused is absent without authority) 
(Signature of trial counsel) 
(Name of trial counsel) 
Note. If the accused cannot be served and has no counsel to receive the record, an explanation for 
failure to serve the record will be attached to the record. See R.C.M. 1104(b)(l)(C). The following 
format may be used: 
The accused was not served a copy of this record because the accused (is absent 
without authority) (  ) Accused has no defense counsel to receive 
the record because (defense counsel has been excused under R.C.M. Article 39(a) session 
Convening orders 
Time of session 
Military judge, counsel 
members present and absent 
Accused and defense counsel 
present 
Swearing reporter; 
interpreter 
Qualification  of trial counsel 
GUIDE FOR PREPARATION OF RECORD  App. 13 
(Signature of trial counsel) 
(Name of trial counsel) 
PROCEEDINGS OF  A  COURT-MARTIAL ARTICLE 
39(a) SESSION. The summarized record of an Article 39(a) session should 
proceed as follows: 
Note. If trial was before a special court-martial without a military judge, there will have been no 
Article 39(a) session. However, generally the same sequence will be followed except as noted below. 
In special courts-martial without a military judge, substituteC'president"  for "military judge"  when it 
appears, andG'court-martial"  for "Article 39(a) session." 
The military judge called the Article 39(a) session to order (at) (on board) 
,at  hours, 
19  ,pursuant to the following orders: 
Note. Here insert a copy of the convening orders and copies of any amending orders. Any written 
orders detailing the military judge and counsel will be attached. Any request of an enlisted accused for 
enlisted members will be inserted immediately following the convening orders, together with any 
declaration of the nonavailability of such enlisted persons. Any written request for trial by the 
military judge alone will also be inserted at this point. See R.C.M. 503(a)(2), 903. 
Note. The reporter should note and record the time and date of the beginning and ending of each 
session of the court-martial. For example: 
The session was called to order at  hours, 
19 
The session (adjourned) (recessed) at  hours, 
PERSONS PRESENT 
Note. Here list the names of the military judge, counsel, accused, and members if present. 
PERSONS ABSENT 
Note. The names of the members need not be listed if members are not present. The absence of other 
detailed persons should be noted. The record should include any reasons given for the absence of 
detailed persons. If the accused was questioned about the absence of any detailed defense counsel, this 
inquiry should be summarized at the point in the record at which such inquiry occurred. 
The accused and the following (detailed defense counsel and associate or assistant 
defense counsel) (civilian or indiyidual military counsel) were present: 
The following detailed (reporter) (and) (interpreter) (was) (were) (had previously 
been) sworn: 
Note. Applicable only when a reporter or interpeter is used. 
The trial counsel announced the legal qualifications and status as to oaths of all 
members of the prosecution (and that (he) (she) (they) had been detailed by App. 13 
Prior participation of trial 
counsel 
Qualification of defense 
counsel 
Prior participation of defense 
counsel 
Inquiry concerning Article 
38@) 
Personnel sworn 
Challenge: military judge 
Request for trial by military 
judge alone 
APPENDIX 13 
The trial counsel further stated that no member of the prosecution had acted in a 
manner which might tend to disqualify (him) (her) except as indicated below. 
Note. If a member of the prosecution is unqualified or disqualified under R.C.M. 502(d) that will be 
shown, together with the action taken under R.C.M. 901(d). Any inquiry or hearing into the matter 
should be summarized. 
The detailed defense counsel announced the legal qualifications and status as to 
oaths of all members of the defense (and) that he (and  ) had 
been detailed by  .) 
Note. Legal qualifications of any civilian or individual military counsel will be shown. 
The defense counsel stated that no member of the defense had acted in a manner 
which might tend to disqualify (him) (her) except as indicated below. 
Note. If a member of the defense is unqualified or disqualified under R.C.M.  502(d), the record will 
show that fact and the action taken under R.C.M. 901(d). Any inquiry or hearing into the matter 
should be summarized. 
The military judge informed the accused of the rights concerning counsel as set 
forth in Article 38(b) and R.C.M. 901(d). 
The accused responded that he/she understood the rights with respect to counsel, 
and that he/she chose to be defended by 
The military judge and the personnel of the prosecution and defense who were 
not previously sworn in accordance with Article 42(a) were sworn. The 
prosecution and each accused were extended the right to challenge the military 
judge for cause. 
The military judge was (not) challenged for cause (by  ) (on the 
ground that  1. 
Note. The record should show the grounds for the challenge, a summary of evidence presented, if  any, 
and the action taken. 
The military judge ascertained that the accused had been advised of his right to 
request trial by the military judge alone and that the accused did (not) desire to 
submit such a request. 
Note. If the accused requests trial by the military judge alone, any written request will be included in 
the record. The action on the request, whether oral or written, should be indicated as follows: 
After ascertaining that the accused had consulted with defense counsel and had 
been informed of the identity of the military judge and of the right to trial by 
members, the military judge (approved) (disapproved) the accused's request for 
trial by military judge alone. 
Note. If the military judge announced at this point that the court-martial was assembled, the record 
should so reflect. If assembly was announced at a different point it should be so shown in the record. GUIDE FOR PREPARATION OF RECORD 	 App. 13 
Note. If the military judge disapproved the accused's request, this fact and any reasons given for the 
disapproval should be summarized. 
Note. If the accused did not submit, or the military judge disapproved, a request for trial by  military 
judge alone, and if the accused is an enlisted person, the following should be included: 
Request for enlisted members 	 The trial counsel announced that the accused had (not) made a request in writing 
that the membership of the court-martial include enlisted persons. The defense 
counsel announced that the accused had been advised of the right to request 
enlisted members and that the accused did (not) want to request enlisted 
members. 
Note. If the accused did request enlisted members, the written request will be included in the record. 
Convening authority identified 	(Name, rank, and organization of  convening authority) convened the court- 
martial and referred the charges and specifications to it. 
Note. In a special court-martial without a military judge, ordinarily the examination and challenges of 
members would occur at this point. The format used below for examination and challenges may be 
inserted here as appropriate. 
Arraignment  The accused was arraigned on the following charges and specifications: 
Note. Here insert the original charge sheet. If there are not enough copies of the charge sheet to insert 
in each copy of the record, copy verbatim from the charge sheet the charges and specifications, and 
the name of the accuser, the affidavit, and the reference to the court-martial for trial. 
Motions  Note. If any motions were made at arraignment, the substance of the motion, a summary of any 
evidence presented concerning it, and the military judge's  ruling will be included in the record. 
Motions or objections made at other times in the court-martial should be similarly treated at a point 
in the record corresponding to when they were raised. 
Pleas  The accused pleaded as follows: 
To all the Specifications and Charges: (Not Guilty) (Guilty) 
To Specification 1 of Charge I: (Not Guilty) (Guilty) 
To Specification 2 of Charge 1: (Not Guilty) (Guilty) 
To Charge I: (Not Guilty) (Guilty) 
etc. 
Note. If the accused pleads guilty the plea inquiry should be summarized. The following may be used 
as a guide. App. 13 
Guilty plea inquiry 
APPENDIX 13 
The military judge inquired into the providence of the accused's pleas of guilty. 
The military judge informed the accused of: the right to counsel [if the accused 
had no counsel]; of the right to plead not guilty and to be tried by court-martial 
and that at such court-martial the accused would have the right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses against the accused and the right against self- 
incrimination; that by pleading guilty the accused waived the rights to trial of the 
offense(s), to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and against self- 
incrimination; and that the military judge would question the accused, under 
oath, about the offense(s) to which the accused pleaded guilty and that if the 
accused answered those questions under oath, on the record, and in the presence 
of counsel, the accused's answers could be used against the accused in a 
prosecution for perjury or false statement. The accused stated that he/she 
understood these rights. The military judge questioned the accused and 
determined that the plea(s) of guilty (was) (were) voluntary and not the result of 
force or threats or of promises (other than those in the pretrial agreement). The 
military judge informed the accused of the elements of the offense(s) and the 
maximum punishment which could be imposed for (this) (these) offense(s). The 
accused stated that he/she understood. 
The military judge asked the accused about the offense(s) to which the accused 
pleaded guilty. Under oath the accused stated as follows: 
Note. Here summarize the accused's description of the offense@). 
The military judge ascertained that there was (not) a pretrial agreement in the 
case. 
Note. If there was a pretrial agreement, the military judges's  inquiry into it should be summarized. 
The following may be used as a guide: 
The pretrial agreement was marked as Appellate Exhibit(s) 

(The military judge did not examine Appellate Exhibit  at this 

time.) The military judge inquired and ensured that the accused understood the 

agreement and that the parties agreed to its terms. 

Note. If there was a question or dispute as to the meaning of any term in  the agreement, the resolution 
of that matter should be described. 
Note. If the accused entered a conditional guilty plea (see R.C.M. 910(a)(2)), this will be included in 
the record. 
The military judge found the accused's pleas of guilty provident and accepted 
them. 
Note. If findings were entered (see R.C.M. 910(g)) on any charges and specifications at this point, the 
record should so reflect. See FINDINGS below for format. 
Note. If the accused pleaded not guilty to any charge(s) and specification(s) which were not dismissed 
or withdrawn, in trial before military judge alone, proceed with PRESENTATION OF 
PROSECUTION CASE. If the accused pleaded guilty to all charge@) and specification(s) in trial 
before military judge alone, proceed with SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS below. If trial was before 
members proceed with INITIAL SESSION WITH MEMBERS below. Members sworn 
preliminary instructions 
GUIDE FOR PREPARATION OF RECORD 	 App. 13 
Note. If the court-martial recessed, closed, or adjourned, or if an Article 39(a) session terminated and 
a session of the court-martial begins, the record should indicate the time of the recess, closing, or 
adjournment, and the time of reopening, using the following formats: 
For example: 
The Article 39(a) session terminated at 	 hours, 
19 	 . The court-martial (recessed) (adjourned) (closed) at 
hours,  19 
Note. Whenever the court-martial reopens after a recess or adjournment, or after being closed, the 
record should indicate whether any party, member, or the military judge previously present was 
absent, or, if not previously present, was now present. Persons present for the first time should be 
identified by name. For example: 
The military judge and all parties previously present were again present. (The 
following members were also present  .) The members were (not) 
present. 
The military judge and all parties previously present were again present, except 
,detailed defense counsel who had been excused by 
,certified in accordance with Article 27(b) 
was present as individual military counsel, and was previously sworn. 
INITIAL SESSION WITH MEMBERS 
Note. Except in a special court-martial without a military judge, ordinarily members will be first 
present at this point. In a special court-martial without a military judge, ordinarily the members will 
he sworn and examined immediately after the accused has been afforded the opportunity to request 
enlisted members. In such cases, the following matters should be inserted at the appropriate point in 
the record. 
The members of the court-martial were sworn in accordance with R.C.M. 807. 
Note. If the military judge announced at this point that the court-martial was assembled, the record 
should so reflect. If assembly was announced at a different point, it should be so shown in the record. 
Note. If the military judge gave preliminary instructions to members, this should be stated at the 
point at which they were given. 
The military judge instructed the members concerning their duties, the conduct 
of the proceedings, (  ). App. 13 
Announcement of pleas 
Opening statement 
Testimony 
APPENDIX 13 
Note. If counsel examined the members concerning their qualifications, the record should so state. If 
any member was challenged for cause, the grounds for challenge should he summarized. In addition, 
when a challenge is denied, the challenged member's statements concerning the matter in question 
should be summarized in the record. For example: 
Trial and defense counsel examined the members concerning their qualifications. 
,member was questioned concerning  ,and 
stated, under oath as follows: 
The offense charged is, in my opinion, very serious, and worthy of a punitive 
discharge. My mind is not made up. I would consider all the evidence and the 
instructions of the military judge before deciding on an appropriate sentence. 
The defense challenged  for cause. The challenge was denied. 
Neither side had any further challenges for cause. The trial counsel challenged 
peremptorily. 
The defense counsel challenged  peremptorily (and stated that it 
would have challenged another member had the challenge of 
for cause been sustained). 
and  were excused and withdrew from the 
courtroom. 
Note. If any part of the examination of members is done outside the presence of other members, this 
should be stated in the record. If challenges are made at an Article 39(a) session this should be stated 
in the record. 
Note. If the accused was arraigned at an Article 39(a) session, ordinarily the military judge will have 
announced at this point to the members how the accused pleaded to the charges and specifications, 
and the record should so state. If the pleas were mixed and the members were not made aware at this 
point of the offense(s) to which the accused pleaded guilty the record should so state. 
The military judge informed the members that the accused had entered pleas of 
(Not Guilty) (Guilty) to (the) (all) Charge(s) and Specification(s) 
PRESENTATION OF PROSECUTION CASE 
The trial counsel made (an) (no) opening statement. The defense counsel made 
(an) (no) opening statement at this time. 
Note. The record will contain a summary of the testimony presented. An example of the manner in 
which testimony may be summarized follows: 
The following witnesses for the prosecution were sworn and testified in substance 
as follows: 
(name of witness, rank, and organization) Objection and ruling 
Stipulation 
Opening statement 
Closing argument 
Instructions 
GUIDE FOR PREPARATION OF RECORD  App.  13 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
I know the accused,  ,who is in the military service and a 
member of my company. We both sleep in the same barracks. When I went to 
bed on the night of October 7, 1984, I put my wallet under my pillow. the wallet 
had $7.00 in it; a $5.00 bill and two $1.00 bills. Sometime during the night 
something woke me up but I turned over and went to sleep again. When I woke 
up the next morning, my wallet was gone. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
I don't know the serial numbers on any of the bills. One of the $1.00 bulls was 
patched together with scotch tape and one of the fellows told me that the accused 
had used a $1.00 bill just like that in a poker game the day after my wallet was 
missing. 
Upon objection by the defense, so much of the answer of the witness as pertained 
to what he had been told was stricken. 
The trial counsel offered in evidence a stipulation of fact entered into between the 
trial counsel, defense counsel, and the accused. The military judge ascertained 
that the accused understood and consented to the stipulation. It was admitted as 
Prosecution Exhibit 1. 
PRESENTATION OF DEFENSE CASE 
The defense counsel made (an) (no) opening statement. The following witnesses 
for the defense were sworn and testified in substance as follows: 
EVIDENCE IN REBUTTAL, SURREBUTTAL 
WITNESSES CALLED BY THE COURT-MARTIAL 
The trial counsel made (an) (no) argument. 

The defense counsel made (an) (no) argument. 

The trial counsel made (an) (no) argument in rebuttal. 

The military judge instructed the members in accordance with R.C.M. 920, 

including the elements of each offense, (and of the lesser included offense(s) of 

) (the defense(s) of  ,) (the following evidentiary 
matters,) the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, and burden of proof as 
required by Article 5  l(c), and on the procedures for voting on the findings 
worksheet. (The members were given Appellate Exhibit  , 
findings worksheet.) (The members were given Appellate Exhibit 
,a copy of the military judge's instructions.) (There were no 
objections to the instructions or requests for additional instructions.) 
Note. If any party requested instructions which were not given, or objected to the instructions given, 
these matters should be summarized in the record. App.  13 
Closing 
Findings by members 
Findings by military judge 
alone 
Announcement 
Data as to service 
APPENDIX 13 
The court-martial closed at 
19 
hours, 
The court-martial reopened at 
19 
hours, 
Note. If the military judge examined a findings worksheet and gave additional instructions, these 
should be summarized. 
FINDINGS 
The president announced that the accused was found: 

Of all Charges and Specifications: (Not Guilty) (Guilty) 

Of Specification 1 of Charge I: (Not Guilty) (Guilty) 

Of Specification 2 of Charge I: (Not Guilty) (Guilty) 

Of Charge I: (Not Guilty) (Guilty) 

Of the Specification of Charge 11: Not Guilty 

Of Charge 11: Not Guilty 

etc. 
Note. In trial by the military judge alone, there would be no instructions given, but the military judge 
may make general and special findings. Any request for special findings should be summarized, and if 
submitted in writing, the request should be attached as an Appellate Exhibit. The general findings 
must be announced in open session with all parties present and may be recorded in the record in the 
following form, together with any special findings announced at that time: 
The military judge announced the following general (and special) findings (and 
directed that  be appended to the record as Appellate Exhibit 
) (and stated that the special findings would be furnished to the 
reporter prior to authentication for insertion in the record as Appellate Exhibit 
1: 
Of all the Specifications and Charges: Guilty 

Of the Specification of Charge I: Guilty. 

Of Charge I: Guilty 

Of the Specification of Charge 11: Not Guilty. 

Of Charge 11: Not Guilty 

Note. All general findings should be recorded as indicated above. Special findings delivered orally 
should be summarized. Any written findings, opinion or memorandum of decision should be 
appended to the record as an appellate exhibit and copies furnished to counsel for both sides. 
Note. If the accused was acquitted of all charges and specifications, proceed to adjournment. 
SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS 
The trial counsel presented the data as to pay, service, and restraint of the 
accused as shown on the charge sheet. There were no objections to the data. Introduction of exhibits 
Inquiry of accused 
Argument 
Instructions 
Closing 
Reopening 
Announcement 
GUIDE FOR PREPARATION OF RECORD  App. 13 
The trial counsel offered Prosecution Exhibits  , 
,and  for identification, matters from the 
accused's personnel records. (The defense did not object.) (The defense objected 
to Prosecution Exhibit  for identification on grounds that it was 
not properly authenticated.) (The objection was (overruled) (sustained).) 
(Prosecution Exhibits  ,and 
were (not) received in evidence.) 
Note. If the prosecution presented evidence in aggravation or of the accused's rehabilitative potential, 
this evidence should be summarized here, in the same way as evidence on the merits, above. 
The military judge informed the accused of the right to present matters in 
extenuation and mitigation, including the right to make a sworn or an unsworn 
statement or to remain silent. In response to the military judge the accused stated 
that he/she chose to (testify) (make an unsworn statement) (remain silent). 
Note. If the defense calls witnesses in extenuation and mitigation, the testimony should be 
summarized in the record. If the accused makes an oral unsworn statement, personally or through 
counsel, this should be shown and the matters contained in the statement summarized. 
The prosecution made (an) (no) argument on sentence. The defense made (an) 
(no) argument on sentence. 
The military judge instructed the members that the maximum punishment which 
could be adjudged for the offense(s) of which the accused had been found guilty 
was:  The military judge also instructed the members 
concerning the procedures for voting, the responsibility of the members, and the 
matters the members should consider in accordance with R.C.M. 1005(e). (The 
members were given Appellate Exhibit  ,a sentence worksheet.) 
(The members were given Appellate Exhibit  ,a copy of the 
military judge's  instructions.) (There were no objections to the instructions or 
requests for additional instructions.) 
Note. If any party requested instructions which were not given, or objected to the instructions given, 
these matters should be summarized in the record. 
Note. If, in trial before military judge alone, the military judge announces what the military judge 
considers to be the maximum punishment, the stated maximum should be recorded. 
The court-martial closed at  hours, 
The court-martial reopened at  hours, 
Note. If the military judge examined a sentencing worksheet and gave additional instructions, these 
should be summarized. 
The (military judge) (president) announced the following sentence: App. 13 	 APPENDIX 13 
Note. If trial was by military judge alone and there was a pretrial agreement, ordinarily the military 
judge will examine any sentence limitation after announcing the sentence. Any inquiry conducted at 
this point should be summarized. 
Pretrial agreement 	 The military judge examined Appellate Exhibit  .The military 
judge stated that, based on the sentence adjudged, the convening authority (was 
obligated, under the agreement to approve no sentence in excess of 
)(could approve the sentence adjudged if the convening 
authority so elected) (  ). 
Note. The military judge must inform the accused of the accused's post-trial and appellate rights. See 
R.C.M.  1010. The following is an example: 
Advice concerning post-trial 	 The military judge informed the accused of: the right to submit matters to the 
and appellate rights 	 convening authority to consider before taking action; (the right to have the case 
examined in the Office of The Judge Advocate General and the effect of waiver or 
withdrawal of such right;) the right to apply for relief from The Judge Advocate 
General; and the right to the advice and assistance of counsel in the exercise of 
the foregoing rights or any decision to waive them. 
Adjournment 	 The court-martial adjourned at  hours, 
b.  Examination of record by defense counsel 
Note. When the defense counsel has examined the record of trial before authentication the following 
form is appropriate: 
Form 	 "I have examined the record of trial in the foregoing case. 
(Grade) (Name), Defense Counsel" 
Note. If the defense counsel was not given the opportunity to examine the record before 
authentication, the reasons should be attached to the record. See R.C.M. 1103(i)(l)(B). 
c.  Authentication of record of trial 
Military judge 	 (1) By general or special court-martial with members and a military judge 
(Captain) (Colonel),  Military Judge [or (LTJG) (1LT) 
, 	 Trial Counsel, because of (death) (disability) (absence) of the 
military judge.] [(LCDR) (Major) or 	 ,a member in lieu of the 
military judge and the trial counsel because of (death) (disability) (absence) of the 
military judge and of (death) (disability) (absence) of the trial counsel.] 
(2) By general or special court-martial consisting of only a military judge GUIDE FOR PREPARATION OF RECORD  App. 13 
(Captain) (Colonel) ,  Military Judge [or (LTJG) (1 LT) 
,  Trial Counsel, because of  (death) (disability) (absence) of  the 
military judge.] [or the court reporter in lieu of the military judge and trial 
counsel because of (death) (disability) (absence) of the trial counsel.] 
President  (3) By  special court-martial without a military judge 
[(CDR) (LTC)  ,President [or (LTJG) (1 LT) 

Trial Counsel, because of (death) (disability) (absence) of the president.] [or (LT) 

(CPT)  a member in lieu of the president and the trial counsel 

because of (death) (disability) (absence) of the trial counsel.] 

Note. If the rank of any person authenticating the record has changed since the court-martial, the 
current rank should be indicated, followed by  "formerly 
d.  Exhibits. See R.C.M. 1  103(b)(2)(D) 
Note. Following the end of the transcript of the proceedings, insert any exhibits which were received 
in evidence, or, with the permission of the military judge, copies, photographs, or descriptions of any 
exhibits which were received in evidence and any appellate exhibits. 
e.  Attachments 
Note. Attach to the record the matters listed in R.C.M. 1103(b)(3). 
f.  Certificate of correction 
Note. See Appendix 14f APPENDIX 14 

GUIDE FOR PREPARATION OF RECORD OF TRIAL BY GENERAL COURT- 

MARTIAL AND BY SPECIAL COURT-MARTIAL WHEN A VERBATIM RECORD 

IS REQUIRED 

a. 	Record of trial  As a general rule, all proceedings in the case 
~  ~ E~~~~~~~ ~  should be recorded verbatim. See R.C.M. 1103.  t . or interlineations should be ini- 
tialed bv those who authenticate the record.  This appendix is not a complete record of trial. 
Pages will be numbered at the bottom; margins  It is to be used by the reporter and trial counsel as a 
of  1 1/2 inches will be left at the top to permit bind-  guide in the preparation of the completed record of 
ing, and 1 inch at the bottom and left side of each  trial in all general and special court-martial cases in 
page, using 8 1/2 x 11 inch paper.  which a verbatim record is required. 
Words on the margins of this appendix are not 
part of the form of record. 
RECORD OF TRIAL 
of 
(Name: last, first, middle initial) 	 (Service No.)  (Rank or grade) 
(Organization and armed force) 	 (Station or ship) 
COURT-MARTIAL 
Convened by 
(Title of convening authority) 
(Command of  convening authority) 
on 
(Place or places of trial) 	 (Date or dates of  trial) 
Note. The title should be followed by an index. The form for this index will be as prescribed in publications of the Secretary con- 
cerned. However, it should cover important phases of the trial, witnesses who testified, and exhibits that are appended to the record. 
COPIES OF RECORD 
Copies of record  copy of record furnished the accused as per attached certificate 
or receipt. 
copies of record forwarded herewith. 
19-
App. 14 
Receipt for record 
Certificate in lieu of receipt 
Convening orders 
APPENDIX 14 
RECEIPT FOR COPY OF RECORD 
I hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of the above-described record of trial, 
delivered to me at  this day of  , 
(Signature of accused) 
(Name of accused) 
CERTIFICATE 
19 
(Place)  (Date) 
I certify that on this day delivery of a copy of the above-described record of trial 
was made to the accused,  ,  at 
(Name of accused) 
by  and that the receipt of the accused had  9 
(Place of  delivery)  (Means of Delivery) 
not been received on the date this record was forwarded to the convening 
authoritf. The receipt of the accused will be forwarded as soon as it is received. 
(Signature of trial counsel) 
(Name of trial counsel) 
Note. If the accused's defense counsel receives the record, the trial counsel must attach an explanation 
to the record. See R.C.M. 1104(b)(l)(C). The following format may be used: 
The accused's defense counsel was served the accused's copy of the record because (the accused so 
requested in a written request, which is attached) (the accused so requested on the record at the court- 
martial) (the accused was transferred to  )  (the accused is absent without 
authority) (  1. 
(Signature of trial counsel) 
(Name of trial counsel) 
Note. If the accused cannot be served and has no counsel to receive the record, an explanation for 
failure to serve the record will be attached to the record. See R.C.M. 1104(b)(l)(C). The following 
format may be used: 
The accused was not served a copy of this record because the accused (is absent 
without authority) (  ). Accused has no defense counsel to receive 
the record because (defense counsel has been excused under R.C.M. 
505(d)(2)(B)) (  1. 
(Signature of trial counsel) 
(Name of trial counsel) 
Proceedings of a  court-martial which met (at) (on board) 
,at h  o  u  r  s  , 
19  pursuant to the following orders: GUIDE FOR PREPARATION OF RECORD  OF TRIAL  App.  14 
Note. Here insert a copy of the orders convening the court-martial and copies of any amending 
orders. Copies of any written orders detailing the military judge and counsel will be inserted here. See 
R.C.M. 503(b) and (c). Any request of an enlisted accused for enlisted court members will be inserted  ..  ..  .  -
immediately following the convening orders, together with any declaration of the nonavailability of 
such enlisted persons. See R.C.M. 503(a)(2), 903. Any written request for trial by military judge alone 
(R.C.M. 903) or statement that a military judge could not be obtained (R.C.M. 201(0(2)(b)(ii)) will be 
inserted at this point. 
GUIDE FOR PREPARATION  OF RECORD OF TRIAL 
PERSONS PRESENT 
PERSONS ABSENT 
Accounting for personnel  Note. List military judge, if any, and all members of the court-martial, prosecution, and defense as 
present or absent, as announced by  the trial counsel. The record of an Article 39(a) session or trial by 
the military judge alone need only reflect that the members are absent and need not list the absent 
members by name. Only rank or grade and name should be shown unless service number is necessary 
to distinguish between two persons. 
Presence of accused  The following named accused (was) (were) present: 
Swearing reporter  The detailed reporter, 
sworn). 
,(was sworn) (had previously been 
Note. The remainder of the record of trial follows the actual proceedings in court-martial. The 
reporter records all the proceedings verbatim. 
Time of session  Note. The reporter should note the time and date of the beginning and ending of each session of the 
court, including the opening and closing of the court-martial during trial. For example: 
The (court-martial) (session) was called to order at 
19 
hours, 
The (court-martial) (session was) (adjourned) (recessed) at hours, 
19 
The court-martial (closed) (opened) at 
19 
hours, 
Administration of oaths  Note. It is not necessary to record verbatim the oath actually used, whether it be administered to a 
witness, the military judge, counsel, or the members. Regardless of the form of oath, affirmation, or 
ceremony by  which the conscience of the witness is bound, R.C.M. 807, only the fact that a witness 
took an oath or affirmation is to be recorded. However, if preliminary qualifying questions are asked a 
witness prior to the administration of an oath, the questions and answers should be recorded 
verbatim. These preliminary questions and answers do not eliminate the requirement that an oath be 
administered. The following are examples of the recording of the administration of various oaths: 
The detailed interpreter, 
sworn). 
,(was sworn) (had previously been 
The military judge and the personnel of the prosecution and defense (were sworn) 
(had previously been sworn). 
The members were sworn. App. 14  APPENDIX 14 
Accounting for personnel 
during trial 
Note. After the reporter is sworn, the reporter will record verbatim the statements, of the trial counsel 
with respect to the presence of personnel of the court-martial, counsel, and the accused. The reporter 
should note whether, when a witness is excused, the witness withdraws from the courtroom or, in the 
case of the accused, whether the accused resumes a seat at counsel table. Similarly, if the military 
judge excuses a member as a result of challenge and the member withdraws, the reporter should note 
this fact in the record. In a special court-martial without a military judge, if a challenged member 
withdraws from the court-martial while it votes on a challenge, and then is excused as a result of 
challenge or resumes a seat after the court-martial has voted on a challenge, the reporter should note 
this fact in the record. Examples of the manner in which such facts should be recorded are as follows: 
The (witness withdrew from the courtroom) (accused resumed his/her  seat at the 
counsel table) 
,the challenged member, withdrew from the courtroom. 
,resumed hidher seat as a member of the court-martial. 
*Arraignment  Note. The original charge sheet or a duplicate should be inserted here. If the charges are read, the 
charges should also be transcribed as read. See R.C.M.  1103@)(2)(D)(i). 
Recording testimony  Note. The testimony of a witness will be recorded verbatim in a form similar to that set forth below 
for a prosecution witness: 
was called as a witness for the prosecution, was sworn, and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
Questions by the prosecution: 
Q. State your full name, (etc.) 
A. 
Q-
A. 
? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
Questions by the defense: 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
Questions by the prosecution: 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
Questions by the defense: 
Q.  ? GUIDE FOR PREPARATION OF RECORD OF TRIAL  App.  14 
EXAMINATION BY THE COURT-MARTIAL 
Questions by (military judge) (member's name): 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
Questions by the prosecution: 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
Questions by the defense: 
Out-of-court hearings and  Note. Out-of-court hearings and Article 39(a) sessions should be recorded and incorporated in the 
Article 39(a) sessions  record of trial. See R.C.M. 803. 
b.  Examination of record by defense counsel 
Note. When the defense counsel has examined the record of trial prior to its being forwarded to the 
convening authority, the following form is appropriate: 
Form  "I have examined the record of trial in the foregoing case. 
(Captain) (Lieutenant)  ,Defense Counsel." 

Note. If defense counsel was not given the opportunity to examine the record before authentication, 

the reasons should be attached to the record. See R.C.M. 1103(i)(l)(B). 

c. Authentication of record of trial 
Note. The authentication should be dated. 
19 
(1) By general or special court-martial with members and a military judge App. 14  APPENDIX 14 
Military Judge  (Captain) (Colonel)  ,Military Judge [or 
(LTJG) (1LT)  ,Trial Counsel, because of (death) (disability) 
(absence) of the military judge)] [or (LCDR) (Major)  ,a 
member in lieu of the military judge and the trial counsel because of (death) 
(disability) (absence) of the military judge, and of (death) (disability) (absence) of 
the trial counsel]. 
(2) By  general court-martial consisting of only a military judge. 
Military Judge  (Captain) (Colonel)  ,Military Judge [or 
(LTJG) (1  LT)  Trial Counsel, because of (death) (disability) 
(absence) of the military judge] [or the court reporter in lieu of the military judge 
and trial counsel because of (death) (disability) (absence) of the military judge, 
and of (death) (disability) (absence) of the trial counsel]. 
(3) By special court-martial without a military judge. 
President  (CDR) (LTC)  ,President [or (LTJG) (ILT) 
,Trial Counsel, because of (death) (disability) (absence) of the 
president] [or (LT) (CPT)  ,a member in lieu of the president 
and the trial counsel because of (death) (disability) (absence) of the president, and 
of (death) (disability) (absence) of the trial counsel]. 
Note. If the rank of any person authenticating the record has changed since the court-martial, the 
current rank should he indicated, followed by  "formerly (list the former rank)." 
d. Exhibits. See R.C.M.  1103(b)(2)(D) 
Note. Following the end of the transcript of the proceedings, insert any exhibits which were received 
in evidence, or, with the permission of the military judge, copies, photographs, or descriptions of any 
exhibits which were received in evidence, and any appellate exhibits. 
e. Attachments 
Note. Attach to the record the matters listed in R.C.M. 1103(b)(3). 
f: Certificate of correction. See R.C.M. 1104(d) 
United States 
v. 
The record of trial in the above case, which was tried by the 
court-martial convened by  ,dated 
19  ,(at) (on board)  ,on 
19  ,is corrected by the insertion on page  , 
immediately following line  ,of the following: GUIDE FOR PREPARATION OF RECORD OF TRIAL  App. 14 
"The detailed reporter,  was sworn." 
This correction is made because the reporter was sworn at the time of trial but a 
statement of that effect was omitted, by error, from the record. 
R.C.M. 1104(d) has been complied with. 
Note. The certificate of correction is authenticated as indicated above for the record of trial in the 
case. 
Copy of the certificate received by me this  day of 
,19 
(Signature of accused) 
(Name of accused) 
Note. The certificate of correction will be bound at the end of the original record immediately before 
the action of the convening authority. 
g. Additional copies of the record 
An original and four copies of the record will be prepared of a verbatim record. In a joint or common 
trial, an additional copy of the record must be prepared for each accused. See R.C.M. 1103(g)(l)(A). APPENDIX 15 
RECORD OF TRIAL BY SUMMARY COURT-MARTIAL 
Arthur  N.  Sherry 
Flnl.  MI1 
Gail  L.  Busybody 
(If SCM WM  aceunrr. #ortoIc.1 
Ron  F.  Andrews 
d. SSN 1..  NAME OF ACCUSED 11.~1. Finf.MIl 
Co A,  1st Battalion,  61st Inf 
12d  Battalion,  6lst Inf 
b.  GRADE 
OR RANK 
111-11-1111 
Com~ande r 
I  1 
(Check appropriate amwer) 
c.  UNIT OR ORGANIZATION OF ACCUSED 
61st  Infantry Brigade 
4 
At a preliminary proceeding held on U~Lenbe~  19 2. the summary court-martial gave the 
accused a copy of  the charge sheet. 
c.  POSITION 
s.  UNIT OR ORGANIZATION OF SUMMARY COURT-MARTIAL 
6.  At that preliminary proceeding the summary courtmartill informed the accused of the following: 
d.  ORGANIZATION OF CONVENING AUTHORITY 
I  a.  The fact that the charge(s) had been referred to  a summary court-martial for trill and the date of refernl.  I  x  l 
b.  The identity of  the convening authority.  1x1 
I  e.  The accused's right to object to  trial by summary court-martial.  1x1 
c.  The  name(s) of  the accuer(s). 
d.  The general nature of the charge(s). 
I  f.  The accused's right to  innpect the allied papers and immediately available personnel records.  1x1 
X 
X 
I 
g.  The names of the witnesses who could be called to  testify and any documents or  physical evidence which the 
summary court-martial expected to introduce into evidence. 
h.  The accused's  right to  cross-examine witnesses and have the summary court-martial cross-examine on bebalf of the 
accused. 
The accused's right to  call witnesses and produce evidence with the assistance of  the summary court-martial if 
necew. 
I 
m. The maximum sentence which could be adjudged  if  the accunaed  wan  found guilty of the offenle(8) alleged.  1x1 
X 
.'X 
J.  That during the trial the aummary court-martial would not consider any matters. including statemenu previously 
made by the accused to  the summary murt-martial, unleas admitted in accordance with the Military Ruler of 
Evidence. 
k.  The  accused's  right to  testify on the merits or to remain silent, with the auurance that no  adverse inference would 
be drawn by the summary court-martial from such ailenee. 
I.  If any findingb of guilty were announced. the accused's  right to  remain silent, to  make an uruworn mhtement. oral 
or written or bolh, and to  testify and to  introduce evidence in extenuation or  mitigation. 
X 
X 
X 
I 
At  the trial  proceeding  held  on -21  19. 97,the accused, after being given a reuonable time to 
decide.  did  did not object to  trial by summary court-martial. 
(Nolo.  The SCM map ask  the occuaed lo  initial (hi,  entry at tho lime the election b mode.)  & 
1I"ltMl 
n.  The accused's right to  plead guilty or not guilty.  X 
6. 
.- .... .. 
The accused  was  El was not  represented by courlse~. (I/  11w occu,ed  was  rsDrp.onlod by euunael. eornptete b. c. and d WOW.) 
b. NAME OF COUNSEL 1Lorl. I.1rrl  .HI)  c.  RANK (Ifany1 
d. COUNSEL OUALIFICATIONS APPENDIX 15 
8.  The  accused was arraigned on  the  attached charge(s) and  specification(s). The  accused's pleas and the Iindings reached are shown  below: 
CHARGEISI AND  SPECIFICATION(S1  I  PLEAISI  FINDINGS Onrludir~~ unv e~co~tion, ottrl rubllilution8J 
Ch.  I 
Spec.  1 
Spec.  2 
Ch.  I1 
Spec. 
~dd'l Ch. 
Spec. 
G 
NG 
G  except  "$74.00"  substituting 
"$2  5.00" 
--
9.  The following sentence was adjudged' 
Confinement  for 15 days;forfeiture  of  $200.00  pay  per  month  for 1 month.  and  reduction to 
13.  ACTION BY CONVENING AUTHORITY 
to grade of  E-1.  -
The  sentence is approved  and will be  executed. 
lo The accused was advised of the right to  request 
that confinement he  deferred. (Not..  Wlnrru ru,rfinmm*tnr 
in adjudned.  1 
B YES  NO 
I 
Gail L.  Busybody  Commander 
'I'yped  Nome of Convenins Authorilg  -
rurition rrICr,nt,e,3in#  Aulh,,ntr 
ti.  The  accused was advised of the right to  subnlit written matters to  the 
conveninu authority, includiny a request for cletnuncv, and of thl.  rieht. to 
rt-yuest review by th? dutlyv A~lvt,calr Gor~eral 
YES  U NO 
v  Q  GPO :  1984  O  - 421  -h46 117049) APPENDIX 16 

FORMS FOR ACTION 

The forms in this appendix are guides for prepara- 
tion of the convening authority's initial action. Gui- 
dance is also provided for actions under R.C.M. 
11  12(f). Appendix  17 contains forms for later ac- 
tions. The forms are guidance only, and are not 
mandatory. They do not provide for all cases. It  may 
be necessary to combine parts of different forms to 
prepare an action appropriate to a specific case. Ex- 
treme care should be exercised in using these forms 
and in preparing actions. See R.C.M.  1107(f) con- 
cerning contents of the convening authority's action. 
In addition to the matters contained in the forms 
below, the action should show the headquarters and 
place, or the ship, of the convening authority taking 
the action, and the date of the action. The signature 
of the convening authority is followed by the grade 
and unit of the convening authority, and "com- 
mander" or "commanding"  as appropriate. 
When the sentence includes confinement, the 
place of confinement is designated in the action un- 
less the Secretary concerned prescribes otherwise. If 
the place of confinement is designated in the action, 
service regulations should be consulted first. See 
R.C.M. 11  13(d)(2)(C). 
In actions on a summary court-martial, when the 
action is written on the record of trial (see Appendix 
15) the words "In  the case of 
9 9 
may be omitted. 
INITIAL ACTION ON COURT-MARTIAL 
SENTENCE-FINDINGS  NOT AFFECTED 
Forms 1-10  are appropriate when the adjudged sen- 
tence does not include death, dismissal, or a dishon- 
orable or bad-conduct discharge. 
Adjudged  sentence approved and ordered executed 
without modification. See R.C.M. 1107(f)(4). 
1.  In the case of  ,the sentence is 
approved and will be executed. (  is 
designated as the place of confinement.) 
Adjudged sentence modified. See R.C.M. 1  107(d)(l), 
(f)(4). 
-Adjudged  sentence approved in part and ordered 
executed. 
2.  In the case of  ,only so much of 
the sentence as provides for  is ap- 
proved and will be executed. (  is 
designated as the place of confinement.) 
-Adjudged  sentence approved; part  of confine- 
ment changed to  forfeiture  of pay. 
3.  In the case of  ,so much of the 
sentence extending to  months of 
confinement  is  changed  to  forfeiture  of 
$  pay  per  month  for 
months. The sentence as changed 
is approved and will be executed. ( 
is designated as the place of confinement.) 
Credit for  illegal pretrial  conjinement. See R.C.M. 
305(k);  11070(4)(F). 
4.  In the case of  ,the sentence is 
approved and will be executed. The accused will be 
credited with  days of confinement 
against  the  sentence  to  confinement. 
(  is designated as the place of con- 
finement.) 
Suspension of sentence. See R.C.M. 1107(f)(4)(B); 
1108(d). 
-Adjudged  sentence approved and suspended. 
5.  In the case of  ,the sentence is 
approved. Execution of the sentence is suspended 
for  (months) (years) at which 
time, unless the suspension is sooner vacated, the 
sentence will be remitted without further action. 
-Adjudged  sentence approved; part  of sentence 
suspended. 
6. In the case of  ,the sentence is 
approved and will be executed but the execution of 
that part of the sentence extending to (confinement) 
(confinement in excess of  months) 
(forfeiture of pay) (  ) is suspended 
for  (months) (years),  at which 
time, unless the suspension is sooner vacated, the 
suspended part of the sentence will be remitted with- 
out further action. (  is designated 
as the place of confinement.) 
Deferment of confinement and termination of defer- 
ment. See R.C.M. 1101(c); 1107(f)(4)(E). 
-Adjudged  sentence approved; conjnement de- 
ferred pending final  review. 
7.  In the case of  ,  the sentence is 
approved and, except for that portion extending to 
confinement.  will be executed. Service of the sen- DIX 16 
tence to confinement (is) (was) deferred effective 
19  ,  and will not 
begin  until  (the  conviction  is  final) 
(  ), unless sooner rescinded by com- 
petent authority. 
-Adjudged  sentence approved; deferment of con- 
finement terminated. 
8.  In the case of  , the sentence is 
approved and will be executed. The service of the 
sentence to confinement  was  deferred  on 
19 
(  ) is designated as the place of con- 
finement.) 
-Adjudged  sentence approved; deferment of con- 
finement terminated previously. 
9.  In the case of  ,  the sentence is 
approved and will be executed. The service of the 
sentence to confinement  was  deferred on 
19  , and  the 
deferment  ended  on 
19  ; (  is desig- 
nated as the place of confinement.) 
Disapproval of sentence; rehearing on sentence only 
ordered. See R.C.M. 1107(e), (f)(4)(A). 
10.  In the case of  ,it appears that 
the following error was committed: (evidence of a 
previous conviction of the accused was erroneously 
admitted) (  ). This error was preju- 
dicial as to the sentence. The sentence is disap- 
proved. A rehearing is ordered before a (summary) 
(special) (general) court-martial to be designated. 
When the adjudged sentence includes death, dis- 
missal, or a dishonorable or a bad-conduct dis- 
charge, forms 1- 10 are generally appropriate, but 
several will require modification depending on the 
action -to  be taken. This is because death, dismissal, 
or a dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge may not 
be ordered executed in the initial action. Therefore, 
unless an adjudged punishment of death, dismissal, 
or a dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge is disap- 
proved, changed to another punishment, or (except 
in the case of death) suspended, the initial action 
must specifically except such punishments from the 
order of execution. This is done by adding the words 
"except for the (part of  the sentence extending to 
death) (dismissal) (dishonorable discharge) (bad- 
conduct discharge),"  after the words "is  approved 
and" and before the words "will be executed" in the 
action. (A death sentence cannot be suspended. See 
R.C.M. 1108(b).) 
Forms 11-14 provide examples of actions when 
the sentence includes death, dismissal, or a dishon- 
orable or bad-conduct discharge. 
Adjudged sentence approved and, except for  death, 
dismissal, or discharge, ordered executed. See 
R.C.M. 1107(f)(4). 
1  1.  In the case of  ,the sentence is 
approved and, except for the (part of the sentence 
extending to death) (dismissal) (dishonorable dis- 
charge) (bad-conduct discharge), will be executed. 
(  is designated as the place of con- 
finement.) 
Adjudged sentence modified. See R.C.M. 1  107(d)(l), 
(f)(4).  Note if the part of the sentence providing for 
death, dismissal, or a dishonorable or a bad-conduct 
discharge is disapproved, see Form 2 above. 
12.  In the case of  ,only so much of 
the sentence as provides for (death) (dismissal) (a 
dishonorable discharge) (a bad-conduct discharge) 
(and  ) is approved and, except for 
the part of the sentence extending to (death) (dismis- 
sal) (dishonorable discharge) (bad-conduct dis- 
charge),  will be executed. ( 
is designated as the place of con- 
finement.) 
-Adjudged  sentence approved; discharge changed 
to confinement. 
13.  In the case of  ,so much of the 
sentence extending to a (dishonorable discharge) 
(bad conduct discharge) is changed to confinement 
for  months (thereby making the 
period of confinement total 
months). The sentence as changed is approved and 
will be executed. (  is designated as 
the place of confinement.) 
Suspension of sentence. See R.C.M. 1  107(f)(4)(B); 
1108(d). Note. If the portion of the sentence ex- 
tending to dismissal or a dishonorable or a bad-con- 
duct discharge is suspended, Form 5 or Form 6,  as 
appropriate, may be used. If parts of the sentence 
other than an approved dismissal or discharge are 
suspended, the following form may be used: 
-Adjudged  sentence approved; part  of sentence, 
other than dismissal or dishonorable or bad-conduct 
discharge, suspended. 
14. In the case of  ,the sentence is 
approved and, except for that part of the sentence FORMS FOR ACTION  App.  16,121. 
extending to (dismissal) (a dishonorable discharge) 
(a bad-conduct discharge), will be executed, but the 
execution of  that part of the sentence adjudging 
(confinement)  (confinement  in  excess  of 
)  (forfeiture  of  pay) 
(  )  is  suspended  for 
(months) (years) at which time, 
unless the suspension is sooner vacated, the sus- 
pended part of the sentence will be remitted without 
further action. (  is designated as 
the place of  confinement.) 
INITIAL ACTION ON COURT-MARTIAL 
WHEN FINDINGS AFFECTED. Findings are ad- 
dressed in the action only when any findings of 
guilty are disapproved, in whole or part. See R.C.M. 
1107(c), (o(3). The action must also indicate what 
action is being taken on the sentence. Appropriate 
parts of  the foregoing forms for action on the sen- 
tence may be  substituted in the following examples 
as necessary. 
Some findings of guilty disapproved; adjudged sen- 
tence approved. 
15. In the case of  ,the finding of 
guilty of Specification 2, Charge I is disapproved. 
Specification 2, Charge I is dismissed. The sentence 
is approved and (except for that part of the sentence 
extending to (dismissal) (a dishonorable discharge) 
(a bad-conduct discharge)) will be  executed. 
(  is designated as the place of con- 
finement.) 
Finding of guilty of lesser included offense approved; 
adjudged sentence modified. 
16. In the case of  ,the finding of 
guilty of Specification 1, Charge I1 is changed to a 
finding of guilty of  (assault with a means likely to 
produce grievous bodily harm, to wit: a knife) (ab- 
sence without authority from the (unit) (ship) 
(  ) alleged from 
19  to 
19  (in violation of Article 86)) 
(  ). Only so much of the sentence as 
provides for  is approved and (, ex-
cept for the (dismissal) (dishonorable discharge) 
(bad-conduct  discharge)), will  be  executed. 
(  is designated as the place of  con- 
finement.) 
Some findings  of guilty and sentence disapproved; 
combined rehearing ordered. See  1107(e). A rehear- 
ing may not be ordered if any sentence is approved: 
See R.C.M. 1107(c)(2)(B); (e)(l)(c)(i). 
17. In the case of  ,it appears that 
the following error was committed: (Exhibit 1, a lab- 
oratory report, was not properly authenticated and 
was admitted over the objection of the defense) 
. This error was prejudicial as to 
Specifications 1 and 2 of Charge 11. The findings of 
guilty as to Specifications 1 and 2 of Charge I1 and 
the sentence are disapproved. A combined rehearing 
is ordered before a court-martial to be designated. 
All findings  of guilty and sentence disapproved; re- 
hearing ordered. See R.C.M. 1107(c)(2)(B). 
18. In the case of  ,it appears that 
the following error was committed: (evidence of- 
fered by the defense to establish duress was improp- 
erly excluded) (  ). Th'  1s  error was 
prejudicial to the rights of the accused as to all find- 
ings of guilty. The findings of guilty and the sentence 
are disapproved. A rehearing is ordered before a 
court-martial to be designated. 
All findings of guilty and sentence disapproved based 
on jurisdictional  error; another trial ordered. See 
R.C.M. 1107(e)(2). Note. This form may also be 
used when a specification fails to state an offense. 
19. In the case of  ,it appears that 
(the members were not detailed to the court-martial 
by the convening authority) (  ). The 
proceedings, findings, and sentence are invalid. An- 
other trial is ordered before a court-martial to be 
designated. 
All findings  of guilty and sentence disapproved; 
charges dismissed. See R.C.M.  1107(c)(2)(B). 
20.  In the case of  ,  the findings of 
guilty and the sentence are disapproved. The 
charges are dismissed. 
ACTION ON  A REHEARING. The action on a re- 
hearing is the same as an action on an original court- 
martial in most respects. It differs first in that, as to 
any sentence approved following the rehearing, the 
accused must be credited with those parts of the sen- 
tence previously executed or otherwise served. Sec- 
ond, in certain cases the convening authority must 
provide for the restoration of certain rights, privi- 
leges, and property. See R.C.M. 1  107(f)(5)(A). 
Action on rehearing; granting credit for previously ex- 
ecuted or served punishment. 
21.  In the case of  ,  the sentence is 
approved and (except for the (dismissal) (dishonora- App. 16, n21.  APPENDIX 16 
ble discharge) (bad-conduct discharge)), will be exe- 
cuted. The accused will be credited with any portion 
of the punishment served from 
19  to 
19  under the sentence adjudged at 
the former trial of this case. 
Action on rehearing; restoration of rights. 
22.  In the case of  ,the findings of 
guilty and the sentence are disapproved and the 
charges are dismissed. All rights, privileges,  and 
property of which the accused has been deprived by 
virtue of the execution of the sentence adjudged at 
the former trial of this case on 
19  will be restored. 
23.  In the case of  ,the accused was 
found not guilty of all the charges and specifications 
which were tried at the former hearing. All rights, 
privileges, and property of which the accused has 
been deprived by virtue of the execution of the sen- 
tence adjudged at the former trial of this case on 
19  will be re-
stored. 
WITHDRAWAL OF PREVIOUS ACTION. 
Form 24 is appropriate for withdrawal of an earlier 
action. See R.C.M.  1107(f)(2) concerning modifica- 
tion of an earlier action. Form 24a is appropriate for 
withdrawal of previous action pursuant to instruc- 
tions from reviewing authority pursuant to R.C.M. 
1107(f)(2) or (g). When the action of a predecessor 
in command is withdrawn due to ambiguity, see 
United States v.  Lower, 10 M.J. 263 (C.M.A. 1981). 
24.  In the case of  ,the action taken 
by  (me) (my predecessor in command) on 
19  is withdrawn 
and  the  following  substituted  therefor: 
preclude the reduction in grade which would other- 
wise be effected under that Article upon the ap- 
proval of certain court-martial sentences by the con- 
vening authority. The Secretary concerned may 
provide in regulations that if  the convening or 
higher authority taking action on the case suspends 
those elements of the sentence that are specified in 
Article 58a the accused may be retained in the grade 
held by the accused at the time of the sentence or in 
any intermediate grade. Forms 25-27 may be used 
by the convening or higher authority in effecting ac- 
tions authorized by the Secretary concerned in regu- 
lations pursuant to the authority of Article 58a. 
If the convening authority or higher authority 
when taking action on a case in which the sentence 
includes a punitive discharge, confinement, or hard 
labor without confinement elects to approve the sen- 
tence and to retain the enlisted member in the grade 
held by  that member at the time of sentence or in 
any intermediate grade, that authority may do so if 
permitted by regulations of the Secretary concerned 
whether or not the sentence also includes a reduc- 
tion to the lowest enlisted grade, by using one of the 
following forms of action. The first action, Form 25, 
is appropriate when the sentence does not specifi- 
cally provide for reduction. The second and third ac- 
tions, Forms 26 and 27, are appropriate when the 
sentence specifically provides for reduction to the 
grade of E-1. The action set forth in Form 26 is in- 
tended for a case in which the accused is to be proba- 
tionally retained in the grade held by that accused at 
the time of sentence. The action set forth in Form 27 
is for a case in which the accused is to serve proba- 
tionally in an intermediate grade. 
Automatic reduction suspended; sentence does not 
specifically include reduction. 
24a.  In the case of  ,in a~~~rdance  25.  In the case of  ,the sentence is 
with instructions from (The Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral) (the  Court of Military Re- 
view) Pursuant to Rule for Courts-Martial 
[1107(f)(2)1 [1107(g)l, the action taken by (me) (my 
predecessor in command) is withdrawn. The follow- 
ing is substituted therefor: 
FORMS FOR ACTIONS APPROVING AND 
SUSPENDING PUNISHMENTS MENTIONED 
IN  ARTICLE 58a AND RETAINING ACCUSED 
IN  PRESENT OR INTERMEDIATE GRADE. 
Under the authority of Article 58a, the Secretary 
concerned may, by regulatiqn, limit or specifically 
approved and will be executed, but the execution of 
that part of the sentence extending to (a dishonora- 
ble discharge) (a bad-conduct discharge) (confine- 
ment) (hard labor without confinement) (and 
)  is  suspended  for 
(months) (years) at which time, 
unless the suspension is sooner vacated, the sus- 
pended part of the sentence will be remitted without 
further action. The accused will (continue to) serve 
in the grade of  unless the suspen- 
sion of (the dishonorable discharge) (the bad-con- 
duct discharge) (confinement) (hard labor without FORMS FOR ACTION  App. 16, n33. 
confinement) is vacated, in which event the accused 
will be reduced to the grade of E-1 at that time. 
Automatic reduction and adjudged reduction to E-1 
suspended; accused retained in grade previously  held. 
26.  In the case of  ,the sentence is 
approved and will be executed, but the execution of 
that part of the sentence extending to (a dishonora- 
ble discharge) (a bad-conduct discharge) (confine- 
ment)  (hard  labor  without  confinement) 
(  ), and reduction to the grade of E- 
1  is suspended for  (months) 
(years), at which time, unless the suspension is 
sooner vacated, the suspended part of the sentence 
will be remitted without further action. The accused 
will  continue  to  serve  in  the  grade  of 
unless the suspension of (the dis- 
honorable discharge) (the bad-conduct discharge) 
(confinement) (hard labor without confinement), or 
reduction to the grade of E-1 is vacated, in which 
event the accused will be reduced to the grade of E-1 
at that time. 
Automatic reduction and adjudged reduction to E-1 
suspended; accused retained in intermediate grade. 
27.  In the case of  ,the sentence is 
approved and will be executed but the execution of 
that part of the sentence extending to (a dishonora- 
ble discharge) (a bad-conduct discharge) (confine- 
ment) (hard labor without confinement), and that 
part of the reduction which is in excess of reduction 
to the grade of  is suspended for 
(months) (years) at which time, 
unless the suspension is sooner vacated, the sys- 
pended part of the sentence will be remitted without 
further action. The accused will serve in the grade of 
unless the suspension of (the dis- 
honorable discharge) @ad-conduct discharge) (con- 
finement) (hard labor without confinement), or re- 
duction to the grade of  E-1, is vacated, in which 
event the accused will be reduced to the grade of E-1 
at that time. 
ACTION UNDER R.C.M. 11 12(f). The forms for 
action for the officer taking action under R.C.M. 
11  12(f) are generally similar to the foregoing ac- 
tions. The officer taking action under R.C.M. 11 12 
(f)may order executed all parts of the approved sen- 
tence, including a dishonorable or bad-conduct dis- 
charge, except those parts which have been sus- 
pended  without later vacation unless the record 
must be forwarded under R.C.M. 11  12(g)(l). See 
R.C.M. 11  13(c)(l)(A). The following are additional 
forms which may be appropriate: 
Sentence approved when convening authority sus- 
pended all or part of it. 
28.  In the case of  ,the sentence as 
approved and suspended by the convening authority 
is approved. 
Sentence approved and, when confinement was de- 
ferred, ordered executed. See R.C.M. 1  101  (c)(6). 
29.  In the case of  ,the sentence is 
approved and the confinement will be executed. The 
service of the sentence to confinement was deferred 
on  19 
(  is designated as the place of con- 
finement.) 
Sentence includes unsuspended dishonorable or bad- 
conduct discharge; order of execution. See R.C.M. 
1113(c)(l) and (2). 
30.  In the case of  ,the sentence is 
approved. The (dishonorable discharge) (bad-con- 
duct discharge) will be executed. 
Findings and sentence disapproved; restoration as to 
parts ordered executed by convening authority. See 
R.C.M. 1208(b). 
3  1. In the case of  ,the findings of 
guilty and the sentence are disapproved. The 
charges are dismissed. (The accused will be released 
from the confinement adjudged by  the sentence in 
this case and all) (All) rights, privileges, and prop- 
erty of which the accused has been deprived by vir- 
tue of the findings and sentence disapproved will be 
restored. 
Findings and sentence disapproved; rehearing au- 
thorized. See R.C.M. 11 12(f). 
32.  In the case of  ,it appears that 
the following error was committed: (Exhibit  1, a 
statement of the accused, was not shown to have 
been preceded by Article 3  1 warnings as required 
and was admitted over the objection of the defense) 
(  ). This error was prejudicial to the 
rights of the accused as to the findings and the sen- 
tence. The case is returned to the convening author- 
ity who may order a rehearing or dismiss the 
charges. 
Action laken is less favorable  to the accused than that 
recommended by the judge  advocate. See R.C.M. 
1  11  2(e), (0. 
33.  In the case of  ,the sentence is 
approved. As this action is less favorable to the ac- App. 16, n 33.  APPENDIX 16 
cused than that recommended by  the judge advo-  34. In the case of  ,the sentence is 
cate, the record and this action shall be forwarded to  approved. The record shall be forwarded to the Sec- 
the Judge Advocate General for review under Arti-  retary of the 
cle 69(b). 
Action when approved sentence includes dismissal. 
See R.C.M. 11  13(c)(2). APPENDIX 17 
FORMS FOR COURT-MARTIAL ORDERS 
a.  Forms for initial promulgating orders 	 court-martial cases. Omit the marginal side notes in 
[Note. The following is a form applicable in  drafting orders. SeeR.C.M. 1114(c).l 
promulgating the results of trial and the action of 
the convening authority in all general and special 
Heading  (General) (Special)  (Headquarters) (USS) 
Court-Martial Order No.  19 
[Note. The date must be the same as the date of the convening authority's action, if 
any.] 
(Grade)  (Name)  (Service No.)  (Armed Force) 
(Unit) 
Arraignment 	 was arraigned (at/on board  ) on the following offenses at a 
court-martial convened by (this command) (Commander,  1. 
Offenses 	 CHARGE I.  ARTICLE 86. Plea: G. Finding: G. 
Specification 1: Unauthorized absence from unit from 1 April 1984 to 31 May 
1984. Plea: G. Finding: G. 
[Note. Specifications may be reproduced verbatim or may be summarized. Specific factors, such as 
value, amount, and other circumstances which affect the maximum punishment should be indicated in 
a summarized specification. Other significant matters contained in the specification may be included. 
If the specification is copied verbatim, include any amendment made during trial. Similarly, 
information included in a summarized specification should reflect any amendment to that information 
made during the trial.] 
Specification2: Failure to repair on 18 March 1984. Plea: None entered. Finding: 
Dismissed on motion of defense for failure to state an offense. 
[Note. If a finding is not entered to a specification because, for example, a motion to dismiss was 
granted, this should be noted where the finding would otherwise appear.] 
CHARGE 11. ARTICLE 91. Plea: NG. Finding: NG, but G of a violation of 
ARTICLE 92. 
Specification: Disobedience of superior noncommissioned officer on 30 March 
1984 by refusing to inspect sentinels on perimeter of bivouac site. Plea: NG. 
Finding: G, except for disobedience of superior noncommissioned officer, 
substituting failure to obey a lawful order to inspect sentinels on perimeter of 
bivouac site. 
CHARGE 111. ARTICLE 112a. Plea: G. Finding: G. -  - 
App. 17 	 APPENDIX 17 
Specification 1  :Wrongful possession of  150 grams of marijuana on 24 March 
1984.Plea: G. Finding: G. 
Specification 2: Wrongful use of marijuana while on duty as a sentinel on 24 
March 1984.Plea: G. Finding G. 
Specification 3: Wrongful possession of heroin with intent to distribute on 24 
March 1984.Plea: NG. Finding: G. 
CHARGE IV. ARTICLE 121. Plea: NG. Finding: G. 
Specification: Larceny of property of a value of $150.00on 27 March 1984.Plea: 
NG. Finding: G, except the word "steal,"  substituting "wrongfully appropriate." 
Acquittal 	 If the accused was acquitted of all charges and specifications, the date of the 
acquittal should be shown: "The findings were announced on 
19 
9, 
SENTENCE 
Sentence adjudged on  19  :Dishonorable 
discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, confinement for 2 years, and 
reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. 
Action of  convening authority 	 ACTION 
[Note. Summarize or enter verbatim the action of the convening authority. Whether or not the 
action is recited verbatim, the heading, date, and signature block of the convening authority need not 
be copied from the action if the same heading and date appear at the top of this order and if the name 
and rank of the convening authority are shown in the authentication.] 
Authentication  [Note. See R.C.M.  11  14(e) concerning authentication of the order.] 
Joint or common trial  [Note. In case of a joint or common trial, separate trial orders should be issued 
for each accused. The description of the offenses on which each accused was 
arraigned may, but need not, indicate that there was a co-accused.] 
b. Forms for supplementary orders promulgating results of afirming action 
[Note. Court-martial orders publishing the final results of cases in which the President or the 
Secretary concerned has taken final action are promulgated by departmental orders. In other cases the 
final action may be promulgated by  an appropriate convening authority, or by an officer exercising 
general court-martial jurisdiction over the accused at the time of final action, or by  the Secretary 
Eoncerned. The following sample forms may be used where such a promulgating order is published in 
the field. These forms are guides. Extreme care should be exercised in using them. If a sentence as 
ordered into execution or suspended by the convening authority is affirmed without modifications and 
there has been no modification of the findings, no supplementary promulgating order is required.] 
Heading 
*See above. Sentence 
-Affirmed 
-Affirmed in part 
Affirmdin  part; prior order 
Of execution set aside in part 
FORMS FOR COURT-MARTIAL ORDERS  App. 17 
In the (general) (special) court-martial case of (name, grade or rank, branch of 
service, and service number of accused,) the sentence to bad-conduct discharge, 
forfeiture of  ,and confinement for  ,as 
promulgated in (General) (Special) Court-Martial Order No.  , 
(Headquarters) (Commandant,  Naval District) dated 
19  ,has been finally affirmed. Article 7 1  (c) 
having been complied with, the bad-conduct discharge will be executed. 
In the (general) (special) court-martial case of (name, grade or rank, branch of 
service, and service number of accused,) only so much of the sentence 
promulgated in (General) (Special) court-~artial  Order No.  , 
(Headquarters) (Commandant,  Naval District) 
,dated  19  ,as provides for 
,has been finally affirmed. Article 7  1(c) having been complied 
with, the bad-conduct discharge will be executed. 
In the (general) (special) court-martial case of (name, grade or rank, branch of 
service, and service number of accused,) the findings of guilty of Charge I1 and its 
specification have been set aside and only so much of the sentence promulgated in 
(General) (Special) Court-Martial Order No. ,  (Headquarters) 
(Commandant,  ,Naval District),  dated 
19  ,as provides for  ,has been 
finally affirmed. Article 71(c) having been complied with, the bad-conduct 
discharge will be executed. 
In the (general) (special) court-martial case of  (name, grade or rank, branch of 

service, and service number of accused,) the proceedings of which are promulgated 

in (General) (Special) Court-Martial Order No.  , 

(Headquarters) (Commandant,  Naval District) 

,dated  19  ,the findings of 
guilty of Charge I and its specification, and so much of the sentence as in excess 
of  have been set aside and the sentence, as thus modified, has 
been finally affirmed. Article 71(c) having been complied with, all rights, 
privileges, and property of which the accused has been deprived by virtue of the 
findings of guilty and that portion of the sentence so set aside will be restored. App.  17 	 APPENDIX 17 
Finding and sentence set aside 	 In the (general)(special) court-martial case of (name, grade or rank, branch of 
service, and service number of accused,) the findings of guilty and the sentence 
promulgated by (General) (Special) Court-Martial Order No.  , 
(Headquarters) (Commandant,  Naval District), 
,  dated 	 19  ,  were set aside on 
19  . (The charges are dismissed. All rights, 
privileges, and property of which the accused has been deprived by virtue of the 
findings of guilty and the sentence so set aside will be restored.) (A rehearing is 
ordered before another court-martial to be designated.) 
Authentication 	 See R.C.M. 1  114(e). 
c. Forms for  orders remitting or suspending unexecuted portions of sentence 
Heading 	 See a above. 
Remissions; suspension 	 The unexecuted portion of the sentence to  ,  in the case of 
See R.C.M. 1108 	 (Name, grade or rank, branch of service and service number of accused.) 
promulgated in (General) (Special) Court-Martial Order No.  , 
(this headquarters) (this ship) (Headquarter  S) (Uss 
1, 	 ,  19  ,  is (remitted) 
(suspended for 	 ,  months, at which time, unless the suspension is 
sooner vacated, the unexecuted portion of the sentence will be remitted without 
further action). 
Authentication 	 See R.C.M. 11 14(e). 
d. Forms for  orders vacating suspension 
[Note. Orders promulgating the vacation of the suspension of a dismissal will be published by 
departmental orders of the Secretary concerned. Vacations of any other suspension of a general court- 
martial sentence, or of a special court-martial sentence which as approved and affirmed includes a 
bad-conduct discharge, will be promulgated by  the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction 
over the probationer (Article 72(b)). The vacation of suspension of any other sentence may be 
promulgated by  an appropriate convening authority under Article 72(c). See R.C.M. 1109.] 
Heading 	 See a above. FORMS FOR COURT-MARTIAL ORDERS 	 App. 17 
Vacation of Suspension 	 So much of the order published in (General) (Special) (Summary) (Court-Martial 
Order No.  ) (the record of summary court-martial), (this 
headquarters) (this ship) (Headquarters  ) (uss 
),  . 19  ,  in the case of (name, 
grade or rank, branch of service, and service number of accused), as suspends, 
effective  19  ,  execution of the approved 
sentence to (a bad-conduct discharge) (confinement for 
(months) (years)) (forfeiture of  ), (and subsequently modified by 
(General) (Special) Court-Martial Order No.  ,  (this 
headquarters) (this ship) (Headquarters  ) (uss 
),  . 19  ,  is vacated. (The 
unexecuted portion of the sentence to  will be executed.) 
(  is designated as the place of confinement.) 
[Note. See R.C.M. 11  13 concerning execution of the sentence.] 
Authentication 	 See R.C.M. 11 14(e). 
e. Forms for orders terminating deferment 
[Note: When any deferment previously granted is rescinded after the convening authority has taken 
action in the case, such rescission will be promulgated in a supplementary order. See R.C.M. 
1 101(~)(7)(c).l 
Heading 	 See a above. 
Recission of deferment  The deferment of that portion of the sentence that provides for confinement for 
(months) (years) published in (General) (Special) Court- 
Martial Order  (this headquarters) (this ship) (Headquarters 
) (USS .  ), , 
19  ,in the case of (name, grade or rank, branch of service, and 
service number accused) (is rescinded) (was rescinded on 
19  .) The portion of the sentence to confinement will be 
executed. (  is designated as the place of confinement.) 
Authentication 	 See R.C.M . 11  14( e). 
[Note. Deferment may be terminated by an appropriate authority once the conviction is final under 
Article 71(c) and R.C.M. 1208(a). See R.C.M. 1 lOl(c) (J).] 
Heading 	 See a above. APPENDIX 17 
Authentication 
In the (general) (special) court-martial case of (name, grade or rank, branch of 
service, and service number of accused,) the sentence to confinement (and 
), as promulgated in (General) (Special) Court-Martial Order 
No.  ,(Headquarters) (Commandant,  Naval 
District)  ,dated  19  , has been 
finally affirmed. Service of confinement was deferred on 
19  .  Article 71(c) having been complied with, the @ad-conduct 
discharge and the) sentence to confinement will be executed. (  is 
designated as the place of confinement.) 
See R.C.M. 11  14(e). APPENDIX 18 
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS TO VACATE SUSPENSION OF A GENERAL COURT- MARTIAL  SENTENCE 
OR OF A SPECIAL COURT-MARTIAL SENTENCE INCLUDING A BAD-CONDUCT  DISCHARGE 
UNDER ARTICLE 72, UCMJ, and R.C.M.  1109 
1.. TO:  (Name of Offlcar  rzercl.lns sensml court-morthl  lur(.dlctlon -
Lat.  Flnt. MI1 
Rabino.  Arthur K. 
L 
6.  ALLEGED  VIOLATIONIS)  OF THE CONDITIONS OF  SUSPENSION.  (BRIEF STATEMENT AND DATE. See  R.C.M  11081~)AND 11W(aI 
CONCERNING THE CONDITIONS OF SUSPENSION.1 
Assault on  Master Sgt Vic Timm,  while in  the execution of duties on  15 September 1993,  in 
violation of Article 91. 
2..  FROM:  (Name ofOfficer  ezorci.lns apeeiol court-morllol  iuri.diction -
Lat.  Fint. MI] 
Roberts,  Leonard E. 
b.  TITLE 
Commander 
s.  ORGANIZATION 
5000th Support Wing 
APO  AP  99999 
Dice,  Morris L. 
3.. NAME OF PROBATIONER (ht.  Finl. MI) 
b.  TITLE 
Commander 
c.  ORGANIZATION 
5001st  Support Group 
APO  AP  99999 
Airman  000-00-0000  1  5001st Support Group 
7.  BEFORE THE HEARING THE AUTHORITY CONDUCTING THE HEARING CAUSED THE PROBATIONER TD BE NOTIFIED OF 
Iaee R.C.M. 1tWId1(1118)1. 
b.  RANK  C. SSN 
4.  DATA AS TO TRIAL BY COURT.MARTIAL.  ATTACH A  COPY  OF THE COURT-MARTIAL ORDER AND ANY SUPPLEMENTARY ORDERS 
OR.  IF NO COURT-MARTIAL ORDER  HAS BEEN  PROMULGATED OR  IS AVAILABLE. ATTACH A SUMMARY  OF  THE CHARGES  AND 
SPECIFICATIONS.  FINDINGS. SENTENCE, INITIAL ACTION. AND ANY SUPPLEMENTARY ACTIONS. ATTACH A COPY OF THE WRITTEN 
NOTICE OF SUSPENSION  [roe R.C.M.  11OBlc)l. 
(Check appropriate answer)  I  YES  I NO 
d.  ORGANIZATION 
6.  PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 72.  UCMJ. AND R.C.M. 1109. A  HEARING WAS HELD ON THE ALLEGED 
VIOLATIONIS) OF THE CONDITIONS OF SUSPENSION  x 
m.  THE TIME. PLACE. AND  PURPOSE OF THE HEARING. 
b.  THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT THE HEARING. 
I
a.  THE  OPPORTUNITY  TO BE HEARD. TO PRESENT  WITNESSES  AND OTHER EVIDENCE.  ANO THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT AND 
CROSS.EXAMINE  ADVERSE WITNESSES UNLESS THE HEARING OFFICER DETERMINES THAT THERE IS GOOD CAUSE FOR 
NOT ALLOWING CONFRONTATION AN0  CROSS.EXAMINATION.  I x  I 
x 
X 
s.  THE ALLEGED VIOLATION(S1 OF THE CONDITIONS OF SUSPENSION AND THE EVIDENCE EXPECTED TO BE RELIED ON. 
d.  THE RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED AT  THE HEARING BY CIVILIAN COUNSEL PROVIDED BY THE PROBATIONER OR. UPON 
REOUEST.  BY MILITARY COUNSEL DETAILED FOR THIS PURPOSE. 
18..  THE PROBATIONER REOUESTED DETAILEO MILITARY COUNSEL.  Ix  I 
X 
x 
a.  DETAILED COUNSEL WAS OUALIFIED  WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 27(b). UCMJ. and R.C.M.  502161.  X 
b.  NAME OF DETAILED  COUNSEL (Lut.  Flnt. MI) 
Young,  Louise 
NOTE:  I1  this form  is  und  and addit~onalID- is  requid for  any  itmm, enter tha mdditionnl m.tari.1  in Block 18 or  on a ~lpar.te haat. Identify such 
m.Nri.l  with the  proper  hmading  IExomplr.  "3d"). S.curaly  att.ch any additional ~hutlsl and add a  not.  in the appropriate item: "See Block Is" or 
"SU dditional sheet."  Thm  form  may b. uud  to uasat.  a suspsndad mprial eourt.m.rtiel  .rnt.nc.  not including  bmd-conduct diuhmrge or a suwendad 
Iumrnarv court-martial untena  undmr R.C.M. 1109ial by lining through or  mltaring thm  form. .I appropriata. 
DD  455  EDITION  OF OCT60 IS OBSOLETE. 
s. RANK 
Captain 
d.  ORGANIZATION 
Area Defense Counsel,  APO  AP  99999 APPENDIX 18 
(Check appropriate a~wer)  (  YES  NO 
3  NAME OF CIVILIAN COUNSEL 1L-t.  s  ADDRESS OF CIVILIAN  COUNSEL 
Fint. MI) 
d  ENTRY OF APPEARANCE BY PROBATIDNER'SCIVILIAN COUNSEL  I HEREBY ENTER MY  APPEARANCE FOR THE ABOVE 
NAMEDPROBATIONER  AND REPRESENT THAT I AM  A MEMBER IN  GOOD STANDING OF THE FOLLOWING BARE) (LIST)  OR 
LICENSED OR OTHERWISE AUTHORIZED TO  PRACTICE LAW (EXPLAIN) [lee R C M  5021d1(31 CONCERNING QUALIFICA 
TIONSI 
rn  SIGNATURE OF COUNSEL  1  DATE 
10s  DETAILED  COUNSEL OR CIVILIAN  COUNSEL WAS PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE PROCEEDINGS 1I~orobatIoner urolues  tho 
n'sht  to hove eouruol prrimt thr&hoqtwrt  or oll qf the pr~se4in#, after relue.tln#  dstalted eounael  or cmplo~inn eivillan caumel. 
eompletr  b below.)  IX  I 
b.  STATE CIRCUMSTANCES AND  SPECIFIC PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED IN  ABSENCE OF COUNSEL. 
11.  (TO be #inned by probattoner If onrwer to  Ilsmr 8 or 9 wu  "No." If  probationer feib to .&n,  tho hearing ofricer ,hall  oxplaln in Item 18.1 
I hava baan inf0rm.d and unden1and my right under R.C.M.  1lOS(d1 to r.pr.r.ntatlon  at  thil  hearing by  civillan counsel  prouidmd 
by ma  or. upon rwunt,  by  d~IIaa mlllnry sOunS.1.  I hereby knowlnglv waiv.  mv  right to  ouch: 
a.  D.tml1.d  Counl.1  b,  Civilian Counwl 
:.  SIQNATURE OF PPOBATIONER  d.  DATE 
1  October  199'3 
12a.  THE PROBATIONER WAS AFFORDED THE RIGHT TD  OBTAIN  WITNESSES AN0  PRODUCE EVIDENCE [roe R.C.M. 405(p)l  I  X  I 
I  I 
b.  IN THE PRESENCE OF PROBATIONER I QUESTIONED UNDER OATH ALL AVAILABLE WITNESSES AND  EXAMINED 
DOCUMENTARY AND  REAL  EVIDENCE FOR BOTH SIDES. ANY DOCUMENTS AND REAL  EVIDENCE WERE SHOWN 
TO THE PROBATIONER. 
c.  THE PROBATIONER WAS AFFORDED THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE ALL  AVAILABLE WITNESSES. 
d.  I HAVE SUMMARIZED THE EVIDENCE CONSIDERED IN  EXHIBIT  1 
b  MADE A STATEMENT SUMMARIZED IN  EXHIBIT  2  1x1 
X 
X 
X 
m.  INDICATED THAT HESHE Dl0  NOT  WISH TO MAKE ASTATEMENT. 
I  I 
m.  THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES REQUESTED BY THE ACCUSED WERE NOT  AVAILABLE UNDER R.C.M. 405191 FOR THE 
REASONS INOICATED. (Brp&in  why mquerted luitne~~e~ wem unauaiiable and any alhrnotiue.  lo te~tirnony under R.C.M. 4051#)(4) 
u8ed.J 
NAME (Lut,  First. MI)  REASON UNAVAILABLE  ALTERNATIVES 
13. AFTER HAVING BEEN INFORMED OF THE RIGHT TO REMAIN  SILENT OR MAKE A STATEMENT. THE PROBATIONER 
X 
I APPENDIX 18 
I RECOMMENO THAT THE SUSPENSION OF THE SENTENCE  BE VACATED. IIndlmtr Wpeond amount olpunbhm#nt, Ifany, to  be 
directed Dice  to clean up  his living area.  Although Airman  Dice  testified that Timm  was 
prejudiced  against him because tie  was  a  probationer, no  evidence of  such bias was  offered. 
Dice  offered no  other exLenuating  or mitigating evidence and  the record reveals none.  Dice 
had  served under  the  suspended  sentence for 2  weeks  before this offense without  previous 
incident.  Uice was  previously convicted by  a  special court-martial  of  disrespect and 
disobedience  toward  superior NCOs  on two  different occasions.  I  am  satisfied that Dice is 
guilty of  the offense of  assaulting a  superior NCO  in  the execution of  office.  I  recommend 
that the suspension of  the bad-conduct  discharge  be  vacated. APPENDIX 18 
a.  VACATE SUSPENSION OF THE SENTENCE TO (#~eclh 1JDC/Omount of punbhment lo be vocalad): 
c. OTHER  I.peclr~): 
of  dlitary discipline and  reflects his failure 
ct  discharge is appropriate. APPENDIX 19 
WAIVERtWITHDRAWAL OF APPELLATE RIGHTS IN  GENERAL AND SPECIAL 
COURTS-MARTIAL  SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY A COURT OF MILITARY REVIEW 
NOTE:  See R.C.M.1203(b) concerning which cases aresubject to reuiew by a Court of Military Review. See R.C.M. 
1110  concerning lvoiuer or withdmlvol of appellate reuiew. 
I have read the attached action dated  lgg3 
I have consulted with  Lieutenant Fender  ,my (associate) defense counsel concerning my 
appellate rights and I am satisfied with histher advice. 
I understand that: 
1.  If I do  not waive or withdraw appellate review -
a.  My court-martial will be reviewed by the  Navy-Marine  Corps  Court of Military Review. 
b.  The Court of Military Review will review my case to determine whether the findings and sentence are correct 
in law and fact and whether the sentence is appropriate. 
c.  After review by  the Court of Military Review, my case could be reviewed for legal error by the United State* 
Court of Military Appeals, on petition by me or on request of the Judge Advocate General. 
d.  If  the Court of Military Appeals reviews my case, my case could be reviewed for legal error by the United 
States Supreme Court on petition by me or the Government. 
e.  1have the right to be represented by military couase1,at no cost to me, or by civilian counsel, at no expense 
to the United States, or both, before the Court of Military Review, the Court of Military  Appeale, and the 
Supreme Court. 
2.  If  I waive or withdraw appellate review -
a.  My  case will not be  reviewed by  the Court of Military Review, or be subject to furth~ review by the Court 
of Military Appeals, or by the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C.  1269. 
b.  My  case will be reviewed  by a judge advocate for legal error, and 1may submit in writing allegations of l@ 
error for consideration by  the judge advocate. 
c.  After review by the judge advocate and final action in my case, I may petition the Judge Advocate General 
for correction of legal errors under Article 69(b). Such a petition must be filed within 2 years of the conven-
ing authority's action, unless 1can show good cause for filing later. 
d.  A waiver or withdrawal, once filed, cannot be revoked, and bars further appellate review. 
Understanding the foregoing,  I (waive my rights to appellate review) ----P-).  I 
make this decision freely and voluntarily. No one has made any  promises that I would receive any benefits from thls 
waiver--,  and no one has forced me to  make it. 
James R.  Richards 
SIGNATURE OF ACCUSED 
PFC 
RANK OF ACCUSED APPENDIX 19 
(Check appropriate block) 
1.  I represented the accused at hislher court-martial. 
2.  1 am associate counsel detailed under  R.C.M. 1110(b). I have communicated with the accused's (detailed) 
(individual military) (civilian) (appellate) defense counsel concerning the accused's waiverlwithdmwal and 
discussed this communication with the accused. 
3.  I am substitute counsel detailed under R.C.M. 1110(b). 
4.  I  am  a civilian counsel  whom  the accused  consulted concerning  this matter. I am  a  member  in good 
standing of the bar of 
5.  1 am appellate defense counsel for the accused. 
I have advised the accused of hislher appellate rights and of the consequences of waiving or withdrawing appellate 
review. The accused has elected to (waive) fm-kappellate  review. 
Dudley  D.  Fender 
TYPED NAME OF COUNSEL  UNIT OF COUNSEL 
Lieutenant,  JAGC, IlSN 
RANK OF COUNSEL  BUSINESS ADDRESS 111 Ctuilhn Cauruell 
5  November  1993 -- --
DATE APPENDIX 20 
WAIVERNVITHDRAWAL OF APPELLATE RIGHTS IN  GENERAL COURTS-MARTIAL 
SUBJECT TO EXAMINATION IN  THE OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL 
NOTE:  See R.C.M.1201(b)(I) concerning  which cases are subject  to examination  in  the Office  of  the Judge 
Advocate General. See R.C.M. 11 10 concerning waiver or withdmwal of  appellate review. 
I have read the attached action, dated I&sLC~~~ 
I
I have consulted with  Captain Rater  ,my faesociatd defense counsel concerning my 
appellate rights and I am satisfied with hk/her advice. 
I 
I understand that:
I  1  I€  I do not waive or withdraw appellate review -
I 
a.  My  case will  be examined  in  the Office of the Judge Advocate General to determine whether the findings 
and sentence are legally correct and whether the sentence is appropriate. 
b.  After examination in the Office of the Judge Advocate General and final action in my case. I may petition 
the Judge Advocate General for review under Article 69(b). Such a petition must be filed within 2 years 
after the convening authority took action in my case, unless I can show good cauee for fding later. 
2.  If  I waive or withdraw appellate review -
a.  My case will not be examined in the Office of the Judge Advocate General under Article 69(a), UCMJ. 
I 
b.  My  case will be reviewed by a judge  advocate for legal error, and I may submit in writing allegations of 
legal error for consideration by the judge advocate. 
I 
c.  After review by the  judge advocate and final action in my case, I may petition the Judge Advocate General 
for review under Article 69(b). Such a petition must be filed within 2 years after the convening authority 
took action in my case, unless I can show good cause for filing later. 
I 
d.  A waiver or withdrawal, once filed. may not be revoked. 
3.  Understanding  the above,  I hereby  fwaive my rights to appellate reviewj ~ ~ W & C W M K X ~ 
fe@bKp  I  make this decision freely and voluntarily. No one has made any promises that I would receive any 
benefits from this waiver-.  and no one has forced me to  make it. 
I 
Gregory  r.  Johns  LCPL,  [ISMI: 
TYPED NAME OF ACCUSE0  RANK OF ACCUSED 
I  Aop&  GmUjL' OF ACCUSED 
5  November  1993 
DATE APPENDIX 20 
A 
STATEMENT OF COUNSEL 
(Check appropriate block) 
1.  I represented the accused at  hislher court-martial. 
2.  1 am  associate counsel detailed under R.C-M. lllO(b).  I have communicated with the accused's (detailed) 
(individual military) (civilian) (appellate) defense counsel concerning the accused's  waiverlwithdrawal and 
discussed this communication with the accused. 
3.  1 am substitute counsel detailed under R.C.M. 1110(b). 
4.  I  am a  civilian  counsel  whom the accused  consulted  concerning this mattcr.  I  am  a  member in  good 
standing of the bar of  ----- ---- - ..  .  .  . -.  .  . . 
5.  I am appellate defense counsel for the accused. 
I have advised the accused of his/her appellate rights and of the consequences of waiving or withdrawing appellate 
review. The accused has elected to (waive) ~htW!,K)(appellate review. 
Libby  Rater  - LSSS,  Camp  Blank,  GA 
TVPLD  NAME OF COUNSLL  UNIT OF COUNSEL 
Captain, DSMC 
RANK OF COUNSEL  - ----. .-- -
BUS1NESS AUDRESS (If  L',viliu#a Cou,t,rl) 
5  November  1993 -- - --..----------.  ----
DATE 
* 
Q  GPO :  1984  0 - 421-646  (1704  1 APPENDIX 21 

ANAL 
Introduction 
The Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, includes 
Executive Order No. 12473 signed by President Reagan  on 13 
April 1984. This publication also contains various supplementary 
materials for the convenience of the user. 
History of the Manual for  Courts-Martial. The President tradi- 
tionally has exercised the power to make rules for the government 
of the military establishment, including rules governing courts- 
martial. See W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 27-28 
(2d ed. 1920 reprint). Such rules have been promulgated under 
the President's authority as commander-in-chief, see U.S. Const., 
Art. 11, sec. 2, cl.l., and, at least since 1813, such power also has 
been provided for in statutes. See W. Winthrop, supra at 26-27. 
In 1875 Congress specifically provided for the President to make 
rules for the government of courts-martial. Act of March 1, 1775, 
Ch. 115. 18 Stat. 337. Similar authority was included in later stat- 
utes (see e.g., A.W. 38 (1916)), and continues in Article 36 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice. See also Articles 18 and 56. See 
generally Hearings on H.R. 3804 Before  the Military Personnel 
Subcom. of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 96th Cong.,  1st 
Sess. 5-6,  14, 17-18,  2C21, 52, 106 (1979). In 1979, Article 36 
was amended to clarify the broad scope of the President's 
rulemaking authority for courts-martial. Act of November 9, 
1979, Pub. L.No. 96-107,  Section 801(b), 93 Stat. 810,811. See 
generally Hearings on H.R. 3804, supra. 
In the nineteenth century the President promulgated, from 
time to time, regulations for the Army. Those regulations were 
published in various forms, including "Manuals".  W. Winthrop, 
supra at 28. Such publications were not limited to court-martial 
procedures and related matters; however, they were more in the 
nature of compendiums of military law and regulations. The early 
manuals for courts-martial were informal guides and were not 
promulgated by  the President. See MCM, 1895 at 1,2; MCM, 
1905 at 3;  MCM, 1910 at 3; MCM, 1917 at 111. See also MCM, 
1921 at XIX. 
The forerunner of the modern Manual for  Courts-Martial was 
promulgated by the Secretary of War in 1895. See MCM, 1895 at 
2. See also Hearings on H.R. 3805, supra at 5. (Earlier Manuals 
were prepared by individual authors. See e.g.,  A. Murray, A Man- 
ual for Courts-Martial (3d ed. 1893); H. Coppee, Field manual for 
Courts-Martial (1863)).  Subsequent Manuals through MCM, 
1969 (Rev.) have had the same basic format, organization, and 
subject matter as MCM, 1895, although the contents have been 
modified  and considerably expanded. See e.g., MCM, 1921 at 
XIX-XX.  The format has been a paragraph format, numbered 
consecutively and divided into chapters. The subject matter has 
included pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedure. In MCM, 1917, 
rules of evidence and explanatory materials on the punitive arti- 
cles were included. See, MCM, 1917 at XIV. The President first 
promulgated the Manual for Courts-Martial as such in 1921. See 
MCM, 192 1  at XXVI. 
Background of this Manual. During the drafting of the Military 
Rules of Evidence (see Analysis, Part 111, introduction, infra), the 
drafters identified several portions of MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  in spe- 
cific areas. However, the project to draft the Military Rules of Ev- 
idence had demonstrated the value of a more comprehensive ex- 
amination of existing law. In addition, changing the format of the 
Manual for Courts-Martial was considered desirable. In this re- 
gard it should be noted that, as indicated above, the basic format 
and organization of the Manual for Courts-Martial had remained 
the same for over 80 years, although court-martial practice and 
procedure had changed substantially. 
Upon completion of the Military Rules of Evidence in early 
1980, the General Counsel, Department of Defense, with the con- 
currence of the Judge Advocates General, directed that the Man- 
ual for Courts-Martial be revised. There were four basic goals for 
the revision. First, the new Manual was to conform to federal 
practice to the extent possible, except where the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice requires otherwise or where specific military re- 
quirements render such conformity impracticable. See Article 36. 
Second, current court-martial practice and applicable judicial 
precedent was to be thoroughly examined and the Manual was to 
be brought up to date, by modifying such practice and precedent 
or conforming to it as appropriate. Third, the format of the Man- 
ual was to be modified to make it more useful to lawyers (both 
military and civilian) and nonlawyers. Specifically, a rule as op- 
posed to paragraph format was to be used and prescriptive rules 
would be separated from nonbinding discussion. Fourth, the pro- 
cedures in the new Manual had to be workable across the spec- 
trum of circumstances in which courts-martial are conducted, in- 
cluding combat conditions. 
These goals were intended to ensure that the Manual for 
Courts-Martial continues to fulfill its fundamental purpose as a 
comprehensive body of law governing the trial of courts-martial 
and as a guide for lawyers and nonlawyers in the operation and 
application of such law. It was recognized  that no single source 
could resolve all issues or answer all questions in the criminal pro- 
cess. However, it was determined that the Manual for Courts- 
Martial should be sufficiently comprehensive, accessible, and un- 
derstandable so it could be reliably used to dispose of matters in 
the military justice system properly, without the necessity to con- 
sult other sources, as much as reasonably possible. 
The Joint-Service Committee on Military Justice was tasked 
with the project. The Joint-Service Committee consists of repre- 
sentatives from each of the armed forces, and a nonvoting repre- 
sentative from the Court of Military Appeals. Since 1980 the 
Joint-Service Committee has consisted of Colonel (later Brigadier 
General) Donald W. Hansen, USA, 1980-July 1981 (Chairman, 
October 198CJuly 1981); Colonel Kenneth A. Raby, USA, July 
1981-January  1984 (Chairman, July 1981-September  1982); 
Captain Edward M. Byrne, USN, 1980-July  1981 (Chairman 
through September  1980); Captain John J. Gregory, USN, July 
1981-January  1984; Colonel Richard  T. Yery  USAF, 
1980-March  1982; Colonel John E. Hilliard, USAF, March 
1982-October  1983 (Chairman, October 1982-October  1983); 
Colonel Thomas L. Hemingway, USAF, October 1983-January 
1984 (Chairman, October 1983-January  1984): Lieutenant Colo- 
nel A.F. Mielczarski, USMC, 198C-July  1982; Lieutenant Colo- 
nel G.W. Bond, USMC, July  1982-October  1982, Lieutenant 
Colonel Gary D. Solis, USMC, October 1982-March  1983; Lieu- 
tenant Colonel George Lange, 111, USMC, June 1983-January 
1984; Commander William  H. Norris, USCG, 1980-August APP. 21, n  APPE 
1981; Commander Thomas B. Snook, USCG, August 1981-Sep- 
tember 1983; Captain William B. Steinbach, USCG, October 
1983-January  1984; and Mr. Robert H. Mueller of the Court of 
Military Appeals (1980-January  1984). 
In the summer of 1980, Commander James E. Pinnell, USN, 
and Major Frederic I. Lederer, USA, prepared an initial outline 
of the new Manual. 
Drafting was done by  the Working Group of the Joint-Service 
Committee on Military Justice. Since September 1980, when the 
drafting process began, the Working Group consisted of: Major 
John S. Cooke, USA (Chairman); Commander James E. Pinnell, 
USN; Lieutenant Colonel Richard R. James, USAF (198CLDe- 
cember 1982); Lieutenant Colonel Robert Leonard, USAF (De- 
cember 1982 to January  1984); Major Jonathan R. Rubens, 
USMC; and Mr. John Cutts, and Mr. Robert Mueller of the staff 
of the Court of Military Appeals. Mr. Francis X. Gindhart and 
Mr. Jack McKay of the staff of the Court of Military Appeals also 
participated early in the drafting process. Clerical support was 
provided by  the Court of Military Appeals. In this regard, Mrs. 
Gail L. Bissi has been instrumental in the success of this project. 
The Working Group drafted the Manual in fourteen incre- 
ments. Each increment was circulated by  each service to various 
field offices for comment. Following such comment, each incre- 
ment was reviewed in the respective offices of the Judge Advocate 
General, the Director, Judge Advocate Division, Headquarters, 
USMC, and the Chief Counsel, USCG, and in the Court of Mili- 
tary Appeals. Following such review, the Joint-Service Commit- 
tee met and took action on each increment. After all increments 
had been reviewed and approved, the Code Committee approved 
the draft. At this time the Code Committee consisted of Chief 
Judge Robinson 0.  Everett, Judge William H. Cook, and Judge 
Albert B. Fletcher, of the Court of Military Appeals; Rear Admi- 
ral James J. McHugh, the Judge Advocate General, USN; Major 
General Hugh J. Clausen, The Judge Advocate General; USA; 
Major General Thomas Bruton, The Judge Advocate General, 
USAF; and Rear Admiral Edward Daniels, Chief Counsel, 
USCG. Brigadier General William H. J. Tiernan, USMC, also sat 
as an ex oficio member. 
Following approval by  the Code Committee, the draft was 
made available for comment by  the public. 48 Fed. Reg. 23688 
(May 26,  1983). In September and October 1983, the comments 
were reviewed. The Working Group prepared numerous modifi- 
cations in the draft based on comments from the public and from 
within the Department of Defense, and on judicial decisions and 
other developments since completion of the draft. In October 
1983, the Joint-Service Committee approved the draft for for- 
warding to the General Counsel, Department of Defense, for sub- 
mission to the President after coordination by  the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget. 
On November 18, 1983, Congress passed the Military Justice 
Act of 1983. This act was signed into law by  the President on De- 
cember 6,  1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209,  97 Stat. 1393 (1983). The 
Working Group had previously drafted proposed modifications 
to the May 1983 draft which would be necessary to implement the 
act. These proposed modifications were approved by  the Joint- 
Service Committee in November 1983 and were made available to 
the public for comment in December 1983. 48 Fed. Reg. 54263 
(December 1, 1983). These comments were reviewed and modifi- 
cations made in  the draft by  the Working Group, and the Joint- 
Service Committee approved these changes in January 1984. The 
draft of the complete Manual and the proposed executive order 
were forwarded to the General Counsel, Department of Defense 
in January 1984. These were reviewed and forwarded to the Office 
of Management and Budget in January 1984. They were reviewed 
in the Departments of Justice and Transportation. The Executive 
Order was finally prepared for submission to the President, and 
the President signed it on 13 April 1984. 
A  note on citation form. The drafters generally have followed 
the Uniform System of Citation (13th ed. 1981), copyrighted by 
the Columbia, Harvard, and  University of Pennsylvania Law Re- 
views and the Yale Law Journal, subject to the following. 
This edition of the Manual for Courts-Martial is referred to 
generally as  "this Manual".  The Rules for Courts-Martial are 
cited, e.g., as R.C.M. 101. The Military Rules of  Evidence are 
cited, e.g., as Mil. R. Evid. 101. Other provisions of this Manual 
are cited to the applicable part and paragraph, e.g., MCM, Part 
V,  paragraph la(1) (1984). 
The previous edition of the Manual for Courts-Martial will be 
referred to as "MCM,  1969 (Rev.)." Except as otherwise noted, 
this includes Exec. Order No. 11476, 34 Fed. Reg. 10,502 (1969), 
as amended by  Exec. Order No. 11  835,40 Fed. Reg. 4,247 (1975); 
Exec. Order No. 12018,42 Fed. Reg. 57,943 (1977); Exec. Order 
No. 12 198,45 Fed. Reg. 16,932 (1980); Exec. Order No. 12223,45 
Fed. Reg. 58,503 (1980); Exec. Order No.  12306, 46 Fed. Reg. 
29,693 (1981); Exec. Order No.  12315, 46 Fed. Reg. 39,107 
(1981); Exec. Order No.  12340, 47 Fed. Reg. 3,071 (1982); Exec. 
Order No. 12383,47 Fed. Reg. 42,317 (1982), and Executive Or- 
der No. 12460, Fed. Reg. (1984). Earlier editions of the Manual 
for Courts-Martial, will be identified by  a complete citation. 
The Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. Sections 
801-940,  as amended by the Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. 
No. 98-209,  97 Stat. 1393 will be cited as follows: 
Each individual section is denominated in the statute as an 
"Article" and will be cited to the corresponding Article. E.g., 10 
U.S.C. Section 801 will be cited as "Article 1";  10 U.S.C. Section 
802 will be cited as "Article  2";  10 U.S.C. Section 940 will be 
cited as "Article 140". The entire legislation, Articles 1 through 
140, will be referred to as "the Code" or "the UCMJ" without ci- 
tation to the United States Code. When a change from MCM, 
1969 (Rev.) is based on the Military Justice Act of  1983, Pub. L. 
No. 98-209,  97 Stat, 1393 (1983), this will be noted in the analy- 
sis, with citation to the appropriate section of the act. When this 
analysis was drafted, the specific page numbers in the statutes at 
large were not available. 
Composition of the Manual for  Courts-Martial (1984) 
a  Executive Order (1983) 
The Executive Order includes the Manual for Courts-Martial, 
which consists of the Preamble, Rules for Courts-Martial, Mili- 
tary Rules of Evidence, the Punitive Articles, and Nonjudicial 
Punishment Procedure. Each rule states binding requirements ex- 
cept when the text of the rule expressly provides otherwise. Nor- 
mally, failure to comply with a rule constitutes error. See Article 
59 concerning the effect of errors. 
b  Supplementary Materials 
As a supplement to the Manual, the Department of Defense, in 
conjunction with the Department of Transportation, has pub- 
lished a Discussion (accompanying the Preamble, the Rules for ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. 
Courts-Martial, and the Punitive Articles), this Analysis, and va- 
rious Appendices. 
(1)  The Discussion 
The Discussion is intended by the drafters to serve as a treatise. 
To the extent that the Discussion uses terms such as "must"  or 
"will",  it is solely for the purpose of alerting the user to important 
legal consequences that may result from binding requirements in 
the Executive Order, judicial decisions, or other sources of bind- 
ing law. The Discussion itself, however, does not have the force of 
law, even though it may describe legal requirements derived from 
other sources. It is in the nature of treatise, and may be used as 
secondary authority. The inclusion of both the President's rules 
and the drafters' informal discussion in the basic text of the Man- 
ual provides flexibility not available in previous editions of the 
Manual, and should eliminate questions as to whether an item is a 
requirement or only guidance. See e.g.. United States v. Baker, 14 
M.J. 361, 373 (C.M.A.  1973). In this Manual, if matter is in- 
cluded in a rule or paragraph, it is intended that the matter be 
binding, unless it is clearly expressed as precatory. A rule is bind- 
ing even if the source of the requirement is a judicial decision or a 
statute not directly applicable to courts-martial. If the President 
had adopted a rule based on a judicial decision or a statute, subse- 
quent repeal of the statute or reversal of the judicial decision does 
not repeal the rule. On the other hand, if the drafters did not 
choose to "codify"  a principle or requirement derived from a judi- 
cial decision or other source of law, but considered it sufficiently 
significant that users should be aware of it in the Manual, such 
matter is addressed in the Discussion. The Discussion will be re- 
vised from time to time as warranted by  changes in applicable 
law. 
(2)  The Analysis 
The Analysis sets forth the nonbinding views of the drafters as 
to the basis for each rule or paragraph, as well as the intent of the 
drafters, particularly with respect to the purpose of substantial 
changes in present law. The Analysis is intended to be a guide in 
interpretation. In that regard, note that the Analysis accompa- 
nied the project from the initial drafting stage through submission 
to the President, and was continually revised to reflect changes 
vrior to submission to the President. Users are reminded. how- 
ever, that primary reliance should be placed on the plain words of 
the rules. In addition, it is important to remember that the Analy- 
sis solely represents the views of staff personnel who worked on 
the project, and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Presi- 
dent in approving it, or of the officials who formally recom- 
mended approval to the President. 
The Analysis frequently refers to judicial decisions and statutes 
from the civilian sector that are not applicable directly to courts- 
martial. Subsequent  modification of such sources of law may pro- 
vide useful guidance in interpreting rules, and the drafters do not 
intend that citation of  a source in this Analysis should preclude 
reference to subsequent developments for purposes of interpreta- 
tion. At the same time, the user is reminded that the amendment 
of the Manual is the province of the President. Developments in 
the civilian sector that affect the underlying rationale for a rule do 
not affect the validity of the rule except to the extent otherwise re- 
quired as a matter of statutory or constitutional law. The same is 
true with respect to rules derived from the decisions of military 
tribunals. Once incorporated into the Executive Order, such mat- 
ters have an independent source of authority and are not depen- 
dent upon continued support from the judiciary. Conversely, to 
the extent that judicial precedent is set forth only in the Discus- 
sion or is otherwise omitted from the Rules or the Discussion, the 
continuing validity of the precedent will depend on the force of its 
rationale, the doctrine of stare decisis, and similar jurisprudential 
considerations. Nothing in this Introduction should be inter- 
preted to suggest that the placement of matter in the Discussion 
(or the Analysis), rather than the rule, is to be taken as disap- 
proval of the precedent or  as an invitation for a court to take a dif- 
ferent approach; rather, the difficult drafting problem of choosing 
between a codification and common law approach to the law fre- 
quently resulted in noncodification of decisions which had the 
unanimous support of the drafters. To the extent that future 
changes are made in the Rules or Discussion, corresponding 
materials will be included in the Analysis. 
The Appendices contain various nonbinding materials to assist 
users of this Manual. The Appendices also contain excerpts from 
pertinent statutes. These excerpts are appropriated for judicial 
notice of law, see Mil. R. Evid. 201A, but nothing herein pre- 
cludes a party from proving a change in law through production 
of an official codification or other appropriate evidence. 
PART I. PREAMBLE 
Introduction. The preamble is based on paragraphs  1 and 2 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See generally Military Justice Jurisdiction of 
Courts-Martial,DA PAM 27-174,  chapter 1 (May 1980.) 
1.  Sources of military jurisdiction. 
This subsection is based on paragraph  1 of MCM,  1969 (Rev.). 
The provisions of the Constitution which are sources of jurisdic- 
tion of military courts or tribunals include: Art I, sec. 8, cl. 1, 
9-16,  18; Art. 11, sec. 2; Art. IV, sec. 4; and the fifth amendment. 
As to sources in international law, see e.g., Ex Parte  Quirin, 317 
U.S.  1 (1942); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
PrisonersofWar, Aug. 12,1949, arts. 82-84,6U.S.T.  3316,3382, 
T.I.A.S.  No.  3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. See generally DA PAM 
27-1  74, supra at paragraph 1-3. 
2.  Exercise of military jurisdiction. 
Subsection (a) is based on the first paragraph of paragraph 2 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
For additional materials on martial law, see W. Winthrop, Mil-
itary Law and Precedent 817-30  (2d ed. 1920 reprint); Ex parte 
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1 866). See also paragraph 3, sec. 1  of 
MCM, 1910 (concerning the exercise of martial law over military 
affiliated persons). 
For additional materials on military government, see W. Win- 
throp, supra at 798-817;  Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952); 
Mechanics'and Traders'Bank v.  Union Bank, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 
276 (1875). 
For additional materials on the exercise of military jurisdiction 
under the law of war, see W. Winthrop, supra at 831-46; Trials of 
War Criminals Before the Nuremberg  Tribunals (U.S. Gov't 
Printing Off., 195Cb5 1); Trials of the Major War  Criminals Before 
the International Military Tribunal (International Military Tribu- 
nal, Nuremberg  1947); In re  Yamashita, 327 U.S.  1 (1946); Ex 
parte  Quirin, supra; Ex parte Milligan, supra; Articles 18 and 21. APP. 21, !l  APPE 
Subsection (b) is based on the second paragraph of paragraph 2 
of MCM,  1969 (Rev.). See also Article 21; DA PAM 27-174, 
supra at paragraph 1-51;  W. Winthrop, supra at 80245,835-36. 
As to provost courts, see also Hearings  on H.R. 2498 Before  a 
Subcomm. of the House  Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 
1st Sess. 975, 1061 (1949). As to trial of prisoners ofwar, see Arti-
cle 2(a)(9) and Article 102, 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra. 
3.  Purpose of military law. 
See generally Chappel v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296,  103 S.Ct. 2362 
(1983); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); S.Rep. No. 53, 98th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3  (1983). For a discussion of the nature and 
purpose of military law, see R. Everett,  Military Justice in the 
Armed Forces of the United States (1956); J. Bishop, Justice Under 
Fire (1974); Hodson, Military Justice: Abolish  or Change?, 22 
Kan. L. Rev. 31 (1975), reprinted in Mil. L. Rev. Bicent. Issue 
579 (1976); Hansen, Judicial Functions for  the Commander, 41 
Mil.L.Rev. 1 (1968); Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before a Subcomm. 
of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 606, 
778-86  (1949); H. Moyer, Justice and the Military 5-23  (1972). 
4.  Structure and application of the Manual for 
Courts-Martial. 
Self-explanatory.See also the Introduction of the Analysis. 
PART II. RULES FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 
CHAPTER I. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Rule 101.  Scope, title 
(a)  In general. This subsection is patterned after Fed. R. Crim. P. 
1. "Courts-martial"  are classified by Article 16. Supplementary 
procedures include all procedures directly relating to the court- 
martial process, such as preparation and authentication of the re- 
cord, vacation proceedings, preparation of orders, and profes- 
sional supervision  of counsel and military judges. The rules do not 
govern imposition of nonjudicial punishment (see Part V)  or ad- 
ministrative actions. 
(b)  Title. This subsection is patterned after Fed.R..Crim.P. 60. 
Rule 102.  Purpose and construction 
This rule restates Fed. R. Crim. P. 2 in terms strictly limiting the 
application of these rules to military justice. Accord, Mil. R. Evid. 
102. 
Rule 103.  Definitions 
The drafters have, whenever possible, followed the definitions 
used in the United States Code. See subsection (20). Some defini- 
tions have been made and followed for convenience, to avoid fre- 
quent repetition of complicated phases. Others have been made to 
address variations in the terminology used among the services. 
The drafters have attempted to minimize the number of defini- 
tions. It is the drafters' intent that the words of the Manual be 
construed in accordance with their plain meaning, with due defer- 
ence to previous usage of terms in military law or custom. 
(1)  "Article." This definition was added to reduce repetitive cita- 
tions to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. MCM, 1969 (Rev.) 
and its predecessors used the same convention. 
(2)  "Capital case."  This definition is based on the first two 
sentences of paragraph l5a (3) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(3)  "Capital offense." This definition is based on the first sentence 
of paragraph 15a(2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev). 
(4)  "Code." This definition was added to avoid frequent repeti- 
tion of "Uniform Code of Military Justice." 
(5)  "Commander." This definition was added to avoid frequent 
repetition of the longer phrase, "commanding officer or officer in 
charge." See Articles l(3) and (4). 
(6)  "Convening authority."  This provision is based on paragraph 
84a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(7)  "Copy." This definition was added to ensure that no construc- 
tion of the Manual could result in delays of cases for the sake of 
unavailable specialized forms or office equipment. 
(8)  "Court-martial." Articles 16 and 39(a). 
(9)  "Days." This definition is added for clarity. Cf: United States 
v. Manalo, 1 M.J. 452 (C.M.A. 1976). 
(10)  "Detail."  DoD Dir. 5550.7, Incl. 1, para. C.8 (Sep. 28, 
1966). 
(11)  "Explosive." 18 U.S.C. $9 232(5); 8446). 
(12)  "Firearm."  18 U.S.C. 9 232(4). 
(13)  "Joint." This definition is based on Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub- 
lication 1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 187 (1 
Jun 79). 
(14) "Members." This term is defined to avoid confusion about 
the membership of courts-martial. 
(15)  "Military  judge."  Article 1 (10). As to presidents of special 
courts-martial, see Mir. R. Evid. 101(c). The latter aspect was 
added for convenience and brevity in drafting. 
(16)  "Party." This definition was required by  adoption of the 
texts of federal civilian rules, which frequently use the term. The 
code uses the same term. See e.g., Article 49. The Military Rules 
of Evidence also use the term. 
(17)  "Staffjudge advocate." This term was not defined in the pre- 
vious Manuals. It is defined to avoid variations in nomenclature 
among the services. 
(18)  "Sua sponte."  "sua  sponte"  has been used frequently to 
avoid gender-specific language ("on  his or her own motion").  Its 
use has been limited to passages expected to be used mainly by 
lawyers or with their assistance. Nonetheless, a definition is nec- 
essary for the benefit of  a president of a special court-martial 
without a military judge. 
(19)  "War, time of."  This definition applies only to 
R.C.M.1004(~)(6)  and to Parts IV and V of the Manual. Parts I1 
(except for R.C.M. 1004(c)(6) and 111 do not use or refer to "time 
of war."  The phrase appears in several articles of the code, other 
than punitive articles. See Articles 2(a)(10); 43(a), (e), and (f); 
7 l(b). The discussions of several rules address "time of war" in 
relation to these articles. See R.C.M. 202(a) Discussion (4); 
407(b) Discussion; 907@)(2)(B)  Discussion. 
"Time of war" is used in six punitive articles. See Articles 101, 
105, and 106 (which define offenses that can occur only in time of 
war-Articles  101 and 106 are capital offenses), and Articles 85, 
90, and 113 (which are capital offenses in  time of war). See also 
Article 82. In addition, three offenses in Part IV use time of war as 
an aggravating circumstance. See paragraphs 37,40, and 104. 
The code does not define "time of war,"  and Congress has not 
generally defined the term elsewhere, despite the appearance of 
"time of war" and similar language in many statutes. See e.g., 18 ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (19) 
U.S.C. 5 3287; 37 U.S.C. 99 301(d); 301a(c), 301(a). In at least 
one instance Congress has expressly qualified the phrase "time of 
war"  by  saying "time of war declared by Congress." 37 U.S.C. 
5 310(a). Compare 37 U.S.C. 9 310(a) with 37 U.S.C.  9 301(d); 
301a(c). See also S.Rep. No. 544, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1965) 
which equates "all out war" to a declared war. 
The legislative history of the code contains few references to 
this matter. The only direct reference, relating to the deletion of 
the phrase from Article 102, indicates that the working group 
which initially drafted the code considered "time of war" to mean 
"a  formal state of war."  Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before a Sub- 
comm. of the House of Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1228-29 (1949). This reference is not cited in any of the deci- 
sions of the Court of Military Appeals construing "time of war." 
Judicial decisions before the code had long recognized that a 
state of war may exist without a declaration of war. See Bas.  v. 
Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800); Hamilton v. M'Claughry, 136 F. 
445 (10th  Cir.  1905). See  also United States v.  Ayers, 4 
U.S.C.M.A. 220, 15 C.M.R. 220 (1954) and cases cited therein, 
W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 668 (2d ed. 1920 re- 
print). See generally  Carnahan, The Law of  War in the  United 
States  Court of Military Appeals, 22 A.F.L. Rev. 120 (1980-81); 
Stevens, Time of  War and  Vietnam, 8 A.F.JAGL.Rev. 23 
(May-June 1966). 
The Court of Military Appeals has held that time of war, as 
used in several provisions of the code, does not necessarily mean 
declared war. Under the court's analysis, whether a time of war 
exists depends on the purpose of the specific article in which the 
phrase appears, and on the circumstances surrounding applica- 
tion of that article. See  United States v. Averette,  19 U.S.C.M.A. 
363,41 C.M.R. 363 (1970) ("time of war" under Article 2(a)(10) 
means declared war; court-martial jurisdiction over civilians is to 
be construed narrowly);  United States v.  Anderson,  17 
U.S.C.M.A. 558,38 C.M.R. 386 (1968) (Vietnam war was time of 
war for purpose of suspension of statute of limitations under Arti- 
cle 43(a); accord Broussard  v. Patton, 466 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 
1972)); United States v. Anderten, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 354,  15 C.M.R. 
354 (1954) (Korean war was time of war for purpose of Article 
85); United States v. Taylor, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 232,  15 C.M.R. 232 
(1954) (Korean war was time of war for purpose of suspension of 
statue of limitations under Article 43(f));  United States v. Ayers, 
supra (Korea war was time of war for purpose of suspension of 
statute of limitations under Article 43(a));  United States v. Chris- 
tensen, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 22,  15 C.M.R. 22 (1954) (Korean war was 
time of war for purpose of Article 90); United States v. Bancroft, 3 
U.S.C.M.A.  3.  l l C.M.R. 3 (1953) (Korean war was time of war 
for purpose of Article 1  13). 
The circumstances the Court of Military Appeals has examined 
to determine whether time of war exists include: the nature of the 
conflict (generally, there must exist "armed  hostilities against an 
organized enemy;" United States v. Shell, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 646, 650, 
23 C.M.R.  110, 114 (1957)); the movement to and numbers of 
United States forces in, the combat area; the casualties involved 
and the sacrifices required; the maintenance of large numbers of 
active duty personnel; legislation by  Congress recognizing or pro- 
viding for the hostilities; executive orders and proclamations con- 
cerning the hostilities; and expenditures in  the war effort. See 
United States v. Bancroft, supra at 5,  11 C.M.R. at 5. See also 
United States v. Anderson, supra; United States v. Shell, supra; 
United States v. Sanders, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 21,21 C.M.R. 147 (1956); 
United States v. Ayers, supra. 
During the Korean war it was suggested that "time of war" ex- 
isted only in the Far Eastern theater. The court did not have to 
decide this issue with respect to whether the death penalty was 
authorized for Articles 85,90, or 113 because the President sus- 
pended the Table of Maximum Punishments (paragraph  117c of 
MCM (Army), 1949; paragraph 127c of MCM, 195 I), only in the 
Far Eastern command. See Exec. Order No.  10149, 3 C.F.R. 
1949-53  Comp. 326 (1950); Exec. Order No.  10247, 3 C.F.R. 
1949-53  Comp. 754 (1951). See also United States v. Greco, 36 
C.M.R. 559 (A.B.R. 1965). The question as to Articles 85,90, or 
113 did not arise during the Vietnam war because the Table of 
Maximum Punishments was not suspended. There are no re- 
ported cases concerning Articles 101 and 106, and the only prose- 
cutions under Article 105 were, of course, for offenses arising in 
the theater of operations. See, e.g., United States v. Dickenson, 6 
U.S.C.M.A. 438, 20 C.M.R. 154 (1955); United States v. Gal- 
lagher, 23 C.M.R. 591 (A.B.R. 1957). 
The Court of Military Appeals rejected the argument that 
"time of war" is geographically limited with respect to Article 43. 
See United States v. Taylor, supra; United States v. Ayers, supra. 
See also United States v. Anderson, supra. The court's analysis in 
Taylor and Ayers suggests, however, that for some purposes "time 
of war" may be geographically limited. For purposes of the death 
penalty, the prerequisite findings of aggravating circumstances 
under R.C.M. 1004 would screen out offenses which did not sub- 
stantially affect the war effort. Therefore, possible geographic lim- 
itations in "time  of war"  would be subsumed in the necessary 
findings under R.C.M. 1004. 
Based on the foregoing, for at least some purposes of the puni- 
tive articles, "time of war"  may exist without a declaration of 
war. The most obvious example would be a major attack on the 
United States and the following period during which Congress 
may be unable to meet. C'  New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 
F.2d  260 (10th Cir. 1946), cert, denied, 331 U.S.  81 1 (1947). 
Moreover, as both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts demon- 
strated, United States forces may be committed to combat of sub- 
stantial proportions and for extended periods, while for many 
possible reasons (see Bas v. Tingy, supra at 44) war is not formally 
declared. 
It should be noted that, under the article-by-article analysis 
used by the Court of Military Appeals to determine whether time 
of war exists, "time of war" as used in Article  106 may be nar- 
rower than in other punitive articles, at least in its application to 
civilians.See United States v. Averette, supra. See also Article 104. 
The definition does not purport to give the President power to 
declare war. See United States v. Ayers, supra at 227, 15 C.M.R. at 
227; United States v. Bancroft. supra at 5, 1  l C.M.R. at 5. Instead, 
it provides a mechanism by  which the President may recognize, 
for purposes of removing or specifically raising the maximum lim- 
its on punishments for certain offenses under Part IV, that a "time 
of war" exists. This determination would be based on the existing 
circumstances. For purposes of coda1 provisions triggered  by 
"time of war," this determination would be subject to judicial re- 
view to ensure it is consistent  with congressional intent. Cf: 
United States v. Bancroft, supra. Nevertheless, a determination by 
the President that time of war exists for these purposes would be 
entitled to great weight. DIX 21 
Paragraph  127c(5) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and the ninth para- 
graph 127c of MCM, 1951 provided for suspension of the Table of 
Maximum Punishments as to certain articles upon a declaration 
of war. The President could, and did in the Korean war, suspend 
the limits the President had established for those offenses. Thus, 
the effect of the definition of "time of war" in R.C.M. 103(19) is 
similar to the operation of those paragraphs. In either case, a dec- 
laration of war or specific action by the President affects the maxi- 
mum punishments.  The definition under R.C.M.  103(19) also 
provides guidance, subject to judicial review as noted above, on 
the application of coda1 provisions. 
(20) "The definitions and rules of construction in 1 U.S.C. $4  1 
through 5 and in 10 U.S.C. 44 101 and 801." Self-explanatory. 
1990 Amendment: The change to the discussion corrects a pre- 
vious typographical omission of clause (20) and misplacement of 
definitions of rank and rating. The note following clause (19) is 
not part of the definitions of  10 U.S.C.  4 101 and was added to 
clarify usage of the terms "rank" and "grade"  in this Manual. 
Rule 104.  Unlawful command influence 
This rule based on Article 37 and paragraph  38 of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). See also United States v. Charette, 15 M.J.  197 (C.M.A. 
1983); United States v. Blaylock, 15 M.J.  190 (C.M.A. 1983); 
United States v. Ledbetter, 2 M.J. 37 (C.M.A. 1976); United States 
v. DuBay, 17 U.S.C.M.A.  147, 37 C.M.R. 41 1 (1967); United 
States v.  Wright, 17 U.S.M.A.  11437  C.M.R. 374 (1967); United 
States v. Hawthorne, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 293,22 C.M.R. 83 (1956). The 
discussion is based on H.R. Rep. No. 491,81st Cong., 1st Sess. 21 
(1949). As to supervision of military judges and counsel, see Arti-
cles 6,26, and 27. Subsection @)(2)(B)  is retained. It is rare that a 
military judge in a special court-martial is not assigned to the ju- 
dicial agency or activity of the service concerned. See e.g., AR 
27-10,  para. 8-6b (3) (Nov. 1982). Subsection @)(2)(B) ensures 
that in the unusual situation that it is necessary to detail a military 
judge not so assigned, the military judge's performance of judicial 
duties will not be the subject of comment or evaluation in an effi- 
ciency or fitness report prepared or reviewed by the convening au- 
thority. The second sentence in subsection @)(2)(B)  clarifies that 
the convening authority may comment only on the military 
judge's nonjudicial duties in such a report. Subsection (D) is new 
and clarifies that the military judge, members, and counsel are not 
immune from action for any offense they might commit while in 
that capacity, e.g. failure to repair. 
Rule 105.  Direct communications: convening 
authorities and staff judge advocates; among staff 
judge advocates 
This rule, while new to the Manual for Courts-Martial, is based 
on Article 6@). Congress intended that Article 6@) serve several 
purposes. First, by  requiring convening authorities to communi- 
cate directly with their staff judge advocates on matters relating 
to the administration of military justice, it was intended that the 
position and effectiveness of the staff judge advocate be enhanced. 
Second, by  providing for communications among judge advo- 
cates, it was intended to emphasize the independence of staff 
judge advocates, which in turn would ensure that staff judge ad- 
vocates exercise their judicial functions in a fair and objective 
manner. Lastly, and most importantly, Article 6@) was intended 
to help prevent interference with the due administration of mili- 
tary justice. See H.R. Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 
(1949); S.Rep. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.9 (1949); 95 Cong. Rec.H. 
5721 (1949); 96 Cong. Rec.S 1356 (1950). See also Cooke v. Orser, 
12 M.J. 335 (C.M.A.  1982); United States  v. Davis,  18 
U.S.C.M.A. 170, 39 C.M.R. 170 (1969);  United States v. Walsh, 
11 M.J. 858 (N.M.C.M.R. 1981). 
Rule 106.  Delivery of military offenders to civilian 
authorities 
This rule is based on Article 14(a)  and on the second paragraph of 
paragraph  12 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. 
Reed, 2 M.J. 64 (C.M.A. 1976) (delivery and speedy trial);  18 
U.S.C.  Appendix 11. The second sentence is new. It provides ex- 
press authority for restraining an offender to be delivered to civil- 
ian authorities, but only when such restraint is justified under the 
circumstances. Note that this rule does not apply to delivery to a 
foreign government; this situation ordinarily is governed by  sta- 
tus of forces agreements. This rule applies to delivery to authori- 
ties of the United States or its political subdivisions.  Occasionally 
when civilian authorities request delivery of a servicemember,  the 
delivery cannot be effected immediately, e.g., when the offender is 
overseas. In such situations, reasonable restraint may be neces- 
sary to ensure that the delivery can be effected and to protect the 
community. The person responsible for deciding whether to relin- 
quish the offender  must decide whether there are adequate 
grounds for restraint in such cases. This rule is not intended to 
permit the military to restrain an offender on behalf of civilian au- 
thorities pending trial or other disposition. Restraint imposed 
under this rule is strictly limited to the time reasonably necessary 
to effect the delivery. Thus, if the civilian authorities are dilatory 
in taking custody, the restraint must cease. 
The discussion is based on Article 140). 
Rule 107.  Dismissed officer's right to request trial 
by court-martial 
This rule is based on Article 4 and paragraph 11 1 of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). See also H.R. Rep. No. 491,  81st Cong.,  1st Sess. 12 
(1949); W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 64 (2d ed. 
1920 reprint). The text of  10 U.S.C. 4 1161(a) is as follows: 
(a)  No commissioned officer may be dismissed from any armed 
force except- 
(1) by sentence of a general court-martial; 
(2) in communication of a sentence of a general court-martial; 
or 
(3) in time of war, by order of the President. 
Rule 108.  Rules of court 
This rule is new and is based on Fed.R.Crim. P. 57(a) and Article 
140. Cf: Article 66(f). See also United States v. Kelson, 3 M.J. 139 
(C.M.A. 1977). Depending on the regulations, rules of court may 
be promulgated on a service-wide,  judicial circuit, or trial judge 
level, or a combination thereof. The rule recognizes that differ- 
ences in organization and operations of services and regional and 
local conditions may necessitate variations in practices and proce- 
dures to supplement those prescribed by  the code and this Man- 
ual. ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (a) 
The  manner in which rules of court are disseminated is within 
the sole discretion of the Judge Advocate General concerned. Ser- 
vice-wide rules, for example, may be published in the same man- 
ner as regulations or specialized pamphlets or  journals. Local 
rules may be published in the same manner as local regulations or 
other publications,  for example. Parties to any court-martial are 
entitled to a copy, without cost, of any rules pertaining thereto. 
Members of the public may obtain copies under rules of the mili- 
tary department concerned. The penultimate sentence ensures 
that failure to publish in accordance with the rules of the Judge 
Advocate General (or a delegate) will not affect the validity of a 
rule if a person has actual and timely notice or if there is no 
prejudice within the meaning of Article 59. Cf. 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(1). 
Rule 109.  Professional supervision of military 
judges and counsel 
This rule is based on paragraph 43 of MCM, 1969, (Rev.).  See 
also Articles 1(13), 6(a), 26, and 27. The  previous rule was limited 
to conduct of counsel in courts-martial. This rule also applies to 
military trial and appellate judges and to all judge advocates and 
other lawyers who practice in military justice, including the ad- 
ministration of nonjudicial punishment and pretrial and posttrial 
matters relating to courts-martial. The rule also applies to civilian 
lawyers so engaged, as did its predecessor.  The rule does not ap 
ply to lay persons.  Nothing in this rule is intended to prevent a 
military judge from excluding, in a particular case, a counsel from 
representinga party before the court-martial over which the mili- 
tary judge is presiding, on grounds of lack of qualifications under 
R.C.M.  502(d), or to otherwise exercise control over counsel in 
accordance with these rules. See e.g., R.C.M.  801. 
1993 Amendment: Subsection (a) was amended to conform 
with subsection (c).  The amendment to subsection (a) clarifies 
that the Judge Advocates General are  responsible for the supervi- 
sion and discipline of judges and attorneys. The amendment to 
subsection (a) is not intended to limit the authority of a Judge Ad- 
vocate General in any way. 
New subsection (c) is based on Article 6a, Uniform Code of 
Military Justice. Article 6a, U.C.M.J. was enacted by the Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990. "Military Appellate Pro- 
cedures,"  Tit. XIII, § 1303, National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-189, 103 Stat. 1352, 1576 
(1989). The legislative history reveals Congressional intent that, 
to the extent consistent with the Uniform Code of Military Jus- 
tice, the procedures to investigate and dispose of allegations con- 
cerning judges in the military should emulate those procedures 
found in the civilian sector. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 331,  lOlst 
Cong., 1st Sess. 656 (1989) [hereinafter Conf. Rep. No. 3311. The 
procedures established by subsection (c) are largely patterned af- 
ter the pertinent  sections of the American Bar Association's 
Model Standards Relating to Judicial Discipline and Disability 
Retirement (1978) [hereinafter ABA Model Standard] and the 
procedures dealing with the investigation of complaints against 
federal judges in 28 U.S.C.  372 (1988). The rule recognizes, 
however, the overall responsibility of the Judge Advocates Gen- 
eral for the certification, assignment, professional supervision and 
discipline of military trial and appellate military judges. See Arti-
cles 6, 26 & 66, Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
Subsection (c)(2) is based on the committee report accompany- 
ing the FY 90 Defense Authorization Act. See Conf. Rep. No. 
331 at 658. This subsection is designed to increase public confi- 
dence in the military justice system while contributing to the in- 
tegrity of the system. See, Landmark Communications v.  Vir-
ginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). 
The  first sentence of the Discussion to subsection (c)(2) is based 
on the committee report accompanying the Defense Authoriza- 
tion Act. Conf. Rep. No. 331 at 358. The second and third 
sentences of the discussion are based on the commentary to ABA 
Model Standard 3.4. See also, Chandler v.  Judicial Council, 398 
U.S. 74 (1970). 
Subsection (c)(3),  (c)(5),  and (c)(7)  reflect, and adapt to the 
conditions of military practice, the general principle that judges 
should investigate judges. 
The first  paragraph of the Discussion to subsection (c)(3)  is 
based on the commentary to ABA Model Standard 4.1. 
The  discussion to subsection (c)(4) is based on the commentary 
to ABA Model Standard 4.6. 
The clear and convincing standard found in  subsection 
(c)(6)(c) is based on ABA Model Standard 7.10. 
Under subsection (c)(7), the principle purpose of the commis- 
sion is to advise the Judge Advocate General concerned as to 
whether the allegations contained in a complaint constitute a vio- 
lation of applicable ethical standards. This sutisection is not in- 
tended to vreclude use of the commission for other functions such 
as rendering advisory opinions on ethical questions. See, ABA 
Model Standard 9 on the establishment and role of an advisory 
committee. 
Subsection (c)(7)(a)  is based on ABA Model Standard 2.3, 
which provides that one-third of the members of a commission 
should be active or retired judges. 
CHAPTER II.  JURISDICTION 
Rule 201.  Jurisdiction in general 
Introduction.  The primary source of court-martial jurisdiction is 
Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 14 of the Constitution, which empowers Con- 
gress to make rules for the government and regulation of the 
armed forces of the United States. Courts-martial are recognized 
in the provisions of the fifth amendment expressly exempting 
"cases arising in the land or naval forces" from the requirement of 
presentment and indictment by grand jury. See also Part I, Pre-
amble, for a fuller discussion of the nature of courts-martial and 
the sources of their jurisdiction. 
(a)  Nature of court-martial jurisdiction.  Subsection (1) reiterates 
the first sentence of the second paragraph of paragraph 8 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  The discussion is based on paragraph 8 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  Cf. Fed R. Crim. P.7(~)(2);  18 U.S.C. 
361 1-20.  Courts-martial generally have the power to resolve 
issues which arise in connection with litigating criminal liability 
and punishment for offenses, to the extent that such resolution is 
necessary to a disposition of the issue of criminal liability or pun- 
ishment. 
Subsection (2) restates the worldwide extent of court-martial 
jurisdiction. Article 5. See Autry  v.  Hyde, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 433, 42 
C.M.R. 35 (1970). The discussion  points out that, despite the 
worldwide applicability of the code, geographical considerations 
may affect court-martial jurisdiction. See R.C.M. 202 and 203. Subsection  (3) restates the third paragraph of paragraph 8 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also Chenoweth v.  Van Arsdall, 22 
U.S.C.M.A. 183,46C.M.R. 183 (1973), which held that Art. 111, 
sec, 2, cl. 3 of the Constitution (requiring crimes to be tried in the 
state in which committed) does not apply to courts-martial. The 
second sentence is based on Article 18. See also Geneva Conven- 
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
August 12, 1949, 6U.S.T. 3516,T.I.A.S.  No. 3365. 
(b)  Requisites of court-martial jurisdiction.  This rule is derived 
from the fourth paragraph of paragraph 8 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
The first sentence in the rule is new. See Rosado v.  Wyman, 397 
U.S. 397, 404 n.3 (1970); Wickham v. Hall, 12 M.J. 145, 152 n.8 
(C.M.A. 1981). Cf: Exparte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933). The  rule 
expands the list of requisites for court-martial jurisdiction to con- 
form more accurately to practice and case law. Requisite (3) has 
been added to reflect the distinction, long recognized  in military 
justice, between creating a court-martial by convening it, and ex- 
tending to a court-martial the power to resolve certain issues by 
referring charges to it. Thus, a court-martial has power to dispose 
only of those offenses which a convening authority has referred to 
it. Not all defects in a referral are  jurisdictional. See United States 
v. Blaylock, 15 M.J. 190 (C.M.A.  1983). Requisite (5) is listed sep- 
arately for the first time. This requisite makes clear that courts- 
martial have the power to hear only those cases which they are 
authorized by the code to try (i.e., offenses made punishable by 
the code, and, in the case of general courts-martial, certain of- 
fenses under the law of war). Second, it recognizes the important 
effect of O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), on courts- 
martial. Although nothing in this rule or R.C.M. 203 is intended 
to codify the service-connection  requirement of O'Callahan or 
later decisions, the requirement cannot be ignored in the Manual 
for Courts-Martial. 
Requisites (1) and (2) restate two requisites in paragraph 8 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See Generally United States v. Ryan, 5 M.J. 
97 (C.M.A.  1978); United States v. Newcomb, 5 M.J. 4 (C.M.A. 
1978). Contrary to the holdings in Ryan and Newcomb, "errors in 
the assignment or excusal of counsel, members, or a military 
judge that do not affect the required composition of a court-mar- 
tial will be tested solely for prejudice under Article 59."  S.Rep. 
No. 53, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1983). The second sentence of 
subsection (2) makes this clear, and also emphasizes that counsel 
is not a jurisdictional component of a court-martial. See Wright v. 
United States, 2 M.J. 9 (C.M.A. 1976). Requisite (4) is somewhat 
broader than the statement in MCM, 1969 (Rev.), since jurisdic- 
tion over the person has been affected by judicial decisions. See 
e.g., McElroy v.  United States ex. rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 
(1960); Reid v. Covert, 354U.S. 1 (1957); United States v. Averette, 
19 U.S.C.M.A.  363, 41 C.M.R. 363 (1970). Thus it is misleading 
to refer solely to the code as determining whether jurisdiction 
over the person exists. The discussion restates the basic principle 
that the judgment of a court-martial without jurisdiction is void. 
(c)  Contempt. This subsection restates Article 48, except for the 
deletion of military commissions and provost courts. These tribu- 
nals are also governed by Article 48, but need to be mentioned in 
rules pertaining to courts-martial. 
(d)  Exclusive  and  nonexclusive jurisdiction.  Subsection (d) is 
based on paragraph  12 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Military offenses 
are those, such as unauthorized absence, disrespect, and disobedi- 
ence, which have no analog in civilian criminal law. The second 
paragraph of paragraph 12 is omitted here, as the subject now ap- 
pears at R.C.M.  106. Concurrent jurisdiction  of courts-martial 
and domestic tribunals was formerly discussed separately from 
concurrent jurisdiction  of courts-martial and foreign tribunals. 
The present rule treats both at once since, for purposes of the rule, 
each situation is treated the same. The differing considerations 
and legal implications in the domestic and foreign situations are 
treated in the discussion. See R.C.M.  907(b)(2)(c) for a discussion 
of the former jeopardy aspects of exercise of jurisdiction by  more 
than one agency or tribunal. With respect to the exercise of juris- 
diction by the United States or a foreign government. Wilson v. 
Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957), establishes that the determination of 
which nation will exercise jurisdiction is not a right of the ac- 
cused. 
The  first paragraph in the discussion reaffirms the policy found 
in DOD Directive 5525.1, Jan. 22, 1966 (superceded by DOD Di- 
rective 5525.1, Aug. 7, 1979), which is implemented by a triser- 
vice regulation,  AR 27-50/SECNAVINST  5820.4E/AFR 
11G12,  Dec. 1, 1978, that the United States seeks to maximize ju- 
risdiction over its personnel. 
The  second paragraph in the discussion restates the third para- 
graph in paragraph 12 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), which was based on 
The Schooner Exchange  v. McFaddon  and Others, 11 U.S.  (7 
Cranch) 116 (1812). See also Wilson v. Girard, supra. 
(e)  Reciprocal jurisdiction. This subsection is based on Article 17 
and paragraph 13 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). It continues the express 
presidential authorization for the exercise of reciprocal jurisdic- 
tion and the delegation of authority (Article 140) to the Secretary 
of Defense to empower commanders of joint commands or task 
forces to exercise such power.  See  United States  v. Hooper, 5 
U.S.C.M.A. 391, 18 C.M.R. 15 (1955). It also continues the gui- 
dance in MCM, 1969 (Rev.) concerning the exercise of reciprocal 
jurisdiction  by commanders other than those empowered under 
R.C.M. 201(e)(2). The language is modified to clarify that mani- 
fest injury is not limited to a specific armed force. The  subsection 
adds a clarification at the end of subsection (3) that a court-mar- 
tial convened by a commander of a service different from the ac- 
cused's is not jurisdictionally defective nor is the service of which 
the convening authority is a member an issue in which the ac- 
cused has a recognized interest. The rule and its guidance effectu- 
ate the congressional intent that reciprocal jurisdiction ordinarily 
not be exercised outside of joint commands or task forces (Hear-
ings on H.R. 2498 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee 
on Armed Services,  81st Cong.,  1st Sess. 612-615;  957-958 
(1949)) and is designed to protect the integrity of intraservice 
lines of authority. See United States v. Hooper, supra (Brosman, J. 
and Latimer, J., concurring in the result). 
1986 Amendment: Subsections (e)(2) and (e)(3) were revised to 
implement the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reor- 
ganization Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99 - 433, tit. 11, 9 21 l(b), 100 
Stat. 992. Because commanders of unified  and specified com- 
mands (the combatant commands) derive court-martial conven- 
ing authority from Article 22(a)(3), as added by this legislation, 
they need not be established as convening authorities in the Man- 
ual. 
Paragraph (2)(A), which sets forth the authority of the combat- 
ant commanders to convene courts-martial over members of any 
of the armed forces, is an exercise of the President's authority 
under Article 17(a). In paragraph (2)(B), the first clause is a dele- ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (a) 
gation from the President to the Secretary of Defense of the Presi- 
dent's authority to designate general court-martial convening au- 
thorities. This provision, which reflects the current Manual, may 
be used by the Secretary of Defense to grant general court-martial 
convening authority to commanders of joint commands or joint 
task forces who are not commanders of a unified or specified com- 
mand. The second clause of paragraph 2(b) is an exercise of the 
President's authority under Article 17(a). 
Nothing in this provision affects the authority of the President 
or Secretary of Defense, as superior authorities, to withhold 
court-martial convening authority from the combatant com- 
manders in whole or in part. 
Subsection (4) has been added to avoid possible questions con- 
cerning detailing military judges from different services. 
Subsection (5) restates Article 17(b). 
1986Amendment: Subsection (6) was inserted in the context of 
the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 
Act of  1986, Pub. L. No. 99-433, tit. 11,  100 Stat. 992, to specify 
the process for resolving disagreements when two organizations, 
at the highest levels of each, assert competing claims for  jurisdic- 
tion over an individual case or class of cases. Under this legisla- 
tion, the commanders of unified and specified commands are au- 
thorized to convene courts-martial. At the same time, the military 
departments retain authority over all aspects of personnel admin- 
istration, including administration of discipline, with respect to 
all persons assigned to  joint duty or otherwise assigned to organi- 
zations within joint commands. In effect, the combatant com- 
mands and the military departments have concurrent jurisdiction 
over persons assigned to such commands. Under most circum- 
stances, any issues as to  jurisdiction will be resolved between the 
military department and the joint command. Paragraph (6) has 
been added to provide a means for resolving the matter when the 
Service Secretary and the commander of the joint  organization 
cannot reach agreement. See H.R. Rep. No. 824, 99th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1986), at 125. Paragraph (6) also requires use of the same 
procedure when there is a disagreement between two Service Sec- 
retaries as to the exercise of reciprocal jurisdiction. 
Subsection (7) was added to ensure that the Secretaries of the 
military departments retain responsibility for the administration 
of discipline, including responsibility for all persons in their de- 
partments assigned to  joint duty. 
Paragraphs (6) and (7) apply only when the commander is act- 
ing solely in his joint capacity or when he is seeking to assert juris- 
diction over a member of a different armed force. There are vari- 
ous provisions of the Manual addressing the duties or 
responsibilities of superior authorities, and it was considered 
more useful to establish who may act as a superior authority as a 
general proposition rather than to specify in great detail the rela- 
tionship between joint commanders and Service Secretaries as to 
each such matter. Accordingly, when action is required to be 
taken by  an authority superior to a combatant commander, the 
responsibility is given to the Secretary of the Military Department 
that includes the armed force of which the accused is a member. 
This includes responsibility for acting on matters such as a re- 
quest for counsel of the accused's  own selection. An exception is 
expressly set forth in paragraph (6), however, which specifically 
provides the procedure for resolving disagreements as to jurisdic- 
tion. The Service Secretary cannot withhold or limit the exercise 
ofjurisdiction under R.C.M. 504(b) or under Part V (Nonjudicial 
Punishment Procedure) by a combatant commander over persons 
assigned to the joint command. Such action may be taken, how- 
ever, by  the Secretary of Defense, who may assign responsibility 
to the military department or the unified command for any case 
or class of cases as he deems appropriate. 
The  amendments to R.C.M. 201 are designed to govern organi- 
zational relationships between joint commands and military de- 
partments over a range of issues, and are not intended to confer 
rights on accused servicemembers. These provisions reflect the 
President's inherent authority as Commander-in-Chief to pre- 
scribe or modify the chain of command, his specific authority 
under Article 17 to regulate reciprocal jurisdiction and his au- 
thority (and that of the Secretary of Defense) under 10 U.S.C. 
$5  161-65 (as added by the 1986 legislation) to prescribe or mod- 
ify the chain of command. 
To the extent that a commander of a joint organization is 
"dual-hatted"  (i.e., simultaneously serving as commander of a 
joint  organization and a separate organization within a military 
department), subsections (6) and (7) apply only to the actions 
taken in a joint capacity. 
(f)  Types of courts-martial. The source for subsection (I) is Arti- 
cle 18. This subsection is substantially the same as paragraph  14 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), although it has been reorganized for clar- 
ity. Several statements in MCM, 1969 (Rev.) concerning punish- 
ments by general courts-martial have been placed  in the discus- 
sion. As to the second sentence in subsection (l)(A)(i), see also 
Wickham v.  Hall, 12 M.J. 145 (C.M.A.  1983); Wickham v.  Hall, 
706 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1983). 
The source for subsection (2) is Article 19. Subsection (2) is 
based on paragraph  15 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), although it has 
been reorganized for clarity. Note that under subsection (2)(C)(ii) 
a general court-martial convening authority may permit a 
subordinate convening authority to refer a capital offense to a spe- 
cial court-martial. This is a modification  of paragraph  15a(l) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.), which said a general court-martial convening 
authority could "cause"  a capital offense to be referred  to a spe- 
cial court-martial without specifying whether the convening au- 
thority had to make the referral personally. Subsection (2)(C)(iii) 
permits the Secretary concerned to authorize special court-mar- 
tial convening authorities to refer capital offense to special courts- 
martial without first getting authorization from a general court- 
martial convening authority. Several statements in MCM, 1969 
(Rev.) have been placed in the discussion. 
As to subsection (3) summary courts-martial are treated sepa- 
rately in R.C.M. 1301-1306. 
(g)  Concurrent jurisdiction of other military tribunals. This sub- 
section is based on the last paragraph in paragraph 12 of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). 
Rule 202.  Persons subject to the jurisdiction of 
courts-martial 
(a)  In general. This subsection incorporates by reference the pro- 
visions of the code (see Articles 2,3,4, and 73) which provide juris- 
diction over the person. See also Articles 83, 104, 106. The  discus- 
sion under this subsection briefly  described some of the more 
important requirements for court-martial jurisdiction  over per- 
sons. Standards governing active duty servicemembers (Article 
2(a)(l)) are emphasized, although subsection (4) brings attention APP.  21, fl (a)  APPENDIX 21 
to limitations on  jurisdiction over civilians established by judicial 
decisions. 
Subsection (2)(A) of the discussion dealing with inception of 
jurisdiction  over commissioned officers,  cadets, midshipmen, 
warrant officers, and enlisted persons is divided into three parts. 
The first part, enlistment, summarizes the area of the law in the 
wake of the amendment of Article 2 in 1979. Act of November 9, 
1979, Pub.L. No. 9G107, 5 801(a), 93 Stat. 810-1 1. In essence, 
the amendment eliminated recruiter misconduct as a factor of le- 
gal significance in matters involving jurisdiction,  and reestab- 
lished and clarified the "constructive  enlistment"  doctrine. The 
statutory enlistment standards concerning capacity under  10 
U.S.C.  $5 504 and 505 thus become critical, along with the issue 
of voluntariness. As to whether an enlistment is compelled or vol- 
untary, compare United States v. Catlow, 23 U.S.C.M.A.  142, 48 
C.M.R. 758 (1974) with  United States v.  Wagner, 5 M.J. 461 
(C.M.A. 1978) and United States v. Lightfoot, 4 M.J. 262 (C.M.A. 
1978). See also United States v. McDonagh, 14 M.J. 415 (C.M.A. 
1983). 
The second paragraph under (i) Enlistment is based on United 
States v. Bean, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 203, 32 C.M.R. 203 (1962); United 
States v. Overton, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 684, 26 C.M.R. 464 (1958); and 
10 U.S.C. 5  1170. The last sentence is based on Article 2(c) which 
provides that in case of constructive enlistment, jurisdiction con- 
tinues until "terminated in accordance with law or regulations 
promulgated by the Secretary concerned." 
The last paragraph restates Article 2(c). The last sentence of 
that paragraph takes account of the legislative history of Article 
2(c). See S.Rep. No. 197, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 122 (1979), which 
indicates that United States v. King, 11 U.S.C.M.A.  19, 28 
C.M.R. 243 (1959) is overruled by the statute. This is also re- 
flected in the first paragraph under (ii) Induction. 
The first paragraph of (ii) Induction is (with the exception of 
the application of the constructive enlistment doctrine, see the im- 
mediately preceding paragraph) based  on  United States v. Hall, 
17 C.M.A. 88, 37 C.M.R. 352 (1967); Unitedstates v. Rodriguez, 
2 U.S.C.M.A.  101,6  C.M.R. 101 (1952); United States v. Ornelas, 
2 U.S.C.M.A. 96 C.M.R. 96 (1952). See also Billings v. Truesdell, 
321 U.S. 542 (1944); Mayborn v. Hejebower, 145 F.2d 864 (5th 
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 854 (1945). 
The second paragraph under (ii) Induction is based on United 
States  v. Scheunemann,  14 U.S.C.M.A. 479, 34 C.M.R. 259 
(1964). See  also  United States v.  Wilson, 44 C.M.R.  891 
(A.C.M.R.  1971). Although no military case has so held, dicta 
and Scheunemann supports the second sentence. 
As to (iii) Call to active duty, see  10 U.S.C.  §$ 672, 673 and 
673(a), See also United States v. Peel, 4 M.J. 28 (C.M.A. 1977). 
The second paragraph of this section reflects decisions in United 
States v. Barraza, 5 M.J. 230 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v. Kil- 
breth, 22 U.S.C.M.A.  390,47 C.M.R. 327 (1973). 
1986Amendment: Paragraph (2)(A)(iii) of the Discussion was 
amended and paragraph (5) was added to reflect amendments to 
Articles 2 and 3 of the UCMJ contained in the "Military  Justice 
Amendment of 1986," tit. VIII, 5 804, National Defense Authori- 
zation Act for fiscal year 1987, Pub.L. No. 99-661,  100 Stat. 3905 
(1986), which, among other things, preserves the exercise ofjuris- 
diction over reservists for offenses committee in a duty status, 
notwithstanding their release from duty status, if they have time 
remaining on their military obligation. The legislation  also pro- 
vides express statutory authority to order reservists,  including 
members of the National Guard of the United States and the Air 
National Guard of the United States who commit offenses while 
serving on duty under Title 10 of the United States Code, to active 
duty for disciplinary action, including the service of any punish- 
ment imposed. 
The first paragraph under (B) Termination ofjurisdiction over 
active duty personnel restates the basic rule. See  United States v. 
Brown, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 693, 31 C.M.R. 297 (1962); United States 
v. Scott,  I1 U.S.C.M.A.  646, 29 C.M.R. 462 (1960). See also 
United States v.  Griffin, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 213, 32 C.M.R. 213 
(1962). 
Subsection (B)(i) is based on  United States v.  Wheeley, 6 M.J. 
220 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Smith, 4 M.J. 265 (C.M.A. 
1978); United States v. Hutchins, 4 M.J.  I90 (C.M.A.  1978); 
United States v. Hout, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 299,41 C.M.R. 299 (1970). 
See also Dickenson v. Davis, 245 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1957). 
Subsection (B)(ii) describes what jurisdiction  remains under 
Article 3(a) in light of  United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 
U.S.  11 (1955). See also United States v. Clardy, 13 M.J. 308 
(C.M.A. 1982). 
The  exceptions is subsection (B)(iii) are restated in slightly dif- 
ferent language for clarity from paragraph  116 of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). Exception (b)  is based on  United States v. Clardy, supra. 
See also 14 M.J. 123 (C.M.A. 1982). As to exception (c), jurisdic- 
tion over prisoners in the custody of the armed forces, see Kahn v. 
Anderson, 255 U.S.  1 (1921);  United States v.  Nelson,  14 
U.S.C.M.A. 93,33 C.M.R. 305 (1963). See also Mosher v. Hunter, 
143 F.2d 745 (10th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 800 (1945). 
Although it has not been judicially  interpreted, the sentence of 
paragraph 1  I  b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) has been included here. The 
principle it expressed has long been recognized. See the last sen- 
tence in paragraph  1  lbof MCM, 1951; the last sentence of the 
third paragraph of paragraph 10 of MCM (Army),  1949; and the 
last sentence of the fourth paragraph of paragraph 10 of MCM, 
1928. As to  jurisdiction under Article 3(b), see Wickham v. Hall, 
12 M.J. 145 (C.M.A.  1981); Wickham v. Hall, 706 F.2d 713 (5th 
Cir. 1983). 
Subsection (3) described the jurisdiction under Article 2(a)(8). 
Seealso 33 U.S.C. 5 855; 42 U.S.C. 5 217. 
Subsection (4) of the discussion points out that jurisdiction 
over civilians has been restricted by judicial decisions. See gener- 
ally Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Toth v. Quarles, supra. The 
MCM 1969 (Rev.) referred  to such limitations only in footnotes 
to Articles 2(a)(10) and (1 1) and 3(a). The discussion of R.C.M. 
202 is a more appropriate place to bring attention to these mat- 
ters. A brief reference in the discussion was considered sufficient, 
while the analysis provides primary sources of law in the area, 
should an issue arise on the subject. 
The second sentence in the subsection (4) of discussion is based 
on McElroy  v.  United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 
(1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); Kinsella v. United 
States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, supra. 
It is not settled whether "peacetime"  as used in these decisions 
means all times other than a period of declared war or whether 
"peacetime"  ceases when armed forces are involved in undeclared 
wars or hostilities. There is some authority for the latter view. See 
W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents, 101 (2d ed. 1920 re- 
print). ANALXSlS  App. 21, R.C.M. 
With respect to Article 2(a)(10), the Court of Military Appeals 
has held that "time of war" means a formally declared war (based 
on U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 11). United States v. Averette, 19 
U.S.C.M.A. 363, 41  C.M.R. 363 (1970). But  cf: Latney v. Igna- 
tius, 416 F.2d  821 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (assuming without deciding 
that Article 2(a)(10) could be invoked during period of un- 
declared war, no court-martial jurisdiction  existed over civilian 
merchant seaman for murder in Vietnam because crime and ac- 
cused were not sufficiently connected with the military). See also 
Analysis, R.C.M. 103(19). 
The words "in the field" and "accompanying an armed force" 
have also been judicially construed. "In the field" implies military 
operations with a view to the enemy. 14 Ops. Atty Gen. 22 (1 872). 
The question whether an armed force is "in the field" is not to be 
determined by the locality in which it is found, but rather by the 
activity in which it is engaged. Hines v. Mikell, 259 F.28, 34 (4th 
Cir. 1919). Thus, forces assembled in the United States for train- 
ing preparatory for service in the actual theater of war were held 
to be "in  the field." Hines v. Mikell, supra. A merchant ship and 
crew transporting troops and supplies to a battle zone constitute a 
military expedition "in  the field."  In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252 
(S.D. Ohio 1944); McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F.Supp. 80 (E.D. Va. 
1943). See also Ex parte  Gerlach, 247 F.616 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); 
United States v. Burney, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 776,21 C.M.R. 98 (1956); 
Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. 
on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 872-3  (1949). But see, W. 
Winthrop, supra at 10C-102; Reid v. Covert, supra at 34 n. 61. 
One may be "accompanying an armed force" although not di- 
rectly employed by  it or the Government. For example, an em- 
ployee of a contractor engaged on a military project or serving on 
a merchant ship carrying supplies or troops is "accompanying an 
armed force." Perlstein v.  United States, 151 F.2d  167 (3d Cir. 
1945), cert. dism., 328 U.S. 822 (1946); In re DiBartolo, 50 
F.Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); In re Berue, supra; McCune  v. Kil-
patrick, supra. To be "accompanying an armed force" one's pres- 
ence within a military installation must be more than merely inci- 
dental; it must be connected with or dependent upon the activities 
of  the armed  forces or its personnel.  Although  a  per-
son"accompanying an armed force" may be "serving with" it as 
well, the distinction is important because even though a civilian's 
contract with the Government ended before the commission of an 
offense, and hence the person is no longer "serving  with"  an 
armed force, jurisdiction may remain on the ground that the per- 
son is "accompanying an armed force" because of continued con- 
nection with the military. Perlstein v. United States, supra; Grewe 
v. France, 75 F.Supp. 433 (E.D. Wis. 1948). 
McElroy v.  Guagliardo, supra at 285-87,  discusses possible 
methods for extending court-martial jurisdiction over civilians in 
some circumstances. To date these methods remain undeveloped. 
See also Everett and Hourcle,  Crime Without Punishment-Ex- 
servicemen, Civilian Employees and Dependents,  13 A.F.JAG L. 
Rev. 184 (1971). Civilians may be tried by  general court-martial 
under Article 18 and the law of  war. See R.C.M. 201(f)(l)(B); 
202(b). See also Article 21. This includes trial by  court-martial in 
places where the United States is an occupying power. See e.g., 
Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952) [upholding  jurisdiction 
of military commission to try a dependent spouse in occupied 
Germany in  1950. Although a state of  war with Germany still 
technica!ly  existed  (see Proclamation  No. 2950, 3 C.F.R. 
(1 948-53  Comp.) 135 (195 1)) hostilities were declared terminated 
on 31 December  1946 (see Proclamation No. 2714, 3 C.F.R. 
(1948-53  Comp.) 99 (1947)) and the United States Supreme 
Court observed in dicta that military courts might have jurisdic- 
tion in occupied territory even in peacetime, 343 U.S. at 360)l. See 
also Wilson v. Bohlender, 361 U.S. 281,283 n. 2 (1960); Kinsella v. 
Singleton, supra at 244. 
(b)  Offenses under the law of war. This subsection is based on Ar- 
ticle 18. See also Article 21. The phrase "offense subject to trial by 
court-martial" or "offense triable by court-martial" is used in the 
R.C.M. in recognition of the fact that the Manual for Courts- 
Martial governs courts-martial for offenses under the law of war 
as well as under the code. See e.g., R.C.M. 301(b); 302(c); 304(c); 
305(d). In such contexts, the phrase does not include a require- 
ment for a jurisdictio~~al  determination. 
(c) Attachment of jurisdiction  over the person. This subsection is 
based on paragraph 1  Id of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), and states the ba- 
sic principle that once the jurisdiction of a court-martial attaches, 
it continues until the process of trial, appeal, and punishment is 
complete. See generally  United States v. Douse,  12 M.J. 473 
(C.M.A. 1982); United States v. Sippel, 4 U.S.C.M.A.  50,  15 
C.M.R. 50 (1954). 
The discussion clarifies the distinction between the existence of 
personal jurisdiction and the attachment ofjurisdiction. Compare 
United States v. Douse, supra at 479 (Everett, C.J., concurring in 
the result); United States v. Wheeley, 6 M.J. 220 (C.M.A.  1979); 
United States v. Hutchins, 4 M.J. 190 (C.M.A. 1978); and United 
States v. Hout, supra (opinion of Quinn, C.J.) with United States v. 
Douse, supra (opinion of Cook, J.); United States v. Smith, 4 M.J. 
265 (C.M.A.  1978);  United States  v. Hout, supra at 302; 41 
C.M.R. 299, 302 (1970) (Darden, J., concurring in the result); 
and  United States v. Rubenstein, 7 U.S.C.M.A.  523, 22 C.M.R. 
313 (1957). See also W. Winthrop, supra at 9C-91. 
Subsection (2) includes examples of means by  which jurisdic- 
tion may attach. They are taken from paragraph 1  ld of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.) although "filing  of charges"  has been clarified to 
mean preferral of charges. See  United States v.  Hout, supra. This 
list is not exhaustive. See  United States  v. Self, 13 M.J. 132 
(C.M.A. 1982); United States v. Douse, supra; United States v. 
Smith, supra. See also  United States v. Fitzpatrick,  14 M.J. 394 
(C.M.A.  1983); United States v. Handy, 14 M.J. 202 (C.M.A. 
1982); United States v.  Wheeley, supra; United States v. Ruben- 
stein, supra; United States v. Mansbarger, 20 C.M.R. 449 (A.B.R. 
1955). 
Rule 203.  Jurisdiction over the offense 
This rule is intended to provide for the maximum possible court- 
martial jurisdiction  over offenses. Since the constitutional limits 
of subject-matter jurisdiction  are matters of judicial interpreta- 
tion, specific rules are of limited value and may unnecessarily re- 
strict jurisdiction more than is constitutionally required. Specific 
standards derived from current case law are treated in the discus- 
sion. 
The discussion begins with a brief description of the rule under 
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). It also describes the 
requirements established in  United States v. Alef, 3 M.J. 414 
(C.M.A. 1977) to plead and prove jurisdiction.  See also R.C.M. 
907(b)(l)(A). The last three sentences in subsection (b) of the dis- 
cussion  are based on United States v. Lockwood, 15 M.J. 1 APP.  21, n  APPE 
(C.M.A.  1983). The remainder of the discussion reflects the 
Working Group's analysis of the application of service-connec- 
tion as currently construed in judicial decisions. It is not intended 
as endorsement or criticism of that construction. 
Subsection (c) of the discussion lists the Relford factors, which 
are starting points in service-connection analysis, although the 
nine additional considerations in Relford  are also significant. 
These factors are not exhaustive.  United States v. Lockwood, 
supra. See also United States v.  Trottier, 9 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 
1980). Relford itself establishes the basis for (c)(2) and (c)(3) of 
the discussion. It has never been seriously contended that purely 
military offenses are not service-connected  per se. See Relford fac-
tor number 12. Decisions uniformly have held that offenses com- 
mitted on a military installation are service-connected. See, e.g., 
United States v. Hedlund, supra:  United States v. Daniels,  19 
U.S.C.M.A.  529,42 C.M.R. 131 (1970). See Relford factors 2,3, 
10, and 11. As to the third sentence in (c)(3), see United States v. 
Seivers, 8 M.J. 63 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Escobar, 7 M.J. 
197 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Crapo, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 594, 
40 C.M.R. 306 (1969); Harkcom v. Parker, 439 F.2d 265 (3d Cir. 
1971). With respect to the fourth sentence of (c)(3), see  United 
States v. Hedlund, supra; United States v. Riehle, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 
603, 40 C.M.R. 315 (1969). But cf: United States v. Lockwood, 
supra. Although much of the reasoning in  United States v. Mc- 
Carthy, 2 M.J. 26 (C.M.A. 1976) has been repudiated by  United 
States v. Trottier, supra, the holding of McCarthy still appears to 
support the penultimate sentence in (c)(3). See also United States 
v. Lockwood, supra; United States v. Gladue, 4 M.J.  1 (C.M.A. 
1977). The last sentence is based on United States v. Lockwood, 
supra. 
The discussion of drug offenses in (c)(4) is taken from  United 
States v. Trottier, supra. 
As to (c)(5), the first sentence is based on United States v. Lock- 
wood, supra. Whether the military status of the victim or the ac- 
cused's use of military identification card can independently sup- 
port service-connection is not established by the holding in 
Lockwood. The second sentence is based on  United States v. 
Whatley, 5 M.J. 39 (C.M.A. 1978); Unitedstates v. Moore, 1  M.J. 
448 (C.M.A. 1976). The last sentence is based on  United States v. 
Conn, supra;  United States v. Borys,  18 U.S.C.M.A.  547, 40 
C.M.R. 259 (1969) (officer status of  accused does not establish 
service-connection under Article 134) (note: service-connection 
of Article 133 offenses has not been judicially determined); United 
States v.  Saulter, 5 M.J. 281 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v. 
Conn, supra (fact that accused was military policeman did not es- 
tablish service-connection); United States v.  Armes,  19 
U.S.C.M.A. 15, 41 C.M.R.  15 (1969) (wearing uniform during 
commission of offense does not establish service-connection). 
Subsection (c)(6) of the discussion indicates that virtually all 
offenses by  servicemembers in time of declared war are service- 
connected. There is little case authority on this point. The issue 
was apparently not addressed during the conflict in Vietnam; of 
course, the overseas exception provided jurisdiction over offenses 
committed in  the theater of  hostilities. The emphasis in 
O'Callahan on the fact that the offenses occurred in peacetime 
(see Relford factor number 5) strongly suggests a different balance 
in time ofwar. Furthermore, in Warner v. Flemings, a companion 
case decided with Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973), Justices 
Douglas and Stewart concurred in the result in upholding Flem- 
ings' court-martial conviction for stealing an automobile while off 
post and absent without authority in 1944, on grounds that such 
an offense, during a congressionally declared war, is service-con- 
nected. The other Justices did not reach this question. Assigning 
Relford factor number 5 such extensive, indeed controlling, 
weight during time of declared war is appropriate in view of the 
need for broad and clear jurisdictional lines in such a period. 
Subsection (d) of the discussion lists recognized exceptions to 
the service-connection requirement. The overseas exception was 
first recognized in United States v. Weinstein, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 29, 
41  C.M.R. 29 (1969). See also  United States v. Keaton, 19 
U.S.C.M.A.  64, 41 C.M.R.  64 (1969). The overseas exception 
flows from O'Callahan's basic premise: that the service-connec- 
tion requirement is necessary to protect the constitutional right of 
service members to indictment by  grand jury and trial by jury. 
While this premise might not be evident from a reading of 
O'Callahan alone, the Supreme Court subsequently confirmed 
that this was the basis of the O'Callahan rule. See Gosa v. 
Mayden, supra at 677. Since normally no civilian court in which 
the accused would have those rights is available in the foreign set- 
ting, the service-connection limitation does not apply, 
The situs of the offense, not the trial, determines whether the 
exception may apply. United States v. Newvine, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 
208, 48 C.M.R. 960 (1974); United States v.  Bowers, 47 C.M.R. 
516 (A.C.M.R. 1973). The last sentence in the discussion of the 
overseas exception is based on United States v. Black, 1 M.J.  340 
(C.M.A. 1976).See also United States v. Gladue, 4 M.J. l(C.M.A. 
1977); United States v. Lazzaro, 2 M.J. 76 (C.M.A. 1976). Some 
federal courts have suggested that the existence of court-martial 
jurisdiction over an overseas offense does not depend solely on the 
fact that the offense is not cognizable in the United States civilian 
courts. See Hemphill  v. ~osele~,  443 F.2d 322 (10th Cir. 1971). 
See also United States v. King, 6 M.J. 553 (A.C.M.R.  1978), pet. 
denied, 6 M.J. 290 (1979). 
Several Federal courts which have addressed this issue have 
also held that the foreign situs of a trial is sufficient to support 
court-martial jurisdiction,  although the rationale for this result 
has not been uniform. See e.g., Williams v. Froehlke, 490 F.2d 998 
(2d Cir. 1974); Wimberly v. Laird, 472 F.2d 923 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 413 U.S. 921 (1973); Gallagher v.  United States, 423 F.2d 
1371 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1970); Bell v. Clark, 308 
F.Supp. 384(E.D. Va. 1970), afd,  437 F.2d  200 (4th Cir. 1971). 
As several of these decisions recognize, the foreign situs of an of- 
fense is a factor weighing heavily in favor of service-connection 
even without an exception for overseas offenses. See Relford fac-
tors 4 and 8. The logistical difficulties, the disruptive effect on mil- 
itary activities, the delays in disposing of offenses, and the need 
for an armed force in a foreign country to control its own mem- 
bers all militate toward service-connection  for offenses committed 
abroad. Another consideration, often cited by the courts, is the 
likelihood that if  the service-connection rule were applied over- 
seas as it is in the United States, the practical effect would be far 
more frequent exercise of jurisdiction  by  host nations, thus de- 
priving the individual of constitutional protections the rule is de- 
signed to protect. 
The petty offenses exception rests on a similar doctrinal foun- 
dation as the overseas exception. Because there is no constitu- 
tional right to indictment by grand jury or trial by jury for petty 
offenses (see Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v. ALYSlS  App. 21, R.C.M. (b) 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Duke v. United States, 301 U.S. 
492 (1 937)); the serivce-connection  requirement does not apply to 
them. United States v. Sharkey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 26,41 C.M.R. 26 
(1969). Under Baldwin  v. New  York, supra, a petty offense is one 
in which the maximum sentence is six months confinement or 
less. Any time a punitive discharge is included in the maximum 
punishment, the offense is not petty. See  United States v. Smith, 9 
M.J. 359, 360 n. 1 (C.M.A. 1980); United States v. Brown,  13 
U.S.C.M.A. 333,32 C.M.R. 333 (1962). 
Sharkey relied on the maximum punishment under the table of 
maximum punishments in determining whether an offense is 
petty. It is the view of the Working Group that offenses tried by 
summary courts-martial and special courts-martial at which no 
punitive discharge may be adjudged are "petty offenses" for pur- 
poses of O'Callahan, in  view of the jurisdictional  limitations of 
such courts. Whether the jurisdictional  limits of a summary of 
such special court-martial makes an offense referred to such a 
court-martial petty has not been judicially determined. 
Rule 204.  Jurisdiction over certain reserve 

component personnel 

1987Amendment: R.C.M. 204 and its discussion were added to 
implement the amendments to Articles 2 and 3, UCMJ, con- 
tained in the "Military Justice Amendments of 1986," tit. VIII, § 
804, National  Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year  1987, 
Pub. L. No. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3905 (1986). Use of the term "mem- 
ber of a reserve component" in Article 3(d) means membership in 
the reserve component at the time disciplinary action is initiated. 
The limitation in subsection (b)(l) restricting general and special 
courts-martial to periods of active duty is based upon the practi- 
cal problems associated with conducting a court-martial only 
during periods of scheduled inactive-duty training, and ensures 
that the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction is consistent with 
the policies set forth in Article 2(d). The last sentence of subsec- 
tion (d) reflects legislative intent "not to disturb the jurisprudence 
of United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949)" 
(H.R. Rep. No. 718, 99th Cong., 2d  Sess. at 227 (1986)). 
CHAPTER Ill.  INITIATION OF CHARGES; 

APPREHENSION; PRETRIAL RESTRAINT; 

RELATED MAlTERS 

Rule 301.  Report of offense 

The primary sources of this rule are paragraphs 29a and 31 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Those provisions were adopted in substance 
except that subsection (b) provides that reports be conveyed to 
the "immediate commander" of suspects, meaning the "com- 
mander exercising immediate jurisdiction. . . under Article 15." 
The language was changed because the previous language was 
cumbersome and legalistic. There is no corresponding provision 
in  the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. the most closely 
analogous provision of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
is Rule 3 (complaints). However, "[wlith  respect to the com- 
plaint, in general, it should be noted that its principle purpose is 
to serve as the basis for an arrest warrant." J. Moore, Moore's 
Federal Practice, Rules Pamphlet (part 3) 10 (1982). That purpose 
is not the same as the purpose of R.C.M. 301. R.C.M. 301 is sim- 
ply to assure that ordinarily information relating to offenses is 
conveyed promptly to the suspect's immediate commander. 
Rule 302.  Apprehension 
(a)  Definition and scope. The definition of "apprehension" in sub- 
section (1) is taken from Article 7(a), as was its predecessor, para- 
graph 18a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
The peculiar military term "apprehension" is statutory (Arti- 
cle 7(a)) and cannot be abandoned in favor of the more conven- 
tional civilian term, "arrest."  See generally  United States v. 
Kinane, 1 M.J. 309 (C.M.A. 1976). See also United States v. Cor-
dero, 11 M.J. 210, 217, n.1 (C.M.A. 1981) (Everett, C.J., concur- 
ring). 
The discussion of "apprehension"  is also consistent with 
paragraphs 18a andb(1) of MCM,  1969 (Rev.). The discussion 
draws a distinction between apprehensions and detentions. The 
distinction is based upon the duration of the status, the legal con- 
sequences of the impairment of liberty, and the circumstances 
under which the two forms are used. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 
(1979); Dunaway v. Now York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S.  1 (1968);  United States  v. Schneider,  14 M.J.  189 
(C.M.A.  1982);  United States v. Texidor-Perez, 7 M.J. 356 
(C.M.A. 1979). 
This rule conforms in intent with the substance of Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 3 through 5. However, the formal warrant application 
process and initial appearance requirement of those rules are im- 
practicable, and, given the command control aspects of the mili- 
tary, unnecessary for military criminal practice. The purposes of 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 3 through 5 are achieved by  later rules in this 
chapter. 
Subsection (2) clarifies the scope of the rule. It does not affect 
apprehensions of persons not subject to trial by  court-martial. 
Apprehension and detention of such persons by  military law en- 
forcement personnel is not part of the court-martial process; it is 
based on the commander's  inherent authority to maintain  law 
and order on the installation and on various state laws concerning 
citizen's arrest. See United States v. Banks, 539 F.2d  14 (9th Cir. 
1976). The rule also does not affect the authority of persons not 
listed in subsection (b) to apprehend. The discussion gives some 
examples of such categories. 
(b) Who may apprehend. This subsection restates the substance 
of Articles 7(b) and (c) and 8, and paragraphs  19a and 23 of 
MCM, 1969, (Rev.). Subsection (3), Federal civilian law enforce- 
ment officers, is the only new provision. 
Subsection (1) is taken from paragraph  19a of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). The phrase "whether subject to the code or not" is added 
to the present rule to make clear that contract civilian guards and 
police and similar civilian law enforcement agents of the military 
have the power to apprehend persons subject to the code. 
The discussion of subsection (1) reflects the elimination of the 
previous restrictive policy against apprehensions of commis- 
sioned and warrant officers by  enlisted and civilian law enforce- 
ment personnel. This recognizes the authority of such personnel 
commensurate with their law enforcement duties. The rule does 
not foreclose secretarial limitations on the discretion of such per- 
sonnel. 
1987Amendment: The Discussion was amended to clarify that 
special agents of the Defense Criminal Investigative Service have 
the authority to apprehend persons subject to trial by  courts-mar- 
tial. 
Subsection (2) restates the previous exercise of delegated au- 
thority under Article 7(b) to designate persons authorized to ap- APP. 2%  1(b)  APPENDIX 21 
prehend which appeared in the first clause in the first sentence of 
paragraph 19a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The accompanying discus- 
sion is based on the second sentence of paragraph 19a of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). 
1990Amendment: The words "or inactive-duty training" were 
added in conjunction with the enactment of the "Military Justice 
Amendments of  1986," tit. VIII, 804 National Defense Authori- 
zation for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661,  100 Stat. 3905 
(1986) expanding  jurisdiction over reserve component personnel. 
Subsection (3) restates Article 8. This seemingly duplicative 
statement is required because the codal provision as to deserters 
extends the Federal arrest power to state and local law enforce- 
ment agents who do not have the kind of Federal arrest power 
possessed by their colleagues listed in subsection (3). The fact that 
a person who apprehended a deserter was not authorized to do so 
is not a ground for discharging the deserter from military cus- 
tody. See paragraph 23 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(c)  Grounds of  apprehension. This subsection concerns apprehen- 
sion of persons subject to the code or to trial by court-martial. 
Note that such persons may be apprehended under this rule only 
for offenses subject to trial by  court-martial. See also the analysis 
of subsection (a)(2) of this rule. The power to apprehend under 
this rule lasts as long as the person to be apprehended is subject to 
the code or to trial by  court-martial. This provision has no ex- 
plicit parallel in MCM, 1969 (Rev.) but is consistent with the lim- 
itation of the apprehension power in both the code and that Man- 
ual to persons subject to the code. The Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure have no similar provision either, because the arrest 
power of civilian law enforcement officials is not similarly limited 
by the status of the suspect. 
The subsection states alternative circumstances which must ex- 
ist to permit apprehension during this period. The first two 
sentences restate the probable cause requirement for apprehen- 
sion of suspects, the main use of the apprehension power of which 
Article 7(b) and paragraph 19a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) took note. 
They are consistent with Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(a). No change to the 
substance of those provisions has been made, but the discussion 
provides that probable cause may be based on "the  reports of 
others" to make clear that hearsay may be relied upon as well as 
personal knowledge. This addition is consistent with Fed.R. 
Crim. P. 4(b). The wording has been changed to eliminate the le- 
gal term, "hearsay." 
The last sentence of the subsection restates the codal authority 
of commissioned, warrant, petty, and noncommissioned officers 
to use the apprehension power to quell disorders, and is based on 
Article 7(c) and paragraph  19b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), changed 
only as necessary to accommodate format. CJ:  paragraph  19a of 
MCM, 1951, and of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) (authority of military law 
enforcement official to apprehend on probable cause). See also 
Article of  War 68 (1920). Compare paragraph 20b (authority of 
military police) with paragraph2~c  (quarrels and frays) of MCM 
(Army), 1949 and of MCM (AF), 1949. Article 7(b) expressly re- 
quires probable cause to believe an offense has been committed; 
Article 7(c) does not. 
(d)  How an apprehension may be  made. In subsection (1) the gen- 
eral statement of procedure to make an apprehension is based on 
paragraph 19c, MCM, 1969 (Rev.) but it has been amplified in ac- 
cord with United States v.  Kinane, 1 M.J. 309 (C.M.A. 1976). See 
also United States v.  Sanford, 12 M.J. 170 (C.M.A. 1981). 
Subsection (2) is consistent with military law. It is superficially 
inconsistent with Fed.R. Crim. P. 4, but the inconsistency is more 
apparent than real. Civilian law enforcement officials generally 
have power to arrest without warrant for offenses committed in 
their presence and for felonies upon probable cause. See e.g.  18 
U.S.C. 99 3052, 3053, and 3056. To restrict the military appre- 
hension power by  requiring warrants in all or most cases would 
actually be inconsistent with civilian practice. The problem of ap- 
prehensions in dwellings is addressed by  cross-reference to sub- 
section (e) (2). 
Subsection (3) clarifies the power of military law enforcement 
officials to secure the custody of a person. There is no similar pro- 
vision in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It is general, 
leaving to the services ample breadth in which to make more de- 
finitive regulations. 
The discussion restates paragraph  19d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
There is no corollary provision in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. The purpose of the notification is twofold. First, it en- 
sures that the unit commander of the person in custody will know 
the status of that member of the command and can participate in 
later decisionmaking that will affect the availability of the mem- 
ber apprehended. Second, it ensures that law enforcement officials 
will promptly bring the case and suspect before the commander, 
thus ensuring that later procedural requirements of the code and 
these rules will be considered and met if appropriate. This is par- 
allel in intent to Fed. R. Crim. P. 5 and 5.1. 
(e)  Where an apprehension may be  made. Subsection (1) is based 
on Article 5.  It is similar to Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(d)(2) but broader 
because the code is not similarly limited by geography. 
Subsection (2) adds the warrant requirement of Payton v.  New 
York,  445 U.S. 573 (1980), conforming the procedure to military 
practice. See also Steagald v.  United States, 451 U.S.  204 
(1981);United States v.  Mitchell,  12 M.J. 265 (C.M.A.  1982); 
United States v.  Davis, 8 M.J. 79 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. 
Jamison, 2 M.J. 906 (A.C.M.R. 1976). The first sentence clarifies 
the extent of Payton by citing examples of the kinds of dwellings 
in which one may and may not reasonably expect privacy to be 
protected to such a degree as to require application  of Payton. 
Subsection (C) joins the warrant requirement to the traditional 
power of military commanders, and military judges when em- 
powered, to authorize similar intrusions for searches generally 
and other kinds of seizures. The first sentence of the last para- 
graph in subsection (2) is based on Steagald, v.  United States, 
supra. The Working Group does not regard Steagald as requiring 
an exclusionary rule or supplying standing to an accused on be- 
half of a third party when the accused's right to privacy was not 
violated. See Rakas v.  Illinois, 439 U.S.  128 (1978). Failure to se- 
cure authorization or warrant to enter a private dwelling not oc- 
cupied by the person to be apprehended may violate the rights of 
residents of that private dwelling. 
Rule 303- Investigation of charges 
This rule is based on paragraph 32 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Much 
of the predecessor now appears in the accompanying discussion. 
Rule 304.  Pretrial restraint 
(a)  Types of  pretrial restraint. Except for the "conditions on lib- 
erty"  provision, which is new, this subsection is based  on 
paragraphs 20a, b,  and c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Some of  the for- ANArLYSlS  App. 21, R.C.M. 
mer Manual which explained the distinction between arrest and 
restriction in  lieu thereof and which described the consequences 
of breaking restrictions has been moved to the Discussion. 
The "conditions on liberty" provision is set out separately in 
the Manual for the first time, although such conditions (several 
examples of which are included in the Discussion) have been in 
practice previously and have received judicial  recognition. See 
United States v. Heard, 3 M.J. 14,20  (C.M.A. 1977);  cf: Pearson v. 
Cox, 10 M.J. 317, 321 n. 2 (C.M.A. 1981) (conditions during pe- 
riod of deferment of adjudged sentence). Such conditions also 
parallel the conditions on release described in  18 U.S.C.  8 
3146(a). See also ABA Standards, Pretrial Release 8 10-5.2 (1979). 
The discussion notes that pretrial restraint, including conditions 
on liberty, may not improperly hinder trial preparation. See 
United States v. Aycock,  15 U.S.C.M.A.  158, 35 C.M.R.  130 
(1964); United States v. Wysong, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 249,26 C.M.R. 29 
(1958). 
The last sentence of the second paragraph  of the discussion is 
based on  United States v.  Weisenmuller, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 636, 38 
C.M.R.  434 (1968); United States  v. Smith, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 427, 
38 C.M.R. 225 (1968); United States v. Williams, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 
589, 37 C.M.R. 209 (1967). See also  United States v. Nelson, 5 
M.J.  189 (C.M.A.  1978); United States v.  Powell, 2 M.J. 6 
(C.M.A. 1976). 
1986 Amendment: A fourth paragraph was added to the Dis- 
cussion to provide a cross-reference to the speedy trial rule in 
R.C.M. 707(a). 
(b)  Who may order pretrial  restraint. This subsection restates, in 
a reorganized format, paragraph  21a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). It is 
based on Article 9(b) and (c). The code does not address forms of 
restraint less severe than arrest; there is no reason to permit a 
broader class of persons than those who may impose arrest or 
confinement to impose less severe forms of restraint. Subsection 
(4) is based on United States v. Gray, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 615, 20 
C.M.R. 331 (1956). A commander who, under subsection (4), has 
withheld authority to order pretrial restraint may, of course, later 
modify or rescind such withholding. Even if such modification or 
rescission is denominated a"delegation,"  it would be a rescission 
of the earlier withholding. The limits of subsection (3) would not 
apply. 
(c)  When a person may be restrained. This subsection is based on 
Articles 9(d) and 10. Although forms of restraint less severe than 
arrest are not addressed by  these articles, it is appropriate to re- 
quire probable cause and a need for restraint for all forms of pre- 
trial restraint. An officer imposing restraint has considerable dis- 
cretion in determining how much restraint is necessary (cf: 18 
U.S.C. 88 3146(a) and 3147), although a decision to confine is 
subject to thorough  review under R.C.M.  305. The Discussion 
borrows from the language of Article 13 to admonish that the re- 
straint must serve only the limited purpose of this rule. See sub-
section (0. See also United States v. Haynes,  15 U.S.C.M.A. 122, 
35 C.M.R. 94 (1964). 
(d)  Procedures for  ordering pretrial  restraint. This subsection is 
based on Article 9(b) and (c) and on paragraph 20d(2) and (3) of 
MCM,  1969 (Rev.). Since all forms of restraint other than con- 
finement are moral rather than physical,  they can be imposed 
only by  notifying the person restrained. 
(e)  Notice of basis for  restraint. This subsection is based on Arti- 
cle 10. Since all forms of restraint other than confinement involve 
some form of communication with the accused or suspect, this 
subsection will impose no undue burden  on commanders. The 
Discussion refers to R.C.M. 305(e) which contains additional no- 
tice requirements for a person who is confined. Failure to comply 
with this subsection does not entitle the accused to specific relief 
in the absence of a showing of specific prejudice. Cf: United States 
v. Jernigan, 582 F. 2d  1211 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991 
(1978); United States v. Grandi, 424 F. 2d 399 (2d Cir. 1970); cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 870 (1972). 
Pretrial restraint other than pretrial confinement (see R.C.M. 
305(e)(2) and (0) does not alone require advice to the suspect of 
the right to detailed counsel or civilian counsel. Fed.R.Crim. 
P.5(c) is not analogous because the advice at the initial appear- 
ance serves multiple purposes other than for pretrial restraint 
short of confinement. The advice at the initial appearance is de- 
signed to protect the defendant not only when pretrial confine- 
ment is imposed, but for events in the criminal process which fol- 
low shortly thereafter. Thus, it is necessary under that provision 
to inform a defendant of the right to counsel immediately because 
the suspect or accused may shortly thereafter be called upon to 
make important decisions. In contrast, the Rules for Courts-Mar- 
tial treat each step in the pretrial process separately and provide 
for advice of the right to counsel when  counsel is necessary. 
R.C.M. 305(e)(2) and (0  (pretrial confinement); 406 (detailing 
counsel for an accused in an investigation under Article 32); 503 
and 506 (detailing counsel for an accused in courts-martial); 
Mi1.R. Evid. 305 (warnings to accompany interrogations). The 
difference is a result of the structural differences between these 
Rules and the Federal Rules of  Criminal Procedure. The intent 
and result of both systems are the same. 
(0 Punishment prohibited.  This section is based on Article  13; 
paragraph  18b(3) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); Hearings on H.R. 2498 
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 81st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 916 (1949). See also  United States v. Bruce,  14 
M.J. 254 (C.M.A. 1982); United States v. Davidson, 14 M.J. 81 
(C.M.A. 1982); United States v. Pringle,  19 U.S.C.M.A. 324, 41 
C.M.R. 324 (1970); United States v. Bayhand, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 762, 
21 C.M.R. 84 (1956). Cf: Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). The 
remedy for a violation of this rule is meaningful sentence relief. 
United States v. Pringle, supra;  United States v.  Nelson.  18 
U.S.C.M.A. 177,39C.M.R. 177(1969). 
(g)  Release. This subsection is based on 21d and on the second 
and third sentences of paragraph 22 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
1986 Amendment: The Discussion was amended to clarify that 
pretrial restraint may be imposed not only when charges are to be 
reinstated but also when a convening authority intends to order a 
rehearing or an "other"  trial. See R.C.M. 1107(e). Restraint im- 
posed during any of these situations is considered  "imposed 
before and during disposition of offenses." See R.C.M. 304(a). 
(h) Administrative restraint. This subsection clarifies the scope of 
this rule. 
Rule 305.  Pretrial confinement 
Introduction. This rule clarifies the basis for pretrial confinement, 
and establishes procedures for the imposition and review of  pre- 
trial confinement. The rule conforms with requirements estab- 
lished by  recent decisions. See United States v. Lynch, 13 M.J. 394 
(C.M.A. 1982); United States v. Malia, 6 M.J. 65 (C.M.A. 1978); 
United States v. Heard, 3 M.J. 14 (C.M.A. 1977);Cortney  v. Wil- APP. 21,!  APPE 
liams,  1 M.J. 267 (C.M.A. 1976). The most significant changes in- 
clude: prevention of foreseeable serious misconduct as a basis for 
pretrial confinement; a system of review of pretrial confinement 
by neutral and detached officials; specific authority for a military 
judge to direct release of an accused from pretrial confinement; 
and a specific and meaningful remedy for violation of the rule. 
The Working Group considered various procedural  mecha- 
nisms for imposition and review of pretrial confinement. Numer- 
ous practical, as well as legal, concerns were analyzed and 
weighed in striking a balance between individual liberty and pro- 
tection of society. The Working Group proceeded from the pre- 
mise that no person should be confined unnecessarily. Neither the 
prisoner nor the government benefits from unnecessary confine- 
ment. On the other hand, in determining when confinement may 
be necessary, the nature of the military and its mission is an im- 
portant consideration. Moreover, some of the collateral impact 
associated with pretrial confinement in civilian life (loss ofjob, in- 
come, and access to defense counsel) is normally absent in the 
military setting and pretrial confinement is seldom lengthy. See 
R.C.M. 707. Finally, the procedures for imposition and review of 
pretrial confinement had to be compatible with existing resources. 
More specific considerations are addressed below. 
(a)  In general. This subsection is based  on the first sentence of 
paragraph 20c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The  second sentence of that 
paragraph is deleted here; the subject is treated at subsections (d) 
and (h)(2) of this rule. The first sentence of the discussion, with 
the addition of the words "of  the United States,"  is Article 12. 
The second sentence is new, and restates current practice. 
(b)  Who may be  confined. This subsection is new. It restates cur- 

rent law. 

(c)  Who may order confinement. See Analysis, R.C.M. 304(b). 
(d)  When a person may be  confined. This subsection contains the 
two basic coda1 prerequisites for pretrial confinement: (1) proba- 
ble cause to believe an offense has been committed by  the person 
to be confined (Article 9(d)); and (2) circumstances require it (Ar- 
ticle 10). This basic standard, which applies to all forms of pre- 
trial restraint, was selected here in lieu of a more detailed formu- 
lation since the initial decision to confine often must be made 
under the pressure of events. The discussion encourages consider- 
ation of the factors discussed under (h)(2)(B) of this rule before 
confinement is ordered, and, as a practical matter, this will proba- 
bly occur in many cases, since persons ordering confinement usu- 
ally consider such matters in making their decision. An initial de- 
cision to confine is not illegal, however, merely because a detailed 
analysis of  the necessity for confinement does not precede it. Cf: 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1975). 
The discussion notes that confinement must be distinguished 
from custody incident to an apprehension. See R.C.M. 302. This 
paragraph is based on Article 9(e) and paragraphs 19d and 174c 
and d of MCM. 1969 (Rev.). Article 9(e) expressly distinguishes 
confinement from measures to "secure  the custody of an alleged 
offender until proper authority may be notified". Such periods of 
custody are not confinement within the meaning of this rule. See 
Un~ted Slates v.  Ellsey, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 455, 37 C.M.R. 75 (1966). 
Such custody may continue only for the period of time reasonably 
necessary for a proper authority under R.C.M. 304 to be notified 
and to act. See Article 9(e). See also paragraphs 21 and 22, Part 
IV. 
(e)  Advice to the accused upon confinement. Except for subsection 
(e)(l), which is based on Article 10 and appeared in subparagraph 
20d(4) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) this subsection is new. It is similar to 
Fed.R.Crim. P.5(c) which requires the magistrate to give such ad- 
vice to the defendant at the initial appearance. The rule does not 
specify who shall inform the accused. This affords considerable 
flexibility in implementing this provision. 
Note that violation of this subsection does not trigger the rem- 
edy in subsection (k) of this rule. Consequently, a violation of this 
subsection must be tested for prejudice. See Article 59. 
(f) Military counsel. This subsection is new. The primary purpose 
of the rule is to help protect the accused's interest in the pretrial 
confinement determinations. Secondarily, this requirement 
should enable the accused to avoid injury to the defense in subse- 
quent proceedings, and, when necessary, to begin to marshal a de- 
fense. See e.g., Article 49(a).  The assignment of counsel at this 
stage is of central importance to ensuring the fairness of the pre- 
trial confinement process. The requirement parallels similar re- 
quirements in federal practice (Fed.R.Crim. P.5(c) and 44(a)) and 
under the District of Columbia Code (D.C.  Code 5  23-
1322(c)(4)). See generally United States v.  Jackson, 5 M.J. 223 
(C.M.A.  1978); United States v.  Mason, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 389, 45 
C.M.R. 163 (1972);  United States v.  Przybycien,  19 U.S.C.M.A. 
120, 122n,2,41 C.M.R. 120, 122n. 2 (1969). Consequently, failure 
to do so triggers the remedy in subsection (k) of this rule. 
The subsection does not require that counsel appointed at this 
stage will represent the prisoner throughout subsequent proceed- 
ings. Although this would be desirable, the mobility of the armed 
forces, the locations of confinement facilities, and the limits on le- 
gal resources render an inflexible requirement in this regard im- 
practicable. Nothing in the code or the Constitution requires such 
early appointment of defense counsel for purposes of representa- 
tion at trial. Cf:  Gerstein v.  Pugh, supra at 123; Kirby v.  Illinois, 
406 U.S. 682 (1972). But see United States v.  Jackson, supra. Cur- 
rent case law permits assignment of counsel for a limited dura- 
tion, at least if the limited nature of the relationship is made clear 
to the client at the outset. See United States v.  Timberlake,  22 
U.S.C.M.A.  117,46C.M.R. 117(1973);Stanten v.  Unitedstates, 
21 U.S.C.M.A. 431, 45 C.M.R. 205 (1972);United States v. 
Kelker, 4 M.J. 323 (C.M.A.  1978); cf:  United States v.  Booker, 5 
M.J. 238 (C.M.A. 1977). Where such a limited relationship is the 
practice, it should be included in the advice under subsection (e) 
of this rule to help prevent misunderstanding. If the limited  na- 
ture of the relationship is not explained to the prisoner, it may not 
be possible, without the prisoner's consent, to terminate the rela- 
tionship for the convenience of the government.  United States v. 
Catt, 1 M.J. 41 (C.M.A. 1975); United  States v.  Eason, 21 
U.S.C.M.A. 335, 45 C.M.R. 109 (1972); United States v.  Murray, 
20 U.S.C.M.A. 61,42 C.M.R. 253 (1970). 
Nothing in this rule requires that counsel assigned for pretrial 
confinement purposes be located near the prisoner. Once again, as 
desirable as this may be, such a requirement would be impractica- 
ble. It is not uncommon for a prisoner to be confined, at least ini- 
tially, far from any available counsel. The rule is designed to af- 
ford the services considerable flexibility In  dealing with  such 
situations. The  distance between the prisoner and defense counsel 
should not pose a serious problem for the defense. They can com- 
municate by  telephone, radio, or other means, and, under 
Mil.R.Evid. 502, such communications would be protected by  the ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (h) 
attorney-client privilege. Moreover, since the initial review may 
be accomplished without the presence  of  prisoner  or defense 
counsel, the defense  counsel may submit appropriate written mat- 
ters without personal  contact with either the prisoner or the re- 
viewing officer. 
1993 Amendment: The  amendment to  subsection (f)provides a 
specific time period  by which to measure compliance. Because it 
is possible to  obtain credit for violations of  this section under sub- 
section (k),  a standard of  compliance was thought necessary. See 
e.g., Unitedstates  v.  Chapman, 26 M.J. 515 (A.C.M.R. 1988),pet. 
denied 27  M.J. 404 (C.M.A. 1989). This amendment, while pro- 
tecting the rights of  the prisoner, also gives reasonable protection 
to  the Government in those cases where the prisoner is confined 
in a civilian facility and the request is never, or is belatedly, com- 
municated to military authorities. While  it is expected  that mili- 
tary authorities will have procedures  whereby civilian confine- 
ment authorities communicate such requests in a timely fashion, 
the failure to  communicate such a request, or the failure to notify 
military authorities in a timely manner should  be tested for 
prejudice under Article 59 U.C.M.J.,  and  should  not be consid- 
ered  as invoking the credit provisions of  subsection (k)  of  this 
rule. 
(g) Who  may direct release from confinement. This  subsection is a 
substantial  change from the following language from paragraph 
22 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.):  "The proper authority to release from 
confinement in a military confinement facility is the commanding 
officer  to  whose authority that facility is subject."  Notwithstand- 
ing this provision, the authority of  the commander to whose au- 
thority the confinement facility is subject was often treated as 
ministerial in nature, at least in some of  the services. Authority to 
direct release was recognized to  repose in a commander of  the ac- 
cused. See generally Boller, Pretrial Restraint in the Military, 50 
Mil.L.Rev. 71, 96-99 (1970);  see also United States v. Pringle, 19 
U.S.C.M.A.  324, 41 C.M.R. 324 (1970). More recently, the au- 
thority of military judges  (see Porter  v.  Richardson, 23 
U.S.C.M.A. 704, 50 C.M.R. 910 (1975);  Courtney v.  Williams, 
supra) and  officials  appointed to do so under regulations (see 
United States v.  Malia, supra) to order release from pretrial  con- 
finement has been recognized. The subsection expressly estab- 
lishes the authority of  such officials to direct release from pretrial 
confinement. 
(h) Notification  and  action  by commander. Subsection (1)  is 
based  on Article  1 l(b),  although the terminology has been 
changed somewhat since the terms "commander of  a guard"  and 
"master at arms"  no longer accurately describes the confinement 
personnel who are responsible for making the report. This  subsec- 
tion is also important in setting in motion the procedures for ap- 
proval  or disapproval of  confinement. See also, Fed.R.Crim. 
P.5(a). The  discussion is based on Hearings on H. R. 2498 Before a 
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Armed Services of the House of Repre- 
sentatives, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 913 (1949). 
Subsection (2)(A)  places  the real initial decision for pretrial 
confinement with the prisoner's commander. Although the imme- 
diate commander may not be a neutral  and  detached  official for 
pretrial  confinement purposes (United States v.  Stuckey, 10 M.J. 
347 (C.M.A. 1981); but cf. United States v.  Ezell, 6 M.J. 307 
(C.M.A. 1979); Courtney v.  Williams, supra), it is appropriate to 
give this officer  the initial decision on pretrial confinement,  so that 
the command implications of  this determination may be fully 
considered and  developed  for later review. See subsections (B) 
and (C).  This will enable the commander, who is in the best posi- 
tion to assess the predictive elements of  the pretrial  confinement 
decision, including not only the prisoner's  likely behavior, but 
also the impact of  release or confinement on mission perform- 
ance, to  make a record of  such factors for the initial review. Sub- 
section (2)(B)  provides additional guidance for the commander in 
making this decision. 
The 72-hour requirement is intended  to ensure reasonably 
prompt  action by the commander, while at the same time al- 
lowing for situations in which the commander is not immediately 
available. If  a commander were unavailable for a longer period, 
then some other official would  normally qualify as acting com- 
mander (see United States v.  Kalscheuer,  11 M.J. 373 (C.M.A. 
1981); United States v. Murray, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 434,3  1 C.M.R. 20 
(1961); United States v.  Bunting, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 84, 15  C.M.R. 84 
(1954))  or the prisoner would be attached  to another unit whose 
commander could act for these purposes. 
1993 Amendment: The  amendment to subsection (h)(2)(A) 
clarifies that the 72-hour period  operates in two distinct situa- 
tions: (a)  if  the commander orders the prisoner into pretrial  con- 
finement, the commander has 72 hours to  decide whether pretrial 
confinement will continue;  but @)  if  someone other than the pris- 
oner's commander orders the prisoner into pretrial  confinement, 
the prisoner's commander has 72 hours from receipt of  a report 
that the prisoner  has been confined to  decide whether pretrial 
confinement will continue. 
Subsection (2)(B)  sets forth the standards for pretrial  confine- 
ment. Probable cause has long been recognized  as a prerequisite 
to  confinement in military law. See Article 9(d);  paragraph 20d(l) 
of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Preventing flight is also well established as 
basis for confinement. See paragraph 20c of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.); 
United States v.  Bayhand, 6 U.S.C.M.A.  762, 21  C.M.R. 84 
(1956). Preventing foreseeable serious criminal misconduct has 
not been expressly recognized  in the Manual  before,  although it 
was probably included in the "seriousness of  the offense  charged" 
language of  paragraph 20c. See e.g.,  United States v.  Nixon, 21 
U.S.C.M.A. 480, 45 C.M.R. 254 (1972). "Seriousness of  the of- 
fense charged"  was rejected  as an independent justification  for 
pretrial  confinement in United States v.  Heard, supra, at least in- 
sofar as it implied confinement may be ordered regardless of  the 
need to prevent flight or serious criminal misconduct. Cf. United 
States v. Nixon, supra; United States v.  Jennings,  19  U.S.C.M.A. 
88,41 C.M.R. 88 (1969). 
Although  prevention  of  serious misconduct is expressly au- 
thorized as a basis for pretrial confinement for the first time, it is, 
as the foregoing analysis indicates, not new to military practice. 
Indeed  the phrase6'foreseeable serious criminal misconduct" 
comes from Heard. See also United States v. Nixon, supra; United 
States v.  Gaskins, 5 M.J. 772 (A.C.M.R. 1978); Dep't  of  Defense 
Directive  1325.4 (7 Oct 68). The need for confinement for such 
purposes has been recognized  and  sanctioned  in civilian commu- 
nities.United  States v.  Edwards, 430 A.2d  1321 (D.C. 1981), cert. 
denied.455 U.S.  1022 (1982).  See also U.S.  Dep't of  Justice, Attor- 
ney General's Task Force on  Violent Crime, Final Report 50-53 
(August 1981); Burger, Report of the Chief Justice to the Ameri- 
can Bar Association-1981,  67 A.B.A.J.  290, 292 (1981);  Note, 
Preventive Detention  Before  Trial, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 1489 (1966). 
The  need for confinement to  prevent serious misconduct is partic- APP. 21, !l(h)  APPENDIX 21 
ularly acute in the military. The business of military units and the 
interdependence of their members render the likelihood of serious 
criminal misconduct by  a person awaiting trial of even graver 
concern than in civilian life. Moreover, as expressed in the last 
sentence of subsection (B), these concerns render a broader range 
or misconduct of a potentially serious nature. For example, the 
"quitter"  who disobeys orders and refuses to perform duties, 
while others are expected to carry out unpleasant or dangerous 
tasks, has immensely adverse effect on morale and discipline 
which, while intangible, can be more dangerous to a military unit 
than physical violence. Thus, although the "pain  in the neck" 
(United States v. Heard, supra) may not be confined before trial 
solely on that basis, the accused whose behavior is not merely an 
irritant to the commander, but is rather an infection in the unit 
may be so confined. Even constant supervision accomplishes little 
in such cases, and military resources do not permit, nor is it rea- 
sonable to require, the establishment of some holding facility 
other than a confinement facility for such persons. 
The definition of national security is based on Exec. Order No. 
12065  6-104 (June 28, 1978), 43 Fed.Reg. 28949, as  amended by 
Exec. Order No. 12148 (July 1979), 44 Fed.Reg. 43239, and Exec. 
Order No. 12148 (July 19, 1979), 44 Fed.Reg. 56673, reprinted at 
50 U.S.C.A.  401 (West Supp. 1982). The second ("includes") 
phrase is taken from Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication  1, Diction- 
ary of Military and Associated Terms 228 (1 July 79). 
The factors for consideration in the discussion are taken from 
18 U.S.C.  3146(b), with minor modifications. See also ABA 
Standards, Pretrial Release $8 10-3.2, 10-3.3, 10-4.4(d), 10-5.l(b) 
(1979), "embraced"  in United States v. Heard, supra at 23-24. The 
discussion also notes that the Military Rules of evidence do not 
apply to the information considered. Although the commander's 
decision is not directly analogous to a bail determination before a 
magistrate, this provision is consistent with 18 U.S.C.  3146(f). 
The last paragraph in the discussion is a reminder of the obliga- 
tion to consider less severe forms of restraint before approving 
continued confinement. United States v. Heard and United States 
v. Gaskins, both supra.The alternatives, which are also referred to 
in R.C.M. 304, are derived from 18 U.S.C.  3146(a). 
The procedures in this rule are the same whether the basis of 
confinement is risk of flight or foreseeable serious misconduct. 
This is appropriate since bail is unavailable in the military. United 
States v. Heard, supra;  18 U.S.C.  3156. Cf: Levy v. Resor,  17 
U.S.C.M.A.  135, 37 C.M.R. 399 (1967). Since the decision  is 
whether or not to confine, whether the basis is risk of flight or 
foreseeable misconduct, and since the factual, predictive, and dis- 
cretionary determinations are qualitatively the same in either 
case, there is no reason for procedures to differ concerning them. 
Indeed, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals acknowledged 
that even where possibility of bail exists in potential flight cases, 
the two determinations involve the same fundamental considera- 
tions. See Upited States v. Edwards, supra at 1336-37. 
The requirement for a memorandum in subsection (2)(C) is 
new although not to military practice. See e.g., AR 27-10,  para. 
9-5b(l), 16-5a (1 September 1982); SECNAVINST 1640.10, 
para. 6 (16 August 1978). The memorandum is important to the 
remaining pretrial confinement procedures since it ordinarily pro- 
vides the primary basis for subsequent decisions concerning pre- 
trial confinement. 
(i)  Procedures for  review of pretrial  confinement. This subsection 
is new, although it roughly parallels current practice in the ser- 
vices. The requirement for review by an official, other than the 
commander ordering the confinement, who is neutral and de- 
tached, in subsection (2) is consistent with the requirement  of 
Courtney v. Williams, supra. Although in United States v. Malia, 
supra, the Court of Military Appeals identified the term "magis- 
trate"  with the term "judge,"  the Working Group did not con- 
strue this to require that a military judge must conduct the initial 
review. Cf: United States v. Lynch, supra. Judicial review is pro- 
vided in subsection 6).Instead, the term as used in Malia appears 
to denote a neutral and detached official with independent power 
to review and order release from pretrial confinement. In any 
event, it is not practicable to require that the reviewing officer be a 
military judge, especially if the review is to occur promptly and if 
the accused is to be permitted to appear personally before the re- 
viewing officer. There are not enough military judges available to 
accomplish this task. Moreover, a legally trained magistrate is not 
necessary since the pretrial confinement decision  is essentially 
factual and predictive. Cf: Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 
345 (1972) (magistrate need not be a lawyer). Thus the rule leaves 
the selection of reviewing officers to service Secretaries. 
The review must take place within 7 days of the imposition of 
confinement under R.C.M. 305. This is a more extended period 
than is the norm for an initial appearance in federal courts. See 
Fed.R.Crim. P.5(a); Gerstein v. Pugh, supra. However, Federal 
courts are willing to tolerate delays of several days, so long as the 
defendant does not suffer prejudice beyond the confinement itself 
during such periods. See e.g., United States v. Motes-Zarate, 552 
F.2d  1330 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.  947 (1978); see 
generally  8 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, ch. 5 (1982). The 
7-day period is more closely analogous to the time periods author- 
ized for the preventive detention hearing under D.C. Code § 23-
1322(c)(3). The 7-day period, with a possible extension up to 10 
days, is intended to accommodate a wide variety of circum- 
stances. Because the review may be conducted entirely with writ- 
ten documents, without the prisoner's presence when circum- 
stances so dictate, there should be no reason why a reviewing 
officer cannot conduct a review of the imposition of confinement 
within that time. Note that the 7-day period begins running from 
the time confinement is imposed by  a person authorized  do so 
under subsection (c) of this rule. 
1993 Amendment: The amendment to subsection (i)(l) pro- 
vides that the required review only becomes applicable whenever 
the accused is confined under military control. For example, if the 
prisoner was apprehended and is being held by civilian authorities 
as a military deserter in another state from where the prisoner's 
unit is located and it takes three days to transfer the prisoner to an 
appropriate confinement facility, the seven day period under this 
rule would not begin to run until the date of the prisoner's trans- 
fer to military authorities. Any unreasonable period of time that it 
may take to bring a prisoner under military control should be 
tested for prejudice under Article 59, U.C.M.J.,  and should not be 
considered as invoking the credit provisions of subsection (k) of 
this rule absent evidence of bad faith by  military authorities in 
utilizing civilian custody. But see  United States v. Ballesteros, 29 
M.J. 14 (C.M.A. 1989). However, any time spent in civilian cus- 
tody at the request of military authorities would be subject to pre- ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M.  (j) 
trial confinement credit mandated by  United States v. Allen,  17 
M.J. 126 (C.M.A. 1984). 
The amendment further clarifies the method of calculation to 
determine if the rule has been violated. See  United States v. 
DeLoatch, 25 M.J. 718 (A.C.M.R. 1987); contra, United States v. 
New, 23 M.J. 889 (A.C.M.R. 1987). 
The rule calls for a limited proceeding. Matters are to be 
presented in writing to facilitate the promptness of the proceeding 
and to ensure that a record is kept of the matters considered by 
the reviewing officer. Notwithstanding some authority to the con- 
trary (United States v. Heard, supra at 25 (Fletcher, C.J., concur- 
ring); ABA Standards, Pretrial Release $10-5.9 (1979)), an adver- 
sary hearing is not required. Gerstein v. Pugh andunited States v. 
Edwards, both supra. Even if a more elaborate hearing might be 
called for in the civilian sphere (ABA Standards, supra; cf: United 
States v. Wind, 527 F.2d 672 (6th Cir. 1975)), it is appropriate to 
consider the institutional goals and needs of the military in mea- 
suring the due process requirements for pretrial confinement. Cf: 
Wolff  v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). See Middendorf  v. 
Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). 
The procedures in the review include the opportunity for repre- 
sentation by counsel, access to all information presented to  the re- 
viewing officer, the right to present matters for the defense, and, 
ordinarily, the opportunity for the prisoner and defense counsel 
to personally address the reviewing officer.  Measured against the 
military's mission, its structure and organization, and the re- 
sources available to it, these procedures, coupled with the oppor- 
tunity for judicial review at an Article 39(a) session, adequately 
protect the liberty interests of the prisoner. 
The review procedures are patterned after the procedures for 
parole revocation proceedings prescribed in Morrissey  v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471 (1972). There the Supreme Court required that an 
initial review of parole revocation must be conducted by a neutral 
person, who need not be a judge; the prisoner must receive notice 
and have an opportunity to be present and speak, and to present 
written matters; and the hearing officer  must prepare an informal 
summary of the findings. (A later, more thorough hearing, to be 
held within approximately 2 months is required under Morrissey; 
judicial review under Article 39(a) coupled with the trial itself ful- 
fills these purposes for pretrial confinement). These requirements 
are virtually identical to those in R.C.M. 305(i)(l). The only re- 
quirement in Morrissey not present in 305 is that the hearing of- 
ficer have discretionary power to call witnesses for purposes of 
confrontation. On the other hand, R.C.M. 305 provides the pris- 
oner with the opportunity to obtain counsel in all cases. This is 
not  required  for parole or probation revocation.  Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 41 1 U.S. 778 (1973). 
Although parole and probation revocations differ from pretrial 
confinement in that in the former there has already been an adju- 
dication of guilt, the distinction cuts in the opposite direction in- 
sofar as (as was emphasized by  the Supreme Court in Morrissey v. 
Brewer, supra at 482) the probationer or parolee typically faces a 
long period of confinement, unlike the pretrial confinee who, es- 
pecially in the military, is not subjected to such a lengthy period. 
Moreover, in Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, the Supreme Court, noting 
the burden of adversary hearings at this pretrial stage (id. at 121 
n. 23), distinguished Morrissey and Gagnon from pretrial proba- 
ble cause hearings (id. at 12 1 n. 2 1) and did not require an adver- 
sary hearing at such pretrial proceedings. The District of Colum- 
bia Court of Appeals deciding that this holding in Gerstein applies 
to preventive detention hearings as well.  United States v. Ed- 
wards, supra. 
The provision that the Military Rules of Evidence do not apply 
at the initial review parallels federal civilian practice. See  18 
U.S.C. 4 3146(f). The burden of proof is on the government. A 
preponderance standard was selected because it strikes the best 
balance between the interests in the military setting of the pris- 
oner and society and because it is easily understood. A higher 
standard is not constitutionally required. Gerstein v. Pugh, supra 
at 119-21. See also Morrissey v. Brewer, supra at 485-89. Federal 
civilian courts may deny bail in capital cases if "the court or  judge 
has reason to believe that no one or more conditions of release will 
reasonably assure that the person will not flee or pose a risk of 
danger to the community." 18 U.S.C. $ 3148. In noncapital cases, 
the judge "in the exercise of his discretion" decides whether and 
how much bail will be  set and hence, in effect, whether the pris- 
oner shall be released. 18 U.S.C. 4 3  146(a). 
Subsection (7) specifically authorizes the presentation of addi- 
tional matters to the reviewing officer, and thus makes clear the 
continuing authority and responsibility of that officer over pre- 
trial confinement. This continuing authority is necessary, espe- 
cially in the unusual case in which referral of charges is delayed. 
(j)  Review by militaly  judge. This subsection is new. MCM, 1969 
(Rev.) did not provide for review of pretrial confinement by  the 
military judge, and it was only recently that the power of a mili- 
tary judge to order release from confinement was recognized, at 
least implicitly. See Porter v. Richardson, supra; United States v. 
Lamb, 6 M.J.  542 (N.C.M.R.  1978), pet.  denied, 6 M.J. 162 
(1979); United States v. Otero, 5 M.J. 781 (A.C.M.R.), pet. denied, 
6 M.J. 121 (1978). Contra, paragraph 21c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
This subsection establishes  that the military judge has the 
power after referral (United Srares v. Newcomb, 5 M.J. 4 (C.M.A. 
1977)) to review pretrial confinement and to order release when 
appropriate. Two separate, but related, issues may be involved: 
(1) whether the prisoner should be released as of the time of the 
hearing; and (2) whether confinement already served was legal. 
The prisoner may raise either or both of these issues by motion for 
appropriate relief. All the procedures and protections normally 
attendant to an Article 39(a) session (see R.C.M. 803) apply. The 
rule does not specify when such a session would take place. As 
with other pretrial motions (see R.C.M. 905) and with scheduling 
proceedings generally (see R.C.M. 801), the determination when 
an Article 39(a) session will be conducted and when a motion will 
be litigated is a matter within the sound discretion of the military 
judge. Note also that the matter may be addressed in a conference 
under R.C.M. 802 and, if the parties agree, resolved without need 
for an Article 39(a) session. The standards for either decision 
posit that the reviewing officer's decision is entitled to substantial 
weight (see United States v. Otero, supra) and may not be over- 
turned in the absence of an abuse of discretion, violation of sub- 
sections (i)(l)(B) and (C) of this rule, or information not 
presented to the reviewing officer. This procedure is analogous to 
the appeal provisions in 18 U.S.C. $ 3147. 
The rule is silent concerning the overlapping responsibilities  of 
the military judge and the reviewing officer. Once charges are re- 
ferred, the need for a reviewing officer diminishes, and it could be 
argued that the reviewing officer's role should terminate on refer- 
ral. On the other hand, even after referral, the reviewing officer ~ , 
APP. 21, n (i)  APPENDIX 21 
may be more accessible to the parties than the military judge, so 

that it was considered unwise to rule out further action by the re- 

viewing officer. 

~h~ remedy for certain violations of the rule is prescribed in 
subsection (k) of this rule and is analyzed below, ~~t~ that the 
military judge must order the remedy when one or more of the 
identified violations occur. 
(k)  Remedy. The requirement for an administrative credit for vi- 
elations in subsection (f), (h), (i), or (i)  of this rule is based on 
United States v. Lamer,  1 M.J. 371 (C,M,A, 1976). This credit is 
the sole remedy for violation of these provisions. See  United 
States v. Nelson, 18 U.S.C.M.A.177,39 C.M.R.  177 (1969). Viola- 
tions of other provisions would not render confinement illegal and 
hence would not trigger the sentence relief requirements. Such vi- 
olations would be tested for specific prejudice, and, where such 
was found, would trigger a requirement to grant relief appropri- 
ate to cure the prejudice suffered. Note that if one of the required 
steps is omitted, but the next step occurs within the time period 
for the omitted step, and pretrial confinement is otherwise valid, 
no credit is required. For example, if the commander does not 
prepare a memorandum under subsection (h)(2)(C), but the re- 
view under subsection (i)(l) occurs within 72 hours of imposition 
of restraint, and the grounds for pretrial confinement are estab- 
lished, the accused is entitled to no credit. Similarly. if  the mili- 
tary judge reviews pretrial confinement  under subsection (i) 
within 7 days of the imposition of confinement  and confinement  is 
approved, the omission  of  the review under subsection  (i)(l) 
would not entitle the accused to credit. 
The one day credit is in addition to the day for day credit pro- 
vided by DOD Instruction 1325.4 as interpreted by united states 
v. Allen,  17 M,J, 126 (C.M,A, 1984) and is intended as an addi-
tional credit to deter violations of the rule, This remedy does not 
replace sanctions against persons who intentionally violate these 
rules. See Articles 97, and 98, The credit for illegal  con-
finement (in addition to any other administrative credit) is pro-
vided as a matter of policy, and does not reflect a determination 
that such cumulative credit is otherwise required. 
The credit applies against confinement, if adjusted, and then 
against several other specified penalties. Thus an accused entitled 
to sentence relief whose adjusted sentence includes no confine- 
ment usually will receive some form of sentence relief. Note, how- 
that the  does  forms of punish- 
ment including punitive discharges or reduction in grade. This is 
because these penalties are so qualitatively different from confine- 
merit that the fact that an accused has served confinement which 
was technically illegal should not automatically affect these forms 
of punishment. 
The rule does not prescribe the mechanics for implementing 
the credit since this will depend on the stage at which the viola- 
tion of the rule is discovered. Cf: United States v. Larner, supra. 
Usually the illegality will be determined by  the trial judge, who 
shall also announce the remedy. After the sentence is announced, 
the military judge should announce on the record how the credit 
will apply to it. Where after application of this credit no confine- 
ment would remain to be served the accused should not be con- 
fined after trial. It is the responsibility of the convening authority 
to apply credit when action is taken on the sentence. See Article 
57. 
(1)  Confinement after release. This subsection is new and is in- 

tended to prevent a "revolving door" situation by  giving finality 

to the decision to release. Cf: United States v. Malia, supra. 

(m)  Exceptions. This subsection is new. Its purpose is to elimi- 

nate several procedural requirements in situations where military 

exigencies make then practically impossible to comply with. Sub- 

section (1) would apply not only to combat situations, but also to 

circumstances in which a unit is deployed to a remote area or on a 

sensitive mission, albeit one not necessarily involving combat. 

Subsection (2) recognizes the 'pecial  problem  at sea? 

and permits suspension of certain procedural requirements in 

cases' 

Rule 306.  Initial disposition 
Introduction. Rule 306 describes who may dispose of offenses and 
the options available to such authorities. Although these matters 
are covered more thoroughly elsewhere (see R.C.M. 401-407, and 
R.C.M. 601) they are included here to facilitate a chronological 

approach to disposition of offenses. 

(a)  Who  may dispose of offenses. This rule and the first paragraph 
of the discussion are based on Articles 15, 22-24, and 30(b), and 
paragraphs 30-33,35, and 128 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The second 
sentence of the rule and the discussion are also based  on 
paragraphs 5b(4) and 5c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.);United States v. 
Charette, 15 M.J.  197 (C.M.A. 1983); United States v. Blaylock, 
15 M.J. 190 (C.M.A. 1983). See also Article 37; United States V. 
Hawthorne, 7 U.S.C.M.A.  293, 22  C.M.R. 83 (1956);  United 
States v. Rembert, 47 C.M.R. 755 (A.C.M.R. 1973); pet. denied, 
23 U.S.C.M.A. 598 
AS noted in the second paragraph of the discussion a referral 
decision commits the disposition of an offense to the jurisdiction 
of a specific  judicial forum, and thus bars other action on that of- 
fense until it is withdrawn from that court-martial by  the conven- 
ing  Or  'Ompetent  See  United States 
v. Charette, United States v. Blaylock both supra. But see Article 
44; R.C.M. 97(b)(2)(C). Neither dismissal of charges nor nonjudi- 
cia1 punishment (for a serious offense) bars subsequent contrary 
action by  the same or a different commander. Thus, a decision to 
dismiss charges does not bar a superior commander from acting 
on those charges if repreferred or from  preferring 
charges relating to the same offenses,if no jeopardy attached to 
the earlier dismissal, See Legal and Legislative 
Courts-Martial, United States,  1951, 47, Cf.  United States v. 
~ h251 U.S. 407 91920); Fed.R.~rim.  ~  P. 48; ~  United ~ ~ ~ 
states v. clay,  481 ~,2d  133 (7th cir,), cert, denied, 414 u.~. 1009 
(1973); Mann v. United States, 304 F.2d 394 (D.C.Cir,), cert, de- 
nied, 371 U,S, 896 (1962). see also ~ ~ i ~ l ~ 44, and R.C.M. 905(~) 
and Analysis, and R.C.M. 907(b)(3) and Analysis. Similarly, im- 
position of nonjudicial punishment does not bar a superior com- 
mander from referring the same offenses, if they are serious, to a 
court-martial (Article 150;  see also United States  v. Fretwell, 11 
U.S.C.M.A. 377, 29 C.M.R. 193 (1960)), or from setting aside 
punishment already imposed. Article 15(e).See generally Part V. 
(b)  Policy. This subsection is based on paragraph 30g of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). Although it is guidance only, it is sufficiently impor- 
tant to warrant inclusion in the rules as a presidential statement. 
The second paragraph of the discussion provides guidelines for 
the exercise of the discretion to dispose of offenses. Guideline (A) 
is based on paragraph 33h of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Guidelines (B) ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (c)(F) 
through (G) are based on ABA  Standards, Prosecution Function fj 
3-3.9(b) (1979). The other guidelines in  fj 3-3.9 are not needed 
here:  fj  3-3.9(a) (probable cause) is followed in the rule: fj  3-
3.9(b)(i)  is inconsistent with the convening authority's judicial 
function; fjfj 3-3.9(c) and (d) are unnecessary in military practice; 
and  fj 3-3.9(e) is implicit in fj 3-3.9(a) and in the rule requiring 
probable cause. Guidelines (H), (I), and (1) were added to ac- 
knowledge other practical considerations. 
(c)  How offenses may be disposed of: This subsection is based gen- 
erally on Articles 15, 22-24 and 30, and paragraphs 32-35, and 
128 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The discussion provides additional 
guidance on the disposition options. 
Rule 307.  Preferral of Charges 
(a)  Who may prefer charges. This subsection is based on Article 
30 and paragraph 29b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
The first sentence of the first paragraph of the discussion is a 
new version  of the former rule at paragraphs 5a(4) and 29c of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.), which provided that "A person subject to the 
code cannot be ordered to prefer charges to which he is unable 
truthfully to make the required oath on his own responsibility." 
This rule is subsumed in the oath requirement of Article 30 and 
subsection (b) of the rule. The discussion clarifies the circum- 
stances under which an order to prefer charges may be given, but 
warns against such orders in some circumstances in which they 
may tend to encourage litigation or to invalidate an otherwise 
valid court-martial. The practice of ordering persons to prefer 
charges has a historical basis.  W. Winthrop, Military Law and 
Precedents 154 (2d ed.  1920 reprint); but cf:  Hearings on H.R. 
2498 Before  a Subcommittee of  the House Committee on Armed 
Service, 81st Cong.,  1st Sess. 850 (1949) (reflecting the fact that 
under the code a person who orders another to prefer charges is 
an accuser). 
The second paragraph of the discussion is a simplified version 
of paragraph 25 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The discussion observes 
that charges may be preferred against a person subject to trial by 
court-martial at any time. But see Article 43. Thus, when charges 
may be preferred depends only on continued or renewed personal 
jurisdiction. The policy forbidding accumulation of charges in 
paragraph 25 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) is now general guidance in 
the discussion. Furthermore, the "reasonable  delay"  aspects of 
the discussion are no longer contingent upon the absence of pre- 
trial arrest and confinement, because delay for a reasonable pe- 
riod and good cause is always permitted. See also R.C.M. 707. 
(b)  How charges are preferred;  oath.  This subsection is taken 
from Article 30(a). This subsection is similar in purpose to 
Fed.R.Crim. P. 7(c)(l)'s requirement  that the indictment or in- 
formation "shall be signed by  the attorney for the government." 
The same concept of requiring accountability for bringing allega- 
tions to trial appears again at R.C.M.  601 (referral). 
The first paragraph of the discussion is based on Article 30 and 
paragraph  114i of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
The last  paragraph of  the discussion is consistent  with 
Fed.R.Crim. P. 4(b). 
(c)  How to allege offenses. Subsection (1) is based on paragraph 
24a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The  nomenclature of charge and speci- 
fication is imbedded in the code. Compare Articles 30, 34(b), 
43(b), 45(b), 54(a), 61, and 62 with Fed.R.Crim. P. 7(c)(l). Tak- 
ing both the charge and specifications together, the practice is en- 
tirely consistent with Fed.R.Crim. P.7. There is no need in mili- 
tary practice for the differentiating nomenclature for indictments 
and informations (Fed.R.Crim P.7(a)); in military practice the 
same charges progress through the pretrial system without any 
change in nomenclature, regardless of the level of court-martial 
by which they are ultimately disposed. See U.S. Const, amend. V. 
That further permits military practice to disregard waiver of in- 
dictment (Fed.R.Crim. P.7(b))  insofar as the pleadings are con- 
cerned. Finally, military practice does not involve criminal for- 
feitures in the same sense as federal civilian practice. Cf. 
Fed.R.Crim. P.7(~)(2). 
Subsection (2) is based on paragraph 24a and appendix 6a of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The definition is consistent with that part of 
Fed.R.Crim. P.7(c)(l) which requires that "The indictment or in- 
formation shall state for each count the official or customary cita- 
tion of the statute, rule, regulation, or other provision of law 
which the defendant is alleged therein to have violated."  The first 
paragraph of the accompanying discussion is based on paragraph 
27 and appendix 6a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The  sources of the let- 
tered subsections of the discussion are: 
(A)  Numbering charges-paragraph  24, and paragraph 3 of 
appendix 6a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); 
(B)  Additional charges-id. 
(C)  Preemption- Article 134; 
(D) Charges under the law of  war-paragraph  12 of appendix 
6a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (3) restates Fed.R.Crim. P.7(c)(l) in military terms. 
That definition is consistent with paragraph 24a and Chapter VI 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The  test of sufficiency of a specification fol- 
lows  United States v. Sell, U.S.C.M.A.  202 (1953); paragraph 
87a(2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Paragraph 29d of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.) is deleted as unnecessary. A specific format for specifica- 
tions is not prescribed. See also Introductory Discussion, Part IV. 
The  sources of the lettered subsection of the accompanying dis- 
cussion are: 
(A) Sample specifications-paragraph  26a of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.); 
(B)  Numbering specifications-paragraph  3 of appendix 6a of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.); 
(C)  Name and description of  the accused; 
(i)  Name-paragraphs  4 and 5 of appendix 6a of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.); 
(ii)  Military association-paragraph  4 of appendix 6a of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.); 
(iii)  Social Security or service number-paragraphs  4 and 6 
of appendix 6a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) (note that the social security 
or service number ordinarily is entered in the data at the top of 
the charge sheet; see Appendix 4); and 
(iv)  Basics of  personal jurisdiction-United  States v. Alef: 3 
M.J. 414 (C.M.A. 1977). See also Analysis, subsection (e)(3) Dis- 
cussion (F) (Subject-matter jurisdiction) of this rule. 
(D) Date and time of  offense-paragraph  7 of appendix 6a of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). As to "on  or about,"  see  United States v. 
Heard, 443 F.2d 856, 859 (6th Cir. 1971); 
(E)  Place of  offense-paragraph  7 of appendix 6a of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.); 
(F) Subject-matter jurisdiction-United  States v.  Alef; supra. 
As to subsection (iii),  United States v.  Trottier,  9 M.J. 337 
(C.M.A.  1980) (jurisdiction over drug offenses). As to subsection APP. 21, n (c)(F)  APPENDIX 21 
(iv), United States v.  Newvine, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 208, 48 C.M.R. 960 
(1974); United States v.  Keaton, 19 U.S.C.M.R. 64, 41 C.M.R. 64 
(1969). 
The guidance here is not prescriptive, just  as the inclusion of 
subject-matter jurisdiction in the sample specifications (Part IV) 
is always parenthetical, a reminder and not as a requirement. The 
Working Group does not consider any particular format for such 
pleadings required by Ale5 
Questions of jurisdiction  are interlocutory questions to be de- 
cided by the military judge applying a preponderance standard. 
See R.C.M. 905(c); 907(b)(l)(A),  and United States v.  Ruiz, 4 
M.J.  85 (C.M.A.1977);  United States v.  Kuriger, 4 M.J.  84 
(C.M.A. 1977); United States v.  Cherry, 4 M.J. 83 (C.M.A. 1977); 
United States v.  McCarthy, 2  M.J. 26,  2811.1  (C.M.A. 
1976);United States v.  Jessie, 5 M.J. 573 (A.C.M.R.), pet. denied, 
5 M.J. 300 (1978). See also United States v.  Laws,  11 M.J. 475 
(C.M.A. 1981). Ordinarily this finding will not be disturbed by 
findings by exceptions and substitutions on the general issue of 
guilt because of the higher standard of proof involved in such de- 
terminations. See generally James, Pleadings and Practice under 
Untied States v.  Alef; 20 A.F.L. Rev. 22 (1978). 
(G) Description of  offense.-The  sources of the section are: 
(i)  Elements-paragraph  28a(3) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); 
(ii)  Words indicating criminality-id.; 
(iii)  Specificity-paragraphs  28a, 696, and 87a(2) of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.); 
(iv)  Duplicity-paragraph  286 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); ac- 
cord, Fed.R.Crim. P.7,8. 
(H) Other considerations in  drafting  specifications.-The 

sources of the sections are: 

(i)  Principals-paragraph  9 of appendix 6a of MCM, 
1969(Rev.); 
(ii)  Victim-paragraph  10 of appendix 6a of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.); 
(iii)  Property-paragraph  13 of appendix 6a of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.); 
(iv)  Value-paragraph  11 of appendix 6a of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.); 
(v)  Documents-paragraph  28c, and paragraph 14 of appen- 
dix 6a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); 
(vi)  Orders-(a),  (b)-  id.; (c) Negating exceptions- United 
States v.  Cuffee,  10 M.J. 381 (C.M.A. 1981); United States v. 
Gohagen, 2U.S.C.M.A. 175,7 C.M.R. 51 (1953); 
(vii)  Oral Statements-paragraph  28c of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.); 
(viii)  Joint offenses-paragraph  26d and paragraph 8 of ap- 
pendix 6a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); 
(ix)  Matters in aggravation-paragraph  127c (Table of Max- 
imum Punishments) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.);  United States v. 
Venerable, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 174,41 C.M.R. 174 (1970). 
Subsection (4) is less restrictive than the former and traditional 
military practice reflected at paragraphs 25, 266 and c of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.) which favored trial of all known offenses at a single 
trial, but complicated that policy with policies against joining ma- 
jor and minor offenses and accumulating charges. The confusion 
is eliminated by  leaving to the discretion of the convening author- 
ity which charges and specifications will be tried. See R.C.M. 
601(d) and accompanying discussion. The rule in this subsection 
does not follow Fed.R.Crim. P.8(a), because that rule is entirely 
too unwieldy for a military criminal system, particularly in com- 
bat or deployment. 
Subsection (5) follows Fed.R.Crim. P.8(b). The civilian rule is 
consistent with the former approach of paragraph 26d of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). The present rule goes even further by making it pos- 
sible to allege related offenses against co-actors on a single charge 
sheet, but the rule does not require that approach. The  rule is also 
consistent with the provision for common trials of paragraph 331 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(d)  Harmless error in citation. The  subsection restates in military 
nomenclature Fed.R.Crim. P.7(~)(3).  The subsection is consistent 
with paragraphs 27 and 28c, and paragraph 12 of appendix 6a of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). It is not intended to provide a comprehensive 
rule on harmless error in drafting specifications. 
Rule 308.  Notification  to accused of charges 
(a) Immediate commander. This subsection paraphrases 
paragraphs 32f(l) and 33c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See Article 30. 
This subsection deletes the requirement for a report of the cir- 
cumstances that make compliance impossible. The  use of a certifi- 
cate of notification is encouraged in the discussion. The  identifica- 
tion of known accusers, including persons who ordered charges to 
be preferred, is new and protects the accused against unautho- 
rized acts by such persons. See Article l(9). 
The certificate requirement  is abandoned only as a require- 
ment, and use of such certificates remains advisable, since they 
give evidence of compliance with Article 10. However, to require 
a certificate might risk an excessive remedy for a mere administra- 
tive failure to complete the certificate properly. 
There is no precisely analogous rule in the federal civilian rules, 
though the federal civilian rules do reach the same end-to  notify 
an accused of the pendency of the allegations. Fed.R.Crim. P.4 
(arrest or summons upon complaint), 5 (initial appearance), 5.1 
(preliminary examination),  6 (grand jury),  7 (indictment, infor- 
mation), and 9 (warrant or summons upon indictment or infor- 
mation) all provide a civilian defendant with notice of the im- 
pending prosecution. 
The  purpose of the subsection is to permit the accused to begin 
preparing a defense.  United States v.  Stebbins, 33 C.M.R. 677 
(C.G.B.R. 1963). The subsection originates in Articles 10 and 30 
and is one of the fundamental rights of an accused. United States 
v.  Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.r. 74 (1951). It gains additional 
importance in this respect since the right of both the United 
States and the accused to take depositions arises upon preferral. 
Article 49(a). 
(b)  Commanders at higher echelons. This subsection reflects the 
same continuing duty to give notice of the preferred charges that 
appeared at paragraph 33c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(c)  Remedy. This subsection is new and is based on the approach 
taken inunited States v.  Stebbins, supra, and consistent with para- 
graph 58 (continuances and postponements) of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (d) 
CHAPTER IV. FORWARDING AND DISPOSITION 
OF CHARGES 
Rule 401.  Forwarding and disposition of charges 
in general 
(a) Who may dispose of charges. This subsection is based  on 
paragraphs 5, 32,33, 35, and  128a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See Ar- 
titles 15, 22-24. The second  sentence is based on United States v. 
Hawthorne, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 293, 22 C.M.R. 83 (1956); United 
States v.  Rembert, 47 C.M.R. 755 (A.C.M.R. 1973),  pet.  denied, 
23 U.S.C.M.A. 598 (1974).  See also United States V. Hardy, 4 M.J. 
20  (C.M.A. 1977).  A  a 
subordinate the authority to dispose of  offenses (see R.C.M. 306) 
or charges may later modify or rescind such withholding. Even if 
such modification or rescission is denominated a "delegation,"  it 
would be a rescission of  the earlier withholding. 
(b) Prompt determination. This subsection is based on Article 
30(b) and  the first sentence of  paragraph  30i of  MCMJ 1969 
(Rev.).  The discussion is also based  on paragraphs  30f, 32b, c, 
Rl),  33a. d, m, and 35a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(c) How charges may be disposed of: This subsection is based on 
paragraphs  32 and  33 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Most matters in 
those paragraphs, including the mechanics of  forwarding charges, 
have been placed  in the discussion as the practices of  the services 
vary because of  differing  command structures. Specific require- 
ments and  additional  details may be provided  by service regula- 
tions. 
(d) National security matters. This subsection is based on the first 
sentencein the second paragraph of  paragraph 33f of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.).  See also R.C.M. 407(b) and  Article 43(e). 
Rule 402.  Action by commander not authorized to 
convene courts-martial 
This rule is based on paragraph 32 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  Para- 
graph 32  was written in terms of  guidance. The structure of  the 
paragraph and  the descriptions of  the alternatives available to  an 
immediate commander indicated  the powers  of  such  com-
manders. R.C.M. 402 expresses these powers. The mechanics of 
forwarding charges, dismissal  of  charges, the requirement for 
prompt  disposition, and  guidance concerning these matters has 
been placed  in R.C.M. 401 and its discussion because these mat- 
ters apply to  commanders at all levels. Other matters contained in 
paragraph 32 have been placed  in other rules. See R.C.M. 303 
(preliminary inquiry); 308 (notification  of  accused); 603 (amend- 
ing charges). See also R.C.M. 306 which includes guidance on dis- 
position determinations. 
Rule 403.  Action by commander exercising 
summary court-martial jurisdiction 
This rule and the discussion are based on paragraph 33 of  MCM, 
1969 (Rev.).See  Article 24. Paragraph 33 was written in terms of 
guidance. The structure of  the paragraph and  the descriptions of 
the alternatives available to the commander exercising summary 
court-martial jurisdiction  indicated the powers  of  such com- 
manders. R.C.M. 403 expresses these powers  in clearer terms. 
Several matters covered in paragraph 33 are now covered in other 
rules. See R.C.M. 303 (preliminary inquiry); 308 (notification  of 
accused); 401 (forwarding charges; discussion of  suspected  in- 
sanity,  joint  or common trials); 601 (instructions  in referral order; 
common trials); 603 (amending charges). See also R.C.M. 306. 
Rule 404.  Action by commander exercising 
jurisdiction 
This rule is new. Paragraph 33 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  treated both 
special and  summary court-martial convening authorities. See 
paragraph 33j(l)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.);  Analysis, R.C.M. 403. 
Rule 405.  Pretrial investigation 
(a) In genera[, This subsection is based on Article 32(a) and  (d) 
and  paragraph  34a of  MCM, 1969 (R~~,),  E~~~~~insofaras the 
code requires otherwise, the rule is generally consistent  with 
Fed,R,Crim,P,6 and 7,  See generally  Johnson v.  Sayre, 158  U.S. 
109 (1895);  Green v.  Convening Authority, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 576, 42 
C.M.R. 178 (1970). The last sentence clarifies that the require- 
ments for an Article 32 investigation apply only if  charges are re- 
ferred to a general court-martial. This sentence is not intended, 
however, to prevent  the accused from challenging the fruits of  a 
violation during a pretrial  investigation of  other rights theac- 
cused  enjoys independent of  the Article 32 investigation (e.g., 
moving to suppress a statement by the accused to the investigat- 
ing officer  because it was taken in violation of  Article 31). 
The  first and  third paragraphs of  the discussion are based  on 
paragraph 34a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The second  sentence has 
been added based on Hutson v.  United States, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 437, 
42 C.M.R. 39  (1970); United States v. Samuels,  10  U.S.C.M.A. 
206,27 C.M.R. 280 (1959);  Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before a Sub- 
comm. of the House  Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st 
Sess. 997 (1949).  See also Mil.R.Evid.  804(b)  and Analysis. The  .  . 
second paragraph of  the discussion is based on the third sentence 
of  paragraph 33e(2) of  MCM, 1969(Rev.). The last paragraph in 
the discussion notes the possibility  of  waiver of  the investigation. 
See subsection (k)  of  this rule and  analysis. The Government is 
not required to accept waiver by the accused, and  may conduct 
the investigation notwithstanding the accused's decision to waive 
it, since the investigation also serves the Government's interest. 
(b) Earlier investigation. This subsection is based on Article 32(c) 
and  paragraph 33e(l)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(c) Who may direct investigation. This subsection is new. There 
was previously  no prescription  of  who had authority to direct an 
investigation under Article 32, although paragraph 33e of  MCM, 
1969 (Rev.)  suggested that the summary or special court-martial 
convening authority ordinarily would  do so. The authority of 
convening authorities to direct an investigation is analogous to 
Fed.R.Crim.  P.6(a) and  the grand jury  system generally. 
(d) Personnel. This subsection follows Article 32 and  paragraph 
34 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  It is consistent with Fed.R.Crim.  P.6  in 
that witnesses, the investigating officer,  and  a representative of 
the prosecution  may be present, but military practice extends fur- 
ther rights to presence and  participation  to the accused and  de- 
fense counsel which are inconsistent with the grand jury  system. 
Compare Article 32(B) with Fed.R.Crim. P.6(d)  and  (e)(2).  Since 
the investigation under Article 32 is conducted by a single investi- 
gating officer,  many of  the provisions of  the grand jury  system are 
inconsistent, e.g., Fed.R.Crim. P.6(b),  (f), and (g). 
Subsection (1)  is based  on Article 32 and  paragraph  34a of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See also Articles 25(d)(2),  26(d), 27(a).  The APP. 21, !(d)  APPENDIX 21 
discussion is also based on United States v.  Payne, 3 M.J. 354 
(C.M.A. 1977); United States v.  Grimm, 6 M.J. 890 (A.C.M.R.), 
pet. denied, 7 M.J. 135 (1979).  Subsection (2)  is based on Articles 
32@)  and 38@) and  paragraph 34c of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).See also 
Article 27(a). Subsections (3)(B)  and  (C)  are new to the Manual 
but conform to current practice. Fed.R.Crim. P.6(c) also pro- 
vides for using reporters. 
(e) Scope of  investigation. This subsection and the discussion are 
based on Article 32(a)  and paragraph 34a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(f) Rights of the accused. This subsection is based on Article 32 
and  paragraph 34b, c, and d of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). As to  subsec- 
tion (f)(3),  see also R.C.M. 804(b)(2) and  Analysis. The accused 
may waive the right to be present. Cf:  R.C.M.  804(b)  and Analy- 
sis. The accused may waive the right to be present. Cf: R.C.M. 
804(b)  and Analysis. As to subsection (6),  see Fed.R.Crim.  P.5. 
(g) Production of witnesses and evidence; alternatives. Subsection 
(1)is based on the third sentence of  Article 32(b)  and the first sen- 
tence in the first paragraph and the first sentence in the third para- 
graph  of  paragraph  34d of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.) as amplified in 
United States v.  Ledbetter, 2 M.J. 37  (C.M.A. 1976). See also 
United States v. Roberts,  10  M.J.  308 (C.M.A. 1981);United 
States v. Chestnut, 2 M.J. 84 (C.M.A. 1976); United States v.  Web- 
ster, 1 M.J. 496 (A.F.C.M.R. 1975); United States v. Houghton, 31 
C.M.R. 579(A.F.B.R. 1961),afd.,  13U.S.C.M.A. 3,32C.M.R. 
3 (1962). Standards for production  of  evidence are also provided. 
These parallel  the standards for the production  of  witnesses. Be- 
cause of  the absence of  subpoena power  at the Article 32 investi- 
gation, only evidence under the control of  the Government is sub- 
ject  to production under this rule. The discussion amplifies the 
considerations in determining reasonable availability, and  is 
based on the same sources. 
1991 Amendment: Subsection (g)(l)(A)  was amended by ad- 
ding a requirement that a witness be located within 100 miles of 
the situs of  the investigation to be "reasonably available."Given 
the alternatives to testimony available under subsection (g)(4),  a 
bright-line rule of 100 statute miles simplifies the "reasonably 
available"  determination and improves the efficiency  of  the inves- 
tigation without diminishing the quality or fairness of  the investi- 
gation. If  a witness is located within 100 statute miles of  the situs 
of  the investigation, the investigating officer  must consider the 
other factors in subsection (g)(l)(A)  in determining availability. 
The remaining provisions  of  section (g)  remain applicable. The 
production of  witnesses located more than 100 statute miles from 
the situs of  the investigation is within the discretion of  the wit- 
ness'  commander (for  military witnesses) or the commander or- 
dering the investigation (for  civilian witnesses). 
Subsection (2)  is new. The second  sentence of  the first para- 
graph of  paragraph 34d of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  recognized that the 
final decision on availability of  a military witness is within the au- 
thority of  that witness' commander. That paragraph did not elab- 
orate on the reasonable availability determination. Subsection 
(2)(A)  recognizes that a command determination of  availability 
(which is essentially whether, and  for how long, the witness can 
be  spared  without unduly impending the mission) isordinarily 
only one of  several factors to be weighed in determining reasona- 
ble availability. The investigating officer  is in the best position  to 
assess the potential  significance of  the witness and  to weigh that 
against such factors as cost, difficulty,  and delay. In many cases it 
will be clear that the witness need not be produced without formal 
application to the witness'  commander. (The  discussion notes, 
however, that advance communication with the commander will 
often be appropriate, as, for example, when the investigating of- 
ficer needs to know how long a witness will be on leave.) Ulti- 
mately, the witness'  importance to the witness'  unit may out- 
weigh all other factors; consequently, the commander of  the 
witness may make a determination of  nonavailability which is re- 
viewable only at trial. Therefore,  subsection (2)(A)  allocates the 
responsibilities  for determining reasonable availability  in accor- 
dance with the practical considerations  involved. See generally 
United States v.  Chestnut and  United States v.  Ledbetter,  both- 
supra; United States v.  Cox, 48 C.M.R. 723  (A.F.C.M.R.), pet. de- 
nied, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 616 (1974). 
Subsection (2)(B)  and the discussion are based on United States 
v.  Roberts,supra; United States v.  Chuculate, 5 M.J.  143 (C.M.A. 
1978); United States v. Chestnut. supra and the first paragraph of 
paragraph 34d of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (2)(C)  applies a similar procedure  for the produc- 
tion of  evidence under the control of  the Government. If  the in- 
vestigating officer  questions the decision of  the commander in 
subsection (2)(B)  or the custodian in subsection (2)(C),  the inves- 
tigating officer  may bring the matter to  the attention of  the com- 
mander who directed  the investigation. When  appropriate the 
matter can be pursued  in command channels. It remains subject 
to  judicial review on motion at trial. 
Subsection (3)  is based  on paragraph  34d of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). 
Subsection (4)  is based on the third  and  fourth paragraphs of 
paragraph  34d of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. 
Samuels, supra. 
1991 Amendment: Subsection (4)(B)  was amended  by adding a 
new clause (v)  which authorizes the investigating officer  to con- 
sider, during time of  war, unsworn statements of  unavailable wit- 
nesses over objection of  the accused. The  burdens of  wartime exi- 
gencies outweigh the benefits to be gained  from requiring sworn 
statements when unsworn statements are available. Article 32, 
U.C.M.J., does not require the investigating officer  to consider 
only sworn evidence or evidence admissible at courts-martial. 
The  investigating officer  should consider the lack of  an oath in de- 
termining the credibility and  weight to give an unsworn state- 
ment. 
Subsection (5)  is new. It parallels subsection (4). 
(h) Procedure. The  second and fourth sentences in subsection (1) 
are based on Article 32(b).  The  first sentence is based on the first 
two sentences  in the second  paragraph  of  paragraph  34d  of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and  on United States v. Samuels, supra. The 
third sentence is based on the first sentence in the last paragraph 
of  paragraph 34d of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  except that now the inves- 
tigating officer  must allow the defense to examine all matters con- 
sidered by the investigation officer,  without exception. See United 
Statesv. Craig, 22C.M.R. 466(A.B.R. 1956),  afd,  8U.S.C.M.A. 
218,24 C.M.R. 28 (1957). 
The  first paragraph in the discussion is based on paragraph 114j 
of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.), except that the former oath has been di- 
vided into two oaths, one for the witness testifying at the investi- 
gation, the second  to be given  when the witness subscribes  to a 
written summary after the hearing. The second oath is described 
in the second. paragraph in the discussion. Note that instead of  a 
second  oath, the witness could  be requested  to sign a statement ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (b) 
with the express proviso that the signature is made under penalty 
of perjury.See paragraph 57 of Part IV and Analysis.  The sec- 
ond and third paragraph in the discussion are based on the second 
paragraph of paragraph 34d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The admoni- 
tion concerning the preservation of substantially verbatim notes 
and tapes of testimony at the end of the second paragraph has 
been added to avoid potential Jencks Act problems, 18 U.S.C. 
3500. See R.C.M. 914 Analysis. 
The fourth paragraph in the discussion of subsection (1) is 
based  on United States v.  Pruitt, 48 C.M.R. 495 (A.F.C.M.R. 
1974). Cf:  UnitedStates v.  Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977). Sub- 
section (2) is new and is intended to promote the early identifica- 
tion of possible defects in the investigation so that they can be cor- 
rected promptly. See also subsection (k) of this rule. Subsection 
(2) clarifies the responsibility of the investigating officer as a judi- 
cial officer. See generally United States v.  Collins, 6 M.J. 256 
(C.M.A. 1979); United States v.  Payne, supra. Requiring objec- 
tions to be made to the investigating officer ensures that they will 
be  placed in proper channels, so that they may be acted upon 
promptly. Many will concern matters which the investigating of- 
ficer can rectify. See generally United States v.  Roberts, and 
United  States v.  Chestnut, both supra. Other matters will fall 
within the province of the commander who directed the investiga- 
tion, in whom most pretrial judicial  authority reposes at this 
stage. See generally United States v.  Nix,  15 U.S.C.M.A. 578, 36 
C.M.R. 76 (1965). Nothing in R.C.M. 405 is intended to restrict 
the authority of the commander who directed the investigation to 
resolve issues involved in it, as long as that commander does not 
encroach upon the investigating officer's discretion and ability to 
personally make conclusions and recommendations. 
Subsection (3) is new and is based on MacDonald v.  Hodson,  19 
U.S.C.M.A. 582,42 C.M.R. 184 (1970). See also R.C.M. 806 for 
examples of some reasons why a pretrial investigation hearing 
might be closed. Fed.R.Crim. P.6 is generally inapplicable due to 
its different nature and purposes; it requires closed proceedings. 
Subsection (3) is not intended to express any preference for closed 
or open hearings. 
(i)  Military Rules of  Evidence. This subsection is solely a cross- 
reference to the Military Rules of Evidence. Mil.R.Evid. 412, 
which  concerns testimony of victims of sexual offenses at trial, 
does not apply at Article 32 hearings. However, there may be cir- 
cumstances in  which questioning should be limited by 
Mil.R.Evid. 303, which prohibits requiring degrading testimony 
in pretrial investigations and elsewhere. The privacy interests of 
the victim may also be protected by closure of the Article 32 hear- 
ings during appropriate periods. See subsection (h)(3) of this rule. 
The first paragraph of the discussion is consistent with present 
practice. It is added to give additional guidance not included in 
paragraph 34 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  It is also consistent with 
General civilian practice. See Office of the United States Attorney 
for the Southern District of Ohio, Proving Federal Crimes 3-3 
(1980). 
1993Amendment: The amendment to R.C.M. 405(i) makes the 
provisions of Mil. R. Evid. 412 applicable at pretrial investiga- 
tions. 
(j) Report of  investigation. This subsection is based on paragraphs 
34d ande of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The provision for informal re- 
ports in paragraph 34f  of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) has been deleted. 
Because R.C.M. 405 applies only if charges are ultimately re- 
ferred to a general court-martial, there is no need  to describe in- 
formal reports. It if  becomes apparent before completion of  the 
investigation that charges will not be referred to a general court- 
martial, no report need be prepared  unless the commander who 
directed the investigation requires it. In other cases a formal re- 
port will be necessary. 
Subsection (1) is based on Article 32(a) and (b) and paragraph 
34e of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsections (2)(A) through (E) are based on Article 32(b) and 
paragraph 34e of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (2)(F) is new but 
is consistent with current practice and with the need to account 
for pretrial delays in relation to speedy trial issues. Subsections 
(2)(G) and (H) are based on Article 32(a) and paragraph 34a of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The probable cause standard is based on 
UnitedStates v.  Engle, 1 M.J. 387, 389, n. 4 (C.M.A. 1976); Hear- 
ings on H.R. 2498 Before  a Subcomm. of  the House Comm. on 
Armed Services, 81st Sess. 997 (1949). Subsection (2)(I) is based 
on Article 32(a) and paragraph 34e(6) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (3) is based on the first sentence of paragraph 34e of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.) which implemented the requirement of the 
last sentence of Article 32(b). Subsection (3) leaves the mechanics 
of reproduction and distribution of the report to the Secretary 
concerned, or, in the absence of Secretarial regulations, to the 
commander concerned. Subsection (4) is new and is intended to 
encourage the early identification of possible defects in the report 
so that they can be corrected promptly when necessary. See also 
subsection (k) and Analysis. 
(k)  Waiver. The first  sentence is based on Article 34(a), as 
amended. Military Justice Act of  1983, Pub.L.No. 98-209, 
4(a)(2), 97 Stat. 1393 (1983), which expressly permits waiver of 
the Article 32 investigation. This is consistent with previous prac- 
tice. See United States v.  Schaffer,  12 M.J. 425 (C.M.A. 1982). 
The remainder of this subsection is also new to the Manual for 
Courts-Martial. Along with subsections (h)(2) and (j)(4) of this 
rule, it is intended to promote efficiency in the pretrial process by 
placing the burden on the defense to raise objections when they 
can most easily be remedied, instead of waiting until trial. Recent 
decisions are consistent with this approach. See United States v. 
Clark, 11 M.J. 179 (C.M.A. 1981);  United States v.  Cumberledge, 
6 M.J. 203 (C.M.A.  1979); United States v.  Cruz, 5 M.J. 286 
(C.M.A. 1978); United States v.  Chuculate, supra. See also Article 
34(d). Because the accused always has the right to be represented 
in the investigation by qualified counsel, this burden is appropri- 
ate. The amendment of Article 32(b) (Military Justice Amend- 
ments of  1981, Pub.L. No. 97-81, § 4, 95 Stat. 1085, 1088) guar- 
antees that qualified counsel will be detailed to represent  the 
accused for the investigation. 
The defense may renew before the military judge any objection 
for which it has not received satisfactory relief. See R.C.M. 
905(b)(2); R.C.M. 906(b)(3). 
The last sentence in the discussion is based on United States v. 
Cumberledge and Uniled States v.  Chuculate, both supra. 
Rule 406.  Pretrial advice 
(a)  In general. This subsection is based  on Article 34(a) as 
amended, Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub.L.No. 98-209,  4,97 
Stat. 1393 (1983); and on paragraph 356 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(b)  Contents. This subsection is based on Article 34(a). It is con- 
sistent with paragraph 35c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) (except insofar APP. 7-1, !I  (b)  APPENDIX 21 
as Article 34 is modified). Matters which paragraph  35c said 
"should" be included are not required, but are listed in the discus- 
sion. The  rule states the minimum necessary to  comply with Arti- 
cle 34(a). Cf: United States v.  Greenwalt, 6 U.S.C.M.A.  569, 20 
C.M.R. 285 (1955). 
The  first paragraph in the discussion is based on paragraph 35c 
of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  and  United States v.  Hardin, 7 M.J.  399 
(C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Greenwalt, supra; United States v. 
Schuller, 5 U.S.C.M.A.  101, 17  C.M.R. 101 (1954);  United States 
v.  Pahl, 50C.M.R. 885 (C.G.C.M.R.  1975). 
The  second paragraph of  the discussion is based on S.Rep. No. 
53,98th Cong., 1st Sess. 17  (1983),  and on the second sentence in 
paragraph 35c of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
The last paragraph  is based  On  United States v.  GreenWalt' 
supra'  See  United States v.  20 U'S'C'M.A' 6,  42 
C.M.R. 198  (1970); United States v.  Henry, 50 C.M.R. 685 
(A'F'C'M'R')P pet.  denied? 23 U'S'C'M'A' 666, 50 C'M'R' 903 
(1975); United States v.  Barton, 41 C.M.R. 464 (A.C.M.R. 1969). 
1991 Amendment: The Discussion  to R.C.M. 406(b) was 
amended to state explicitly the applicable standard of  proof. See 
United States v.  M.J. 387,  389 n.4 (C.M.A. 1976). The 
sentence concerning pretrial  advice defects is based upon United 
v.  Murray925 M'J' 445  (C'M'A'  1988)1  in which the 
reviewed the legislative history to  the 1983 amendment to  Article 
34, U.C.M.J., and held that lack ofa  pretrial advice in violation of 
the article is neither jurisdictional  nor per se prejudicial. 
(C) Distribution. This subsection is based on Article 34(b), as 
amended, Military Justice Act of  1983, Pub.L. No. 98-209, 
§ 4(b),97 Stat. 1393  35c  MCM, 1969 (Rev.) 
also required that the staff  judge  advocate's recommendation be 
forwarded with the charges if  referred to trial. This subsection 
makes clear that the entire advice is to  be forwarded. This  ensures 
that the advice can be subjected  to  judicial  review when neces- 
sary. See R.C.M. 9°6(b)(3). See  United States v. 
M.J. 256 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v.  Engle, supra. 
Rule 407.  Action by commander exercising 
general court-martial jurisdiction 
(a) ~i~~~~iti~~,  34(a) and par-  hi^ subsection is based on ~~ti~l~ 
agraph 35a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See Article 22. 
(b) ~  ~  i  ~ ~ l security~ matters. l-his subsection is based  ~  on the set-
ond and third sentences of  the second paragraph of  paragraph 33f 
of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  and Article 43(e). It has been broadened to 
expressly recognize the authority ofservice Secretaries to  promul- 
gate regulations governing disposition of  sensitive cases. Note 
that the rule applies regardless of  whether hostilities exist, a]- 
though as the discussion notes the Article 43(e)  procedure for sus- 
pending  the statute of  limitations could  only be used in time of 
war. 
CHAPTER V.  COURT-MARTIAL COMPOSITION 
AND 
Rule 501.  Composition and personnel of courts- 
martial 
(a) Composition of courts-martial. This  subsection is based on Ar- 
ticle 16. Except for the change in the requirement as to the form 
of  the request for trial by military judge alone, it is consistent with 
paragraph 4a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(b) Counsel in general and special courts-martial. This  subsection 
is based on Article 27(a). Except for the change concerning who 
details counsel (see R.C.M.  503(c)), it is consistent with para- 
graph 6a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). This subsection includes refer- 
ence to  detailing associate defense counsel. This  is based on Arti- 
cle 27(a), as amended Pub.L. No. 98-209,g  3(c), (f),97  Stat. 1393 
(1983). 
(c) Other personnel. This subsection is based on paragraph 7 of 

MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 

~~l~ 502.  ~~~lifi~~ti~~~  and duties of personnel 
Of courts-martial 
(a) Members. Subsection (1)  is based on Article 25(a),  (b)  and (c) 
and  on the first paragraph of  paragraph 4b and  paragraph 4d of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Factors which disqualify  a  fromserv-
ing as a memberare listed in R.C,M. 912(f)(l), 
The  discussion is based on the second  paragraph  of  paragraph 
4b ofMCM, 1969(Rev.). 
The references to use of  members of  the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration and of  the Public Health Service 
carry forward the similar provision at paragraph  4b of  MCM, 
1969 (Rev.), Similar provisionshave been included in naval prac-
tice since at least 1937. See, e.g., Naval  Courts and Boards § 347 
(1937,  1945  The similar provision in MCM, 1951was 
upheld in United  v.  Braud,  U,S.C.M.A, 192,29 C.M.R. 
8 (1960) (Public Health Service commissioned officer served as 
member of  Coast Guard  court-martial), decision  below, 28 
C,M,R,  692 (C.G.B.R.  1959). Braud upheld the provision even 
though Article 25 is arguably ambiguous  the p,H,S, 
who served as a memberhad  not been '.militarized,9and was not 
himselfsubject  to the code. Cf: 42 u.s.~, § 217 (1976)  (P.~.~. 
maybe declared to be a military service in timeofwar; members 
become sub,ect  to persona~~u~sdict~on  855 ofCode);  33 u,~.~. 
(NOAA  may  be transferred  by  President to  military  service in na- 
tional emergency; members become subject  to personal jurisdic- 
tion of  Code);  Art. 2(a)(8)  (jurisdiction over members of  Public 
Health Service and  of  Environmental  Science Services Adminis- 
tration). The Environmental  Science Services Administration, 
which succeeded  the Coast and  Geodetic Survey mentioned in 
some earlier Manuals, is now defunct. Its functions were trans- 
ferred to  the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
ReOrg.  1970,  C.F.R. 1075 (1966-1970  COm~.)y  re-
printed in 84 Stat. 2090. NOAA has only a commissioned officer 
CO'PS.  Id. § 2(f);33 U.S.C.A. 5 851  (Su~~. 1981). P.H.S.  has 
and warrant  42 § 204  1981). 
Subsection (2)  and  the discussion are based on paragraph  41a 
and  and the last paragraph  paragraph  53d  1969 MCMl 
(Rev.).  The  admonition of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  that misconduct by 
members may constitute an offense  and  that members should be 
attentive and dignified has been deleted as unnecessary. 
(b) President. Subsection (1)  is based on paragraph 40a of  MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). Subsections (2)(A)  and (B)  are based on paragraphs 
40b(l)(c)  and  (d)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Paragraphs  40b(l)(a) 
and  (b)  are deleted. Paragraph  40b(l)(a)  conflicts with the au- 
thority of  the military judge  under R.C.M.  801(a)(l).  Paragraph 
40b(l)(b)  is unnecessary. Subsection (2)(c)  is based on paragraph 
40b(2) of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  The  general description of  the du- 
ties of  a president  of  a special court-martial without a military 
judge  in paragraph  40b(2) is deleted  here. Such a summarized ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (b) 
description  is an inadequate substitute for familiarity with the 
rules themselves. 
(c)  Qualifications of  military judge.  This subsection and the dis- 
cussion are based on Article 26(b) and (c) and paragraph 4e of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Reasons for disqualification are described in 
R.C.M. 902. 
(d)  Counsel. Subsection (1) is based on Article 27(b) and para- 
graph 6 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The possibility of detailing associ- 
ate counsel has been added based on the amendment of Article 
27(a) and 42(a). See Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub.L. No. 
98-209,  8 3(c), (f), 97 Stat. 1393 (1983). As the discussion indi- 
cates, "associate  counsel"  ordinarily refers to detailed counsel 
when the accused has military or civilian counsel. See Article 
38(b)(6). An  associate defense counsel must be qualified to act as 
defense counsel. An assistant defense counsel need not be. One 
other substantive change from MCM, 1969 (Rev.). has been 
made. Detailed defense counsel in special courts-martial must be 
certified by  the Judge Advocate General concerned although this 
is not required by Article 27(c). Article 27(c) permits representa- 
tion of an accused by  a counsel not qualified and certified under 
Article 27(b) if the accused does not request qualified counsel, 
having been given the opportunity to do so, or when such counsel 
cannot be obtained on account of physical conditions or military 
exigencies. In the latter event, no bad-conduct discharge may be 
adjudged. Article 19. Currently, certified counsel is routinely pro- 
vided in all special courts-martial, so the modification of the rule 
will not change existing practice. Moreover, the enforcement of 
waiver provisions in these rules and the Military Rules of Evi- 
dence necessitate, both for fairness and the orderly administration 
of justice, that the accused be represented  by  qualified counsel. 
See also United States v.  Rivas, 3 M.J. 282 (C.M.A.  1977). Be- 
cause of this rule, the rule of equivalency in Article 27(c) and (3) 
is not necessary. 
Subsection (2) is based on the fifth sentence of the first para- 
graph of paragraph 6c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (3) is based on the first sentence of the second para- 
graph of paragraph 48a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and on Soriano v. 
Hosken, 9 M.J. 221 (C.M.A. 1980); United States v.  Kraskouskas, 
9 U.S.C.M.A. 607,26 C.M.R. 387 (1958). The discussion is taken 
from Soriano v.  Hosken, supra. 
Subsection (4) is based on Article 27(a) and on the fourth and 
fifth sentences of paragraph 6a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also 
United States v.  Catt, 1 M.J. 41 (C.M.A. 1975). The accuser has 
been added to the list of disqualifications. See ABA  Standards, 
The Prosecution Function, $8 3-l(c);  3-3.9(~)(1979). 
Subsection (5) is based on paragraph 44d and 450 of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.) and on Article 38(d). The forum-based distinction as 
to the powers of an assistant trial counsel has been deleted. The 
trial counsel is responsible for the prosecution of the case. R.C.M. 
805(c) requires the presence of a qualified trial counsel at general 
courts-martial. The discussion is based on paragraphs 44e. f; g, 
and h of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Some of the specific duties are now 
covered inother rules, e.g., R.C.M. 701; 812, 813; 914; 919. Some 
examples and explanations have been deleted as unnecessary. 
The first sentence of subsections (6) is new. Cf:paragraphs 46d 
and 48c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The second sentence of subsection 
(6) is based on Article 38(e). The rule does not require that de- 
fense counsel in the court-martial represent the accused in admin- 
istrative or civil actions arising out of the same offenses. The dis- 
cussion is based on paragraphs 46d, 47, and 48c, d, e, 1:  g, h, j and 
k of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The matters covered in paragraph 48k(2) 
and (3) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) are modified in the discussion based 
on the amendment of Articles 38(c) and 61. See Military Justice 
Act of 1983, Pub.L. No. 98-209,  $8 3(e)(3), 5(b)(l), 97 Stat. 1393 
(1983). See R.C.M. 1105; 11 10. As to associate counsel, see the 
Analysis subsection (d)(l) of this rule. See also United States v. 
Breese, 11 M.J. 17,22  n. 13 (C.M.A. 1981); United States v.  Rivas, 
supra; United States v.  Palenius, 2 M.J. 86 (C.M.A. 1977); United 
States v.  Goode, 1 M.J. 3 (C.M.A. 1975). 
(e)  Interpreters, reporters, escorts, bailiffs,  clerks, and guards. 
This subsection is based on paragraphs 7,49,50, and 51 of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). The list of disqualifications, except for the accuser, is 
new and is intended to prevent circumstances which may detract 
from the integrity of the court-martial. 
(f) Action upon discovery of  disqualification or lack of  qualifica- 
tion. This subsection is based on paragraphs 41c, 44b, 46b of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Rule 503.  Detailing members, military judge, and 
counsel 
(a)  Members. Subsection (1) is based on Article 25. Because of 
the amendment of Articles 26 and 27, the convening authority is 
no longer required to detail personally  the military judge and 
counsel. Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub.L. No. 98-209,  8 3(c), 
97 Stat. 1393 (1983). The last sentence of paragraph 4b of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.) is deleted as unnecessary. The second paragraph in 
the discussion serves the same purpose as the third paragraph of 
paragraph 4b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.): to alert the convening au- 
thority to avoid appointing people subject to removal for cause. 
Unlike that paragraph, however, no suggestion is now made that 
the convening authority commits error by  appointing such per- 
sons, since the disqualifications are waivable. See Analysis, 
R.C.M. 912(f)(4). 
Subsection (2) is based on Article 25(c) and the third paragraph 
of paragraph 4c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The discussion is based on 
paragraph 36c(2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
1986 Amendment: Subsection (2) was amended  to reflect an 
amendment to Article 25(c)(l), UCMJ, in  the "Military Justice 
Amendments of 1986," tit. VIII, 8 803, National Defense Au- 
thorization Act for fiscal year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661,  100 Stat. 
3905, (1986) which authorizes enlisted accused to request orally 
on the record that at least one-third of the members of courts- 
martial be enlisted. 
Subsection (3) is based on paragraphs 4f  and g of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). Subsection (3) combines treatment of members from a dif- 
ferent command and those from a different armed force. The 
power of a commander to detail members not under the conven- 
ing authority's command is the same whether the members are in 
the same or a different armed force. Therefore each situation can 
be covered in one rule. The discussion repeats the preference for 
members, or at least a majority thereof, to be of the same service 
as the accused which was found in paragraph 4g(l) of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). Permission for the Judge Advocate General to detail 
members of  another armed force is no longer required in the 
Manual. Detailing a military judge from a different command or 
armed force is now covered in subsection (d). 
(b)  Military Judge. Subsections (1) and (2) are based on Article 
26(a), as amended, Military Justice Act of  1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209,  fj 3(c)(l), 97 Stat. 1393 (1983). The convening authority 
is no longer required to detail personally the military judge. Id. 
Subsection (1) requires that responsibility for detailing military 
judges will be in judicial channels. See Hearings on ,52521 Before 
the Subcomm. on Manpower and Personnel of  the Senate Comm. 
on Armed Services, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 52 (1982). More specific 
requirements will be provided in service regulations. Subsection 
(2) is intended to make detailing the military judge administra- 
tively efficient. See S. Rep. No. 53, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5,  12 
(1983), H.R.  Rep. No. 549,98th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14  (1983). As 
long as a qualified military judge presides over the court-martial, 
any irregularity in detailing a military judge is not jurisdictional 
and would result in reversal only if specific prejudice were shown. 
See S. Rep. No. 53,98th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1983). 
Subsection (3) is based on Article 26. See also Article 6(a). 
(c)  Counsel. Subsections (1) and (2) are based on Article 27(a), as 
amended, Military Justice Act of  1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, 
fj 3(c)(2), 97 Stat. 1393 (1983). The convening authority is no 
longer required to detail personally the counsel. Id. Efficient allo- 
cation of authority for detailing counsel will depend on the orga- 
nizational structure and operational requirements of each service. 
Therefore, specific requirements will be provided in service regu- 
lations. Subsection (2) is intended to make detailing counsel ad- 
ministratively efficient. See S. Rep. No. 53, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
3-5,  12 (1983); H.R. Rep. No. 549, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 
(1983). Counsel are not a jurisdictional component of courts-mar- 
tial. Wright v.  United States, 2 M.J. 9 (C.M.A. 1976). Any irregu- 
larity in detailing counsel would result in reversal only if specific 
prejudice were shown. See S. Rep. No. 53,98th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 
(1983). 
Subsection (3) is based on Article 27. See also Article 6(a). 
Rule 504.  Convening courts-martial 
(a)  In general. This subsection substantially repeats the first sen- 
tence of paragraph 36b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(b)  Who may convene courts-martial. Subsection (1) is based on 
Article 22 and paragraph 5a(l) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The  power 
of superiors to limit the authority of subordinate convening au- 
thorities is based on paragraph 5b(4) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Al- 
though that paragraph applied only to special and summary 
courts-martial, the same principle applies to general courts-mar- 
tial. See Article 22(b). Seegenerally United States  v.  Hardy, 4 M.J. 
20 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v.  Hawthorne, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 
293, 22 C.M.R. 83 (1956); United States v.,  Rembert, 47 C.M.R. 
755 (A.C.M.R. 1973), pet. denied, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 598 (1974). 
The discussion is based on the second and third sentences of para- 
graph 5a(5) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (2) is based on Article 23 and paragraphs 5b(l), (3), 
and (4) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
As to subsection (3), see Analysis, R.C.M. 1302(a). 
Subsection (4) is based on the first sentence of paragraph 5a(5) 
of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v.  Greenwalt, 6 
U.S.C.M.A. 569, 20 C.M.R. 285 (1955); Unitedstates v.  Bunting, 
4U.S.C.M.A. 84, 15 C.M.R. 84 (1954). 
(c)  Disqualification.  This subsection is based  on Articles 22(b) 
and 23(b) and on paragraph 5a(3) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also 
Article  l(5) and (9); United States v.  Haygood,  12 U.S.C.M.A. 
481,  31 C.M.R. 67 (1961); United States v.  LaGrange,  1 
U.S.C.M.A. 342,3 C.M.R. 76 (1952); United States v.  Kostes, 38 
C.M.R. 512 (A.B.R. 1967). 
(d)  Convening orders. This subsection is based on paragraph 36b 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) with two substantive modifications.  First, 
in conformity with the amendment of Articles 26(a) and 27(a), see 
Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209,  fj 3(c) 97 Stat. 
1393 (1983), the military judge and counsel are no longer in- 
cluded in the convening order. See R.C.M. 503(b) and (c) and 
Analysis. Second, several matters, such as the unit of any enlisted 
members, which were required by  paragraph 366 are not included 
here. These may be required by  service regulations. Summary 
courts-martial are treated separately from general and special 
courts-martial because of their different composition. 
(e)  Place. This subsection is new. It derives from the convening 
authority's  power to fix the place of trial (see also R.C.M. 
906(b)(11)) and from the convening authority's control of the re- 
sources for the trial. It does not change current practice. 
Rule 505.  Changes in members, military judge, 

andycounsel 

(a)  In general. This subsection is based on the first sentence of 
paragraph 37a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) except that it has been modi- 
fied to conform to the amendment of Articles 26(a) and 27(a). See 
Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209,  fj 3(c), 97 Stat. 
1393 (1983). The discussion is based  on the third and fourth 
sentences of paragraph 37c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(b)  Procedure. This subsection is based on the first two sentences 
of paragraph  37c(l) and on paragraph 37c(2) of MCM, 1969 
(rev.). See also United States v.  Ware, 5 M.J. 24 (C.M.A. 1978). It 
has been modified to reflect that military judges and counsel no 
longer must be detailed by the convening authority. The second 
paragraph in the discussion is based on United States v.  Her- 
rington, 8 M.J.  194 (C.M.A.  1980). References in paragraph 376 
to excusal as a result of challenges are deleted here as challenges 
are covered in R.C.M. 902 and 912. 
(c)  Changes of  members. This subsection is based  on Articles 
25(e) and 29, and paragraphs 376 and c, and 39e of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). The limitation on the authority of the convening author- 
ity's delegate to excuse no more than one-third of the members is 
based on S. Rep. No. 53, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1983). 
(d)  Changes of  detailed counsel. Subsection (1) is based on that 
part of the second sentence of paragraph 37a of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.) which covered trial counsel. 
Subsection (2) is new and conforms to the amendment of Arti- 
cle 27(a) concerning who details counsel. Subsection (2)(A) is 
consistent with that part of the second sentence of paragraph 37a 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) which dealt with defense counsel. Subsec- 
tion (2)(B) is based on Article 38(b)(5);  United States v.  Catt, 1 
M.J. 41 (C.M.A. 1975);  United States v.  Timberlake, 22 
U.S.C.M.A. 117,46 C.M.R. 117 (1973); United States v.  Andrews, 
21 U.S.C.M.A. 165,44  C.M.R. 219 (1972); United States v.  Mas-
sey, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 486, 34 C.M.R. 266 (1964). 
(e)  Change of  military judge. This subsection is based on Articles 
26(a) and 29(d) and on paragraph 39e of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See 
also United States v.  Smith, 3 M.J. 490 (C.M.A. 1975). 
(f)  Good cause. This subject is based on Article 29 and on United 
States v.  Greenwell,  12 U.S.C.M.A. 560, 31 C.M.R. 146 (1961); 
United States v.  Boysen,  11 U.S.C.M.A. 331, 29 C.M.R. 147 
(1960); Unites States v.  Grow, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 77,  11 C.M.R. 77 ANArLYSlS 	 App. 21, R.C.M. (d) 
(1953). See S. Rep. No. 53, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1983). As to 
defense counsel, see also  United States v. Catt, United States v. 
Timberlake, United States v. Andrews, and United States v. Mas- 
sey, all supra. 
Rule 506.  Accused's rights to counsel 
(a)  In  general. This subsection it taken from the first two 
sentences of paragraph 48a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.), which was 
based on Article 38(b) as amended. Act of November 20,  1981, 
Pub. L. No. 97-81;  95 Stat. 1085. Note that the amendment of 
Article 38(b) effectively overruled  United States v. Jordan, 22 
U.S.C.M.A.  164, 46 C.M.R.  164 (1973), which held that an ac- 
cused who has civilian counsel is not entitled to individual mili- 
tary counsel. The amendment of Article 38(b) provides that the 
accused may be represented by  civilian counsel "and" by detailed 
or requested military counsel instead of civilian counsel "or"  re-
quested military counsel as it formerly did. See also H.R. Rep. 
No. 306, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-7 (1981). 
Nothing in this rule is intended to limit the authority of the mil- 
itary judge to ensure that the accused exercises the rights to coun- 
sel in a timely fashion and that the progress of the trial is not un- 
duly impeded. See Morris  v. Slappy, 461 U.S. (1983), 33 Cr.L. 
Rptr. 3013 (1983); United States v.  Montoya, 13 M.J. 268 (C.M.A. 
1982); United States v. Kinard, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 300,45 C.M.R. 74 
(1972); United States v. Brown,  10 M.J. 635 (A.C.M.R.  1980); 
United States v. Alicea-Baez, 7 M.J. 989 (A.C.M.R. 1979); United 
States v.  Livingston, 7 M.J. 638 (A.C.M.R. 1979), afd  8 M.J. 828 
(C.M.A.  1980). See  also  United States v. Johnson, 12 M.J 670 
(A.C.M.R. 1981); United States v. Kilby, 3 M.J. 938 (N.C.M.R.), 
pet. denied, 4 M.J. 139 (1977). 
(b) Individual military counsel. Subsection (1) is based  on 
paragraphs 48b(l) and (2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also Article 
380); H.R. Rep. No. 306, supra at 5-7;  United States v. Kelker, 4 
M.J. 323 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v. Eason, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 
335,  45 C.M.R. 109 (1972);  United States  v.  Murray, 20 
U.S.C.M.A. 61,42 C.M.R 253 (1970). The second sentence of the 
last paragraph of this subsection has been modified based on the 
amendment of Article 38(b)(7), Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. 
L. No. 98-209, 	 5 3(e)(2), 97 Stat. 1393 (1983). 
Subsection (2) is taken from paragraph 48b(3) of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). See also Article 38(b)(7). It ensures substantial uniformity 
in procedure among the services for handling requests for individ- 
ual military counsel. 
Subsection (3) is based on the fourth through eighth sentences 
in the second paragraph of paragraph 46d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) 
and on Article 38@)(6). See also H.R. Rep. No. 306, supra at 4-7. 
Authority to excuse detailed counsel has been modified based on 
the amendment of Article 38(b)(6). See  Military Justice Act of 
1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209,  5 3(e)(l), 97 Stat. 1393 (1983). 
(c)  Excusal or withdrawal. This subsection is based on  United 
States v. Iverson, 5 M.J. 440 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v. 
Palenius, 2 M.J. 86 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. Eason, supra; 
United States v. Andrews, 21 U.S.C.M.A.  165, 44 C.M.R. 219 
(1972). See Analysis, R.C.M. 505(c)(2). 
(d)  Waiver. This subsection is based on the third sentence of the 
second paragraph of paragraph 48a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and on 
Faretta  v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). As to the last two 
sentences,see id. at 834 11.46. 
(e)  Nonlawyer present. This subsection is based on the last sen- 
tence of the second paragraph of paragraph 48a of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). 
CHAPTER VI.  REFERRAL, SERVICE, 
AMENDMENT, AND WITHDRAWAL OF CHARGES 
Rule 601.  Referral 
(a)  In general. This definition is new. MCM, 1969 (Rev.) did not 
define "referral." 
(b)  Who may refer. This section is also new, although MCM, 
1969 (Rev) clearly implied that any convening authority could re- 
fer charges. See also United States v. Hardy, 4 M.J. 29 (C.M.A. 
1977). Paragraphs 5b(4) and 5c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) contained 
similar provisions. 
(c)  Disqualification. This section is added to the Manual to ex- 
press the statutory disqualification of an accuser to convene a 
court-martial in parallel terms in relation to referral. See Articles 
22(b), 23(b). Cf: Article 24(b). The discussion follows paragraph 
33i of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(d)  When charges may be referred. Subsection (1) is new. Neither 
the code nor MCM, 1969 (Rev) have previously provided a stan- 
dard for referral except in general courts-martial. See Article 
34(a). Subsection (1) promotes efficiency by helping to prevent 
groundless charges from being referred for trial. This is consistent 
with Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.l(a). Accord ABA Standards Prosecution 
Function section 3-3.9(a) (1979). Consistent with the amendment 
of Article 34, subsection (1) does not require the convening au- 
thority to evaluate the legal sufficiency of the case personally. In 
general courts-martial the legal sufficiency determination must be 
made by the staffjudge advocate. See Article 34(a) and subsection 
(3)(2) of this rule. Subsection (1) requires a similar determination 
in all courts-martial, including special and summary courts-mar- 
tial. Because of the judicial limitations on the sentencing power of 
special and summary courts-martial, any judge  advocate may 
make the determination or the convening authority may do so 
personally. (A special or summary court-martial convening au- 
thority does not always have access to a judge advocate before re- 
ferring charges; moreover, this subsection does not require refer- 
ence to a judge advocate, even if one is available, if the convening 
authority elects to make the determination personally.) A person 
who serves as a trial counsel is not disqualified from rendering 
this advice. Cf: ABA Standards Prosecution  Function Section 
3-3.9(a) (1979). Note that there is no requirement under this sub- 
section that the judge advocate's advice be written or that the con- 
vening authority memorialize the basis of the referral in any way. 
The "reasonable  grounds"  standard is based on Article 34's 
prerequisite to referral of charges to a general court-martial that 
the charges be warranted by the evidence in the report of the Arti- 
cle 32 investigation. Further, the legislative history of Article 32 
strongly suggests that this is the intended standard of the investi- 
gation. Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before a Subcomm, of the House 
Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 997-98  (1949). 
Nothing suggests that the standard governing referral to inferior 
courts-martial should be different from that applicable to general 
courts-martial. It appears that the reasonable grounds standard 
has been in operation even without an explicit requirement. See, 
e.g., United States v.  Eagle,  1 M.J. 387, 389 n.4 (C.M.A. 1976); 
United States v. Kauffman, 33 C.M.R. 748, 795 (A.F.B.R.), rev'd APP. 2% !I (d)  APPE 
on other grounds,  14 U.S.C.M.A. 283, 34 C.M.R. 63 (1963). CJ 
Gerstein v.  Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
Subsection (2) restates the prerequisites for referral to a general 
court-martial of  Articles 32 and 34. It is consistent with 
paragraphs 30c and d, 34a, and 35 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) except 
insofar as the amendment of Article 34 (see Military Justice Act 
of  1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209,  5 4, 97 Stat. 1393 (1983)) requires 
otherwise. The function of this provision is the same as paragraph 
30, of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) to serve as a reminder of procedural 
limitations on referral. The waiver provision is based on Article 
32(d); S. Rep. No. 53, 98th Cong.,  1st Sess. 17 (1983);  United 
States v.  Schaffer,  12 M.J. 425 (C.M.A.  1982); United States v. 
Ragan, 14U.S.C.M.A. 119, 33 C.M.R. 331 (1963). 
(e)  How changes shall be  referred.  Subsection (1) is consistent 
with paragraph 33j(l) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The personal re- 
sponsibility of the convening authority to decide whether to refer 
and how to refer is emphasized, but the discussion makes clear 
that the administrative aspects of recording that decision may be 
delegated. 
The  discussion's instructions for subsequent referrals are based 
on paragraph 33j(l) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
The special case of referrals to summary courts-martial by the 
only officer present in command follows paragraph 33j(l) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and Article 24(b). 
The discussion of limiting instructions follows paragraphs 
33j(l) and k of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The advice that convening au- 
thorities be guided by the criteria for capital punishment found at 
R.C.M. 1004 is new. See Gregg v.  Georgia, 428 U.S.  153, 225 
(1976) (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
The last paragraph of the discussion on transmitting the re- 
ferred charges and allied papers to the trial counsel is based on 
paragraph 33j(2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (2) is less restrictive than the previous military rule 
found at paragraphs 26b and c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), which cau- 
tioned against joining  major and minor offenses. This rule is in- 
consistent with Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a), which requires (in general) 
separate trials for each offense. Such a requirement is too un- 
wieldy to be effective, particularly in combat or deployment. Join- 
der is entirely within the discretion of the convening authority. 
The last two sentences of the rule dealing with additional charges 
are based on paragraph 65b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The discussion 
encourages economy, following paragraph 33h of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). The last sentence in subsection (2) is new and clarifies that 
the accused may consent to the referral of additional charges after 
arraignment. Since the prohibition  of such referral is for the ac- 
cused's benefit, the accused may forego it when it would be the ac- 
cused's  advantage. See United States v.  Lee,  14 M.J. 983 
(N.M.C.M.R.  1983). 
The first two sentences of subsection (3) restate Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 8(b) in military nomenclature. They are consistent with the ap- 
proach taken by  paragraph 26d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The last 
sentence is based on paragraph 331 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). There is 
no counterpart in federal civilian practice. 
(0 Referral by  other convening authorities. This new provision re- 
flects the principle that a subordinate convening authority's deci- 
sion does not preempt different dispositions by superior conven- 
ing authorities. See United States v.  Charette, 15 M.J. 197 
(C.M.A. 1983); United States v.  Blaylock,  15 M.J. 190 (C.M.A. 
1983). See also Analysis, R.C.M. 306(a),  Analysis, R.C.M. 
905(g), and Analysis, R.C.M. 907(b)(2)(C). 
Rule 602.  Service of charges 
This rule is based on Article 35 and paragraph 44h of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). Fed. R. Crim. P. 9 is consistent in purpose with this rule, 
but not in structure. The warrant system of Fed. R. Crim. P. 9(a), 
(b)(l), and (c)(2) is unnecessary in military practice. The remand 
provision of Fed. R. Crim. P. 9(d) is inconsistent with the struc- 
ture of military procedure but consistent with the convening au- 
thority's discretion to refer charges to a minor forum. See R.C.M. 
306. The provision of Fed. R. Crim. P. 9(c) for service by mail or 
delivery to a residence is inconsistent with Article 35. 
Rule 603.  Changes to charges and specifications 
(a)  Minor changes defined.  This definition and the discussion 
consolidate the tests and examples found at paragraphs  33d, 
44fll) and 696(1) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). They are consistent with 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(e). 
(b)  Minor changes before  arraignment. This provision is based on 
and consolidates the authority of various persons to make minor 
changes as stated at paragraphs 33d and 44fll) of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). It is inappropriate for an Article 32 investigating officer to 
make changes, but an investigating officer  may recommend 
changes. See also Article 34(b) which provides authority for the 
staff judge advocate or legal officer to amend charges or specifica- 
tions for the reasons stated therein. 
(c)  Minor changes after arraignment. This provision is based on 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(e), which is generally consistent with military 
practice. 
(d)  Major changes. This subsection is based on paragraphs 33d 
and 33e(2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also Article 34(b) which 
provides authority for the staff judge advocate or legal officer to 
amend charges or specifications for the reasons stated therein. 
Rule 604.  Withdrawal of charges 
(a)  Withdrawal.  This rule is based on paragraphs 5a(6) and 56a 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The rule parallels Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a), 
but leave of the court is not required for the convening authority 
to withdraw (or dismiss) charges and specifications.  This would 
be inconsistent with the responsibilities  of the convening author-  -
ity under the Code. See Articles 34 and 60. The potential abuses 
which the leave-of-court requirement in the federal rule are de- 
signed to prevent are adequately prevented by  the restraint on a 
later referral of withdrawn charges in the subsection (b). 
The first paragraph in the discussion is new. It recognizes the 
distinction between withdrawal of charges, which extinguishes 
the jurisdiction of a court-martial over them, and dismissal of 
charges, which extinguishes the charges themselves. The discus- 
sion cautions that withdrawn charges, like any other unreferred 
charges, should be disposed of promptly. Dismissal of charges 
disposes of those charges; it does not necessarily bar subsequent 
disposition of  the underlying offenses (see Analysis, R.C.M. 
306(a)), although a later preferral and referral would raise the 
same issues as are discussed under subsection (b). 
The second paragraph in the discussion is based on the last sen- 
tence of paragraph 56a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (a) 
The third paragraph in the discussion is based on the second 
and fourth sentences in paragraph 56a of MCM 1969 (Rev.). 
The  first sentence of the fourth paragraph is based on the third 
sentence of paragraph  56a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and  United 
States v. Chorette, 15 M.J.  197 (C.M.A. 1983); United States v. 
Blaylock, 15 M.J. 190 (C.M.A. 1983). The remainder of this para- 
graph is based on the second sentence of paragraph 56a and para- 
graph 56d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(b) Referral  of withdrawn charges. This rule is based  on 
paragraphs 33j(l) and 56 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and numerous de- 
cisions. See, e.g., United States v. Charette, United States v. 
Blaylock, and  United States v. Hardy, all supra; United States v. 
Jackson, 1 M.J. 242 (C.M.A. 1976); United States v.  Walsh, 22 
U.S.C.M.A. 509, 47 C.M.R. 926 (1973); Petty v. Convening Au- 
thority, 20 U.S.C.M.A.  438, 43 C.M.R. 278 (1971). The second 
sentence in the rule is derived from portions of paragraphs 566 
and c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) which were in turn based on Wade v. 
Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949); Legal and Legislative Basis, Manual 
for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951 at 64. See Article 44. The 
second sentence of paragraph 56b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) has been 
deleted. That sentence suggested that withdrawal after introduc- 
tion of evidence on the merits for reasons other than urgent and 
unforeseen military necessity would not bar re-referral in some 
cases. If further prosecution is contemplated, such other possible 
grounds for terminating the trial after introduction of evidence 
has begun are more appropriately subject to a judicial determina- 
tion whether to declare a mistrial under R.C.M. 915. 
The  first paragraph in the discussion contains a cross-reference 
to R.C.M. 915, Mistrial. Paragraph 56 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) 
dealt with both withdrawal and mistrial. This was unnecessary 
and potentially confusing. Although the effect of a declaration of 
a mistrial may be similar to that of withdrawal, the narrow legal 
bases for a mistrial (see United States v. Simonds, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 
641, 36 C.M.R. 139 (1966)) should be distinguished from with- 
drawal, which involves a far wider range of purposes and consid- 
erations. See Analysis, R.C.M. 915. 
The second paragraph in the discussion is based on paragraph 
566 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Unlike paragraph 566, the current 
rules does not require a record in certain cases. Instead the  discus- 
sion suggests that such a record is desirable if the later referral is 
more onerous to the accused. See United States v. Blaylock, supra 
at 192 n.1; United States v. Hardy. supra. 
The  third paragraph in the discussion is based on United States 
v. Charette, United States v. Blaylock, United States v. Walsh, and 
Petty v. Convening Authority, all supra; United States v. Fleming, 
18 U.S.C.M.A.  524,40 C.M.R. 236 (1969). See Article 37. 
The fourth paragraph in the discussion is based generally on 
paragraphs 566 and c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), but more specificity 
is provided as to proper reasons for withdrawal and its effect at 
certain stages of the proceedings. The grounds for proper with- 
drawal and later referral are based on United States v. Charette, 
United States  v. Blaylock,  United States v. Jackson, all supra; 
United States  v.  Lord, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 78,  32 C.M.R. 78 (1962); 
and current practice.  United States v. Hardy and  United States v. 
Walsh, both supra, indicate that the commencement of court- 
martial proceedings is, by itself, not important in analyzing the 
propriety of withdrawal. Arraignment is normally the first signifi- 
cant milestone for the same reasons that make it a cut-off point for 
other procedures.  See, e.g., R.C.M. 601; 603; 804. It should be 
noted that assembly of the court-martial, which could precede ar- 
raignment, could also have an effect on the propriety of a with- 
drawal, since this could raise questions about an improper intent 
to interfere with the exercise of coda1 rights or the impartiality of 
the court-martial. The  importance of the introduction of evidence 
is based on Article 44. See also R.C.M. 907(b)(2)(C)  and Analy- 
sis. 
CHAPTER VII.  PRETRIAL MATTERS 
Rule 701.  Discovery 
Introduction. This rule is based on Article 46, as well as Article 
36. The rule is intended to promote full discovery to the maxi- 
mum extent possible consistent with legitimate needs for nondis- 
closure (see e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 301; Section V) and to eliminate 
"gamesmanship"  from the discovery process. See generally ABA 
Standards, Discovery and Procedure Before  Trial (1978). For rea- 
sons stated below, the rule provides for broader discovery than is 
required in Federal practice. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1; 12.2; 16. 
See also 18 U.S.C.  8 3500. 
Military discovery practice has been quite liberal, although the 
sources of this practice are somewhat scattered. See Articles 36 
and 46; paragraphs 34,44h, and 115c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See 
also United States v. Killebrew, 9 M.J. 154 (C.M.A. 1980); United 
States v. Cumberledge 6 M.J. 203,204 n.4 (C.M.A. 1979). Provid- 
ing broad discovery at an early stage reduces pretrial motions 
practice and surprise and delay at trial. It leads to  better informed 
judgment  about the merits of the case and encourages early deci- 
sions concerning withdrawal of charges, motions, pleas, and com- 
position of court-martial. In short, experience has shown that 
broad discovery contributes substantially to the truth-finding pro- 
cess and to the efficiency with which it functions. It is essential to 
the administration of military justice; because assembling the mil- 
itary judge, counsel, members, accused, and witnesses is fre- 
quently costly and time-consuming, clarification or resolution of 
matters before trial is essential. 
The rule clarifies and expands (at least formally) discovery by 
the defense. It also provides for the first time some discovery by 
the prosecution. See subsection (b) of the rule. Such discovery 
serves the same goal of efficiency. 
Except for subsection (e), the rule deals with discovery in terms 
of disclosure of matters known to or in the possession of a party. 
Thus the defense is entitled to disclosure of matters known to the 
trial counsel or in the possession of military authorities. Except as 
provided in subsection (e), the defense is not entitled under this 
rule to disclosure of matters not possessed by military authorities 
or to have the trial counsel seek out and produce such matters for 
it. But see Mil. R. Evid, 506 concerning defense discovery of gov- 
ernment information generally. Subsection (e) may accord the de- 
fense the right to have the Government assist the defense to se- 
cure evidence or information when not to do so would deny the 
defense similar access to what the prosecution would  have if it 
were seeking the evidence or information. See United States v. Kil- 
lebrew, supra; Halfacre v. Chambers, 5 M.J.  1099 (C.M.A. 1976). 
(a)  Disclosure by the trial counsel. This subsection is based in part 
on Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a), but it provides for additional matters to 
be provided to the defense. See ABA Standards, Discovery  and 
Procedure Before Trial 8 11-2.1  (1978). Where a request is neces- 
sary, it is required to trigger the duty to disclose as a means of 
specifying what must be produced. Without the request, a trial APP. 21, !I  (a)  APPE 
counsel might be uncertain in many cases as to the extent of the 
duty to obtain matters not in the trial counsel's immediate posses- 
sion. A request should indicate with reasonable specificity what 
materials are sought. When obviously discoverable materials are 
in the trial counsel's possession, trial counsel should provide them 
to the defense without a request. "Inspect"  includes the right to 
copy. See subsection (h) of this rule. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(l)(A) is not included here because the 
matter is covered in Mil. R. Evid. 304(d)(l). The discussion under 
subsection (a)(6) of this rule lists other discovery and notice pro- 
visions in the Military of Evidence. 
Subsection (1) is based  on paragraph 44h of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.).  See also paragraph 33i, id.  18 U.S.C.  § 3500(a) is contra; 
the last sentence of Article 32@) reflects Congressional intent that 
the accused receive witness statements before trial. 
Subsection (2)  is based on paragraph 11  5c of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.) and parallels Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(l)(C) and (D). 
Subsection (3)(A)  is based  on the last sentence in the second 
paragraph of paragraph 44th of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also Ap-
pendix 5 at A5-1  of MCM, 1969 (Rev.);  United States v. Webster, 
1 M.J. 216 (C.M.A.  1975). Subsection (3)(B) is based on Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 12.1@). Fed. R. Crim. P.  12.2 (notice based on mental 
condition) contains no parallel requirement for disclosure of re- 
buttal witnesses by the prosecution. The defense will ordinarily 
have such information because of the accused's participation in 
any court-ordered examination, so the distinction diminishes in 
practice. In the interest of full disclosure and fairness, subsection 
(3)(B) requires the prosecution to notify the defense of rebuttal 
witnesses on mental responsibility.  See also R.C.M. 706. 
1991 Amendment: Subsection (a)(3)(B)  was amended to pro- 
vide for prosecution disclosure of rebuttal witnesses to a defense 
of innocent ingestion. This conforms to the amendment to 
R.C.M. 7OI@). 
Subsection (4) is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(l)(B). The 
language is modified to make clear that the rule imposes no duty 
on the trial counsel to seek out prior convictions. (There is an eth- 
ical duty to exercise reasonable diligence in doing so, however. 
See ABA Code of Professional  Responsibility, DR  6101(A)(2); 
EC  6-4(1975).)  The purpose of the rule is to put the defense on 
notice of prior convictions of the accused which may be used 
against the accused on the merits. Convictions for use on sentenc- 
ing are covered under subsection (a)(5).  Because of this distinc- 
tion, under some circumstances the trial counsel may not be able 
to use a conviction on the merits because of lack of timely notice, 
but may be able to use it on sentencing. 
Subsection (5) is based on paragraph 75b(5) of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.) Cf: Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3). 
Subsection (6) is based on ABA Standards, The Prosecution 
Function  8 3-3.1  ](a) (1979); ABA Standards, Discovery and Pro- 
cedure Before Trial § 11-2.l(c)  (1978). See also United States v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); 
United States v. Brickey, 16 M.J. 258 (C.M.A.  1983); United 
States v. Horsey, 6 M.J.  112 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Lu- 
cas, 5 M.J. 167 (C.M.A.  1978); ABA Code of Professional Respon- 
sibility, DR 7-103(B)  (1975). 
(b)  Disclosure  by defense. This subsection is based on Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 12.1, 12.2, and 16(b)(l)(A) and (B). See generally  Wil- 
liams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). The requirement in Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 12.1 for a written request by the prosecution for notice of 
an alibi defense was deleted because it would  generate unneces- 
sary paperwork. The accused is adequately protected by  the op- 
portunity to request a bill of particulars. 
1986 Amendment. The phrase "a  mental disease, defect, or 
other condition bearing upon the guilt of the accused"  was de- 
leted from this subsection, with other language substituted, in 
conjunction with the implementation of Article 50a, and the 
phrase "or  partial mental responsibility"  was deleted from the 
discussion to conform to the amendment to R.C.M. 916(k)(2). 
1991 Ammendment: Subsection (b)(l) has been revised to ex- 
pand the open discovery that is characteristic of military practice. 
It provides the trial counsel with reciprocal discovery and equal 
opportunity to interview witnesses and inspect evidence as that 
available to the defense under subsection (a).See  Article 46, 
U.C.M.J.,  and R.C.M. 701(e). Enhanced disclosure requirements 
for the defense are consistent with a growing number of state ju- 
risdictions that give the prosecution an independent right to re- 
ceive some discovery from the defense. See Mosteller, Discovery 
Against  the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial  Balance, 74 Calif. L. 
Rev. 1567,  1579-1 583 (1986).  Mandatory disclosure require- 
ments by the defense will better serve to foster the truth-finding 
process. 
1991 Amendment: Subsection (b)(2) was revised to add the re- 
quirement that the defense give notice of its intent to present the 
defense of innocent ingestion. The innocent ingestion defense, 
often raised during trials for wrongful use of a controlled sub- 
stance, poses similar practical problems (e.g., substantial delay in 
proceedings) as those generated by an alibi defense, and thus mer- 
its similar special treatment. 
1991 Amendment: Subsection (b)(5)  was amended to clarify 
that when the defense withdraws notice of an intent to rely upon 
the alibi, innocent ingestion, or insanity defenses, or to introduce 
expert testimony of the accused's mental condition, neither evi- 
dence of such intention, nor statements made in connection there- 
with, are admissible against the servicemember who gave notice. 
This rule applies regardless of whether the person against whom 
the evidence is offered is an accused or a witness. Fed. R. Crim. P. 
12.1 and 12.2, upon which the subsection is based, were similarly 
amended [See H.R. Doc. No. 64, 99th Cong.,  1st Sess.  17-18 
(1985)l. 
(c)  Failure  to call witness. This subsection is based on repealed 
subsection (a)(4) and (b)(3) of Fed. R. Crim. P. 16. Those subsec- 
tions were inadvertently left in that rule after the notice of wit- 
nesses provisions were deleted by  the conference committee. Act 
of December 12, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-149,  § 5, 89 Stat. 806. But 
see Fed. R. Crim.  12.l(f). Because notice of witnesses under 
R.C.M. 701 is required or otherwise encouraged (see also R.C.M. 
703), such a provision is necessary in these rules. 
(d)  Continuing duty to disclose. This subsection is based on Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 16(c). See also ABA Standards, Discovery and Proce- 
dure Before Trial § 114.2  (1978). 
(e)  Access to witnesses and other evidence. This subsection is based 
on Article 46; paragraphs 42c and 48h of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); 
United States v. Killebrew, supra; Halfacre,  v. Chambers, supra; 
Unitedstates  v. Enloe, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 256,35 C.M.R. 228 (1965); 
United States v. Aycock,  15 U.S.C.M.A.  158, 35 C.M.R.  130 
(1964). The subsection permits witness (e.g., informant) protec- 
tion programs and prevents improper interference with prepara-  . 
tion of the case. See United States v. Killebrew and United States v. ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (c) 
Cumberledge, both supra. See also subsection (f) of this rule; Mil. 
R. Evid. 507. 
1986 Amendment. The discussion was added, based on United 
States v.  Treakle, 18 M.J. 646 (A.C.M.R. 1984). See also United 
States v.  Tucker, 17 M.J. 519 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984); United States v. 
Lowery, 18 M.J. 695 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984): United States v.  Charles, 
15 M.J. 509 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982); United States v.  Estes, 28 C.M.R. 
501 (A.B.R. 1959). 
(f) Information not subject to  disclosure. This subsection is based 
on the privileges and protections in other rules (see, e.g., Mil. R. 
Evid. 301 and Section V). See also Goldberg v.  United States, 425 
U.S. 94 (1976);  United States v.  Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); 
Hickman v.  Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). It differs from Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 16(a)(2) because of the broader discovery requirements 
under this rule. Production under the Jencks Act,  18 U.S.C. 
5 3500, is covered under R.C.M. 914. 
(g) Regulation of  discovery. Subsection (1) is based on the last 
sentence of Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2). It is a separate subsection 
to make clear that the military judge has authority to regulate dis- 
covery generally, in accordance with the rule. Local control of 
discovery is necessary because courts-martial are conducted in 
such a wide variety of locations and conditions. See also R.C.M. 
108. 
Subsection (g)(2) is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(l). Cf: Mil. 
R. Evid. 505; 506. See also ABA  Standards, Discovery and Proce- 
dures Before  Trial 5 114.4  (1978). 
Subsection (g)(3) is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2), but it 
also corporates the noncompliance  provision of Fed. R. Crim. 
P.12.l(d) and 12.2(d). But see Williams v.  Florida, supra at 83 n. 
14; Alicea v.  Gagnon, 675 F. 2d 913 (7th Cir. 1982). The discus- 
sion is based on United States v.  Myers, 550 F.2d. 1036 (5th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 847 (1978). 
1993 Amendment. The amendment to R.C.M. 701(g)(3)(C), 
based on the decision of Taylor v.  Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), 
recognizes that the Sixth Amendment compulsory process right 
does not preclude a discovery sanction that excludes the testi- 
mony of a material defense witness. This sanction, however, 
should be reserved to cases where the accused has willfully and 
blatantly violated  applicable discovery rules, and alternative 
sanctions could not have minimized the prejudice to the Govern- 
ment. See Chappee v.  Commonwealth Massachusetts, 659 F.Supp. 
1220 (D. Mass.  1988). The Discussion to R.C.M. 701(g)(3)(C) 
adopts the test, along with factors the judge must consider, estab- 
lished by  the Taylor decision. 
(h) Inspect. This subsection is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 16. 
Rule 702.  Depositions 
(a)  In general. This subsection is based on the first sentence in 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(a). The language concerning preferral of 
charges is added based on Article 49(a). The language concerning 
use at Article 32 investigations is also added because depositions 
may be used at such hearings. 
"Exceptional"  means out of the ordinary. Depositions are not 
taken routinely, but only when there is a specific need under the 
circumstances. As used in Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(a) "exceptional 
circumstances" is generally limited to preserving the testimony of 
a witness who is likely to be unavailable for trial. See 8 J. Moore, 
Moore's Federal Practice ( 15.02[1]; 15.03 (1982 rev.ed.); United 
States v.  Singleton, 460 F.2d. 1148 (2d Cir. 1972). A deposition is 
not a discovery device under the Federal rule. 8.J. Moore, supra ( 
15.02[1]. See also United States v.  Rich, 580 F.2d. 929 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935 (1978); United States v.  Adcock, 558 
F.2d. 397 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 921 (1977). The Court 
of Military Appeals has held that depositions may serve as a dis- 
covery device in certain unusual circumstances. See Analysis, 
subsection (c)(3)(A) infra. Consequently, "exceptional  circum- 
stances" may be somewhat broader in courts-martial.  Neverthe- 
less, the primary purpose of this rule is to preserve the testimony 
of unavailable witnesses for use at trial. See Article 49; Hearings 
on H.R. 2498 Before a Subcomm. of  the Comm. on Armed Services 
81st Cong. 1st Sess. 1064-1070  (1949). 
The first paragraph in the discussion is based on Article 49(d) 
and (f) and on paragraph  117a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The second 
and third paragraphs are based on Article 49(d), (e), and (f); para-
graph  117b(ll) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(e). 
The admissibility of depositions is governed by Mil. R. Evid. 804 
and by Article 49(d), (e), and (f) so it is unnecessary to prescribe 
further rules governing their use in R.C.M.  702. As to Article 
49(d)(l), see  United States v.  Davis,  19 U.S.C.M.A. 217, 41 
C.M.R. 217 (1970). See also United States v.  Bennett, 12 M.J. 463, 
471 (C.M.A. 1982); United States v.  Gaines, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 557, 
43 C.M.R. 397 (1971); Unitedstates v.  Bryson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 329, 
12 C.M.R. 85 (1953). The fourth paragraph in  the discussion is 
based on paragraphs 75b(4) and 75e of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(b)  Who may order. This subsection is based on Article 49(a) and 
on the second and third sentences of paragraph 117b(l) of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). As noted in subsection (i) the express approval of a 
competent authority is not required in order to take a deposition. 
See also United States v.  Ciarletta, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 606, 23 C.M.R. 
70 (1957). Express approval may be necessary in order to secure 
the necessary personnel or other resources for a deposition, when 
a subpoena will be necessary to compel the presence of a witness, 
or when the parties do not agree to the deposition. 
(c)  Request to take deposition. Subsection (1) is based on the first 
sentence in paragraph  117b(l) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The discus- 
sion is based on the fourth sentence of that paragraph. Subsection 
(2) is based on the fifth and sixth sentences in paragraph  117b(l). 
Subsection (3)(A) is based on Article 49(a). The discussion pro- 
vides guidance on what may be good cause for denial. The discus- 
sion indicates that ordinarily the purpose of a deposition is to pre- 
serve the testimony of a necessary witness when that witness is 
likely to be unavailable for trial. See Analysis, subsection (a) of 
this rule. The Court of Military Appeals has held that a deposi- 
tion may be required in other circumstances described in the last 
sentence of the discussion. See United States v.  Killebrew, 9 M.J. 
154 (C.M.A. 1980); United States v.  Cumberledge, 6 M.J. 203, 
205, n. 3 (C.M.A. 1979) (deposition may be appropriate means to 
compel interview with witness when Government improperly im- 
pedes defense access to a witness); United States v.  Chuculate, 5 
M.J. 143, 145 (C.M.A. 1978) (deposition may be an appropriate 
means to allow sworn cross-examination of an essential witness 
who was unavailable at the Article 32 hearing); United States v. 
Chestnut, 2 M.J. 84 (C.M.A. 1976) (deposition may be an appro- 
priate means to cure error where witness was improperly found 
unavailable at Article 32 hearing). Chuculate and Chestnut have 
construed Article 49 as means of satisfying the discovery pur- 
poses of Article 32 when the Article 32 proceeding fails to do so. 
Killebrew and Cumberledge have construed Article 49 as a means APP. 21, n(c)  APPENDIX 21 
of  permitting full investigation  and preparation by  the defense 
when the Government improperly interferes. Whether a deposi- 
tion is an appropriate tool for the latter purpose may bear further 
consideration, especially since R.C.M. 701(e) makes clear that 
such interference is improper. See also R.C.M. 906(b)(7). 
subsection (3)(~)  is based on the first sentence of paragraph 
117b(1) and on paragraphs 75b(4) and e of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
See also United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 
244 (1960). 
Subsection (3)(C) is new and is self-explanatory. 
Subsection (3)(D) is based on United States v. Cumberledge and 
United States v. Chuculate, both supra. 
(d)  Action when request is approved. Subsection (1) and its discus- 
sion are new. See Article 49(c). Detailing the deposition officer is 
a ministerial act. When it is intended that the deposition officer is- 
sue a subpoena, it is important that the deposition officer be Prop- 
erly detailed. In other cases, proper detailing is not of critical im- 
portance so long as the deposition officer is qualified. Cf: United 
States v. Ciarletta, supra. 
Subsection (2) is based on paragraph 117b of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). That paragraph provided that the accused would have the 
same rights to counsel as that for the trial at which the deposition 
could be used. Under R.C.M. 502, the accused has the right to 
qualified counsel at both general and special courts-martial. If a 
summary court-martial is intended, ordinarily there is no need for 
an oral deposition; instead, the summary court-martial should be 
detailed and proceed  to call the witness. Under subsection 
(g)(2)(A) the accused at a summary court-martial is not entitled 
to counsel for a written deposition. The first paragraph in the dis- 
cussion is based on  United States  V.  Catt, 1 M.J. 41  (C.M.A. 
1975): .  . United States  v.  Timberlake, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 117, 46 
C.M.R. 117 (1973);  United States v.  Gaines, supra. See  also 
R.C.M. 505(d)(2)(B) and analysis. The second paragraph in  the 
discussion is based on the second sentence in paragraph  117b(2) 
of MCM,  1969 (Rev.). The rule does not prohibit the accused 
from waiving the right to counsel at a deposition. See R.C.M. 
506(d); United States v. Howell,  1  1 U.S.C.M.A. 712, 29 C.M.R. 
528 (1960). 
Subsection (3) is new and reflects the ministerial role of the 
deposition officer. 
(e)  Notice. This subsection is based on Article 49(b) and para- 
graph 117b(4) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). It is consistent with Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 15(b). See generally  United States  v. Donati, 14 
U.S.C.M.A. 235, 34 C.M.R. 15 (1963). 
(f)  Duties of the deposition officer. This subsection is based on 
paragraphs 117b(5), (7), and (8) and c(3) and (4) of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). It is organized to provide a deposition officer a concise list 
of the duties of that office. 
(g)  Procedure.  Subsection (l)(A) is based on paragraph  117b(2) 
of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.); Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(b). See also  United 
Stales v. Donati, supra. Subsection (l)(B) is based on paragraph 
117b(6) and (7) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 
15(d). Subsection (2) is based on the first sentence of paragraph 
117b(2) and paragraph  117c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection 
(2)(B) is based on paragraph  117c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Note 
that if the accused and counsel can be present, it ordinarily is fea- 
sible to conduct an oral deposition. Written interrogatories are 
expressly provided for in Article 49. 
Subsection (3) is new and is based on Article 49(d) and (0, as 
amended, Military Justice Act of  1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, 
5 6(b), 97 Stat. 1393 (1983). The convening authority or military 
judge who orders the deposition has discretion to decide whether 
it will be recorded in a transcript or by  videotape, audiotape, or 
similar material. Nothing in this rule is intended to require that a 
deposition be recorded by  videotape, audiotape, or similar mate- 
rial. Factors the convening authority or military Judge may con- 
sider include the availability of a qualified reporter and the availa- 
bility of recording equipment. See also United States v. Vietor, 10 
M.J. 69,77 n.7 (C.M.A. 1980) (Everett, C.J., concurring in the re- 

sult), 

(h)  Objections. This subsection is based on the second and third 

sentences of the penultimate paragraph of paragraph  1176 of 
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provisions are more specific than in paragraph  117b in order to 
ensure that objections are made when the defect arises. This pro- 
motes efficiency  by permitting  prompt corrective action. see ~~d, 
R. Grim. P. 15(f). This requirement should not be applied so as to 
unduly impede the taking of a deposition, however. Only objec- 
tions to matters which are correctable on the spot need be made. 
For example, an objection to opinion testimony should ordinarily 
be made at the deposition so that the necessary foundation  may be 
laid, if possible. On the other hand, objections on grounds of rele- 
vance ordinarily are inappropriate at a deposition. Subsection (I) 
is also based on  United States  v.  Ciarletta supra. See also United 
States v. Gaines and United States v. Bryson, both supra. Matters 
which ordinarily are waived if not raised include lack of timely 
notice and lack of qualifications of the deposition officer. 
(i)  Deposition by agreement not  hi^ subsection is 
based on Article 49(a)  on Fed, R. Grim, p. 15(~). 
Rule 703.  Production of witnesses and evidence 
(a) In general. This subsection is based on Article 46. 
(b)  Right to witnesses. Subsections (1) and (2) are based on the 
fourth paragraph of paragraph  1  l5a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The 
second paragraph  in  the discussion is based on United States v. 
Roberts, 10 M.J. 308 (C.M.A. 1981). See also United States v. Jef-
ferson,  13 M.J. 1 (C.M.A. 1982); United States v. Bennett, 12 M.J. 
463 (C.M.A. 1982); United States v. Credit, 8 M.J. 190 (C.M.A. 
1980) (Cook, J.); United States v. Hampton, 7 M.J. 284 (C.M.A. 
1979);  United States  v.  Tangpuz, 5 M.J. 426 (C.M.A. 1978) 
(Cook, J.); United States  v. Lucas, 5 M.J. 167 (C.M.A. 1978); 
United Stales  v.  Williams, 3 M.J. 239 (C.M.A.  1977); United 
States v. Carpenter, 1 M.J. 384 (C.M.A. 1976); United States v. 
~turralde-~~onte, 1 M.J. 196 (c.M.A.  1975). ~f: Fed. R. Crim. P. 
17(b). See generally 8 J.Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 117.05 
(1982 rev.ed). Subsection (3) is based on  United States v. Bennett, 
supra; United States v. Daniels, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 94,48 C.M.R.  655 
(1974). See also United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,  458 U.S. 858, 
102 S. Ct. 3440 (1982). 
(c)  Determining which witnesses will be produced. This subsection 
is based generally on paragraph 115a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The 
procedure for obtaining witnesses under Fed. R. Crim. P. 17 is 
not practicable in courts-martial. Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 17, wit- 
nesses are produced by  process issued and administered by  the 
court. In the military trial judiciary,  no comparable administra- 
tive infrastructure capable of performing such a function exists, 
and it would be impracticable to create one solely for that pur- ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (e) 
pose. The mechanics and costs of producing witnesses are the re- 
sponsibility of the command which convened the court-martial. 
Moreover, military judges often do not sit at fixed locations and 
must be available for service in several commands or places. Note, 
however, that any dispute as to production of a witness is subject 
to a judicial  determination.  Experience has demonstrated that 
these administrative tasks should be the responsibility of trial 
counsel. 
Subsection (1) is based on the first three sentences in the fourth 
paragraph of paragraph 115a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (2) is based generally on the remainder of paragraph 
115a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The procedure for production of de- 
fense witnesses prescribed in paragraph  11  5a was questioned in 
several decisions. See United States v.  Arias, 3 M.J. 436, 439 
(C.M.A.  1977); United  States v.  Williams,  supra at 240 n.2; 
United States v.  Carpenter, supra at 386 n.8. The practical advan- 
tages of  that procedure were recognized, however, in United 
States v.  Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 77 (C.M.A. 1980) (Everett, C.J., con- 
curring in the result). 
Subsection (2) modifies the former procedures to reduce the 
criticized aspects of the earlier practice while retaining its practi- 
cal advantages. For reasons states above, the trial counsel is re- 
sponsible for the administrative aspects of production of wit- 
nesses. Thus, under subsection (2)(A) the defense submits its list 
of witnesses to the trial counsel so that the latter can arrange for 
their production. The  trial counsel stands in a position similar to a 
civilian clerk of court for this purpose. Because most defense re- 
quests for witnesses are uncontested, judicial economy is served 
by  routing the list directly to the trial counsel, rather than to the 
military judge first. This also allows the trial counsel to consider 
such alternatives as offering to stipulate or take a deposition, or 
recommending to the convening authority that a charge be with- 
drawn. See United States v.  Vietor, supra. Further, it allows ar- 
rangements to be made in a more timely manner, since the trial 
counsel is usually more readily available than the military judge. 
Only if there is a genuine dispute as to whether a witness must be 
produced is the issue presented to the military judge by  way of a 
motion. 
Subsections (2)(B) and (C) also further judicial economy and 
efficiency by facilitating early arrangements for the production of 
witnesses and by permitting the prompt identification and resolu- 
tion of disputes. Subsection (2)(B)  is based on the fifth and sixth 
sentences of the fourth paragraph of paragraph  115a of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). See also United States v.  Valenzuela-Bernal,  supra; 
Unitedstates v.  Wagner, 5 M.J. 461 (C.M.A. 1978); United States 
v.  Lucas, 5 M.J.  167 (C.M.A.  1978). Cf.  United States v. 
Hedgwood, 562 F.2d 946 (5th Cir.  1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 
1079 (1978);  United States v.  Barker,  553 F.2d  1013 (6th Cir. 
1977). Subsection (2)(C) is new. See generally United States  v. Me-
noken, 14 M.J. 10 (C.M.A. 1982); and United States V. Johnson, 3 
M.J. 772 (A.C.M.R.), pet. denied, 4 M.J. 50 (1977). 
Subsection (2)(D) provides for resolution of disputes concern- 
ing witness production by  the military judge.  Application to the 
convening authority for relief is not required. It is permitted 
under R.C.M. 9056). The last sentence in this subsection is based 
on United States  v. Carpenter, supra. See subsection (b) of this rule 
as to the test to be applied. 
(d)  Employment of  expert witnesses. This subsection is based on 
paragraph  116 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. 
Johnson, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 424, 47 C.M.R. 402 (1973); Hutson  v. 
United States, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 437,42 C.M.R. 39 (1970). Because 
funding for such employment is the responsibility of the com- 
mand, not the court-martial, and because alternatives to such em- 
ployment may be available, application to the convening author- 
ity is appropriate. In most cases, the military's investigative, 
medical, or other agencies can provide the necessary service. 
Therefore the convening authority should have the opportunity 
to make available such services as an alternative. Cf:  United States 
v.  Johnson, supra;  United States v.  Simmons, 44 C.M.R. 804 
(A.C.M.R. 1971),pet. denied, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 628,44C.M.R.  940 
(1972). This subsection has no reference to ratification of employ- 
ment of an expert already retained, unlike 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e). 
See also Ms. Comp. Gen. B49109 (June 25, 1949). This subsec- 
tion does not apply to persons who are government employees or 
under contract to the Government to provide services which 
would otherwise fall within this subsection. The  reference in para- 
graph 116 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.),  to service regulations has been 
deleted as unnecessary. 
(e)  Procedures for production. Subsection (1) and the discussion 
are based on paragraph 11  5b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (2)(A) is consistent with current practice. 
Subsection (2)(B)  is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(a) and (c) 
and on Appendix 17 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See Article 46. The 
discussion is taken from the second sentence of the second para- 
graph of paragraph  115a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Note that the 
purpose of producing books, papers, documents and other objects 
before a proceeding for inspection is to expedite the proceeding, 
not as a general discovery mechanism. See Bowman Dairy Co.  v. 
United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951). See generally United States v. 
Nixon, 418 683 (1974). 
Subsection (2)(C) is based  on paragraph 79b, the third para- 
graph of paragraph  11  5a, and the first  sentence of paragraph 
115d(l) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  Authority for the president of a 
court of inquiry and a deposition officer to issue a subpoena is ex- 
pressly added to fill the gap left by MCM, 1969 (Rev). in regard to 
these procedures. See Article 47(a)(l),  135(f). 
Subsection (2)(D) is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(d) and on the 
second sentence of the fifth paragraph of paragraph  115d(l) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also 28 U.S.C. § 569(b). The  discussion is 
based on paragraph 115d(l) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (2)(E) is based on Article 46 and the first sentence of 
paragraph 115d(l) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). It parallels Fed. R. 
Crim. P.  17(e)(l). Process in courts-martial does not extend 
abroad, except in occupied territory, nor may it be used to compel 
persons within the United States to attend courts-martial abroad. 
See Article 46;  United States v.  Bennett, supra:  United States v. 
Daniels, supra;  United States v.  Stringer, 5 U.S.C.M.A.  122, 17 
C.M.R. 122 (1954). But see United States v. Daniels, supra at 97, 
48 C.M.R. at 658 (Quinn, J. concurring in the result) (suggesting 
possible use of 28 U.S.C.  § 1783(a) to secure presence of witness 
overseas to testify in a court-martial). The discussion is based on 
the last paragraph of paragraph  115d(l) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Note that under subsection (2)(E)(iii)  any civilians in occupied 
territory are subject to compulsory process of the occupying 
force. 
Subsection (2)(F)  is based on Fed. R. Crim. P.  17(c), but is 
broader in that is not limited to a subpoena duces tecum. Cf.  Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 17(f)(2). APP.  St7  (e)  APPE 
Subsection (2)(G) and the discussion are based on paragraphs 
115d(2) and (3), MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The definition of "warrant of 
attachment" is based on 12 Op. Atty. Gen. 501, 502 (1868). The 
military power to use a warrant of attachment is inherent in  the 
power to subpoena. 12 Op. Atty. Gen. 501 (1868) (construing Act 
of 3 March 1863, ch. 79, 8 25, 12 Stat. 754, which became Article 
of War 22 of  1916 (39 Stat. 654), the predecessor of Article 46.). 
See also W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 200-202,202 
11.46  (2d ed. 1920 reprint). The power of attachment has been in- 
cluded in the Manuals for Courts-Martial since 1895. Treatment 
of this enforcement provision in the Manual is in accord with the 
legislative intent to "leave mechanical details as to the issuance of 
process to regulation." H. R. Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 
24 (1949). The power has been used and sustained. See, e.g.. 
United States v. Shibley, 112 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Cal. 1953) (court 
of inquiry). Federal civilian courts have previously used the war- 
rant of attachment but no longer do because the power to issue an 
arrest warrant is implied from Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(b) and  18 
U.S.C. 8 3149. See Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d. 933 (9th Cir. 
1971) (arrest of material witness for testimony at grand jury 
before actual disobedience of subpoena). Warrants of attachment 
may be served in the same way and by the same officials as sub- 
poenas. By their nature warrants of attachment have caused little 
litigation in military appellate courts. See generally United States 
v. Sevaaetasi, 48  C.M.R. 964 (A.C.M.R.), pet.  denied, 23 
U.S.C.M.A. 620 49 C.M.R. 889 (1974); United States v. Ercolin, 
46 C.M.R. 1259 (A.C.M.R. 1973); United States v. Feeley, 47 
C.M.R. 581 (N.C.M.R.),pet. denied, 22U.S.C.M.A.  635 (1973). 
The procedure for issuing warrants of attachment is modified 
somewhat. The warrant must be authorized by  the military judge, 
or, in special courts-martial without a military judge and sum- 
mary courts-martial (see subsection (e)(Z)(G)(v)  of this rule), and 
for depositions and courts of inquiry, the convening authority. 
Paragraph 115d(3) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) required only that the 
trial counsel consult with the convening authority, or "after the 
court was convened"  the military judge. Subsection (e)(2)(G) 
now requires written authorization from one of these persons. 
Second, subsection (e)(Z)(G)(ii) incorporates as requirements the 
standards in the third paragraph  115d(3) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
That paragraph was seemingly advisory in nature. Subsection 
(e)(Z)(G)(iv) is based on the second paragraph and the first sen- 
tence of the last paragraph of paragraph  115d(3) of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). The last sentence of subsection (e)(Z)(G)(iv) is new and is 
intended to ensure that any detention under this rule is limited to 
the minimum necessary to effect its purpose. These modifications 
provide additional safeguards to ensure that detention of wit- 
nesses is exercised only when necessary and appropriate. See gen- 
erally Lederer, Warrants  of Attachment-Forcibly  Compelling the 
Attendance of  Witnesses; 98 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1982). 
(f) Evidence. This subsection is based generally on paragraph 
115a and c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. Toledo, 
15 M.J. 255 (C.M.A. 1983). It parallels the procedures for pro- 
duction of witnesses. Discovery and introduction of classified or 
other government information is covered by  Mil. R. Evid. 505 
and 506. Note that unlike the standards for production of wit- 
nesses, there is no difference  in the standards for production of ev- 
idence on themerits and at sentencing. The relaxation of the rules 
of evidence at presentencing proceedings provides some flexibility 
as to what evidence must be produced at those proceedings. 
Rule 704.  Immunity 
(a)  Types of immunity. This subsection recognizes both transac- 
tional and testimonial or use immunity. See Pillsbury Co. v. Con- 
boy, 459 U.S. 248, 459 U.S. 248 (1983); Kastigar v. United States, 
406 U.S. 441 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 
52 (1964). See also 18 U.S.C. $8 6001-6005;  United States v. Vil- 
lines, 13 M.J. 46 (C.M.A.  1982). See generally H. Moyer, Justice 
and the Military 376-381  (1972); Green, Grants of Immunity and 
Military Law, 1971-1976,  73 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1976) (hereinafter 
cited as Green 11); Green, Grants of Immunity and Military Law, 
53 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Green I). 
Paragraph 68h of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) expressly recognized 
transactional immunity. It did not address testimonial immunity. 
Nevertheless, testimonial immunity has been used in courts-mar- 
tial. See United States v. Villines, supra; United States v. Eastman, 
2 M.J. 417 (A.C.M.R.  1975); United States v. Rivera, 49 C.M.R. 
259 (A.C.M.R.1974), rev'd on other grounds, 1 M.J. 107 (C.M.A. 
1975). See also Mil. R. Evid. 301(c)(l). 
Subsection (1) makes clear that transactional immunity ex- 
tends only to trial by  court-martial. See Dept. of Defense Dir. 
1355.1 (July 21, 1981). Subsection (2) is written somewhat more 
broadly, however. Use immunity under R.C.M. 704 would extend 
to a State prosecution. Cf: Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 
supra. Moreover, although a convening authority is not indepen- 
dently empowered to grant immunity extending to Federal civil- 
ian prosecutions, use immunity extending to such cases may be 
granted by  a convening authority when specifically authorized 
under 18 U.S.C. 48 6002 and 6004. See subsection (c) and Analy- 
sis. 
The second paragraph  in the discussion is based on 18 U.S.C. 
8 6004. The third paragraph in the discussion is based on United 
States v. Rivera,  I M.J. I07 (C.M.A. 1975); United States v. East- 
man, supra. 
@)  Scope. This subsection clarifies the scope of R.C.M. 704. It is 
based on the last clause in 18 U.S.C. 8 6002. Note that this rule re- 
lates only to criminal proceedings. A grant of immunity does not 
extend to administrative proceedings unless expressly covered by 
the grant. 
(c) Authority to grant immunity. This subsection is based on par- 
agraph 68h of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and on United States v. Kirsch, 
15 U.S.C.M.A. 84,35 C.M.R. 56 (1964). See also United States v. 
Villines, supra. Kirsch recognized coda1 authority for a convening 
authority to grant immunity (see Articles 30, 44, and 60) and 
found implementing Manual provisions to be a proper exercise of 
authority under Article 36. (At the timeKirsch was decided, the 
convening authority's powers now contained in Article 60 were in 
Article 64.) The enactment of  18 U.S.C. 8 6001-6005  did not re- 
move this power. See United States v. Villines, supra; Department 
of Justice Memorandum, Subject: Grants of Immunity by Court- 
Martial Convening Authorities (Sept. 22,  1971) discussed  in 
Grants of Immunity, The Army Lawyer 22 (Dec. 1973). See also 
Dept. of Defense Dir. 1355.1 (July 21, 1981). See generally Green 
I, supra at 27-35;  H.  Moyer, supra at 377-380.  The rule recog- 
nizes, however, that the authority under the code of  a general 
court-martial convening authority to grant immunity does not ex- 
tend to federal prosecutions. Id. Consequently, the rule directs 
military authorities to 18 U.S.C. $8 6001-6005  as a means by 
which such immunity can be granted when necessary. The discus- 
sion under subsection (1) offers additional guidance on this mat- ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (e) 
ter. See the penultimate paragraph of  the Analysis of  subsection 
(a)of  this rule as to  the effect  of  a grant of  immunity to  state pros- 
ecutions. 
The  rule makes clear that only a general court-martial conven- 
ing authority may grant immunity. See United States v. Joseph, 11 
M.J.  333 (C.M.A. 1981); United States  v.  Caliendo, 13 
U.S.C.M.A. 405, 32 C.M.R. 405 (1962); United States v.  Thomp- 
son,  1 l U.S.C.M.A. 252, 29 C.M.R. 68 (1960); United States v. 
Werthman,  5 U.S.C.M.A. 440, 18  C.M.R. 64 (1955). Cf: Pillsbury 
Co. v.  Conboy, supra. Cooke v. Orser, 12 M.J. 335 (C.M.A. 1982), 
is not to the contrary. In Cooke the majority found that due pro- 
cess required enforcement of  promises  of  immunity under the 
facts of  that case. One member of  the majority also opined  that 
the convening authority could  be held, on the facts, to have au- 
thorized the grant  of  immunity. The limitations in subsection 
(c)(3)  and  the procedural  requirements in subsection (d)  are in- 
tended to reduce the potential  for the kinds of  problems  which 
arose in Cooke. 
The  power to grant immunity and the power to  enter into a pre- 
trial agreement, while related, should  be distinguished.  R.C.M. 
704 does not disturb the power  of  the convening authority, in- 
cluding a special or summary court-martial convening authority, 
to  make a pretrial agreement with an accused under which the ac- 
cused promises to testify in another court-martial, as long as the 
agreement does not purport  to  be a grant of  immunity. Note that 
the accused-witness in such a case could not be ordered to testify 
pursuant  to the pretrial  agreement; instead, such an accused 
would  lose the benefit of  the bargained-for relief upon refusal to 
carry out the bargain. See also R.C.M. 705. 
The first paragraph in the initial discussion under subsection 
(c)is based on Cooke v. Orser and  United States v.  Caliendo, both 
supra. As to the second  paragraph in the discussion, see  United 
States v.  Newman, 14 M.J. 474 (C.M.A. 1983). The discussion 
under subsection (c)(l)  is based  on Grants of Immunity, The 
Army Lawyer 22 (Dec. 1973). See also Dept. of  Defense Dir. 
1355.1 (July 21, 1981);  Memorandum of  Understanding Between 
the Departments of  Justice and Defense Relating to  the Investiga- 
tion and  Prosecution  of  Crimes Over Which the Two  Depart- 
ments Have Concurrent Jurisdiction (1955). 
As to  whether the threat of  a foreign prosecution  is a sufficient 
basis to refuse to testify in a court-martial notwithstanding a 
grant ofimmunity,  see  United States v.  Murphy, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 32, 
21 C.M.R. 158 (1956). See also  United States v.  Yanagita, 552 
F.2d  940 (2d (3.1977);  In re  Parker, 41 1  F.2d  1067 (10th Cir. 
1969), vacated  as moot, 397 U.S. 96 (1970);  Green 11, supra at 
12-14. But see In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D.  Conn. 1972); 
McCormick's Handbook  of  the Law of Evidence 262-63  (E. 
Cleary ed. 1972). The Supreme Court has not decided  the issue. 
See Zicarelli v.  New Jersey State Commission of Investigation, 406 
U.S.  472 (1974). 
(d) Procedure. This subsection is new. It  is intended  to protect 
the parties  to a grant of  immunity by reducing the possibility  of 
misunderstanding or disagreement over its existence or terms. Cf: 
Cooke v. Orser, supra. 
The first paragraph in the discussion is based on United States 
v. Kirsch, supra. 
The second  paragraph  in the discussion is based  on United 
States v.  Conway, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 99, 42 C.M.R. 291 (1970); 
United States v.  Stoltz, 14 U.S.C.M.A.  461,34 C.M.R. 241 (1964). 
See also United States v.  Scoles, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 14, 33 C.M.R. 226 
(1963);  Green I, supra at  20-23. 
The last paragraph in the discussion is based on Mil. R. Evid. 
301(c)(2)  and  United States v.  Webster, 1 M.J. 216 (C.M.A. 1975). 
(e) Decision  to grant immunity. This subsection  is based  on 
United States v.  Villines, supra. Although there was no majority 
opinion in that case, each judge  recognized the problem  of  the 
need  to immunize defense witnesses under some circumstances, 
and  each suggested  different possible  solutions. The rule ad- 
dresses these concerns and  provides a mechanism to deal with 
them. Note that the military judge is not empowered to  immunize 
a witness. If  the military judge finds that a grant of  immunity is 
essential to a fair trial, the military judge  will abate the proceed- 
ings unless immunity is granted by an appropriate convening au- 
thority. 
1993 Amendment. Subsection (e)  to R.C.M. 704 was amended 
to make the military practice for granting immunity for defense 
witnesses consistent with the majority rule within the Federal 
Courts. United States v. Burns, 684 F.2d  1066 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 1174 (1983); United States v. Shandell, 800 F.2d 
322 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v.  Turkish, 623 F.2d  769 (2d Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981); United States v. Thevis, 
665 F.2d  616 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); 
United States v.  Pennell, 737 F.2d  521  (6th Cir. 1984); United 
States v.  Taylor, 728 F.2d  930 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Brutzman, 731 F.2d  1449 (9th Cir. 1984);McGee v.  Crist, 739 
F.2d 505 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d  1494 
(1  lth Cir. 1986). The  amended rule conforms R.C.M. 704(e)  with 
case law requiring  the military judge  to consider the Govern- 
ment's interest in not granting  immunity to the defense witness. 
See  United States v.  Smith, 17  M.J.  994, 996 (A.C.M.R. 1984), 
pet.  denied, 19  M.J. 71 (C.M.A. 1984); United States v. O'Bryan, 
16  M.J. 775 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983),pet. denied, 218 M.J.  16  (C.M.A. 
1984). 
The majority rule recognizes that an accused  has no Sixth 
Amendment right to immunized  testimony of  defense witnesses 
and, absent  prosecutorial  misconduct which is intended  to dis- 
rupt the judicial  fact-finding process,  an accused  is not denied 
Fifth Amendment due process by the Government's failure to  im- 
munize a witness. If  the military judge finds that the witness is a 
target for prosecution,  there can be no claim of  Government over- 
reaching or discrimination if  the grant  of  immunity is denied. 
United States v.  Shandell, supra. 
The prior military rule was based on United States v.  Villines, 
supra, which had adopted the minority view espoused in Govern- 
ment of  Virgin  Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980). This 
view permitted  the court to immunize also a defense  witness when 
the witness'  testimony was clearly exculpatory, was essential  to 
the defense case and there was no strong Government interest in 
withholding testimonial immunity. This rule has been sharply 
criticized. See, e.g.,  United States v.  Turkish, supra; United States 
v.  Taylor, supra; United States v.  Pennel, supra; United States v. 
Zayas, 24 M.J.  132, 137 (C.M.A. 1987) (dissenting opinion by 
Judge Cox). 
The  current rule continues to  recognize that a military judge is 
not empowered  to immunize a witness. Upon a finding that all 
three prerequisites exist, a military judge  may only abate the pro- 
ceedings for the affected  charges and specifications unless the con- 
vening authority grants immunity to the witness. APP. 21, n  APPE 
Rule 705.  Pretrial agreements 
Introduction. This rule is new. The code does not address pretrial 
agreements, and MCM, 1969 (Rev.) did not discuss them. Pre- 
trial agreements have long existed and been sanctioned in courts- 
martial, however, see United States v. Allen, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 504,25 
C.M.R. 8 (1957). Seegenerally Gray, Pretrial Agreements, 37 Fed. 
Bar. J. 49 (1978). The rule recognizes the utility of pretrial agree- 
ments. At the same time the rule, coupled with the requirement 
forjudicial inquiry in R.C.M. 910, is intended to prevent informal 
agreements and protect the rights of the accused and the interests 
of the Government. See also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 
(1971); Fed. R. Crim. P.  1  I(e); ABA Standards, Pleas of Guilty 
(1979). 
(a)  In general. This subsection is based on United States v.  Allen, 
supra. Only the convening authority may enter a pretrial agree- 
ment with an accused. See  United States v. Caruth, 6 M.J. 184 
(C.M.A.  1979); United States v.  Johnson, 2 M.J. 541 (A.C.M.R. 
1976); United States v.  Crawford, 46 C.M.R.  1007 (A.C.M.R. 
1972). See also United States v.  Troglin, 21 U.S.C.M.A.  183, 44 
C.M.R. 237 (1972). Pretrial agreements have long been subject to 
service regulations. See, e.g., A.F.M.  1  1  1-1,  para. 4-8  (May 13, 
1980); JAGMAN Section 01 14 (June 11, 1982). Subsection (a) 
expressly continues such authority. The discussion is based on 
Dept. of Defense Dir. 1355.1 (July 21, 1981). 
(b) Nature of agreement. This subsection recognizes the matters 
contained in pretrial agreements. See  United States v.  Cooke, 12 
M.J. 448 (C.M.A.  1982); United States v. Schaffer, 12 M.J. 425 
(C.M.A. 1982); United States v.  Brown,  12 M.J. 420 (C.M.A. 
1982); United States v.  Bertelson, 3 M.J. 314 (C.M.A. 1977); 
United States  v.  Allen, supra. As to prohibited and permitted 
terms and conditions, see subsection (c) of this rule. This discus- 
sion under subsection (2)(C) is based on  United States v.  Cook, 
supra. 
(c)  Terms and conditions. This subsection is intended to ensure 
that certain fundamental rights of the accused cannot be bar- 
gained away while permitting the accused substantial latitude to 
enter into terms or conditions as long as the accused does so freely 
and voluntarily. Subsection (l)(B) lists certain matters which can- 
not be bargained away. This is because to give up these matters 
would leave no substantial means to ensure judicially that the ac- 
cused's plea was provident, that the accused entered the pretrial 
agreement voluntarily, and that the sentencing proceedings met 
acceptable standards. See  United States  v.  Mills, 12 M.J.  1 
(C.M.A. 1981); United States v. Green, 1 M.J. 453 (C.M.A. 1976); 
United States v.  Holland, 1 M.J. 58 (C.M.A. 1975); United States 
v.  Care, 18 U.S.C.M.A., 40 C.M.R. 247 (1969); United States  v. 
Cummings, 17 U.S.C.M.A.  376, 38 C.M.R. 174 (1968); United 
States v. Allen, supra. The discussion under subsection (2) is based 
on  United States  v.  Holland, supra. The rule is not intended to 
codify Holland  to the extent that Holland may prevent the ac- 
cused from giving up the right to make any motions before trial. 
Cf: United States v.  Schaffer, supra. Subsection (l)(A) provides 
that any term or condition, even if not otherwise prohibited, must 
be agreed to by  the accused freely and voluntarily. Cf: United 
States v.  Green, supra: United States v.  Care, supra. 
Subsection (2) makes clear that certain terms or conditions are 
not included in subsection (l)(B) and are permissible so long as 
they are freely and voluntarily agreed to by  the accused. Since the 
accused may waive many matters other than jurisdiction, in some 
cases by failure to object or raise a matter (see R.C.M. 905(e); Mil. 
R. Evid. 103(a)), or by  a plea of guilty (see R.C.M. 910(j) and 
Analysis), there is no reason why the accused should not be able 
to seek a more favorable agreement by agreeing to waive such 
matters as part of a pretrial agreement. Indeed, authorization for 
such terms or conditions, coupled with the requirement that they 
be included in the written agreement (see subsection (d)(3) of this 
rule) prevents sub rosa agreements concerning such matters and 
ensures that a careful judicial inquiry into, and record of, the ac- 
cused's understanding of such matters will be made. The matters 
listed in subsection (2) have been judicially sanctioned. As to sub- 
section (2)(A), see United States v.  Thomas, 6 M.J. 573 (A.C.M.R. 
1978). Cf:United States v.  Bertelson, supra. Subsection (2)(B) is 
based on United States v.  Reynolds, 2 M.J. 887 (A.C.M.R.  1976); 
United States v.  Tyson, 2 M.J. 583 (N.C.M.R.  1976). See also 
United States v.  Chavez-Rey, 1 M.J. 34 (C.M.A.  1975); United 
States v. Stoltz, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 461, 34 C.M.R. 241 (1964). 
Subsection (2)(C) is based on United States v.  Callahan, 8 M.J. 
804 (N.C.M.R. 1980); United States v.  Brown, 4 M.J.  654 
(A.C.M.R. 1977). Enforcement of a restitution clause may raise 
problems if the accused, despite good faith efforts, is unable to 
comply. See United States v.  Brown, supra. 
Subsection (2)(D) is based on United States v. Dawson, 10 M.J. 
142 (C.M.A. 1982). Although the post-trial misconduct provision 
in Dawson was rejected, a majority of the court was apparently 
willing to permit such provisions if adequate protections against 
arbitrary revocation of the agreement are provided. However, see 
United States v.  Connell, 13 M.J.  156 (C.M.A. 1982) in which a 
post-trial misconduct provision was held unenforceable without 
detailed analysis. Subsection (D) provides the same protections as 
revocation of a suspended sentence requires. See R.C.M.  1109 
and Analysis. Given such protections, there is no reason why an 
accused who has bargained for sentence relief such as a suspended 
sentence should enjoy irnmunity from revocation of the agree- 
ment before action but not afterword. Other decisions have sug- 
gested the validity of post-trial misconduct provisions. See United 
States v.  Goode, 1 M.J. 3 (C.M.A. 1975); United States v. Thomas, 
supra; United States v. French, 5 M.J. 655 (N.C.M.R. 1978). Cf: 
United States v.  Lallande, 22 U.S.C.M.A.  170, 46 C.M.R.  170 
(1973). 
Subsection (2)(E) is based on United States v. Schaffer,  supra; 
United States  v.  Mills, supra; United States v.  Schmeltz, 1 M.J. 8 
(C.M.A.  1975). Note that the list is not exhaustive. The right to 
enlisted members may be waived, for example. 
1991 Amendment: Subsection (2) was amended to clarify that 
either side can propose the inclusion of the listed terms in  a pre- 
trial agreement. This conforms to the amendment to R.C.M. 
705(d). 
(d) Procedure. This subsection ensures that an offer to plead 
guilty pursuant to a pretrial agreement originates with the ac- 
cused, and that the accused freely and voluntarily enters a pretrial 
agreement. At the same time it recognizes that a pretrial agree- 
ment is the product of negotiation and discussion on both sides, 
each of which is free to refuse to enter an agreement and go to 
trial. Subsection (1) is based on United States  v.  Schaffer, supra. 
This subsection, together with the prohibition against terms not 
freely and voluntarily agreed to by the accused and the require- 
ment in R.C.M. 910 for an inquiry into the agreement, should 
prevent prosecutorial  pressure or improper inducements to the ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. 
accused to plead guilty or to waive rights against the accused's 
wishes or interest. See United States v. Schaffer, supra at 428-429. 
Subsection (2) provides that once plea discussions are initiated 
by  the defense the convening authority or a representative may 
negotiate with the defense. This recognizes that, while the offer 
must originate with the defense, the specific provisions in an 
agreement may be the product of discussions with the Govern- 
ment. Schaffer, Mills, and Schmeltz suggest that each term must 
originate with the defense. R.C.M. 705 is consistent with this in- 
sofar as it requires that the offer to plead guilty originate with the 
accused (subsection (d)(l)), that the written proposal be prepared 
by  the defense (subsection (d)(3)), and that the accused enter or 
agree to each term freely and voluntarily (subsection (c)(l)(A)). It 
is of no legal consequence  whether the accused's counsel or some- 
one else conceived the idea for a specific provision so long as the 
accused, after thorough consultation with qualified counsel, can 
freely choose whether to submit a proposed agreement and what 
it will contain. See United States v. Munt, 3 M.J. 1082 (A.C.M.R. 
1977),pet. denied, 4 M.J. 198 (C.M.A. 1978). 
Subsection (3) ensures that all understandings be included in 
the agreement. This is in the interest of both parties. See  United 
States v. Cooke, 11 M.J. 257 (C.M.A.  1981); United States v. 
Lanzer, 3 M.J.  60 (C.M.A.  1977); United States  v.  Cox, 22 
U.S.C.M.A. 69,46 C.M.R. 69 (1972). The last sentence is based 
on United States v.  Green, supra. Note that the rule does not re- 
quire the convening authority to sign the agreement. Although 
the convening authority must personally approve the agreement, 
(see subsection (a)) and has sole discretion whether to do so under 
subsection (4), the convening authority need not personally sign 
the agreement. In some circumstances, it may not be practicable 
or even physically possible to present the written agreement to the 
convening authority for approval. The rule allows flexibility in 
this regard. The staff judge advocate, trial counsel, or other per- 
son authorized by the convening authority to sign may do so. Au- 
thority to sign may by  granted orally. Subsection (3) is not in- 
tended to preclude oral modifications in  the agreement from 
being made on the record at trial with the consent of the parties. 
Subsection (5) makes clear that neither party is bound by a pre- 
trial agreement until performance begins. See  United States  v. 
Kazena, 11 M.J. 28 (C.M.A. 1981). In Shepardson v.  Roberts, 14 
M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1983), the Court stated that the convening au- 
thority may be bound by  a pretrial agreement before entry of a 
plea of guilty if the accused has detrimentally relied on the agree- 
ment. The Court indicated, however, that not all forms of reliance 
by  the accused rise to the level of detrimental reliance as it used 
that term. Thus the Court held in Shepardson that exclusion of 
statements allegedly made by the accused as a result of the agree- 
ment (but not necessarily pursuant to it) was an adequate remedy, 
and enforcement of the agreement was not required  when the 
convening authority withdrew from it before trial. Similarly, the 
Court opined that the fact that an accused made arrangements to 
secure employment or took similar actions in reliance on an 
agreement would not require enforcement of a pretrial agree- 
ment. Subsection (5) is consistent with this approach, but uses be- 
ginning of performance by the accused to provide a clearer point 
at which the right of the convening authority to withdraw termi- 
nates. Note that the beginning of performance is not limited to en- 
try of a plea. It would also include testifying in a companion case, 
providing information to Government agents, or other actions 
pursuant to the terms of an agreement. 
Note that the accused may withdraw from a pretrial agreement 
even after entering a guilty plea or a confessional stipulation, but, 
once the plea is accepted or the stipulation admitted, could not 
withdraw the plea or the stipulation except as provided under 
R.C.M. 910(h) or 811(d). The fact that the accused may with- 
draw at any time affords the accused an additional measure of 
protection against prosecutorial abuse. It also reflects the fact that 
the convening authority can retrieve any relief granted the ac- 
cused. See Article 63; United States v. Cook, supra. 
1991 Ammendment: R.C.M. 705(d) was amended to authorize 
either party to initiate pretrial agreement negotiations and pro- 
pose terms and conditions. The amendment does not change the 
general rule that all terms and conditions of a pretrial agreement 
proposed pursuant to this rule must not violate law, public policy 
or regulation. Subparagraph (1) was eliminated and subpara- 
graphs (2)-(5),  as amended, were renumbered  (1)-(4),  respec- 
tively. This amendment is patterned after federal civilian practice 
[see Fed. R. Crim. P. 1  l(e)] where there is no requirement that ne- 
gotiations for plea agreements originate with the defense. In 
courts-martial the military judge is required to conduct an ex- 
haustive inquiry into the providence of an accused's guilty plea 
and the voluntariness of the pretrial agreement. R.C.M. 705(c) 
ensures that certain fundamental rights of the accused cannot be 
bargained  away. Furthermore it can be  difficult to determine 
which  side originated  negotiations or proposed a particular 
clause. Cf: United States v. Jones, 23 M.J. 305, 308-309  (C.M.A. 
1987) (Cox, J., concurring). 
(e)  Nondisclosure  of existence of agreement. This subsection is 
based on United States v.  Green, supra: United States v.  Wood, 23 
U.S.C.M.A. 57, 48 C.M.R. 528 (1974). See also R.C.M. 910(f); 
Mil. R. Evid. 410. 
Rule 706.  Inquiry into the mental capacity or 
mental responsibility of the accused 
This rule is taken from paragraph  121 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Minor changes were made in order to conform with the format 
and style of the Rules for Courts-Martial. See also United States v. 
Cortes-Crespo, 13 M.J. 420 (1982); United States  v. Frederick, 3 
M.J. 230 (C.M.A. 1977); Mil. R. Evid. 302 and Analysis. The rule 
is generally consistent with 18 U.S.C. 5 4244. The penultimate 
paragraph in paragraph  121 is deleted as an unnecessary state- 
ment. 
1987 Amendment: Subsection (c)(l) was modified, in light of 
changes to federal law, to allow the use of available clinical psy- 
chologists. See  18 U.S.C. $5 4241, 4242, and 4247. Subsection 
(c)(2) was revised to implement Article 50a, which was added to 
the UCMJ in the "Military  Justice Amendments of  1986," tit. 
VIII, 5 802, National Defense Authorization  Act for fiscal year 
1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661,  100 Stat. 3905 (1986). Article 50a 
adopted some provisions of the Insanity Defense Reform Act, ch. 
IV, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (1984). See also Analysis of 
R.C.M. 916(k). The subsection dealing with the volitional prong 
of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code test was de- 
leted. Subsection (A) was amended by  adding and defining the 
word "severe."  See  R.C.M. 916(k)(l); S. Rep. No. 225, 98th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 229 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & APP. 21, n  APPENDIX 21 
Ad. News  1,  231. Subsection (C) was amended to state the cogni- 
tive test as now set out in R.C.M. 916(k)(l). 
Rule 707. Speedy trial 
Introduction. This rule applies the accused's speedy trial rights 
under the 6th Amendment and Article 10, UCMJ, and protects 
the command and societal interest in the prompt administration 
ofjustice, seegenerally ~~~k~~  v,  wingo, 407 U,S, 514 (1972); 
united states  1980). ~h~ purpose of v, walls, 9 M,J, 88 (c,M,A, 
this rule is to provide guidance for granting pretrial delays and to 
eliminate after-the-fact determinations as to whether certain peri- 
ods of delay are excludable. This rule amends the former rule, 
which excluded from accountable time periods covered by certain 
exceptions. 
(a)  In general. This subsection is based on ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice, Speedy Trial, 12-2.1,  12-2.2  (1986). The ABA 
Standards set no time limit but leave the matter open depending 
on local conditions. The basic period from arrest or summons to 
trial under The Federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 9 3  161, is 100 
days. The period of 120 days was selected for courts-martial as a 
reasonable outside limit given the wide variety of locations and 
conditions in which courts-martial occur. The dates of the events 
which begin government accountability are easily ascertainable 
and will avoid the uncertainty involved in Thomas v. Edington, 26 
M.J. 95 (C.M.A. 1988). 
The 90-day rule previously established in R.C.M. 707(d) has 
been eliminated. As such, the 120-day rule established in subsec- 
tion (a) of this rule applies to all cases, not just cases where the ac- 
cused is in pretrial confinement. Judicial decisions have held, 
however, that when an accused has been held in pretrial confine- 
ment for more than 90 days, a presumption arises that the ac- 
cused's  right to a speedy trial under Article 10, UCMJ has been 
violated. In such cases, the government must demonstrate due 
diligence in bringing the case to trial.  United States v. Burton, 44 
C.M.R. 166(C'M.A.  1971). Unless  and its progeny are re-
examined, it would be possible to have a Burton violation despite 
compliance with this rule. 
The discussion is based on United States v. McDonald, 456 U.S. 
1 (1982);  hifed  States v. Marion, 404  307 (1971). See also 
United  v. Lovascol  43  U.S. 783  before  re-
straint or referral of charges could raise due process issues. See 
id.; united states v. McGraner, 13 M.J. 408 (C.M.A. 1982). See 
generally pearson and Bowen, Unreasonable Pre-Preferral Delay, 
10 A.F. JAG Rptr. 73 (June 1981). 
(b) Accountability. Subsection (1) is based on United States v. 
ManalO,  M.J. 452 (C.M.A.  1976). The reference  to R.C.M. 
304(a)(2)-(4) conforms to the language of R.C.M. 707(a)(2). 
Subsection (2) is based on ABA Standards, supra at 12-2.2(a) 
(1986). See also United States  v.  Talaveraz, 8 M.J.  14 (C.M.A. 
1979). 
Subsection (3)(A) establishes that a mistrial or dismissal by any 
proper authority begins a new trial period. This subsection clari- 
fies the date from which to begin measuring new time periods in 
cases involving rereferral, restraint or no restraint. 
Subsection (3)(B) clarifies the intent of this portion of the rule. 
The harm to be avoided  is continuous pretrial restraint. See 
United States v. Gray, 21 M.J. 1020 (N.M.C.M.R. 1986). Where 
an accused is released from pretrial restraint for a substantial pe- 
riod, he will be treated the same as an accused who was not re- 
strained. Therefore, unless the restraint is reimposed, the 120-day 
time period will run from the date of preferral or entry on active 
duty regardless of whether that event occurs before or after the 
accused was released from restraint. 
Subsection (3)(C) clarifies the effect of government appeals on 
this rule. This subsection treats all government appeals the same. 
Once the parties are given notice of either the government's deci- 
sion not to appeal under R.C.M. 908(b)(8) or the decision of the 
Court of Military Review under R.C.M. 908(c)(3), a new 120-day 
period begins. 
This subsection clarifies how time should be counted for those 
charges not affected by the ruling that is subject to appeal. Under 
R.C.M. 908(b)(4), trial On  such charges may in some circum- 
Stances proceed notwithstanding the appeal, or trial may await 
resolution of the appeal. Since the traditional policy of resolving 
all known charges at a single trial has not changed (See R.C.M. 
906(b)(10), Discussion), charges not the subject of the appeal may 
be  properly delayed without violating this rule. Accordingly 
where the trial is interrupted by a government appeal, all charges 
may be treated the same and proceeded upon at the same time 
once the appeal is resolved. 
(c)  Excludable delays, This subsection, based on ABA Standards 
for  Criminal Justice, Speedy  Trial, 12-1.3  (1986), follows the 
principle that the government is accountable for all time prior to 
trial unless a competent authority grants a delay. See  United 
States v. Longhofer, 29 M.J. 22 (C.M.A. 1989). The rule of proce- 
dure established in subsection (1) is based on United States v. Ma- 
resca, 28 M.J. 328 (C.M.A. 1989). See also United States v. Car- 
lisle, 25 M.J. 426,428 (C.M.A. 1988). 
he discussion to subsection (1) provides guidance for judges 
and convening authorities to ensure the full development of 
speedy trial issues at trial. See united  v, Maresca, supra, 
This amendment follows ABA guidance and places 
on a military  judge or the conveningauthority to grant reasonable 
pretrial delays. Military judges and convening authorities are re- 
quired, under this subsection, to make an independent determina- 
tion as to whether there is in fact good cause for a pretrial delay, 
and to grant such delays for only so long as is necessary under the 
circumstances, ABA standards, supra at 12-1.3;  united states v, 
Longhofer, supra. Decisions granting or denying pretrial  delays 
will be subject to review for both abuse of discretion and the rea- 
sonableness of the period of delay granted. Id.; United States v. 
Maresca, supra. 
(d)  Remedy. This subsection is based  on The Federal Speedy 
Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. Q:  3162. The Federal Rule provides dismissal 
as the sanction for speedy trial violations but permits the judge to 
dismiss with or without prejudice. Accordingly, this subsection 
permits the judge to dismiss charges without  prejudice for non- 
constitutional violations of this rule. If, however, the accused has 
been denied his or her constitutional right  to a speedy trial, the 
only available remedy is dismissal with  prejudice.  Strunk  v. 
United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973). 
(e)  Waiver. A lack of a demand for immediate trial will not con- 
stitute waiver and will  not preclude an accused from raising 
speedy trial issues at trial. See Barker v.  Wingo, supra. ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (d) 
CHAPTER VIII.  TRIAL PROCEDURE GENERALLY 
Rule 801.  Military judge's responsibility; other 
matters 
(a)  Responsibilities of  military judge.  This subsection is based on 
paragraphs 39b and 40b(2) and the first sentence of paragraph 
57a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  It is intended to provide the military 
judge or president of a special court-martial without a military 
judge broad authority to regulate the conduct of courts-martial 
within the framework of the code and the Manual, and to estab- 
lish the outlines of their responsibilities. Much of the discussion is 
also derived from paragraphs 39b, 40b(2), and 53g of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). A few minor changes have been made. For instance, the 
military judge, not the president, determines the uniform to be 
worn, and the military judge is not required to consult with the 
president, nor is the president of a special court-martial without a 
military judge required to consult with trial counsel, concerning 
scheduling. As a practical matter, consultation or coordination 
among the participants concerning scheduling or uniform may be 
appropriate, but the authority for these decisions should rest with 
the presiding officer of the court, either military judge or presi- 
dent of a special court-martial without a military judge, without 
being required to  consult with others. 
(b)  Obtaining evidence. This subsection is taken from paragraph 
54b of the MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Some of the language in paragraph 
54b has been placed in the discussion. 
(c)  Uncharged offenses.  This subsection is taken from paragraph 
55a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The discussion is designed to accom- 
plish the same purpose as paragraph 55b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), 
although the language is no longer in terms which could be con- 
strued as  jurisdictional. 
(d)  Interlocutory questions and questions of  law. This subsection 
is similar in substance to paragraph 57 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and 
is based on Articles 5  1(b) and 52(c). 
Subsections (1) and (2) are based on Articles 51(b) and 52(c). 
The provisions (R.C.M.  8Ol(e)(l)(C); 801(e)(2)(C)) permitting a 
military judge or president of a special court-martial without a 
military judge to change a ruling previously made (Article 51(b)) 
have been modified  to preclude changing a previously granted 
motion for finding of not guilty. United States v.  Hitchcock, 6 M.J. 
188 (C.M.A. 1979). Under R.C.M. 916(k) the military judge does 
not rule on the question of mental responsibility as an interlocu- 
tory matter. See Analysis, R.C.M. 916(k). Thus there are no rul- 
ings by the military judge  which are subject to objection by a 
member. 
Subsection (2)(D) makes clear that all members must be pre- 
sent at all times during special courts-martial without a military 
judge. The president of a special court-martial lacks authority to 
conduct the equivalent of an Article 39(a) session. Cf:  United 
States v.  Muns, 26 C.M.R. 835 (C.G.B.R.  1958). 
Subsection (3) is based on Articles 51(b) and 52(c) and is de- 
rived from paragraph 57c, d, f,and g of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Some 
language from paragraph 57g has been placed in the discussion. 
Subsection (4) is taken from paragraph 57g(l) of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). The rule recognizes, however, that a different standard of 
proof may apply to some interlocutory questions. See, e.g., Mil. 
R. Evid. 314(e)(5). The assignments of the burden of persuasion 
are determined by specific rules or, in the absence of a rule, by the 
source of the motion. This represents a minor change from the 
language in paragraph 67e of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), which placed 
the burden on the accused for most questions. This assignment 
was rejected by the Court of Military Appeals in several cases, see, 
e.g.,  United States v.  Graham, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 75, 46 C.M.R. 75 
(1972). Assignments of burdens of persuasion and, where appro- 
priate, going forward are made in specific rules."Burden  of per- 
suasion" is used instead of the more general "burden of proof' to 
distinguish the risk of nonpersuasion once an issue is raised from 
the burden of production  necessary to raise it. See McCormick's 
Handbook of  the Law of  Evidence 5 336 (E. Cleary ed. 1972). For 
example, although the defense may have the burden of raising an 
issue (e.g., statute of limitations), once it has done so the prosecu- 
tion may bear the burden of persuasion. 
The discussion under subsection (5) describes the differences 
between interlocutory questions and ultimate questions, and be- 
tween questions of fact and questions of law. It is taken, substan- 
tially, from paragraph 57b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). As to the dis- 
tinction between questions of fact and questions of law, see United 
States v.  Carson, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 407, 35 C.M.R. 379 (1965). The 
discussion of issues which involve both interlocutory questions 
and questions determinative of guilt is based on United States v. 
Bailey, 6 M.J. 965 (N.C.M.R. 1979);  United States v.  Jessie,  5 
M.J. 573 (A.C.M.R.), pet, denied, 5 M.J. 300 (1978). It is similar 
to language in the third paragraph of paragraph 57b of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.), which was based on  United States v.  Ornelas, 2 
U.S.C.M.A.  96, 6 C.M.R. 96 (1952). See Analysis of  Contents, 
Manual  for Courts-Martial,  United States, 1969, Revised Edition, 
DA PAM  27-2,  10-5  (July 1970). That example, and the decision 
in United States v.  Ornelas, supra were questioned in United States 
v.  Laws, 11 M.J. 475 (C.M.A. 1981). The  discussion clarifies that 
when a military offense (i.e., one which requires that the accused 
be a "member  of the armed forces," see Articles 85, 86, 99; see 
also Articles 88-91,  133) is charged and the defense contends that 
the accused is not a member of the armed forces, two separate 
questions are raised by that contention: first, whether the accused 
is subject to court-martial jurisdiction (see R.C.M. 202); and, sec- 
ond, whether, as an element of the offense, the accused had a mili- 
tary duty which the accused violated (e.g., was absent from the 
armed forces or a unit thereof without authority). The first ques- 
tion is decided by  the military judge by a preponderance of the ev- 
idence. The  second question, to the extent it involves a question of 
fact, must be decided by the factfinder applying a reasonable 
doubt standard. United States v.  Bailey, supra. See also United 
States v.  McGinnis,  15 M.J. 345 (C.M.A.  1983); United States v. 
Marsh,  15 M.J. 252 (C.M.A. 1983); United States v.  McDonagh, 
14 M.J. 415 (C.M.A. 1983). Thus it would be possible, in a case 
where larceny and desertion are charged, for the military judge to 
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused is subject 
to military jurisdiction and for the members to convict of larceny 
but acquit of desertion because they were not satisfied beyond rea- 
sonable doubt that the accused was a member of the armed forces. 
Ornelas does not require a different result. The holding in Or- 
nelas was that the law officer (military judge) erred in failing to 
permit the members to resolve a contested issue of the accused's 
status as a servicemember on a desertion charge. Language in the 
opinion to the effect that the "jurisdictional"  issue should have 
been submitted to the members is attributable to language in par- 
agraph 67e of MCM, 1951, which suggested that "defenses,"  in- 
cluding "jurisdiction,"  were to be resolved by  the members. Such 
a procedure for resolving motions to dismiss has been abolished. APP. 21, ! (d)  APPENDIX 21 
See R.C.M. 905; 907; and 916. Thus the procedure implied by  a 
broad reading of Ornelas for resolving jurisdiction is not required 
by the Manual. See generally  United States v. Laws, supra. Cf: 
United States v. McDonagh, supra. On the other hand, when mili- 
tary status is an element of the offense, the fact of such military 
status must be resolved by the factfinder. Cf: United States v. Mc- 
Ginnis and United States v. Marsh, bothsupra. 
(9 Rulings on record. This subsection is based on paragraph  39c 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Paragraph 39c did not include a reference 
to rulings and instructions by  the president of a special court- 
martial without a military judge, nor was specific reference to 
them made elsewhere in the Manual. Since such rulings and in- 
structions are subject to the same review as those of  a military 
judge, the same standard should apply to both at this stage. The 
rule is based on Article 54. The discussion refers to R.C.M. 808 
and 1103 to indicate what must be recorded at trial. Concerning 
requirements for verbatim records, see United States v. Douglas, 1 
M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1976); United States v. Boxdale, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 
414,  47 C.M.R. 351 (1973);  United States v.  Weber, 20 
U.S.C.M.A. 82,42 C.M.R. 274 (1970). 
(g)  Effect of failure  to raise defenses or objections. This subsection 
is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(9, except for the addition of the 
term "motions"  to make clear that motions may be covered by 
the rule and changes to conform to military terminology and pro- 
cedure. Such waiver provisions are more specifically implemented 
as to many matters throughout the Rules. Several examples are 
listed in the discussion. 
Rule 802.  Conferences 
Introduction.  This rule is new. It is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 
17.1, but is somewhat broader and more detailed. Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 17.1 apparently authorizes, by its title, only pretrial confer- 
ences. Conferences other than pretrial conferences are also au- 
thorized in federal practice. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(c)(3); Cox v. 
United States, 309 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962). R.C.M. 802 applies 
to all conferences. Nothing in this rule is intended to prohibit the 
military judge from communicating, even ex parte, with counsel 
concerning routine and undisputed administrative matters such 
as scheduling, uniform, and travel arrangements. Such authority 
was recognized in the fourth sentence of paragraph  39c of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). 
Like Fed. R. Crim. P. 17.1, this rule provides express authority 
for what is already common practice in many courts-martial, and 
regularizes the procedure for them. Fed. R. Crim. P. 17.1 is de- 
signed to be  used in unusual cases, such as complicated trials. 
Conferences are needed more frequently in courts-martial be- 
cause in many instances the situs of the trial and the home bases 
of the military judge, counsel, and the accused may be different. 
Even when all the participants are located at the same base, con- 
ferences may be necessary. See ABA Standards, Discovery and 
Procedural Before Trial 4 11-5.4 (1978). After the trial has begun, 
there is often a need to discuss matters in chambers. Cf: Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 43(c);  United States v.  Gregorio, 497 F.2d  1253 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1024 (1974). 
(a)  In general. This subsection is taken directly from the first sen- 
tence of Fed. R. Crim. P. 17.1, with modifications to accommo- 
date military terminology. Subsection (c) provides that a confer- 
ence may not proceed over the objection of a party and that, in 
effect, matters may be resolved at a conference only by agreement 
of the parties. Thus, the military judge can bring the parties to- 
gether under subsection (a), but a conference could not proceed 
further without the voluntary participation of  the parties. Noth- 
ing in this rule is intended to prohibit the military judge  from 
communicating to counsel, orally or in  writing, matters which 
may properly be the subject of rules of court. See R.C.M. 108; 
801. This is also true under the federal rule. See Committee on 
Pretrial Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 
Recommended  Procedures in  Criminal Trials, 37 F.R.D. 95, 98 
(1965); C. Wright, Wright's Federal Practice and Procedure 1292 
(1969). Cf: United States v.  Westmoreland, 41 F.R.D. 419 (S.D. 
Ind. 1967). 
The discussion provides some examples of the potential uses of 
conferences. As noted, issues may be resolved only by agreement 
of the parties; they may not be litigated or decided at a confer- 
ence. To do so would exceed, and hence be contrary to, the au- 
thority established under Article 39(a). The prohibition against 
judicial participation in plea bargaining is based on United States 
v. Caruth, 6 M.J. 184, 186 (C.M.A. 1979). Cf: United States v. Al- 
len, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 504, 25 C.M.R. 8 (1957). But, cf: ABAStan- 
dards, Pleas of Guilty 4 14-3.3(c)  (1979). 
(b)  Matters on record. This subsection is based on the second sen- 
tence in Fed. R. Crim. P. 17.1. The federal rule requirement for a 
written memorandum was rejected as too inflexible and unwieldy 
for military practice. The interests of the parties can be ade- 
quately protected by  placing matters on the record orally. If any 
party fears that such an oral statement will be inadequate, that 
party may insist on reducing agreed-upon matters to writing as a 
condition of consent. In any event, a party is not prohibited from 
raising the matters again at trial. See subsection (c) below. 
The waiver provision has been added because the conference is 
not part of the record of trial under Article 54. The purpose of the 
requirement for inclusion in the record is to protect the parties, 
and therefore it may be waived. United States v. Stapleton, 600 
F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1979). 
(c)  Rights of parties.  This subsection does not appear in the fed- 
eral rule. It is intended to ensure that conferences do not become 
a substitute for Article 39(a) sessions. In this respect Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 17.1 is broader than R.C.M. 802, since the federal rule 
apparently includes "conferences" held on the record and permits 
the parties to be bound by matters resolved at the conference. See 
C. Wright, supra at 1  292. 
1991 Amendment: The prohibition against conferences pro- 
ceeding over the objection of any party was eliminated as it con- 
flicted with the military judge's specific authority to order confer- 
ences under section (a) of this rule and general authority to 
control the conduct of court-martial proceedings. While the mili- 
tary judge may compel the attendance of the parties, neither party 
may be compelled to resolve any issue or be pressured to make 
any concessions. 
(d) Accused's presence.  This subsection does not appear in Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 17.1.  The silence of the federal rule on this matter has 
been controversial. See Douglas, J., dissenting from approval of 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 17.1 at 39 F.R.D. 276, 278 (1966). See also 8 J. 
Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 11  17.1.02 [I]; 17.1.03 [3] (1982 
rev. ed.); Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
54 Geo. L. J. 1276, 1294-99  (1966); ABA Standards, Discovery 
and Procedure  Before  Trial 4  11-5.4(a)  (1978). The presence of 
the accused is not necessary in most cases since most matters ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (b) 
dealt with at conferences will not be substantive. The participa- 
tion of the defense in conferences and whether the accused should 
attend are matters to be resolved between defense counsel and the 
accused. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(c)(2)  authorizes conferences concerning 
questions of law to be held without the presence of the accused. 
The  proceedings described in Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(c)(2) are analo- 
gous to those described in Article 39(a)(2), since the  judge may 
make rulings at a 43(c)(2) conference and such a conference is 
"on  the record."  Article 39(a) expressly gives the accused  the 
right to be present at similar proceedings in courts-martial. Be- 
cause of  this inconsistency, Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(c)(2)  is not 
adopted. Questions of law may be discussed at a conference under 
R.C.M.  802, but the military judge may not decide them at such 
conferences. 
(e)  Admission. This subsection is taken from the third sentence of 
Fed. R. Crim. P.  17.1. 
(f)  Limitations. This subsection is based  on the last sentence in 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 17.1, with the addition of the prohibition against 
conferences in special courts-martial without a military judge. 
Rule 803.  Court-martial sessions without 
members under Article 39(a) 
Article 39(a) authorizes the military judge to call and conduct 
sessions outside the presence of members. The discussion con- 
tains a general description, based on paragraph 53d(l) of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.), of the types of matters which  may be dealt with at 
Article 39(a) sessions. The  quoted language in the first paragraph 
of the discussion is found in the legislative history of Article 
39(a). See S. Rep. No. 1601,90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 9-10  (1968). 
The rule modifies the language concerning Article 39(a) ses- 
sions after sentence is announced. The former provision  permit- 
ted such sessions only "when directed by the appropriate review- 
ing authority."  Yet paragraphs 80b and c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) 
implied that a military judge could call such a session on the 
judge's  own motion. R.C.M.  1102 also authorizes such action. 
The  first two paragraphs of the discussion are based on the sec- 
ond and third paragraphs of paragraph 53d(l) of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.), except that the present language omits "defenses"  from 
the matters a military judge may hear at an Article 39(a) session. 
Clearly a military judge does not rule on the merits of a defense at 
an Article 39(a) session, and matters collateral to a defense which 
might be heard at an Article 39(a) session are adequately de- 
scribed elsewhere in the discussion. 
As to the third paragraph of the discussion, see Articles 35 and 
39. See also United States  v.  Pergande, 49 C.M.R. 28 (A.C.M.R. 
1974). 
Rule 804. Presence of the accused at trial 
proceedings 
Introduction. Subsections (a) and (b) of this rule are very simi- 
lar to Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a) and (b). Subsection (c) is derived 
from paragraph 60 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(c) 
was not adopted since it is not compatible with military practice, 
as it concerns corporate defendants, misdemeanor proceedings, 
conferences or arguments upon questions of law, and sentence re- 
duction proceedings. Of these, only presence of the accused at 
conferences or arguments upon questions of law has relation to 
military procedure. Article 39(b) would  preclude absence by the 
accused from arguments, except as provided  in subsection (b). 
Conferences are treated in R.C.M. 802. 
Other differences between this rule and Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 and 
paragraphs 11 and 60 of the MCM, 1969 (Rev.) are discussed be- 
low. 
(a)  Presence required. Article 39 establishes the right of the ac- 
cused to be present at all trial proceedings and Article 39(a) ses- 
sions. The right is grounded in the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the right to confrontation clause of the Sixth 
Amendment of the Constitution. This subsection is basically the 
same as Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a) with modifications in language to 
conform to military procedures. 
The requirement that the accused be  present is not jurisdic- 
tional. While proceeding in the absence of the accused, without 
the express or implied consent of the accused, will normally re- 
quire reversal, the harmless error rule may apply in some in- 
stances. See  United States v.  Walls, 577 F.2d 690 (9th Cir.) cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978); Unitedstates  v. Nelson, 570 F.2d 258 
(8th Cir. 1978); United States  v. Taylor, 562 F.2d  1345 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 853 (1977). 
(b)  Continuedpresence not required. This subsection is similar to 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b). Aside from modifications in terminology, 
two minor substantive changes have been made. First, this sub- 
section specifies that sentencing, as well as trial on the merits, 
may take place when the accused is absent under this rule. Such a 
construction is necessary  in the military because delaying a sen- 
tence determination increases the expense and inconvenience of 
reassembling the court-martial and the risk that such reassembly 
will be impossible. Federal courts do not face a similar problem. 
See  United States  v. Houghtaling, 2 U.S.C.M.A.  230, 235, 8 
C.M.R. 30,35 (1953). 
The second change substitutes the word "arraignment"  for 
"the trial has commenced." This is a clearer demarcation of the 
point after which the accused's  voluntary absence will not pre- 
clude continuation of the proceedings. Since there are several pro- 
cedural steps, such as service of charges, which, while associated 
with the trial process, do not involve a session, the arraignment is 
a more appropriate point of reference. This is consistent with the 
previous military rule. 
The  discussion points out that, although not explicitly stated in 
this subsection (or Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b)), the accused may ex- 
pressly waive the right to be present at trial. Federal courts have 
so construed Rule 43. See  8 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, 
4 43.02[2] (1982 rev. ed.): 
[Rule 431 does not refer to express waiver of presence on the 
part of felony defendants, although it includes such a provision 
for misdemeanants. This omission was not intended to negate the 
right of felony defendants expressly to waive presence at the trial, 
for the Diazcase (Diazv.  United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912)) cited 
as authority for the "voluntary absence" provision itself involved 
an express waiver. [Footnote omitted.] 
See also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291  U.S. 97,  106 (1934) 
(dicta); In  re  United States, 597 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Jones, 514 F.2d  1331 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. 
Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 
(1969); Pearson v.  United States, 325 F.2d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1963); 
Cross v. United States, 325 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Such waiver 
should be made expressly by  the accused in open court. Compare APP. 2% !l(b)  APPE 
Cross v.  United States, supra, with Pearson v. United States, supra. 
Federal cases also establish that there is no right to waive pres- 
ence, see, e.g., United States v. Durham, 587 F.2d  799 (5th Cir. 
1979); United States v. Fitzpatrick, 437 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1970). In 
In re United States, supra, the court stated that there is a duty on 
the part of  a defendant in a felony trial to be present. 597 F.2d at 
28. 
Military cases also recognize that an accused may expressly 
waive the right to be present,  United States v. Blair, 36 C.M.R. 
750 (N.B.R. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 257,36 
C.M.R. 413 (1966). See e.g.,  United States v. Holly, 48 C.M.R. 
990 (A.F.C.M.R.  1974). Cf. United States v.  Cook, 20 
U.S.C.M.A. 504, 43 C.M.R. 344 (1971). Some earlier military 
cases indicated that accused's counsel could waive the accused's 
right to be  present. This is contrary to present authority. See 
United States v. Holly, supra. 
Subsection (1) is similar to paragraph  I Ic of MCM,  1969 
(Rev.). The language in MCM, 1969 (Rev.), which indicated that 
an absence had to be unauthorized, has been omitted. The lan- 
guage now conforms to the federal rule in this respect. The term 
"unauthorized"  has never been treated as significatlt. See  United 
States v. Peebles, 3 M.J.  177 (C.M.A.  1977). As the discussion 
notes in  the fourth paragraph, a person who is in custody or oth- 
erwise subject to military control cannot, while in such a status, 
voluntarily be absent from trial without expressly waiving the 
right on the record and receiving the permission of the military 
judge to be  absent. Cf: United States v.  Crutcher, supra. This ap- 
pears to be  the treatment that the term "unauthorized"  was de- 
signed to effect. See  United States v.  Peebles, supra at 179 (Cook, 
J.). 
Trial in absentia, when an accused voluntarily fails to appear at 
trial following arraignment, has long been permitted in the mili- 
tary. United States v. Houghtaling, supra. Authority for the third 
and fourth paragraphs of the discussion under Voluntary absence 
is found in  United States v. Peebles, supra. United States v. Cook, 
supra requires that the voluntariness of an absence be established 
on the record before trial in absentia may proceed. Because the  .  -
prosecution will be the party moving for trial in absentia, the dis- 
cussion notes that the prosecution has the burden to prove volun- 
tariness as well as absence. The example of an inference is taken 
from Judge Perry's seperate opinion in  United States v. Peebles, 
supra. Compare United States v. Partlow, 428 F.2d 814 (2d. Cir. 
1970) with Phillips v. United States, 334 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1964), 
cert, denied, 379 U.S. 1002 (1965). 
Subsection (2) is the same as Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b)(2) except 
for changes in terminology. The rule and much of the discussion 
are based on  Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). The discussion 
also draws heavily on ABA Standards, Special Functions of the 
Trial Judge 8 6-3.8  and Commentary (1978). With  respect to 
binding an  accused, see  United States v. Gentile, 1 M.J. 69 
(C.M.A. 1975). See  also  United States  v.  Henderson,  11 
U.S.C.M.A. 556, 29 C.M.R. 372 (1960). 
(c)  Appearance and security of accused. This subsection is similar 
to paragraph 60 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
In subsection (I), the last sentence represents a modification of 
previous practice by  making the accused and defense counsel pri- 
marily responsible for the personal appearance of the accused. Be- 
cause of difficulties the defense may face in meeting these respon- 
sibilities, the rule requires the commander to give reasonable 
assistance to the defense when needed. The discussion emphasizes 
the right (see United States v.  West, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 670, 31 
C.M.R. 256 (1962)) and the duty (see United States v.  Gentile, 
supra) of the accused to appear in proper military uniform. 
Subsection (2) reflects the changes since 1969 in rules gov- 
erning pretrial restraint. These rules are now found in the sections 
referred  to by  R.C.M. 804(c)(2). Insofar as paragraph 60 of 
MCM,  1969 (Rev.) was a means of allocating responsibility for 
maintaining (as opposed to authorizing) custody over an accused 
until completion of trial, and insofar as this allocation is not man- 
dated by other rules in this Manual, the service secretaries are au- 
thorized to prescribe rules to accomplish such allocation. 
Subsection (3) is taken verbatim from paragraph 60 of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). 
Rule 805.  Presence of military judge, members, 
and counsel 
(a)  Military judge. This subsection is based on paragraph  39d of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(b)  Members. This subsection is based  on paragraphs 41c and 
41d(l) and (2) and the first sentence of the second paragraph 62b 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and on Article 29(c). See also United States 
v. Colon, 6 M.J. 73 (C.M.A. 1978). 
1986Amendment: References to R.C.M. "91 1"  were changed 
to R.C.M. "912"  to correct an error in MCM, 1984. 
(c)  Counsel. This subsection  modifies paragraphs 44c and 46c 
which required the express permission of the convening authority 
or the military judge for counsel to be absent. The rule now states 
only the minimum requirement to proceed. The discussion noted 
that proceedings ordinarily should not be conducted in the ab- 
sence of any defense or assistant defense counsel unless the ac- 
cused consents. The second sentence in the discussion is based on 
Ungar v. Sarajte, 376 U.S. 575 (1964); United States v. Morris, 23 
U.S.C.M.A. 319,49 C.M.R. 653 (1975); United States v. Kinard, 
2 1  U.S.C.M.A.  300,45 C.M.R. 74 (1972); United States v.  Hamp-
ton, 50 C.M.R. 531 (N.C.M.R.),pet. denied, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 663 
(1975); United States v. Griffiths, 18 C.M.R. 354 (A.B.R.),pet. de-
nied, 6U.S.C.M.A. 808, 19C.M.R.413(1955).SeealsoMorrisv. 
Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983); Dennis v.  United States, 340 U.S.887 
(1950) (statement of Frankfurter, J.); United States v. Batts, 3 
M.J. 440 (C.M.A. 1977); 17 AM. Jur. 2d  $8 3437  (1964). 
(d) Effect of replacement of member or military judge. This sub- 
section is based on Article 29(b), (c), and (d) and on paragraphs 
39e and 41e and f of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). MCM, 1969 (Rev.) also 
provided a similar procedure when a member of a court-martial 
was temporarily excused from the trial. This rule does not author- 
ize such a procedure. If a member must be temporarily absent, a 
continuance should be granted or the member should be perma- 
nently excused and the trial proceed as long as a quorum remains. 
Trial may not proceed with less than a quorum present in any 
event. This subsection provides a means to proceed with a case in 
the rare circumstance in which a court-martial is reduced below a 
quorum after trial on the merits has begun and a mistrial is inap- 
propriate. 
Rule 806.  Public trial 
Introduction. This rule recognizes and codifies the basic princi- 
ple that, with limited exceptions, court-martial proceedings will ANAL.YSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (b) 
be open to the public. The thrust of the rule is similar to para- 
graph 53e of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), but the right to a public trial is 
more clearly expressed, and exceptions to it are more specifically 
and more narrowly drawn. This construction is necessary in light 
of recent decisions, particularly  United States v.  Grunden, 2 M.J. 
116 (C.M.A. 1977). 
(a)  In general. This subsection reflects the holding in  United 
States v. Grunden, supra, that the accused has a right to a public 
trial under the Sixth Amendment.  See also United States  v. 
Brown, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 251, 22 C.M.R. 41 (1956); United States v. 
Zimmerman, 19 C.M.R. 806 (A.F.B.R.  1955). 
Although the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is per- 
sonal to the accused (see Gannett Co., Inc.  v. DePasquale, 443 
U.S. 368 (1979)), the public has a right under the First Amend- 
ment to attend criminal trials. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.  Vir- 
ginia, 448 U.S.  555 (1980). The applicability of these cases to 
courts-martial is not certain (cf: Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 
(1976); In re  Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,26 n. 12 (1948); but see United 
States v. Czarnecki, 10 M.J. 570 (A.F.C.M.R. 1980) (dicta)), espe- 
cially in view of the practical differences between civilian courts 
and courts-martial (i.e., courts-martial do not necessarily sit at a 
permanent or fixed site; they may sit overseas or at sea; and at re- 
mote or dangerous locations). Nevertheless the rule and the dis- 
cussion are based on recognition of the value to the public of nor- 
mally having courts-martial open to the public. This is 
particularly  true since the public includes members of the mili- 
tary community. 
(b)  Control of spectators.  Neither the accused nor the public has 
an absolute right to a public trial. This subsection recognizes the 
power of a military judge to regulate attendance at courts-martial 
to strike a balance between the requirement for a public trial and 
other important interests. 
As the discussion notes, the right to public trial may be violated 
by  less than total exclusion of the public. See  United States v. 
Brown, supra. Whether exclusion of a segment of the public is 
proper depends on a number of factors including the breadth of 
the exclusion, the reasons for it, and the interest of the accused, as 
well as the spectators involved, in the presence of the excluded in- 
dividuals. See  United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 
691 (7th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1076 (1978); United 
States ex rel. Lloyd v.  Vincent, 520 F.2d  1272 (2d Cir.), cert. de- 
nied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975). See also Stamicarbon  v. American Cy- 
anamid Co., 506 F.2d  532 (2d Cir. 1974). 
The third paragraph  in the discussion of Rule 805(b) is based 
on United States v. Grunden, supra. 
Judicial authority to regulate access to the courtroom to pre- 
vent overcrowding or other disturbances is clearly established 
and does not conflict with the right to a public trial. See Rich- 
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, supra at 581 n. 18 C'  Illinois v. 
Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). In addition, there is substantial au- 
thority to support the example in the discussion concerning re- 
stricting access to protect certain witnesses.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Eisner, 533 F.2d 987 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 
(1976) (proper to exclude all spectators except press to avoid em- 
barrassment of extremely timid witness); United States ex rel. Or- 
lando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 
1008 (1966) (proper to exclude all spectators except press and bar 
to avoid intimidation of witnesses); United States ex rel. Latimore 
v. Sielafi  supra (proper to exclude all spectators except press, 
clergy, and others with specific interest in presence during testi- 
mony of alleged rape victim); United States ex rel. Lloyd  v.  Vin-
cent, supra (proper to exclude spectators in order to preserve con- 
fidentiality of undercover agents' identity). See also Gannett Co., 
Inc.  v. DePasquale, supra at 401-500  (Powell J., concurring); 
United States v. Brown, supra; United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 
(3rd Cir. 1949). 
Subsection (b) authorizes closure of court-martial proceedings 
over the accused's objection only when otherwise authorized in 
this Manual. Effectively, this means that the only time trial pro- 
ceedings may be closed without the consent of the accused is 
when classified information is to be introduced. See Mil. R. Evid. 
5056). Article 39(a) sessions may also be closed under Mil. R. 
Evid. 505(i); 506(i); and 412(c). Some federal cases seem to sug- 
gest that criminal proceedings may be closed for other purposes. 
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lloyd v.  Vincent, supra. Selective  ex- 
clusion of certain individuals or groups for good cause, under the 
first clause of this subsection, is a more appropriate and less con- 
stitutionally questionable method for dealing with the problems 
treated in such cases. 
Court-martial  proceedings may be closed when the accused 
does not object. As noted in the discussion, however, such closure 
should not automatically be granted merely because the defense 
requests or acquiesces in it. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. 
Virginia, supra. See also Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, supra. 
With respect to methods of dealing with the effect of publicity 
on criminal trials, as treated in the discussion, see Nebraska Press 
Association  v.  Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Sheppard  v.  Maxwell, 
384 U.S. 333 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Ir-
vin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961);  United States v. Calley, 46 
C.M.R.  1131 (A.C.M.R.),affd,  22 U.S.C.M.A. 534, 48 C.M.R. 
19 (1973); Caley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d  184 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 425 U.S.  91 1 (1976). See also ABA Standards, Fair Trial 
and Free Press part I11 (1972). 
(c)  Photography  and broadcasting prohibited.  This subsectiqn is 
based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 53, and is consistent with paragraph 
53e of MCM,  1969 (Rev.) and practice thereunder. See C. 
Wright, Wright's Federal Practice and Procedure § 861 (1969); 8B 
J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice  7 53.02 (1982 rev. ed.). The 
exception which authorizes contemporaneous transmission of the 
proceedings to another room (e.g., by closed circuit television) 
has been added to the language of the federal rule. Many military 
courtrooms have limited space, and such methods have been used 
to accommodate the accused's and the public's interest in attend- 
ance at courts-martial, as in the case of United States v. Garwood, 
NMC 81-1982  (1981). The Working Group considered the con- 
stitutional alternatives identified in Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 
560 (1981), but determined that Article 36 requires adherence to 
the federal rule except to the extent described. As to the matters 
in the discussion, see Amsler v.  United States, 381 F.2d 37 (9th 
Cir. 1967). 
Rule 807. Oaths 
(a)  Definition. This rule and the discussion are taken from para- 
graph 112a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 54(c). 
(b)  Oaths in courts-martial. Subsection (1) including the discus- 
sion is based on Article 42 and is based on paragraph  1126 and c 
of MCM,  1969 (Rev.). Subsection (2) is taken from paragraph 
112d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The discussion is taken in part from paragraph  112d and in  part from paragraph 114 of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). The oath for questioning members has been combined 
with the oath concerning performance of duties for administra- 
tive convenience and to impress upon the members the signifi- 
cance of voir dire. The reference in paragraph 112a of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.), to Article 135 has been deleted. The  oaths for prefer- 
ral of charges, and witnesses at Article 32 investigations and dep- 
ositions are contained in the discussion of applicable rules. 
Rule 808.  Record of trial 
The  primary purpose of this rule is to highlight for participants 
at the trial stage the requirements for the record of trial. The  dis- 
cussion is based  on paragraph  82a, b, and h, of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). See also United States v.  Eichenlaub, 11 M.J. 239 (C.M.A. 
1981); United States v.  McCullah,  11 M.J. 234 (C.M.A.  1981); 
United States v.  Boxdale, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 414, 47 C.M.R. 351 
(1973); United States v.  Bielecki, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 450, 45 C.M.R. 
224 (1972);  United States v.  DeWayne, 7 M.J. 755 (A.C.M.R.), 
pet. denied, 8 M.J. 25 (1979); United States v.  Hensley, 7 M.J. 740 
(A.F.C.M.R.), pet. denied, 8 M.J. 42 (1979);  United States v. 
Pearson, 6 M.J. 953 (A.C.M.R.), pet. denied, 7 M.J. 164 (1979). 
The preparation, authentication, and disposition of records of 
trial is covered in Chapter XI. The administrative responsibility 
of trial counsel to prepare the record is codal. Article 38(a). See 
also R.C.M. 1103(b). 
Rule 809.  Contempt proceedings 
(a) In general. This subsection restates codal authority. The dis- 
cussion is based on paragraph  118a of MCM 1969 (Rev.). The 
language of Article 48 applies only to "direct"  contempts. See W. 
Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 301-302  (2d ed. 1920 re- 
print); paragraph  101 of MCM, 1928; paragraph  109 of MCM 
(Army), 1949; paragraph 118a of MCM, 1951; paragraph 118a of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The definition of a "direct"  contempt is also 
based on these sources. See also 8B J. Moore, Moore's  Federal 
Practice 142.02[3] (1982 rev. ed); 18 U.S.  5 401; cf: Ex parte 
Savin, 131 U.S. 267, witnessed by the court and other direct con- 
tempts is based on Cooke v.  United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925), 
and is inportant for procedural purposes. See subsection (b) be- 
low. 
(b)  Method of  disposition.  The subsection is based on Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 42. By its terms, Article 48 makes punishable con- 
temptous behavior which, while not directly witnessed by  the 
court-martial, disturbs its proceedings (e.g., a disturbance in the 
waiting room). As Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b) recognizes, this type of 
contempt may not be punished summarily. See Johnson v.  Missis- 
sippi, 403 U.S. 212 (1971); Cooke v.  United States, supra. Para- 
graph 118 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) did not adequately distinguish 
these types of contempt. There may be technical and practical 
problems associated with proceeding under subsection (b)(2) but 
the power to do so appears to exist under Article 48. 
(c)  Procedure;  who may punish for  contempt. This subsection 
prescribes different procedures for punishment for contempt 
when  members are or are not present. The Working Group ex- 
amined the possibility of vesting contempt power solely in the 
military judge; but Article 48 provides that "court[s]-martial" 
may punish for contempt. When members are present, the mili- 
tary judge is not the court-martial. See Article 16. When trial by 
military judge alone is requested and approved, the military judge 
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is the court-martial. Under Article 39(a) the military judge may 
"call the court into session without the presence of the members," 
and the military judge therefore acts as the court-martial within 
the meaning of Article  16 and 48. Since Article 48 authorizes 
summary punishment for contempt committed in the presence of 
the court-martial (see Hearings of  H. R.  2498 Before  a Subcomm. 
of  the House Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1060 
(1949)),  its purpose would be destroyed by requiring members 
who were not present and did not observe the behavior to decide 
the matter. The  second sentence in subsection (c)(l) parallels Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 42(a). 
The procedure for contempt proceedings before members has 
been simplified to the extent possible consistent with the require- 
ment for the members to decide the issue. The procedure for a 
preliminary ruling by the military judge to decide as a matter of 
law that no contempt has occurred is expressly recognized for the 
first time. See Article 51(b). The requirement  for a two-thirds 
vote on findings and punishment is based on Article 52(a) and 
(b)(3). 
(d) Record;  review.  This subsection is based on the eighth para- 
graph of paragraph 118b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) concerning the re- 
cord and post-trial action. The  requirement for approval and exe- 
cution of the sentence by the convening authority is based on 
previous practice. See W. Winthrop, supra at 301-312;  paragraph 
101 of MCM, 1928, paragraph 109 of MCM (Army) and MCM 
(AF), 1949, paragraph 11  8 of MCM, 195  1; paragraph 1  18b of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). This requirement also reflects the need of the 
command to control its assets. The last sentence is also based on 
Hearings on H.  R.  2498 Before  a Subcomm. of  the House Comm. 
on Armed Services, 81st Cong.,  1st Sess. 1060 (1949). 
(e)  Sentence. This subsection is based on Article 57 and para- 
graph  118b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). It clarifies that the military 
judge may delay announcement of a sentence to permit participa- 
tion of the contemnor when necessary. Paragraph 118b of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.) was ambiguous in this regard. 
(f)  Informing person  held in contempt. This subsection and the 
discussion are based on paragraph 118b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); it 
has been modified for clarity. 
Rule 810.  Procedures for rehearings, new trials, 

and other trials 

Introduction. This rule is based on Articles 63 and 73. It con- 
cerns only the procedures for rehearings, new trials, and other tri- 
als. Matters relating to ordering rehearings or new trials are cov- 
ered in R.C.M. 1107 and 1210. 
(a) In general. This subsection is based  on paragraph  81b of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(b)  Composition. This subsection is based on Article 63(b) and 
the seventh paragraph of paragraph 92a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
As to subsection (3),  see also United States v.  Staten, 21 
U.S.C.M.A. 493,45 C.M.R. 267 (1972). 
(c)  Examination of  record of  formerproceedings. This subsection 
is based on paragraph 8lc  of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(d)  Sentence limitations. Subsection (1) is based on the second 
sentence of Article 63 and its legislative history. See H. R. Rep. 
No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1949) and paragraph  81d of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v.  Ball, 163 U.S. 662 
(1896);  United States v.  Culver, 22 U.S.C.M.A.  141, 46 C.M.R. 
141 (1973);  United States v.  Eschmann, 11 U.S.C.M.A.  64, 28 ANAl-YSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (e) 
C.M.R. 288 (1959); United States v. Jones, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 532,28 
C.M.R. 98 (1959);  United States v. Dean, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 721, 23 
C.M.R. 185 (1957). The provision (prohibiting advising members 
of the basis of the sentence limitation) in the third paragraph of 
paragraph 81d(l) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) has been placed, in preca- 
tory language, in the discussion. The prohibition was based  on 
United States v. Eschmann, supra. Analysis of Contents, Manual 
for  Courts-Martial, United States, 1969, Revised  edition, DA 
PAM 27-2  at 15-2  (1970). The rationale of Eschmann is subject 
to reasonable challenge. See  United States v. Gutierrez, 11 M.J. 
122, 125 n.3 (C.M.A. 1981) (Everett, C. J., concurring in the re- 
sult);  United States v. Eschmann, supra at 67, 28 C.M.R. at 291 
(Latimer, J., concurring in the result). By placing an admonition 
against such instructions in the discussion, rather than a prohibi- 
tion in the rule, users are alerted to current decisional require- 
ments while the issue is left open to future judicial development. 
Subsection (2) is based  on the last sentence of Article 63, as 
amended, Military Justice Act of  1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, 
5  5(d)(2)(C),  97 Stat. 1393 (1983). 
(e)  Definition. This definition is taken from paragraph  81d(2) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See also paragraph 926 of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). 
Rule 811.  Stipulations 
(a)  In general. This subsection restates the first sentence of para- 
graph 54fll) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(b)  Authority to reject. This subsection affirms the authority of the 
military judge to decline to accept a stipulation, as an exercise of 
discretion and in the interest of justice. This authority was im- 
plicit in paragraph 54fll) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) which suggested 
that stipulations should not be accepted in certain circumstances. 
These examples are now included in the discussion.  See  also 
United States v. Cambridge, 3 U.S.C.M.A.  377, 12 C.M.R. 133 
(1953); United States v. Field, 27 C.M.R. 863 (N.B.R. 1958). 
(c)  Requirements. This subsection makes clear that a stipulation 
can be received only with the consent of the parties. This consent 
must be manifested in some manner before the military judge may 
receive the stipulation, although the rule does not specify any par- 
ticular form for the manifestation, as this rests within the discre- 
tion of the trial judge.  United States v.  Cambridge, supra. Al-
though it is normally preferable to obtain it, the express consent 
of the accused on the record is not always necessary for admission 
of a stipulation. In the absence of circumstances indicating lack of 
consent by the accused (see e.g., United States v.  Williams, 30 
C.M.R. 650 (N.B.R. 1960)), the defense counsel's concurrence in 
the stipulation will bind the accused. United States v. Cambridge, 
supra.  If there is any doubt, the accused should be personally 
questioned. See United States v. Barbeau, 9 M.J. 569 (A.F.C.M.R. 
1980). 
The last three paragraphs of the discussion deal with stipula- 
tion  "which  practically  amount to a confession."  Paragraph 
54f(l)  of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), states that such a confession 
"should  not be received in evidence."  Despite this admonition, 
such stipulations were occasionally received in order to allow the 
defense to avoid waiving certain issues by pleading guilty while 
saving the parties the time and expense of a full trial when the ac- 
cused's guilt, as a practical if not legal matter, was conceded. See, 
e.g., United States v. Rempe, 49 C.M.R. 367 (A.F.C.M.R. 1974). 
The Court of Military Appeals has approved this procedure, but 
only if an inquiry of the sort described in the discussion is con- 
ducted. United States v. Bertelson, 3 M.J. 314 (C.M.A. 1977). The 
definition of a stipulation which practically amounts to a confes- 
sion in the discussion is based  on Bertelson, along with United 
States v. Schaffer,  12 M.J. 425, 427428 nn. 4.6 (C.M.A. 1982);; 
United States v. Reagan, 7 M.J. 490 (C.M.A.  1979); United States 
v. Aiello, 7 M.J. 99 (C.M.A.  1979); and  United States v. Long, 3 
M.J. 400 (C.M.A.  1977). These cases indicate that a stipulation 
practically amounts to a confession when it amounts to a "de 
facto"  plea of guilty, rather than simply one which makes out a 
prima facie  case. The example in the discussion is taken from 
United States v. Long, supra. 
(d)  Withdrawal. This subsection is taken, substantially verbatim, 
from paragraph 54fll) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), and restates current 
law. See  also United States v. Daniels,  11 U.S.C.M.A. 52, 28 
C.M.R. 276 (1959). 
(e)  Effect of stipulations. This subsection modifies previous Man- 
ual rules in two respects. First, it states that a stipulation of fact is 
binding on the court-martial. This is consistent with federal prac- 
tice, see e.g., Jackson v.  United States, 330 F.2d 679 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied. 379 U.S. 855 (1964), as well as the prevailing view in 
the vast majority of states. See 4 J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evi- 
dence 5  2590 (3d ed. 1940); 73 Am. Jur. 2d. Stipulations,  5  8 
(1974); 83 C.J.S.  Stipulations,  $9 12-13  (1953). See  also H. 
Hackfield & Co. v. United States, 197 U.S. 442 (1905). Paragraph 
1546 of MCM, 1951, contained the following provision:  "The 
court is not bound by a stipulation even if received. For instance 
its own inquiry may convince the court that the stipulated fact is 
not true."  The provision  was drawn verbatim from paragraph 
1406 of MCM (Army), 1949, and of MCM(AF), 1949 and can be 
traced to paragraph  1266 of MCM, 1928. The Court of  Military 
Appeals questioned the validity of this provision in United States 
v.  Gerlach, 16 U.S.C.M.A.  383, 37 C.M.R. 3 (1966), but did not 
have to resolve whether the court-martial was bound by a stipula- 
tion of fact, since it held that the parties were. The above quoted 
language was omitted from MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  The analysis to 
the Manual does not explain why. See Analysis of  Contents, Man- 
ual for  Courts-Martial, 1969, Revised  Edition, DA PAM 27-2  at 
2749  (1970).  Despite this omission, some courts-martial have 
apparently continued to apply the earlier rule. See Military Crimi- 
nal Law, Evidence DA  PAM 27-22,  AFP 11 1-8  at paragraph 62 
(1975). There is no reason not to follow federal practice on this 
matter. If the court-martial's  "own  inquiry" indicates that the 
stipulated facts may not be true, the parties should be afforded the 
opportunity to withdraw from the stipulation and to present &i- 
dence on the matter in question. 
The  second change is in the treatment of stipulations of a docu- 
ment's contents. MCM, 1969 (Rev.), applied the same "observa- 
tions"  it made concerning stipulations of facts to stipulations of 
documents' contents thus implying that, by stipulating to a docu- 
ments' contents, the parties agreed that the contents are true. This 
may have been due to the treatment of admissions concerning 
documents' contents as a matter of civil procedure in Federal 
courts, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 (1948) (since replaced by Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 36 (1970)); see also Wigmore, supra, 5  2596, and the fact 
that stipulations of a documents' contents, like stipulations of 
fact, are handed to the members of the court. Yet, it is clear that 
the parties may stipulate that a document contains certain text or 
other information, or that a given document is genuine, without APP. 21,  (e)  APPENDIX 21 
necessarily agreeing that the text or other information in the doc- 
ument is true. In this sense, a stipulation as to a document's con- 
tents is like a stipulation of expected testimony, and the rule so 
treats it. 
Otherwise, this subsection essentially restates paragraph 54fll) 
and (2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v.  Bennett, 
18 U.S.C.M.A. 96, 39 C.M.R. 96 (1969) and United States v.  Ger- 
lach, supra for further discussion of the effects of stipulations. If 
the parties fail to object to inadmissible matters in a stipulation, 
this will normally constitute a waiver of such objection. Mil. R. 
Evid. 103. Cf:  United States v.  Schell, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 410, 40 
C.M.R. 122 (1969). See also Wigmore, supra at 9 2592. 
(0 Procedure. This subsection is based on the second paragraph 
in paragraph 54fl2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Rule 812.  Joint and common trials 
This rule is taken from paragraph 53c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
The  rule itself substantially repeats the first sentence in paragraph 
53c. The  discussion refers to other rules dealing with joint or  com- 
mon trials, and includes the examples discussed in paragraph 53c 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). It also incorporates a statement on stipula- 
tions which appeared at paragraph 54fl3) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), 
and a statement concerning severances from paragraph  61h of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The rule does not change current law. 
Rule 813.  Announcing personnel of the court- 
martial and accused 
This rule is based on paragraph 61c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and 
is placed in Chapter 8 since the requirement for announcing the 
presence or absence of parties usually recurs several times during 
the trial. The rule has been rephrased to acknowledge the respon- 
sibility of the military judge to ensure that the matters covered are 
reflected in the record. Paragraph 61c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) re- 
quired the trial counsel to make these announcements. This rule 
leaves to the discretion of the military judge who will make the 
announcements. The importance of requiring such announce- 
ments to be made on the record is emphasized in United States v. 
Nichelson, 18 U.S.C.M.A.  69, 39 C.M.R. 69 (1968). 
CHAPTER IX. TRIAL PROCEDURE THROUGH 
FINDINGS 
Rule 901.  Opening session 
Introduction. R.C.M. 901 through 903 set out in chronological 
order the procedures to be followed before arraignment. The or- 
der need not be followed rigidly. 
(a)  Call to order. This subsection is based on the first sentence in 
paragraph 61 b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The purpose of the subsec- 
tion is to establish a definite point to indicate when a court-mar- 
tial is in session. The first paragraph in the discussion is taken 
from paragraph 61a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), but the present provi- 
sion has been expanded to include comparing the record of the re- 
ferral on the charge sheet with the convening orders to ensure 
that they are consistent. The other matters in paragraphs 61a and 
b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), are omitted here as unnecessary. 
The second paragraph in the discussion is based on paragraph 
58c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and serves as a reminder of the Article 
35 requirements. See United States v.  Pergande, 49 C.M.R. 28 
(A.C.M.R. 1974). The failure to object is normally a waiver of the 
statutory right.  United States v.  Lum  bus,  48 C.M.R. 61  3 
(A.C.M.R.  1974). Because of the importance of the right, how- 
ever, the military judge should secure an affirmative waiver. See 
United States v.  Perna,  1 U.S.C.M.A.  438, 4 C.M.R. 30 (1952); 
United States v.  Pergande, supra. 
(b)  Announcement of  parties. This subsection is based  on para- 
graph 61c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  Requiring an announcement is 
intended to guard against inadvertently proceeding in the absence 
of necessary personnel and to ensure that the record reflects the 
presence of required personnel.  Failure to make the announce- 
ment is not error if it otherwise appears that no essential person- 
nel were absent. 
(c)  Swearing reporter and interpreter. This subsection and its dis- 
cussion are taken directly from paragraph 61d of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). 
(d)  Counsel. This subsection, except for subsection (4)(A) and 
(D), is based on paragraphs 61e and f of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The 
qualifications of counsel and matters which disqualify counsel are 
treated at R.C.M. 502(d) and are not repeated here. The subsec- 
tion makes clear that at trial the military judge is responsible for 
determining whether counsel is disqualified, Soriano v.  Hosken, 9 
M.J. 221 (C.M.A. 1980), and for seeing that appropriate action is 
taken. Of course, if a detailed counsel is disqualified the responsi- 
bility will fall upon the convening authority to rectify the prob- 
lem. The discussion points out that defects in the qualification  of 
counsel are not jurisdictional.  Wright v.  United States, 2 M.J. 9 
(C.M.A.  1976). Subsection (4)(A) has been added to conform to 
the requirements of  United States v.  Donohew,  18 U.S.C.M.A. 
149,39 C.M.R. 149 (1969). Cf:  Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(c). Subsection 
(4)(D) is based  on Fed. R. Crim. P. 44(c)  and  United States v. 
Breese, 11 M.J. 17 (C.M.A. 1981). See also United States v.  Davis, 
3 M.J. 430 (C.M.A.  1977); United States v.  Blakey, 1 M.J. 247 
(C.M.A. 1976); United States v.  Evans, 1 M.J. 206 (C.M.A.  1975). 
(e)  Presence of  members. This subsection is new. Its purpose is to 
eliminate unnecessary attendance by members. Accord Article 
39(a). 
Rule 902.  Disqualification  of military judge 
Introduction. This rule is based on 28 U.S.C. 9 455, which is it- 
self based on Canon I11 of the ABA  Code of  Judicial Conduct, and 
on paragraph 62 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
The procedures prescribed  by  28 U.S.C.  9 144 were not 
adopted. That statute provides that whenever a party "files  a 
timely and sufficient affidavit that the  judge before whom the mat- 
ter is pending has a personal  bias or prejudice either against him 
or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no fur- 
ther therein." This section does not establish a different test from 
28 U.S.C. 5 455 for disqualification  for prejudice or bias. Instead, 
28 U.S.C.  9 144 provides a procedure mechanism by  which the 
disqualification determination may be made. United States v. 
Sibla, 624 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Parrish v.  Board of 
Commissioners of  Alabama State Bar, 524 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(en banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). 
This procedure is not practicable for courts-martial because of 
the different structure of the military judiciary  and the limited 
number of military judges. 
(a)  In general. This subsection is, except for changes in terminol- 
ogy, identical to 28 U.S.C. 5 455(a). See also paragraph 62fl13) of ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (e) 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.);  United States v.  Conley, 4 M.J. 327 (C.M.A. 
1978); United States v.  Head, 2 M.J. 131 (C.M.A. 1977). 
(b)  Specific grounds.  The stem and  subsection (1)  are, with 
changes in terminology, identical to the stem and  subsection (1) 
of  28  U.S.C. 5 455(b). See also paragraph  62fl13)  of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). Note that any interest or bias to be disqualifying must be 
personal, not judicial, in nature. Berger v.  United States, 255 U.S. 
22 (1921);  Azhocar v.  United Stales, 581 F.2d  735 (9th  Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 440 U.S.  907 (1979);  United States v. Lewis, 6 M.J. 43 
(C.M.A. 1978); United States v.  Grance, 2 M.J. 846 (A.C.M.R. 
1976); United States v.  Stewart, 2 M.J. 423 (A.C.M.R. 1975).  See 
also United States v.  Lynch, 13 M.J. 394, 398, n. 3 (C.M.A. 1982) 
(Everett,  C.J. concurring). 
Subsection (2)  is based on paragraphs 62fl5),  (6),  and  (1  1)  of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See  United States v.  Goodman, 3 M.J.  1 
(C.M.A. 1977). These grounds are analogous to the disqualifying 
activities in 28  U.S.C. 5 455(b)(2). 
Subsection (3)  is based on paragraphs 62fl3),  (4),  (9),  (lo),  and 
(13)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See also Mil. R. Evid. 605; United 
States v.  Cooper, 8 M.J. 5 (C.M.A  1979); United States v. Bradley, 
7 M.J. 332 (C.M.A. 1979). The purpose of  this section is analo- 
gous to  that of  28  U.S.C. 5 455(b)(3). 
Subsection (4)  is based on Article 26 and  paragraph 62fll)  and 
(2)  and  62g of  MCM, 1969 (Rev).  The matters in 28 U.S.C. 
5 455(b)(4)  regarding financial interest in the proceedings are not 
of  significance in courts-martial. The remote possibility  that a 
judge or a member of  the family might have a financial interest in 
the outcome of  a court-martial is adequately covered  in subsec- 
tion (5)  of  this rule. 
Subsection  (5)  is taken directly from 28  U.S.C. 5 455(b)(5), 
with the added  clarification that the interest in subsection  (C) 
may be financial or otherwise. 
The discussion is based on 28  U.S.C.  5 455(c). 
(c) Definitions. Subsections (1)  and  (2)  are, with changes in ter- 
minology, identical to 28  U.S.C.  5 455(d)(l)  and  (2).  Subsection 
(3)has been added to  clarify that the president of  a special court- 
martial  without a military judge  is treated as any other member 
for purposes of  qualifications and  challenges. See R.C.M. 912. 
Subsection (3)  of  28  U.S.C.  5 455(d)  is unnecessary. 
(d) Procedure. This section including the discussion is based on 
Article 41 and  paragraph 62d, g, and  h of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(e) Waiver. This section is, with changes in terminology, identical 
to 28  U.S.C. 5 455(e). 
Rule 903. Accused's elections on composition of 
court-martial 
(a) Time ofelections. This subsection is based on Articles 16, 18, 
19, and  25. It is similar to paragraphs 53d(2)(c)  and 61g and  h of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  insofar as  it  concerns the timing of  requests 
for enlisted members of  trial by military judge  alone. It  parallels 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a).  Section (b)  of  Fed. R.  Crim. P. 23 is inap- 
plicable in the military, and the matters covered in Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 23(c)  are covered in R.C.M. 918(b). 
Article 25  states  that a request for enlisted  members must be 
made before the end of  an Article 39(a) session, if  any. The first 
Article 39(a)  session is appropriate to consider these matters. Al- 
though the Court of  Military Appeals has not decided  the issue 
(United Slates v. Morris, 23 U.S.C.M.A.  319, 321, 49 C.M.R.  653, 
655 n.2 (1975)),  the Working Group concluded  that this does not 
establish a  jurisdictional  deadline. Cf: United States v.  Bryant, 23 
U.S.C.M.A. 326, 49 C.M.R. 660 (1975);  United States v.  Morris, 
supra (Article 16 requirement that request be submitted before  as- 
sembly is not jurisdictional). To  permit greater flexibility,  the mil- 
itary judge  is authorized to permit  the defense to defer a request 
for enlisted  members until a later time. Such a request should be 
granted for good  cause only, bearing in mind the burden which it 
may impose on the Government. 
A  request for trial by military judge  alone should  be made at 
the initial Article 39(a) session to simplify procedure  and  facili- 
tate scheduling and  preparation.  However, since Article  16  gives 
the accused  a statutory right to wait until assembly to request 
trial  by military judge  alone, subsection (2)  allows automatic 
deferral of  this request. 
The  discussion points out the statutory limits on requesting en- 
listed  members or trial by military judge  alone. See Articles 16, 
18, and  25. 
(b) Form ofelection. This subsection is based on Articles  16  and 
25. The amendment of  Article  16  permits a request for trial by 
military judge alone to  be made orally on the record. Military Jus- 
tice Act of  1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209,  5 3(a),  97 Stat. 1393 (1983). 
(c) Action on request. This subsection is based on Articles  16  and 
25. Subsection (2)(A)  is based on Article  16(1)(B)  and  on para- 
graph 53d(2)(C)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  It does not require an in- 
quiry of  the accused by the military judge, although, as the discus- 
sion points  out, it is good  practice to do so, and  failure to do so 
could  be error if  the record otherwise left the accused's under- 
standing of  the rights in doubt. See S. Rep. No. 53, 98th Cong., 
1st Sess. 12  (1983); United States v.  Parkes, 5 M.J. 489 (C.M.A. 
1978); United States v.  Turner, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 167, 43 C.M.R. 7 
(1970); United States v.  Jenkins, 20 U.S.C.M.A.  112, 42 C.M.R. 
304 (1970).  This is consistent with prevailing federal civilian prac- 
tice. See, e.g.,  Estrada v.  United States, 457 F.2d  255 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 858 (1972); United States v.  Mitchell, 427 
F.2d  1280 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Straite, 425 F.2d  594 
(D.C.  Cir. 1970); United States v.  Hunt, 413 F.2d  983 (4th Cir. 
1969);  but see  United States v. Scott, 583 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1978) 
(establishing requirement for personal  inquiry into  jury  waiver in 
Seventh Circuit). See generally  8AJ. Moore, Moore's Federal 
Practice 7 23.03[2]  (1982 rev. ed.). 
Subsection (2)(B)  is based on Article 16(1)(B)  which makes 
trial by military judge  alone contingent on approval by the mili- 
tary judge. See Unitedstates v.  Morris, supra at 324,49 C.M.R.  at 
658. The  discussion is based on United States v. Butler, 14 M-J.  72 
(C.M.A.  1982); United States v.  Ward,  3 M.J. 365 (C.M.A. 1977); 
United States v.  Bryant, supra. 
1986 Amendment: Subsection (3)  was amended  to reflect 
clearly that requests for trial by military judge alone need  not be 
in writing. 
(d)  Right to withdraw request. Subsection (I) is based on U~ziled 
States v.  Stipe, 23 U.S.C.M.A.  11, 48 C.M.R.  267 (1974). 
Subsection (2)  is based on the fifth sentence  of  paragraph 39e 
and on paragraph 53d  (2)(b)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.),  and  current 
practice. 
(e) Untimely requests. This subsection is based on Articles 16  and 
25, and  United States v. Jeanbaptiste, 5 M.J. 374 (C.M.A. 1978); 
United States v.  Thorpe, 5 M.J. 186 (C.M.A. 1978); United States 
v.  Wright, 5 M.J.  106 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v.  Bryant, APP.2 1, 7 (e)  APPENDIX 21 
supra. See also United States v.  Holmen, 586 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 
1978). 
Despite dicta in  United States v.  Bryant, supra at 328, 49 
C.M.R. at 662 n. 2, that withdrawal must be in writing, the rule 
prescribes no format for withdrawal.  Cf:  Article 16(1)(B), as 
amended, see Military Justice Act of  1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, 
$ 3(a), 97 Stat. 1393 (1983). 
1987 Amendment: Subsections (b)(l), (c)(l) and (c)(3) were 
amended to reflect an amendment to Article 25(c)(l) UCMJ, in 
the "Military Justice Amendments of 1986," tit. VIII, 5 803, Na- 
tional Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year  1987, Pub. L. 
No. 99-661,  100 Stat. 3905, (1986). See Analysis R.C.M. 503. 
Rule 904.  Arraignment 
This rule is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 10 and paragraph 65a of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The second sentence of Fed. R. Crim. P. 10 
has been deleted as unnecessary since in military practice the ac- 
cused will have been served with charges before arraignment. Ar- 
ticle 35; R.C.M. 602. the discussion is based on paragraph 65 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Rule 905.  Motions generally 
Introduction. This rule is based generally on Fed. R. Crim. P. 
12 and 47 and paragraphs 66 and 67 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Spe- 
cific similarities and differences are discussed below. 
(a)  Definitions and form. The first sentence of this subsection is 
taken from the first sentence of paragraph 666 of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). It is consistent with the first sentence of Fed. R. Crim. P. 
47 and the second sentence of Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(a). The second 
sentence is based on the second sentence of paragraph 67c of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.), although to be consistent with Federal prac- 
tice (see Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) (second sentence) and 47 (second 
sentence)) express authority for the military judge to exercise dis- 
cretion over the form of motions has been added. The third sen- 
tence is based on the third sentence of Fed. R. Crim. P. 47 and is 
consistent with the first sentence of paragraph 67c and the fourth 
sentence of  paragraph 69a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The last sen- 
tence in this subsection is based on the third sentence of para- 
graph 67c of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Although no parallel provision 
appears in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, this standard 
is  similar to federal practice. See Marteney v.  United States, 216 
F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1954); United States v.  Rosenson, 291 F. Supp. 
867 (E.D. La. 1968), affd, 417 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1969); cert. de- 
nied, 397 U.S. 962 (1970). The last sentence in Fed. R. Crim. P. 
47, allowing a motion to be supported by affidavit, is not included 
here. See subsection (h) of this rule and Mil. R. Evid. 104(a). See 
generally Fed. R. Crim. P. 47 Notes Of  Advisory Committee on 
Rules n. 3. 
(b)  Pretrial motions. This subsection, except for subsection (6), is 
based on Fed. R. Crim. P.  12(b). Subsections (1) and (2) have 
been modified to conform to military practice and are consistent 
with the first two sentences of paragraph 67b of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). Subsection  (3) is consistent  with  Mil. R. Evid. 
304(d)(2)(A); 3  11(d)(2)(A); 321(c)(2)(A). The discussion is based 
on paragraph  69A of MCM, 1969 (rev.). Subsection (4) is new. 
See R.C.M. 701; 703; 1001(e). Subsection (5) is also new. Subsec- 
tion (6) is based on paragraphs 46d and 48b(4) of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.) and United States v.  Redding, 11 M.J. 100 (C.M.A. 1981). 
(c)  Burden of  proof: This subsection is based  on paragraphs 
57g(l) and 67e of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The assignment of the bur- 
den of persuasion to the moving party is a minor change from the 
language in paragraph 67e of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), which placed 
the burden on the accused "generally."  The effect is basically the 
same, however, since the former rule probably was intended to 
apply to motions made by  the accused. See also United States v. 
Graham, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 75,46 C.M.R. 75 (1972). Theexceptions 
to this general rule in subsection (B) are based on paragraphs 
68b(1), 68c, and 215e of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United 
States v.  McCarthy, 2 M.J. 26, 28 n. 1 (C.M.A.  1976); United 
States v.  Graham, supra;  United States v.  Garcia, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 
88, 17 C.M.R. 88 (1954). The Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-  .  . 
dure are silent on burdens of proof. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)  is not adopted. This is because in courts- 
martial, unlike civilian practice, arraignment does not necessa- 
rily, or even ordinarily, occur early in the criminal process. In 
courts-martial, arraignment usually occurs only a short time 
before trial and in many cases it occurs the same day as trial. Be- 
cause of this, requiring a motions date after arraignment but 
before trial is not appropriate, at least as a routine matter. In- 
stead, entry of pleas operates, in the absence of good cause, as the 
deadline for certain motions. A military judge could, subject to 
subsections (d) and (e), schedule an Article 39(a) session (see 
R.C.M. 803) for the period after pleas are entered but before trial 
to hear motions. 
(d)  Ruling on motions. This subsection is based on Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 12(e). It is consistent with the first sentence in paragraph 67eof 
MCM,  1969 (Rev.). The admonition in the second sentence of 
that paragraph has been deleted as unnecessary. The discussion is 
based on the third paragraph of paragraph 67f  of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). 
1991 Amendment: The discussion was amended to reflect the 
change to R.C.M. 908(b)(4). 
(e)  Effect of  failure  to  raise defenses or objections. The first two 
sentences in  the subsection are taken from Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(9 
and are consistent with paragraph 676 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The 
third sentence is based on paragraph  67a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not expressly pro- 
vide for waiver of motions other than those listed in Fed. R. Crim. 
P.  12(b). (But see 18 U.S.C.  $ 3162(a)(2) which provides that fail- 
ure by  the accused to move for dismissal on grounds of denial of 
speedy trial before trial or plea of guilty constitutes waiver of the 
right to dismissal under that section.) Nevertheless, it has been 
contended that because Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) provides that 
lack ofjurisdiction or failure to allege an offense "shall be noticed 
by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceedings," 
"it may, by  negative implications be interpreted as foreclosing the 
other defense if  not raised during the trial itself."  8A J. Moore, 
Moore's Federal Practice 112.03[1] (1982 rev. ed.). "Pendency of 
the proceedings" has been held to include the appellate process. 
See United States v.  Thomas, 444 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 34 tends to support this construction insofar as it per- 
mits a posttrial motion in arrest ofjudgment only for lack ofjuris- 
diction over the offense or failure to charge an offense. There is no 
reason why other motions should not be waived if not raised at 
trial. Moore's, supra at 112.03[1]; accord C. Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure $193 (1969). See also  United States v. 
Scott, 464 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v.  Friedland, ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (b) 
391 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 867 (1969). See 
generally  United States ex rel. DiGiangiemo v. Regan, 528 F.2d 
1262 (2d Cir. 1975). Decisions of the United States Court of Mili- 
tary Appeals are generally consistent with this approach. See 
United States v.  Troxell, 12 U.S.C.M.A.  6. 30 C.M.R. 6 (1960) 
(statute of limitations may be waived);  United States v. Schilling, 
7 U.S.C.M.A. 482, 22 C.M.R. 272 (1957) (former jeopardy may 
be waived). Contra United States v. Johnson, 2 M.J. 541 
(A.C.M.R. 1976). 
1990 Amendment: Subsection (e) was amended to clarify that 
"requests"  and "objections"  include "motions". 
(0 Reconsideration. This subsection is new and makes clear that 
the military judge may reconsider rulings except as noted. The 
amendment of Article 62 (see Military Justice Act of  1983, Pub. 
L. No. 98-209,  § 5(c), 97 Stat. 1393 (1983)), which deleted the re- 
quirement for reconsideration when directed by the convening 
authority' does not preclude this. See S. Rep. No. 53,98th Cong., 
1st Sess. 24 (1983). 
(g)  Effect  offinal determinations. Except as noted below, this 
subsection is based on paragraph 716 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and 
on Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); Oppenheimer v.  United 
States, 242 U.S. 85 (1916); United States v. Marks, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 
28 1,45  C.M.R. 55 (1972); Restatement of Judgements, Chapter 3 
(1942). See also Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 
U.S.  591 (1948);  United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236 (1924); 
United States v.  Washington, 7 M.J. 78 (C.M.A.  1979); United 
States v. Hart, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 438,42 C.M.R. 40 (1970);  United 
States v. Smith, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 369, 15 C.M.R. 369 (1954). 
Subsection (g) differs from paragraph 71 6 in two significant re- 
spects. First, the term, "res judicata"  is not used in R.C.M. 905(g) 
because the term is legalistic and potentially confusing. "Res judi- 
cata"  generally includes several distinct but related concepts: 
merger, bar, direct estoppel, and collateral estoppel. Restatement 
of Judgments, Chapter 3 Introductory Note at 160 (1942). But see 
1B J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 10.441(1) (1980 rev. ed.) 
which distinguishes collateral estoppel from res judicata gener- 
ally. Second, unique aspects of the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
are recognized  in the "except"  clause of the first sentence in the 
rule. Earlier Manuals included the concept of collateral estoppel 
within the general discussion of res judicata (seeparagraph 726 of 
MCM (Army),  1949; paragraph 7 16 of MCM, 195  1, paragraph 
71 b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); see also United States v. Smith, supra) 
without discussing its distinguishing characteristics. Unlike other 
forms of res judicata, collateral estoppel applies to determinations 
made in actions in which the causes of action were different. 1B J. 
Moore, supra, 10.441[1]. Because of this, its application is some- 
what narrower. Specifically, parties are not bound by determina- 
tions of law when the causes of action in the two suits arose out of 
different transactions. Restatement of Judgments, supra, §§ 68, 
70. See also Commissioner v. Sunnen, supra. This distinction is 
now recognized in the rule. 
The absence of such a clarifying provision  in earlier Manuals 
apparently caused the majority, despite its misgivings and over 
the dissent of Judge Brosman, to reach the result it did in  United 
States  v.  Smith, supra. When paragraph 716 was rewritten  in 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.), the result in Smith was incorporated into that 
paragraph, but neither the concerns of the Court of Military Ap- 
peals nor the distinguishing characteristics of collateral estoppel 
were addressed. See Analysis of Contents of the Manual for 
Courts-Martial, United States, 1969, Revised  Edition, DA Pam 
27-2  at 12-5  (July 1970). To the extent that Smith relied on the 
Manual, its result is no longer required. But see  United States V 
Martin, 8 U.S.C.M.A.  346,  352, 24 C.M.R. 156, 162 (1957) 
(Quinn, C.J., joined  by Ferguson, J. concurring in the result). 
The  discussion is based on the sources indicated above. See also 
Restatement of Judgments, supra § 49; United States v. Guzman,  4 
M.J. 115 (C.M.A. 1977). As to the effect of pretrial determina- 
tions by a convening authority, see Analysis, R.C.M. 306(a). 
(h)  Written motions. This subsection is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 
47. 
(i)  Service. This subsection is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 49(a) and 
(b), insofar as those provisions apply to motions. 
(i) Application to convening authority. This subsection is taken 
from paragraph 66b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) although certain ex- 
ceptions provided  elsewhere in  these rules (e.g., R.C.M. 
906(b)(l)) have been established for the first time. It is consistent 
with the judicial functions of the convening authority under Arti- 
cle 64. It also provides a forum for resolution of disputes before 
referral and in the absence of the military judge after referral. It 
has no counterpart in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(g) and (h) are not included. Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 12(g) is covered at R.C.M. 803 and 808. The matters in Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 12(h) would fall under the procedures in R.C.M. 304 
and 305. 
(k)  Production of statements on motion to suppress. This subsec- 
tion is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(i). 
906.  Motions for appropriate relief 
(a)  In general. This subsection is based on the first sentence of 
paragraph 69a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The  phrase concerning dep- 
rivation  of rights is new; it applies to such pretrial matters as de- 
fects in the pretrial advice and the legality of pretrial confinement. 
Paragraph 69a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) provided only for the ac- 
cused to make motions for appropriate relief. This rule is not so 
restricted because the prosecution may also request appropriate 
relief.  See e.g., United States v. Nivens, 2 1 U.S.C.M.A. 420, 45 
C.M.R. 194 (1972). This change is not intended to modify or re- 
strict the power of the convening authority or other officials to di- 
rect that action be taken notwithstanding the fact that such action 
might also be sought by the trial counsel by motion for appropri- 
ate relief before the military judge. Specific modifications of the 
powers of such officials are noted expressly in the rules or analy- 
sis. 
(b)  Grounds for  appropriate relief: This subsection has the same 
general purpose as paragraph 69 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). It identi- 
fies most of the grounds for motions for appropriate relief com- 
monly raised in courts-martial, and provides certain rules for liti- 
gating and deciding such motions where these rules are not 
provided elsewhere in the Manual. Specific sources for the rules 
and discussion are described below. 
Subsection (1) and the accompanying discussion  are based on 
Article 40 and paragraphs 58b and c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The 
rule provides that only a military judge may grant a continuance. 
Paragraph 58a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) which  provided  for "post- 
ponement"  has been deleted. Reposing power to postpone pro- 
ceedings in the convening authority is inconsistent with the au- 
thority of the military judge to schedule proceedings and control 
the docket. See generally  United States v.  Wolzok, 1  M.J.  125 APP.  21,ll (b)  APPE 
(C.M.A. 1975). To the extent that paragraph 58a extended to the 
military judge the power to direct postponement, it was duplica- 
tive of the power to grant a continuance and unnecessary. 
Subsection (2) is based  on paragraph 48b(4) of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). See also United states v. ~eddini,  11 M.J. 100 (C.M.A. 
1981). 
Subsection (3) is based on paragraph 69c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
See also Articles 32(d) and 34; United State v. Johnson, 7 M.J. 396 
(C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Donaldson, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 293, 
49 C.M.R. 542 (1975);  United States v. Maness, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 
41,48 C.M.R. 512 (1974). 
Subsection (4) is based  on paragraph  69b of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). See also Article 30(a); paragraphs 29e and 33d of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.); Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d). See generally  United States v. 
Arbic, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 292,36 C.M.R. 448 (1966); United States v. 
Krutsinger, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 235, 35 C.M.R. 207 (1965);  United 
States v. Johnson,  12 U.S.C.M.A. 710,31 C.M.R. 296 (1962). 
Subsection (5) and its discussion are  based on paragraph 28b of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v. Collins, 16 U.S.C.M.A.  167, 
36 C.M.R. 323 (1966); United States v. Means,  12 U.S.C.M.A. 
290,30  C.M.R. 290 (1961); United States v. Parker, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 
541,  13 C.M.R. 97 (1953);  United States  v.  Voudren, 33 C.M.R. 
722 (A.B.R. 1963). See also paragraphs 158 and 200a(8) of MCM, 
1969 (Rev). But see  United States v. Davis, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 207,36 
C.M.R. 363 (1966) (thefts occurring at different places and times 
over four-month period were separate). 
Subsection (6) is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(f).  Although not 
expressly provided for in the previous Manual, bills of particulars 
have been recognized in military practice. See  United States v. 
Alef, 3 M.J. 414 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. Paulk, 13 
U.S.C.M.A. 456, 32 C.M.R. 456 (1963);  United States v.  Calley, 
46 C.M.R. 1131, 1170 (A.C.M.R.), afd,  22 U.S.C.M.A 534, 48 
C.M.R. 19 (1973); James, Pleadings  and Practice  under  United 
States v. Alef, 20 A.F.L. Rev. 22 (1978); Dunn, Military Plead- 
ings, 17 A.F.L. Rev. 17 (Fall, 1975). The discussion is based on 
United States  V. Mannino, 480 F. Supp. 1182, 1185 (S.D. N.Y. 
1979); United States v. Deaton, 448 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Ohio 
1978); see also United States  v. Harbin, 601 F.2d 773, 779 (5th 
Cir. 1979); United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1180 (9th Cir. 
1979); United States v. Davis, 582 F. 2d 947, 951 (5th Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962 (1979). Concerning the contents of a 
bill, see  United States v. Diecidue,  603 F.2d 535, 563 (5th Cir. 
1979); United States v. Murray, 527 F.2d 401,411 (5th Cir. 1976); 
United States v. Mannino, supra; United States v. Hubbard, 474 F. 
Supp. 64,8&81  (D. D.C. 1979). 
Subsection (7) is based on paragraphs 75e and 115a of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(4); United States v. 
Killebrew, 9 M.J. 154 (C.M.A. 1980); United States v. Chuculate, 
5 M.J. 143 (C.M.A. 1978). 
Subsection  (8) is new to the Manual although not to military 
practice. See Analysis, R.C.M. 305(j). 
Subsection (9) is based on paragraph 69d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) 
and Fed. R. Crim. P. 14 to theextent that the latter applies to sev- 
erance of codefendants. Note that the G~vernment  may also ac- 
complish a severance by proper withdrawal of charges against 
one or more codefendants and rereferrals of these charges to an- 
other court-martial. See R.C.M. 604. The discussion is based on 
paragraph 69d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (10) is new. It roughly parallels Fed. R.  Crim. P. 14, 
but is much narrower because of the general policy in the military 
favoring trial of all known charges at a single court-martial. See 
R.C.M. 601(e) and discussion; United States  v. Keith,  1 
U.S.C.M.A. 442, 4 C.M.R. 34 (1952). Motions to sever charges 
have, in effect, existed through the policy in paragraph  26c of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.), against joining minor and major offenses. 
See,  e.g., United States v. Grant, 26 C.M.R. 692 (A.B.R.  1958). 
Although that provision has been  eliminated, severance of of- 
fenses may still be appropriate in unusual cases. See generally 
United States v. Gettz, 49 C.M.R. 79 (N.C.M.R. 1974). 
Subsection (1 1) is based generally on paragraph  69e of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.) and on Fed. R. Crim. P. 21. See  United States v. Niv- 
ens, supra; United States v. Gravitt, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 249, 17 C.M.R. 
249 (1954). The constitutional requirement that the trial of a 
crime occur in the district in which  the crime was committed 
(U.S. Const. Art. 11, sec. 2, cl. 3; amend VI) does not apply in the 
military. Chenoweth v.  VanArsdall, 22 U.S.C.M.A.  183, 46 
C.M.R. 183 (1973). Therefore Fed. R.  Crim. P. 21(b) is inapplica- 
ble. In recognition of this, and of the fact that the convening au- 
thority has an interest, both financial and operational, in fixing 
the place of the trial, the rule allows the situs of the trial to be set 
and changed for the convenience of the Government, subject to 
judicial protection of the accused's rights as they may be affected 
by that situs. See  United States v. Nivens, supra. 
Subsection (12) is based  on paragraph 76a(5) of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). See  also Analysis, R.C.M. 907(b)(3)(B)  and Analysis, 
R.C.M. 1003(c)(l)(C). 
Subsection (13) is new to the Manual, although motions in 
limine have been recognized previously. See Mil. R. Evid. 104(c); 
United States v. Cofield, 11 M.J. 422 (C.M.A. 1981); Siano, Mo-
tions in Limine, The Army Lawyer, 17 (Jan. 1976). 
Subsection (14) is based on paragraph 69f  of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.).  See Analysis, R.C.M.  706, R.C.M. 909, and Analysis, 
R.C.M. 916(k). 
907.  Motions to dismiss 
(a) In general. This subsection is based on paragraphs 68 and 214 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a) is inapposite because the trial counsel 
may not independently request dismissal of charges, and unneces- 
sary because the convening authority already has authority to 
withdraw and to dismiss charges. See R.C.M. 306(c)(l); 
401(c)(l);  604. The matters contained in Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(b) 
are addressed by R.C.M. 707 and 907(b)(2)(A). 
(b)  Grounds  for dismissal. This subsection lists common grounds 
for motions to dismiss. It is not intended to be exclusive. It is di- 
vided  into three subsections. These correspond to nonwaivable 
(subsection (1)) and waivable (subsection (2) and (3)) motions to 
dismiss (see R.C.M. 905(e) and analysis), and to circumstances 
which require dismissal (subsections (1) and (2)) and those in 
which dismissal is only permissible (subsection (3). 
Subsection (1) is based  on paragraph  68b of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) and 34. 
Subsection (2)(A) is based  on paragraph  68i of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). See also 18 U.S.C. 5 3162(a)(2). The rules for speedy trial 
are covered in R.C.M. 707. 
Subsection (2)(B) is based on the first two paragraphs in para- 
graph 68c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v. Troxell, 12 ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (b) 
U.S.C.M.A.  6, 30 C.M.R. 6 (1960);  United States v. Rodgers, 8 
U.S.C.M.A. 226,24 C.M.R. 36 (1957). The  discussion is based on 
paragraphs 68c and 215d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United 
States v. Arbic, 16 U.S.C.M.A.  292,36 C.M.R. 448 (1966); United 
States v. Spain, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 410,27 C.M.R. 484 (1959); United 
States v. Reeves, 49 C.M.R. 841 (A.C.M.R.  1975). 
1987 Amendment: The discussion under subsection (b)(2)(B) 
was revised to reflect several amendments to Article 43, UCMJ, 
contained in the "Military  Justice Amendments of  1986,"  tit. 
VIII, $ 805, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 
1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661,  100 Stat. 3905, (1986). These amend- 
ments were derived, in part, from Chapter 213 of Title 18, United 
States Code. 
1990 Amendment: The fourth paragraph  of the discussion 
under subsection (b)(2)(B) was amended to reflect the holding in 
United States v. Tunnell, 23 M.J. 1  I0 (C.M.A.  1986). 
Subsection (2)(C) is based on paragraph 2156 of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.) and Article 44. See also paragraph  56 of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.).  Concerning the applicability to courts-martial of the 
double jeopardy  clause (U.S. Const. Amend. V), see  Wade v. 
Hunter, 336 U.S.  684 (1949);  United States v. Richardson, 21 
U.S.C.M.A. 54, 44 C.M.R.  108 (1971). See also United States v. 
Francis,  15 M.J. 424 (C.M.A.  1983). 
Subsection (2)(C)(i) is based on Article 44(c). The applicability 
of Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) was considered. Crist held 
that, in jury cases, jeopardy attaches when the jury is empanelled 
and sworn. For reasons stated below, the Working Group con- 
cluded that the beginning of the presentation of evidence on the 
merits, which is the constitutional standard for nonjury trial 
(Crist v. Bretz, supra at 37 n. 15; Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 
377 (1975)) and is prescribed by Article 44(c), is the proper cutoff 
point. 
There is no  jury in courts-martial. O'Callahan  v. Parker, 395 
U.S. 258 (1969); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); United States 
v. Crawford, I5 U.S.C.M.A.  31, 35 C.M.R.  3, (1964).  See also 
United States v. McCarthy, 2 M.J. 26,  29 n.3 (C.M.A.  1976). 
Members are an essential jurisdictional  element of a court-mar- 
tial. United States v. Ryan, 5 M.J. 97 (C.M.A.  1978). Historically 
the members, as an entity, served as  jury and judge,  or, in other 
words, as the "court."  W. Winthrop, Military Law and Prece- 
dents 54-55,  173 (2d. ed.,  1920 reprint). Assembling the court- 
martial has not been the last step before trial on the merits. See 
paragraph 6lj  and appendix 86 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); paragraph 
61h and i and appendix 8a of MCM, 1951; paragraph 61 of 
MCM, 1949 (Army); paragraph 61 of MCM, 1928; W. Winthrop, 
supra at 205-80.  Congress clearly contemplated that the members 
may be sworn at an early point in the proceedings. See Article 
42(a); H. Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. 22 (1949). 
The role of members has become somewhat more analogous to 
that of a jury. See, e.g., Article 39(a). Nevertheless, significant dif- 
ferences remain. When they are present, the members with the 
military judge constitute the court-martial and participate in the 
exercise of contempt power. Article 48. See R.C.M. 809 and anal- 
ysis. Moreover members may sit as a special court-martial with- 
out a military judge, in which case they exercise all judicial func- 
tions. Articles 19; 26; 40; 41; 51; 52. 
The holding in Crist would have adverse practical effect if ap- 
plied in the military. In addition to being unworkable in special 
court-martial without a military judge, it would negate the utility 
of Article 29, which provides that the assembly of the court-mar- 
tial does not wholly preclude later substitution of members. This 
provision recognizes that military exigencies or other unusual cir- 
cumstances may caus5a member to be unavailable at any stage in 
the court-martial. It also recognizes that the special need of the 
military to dispose of offenses swiftly, without necessary diversion 
of personnel and other resources, may justify continuing the trial 
with substituted members, rather that requiring a mistrial. This 
provision is squarely at odds with civilian practice with respect to 
juries and, therefore, with the rationale in Crist. 
Subsection (2)(C)(ii) is based on paragraph 56 of MCM, 1969 
(Rev). See also Wade v. Hunter, supra; United States v. Perez, 22 
U.S.  (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). "Manifest  necessity"  is the tradi- 
tional justification  for a mistrial. Id. See United States v. Richard- 
son, supra. C'  Article 44(c), which  does not prohibit retrial of a 
proceeding terminated on motion of the accused. See also Analy-
sis, R.C.M. 915. 
Subsection (2)(C)(ii)  is taken from Article 44(b).  See  United 
States v. Richardson, supra. See also Article 63. But see R.C.M. 
810(d). 
Subsection(2)(C)(iv)  is new. It is axiomatic that jeopardy does 
not attach in a proceeding which lacks  jurisdiction. Ball  v. United 
States, 163 U.S. 662 (1973). Therefore, if proceedings are termi- 
nated before findings because the court-martial lacks jurisidic- 
tion, retrial is not barred if the jurisdictional  defect is corrected. 
For example, if during the course of trial it is discovered that the 
charges were not referred to the court-martial by a person em- 
powered to do so, those proceedings would be terminated. This 
would not bar later referral of those charges by a proper official to 
a court-martial. C'  Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977); Illi-
nois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973). See also United States v. 
Newcomb, 5 M.J. 4 (C.M.A.  1977); United States v. Hardy, 4 M.J. 
20 (C.M.A. 1977) authorizing re-referral of charges where earlier 
proceedings lacked jurisdiction because of defects in referral and 
composition. Res  judicata would bar retrial by a court-martial for 
a jurisdictional  defect which is not "correctable."  See, e.g., 
R.C.M. 202 and 203. See also R.C.M. 905(g). 
By its terms, the rule permits a retrial of a person acquitted by a 
court-martial which lacks  jurisdiction. The Court of Military Ap- 
peals decision in  United States v. Culver, 22 U.S.C.M.A.  141, 46 
C.M.R. 141 (1973) does not preclude this, although that decision 
raises questions concerning this result. There was no majority 
opinion in Culver. Judge Quinn held that the defect (absence of a 
written judge alone request) was not jurisdictional. In the alterna- 
tive, Judge Quinn construed paragraph 8 ld  of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) 
and the automatic review structure in courts-martial as preclud- 
ing retrial on an offense of which the accused had been acquitted. 
(Note that R.C.M. 810(d), using slightly different language, con- 
tinues the same policy of limiting the maximum sentence for of- 
fenses tried at an "other trial"  to that adjudged at the earlier de- 
fective trial.) Judge Duncan, concurring in the result in Culver, 
found that although the original trial was jurisdictionally  defec- 
tive, the defect was not so fundamental as to render the proceed- 
ings void. In Judge Duncan's  view, the original court-martial had 
jurisdiction when it began, but "lost"  it when the request for mili- 
tary judge alone was not reduced to writing. Therefore, the 
double jeopardy  clause of the Fifth Amendment and Article 44 
barred the second trial for an offense of which the accused had 
been acquitted at the first. Chief Judge Darden dissented. He held that because the earlier court-martial lacked jurisdiction, the pro- 
ceedings were void and did not bar the second trial. Thus in Cul-
ver, two judges divided over whether the double jeopardy clause 
bars a second trial for an offense of which the accused was acquit- 
ted at a court-martial which lacked jurisdiction because of im- 
proper composition. The third judge held retrial was barred on 
nonconstitutional grounds. 
Subsection (2)(D) is based  on paragraph 68e f; g, and h of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). As to subsection (iv) see United States v. Wil- 
liams. 10U.S.C.M.A. 615,28 C.M.R. 181 (1959). 
Subsection (3) sets out grounds which, unlike those in subsec- 
tion (1) and (2), do  not require dismissal when they exist. The  mil- 
itary judge has discretion whether to dismiss or to apply another 
remedy (such as a continuance in the case of subsection (3)(A), or 
sentencing instructions in the case of subsection (3)(B)). But see 
United States v. Sturdivant, 13 M.J. 323 (C.M.A.  1982). See also 
United States v. Baker, 14 M.J. 361 (C.M.A. 1983). 
Subsection (3)(A)  and the discussion are based on paragraph 
69b(3) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (3)(B)  is based  on paragraph 26b, 74b(4), and 
76a(5) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v. Gibson, 11 M.  J. 435 
(C.M.A. 1981);  United States v. Stegall, 6 M.J.  176 (C.M.A. 
1979); United States v.  Williams, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 78, 39 C.M.R. 
78 (1968). 
Rule 908.  Appeal by the United States 
Introduction. This rule is based on Article 62, as amended, Mil- 
itary Justice Act of  1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209,  § 5(c)(l),  97 Stat 
1393 (1983). See also S. Rep. No. 53, 98th Cong., 1st. Sess. 23 
(1983);  18 U.S.C.  5 3731. Article 62 now provides the Govern- 
ment with a means to seek review of certain rulings or orders of 
the military judge. The need for such procedure has been recog- 
nized previously.  See  United States v. Rowel, 1 M.J. 289, 291 
(C.M.A. 1976) (Fletcher, C.J., concurring). See also Dettinger v. 
United States, 7 M.J. 216 (C.M.A. 1978). It is not expected that 
every ruling or order which might be appealed by the Govern- 
ment will be appealed. Frequent appeals by  the Government 
would disrupt trial dockets and could interfere with military op- 
erations and other activities, and would impose a heavy burden 
on appellate courts and counsel. Therefore this rule includes pro- 
cedures to ensure that the Government's right to appeal is exer- 
cised carefully. See S. Rep. No. 53 supra at 23. 
(a)  In general. This subsection repeats the first sentence of Arti- 
cle 62(a). 
(b)  Procedure. Subsection (1) provides the trial counsel with a 
mechanism to ensure that further proceedings do  not make an is- 
sue moot before the Government can file notice of appeal. 
The first sentence in subsection (2) is based on the second sen- 
tence of Article 62(a). The second sentence in subsection(2) au- 
thorizes an initial measure to ensure that a decision to file notice 
of appeal is carefully considered. The Secretary concerned may 
require trial counsel to secure authorization from another person, 
such as the convening authority, the convening authority's desig- 
nee, or the staff judge advocate. Because the decision whether to 
file the notice must be made within 72 hours, it probably will not 
be practicable in many cases to secure authorization from a more 
distant authority (see subsection (b)(5) and Analysis, below), but 
nothing in  this subsection prohibits requiring this authorization 
to be secured from, for example, the chief of appellate Govern- 
ment counsel or a similar official in the office of the Judge Advo- 
cate General. Note that the Secretary concerned is not required to 
require authorization by anyone before notice of appeal is filed. 
The provision is intended solely for the benefit  of the Govern- 
ment, to avoid disrupting trial dockets and the consequences this 
has on command activities, and to prevent overburdening appel- 
late courts and counsel. The accused has no right to have the 
Government forego an appeal which it might take. But see 
R.C.M. 707(c)(l)(D).  The authorization may be oral and no rea- 
son need be given. 
Subsection (3) is based on the second and third sentences of Ar- 
ticle 62(a). The second sentence is added to permit decisions by 
defense counsel and the military judge on how to proceed as to 
any unaffected charges and specifications under subsection (4). 
Subsection (4) is necessary because, unlike in Federal civilian 
trials (see Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a)), unrelated offenses may be and 
often are tried together in courts-martial. Consequently, a ruling 
or order which is appealable by the Government may affect only 
some charges and specifications. As to those offenses, the pen- 
dency of an appeal under this rule necessarily  halts further pro- 
ceedings. It does not necessarily  have the same effect on other 
charges and specifications unaffected  by the appeal. Subsection 
(4) provides several alternatives to halting the court-martial en- 
tirely, even as to charges and specifications unaffected by  the ap- 
peal. Subsection (4)(A) permits motions to be litigated as to unaf- 
fected charges and specifications, regardless of the stage of the 
proceedings.  Subsection (4)(B)  permits unaffected charges and 
specifications to be served, but only before trial on the merits has 
begun, that is, before jeopardy  has attached. See  R.C.M. 
907(b)(2)(C)  and Analysis. Once jeopardy has attached, the ac- 
cused is entitled to have all the charges and specification resolved 
by the same court-martial. Cf: Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978). It 
is expected that in most cases, rulings or orders subject to appeal 
by the Government will be made before trial on the merits has be- 
gun. See R.C.M. 905(b) and (e); Mil. R. Evid. 304(d), 31 l(d), and 
321(c). Subsection (4)(C) provides a mechanism to alleviate the 
adverse effect an appeal by the Government may have on unaf- 
fected charges and specifications. Thus witnesses who are present 
but whom it may be difficult and expensive to recall at a later time 
may, at the request of the proponent party and in the discretion of 
the military judge, be called to testify during the pendency of any 
appeal. Such witnesses  may be called out of order. See  also 
R.C.M. 801(a); 914; Mil.R.Evid. 61 1. Note, however, that a party 
cannot be compelled to call such witnesses or present evidence 
until the appeal is resolved. This is because a party's tactics may 
be affected by the resolution of the appeal. Note also that if simi- 
lar problems arise as to witnesses whose testimony relates to an 
affected specification, a deposition could be taken, but it could not 
be used at any later proceedings unless the witness was unavaila- 
ble or the parties did not object. 
Subsection (5) ensures that a record will be prepared promptly. 
Because the appeal ordinarily will involve only specific issues, the 
record need be complete only as to relevant matters. Defense 
counsel will ordinarily have the opportunity to object to any 
omissions. See R.C.M. 1103(i)(l)(B). Furthermore, the military 
judge and the Court of Military Review may direct preparation of 
additional portions of the record. 
Subsection (6) provides for the matter to be forwarded 
promptly. No specific time limit is established, but ordinarily the ANAlLYSlS  App. 21, R.C.M. (a) 
matters specified should be forwarded within one working day. 
Note that the record need not be forwarded at this point as that 
might delay disposition.  If the record is not ready, a summary 
may be forwarded for preliminary consideration before comple- 
tion of the record. An appropriate authority will then decide 
whether to file the appeal, in accordance with procedures estab- 
lished by the Judge Advocate General. See S.Rep. No. 53, supra 
at 23. This is an administrative determination; a decision not to 
file the appeal has no effect as precedent. Again, no specific time 
limit is set for this decision, but it should be made promptly under 
the circumstances. 
Subsection (7) is based on Article 62(b). 
Subsection (8) ensures that trial participants are notified in the 
event no appeal is filed. 
1991 Amendment: Subsection (4) was amended to state explic- 
itly that, upon timely notice of appeal, the legal effect of an ap- 
pealable ruling or order is stayed pending appellate resolution. 
Although most military practitioners understood  this necessary 
effect of an appeal under the rule, some civilian practitioners were 
confused by the absence of an explicit statement in the rule. 
New subsection (9) is based on 18 U.S.C. 3143(c) governing the 
release of an accused pending appeal by the United States of an 
order of dismissal of an indictment or information, or an order 
suppressing evidence. Since appeals by the United States under 
Article 62, U.C.M.J.,  contemplate a situation in which the ac- 
cused has not been convicted, a commander's decision whether to 
subject the individual to continued confinement after an appeal 
has been taken should be based on the same considerations which 
would authorize the imposition of pretrial confinement. 
(c)  Appellateproceedings. Subsection (1) is based on Article 70(b) 
and (c). 
Subsection (2) is based on Article 62(b). 
Subsection (3) is based  on Article 67(b) and (h) and on 28 
U.S.C. section 1259. Note that if the decision of the Court of Mili- 
tary Review permits it (i.e., is favorable to the Government) the 
court-martial may proceed as to the affected charges and specifi- 
cations notwithstanding the possibility or pendency of review by 
the Court of Military Appeals or the Supreme Court. Those 
courts could stay the proceedings. The penultimate sentence is 
similar in purpose to Article 66(e) and 67(f). 
(d) Military judge.  This subsection is necessary because Article 
62 authorizes appeals by  the Government only when a military 
judge is detailed. 
Rule 909.  Capacity of the accused to stand trial by 
court-martial 
This rule is based on paragraphs 120a and d, and 122 of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). It has been  reorganized and minor changes were 
made in some language in order to conform to the format and 
style of the Rules for Courts-Martial. The procedures for examin- 
ing the mental capacity of the accused are covered in R.C.M. 706. 
Matters referring solely to the accused's sanity at the time of the 
offense are treated at R.C.M. 916(k). The rule is generally consis- 
tent  with  18 U.S.C. $4244. The standard of proof has been 
changed from beyond reasonable doubt to a preponderance of the 
evidence. This is consistent with the holdings of those federal 
courts which have addressed the issue. United States v.  Gilio, 538 
F.2d972 (3d. Cir.  1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); 
United States v.  Makris, 535 F.2d 899 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.  de- 
nied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977). 
February 1986 Amendment: Following passage of the Insanity 
Defense Reform Act, ch. IV, Pub.L. No. 98-473  98 Stat. 2058 
(1984), the rule was changed pursuant to Article 36, to conform 
to 18 U.S.C.  §4241(d). 
Rule 910.  Pleas 
Introduction. This rule is based generally on Article 45; para- 
graph 70 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); and on Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. See 
also H.Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong.,  1st Sess. 23-24  (1949); S.Rep. 
No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2G21 (1949). The format generally 
follows that of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. 
(a) In general. Subsection (1) is based on Article 45 and para- 
graph 70a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The first sentence parallels the 
first sentence in Fed. R. Crim. P.  1  l(a)(l), except that no provi- 
sion is made for pleas of nolo contendere. Such a plea is unneces- 
sary in courts-martial. Hearings on H.  R. 4080 Before  A Sub- 
comm, of  the Comm. on Armed Services of  the House of 
Representatives. 81st Cong., 1st Sess.  1054 (1949). See 8A.J. 
Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 111.07(1) (1980 rev. ed) con- 
cerning the purpose of nolo pleas in civilian practice, and a dis- 
cussion of the controversy about them. Furthermore, the practice 
connected with nolo pleas (see Fed. R. Crim. P. 1  l(f) which does 
not require that a factual basis be established in order to accept a 
plea of nolo contendere; see also Moore's supra at 111.07(1) is in- 
consistent with Article 45. The second sentence on Fed. R. Crim. 
P.  1  l(a) is covered under subsection (b) of this rule insofar as it 
pertains to military practice. 
1993 Amendment:  The amendment to R.C.M. 910(a)(l) re- 
moved the necessity of pleading guilty to a lesser included offense 
by exceptions and substitutions. This parallels the amendment to 
R.C.M. 918(a)(l), allowing a finding of guilty to a named lesser 
included offense without mandating the use of exceptions and 
substitutions, made to correspond more closely to verdict practice 
in federal district courts. See Analysis comments for R.C.M. 
918(a)(l). 
Subsection (2) is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 1  l(a)(2). Condi- 
tional guilty pleas can conserve judicial and governmental re- 
sources by dispensing with a full trial when the only real issue is 
determined in a pretrial motion. As in the federal courts, the ab- 
sence of clear authority in courts-martial for such a procedure has 
resulted in some uncertainty as to whether an accused could pre- 
serve some issues for appellate review despite a plea of guilty. See 
e.g., United States v.  Schaffer, 12 M.J. 425 (C.M.A. 1982); United 
States v.  Mallett, 14 M.J. 631 (A.C.M.R. 1982). Now such issues 
may be preserved, but only in accordance with this subsection. 
See also subsection (j) of this rule. 
There is no right to enter a conditional guilty plea. The military 
judge  and the Government each have complete discretion 
whether to permit or consent to a conditional guilty plea. Because 
the purpose of a conditional guilty plea is to conserve judicial and 
government resources, this discretion is not subject to challenge 
by  the accused. The rationale for this discretion is further ex- 
plained in Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 advisory committee note: 
The requirement of approval by the court is most appro- 
priate, as it ensures, for example, that the defendant is not al- 
lowed to take an appeal on the matter which can only be APP. 21, !l(a)  APPE 
fully developed by proceeding to trial (citation omitted). As 
for consent by the government, it will ensure that conditional 
pleas will be allowed only when the decision of the court of 
appeals will dispose of the case either by allowing the pleas to 
stand or by such action as compelling dismissal of the indict- 
ment or suppressing essential evidence. Absent such circum- 
stances, the conditional plea might only serve to postpone 
the trial and require the government to try the case after sub- 
stantial delay, during which time witnesses may be lost, 
memories dimmed, and the offense grown so stale as to lose 
jury appeal. The government is in a unique position to deter- 
mine whether the matter at issue would be case-dispositive, 
and, as a party to the litigation, should have an absolute right 
to refuse to consent to potentially prejudicial delay. 
The  last sentence ofsubsection (a)(2) has been added to the lan- 
guage of Fed. R. Crim. P. 1  l(a)(2).  This permits the Secretary 
concerned to require that consent of the Government be obtained 
at higher echelons or at a centralized point. The consequences of 
overuse of conditional guilty pleas will be visited upon appellate 
courts and activities and the consequences of inappropriate use of 
them will typically fall on a command or installation different 
from the one where the original court-martial sat. Thus, it may be 
deemed appropriate to establish procedures to guard against such 
problems. 
(b)  Refusal  to plead, irregular plea.  The subsection is based on 
Article 45(a) and paragraph 70a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  It paral- 
lels the second sentence of Fed. R. Crim. P. 1  l(a), but is broad- 
ened to conform to Article 45(a). The  portion of Fed. R. Crim. P. 
1  l(a) concerning corporate defendants does not apply in courts- 
martial. The discussion is based on the last sentence of the first 
paragraph of paragraph 70a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(c)  Advice of accused. This subsection is taken from Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 1  l(c) and is consistent with paragraph 70b(2) of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). See also H.R. Rep. No. 491, supra at 23-24;  S.Rep. 
No. 486, supra at 2C21; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); 
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969);  United States v. 
Care, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 535,40C.M.R. 247 (1969). 
As to subsection (I), the requirement  that the accused under- 
stand the elements of the offense is of constitutional dimensions. 
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976); see also United States 
v. Care, supra. The elements need not be listed as such, seriatim, if 
it clearly appears that the accused was apprised of them in some 
manner and understood them and admits (see subsection (e) of 
this rule) that each element is true. See Henderson v. Morgan, 
supra; United States v. Grecco, 5 M.J. 1018 (C.M.A. 1976); United 
States v. Kilgore, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 35,44C.M.R. 89 (1971). But see 
United States  v. Pretlow, 13 M.J. 85 (C.M.A.  1982). 
Advice concerning a mandatory minimum punishment would 
be required only when the accused pleads guilty to murder under 
clause (1) or (4) of Article 11  8. The accused could only do so if the 
case had been referred as not capital. As to advice concerning the 
maximum penalty, the adoption of the language of the federal 
rule is not intended to eliminate the requirement that the advice 
state the maximum including any applicable escalation provi- 
sions. As to misadvice concerning the maximum penalty see 
United States v. Walls, 9 M.J. 88 (C.M.A.  1981). 
Subsection (2) of Fed. R. Crim. P. 1  l(c) has been modified be- 
cause of the absence of a right to counsel in summary courts-mar- 
tial. See R.C.M.l30l(e) and Analysis. In other courts-martial, 
full advice concerning counsel would ordinarily have been given 
previously (see R.C.M.901(d)(4))  and need not be repeated here. 
The discussion is based on paragraph 70b(l) of MCM,  1969 
(Rev.) and H.Rep. 491, supra at 23-24,  S.Rep. 486, supra at 
20-2  1. 
Subsections (3), (4), and (5) have been taken without substan- 
tial change from Fed. R. Crim. P. 1  l(c). Subsections (3) and (4) 
are consistent with the last paragraph and paragraph 70b (2) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (5) corresponds to Mil. R. Evid. 
410. As to the effect of failure to give the advice in subsection (5) 
see United States v. Conrad, 598 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1979). 
(d)  Ensuring that the plea  is voluntary. This subsection is based 
on Fed. R. Crim. P. 1  l(d) and is consistent with paragraph 70b(3) 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). As to the requirement to inquire concern- 
ing the existence of a plea agreement, see  United States v. Green, 1 
M.J. 453 (C.M.A.  1976). 
(e)  Determining accuracy of plea. This subsection is based on 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 1  l(f), except that "shall"  replaces "should"  and 
it is specified that the military judge must inquire of the accused 
concerning the factual basis of the plea. This is required under 
Article 45(b) and is consistent with paragraph 70b(3) of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). See also H.R. Rep. 491, supra at 23-24;  S.Rep. 486, 
supra at 2C21; United States v. Davenport, 9 M.J. 364 (C.M.A. 
1980); United States v. Johnson, 1 M.J. 36 (C.M.A.  1975); United 
States v. Logan, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 349, 47 C.M.R. 1 (1973).  Not- 
withstanding the precatory term "should,"  the factual basis in- 
quiry in Fed. R. Crim. P. 1  l(f) is, in practice, mandatory, al- 
though the means for establishing it are broader. See J. Moore, 
supra at 11  1.02(2). See also ABA Standards, Pleas of Guilty 91.6 
(1978).  The last sentence requiring that the accused be placed 
under oath is designed to ensure compliance with Article 45 and 
to reduce the likelihood  of later attacks on the providence of the 
plea. This is consistent with federal civilian practice. See 
Fed.R.Evid. 410. 
The first paragraph in the discussion is also based  on United 
States v. Jemmings, 1 M.J. 414 (C.M.A.  1976); United States v. 
Kilgore, supra; United States v. Care, supra. See also United States 
v. Crouch, 11 M.J. 128 (C.M.A.  1981). 
The second paragraph in the discussion is new and is based on 
United States v. Moglia, 3 M.J. 216 (C.M.A.  1977); United States 
v. Luebs, 20 U.S.C.M.A.  475, 43 C.M.R. 315 (1971); United 
States v. Butler, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 247, 43 C.M.R. 87 (1971). 
(f) Plea agreement inquiry. This subsection is based on Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 1  l(e), with substantial modifications to conform to plea 
agreement procedures in the military. See R.C.M. 705 and Analy- 
sis. The procedures here conform to those prescribed in United 
States v. Green, supra. See also  United States v. Passini,  10 M.J. 
109 (C.M.A. 1980). 
It is not intended that failure to comply with this subsection 
will necessarily result in a improvement plea. See  United States v. 
Passini, supra; cf. United States  v. Davenport, supra. Contra 
United States v. King, 3 M.J. 458 (C.M.A.  1977). Proceedings in 
revision may be appropriate to correct a defect discovered after fi- 
nal adjournment. United States v. Steck, 10 M.J. 412 (C.M.A. 
1981). Even if a prejudicial defect in the agreement is found, as a 
result of an inadequate inquiry or otherwise, allowing withdrawal 
of the plea is not necessarily  the appropriate remedy. See 
Santobello  v. New  York, 404 U.S.  257 (1971);  United States  v. ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (d) 
Kraffa, 11 M.J. 453 (C.M.A. 1981);  United States v. Cifuentes, 11 
M.J. 385 (C.M.A. 1981). If an adequate inquiry is conducted, 
however, the parties are normally bound by the terms described 
on the record. Id,; United States v. Cooke, 11 M.J. 257 (C.M.A. 
1981). But see  United States v. Partin, 7 M.J. 409 (C.M.A. 1979) 
(the parties were not bound by military judge's  interpretation 
which had the effect of adding illegal terms to the agreement; the 
plea was held provident). 
(g)  Findings. This subsection is based on the last paragraph  of 
paragraph 706 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also Articles 39(a)(3) 
and 52(a)(2). The discussion is new and recognizes that it may be 
unnecessary and inappropriate to bring to the member's attention 
the fact that the accused has pleaded guilty to some offenses 
before trial on the merits of others. See United States v. Nixon, 15 
M.J. 1028 (A.C.M.R. 1983). See also United States v. Wahnon, 1 
M.J. 144 (C.M.A. 1975). 
1990 Amendment: The discussion  to the subsection was 
changed in light of the decision in United States v. Rivera, 23 M.J. 
89 (C.M.A.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1986). 
(h) Later action. Subsection (1) is based on the fourth and fifth 
sentences of the penultimate paragraph of paragraph 70b of 
MCM, 1969 Wev.). Note that once a plea of guilty is accepted the 
accused may withdraw it only within the discretion of the mili- 
tary  judge. Before the plea is accepted, the accused may withdraw 
it as a matter of right. See  United States v. Leonard, 16 M.J. 984 
(A.C.M.R. 1983); United States v. Hayes, 9 M.J. 825 (N.C.MR. 
1980). 
Subsection (2) is based on the first two sentences in the penulti- 
mate paragraph of paragraph 70b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and on 
Article 45(a). See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d). The discussion is 
based on United States v. Cooper, 8 M.J. 5 (C.M.A. 1979); United 
States v. Bradley, 7 M.J. 332 (C.M.A. 1979). Subsection (3) is 
based on United States v. Green, supra. See also United States v. 
Kraffa, supra. 
(i)  Record of proceedings. This subsection is based on subpara- 
graph (4) of the first paragraph of paragraph 706 of MCM, 1969. 
See also Article 54; H.R. Rep. No. 491, supra at 24; S. Rep. No. 
486, supra at 21; ABA Standards, Pleas of Guilty supra at 51.7. 
This subsection parallels Fed. R. Crim. P. 1  l(g), except insofar as 
the former allows for nonverbatim records in inferior courts-mar- 
tial. See Article 54(b). 
6)  Waiver. This subsection replaces the third paragraph in para- 
graph 70a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) which listed some things a guilty 
plea did not waive, and which was somewhat misleading in the 
wake of the pleading standards under United States v. Alef; 3 M.J. 
414 (C.M.A. 1977). This subsection is based on Menna v. New 
York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975);  Tollett v. Henderson, 41 1 U.S. 258 
(1973); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Brady v.  United States, 397 U.S. 
742 (1970); United States v. Engle, 1 M.J. 387 (C.M.A. 1976); 
United States v. Dusenberry, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 287,49 C.M.R. 536 
(1975); United States v. Hamil, 15 U.S.C.M.A.  110, 35 C.M.R. 82 
(1964).See also subsection (a)(2) of this rule and its analysis. 
Rule 91  1.  Assembly of the court-martial 
The code fixes no specific point in the court-martial for assem- 
bly although, as noted in the discussion, it establishes assembly as 
a point after which the opportunities to change the composition 
and membership of the court-martial are substantially circum- 
scribed. See  United States v. Morris, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 319, 49 
C.M.R. 653 (1975); United States v. Dean, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 212,43 
C.M.R. 52 (1970). 
The purpose of this rule is simply to require an overt manifesta- 
tion of assembly in order to mark clearly for all participants the 
point at which the opportunities to elect freely as to composition 
or to substitute personnel has ended. Failure to make the an- 
nouncement described in the rule has no substantive effect other 
than to leave open a dispute as to whether a change in composi- 
tion or membership was timely. 
The rule prescribes no specific point for assembly. The points 
noted in the discussion are based on paragraph 61j  of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). It is normally appropriate to assemble the court-martial at 
these points to protect the parties from untimely changes in mem- 
bership or composition. In some circumstances flexibility is desir- 
able, as when the military judge approves a request for trial by 
military judge alone, but recognizes that it may be necessary to 
substitute another  judge because of impending delays. The discus- 
sion is also based on paragraphs 53d(2)(c) and 61  6 of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). 
Rule 912.  Challenge of selection of members; 
examination and challenges of members 
(a)  Pretrial matters. Subsection (1) recognizes the usefulness of 
questionnaires to expedite voir dire. Questionnaires are already 
used in some military jurisdictions.  This procedure is analogous 
to the use ofjuror qualification forms under 28 U.S.C. 5 1864(a). 
See also ABA Standards, Trial by Jury 52.l(b) (1979). It is not in- 
tended that questionnaires will be used as a complete substitute 
for voir dire. As to investigations of members, see also ABA Stan- 
dards, The Prosecution Function  § 3-5.3(b) (1979); The Defense 
Function  4-7.2(b) (1979). 
Subsection (2) recognizes that in order to challenge the selec- 
tion of the membership of the court-martial (see subsection (b) of 
this rule) discovery of the materials used to select them is neces- 
sary. Such discovery is already common. See, e.g., United States v. 
Greene, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 232,43 C.M.R. 72 (1970); United States v. 
Herndon, 50 C.M.R. 166 (A.C.M.R. 1975); United States v. Perry, 
47 C.M.R. 89 (A.C.M.R. 1973). The purpose of this procedure is 
analogous to that of 18 U.S.C. 58 1867(f) and 1868. The rule is a 
discovery device; it is not intended to limit the types of evidence 
which may be admissible concerning the selection process. 
(b)  Challenge of selection of members. This subsection is based on 
28 U.S.C. 5 1867(a), (b) and (d). Other subsections in that section 
are inapposite to the military. No similar provision appeared in 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Nevertheless, a motion for appropriate relief 
challenging the selection of members and requesting a new one 
was recognized. See  United States v. Daigle,  1 M.J. 139 (C.M.A. 
1975); United States v.  Young, 49 C.M.R.  133 (A.F.C.M.R. 
1974). Except for matters affecting the composition of the court- 
martial (see Article 16 and 25(a), (b) and (c)), improper selection 
of members is not a jurisdictional  defect. United States v. Daigle, 
supra. See also S. Rep. No. 53, 98th Cong., 18th Sess. 12 (1983). 
~f: United States v. ~la~lock,  1983). The is-  15 M.J. ~~o(c.M.A. 
sue may be waived if not raised in a timely manner. 
(c)  Stating of grounds for  challenge. This subsection is based on 
the second sentence of paragraph 62b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(d)  Examination of members. This subsection is based on Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 24(a). Paragraph 62b and h of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) dis- APP. 21, ll  (d)  APPENDIX 21 
cussed questioning members. Paragraph 62b provided  that ". . .  prejudice and  does not affect  their competency. See Hearings on 
the trial or defense counsel may question the court, or individual  H.R. 2498 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.  on Armed Ser- 
members thereof."  United States v.  Slubowski, 7 M.J.  461  vices~,  81st Cong. 1st Sess. 1140, 1150-52 (1949).See also S. Rep. 
(C.M.A. 1979), reconsideration not granted  by equally divided  No. 53, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 12(1983). 
court, 9 M.J. 264 (C.M.A. 1980), held that this provision did  not  The  second sentence in subsection (4)  is based on United States 
establish a right of  the parties to  personally question members. In-  V. Seabrooks, 48 C.M.R. 471 (N.C.M.R. 1974). See also United 
stead, the court recognized that the procedures in Fed. R. Crim.  States v.  Jones, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 283, 22 C.M.R. 73 (1956).  This is 
P. 24(a) are applicable to the military. See also United States v.  consistent with federal practice.  See, e.g.,  United States v.  Rich- 
Parker, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 274,19 C.M.R.  400 (1955).  Therefore,  sub-  ardson, 582 F.2d  968 (5th  Cir. 1978). The  third sentence clarifies 
section (d) does not change current practice.  the effect  of  using or failing to use a peremptory challenge after a 
The  discussion is based generally on paragraph 62b of  MCM,  challenge for cause is denied. This has been a subject of  some con- 
1969 (Rev.)  and encourages permitting  counsel to question per-  troversy. See United States v.  Harris, 13 M.J. 288 (C.M.A. 1982); 
sonally  the members. See United States v. Slubowski, supra at 463  United States v.  Russell, 43 C.M.R. 807 (A.C.M.R. 1971) and 
n.4; ABA  Standards, Trial by Jury 3 2.4 (1979).  As to  the scope of  cases cited  therein. Failure to use a peremptory  challenge at all 
voir dire generally, see Ristaino v.  Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1977);  has been held  to waive any issue as to denial of  a challenge for 
United States v.  Baldwin, 607 F.2d  1295 (9th Cir. 1979);United  cause. UnitedStates v. Henderson, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 556,29 C.M.R. 
States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d  121  (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.  372 (1960). Because the right to a peremptory challenge is inde- 
Slubowski, supra; United States v. Parker, supra. The  second para-  pendent  to the right to challenge members for cause, see Article 
graph of  the discussion is based on ABA Standards, The Prosecu-  41, that right should  not be forfeited when a challenge for cause 
tion Function 3 3-5.3(c). (1979);  The Defense Function  3 4-7.2(c)  has been erroneously denied. See United States v.  Baker, 2 M.J. 
(1979).  773 (A.C.M.R. 1976). See also United States v.  Rucker, 557 F.2d 
(e) Evidence. This subsection is based on the first sentence of  par-  1046 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v.  Nell, 526 F.2d  1223 (5th 
agraph 62h(2)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  Cir. 1976). See generally Swain v.  Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
(f)  Challenges and removal for  cause. See generally Article 41(a).  The  requirement that a Party peremptorily challenging a member 
subsection (1)  is based on Article 25 ?nd paragraph  62f of  MCM,  it has unsuccessfully challenged for cause state that it would have 
1969 (Rev.). The  examples in the laitpk'iigraph of  paragraph 62f  peremptorily challenged another member is designed to  Prevent a 
have been placed  in the discussion.  '"'"  "windfall" to a party which had no intent to exercise its preemp- 
Subsection (2)  is based on paragraphs  62d and  h(l)  of  McM,  tory challenge against  any other member. see united states v. 
1969 (Rev.).  Harris, supra; United States v.  Shaffer, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 76, 6 
Subsection (3)  is based on Article 41(a)  and  paragraph  62h of  C.M.R. 75  United  v'  M.J. 538 (N.C.M.R. 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The first sentence is new. MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  1979). 
was silent on this matter. The  procedure is intended to protect the  (8) Peremptory challenges. Subsection (1)  is based  on Article 
parties from prejudicial disclosures before the members, and is in  41@).The  sentence is new.  62e  MCM, 1969 
accord with practice in many courts-martial. Paragraph 62h(2)  of  (Rev.) stated  that a Peremptory challenge ''may be used before, 
MCM,  1969 (R~~,)  during, or after challenges for cause."  Subsection (1)  does not pre-  advised that the military  judge -should  be lib- 
era1  in passing  on challenges, but need  not sustain a challenge  vent a party from  exercising a peremptory challenge before chal- 
upon the mere assertion of  the challenger."  The precatory  Ian-  lenges for cause, but it Protects a Party against being compelled to 
guage has been deleted from the rule as an unnecessary statement.  a Peremptory  before  for cause are made. 
This deletion is not intended  to change the policy  expressed in  Each party is entitled to  one peremptory challenge. ~rticle  41(b); 
that statement.  Unitedstates v.  Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1162 (A.C.M.R.), affd 
The waiver rule in subsection (4)  is based on United  v.  23 U.S.C.M.A. 534,48 C.M.R. 19 (1973).  But see United States v. 
Beer, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 180, 19  C.M.R. 306 (1955). See also united  Harris, supra at 294 n. 3 (c.M.A.  1982) (~verett,  c.J.,  dissent- 
ing)' Fed' R'  '' 24(b)'s States v. Dyche, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 430,24 C.M.R. 240 (1957);  United 

States v.  Wolfe, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 247,24 C.M.R. 57  (1957).  Grounds  (2)  is based  On  United  v.  22 C.M.R. 

(A)  and  (B)  in subsection (f)(l)  may not be waived, except as  892 (A.B.R. 1956); United States V.  ~raham,  14 C.M.R. 645 
noted. See generally H. R. Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong, 1st Sess. 17-  (A.F.B.R. 1954). See also United States v.  Fetch, 17  C.M.R. 836 
(A.F.B.R. 1954). The discussion is based on the last sentence of  18  (1949); united states v, ~  ~5 M,J,  4~ (c,M,A,~ 1978).  ~  ~  b  , 

Membership of  enlisted members of  the enlisted  members of  the  paragraph 62d and the last sentence  paragraph 62h(4) 

accused's unit  has been held not to be jurisdictional, and, there-  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  The last sentence in the discussion is also 

fore, may be waived, united states v,  wilson, 16  M, J, 678  based on United States v.  Lee, 31 C.M.R. 743 (A.F.B.R. 1962). 

(A.C.M.R. 1983); United States v.  Kimball,  13  M.J. 659  (h) Special courts-martial  without a military judge.  This subsec- 
(N.M.C.M.R. 1982) United States v.  Tagert,  11 M.J. 677  tion is based on Articles 41, 51(a) and  52(c)  and  on paragraph 
(N.M.C.M.R. 1981); United States v.  Scott, 25  C.M.R. 636  62h(3)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(A.B.R. 1957). Contra  United States v.  Anderson, 10  M.J. 803  (i) Definitions. Subsection (2)  is based on paragraph 63 of  MCM, 
(A.F.C.M.R. 1981). The  Court of  Military Appeals has held that  1969 (Rev.).  See also United States v.  Grijin, 8 M.J. 66 (C.M.A. 
the presence of  a statutorily  ineligible member is not a jurisdic-  1979); United States v.  Wilson, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 656, 23 C.M.R. 120 
tional defect. United States v.  Miller, 3 M.J. 326 (C.M.A. 1977);  (1957);  United States v.  Moore, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 675, 16 C.M.R. 249 
United States v.  Beer, supra. Ineligibility of  enlisted  members  (1954).  The  distinction between witnesses for the prosecution and 
from the accused's unit is designed  to protect  the accused  from  witnesses for the defense has been eliminated  for purpose of  chal- ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (e) 
lenges, notwithstanding the statutory basis for the former (Article 

25(d)(2)) but not the latter. Disqualification as a witness for the 

prosecution has been held to be waivable. United States v. Beer, 6 

U.S.C.M.A. 180, 19 C.M.R. 306 (1955). Consequently, there is no 
substantive distinction between either ground. 
Subsection (3) is taken from paragraph  64 of  MCM,  1969 

(Rev.). C' United States v. Goodman, 3 M.J. 1 (C.M.A. 1977) 

(military judge as investigator). 

Rule 913.  Presentation of the case on the merits 
(a)  preliminary instructions, hi^ subsection is based on A  ~ 
dix 8 at 10-1  1 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also  United States v. 
Waggoner, 6 M.J. 77 (C.M.A. 1978). 
1990 Amendment: The second sentence to the rule and the dis- 
cussion which follows are based on the decision in united states v, 
Rivera, 23 M.J. 89 (C.M.A. 1986). See also United States v. 
Wahnon, 1  M.J. 144 (C.M.A. 1975). 
(b)  Opening statement. This subsection is based on the first of 
paragraph of paragraph 44g(2) and the first paragraph of para- 
graph 48i of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The discussion is taken from 
ABA Standards, The Prosecution Function 5 3-5.5 (1979); The De- 
fense  Function 5 4-7.4 (1979). 
(c)  Presentation of evidence. Subsection (1) is based on paragraph 
54a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), except that (E), Additional rebuttal ev- 
idence, has been added to expressly note the occasional need for 
further rebuttal. 
Subsection (2) is based on the first sentence of Fed. R. Crim. P. 
26. The first paragraph of the discussion of subsection (2) is based 
on paragraphs 44g(2), 48i, and 54a of MCM,  1969 (Rev.) and 
Mil.R.Evid. 61 1 and 614. The second paragraph of the discussion 
is based on paragraphs 54d and g of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (3) and the discussion are based on paragraph 54e of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev). 
Subsection (4) is based on paragraph 54cof MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (5) is based on the fourth sentence of the second 
paragraph of paragraph 71a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and is consis- 
tent with current practice. 
Rule 914. Production of statements of witnesses 
~~t~~d~~ti~~. R, hi^ rule is based on ~~d,  p, 26.2 ~,=d, 
R. Crim. P. 26.2 is based on the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C.  5  3500, 
which has long been applied in  United states v, 
Albo, 22 U.S.C.M.A.  30,46 C.M.R. 30 (1972); United States v. 
Wa[bert, 14 u.S.C.M.A.  34, 33 C.M.R. 246 (1963);$Jnited States 
v. Heinel, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 259, 26 C.M.R. 39 (1958). See  United 
States v. Jarrie,  5 M.J. 193 (C.M.A. 1978); United States  v. 
Herndon, 5 M.J. 175 (C.M.A. 1978); United States V. Scott, 6 M.J. 
547 (A.F.C.M.R. 1978) (applied to statements made during Arti- 
cle 32 investigation and demand at trial);  United States v. Calley, 
46 C.M.R. 1131 (A.C.M.R.) ard,  22  U.S.C.M.A. 534, 48 
C.M.R. 19 (1973); Kesler, The Jencks Act: An Introductory Anal- 
ysis,  13 The Advocate 391 (Nov- Dec. 1981); Lynch, Possession 
Under the Jencks Act,  10 A.F.JAG Rptr 177 (Dec. 1981); 
O'Brien.  The Jencks Act- A Recognized  Tool for Military Defense 
Counsel, 11 The Advocate 20 (Jan- Fed  1979); Waldrop, The 
JencksAct, 20A.F.L. Rev. 93 (1978); Bogart, Jencks Act, 27 JAG 
J. 427 (1973); West, Significance of the Jencks Act  in Military 
Law, 30 Mil. L. Rev. 83 (1965). Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2 expands the 
Jencks Act by  providing for disclosure by  the defense as well as 
the prosecution, based on United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 
(1975). Otherwise, it is not intended to change the requirements 
of the Jencks Act. Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2 Advisory  Committee 
Note (Supp. v. 1981). Prosecution compliance with R.C.M. 701 
should make resort to this rule by the defense unnecessary in most 
cases. 
This rule, like Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2, applies at trial. It is not a 
discovery  rule (United States v.  Ciesielski, 39 C.M.R. 839 
(N.M.C.R. 1968)), and it does not apply to Article 32 hearings 
(contra, United States V. Jackson, 33 C.M.R. 884, 890 nn.3, 4 
(A.F.B.R. 1963)). It is a distinct rule from the rule requiring pro- 
duction for inspection by  an opponent of memoranda used by a 
witness to refresh recollection. United States v. Ellison, 46 C.M.R. 
839 (A.F.C.M.R.  1972); cf:Mil. R. Evid. 612 and accompanying 
Analysis. The rule is not intended to discourage voluntary disclo- 
sure before trial, even where R.C.M. 701 does not require disclo- 
sure, so as to avoid delays at trial. Further, this rule does not fore- 
close other avenues 
~ ~ ~ -
(a) Motion for production.  This subsection is based on Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 26.2(a). It has been reworded to clarify what statements 
must be produced."(I)n  the possession of the United States," and 
"in  the possession of the accused or defense counsel" are substi- 
tuted for "in  their possession" to make clear that the rule is not 
limited to statements in the personal possession of counsel. See 18 
U.S.C. 5 3500(a). As to the meaning of "in the possession of the 
United States,"  see  ~nittii~tates  v. Calley, supra (testimony at 
congressional hearing); see also United States v. Ali, 12 M.J. 1018 
(A.C.M.R.  1982) (statements in possession  of commander); 
United States v. Boiser,  12 M.J.  1010 (A.C.M.R.  1982) (notes of 
undercover informant);  United States v. Fountain, 2 M.J. 1202 
(N.C.M.R. 1976); United States  v. Brakefield, 43 C.M.R. 828 
(A.C.M.R. 1971) (notes taken by government psychiatrist). 
(b)  Production  of entire statement. This subsection is taken from 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2(b). 
(c)  Production of excisedstatement. This subsection is taken from 
Fed. R. Crim. P.26.2(c). Failure of a judge to make the required 
examination on request  is error.  United States v.  White, 37 
C.M.R. 791 (A.F.B.R. 1966) (decision under Jencks Act). Failure 
to preserve the statement after denial or excision frustrates appel- 
late review and is also error under decisions interpreting 18 
U.S.C. 5 3500. United Statesv. Dixon, 8 M.J. 149 (C.M.A. 1979); 
Unitedstates  v. Jarrie, supra. However, the statement need not be 
appended to the record (where it would become public) because it 
is not error to consider the statement when forwarded separately 
as this rule provides. United States v. Dixon, supra. 
(d) Recess for  examination of  the statement. This subsection is 
taken from Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2(d). 
(e)  Remedy for failure  to produce statement. This subsection is 
based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2(e). Although not expressly men- 
tioned  there, the good faith loss and harmless error doctrines 
under the Jencks Act would apparently apply. See  United States 
v.  Patterson, 10 M.J. 599 (A.F.C.M.R. 1980); United States v. 
Kilmon, 10 M.J. 543 (N.C.M.R. 1980), United States v. Dixon, 
United States v. Scott, United States v. Jarrie, and United States v. 
White, all supra. Note, however, that under the Jencks Act deci- 
sions the accused  need  not demonstrate prejudice on appeal 
(United States v. Albo, supra; but see  United States v. Bryant, 439 
F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Ali, and United States 
v. Boiser, both supra) and that the military judge may not substi- APP. 21, n (e)  APPE 
tute the judge's  assessment of  the usefulness of  the statement for 
the assessment of  the accused and  defense counsel (United States 
v. Dixon and  United States v.  Kilmon, both supra). 
(9  Definitions.  This subsection is taken from Fed. R. Crim. P. 
26.6(9. 
In subsection  (1)  the inclusion of  statements approved or 
adopted by a witness is consistent with 18  U.S.C. 8 3500(e)(l).  See 
United States v. Jarrie and  United States v.  Kilmon, both supra. 
In subsection (2)  the inclusion of  substantially verbatim record- 
ings or  transcriptions exceeds some interpretations under  18 
U.S.C. 8 3500. See, e.g.,  United States v.  Matfield, 4 M.J. 843 
(A.C.M.R.),  pet.  denied., 5 M.J. 182 (1978)  (testimony in a prior 
court-martial not accessible under 18  U.S.C. 8 3500 but accessible 
under a general "military due process"  right to  discovery). 
Rule 915.  Mistrial 
(a) In general. This subsection is based on the second and  third 
sentences of  paragraph 56e(l)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See gener- 
ally Oregon v.  Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982);  Arizona v.  Washing- 
ton, 434 U.S. 497 (1978);  Lee v.  United States, 432 U.S.  23 (1977); 
United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976);  Illinois v. Somerville, 
410 U.S.  458 (1973);  United States v.  Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); 
United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9  Wheat)  579 (1824);United States 
v.  Richardson, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 54, 44 C.M.R. 108 (1971); United 
States v.  Schilling, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 482, 22 C.M.R. 272 (1957). 
(b) Procedure. This subsection is bas'ed  on paragraph 56e(2) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Because consentbr lack thereof by the de- 
fense to  a mistrial may be determinative of  a former jeopardy  mo- 
tion at a second trial, the views of  the defense must be sought. 
(c) Effect of a declaration of mistrial. Subsection (1)  is based on 
the first sentence of  paragraph 56e(l)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Note 
that dismissal of  charges may have the same effect  as declaring a 
mistrial, depending on the grounds for dismissal. See Lee v. 
United States and Illinois v. Somewille, both supra. Subsection (2) 
is based on the first two sentences of  paragraph 56e(3)  of  MCM, 
1969 (Rev).  See also Oregon v.  Kennedy, supra; United States v. 
Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978);  Arizona v.  Washington, United States v. 
Dinitz, Illinois v.  Somewille, and  United States v.  Jorn, all supra; 
Gori v.  United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961);  United States v.  Rich- 
ardson, supra. Subsection (2)  notes, as paragraph  56e of  MCM, 
1969 (Rev.)  did not, that a declaration of  a mistrial after findings 
does not trigger double jeopardy  protections. See United States v. 
Richardson, supra.  Moreover subsection (2)  notes that certain 
types of  prosecutorial misconduct resulting in mistrial will trigger 
double  jeopardy protections. See United States v. Jorn, and  United 
States v.  Gori, both supra. See also United States v. Dinitz, and Illi- 
nois v.  Sommerville, both supra. 
Rule 916.  Defenses 
(a) In general. This subsection and  the discussion are based on 
the third paragraph of  paragraph 214 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Motions in bar of  trial, which were also covered in paragraph 
214, are now covered in R.C.M. 907 since they are procedurally 
and  conceptually different  from the defenses treated  in R.C.M. 
916. 
(b) Burden of proof: This subsection is based on the fourth para- 
graph of  paragraph 214 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also paragraph 
112a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See, e.g.,  United States v.  Cuffee, 10 
M.J. 381 (C.M.A. 1981). The first paragraph in the discussion is 
based on the fifth paragraph  of  paragraph  214 of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.).  The  second paragraph in the discussion is based on United 
States v.  Garcia, 1  M.J.  26  (C.M.A. 1975); United States v. 
Walker,  21 U.S.C.M.A. 376,45 C.M.R. 150 (1972);  United States 
v. Ducksworth, 13  U.S.C.M.A. 515, 33 C.M.R. 47 (1963);  United 
States v.  Bellamy, 47  C.M.R. 319 (A.C.M.R. 1973). It is unclear 
whether, under some circumstances, an accused's testimony may 
negate a defense which might otherwise have been raised by the 
evidence. See United States v.  Garcia, supra. 
1986 Amendment: The  requirement that the accused prove lack 
of  mental responsibility was added  to implement Article 50a, 
which was added to  the UCMJ in the "Military Justice Amend- 
ments of  1986," Tit. VIII,  § 802, National Defense Authorization 
Act for fiscal  year  1987, Pub.L. No. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3905, 
(1986).  Article 50a(b) adopted  the provisions of  18  U.S.C. 20(b), 
created by the Insanity Defense Reform Act, ch. IV, Pub. L. No. 
98-473,98 Stat. 2057 (1984).  See generally Jones v.  United States, 
463 U.S.  354, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 3051 n.17 (1983);  Leland v. Oregon, 
343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952);  S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
224-25 (1983),  reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1, 
226-27. 
(c) Justification. This  subsection and the discussion are based on 
paragraph 216a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See also United States v. 
Evans. 17  U.S.C.M.A. 238, 38  C.M.R. 36 (1967);  United States v. 
Regalado,  13  U.S.C.M.A. 480, 33  C.M.R. 12 (1963); United 
States v.  Hamilton, 10 U.S.C.M.A.  130, 27  C.M.R. 204 (1959). 
The  last sentence in  the discussion is based on the second sentence 
of  paragraph  195b of  MCM (1951). 
(d) Obedience to orders. This subsection is based on paragraph 
216d  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v.  Calley, 22 
U.S.C.M.A.  534,48 C.M.R. 19 (1973);United States v.  Cooley, 16 
U.S.C.M.A. 24, 36  C.M.R. 180 (1966).  See also United States v. 
Calley, 46C.M.R. 1131 (A.C.M.R. 1973). 
(e) Self-defense.  Subsection (1)  is based on the first paragraph of 
paragraph 216c of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  The  discussion is based on 
the second paragraph of  paragraph 2 16c of  MCM  1967 (Rev.)  See 
also United States v.  Jackson, 15  U.S.C.M.A. 603, 36 C.M.R. 101 
(1966). 
Subsection (2)  is new and  is based on United States v.  Acosta- 
Vergas, 13 U.S.C.M.A.  388, 32 C.M.R. 388 (1962). 
Subsection (3)  is based on the fourth paragraph of  paragraph 
216c of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See also United States v.  Sawyer, 4 
M.J. 64 (C.M.A. 1977).  The  second paragraph in the discussion is 
based on United States v. Jones, 3 M.J. 279 (1977).  See also United 
States v.  Thomas, 11 M.J. 315 (C.M.A. 1981). 
1986 Amendment: References to subsections "(c)(l)  or (2)" 
was changed to 'r(e)(l)  or (2)" to correct an error in MCM, 1984. 
Subsection (4)  is based  on the third paragraph  of  paragraph 
216c of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See also United States v.  Yabut, 20 
U.S.C.M.A. 393, 43 C.M.R. 233 (1971);  United States v.  Green, 
13 U.S.C.M.A. 545, 33 C.M.R. 77 (1963);UnitedStates  v. Brown, 
13 U.S.C.M.A. 485,33 C.M.R. 7 (1963).  The  second paragraph in 
the discussion is based on United States v.  Smith, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 
471, 33 C.M.R. 3 (1963). 
Subsection (5)  is based  on paragraph  216c of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.)  which described self-defense  in terms which also apply to 
defense of  another. It is also based on United States v.  Styron, 21 
C.M.R. 579 (C.G.B.R. 1956); United States v.  Hernandez,  19 ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (k) 
C.M.R. 822 (A.F.B.R. 1955). But see R. Perkins,Criminal  Law 
1018-1022 (2d ed. 1969). 
(f)  Accident. This subsection and the discussion are based on par- 
agraph 216b of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. 
Tucker, 17  U.S.C.M.A. 551, 38 C.M.R. 349 (1968);  United States 
v.  Redding, 14  U.S.C.M.A.  242, 24 C.M.R. 22 (1963);  United 
States v.  Sandoval, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 61, 15  C.M.R. 61 (1954);United 
States v.  Small, 45 C.M.R. 700 (A.C.M.R. 1972). 
(g) Entrapment. This subsection and the discussions are based on 
paragraphs 216e of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. 
Vanzandt, 14 M.J. 332 (C.M.A. 1982). 
(h) Coercion or duress. This subsection is based  on paragraph 
216f of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Paragraph 216f required that the fear 
of  the accused be that the accused would be harmed. This test was 
too narrow, as the fear of  injury to  relatives or others may be a ba- 
sis for this defense. United States v.  Jemmings, 1  M. J. 414 
(C.M.A. 1976); United States V.  Pinkston, 18 u.S.C.M.A.  261,39 
C.M.R. 261 (1969).  The discussion is based  on United States v. 
Jemmings, supra. 
(i)  Inability.  This subsection is based  on paragraph  216g of 
MCM, 1969 (R~~.).  seeunited states v, cooley, supra; united 
States v.  Pinkston, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 700, 21  C.M.R. 22 (1956); 
United States v.  Heims, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 418, 12 C.M.R. 174 (1953). 
(j) Ignorance or mistake of fact. This subsection is based on para- 
graph 216i of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.);  United States v.  Jenkins, 22 
U.S.C.M.A. 365, 47 C.M.R. 120 (1973); United States v.  Hill, 13 
U.S.C.M.A.  158, 32 C.M.R. 158, (1962);United  States v.  Green- 
wood, 6 U,S,C,M,A,209, 19 C.M,R, 335 (1955);  united states v, 
Graham, 3 M.J. 962 (N.C.M.R.),  pet  denied, 4 M.J. 124 (1977); 
United States v.  Coker, 2. M.J. 304 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976), rev'd on 
other grounds, 4 M.J. 93 (C.M.A. 1977).  See also United States v. 
Calley, 46  C.M.R.  1131, 1179 (A.C.M.R. 1973), aff d, 22 
U.S.C.M.A. 534,48 C.M.R. 19  (1973). 
(k)  ~~~k of  responsibility, subsection  (1)  is taken from 
paragraph  120b of  MCM, 1969 (Rev).  See also United States v. 
Frederick, 3 M.J. 230 (C.M.A. 1977). 
1986 Amendment: The test for lack of  mental responsibility in 
subsection (1)  was changed to implement Article 50a, which was 
added  to the UCMJ  in the "Military Justice Amendments of 
1986,"  tit. VIII,  802, National Defense Authorization Act for fis- 
cal year  1987, Pub.L. No. 99-661, 100 stat. 3905, (1986).  Article 
50a is modeled  on 18  U.S.C. 20. See Insanity Defense Reform 
Act, ch. IV, Pub.L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057  (1984).  The new 
test deletes the volitional  prong  of  the American Law Institute's 
Model Penal Code Standard (see United States v.  Lyons, 731 F.2d 
243 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 323 (1985)), 
which was applied to  courts-martial in United States v.  Frederick, 
3 M.J. 230 (C.M.A. 1977). The new standard  also changes the 
quantity of  mental disability necessary to establish the defense 
from "lacks substantial capacity to appreciate"  to being "unable 
to appreciate."  The new test is very similar  to the test in 
M'Naghten's  Case. 10 C1. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (House of 
Lords. 1843).See also Carroll, Insanity Defense Reform, 114 Mil. 
L. Rev. 183 (1986). 
Subsection (2)  is taken from paragraph  120c of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). See also United States v.  Higgins, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 143, 15 
C.M.R. 143 (1954). 
1986 Amendment: Subsection (2)  was amended to  eliminate the 
defense  of  partial mental responsibility in conformance with Arti- 
cle 50a, which was added  to the UCMJ in the "Military Justice 
Amendments of 1986,"  tit. VIII 802, National  Defense Authori- 
zation Act for fiscal year  1987, Pub.L. NO.  99-661, 100 Stat. 3905, 
(1986). Article 50a(a) is adopted  from 18  U.S.C. 20(a).  Congress 
wrote the last sentence of  18  U.S.C. 20(a) (now also the last sen- 
tence of  Article  50(a))  "to insure that the insanity defense is not 
improperly resurrected in the guise of  showing some other affirm- 
ative defense,  such as that the defendant had has a 'diminished re- 
sponsibility'  on some similarly  asserted  state of  mind which 
would serve to  excuse the offense  and  open the door, once again, 
to needlessly confusing psychiatric  testimony."  %Rep.  No. 225, 
98th Cong. 1st Sess. 229  (1983), reprinted  in 1984 U.S.Code 
COW  & Ad. News  1. 231. See Muench v.  Israel, 715 F.2d  1124 
(7th Cir. 1983),cert. denied, 104 s.Ct. 2682 (1984);  state v.  ~il- 
COX. 436 N.E. 2d  523 (Ohio l982). 
Because the language of  section 20(a)  and  its legislative history 
have been contended  to  be somewhat ambiguous regarding "di- 
minished capacity"  or "diminished responsibility,"  this aspect of 
the legislation has been litigated  in Article I11 courts. United 
States  V. Pohlot, Crim. NO. 85-00354-01 (E.D. Pa. March 31, 
1986)  held that section 20(a)  eliminated the defense  of  diminished 
capacity. See also United States v.  white, 766 F.2d  22, 24-25 (1st 
Cir. 1985);  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK 
ON THE  ACT  OF 
1984 AND OTHER  STATUTES ENACTED BY 
THE  98TH C0NGRES'?,28~ 60(December 1984).Contra United 
States v.  Frisbee, 623 F,,Tupp.  1217 (N.D. ~al.  1985) (holding 
that Congress did not intend to eliminate the defense of  dimin- 
ished capacity). See also Carroll, Insanity ~efense  ~eform.  114 
Mil. L. Rev. 183, 196 (1986). The drafters concluded that con- 
gress intended to  eliminate this defense in section 20(a). 
Subsection (3)(A)  and  the discussion are based on paragraph 
122a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Several matters in paragraph  122a 
are covered in other parts of  this subsection or in R.C.M. 909. 
1986 hnendment: Subsection (3)(A)  was mnended to conform 
to  article 50a(b)  and R.C.M. 916(b). 
subsection (3)(B)  and the discussion are based on on paragraph 
122b(2)  of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  The  procedures for  an inquiry into 
the mental responsibility of  the accused  are covered  in R.C.M. 
706. 
Subsection (3)(C)  is new. Article 51(b) prohibits  a military 
judge from ruling finally on the factual question of  mental respon- 
sibility. It does not, however, require that the question be treated 
as an interlocutory one, and there is no  apparent reason for doing 
so. The  import of  Article 51(b)  is that the issue of  mental respon- 
sibility may not be removed from the factfinder.  Moreover, to  per- 
mit mental responsibility to be treated  separately from other is- 
sues relating to the general issue could  work to the detriment of 
the accused. Cf: United States v.  Laws,  11 M.J. 475  (C.M.A. 
1981). 
(1)  Not defensesgenerally. 
Subsection (1)  is based on the first sentence of  paragraph  216j 
of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The discussion is based on the remainder 
of  paragraph 216j of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.);  R. Perkins, supra at 920- 
38. See also United States v.  Sicley, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 402, 20 C.M.R. 
118 (1955);  United States v. Bishop, 2 M.J. 741 (A.F.C.M.R.), pet, 
denied, 3 M.J. 184 (1977). 
Subsection (2)  is based  on paragraph  216h of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.).  See also United States v.  Hernandez, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 219 APP.  Sty  (k)  APPE 
43 C.M.R. 59 (2970); United States v. Ferguson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 
441, 38 C.M.R. 239 (1968); United States v.  Garcia, 41 C.M.R. 
638 (A.C.M.R.  1969). See United States v.  Santiago-Vargas,  5 
M.J. (C.M.A. 1978) (pathological intoxication). 
Rule 917.  Motion for a finding of not guilty 
(a)  In general. This subsection is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a) 
and on the first two sentences of paragraph 71a of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). Paragraph 71a did not expressly provide for a motion for a 
finding of not guilty to be made sua sponte, as does Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 29(a). Unlike Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, this rule requires the motion 
to be resolved before findings are entered. If the evidence is insuf- 
ficient to support a rational finding of guilty, there is no reason to 
submit the issue to the members. That would be inefficient. More- 
over, if a military judge set aside some but not all of the findings 
as"irrational,"  it would be awkward to proceed to sentencing 
before the same members. However, nothing in this rule is in- 
tended to limit the authority of a military judge to dismiss charges 
after findings on other grounds, such as multiplicity or improper 
findings (e.g., conviction for both larceny as perpetrator and re- 
ceiving stolen property, see United States v.  Cartwright, 13 M.J. 
174 (C.M.A.  1982); United States v. Ford,  12 U.S.C.M.A.  3, 30 
C.M.R. 3 (1960); cf:  United States v.  Clark, 20 U.S.C.M.A.  140, 
42 C.M.R. 332 (1970)). 
(b)  Form of  motion. This subsection is.based on the first sentence 
in the second paragraph of paragraph,Zla of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), 
except that now a statement of thej&eficiencies of proof is re- 
quired. This will enable the trial counsel to respond to the motion. 
(c)  Procedure. This subsection is new, although it conforms to 
current practice. By ensuring that counsel may be heard on the 
motion, a precipitant ruling will be avoided. This is important 
since a ruling granting the motion may not be reconsidered. See 
United States v.  Hitchcock, 6 M.J.  188 (C.M.A. 1979). The first 
paragraph in the discussion is based on the fifth sentence of the 
second paragraph of paragraph 71a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(d) Standard. This subsection is based on the fourth sentence of 
the second paragraph of paragraph 71a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See 
also Jackson  v.  Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); United States v. 
Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1981);United  States v.  Beck, 615 
F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1980). 
(e)  Motion as to greater offense. This subsection is new and is in- 
tended to resolve the problem noted in United States v.  Spearman, 
23 U.S.C.M.A. 31,48 C.M.R. 405 (1974). See Government of  Vir- 
gin Islands v.  Josiah, 641 F.2d 1103, 1108 (3d Cir. 1981). 
(f) Effect of  ruling. This subsection is based on the third sentence 
of Article 51(a) and on United States v. Hitchcock, supra. 
(g) Effect of  denial on review. This subsection is based on the last 
sentence of the first paragraph of paragraph 71a of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). See also United States v. Bland, 653 F.2d 989 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981). 
Rule 918.  Findings 
(a)  Generaljndings. This subsection and the discussion are based 
on paragraphs 74b and c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The discussion of 
lesser included offenses is also based on Article 80. See also United 
States v. Scott, 50 C.M.R. 630 (C.G.C.M.R.  1975). 
Failure to reach findings as to the charge or the designation of a 
wrong article is not necessarily prejudicial. United States v. 
Dilday, 471C.M.R. 172 (A.C.M.R. 1973). 
1986Amendment: The provisions allowing for findings of not 
guilty only by reason of lack of mental responsibility were added 
to subsections (a)(l) and (2) to implement Article 50a(c), which 
was added to the UCMJ in the6'Military Justice Amendments of 
1986," Tit. VIII, 802, National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1987, Pub.L. No. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3905 (1986). This 
finding is modeled after 18 U.S.C. 4242(b)(3), section 403 of the 
Insanity Defense Reform Act, ch. IV, Pub.L. No. 98-473,98 Stat. 
2057, 2059. The drafters intended that adoption of the finding of 
"not  guilty only by  reason of lack of mental responsibility" does 
not require conformance to the procedures that follow an insanity 
acquittal in federal courts (see U.S.C. 4243 et. seq.). The Services 
are free to use available medical and administrative procedures 
which address disposition of servicemembers having psychiatric 
illnesses. The drafters further intended that, for purposes of sub- 
sequent appellate and other legal reviews under this Manual, a 
finding of "not guilty only by reason of lack of mental responsibil- 
ity" shall be treated as any other acquittal. 
1993Amendment: The amendment to R.C.M. 918(a)(l) allows 
for a finding of guilty of a named lesser included offense of the 
charged offense, and eliminates the necessity of making findings 
by exceptions and substitutions. This serves to conform military 
practice to that used in criminal trials before federal district 
courts. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c); E. Devitt and C. Blackman, 
Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, 18.07 (1977). The practice 
of using exceptions and substitutions is retained for those cases in 
which the military judge  or court members must conform the 
findings to the evidence actually presented, e.g.,  a larceny case in 
which the finding is that the accused stole several of the items al- 
leged in the specification but not others. 
(b) Specialjndings. This subsection is based on Article 51(d), 
paragraph 74i of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v.  Gerard, 11 
M.J. 440 (C.M.A. 1981).See also United States v.  Pratcher 14 M.J. 
819 (A.C.M.R.  1982) United States v.  Burke, 4 M.J. 530 
(N.C.M.R.  1977); United States v.  Hussey,  1 M.J. 804 
(A.F.C.M.R.  1976); United  States v.  Baker, 47 C.M.R.  506 
(A.C.M.R.  1973);United States v.  Falin, 43 C.M.R.  702 
(A.C.M.R.  1971); United States v.  Robertson, 41 C.M.R. 457 
(A.C.M.R.  1969); Schinasi, Special Findings: Their Use at Trial 
and on Appeal, 87 Mil.L.Rev. (Winter 1980). 
The requirement that a request for special findings be made 
before general findings are announced is based on the fifth sen- 
tence of paragraph 74i of MCM,  1969 (Rev.), and on Fed.  R. 
Crim. P.23(c). Article 51(d) is patterned after Fed. R. Crim. P. 
23(c).  United States v.  Gerard, supra. The language in Article 
51(d) is virtually identical to that in Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(c) as it 
existed when Article 51(d) was adopted in 1968. Fed. R. Crim. P. 
23(c) was amended in 1977 to provide specifically that a request 
for special findings be made before general findings are entered. 
Pub. L. No. 95-78 4 2(b), 91 Stat. 320. This was done "to make 
clear that deadline for making a request for findings of fact and to 
provide that findings may be oral."  Id., Advisory  Committee 
Note (Supp. v.  1981). Subsection (b), therefore, continues con- 
formity with federal practice. 
(c)  Basis ofjndings. This subsection and the discussion are based 
on paragraph 74a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The discussion of rea- 
sonable doubt has been modified based on United States  v. Cotten, 
10 M.J. 260 (C.M.A. 1981);United States v.  Salley, 9 M.J.  189 
(C.M.A. 1980). See also Holland v.  United States, 348 U.S.  121, ANAlYSIS  ~pp. R.C.M. (e) PI, 
140-41 (1954); United States v.  Previte, 648 F.2d  73 (1st Cir. 
1981); United States v.  De  Vincent, 632 F.2d  147  (1st Cir.),  cert 
denied, 449 U.S. 986 (1980); United States v.  Cortez, 521 F.2d  1 
(5th Cir. 1975); United States v.  Zeigler, 14 M.J. 860 (A.C.M.R. 
1982); United States v.  Sauer,  11 M.J.  872 (N.C.M.R.), pet. 
granted, 12 M.J. 320 (1981); United States v.  Crumb, 10 M.J. 520 
(A.C.M.R. 1980);E. Devitt and C.  Blackmar, Federal Jury Prac- 
tice Instructions, 5  11.14 (3d. ed. 1977). As to instructions con- 
cerning accomplice testimony, see United States v.  Lee, 6 M.J. 96 
(C.M.A. 1978); United States v.  Moore, 8 M.J.  738 (A.F.C.M.R. 
1980), afd,  10 M.J. 405 (C.M.A. 1981) (regarding corrobora- 
tion). 
Rule 919.  Argument by counsel on findings 
(a) In general. This subsection is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.1. 
It has been reworded slightly to  make clear that trial counsel may 
waive the opening and  the closing argument. The rule is consis- 
tent with the first sentence of  paragraph  72a of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). 
(b) Contents. This subsection is based on the first sentence of  the 
second  paragraph of  paragraph 726 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The 
discussion is based  on paragraphs  72a and  b of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). See also paragraphs 44g and  48c of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.); 
Griffin v.  California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)  (comment  on accused's 
failure to testify);  United States v.  Saint John, 23 U.S.C.M.A.  20, 
48 C.M.R. 312 (1974)  (comment on unrebutted nature of  prose- 
cution evidence); United States v.  Horn, 9 M.J. 429 (C.M.A. 1980) 
(repeated  use of  "I think"  improper but not prejudicial);  United 
States v.  Knickerbocker, 2 M.J.  128 (C.M.A. 1977) (personal 
opinion of  counsel); United States v.  Shamberger,  1  M.J.  377 
(C.M.A. 1976) (inflammatory argument); United States v.  Nelson, 
1  M.J. 235 (C.M.A.  1975) (comment on Article 32 testimony of 
accused  permitted; inflammatory argument; misleading argu- 
ment); United States v.  Reiner, 15  M.J. 38 (C.M.A. 1983); United 
States v.  Fields, 15  M.J. 34 (C.M.A. 1983); United States v.  Fitz- 
patrick,  14 M.J.  394 (C.M.A. 1983) (bringing to members'  atten- 
tion that accused had opportunity to  hear the evidence at the Ar- 
ticle 32  hearing  is permissible);  United States v.  Boberg,  17 
U.S.C.M.A.  401,38 C.M.R. 199 (1968); United States v.  Cook, 11 
U.S.C.M.A.  99,28 C.M.R. 323 (1959)  (comment on community 
relations); United States v.  McCauley, 9 U.S.C.M.A.  65, 25 
C.M.R. 327 (1958)  (citation of  authority to  members). See gener- 
ally ABA  Standards, The Prosecution Function  5  3-5.8 (1979), 
The Defense Function  5 4-7.8  (1979). See also United States v. 
Clifton, 15M.J. 26(C.M.A. 1983). 
(c) Waiver of objection to improper argument. This subsection is 
based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.1  and is generally consistent with 
current practice.  See  United States v.  Grandy, 11 M.J.  270 
(C.M.A.  1981). See also United States v.  Doctor, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 
126, 21  C.M.R. 252 (1956).  But see  United States v.  Knicker- 
bocker, United States v.  Shamberger, and  United States v.  Nelson 
allsupra; United States v.  Ryan, 2  1  U.S.C.M.A.  9, 44 C.M.R. 63 
(1971); United States v.  Wood, 18  U.S.C.M.A. 291, 40 C.M.R. 3 
(1969)  (military  judge  had duty to act on improper argument sua 
sponte where error was plain). As to the discussion, see  United 
States v.  Knickerbocker, and  United States v.  Nelson, both supra; 
United States v.  O'Neal, 16  U.S.C.M.A.  33, 36  C.M.R.  189 
(1966);United States v.  Carpenter, 11  U.S.C.M.A. 418,29 C.M.R. 
234 (1960). 
Rule 920.  Instructions on findings 
(a) In general. This subsection is based on the first sentence of 
paragraph 73a of  MCM. 1969 (Rev.).  The discussion is based on 
the first paragraph of  paragraph  73a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See 
United States v.  Buchana, 19  U.S.C.M.A. 394, 41 C.M.R. 394 
(1970); United States v.  Harrison, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 179,41 C.M.R. 
179 (1970); United States v.  Moore,  16  U.S.C.M.A. 375, 36 
C.M.R. 531 (1966); United States v.  Smith, 13  U.S.C.M.A. 471, 
33 C.M.R. 3(1963). See also United States v.  Gere, 662 F.2d  1291 
(9th Cir. 1981). 
(b)  When given. This subsection is based on the first sentence of 
paragraph  73a and on paragraph 74e of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.),  and 
is consistent with Fed. R. Crim. P. 30. This subsection expressly 
provides that additional instructions may be given after delibera- 
tions have begun without a request from the members. MCM, 
1969 (Rev.)  was silent on this point.  The discussion is based on 
United States v.  Ricketts, 1 M.J. 78 (C.M.A. 1975). 
1993 Amendment: The amendment to R.C.M. 920(b) is based 
on the 1987 amendments to Federal Rule of  Criminal Procedure 
30. Federal Rule of  Criminal Procedure 30 was amended  to per- 
mit instructions either before or after arguments by counsel. The 
previous version of  R.C.M. 920 was based on the now superseded 
version of  the federal rule. 
The purpose of  this amendment is to give the court discretion 
to instruct the members before or after closing arguments or at 
both times. The amend'ieht will permit  courts to continue in- 
structing the members %te~ arguments as Rule 30 and  R.C.M. 
920(b)  had previously  re$uired.  It  will also permit  courts to in- 
struct before arguments in order to give the parties an opportu- 
nity to  argue to  the jury in light of  the exact language used by the 
court. See United States v.  Slubowski, 7 M.J. 461 (C.M.A 1979); 
United States v.  Pendry, 29 M.J. 694 (A.C.M.R. 1989). 
(c) Requests for  instructions. This  subsection is based on the first 
three sentences in Fed. R. Crim. P. 30 and  on the second  and 
fourth sentences of  paragraph 73d of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  The  dis- 
cussion is based on the remainder of  paragraph 73d. 
(d)  How given. The first sentence of  this subsection is based on 
the last paragraph of  paragraph 73a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The 
second sentence of  this subsection permits  the use of  written cop- 
ies of  instructions without stating a preference for or against 
them. See United States v.  Slubowski, 7 M.J. 461 (C.M.A. 1979); 
United States v.  Muir, 20 U.S.C.M.A.  188, 43  C.M.R. 28 
(197O);United States v.  Sampson, 7 M.J. 513 (A.C.M.R.  1979); 
United States v.  Sanders, 30 C.M.R. 521 (A.C.M.R. 1961). Only 
copies of  instructions given orally may be provided, and delivery 
of  only a portion of  the oral instructions to the members in writ- 
ing is prohibited  when a party objects. This should eliminate the 
potential  problems  associated  with written instructions.See 
United States v.  Slubowski, supra: United States v.  Caldwell,  1 1 
U.S.C.M.A. 257,29 C.M.R. 73 (1960); United States v.  Helm, 21 
C.M.R. 357 (A.B.R. 1956). Giving written instructions is never 
required. The discussion is based on the last paragraph of  para- 
graph 73a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  and  United States v.  Caldwell, 
supra.  As to the use of  written instructions in federal distrlct 
courts, see generally  United States v.  Read, 658 F.2d  1225 (7th 
Cir. 1981); United States v.  Calabrase, 645 F.2d  1379 (10th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831 (1981). 
(e) Required  instructions. This subsection is based on Article 
51(c)  and on the first paragraph of  paragraph 73a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. Steinruck, 11 M.J.  322 (C.M.A. 
1981); United States v. Moore, supra;  United States v.  Clark, 1 
U.S.C.M.A. 201, 2 C.M.R. 107 (1952).  As  to  whether the defense 
may affirmatively waive certain instructions (e.g., lesser included 
offenses)  which might otherwise be required, see  United States v. 
Johnson,  1  M.J.  137  (C.M.A. 1975); United States v.  Mundy, 2 
U.S.C.M.A. 500,9 C.M.R. 130 (1953).  See generally Cooper, The 
Military Judge: More Than a Mere Reference, The  Army Lawyer 
(Aug. 1976) 1; Hilliard, The Waiver Doctrine: Is It Still Viable?, 
18 A.F.L. Rev. 45 (Spring 1976). 
1986 Amendment: Subsection (2)  was amended to  require the 
accused to  waive the bar of  the statute of  limitations if  the  accused 
desires instructions on any lesser included  offense  otherwise 
barred. Spaziano v.  Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984). This overturns 
the  holdings in United States v.  Wiedemann, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 356, 
36 C.M.R. 521 (1966) and  United States v.  Cooper,  16 
U.S.C.M.A. 390, 37  C.M.R. 10 (1966). The  same rule applies in 
trials by military judge  alone. Article 51(d). This is consistent 
with Article 79 because an offense  raised  by the evidence but 
barred by the statute of  limitations is "necessarily included in the 
offense  charged,"  unless the accused waives the statute of  limita- 
tions. 
The  first paragraph in the discussion is based on United States 
v.  Jackson,  12 M.J.  163 (C.M.A. 1981); United States v.  Waldron, 
11  M.J. 36(C.M.A. 19810; UnitedStates  v.  Evans, 17U.S.C.M.A. 
238, 38 C.M.R.  36 (1967); United States v.  Clark, supra. See 
United States v.  Johnson, 637 F.2d  1224 (9th Cir. 1980); United 
States v.  Burns, 624 F.2d  95 (10th Cir), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 954 
(1980). 
The  third paragraph  in the discussion is based on paragraph 
73a  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  and on  Military Judges Benchbook, DA 
Pam 27-9  Appendix A.  (May 1982). See also United States v. 
Thomas, 11 M.J. 388 (C.M.A.1981); United States v.  Fowler, 9 
M.J.  149 (C.M.A. 1980); United States v.  James, 5 M.J.  382 
(C.M.A. 1978) (uncharged misconduct); United States v.  Robin- 
son, 11  M.J.  218 (C.M.A. 1981) (character evidence); United 
States v.  Wahnon, 1 M.J.  144 (C.M.A. 1975) (effect  of  guilty plea 
on other charges); United States v.  Minter, 8  M.J.  867 
(N.C.M.R.),  afd, 9 M.J.  397 (C.M.A. 1980); United States v. 
Prowell, 1  M.J. 612 (A.C.M.R. 1975) (effect  of  accused's  absence 
from trial); United States v.  Jackson, 6 M.J.  116 (C.M.A. 1979); 
United States v.  Farrington, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 614, 34 C.M.R. 394 
(1964)  (accused's failure to  testify).  The  list is not exhaustive. 
The  fourth paragraph  in the discussion is based on paragraph 
73c of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v.  Grandy, 11 
M.J. 270 (C.M.A. 1981). 
1986 Amendment: Subsection (e)(5)@) was amended to  con- 
form to  amendments to  R.C.M. 916(b). 
(0 Waiver. This subsection is based on the last two sentences in 
Fed. R. Crim. P.  30. See also United States v.  Grandy, supra; 
United States v. Salley, 9 M.J. 189 (C.M.A. 1980). 
Rule 921.  Deliberations and voting on findings 
(a) In general. This subsection is based on Article 39(b) and  on 
the second, third, and  fifth sentences of  paragraph  74d(l)  of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  The  first sentence of  that paragraph is unnec- 
essary and the fourth is covered in subsection (b)  of  this rule. 
(b) Deliberations.  The  first sentence of  this subsection is based on 
the fourth sentence of  paragraph  74d(l)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
The  second  sentence is new but conforms to  current practice. See 
United States v. Hurt, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 735, 27 C.M.R. 3 (1958); 
UnitedStates v. Christensen, 30 C.M.R.  959 (A.F.B.R. 1961). The 
third sentence is based on United States v.  Jackson, 6 M.J.  116, 
117 (C.M.A. 1979) (Cook,  J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); United States v.  Smith, 15  U.S.C.M.A. 416, 35 C.M.R. 388 
(1965). See also paragraph  54b of  MCM, 1969 (Rev); United 
States v. Ronder, 639 F.2d  931 (2d Cir. 1981). 
(c) Voting. Subsection (1)  is based on the first sentence of  Article 
51(a)  and on the  first sentence ofparagraph  73d(2)  of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). 
Subsection (2)  is based on Article  52(a) and on the first two 
sentences of  paragraph 74d(3)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also 
United States v.  Guilford, 8 M.J.  598 (A.C.M.R.  1979), pet.  de- 
nied, 8 M.J. 242 (1980)  (holding Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 
(1979),  does not apply to courts-martial.)  The  discussion is based 
on the third sentence of  paragraph 74d(3)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (3)  is based on the fourth sentence of  paragraph 
74d(3)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
1986 Amendment: Subsections (4)  and (5)  were redesignated as 
subsections (5)  and (6)  and a new subsection (4)  was inserted. 
New subsection (4)  is based on Article 50a(e)  and provides for bi- 
furcated voting on the elements of  the offense  and  on mental re- 
sponsibility, and defines the  procedures for arriving at a finding of 
not guilty only by reason of  lack on mental responsibility. When 
the prosecution had the burden of  proving  mental responsibility 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the same as the burden regarding the 
elements of  the  offense,  the members were unlikely to  confuse the 
two general  issues. Without any procedure  for bifurcated voting 
under the 1984 amendment, substantial  confusion  might result if 
the members were required to  vote simultaneously on whether the 
defense has proven lack of  mental responsibility by  clear and con- 
vincing evidence, and whether the prosecution has proven the ele- 
ments of  the offense  beyond a reasonable doubt. Each issue might 
result in a different  number of  votes. Bifurcated voting is also nec- 
essary to  provide the finding of  "not guilty only by reason of  lack 
of  mental responsibility"  provided  for in R.C.M. 918(a). But see 
Carroll, Insanity Defense Reform, 114 Mil. L. Rev. 183, 216 
(1986). 
Subsection (4)  is new to  the Manual but it conforms to  practice 
generally followed in courts-martial. Paragraph 74d(2)  of  MCM, 
1969 (Rev.) suggested  that findings as to a specification and all 
lesser offenses  included therein would be resolved by a single bal- 
lot. Such an approach is awkward, however, especially when 
there are multiple lesser included offenses.  It is more appropriate 
to  allow separate consideration of  each included offense  until a 
finding  of  guilty has been reached. See Military Judges 
Benchbook, DA  Pam 27-9,  para. 2.28 (May 1982). 
Subsection (5)  is based on the second sentence of  Article 5 I(b) 
and  on paragraph  74d(2)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See also  United 
States v.  Dilday, 47 C.M.R. 172 (A.C.M.R. 1973). 
(d) Action afterfindings are reached. This  subsection and the dis- 
cussion are based on paragraphs  74fll)  and  74g of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). See  United States v.  Justice, 3 M.J. 451 (C.M.A.  1977); 
United States v. Ricketts, 1 M.J. 78 (C.M.A. 1975); United States 
v.  McAllister, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 420, 42 C.M.R. 22 (1970). The  use 
of  findings worksheets is encouraged. See United States v. Hender- 
son, 11 M.J. 395 (C.M.A.  1981); United States v.  Barclay, 6 M.J. 
785 (A.C.M.R. 1978),pet. denied, 7 M.J. 71 (1979). ANAiLYSlS  App. 21, R.C.M. 
1986 Amendment: The  word "sentence"  was changed to "find- 
ings" to  correct an error in MCM, 1984. 
Rule 922. Announcement of findings 
(a) In general. This subsection is based on Article 53 and  on the 
first sentence of  paragraph  74g of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also 
United Stales v. Dilday, 47 C.M.R. 172 (A.C.M.R. 1973). The  dis- 
cussion is based  on United States v.  Ricketts,  1 M.J. 78 (C.M.A. 
1975); United States v.  Stewart, 48 C.M.R. 877 (A.C.M.R. 1974). 
The requirement for the announcement to  include a statement of 
the percentage  of  members concurring in each finding of  guilty 
and  that the vote was by secret written ballot has been deleted. 
Article 53 does not require such an announcement and when in- 
structions on such matters are given (see R.C.M.  920(e)(6)),  the 
members are "presumed to have complied with the instructions 
given them  by the judge,"  United States v.  Ricketts, supra at 82. 
See  United States v.  Jenkins, 12  M.J. 222 (C.M.A. 1982). Cf: 
United States v.  Hendon, 6 M.J.  171, 173-174 (C.M.A. 1979). 
(b) Findings by members. This subsection is based on the second 
sentence of paragraph 74g of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The last sen- 
tence is based  on the last sentence of  paragraph  70b of  MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). 
1986 Amendment: R.C.M. 922(b) was amended  by adding a 
new paragraph  (2)  as a conforming change to the amendment in 
R.C.M. 1004(a)  making unanimity on findings a precondition to  a 
capital sentencing proceeding. The Rule and the Discussion  also 
preclude  use of  the reconsideration procedure  in R.C.M.  924 to 
change a nonunanimous finding of  guilty to  a unanimous verdict 
for purposes  of  authorizing a capital  sentencing  proceeding. 
Thus,  if  a nonunanimous finding of  guilty is reaffirmed  on recon- 
sideration and the vote happens to  be unanimous, the president of 
the court-martial does not make a statement as to  unanimity. 
(c) Findings by military judge.  This subsection is based on the 
second sentence of  the last paragraph of  paragraph 70b  and on the 
second paragraph of  paragraph 74g of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  See also 
Article 39(a). 
(d) Erroneous  announcement. This subsection is based on the 
third and  fourth sentences  of  paragraph  74g of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). 
(e) Polling prohibited.  This subsection is based on the require- 
ment in Article 51(a)  for voting by secret written ballot. This dis- 
tinguishes military from civilian practice (see, Fed. R. Crim. P. 
3  l(d)).  Mil.R.Evid. 606(b)  permits adequately broad questioning 
to ascertain whether a finding is subject to impeachment due to 
extraneous factors. To  permit  general inquiry into other matters, 
including actual votes of  members, would be contrary to Article 
51(a) and  Article 39(b). See  United States v.  Bishop,  11 M.J. 7 
(C.M.A. 1981); United States v.  West, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 77, 48 
C.M.R. 548 (1974) (Duncan, C.J.); United States v.  Nash, 5 
U.S.C.M.A. 550, 555, 18  C.M.R. 174, 179 (1955) (Brosman, J. 
concurring); United States v.  Connors, 23 C.M.R. 636 (A.B.R. 
1957); United States v.  Tolbert, 14 C.M.R. 613 (A.F.B.R. 1953). 
Contra Caldwell, Polling the Military Jury,  11 The Advocate 53 
(Mar- Apr, 1979); Feld, A Manual for  Courts-Martial Practice 
and Appeal 8 72 (1957).  See also United States v.  Hendon, supra. 
Rule 923.  Impeachment of findings 
This rule is based  on United States v. Bishop,  11 M.J. 7 
(C.M.A. 1981);United States v.  West, 23  U.S.C.M.A. 77,  48 
C.M.R. 548 (1974).  See also United States v.  Witherspoon, 12 M.J. 
588 (A.C.M.R. 1981), pet.  granted, 13 M.J. 210 (C.M.A. 1982); 
affd 16  M.J. 252 United States v.  Hance, 10 M.J. 622 (A.C.M.R. 
1980); United States v.  Zinsmeister, 48 C.M.R. 931, 935 
(A.F.C.M.R.),  pet.  denied, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 620 (1974); United 
States v.  Perez-Pagan, 47 C.M.R.  719 (A.C.M.R. 1973); United 
States v.  Connors, 23 C.M.R. 636 (A.B.R. 1957); Mil.R.Evid. 
606(b). 
As to inconsistent findings, see Harris v.  Rivera, 454 U.S. 339 
(1981);Dunn v.  United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932);  United States 
v.  Gaeta, 14 M.J. 383, 391 n. 10 (C.M.A. 1983); United States v. 
Ferguson, 21  U.S.C.M.A. 200, 44 C.M.R. 254 (1972); United 
States v.  Jules, 15  C.M.R. 517 (A.B.R. 1954). But see  United 
States v.  Reid, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 497, 31 C.M.R. 83 (1961);  United 
States v.  Butler, 41 C.M.R. 620 (A.C.M.R. 1969). 
The  rule is not intended to  prevent a military judge from setting 
aside improper findings. This would include improper findings of 
guilty of  'mutually exclusive"  offenses,  for example, larceny (as a 
perpetrator) of  certain property  and  receiving the same stolen 
property. In such a case, the members should be instructed before 
they deliberate that they may convict of  no more than one of  the 
two offenses. See Milanovich  v.  United States, 365  U.S. 551 
(1961); United States v.  Cartwright, 13  M.J.  174 (C.M.A. 
1982);United  States v.  Clark, U.S.C.M.A. 140, 42 C.M.R. 332 
(1970); United States v.  Ford,  12 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 30 C.M.R. 3 
(1960).  ,!,: 
.cr; - -.. 
Rule 924. Reconsideration of findings 
(a) Time  for  reconsideration. This subsection is based on Article 
52(c)  and on the fourth and fifth sentences of  paragraph 74d(3)  of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(b) Procedure.  This subsection is based  on Articles 52(a) and 
53(c) and  on the last three sentences of  paragraph  74d(3)  of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also  United States v.  Boland, 20 
U.S.C.M.A. 83,42 C.M.R. 275 (1970). 
1987 Amendment: R.C.M. 924(b) was amended in conjunction 
with the adoption in R.C.M. 921(c)(4)  of  bifurcated voting on 
lack of  mental responsibility. It is also necessary to bifurcate the 
vote on reconsideration to  retain the relative burdens for recon- 
sideration and to  prevent prejudice to the accused. 
(c) Military judge  sitting  alone.  This subsection is new to the 
Manual, although the power  of  the military judge  to reconsider 
findings of  guilty has been recognized. United States v.  Chatman, 
49 C.M.R. 319 (N.C.M.R.  1974). It is also implicit in Article 16 
which empowers the military judge  sitting alone to perform the 
functions of  the members. See Article 52(c). 
Rule 1001. Presenting procedure 
Introduction. This rule is based  on paragraph  75 of  MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). Additions, deletions, or modifications, other than 
format or style changes, are noted in specific subsections infra. 
Sentencing procedures  in Federal  civilian courts can be fol- 
lowed  in courts-martial  only to a limited degree. Sentencing in 
courts-martial  may be by the military judge  or members. See Ar- 
ticle 16  and 52(b).  The  military does not have-and  it is not feasi- 
ble to create-an  independent, judicially  supervised  probation 
service to  prepare presentence reports. See Fed. R.  Crim. P. 32(c). 
This rule allows the presentation  of  much of  the same information 
to the court-martial as would  be contained in a presentence  re-APP. St11  APPENDIX 21 
port, but it does so within the protections of an adversarial pro- 
ceeding, to which rules of evidence apply (but cf: Williams v. New 
York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)), although they may be relaxed for 
some purposes. See subsections (b)(4) and (5), (c)(3), (d), and (e) 
of this rule. The presentation of matters in the accused's service 
records (see subsection (b)(2) of  this rule) provides much of the 
information which would be in a presentence report. Such records 
are not prepared for purposes of prosecution (cf: United States v. 
Boles,  11 M.J. 195 (C.M.A. 1981)) and are therefore impartial, 
like presentence reports. In addition, the clarification of the types 
of cases in  which aggravation evidence may be introduced (see 
subsection (b)(4) of this rule) and authorization for the trial coun- 
sel to present opinion evidence about the accused's rehabilitative 
potential (see subsection (b)(5) of this rule) provide additional av- 
enues for presenting relevant information to the court-martial. 
The accused retains the right to present matters in extenuation 
and mitigation (see subsection (c) of this rule). 
In addition to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c), several other subsections 
in Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 are inapplicable to courts-martial or are 
covered in other rules. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(2) is covered in 
R.C.M. 1010. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(l) is inapposite; parallel 
matters are covered in R.C.M. 11 14, Fed. R. Crim. P. 32@)(2) is 
inapplicable as courts-martial lack power to adjudge criminal for- 
feiture of property. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d) is covered in R.C.M. 
910(h). See also Article 45(a). As to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e), see 
R.C.M.  1108.  hi. 
(a)  In general. Subsestion (a)(3) is basefon the third sentence of 
paragraph 53h of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and on the second sentence 
of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a). See also Hill v.  United States, 368 U.S. 
424 (1962); Green  v.  United States, 365 U.S. 301 (1961). Subsec- 
tion (a)(3) of paragraph 75 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) is deleted as the 
convening authority is no longer required to examine the findings 
for factual sufficiency. Subsection (a)(2) is consistent with the first 
sentence of  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a). See Article 53. As to the last 
sentence of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a), see subsection (g) of this rule. 
(b)  Matter to be presented by  the prosecution. Subsections (3) and 
(4) are modifications of paragraph 75b(3) and (4) of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.), and subsection (5) is new. 

1986 Amendment: The word "age"  in subsection (1) was deleted 

to correct error in MCM, 1984. 

The fourth sentence of subsection (2) is modified by substitut- 
ing "a  particular document" for "the information." This is in- 
tended to avoid the result reached in United States v. Morgan, 15 
M.J. 128 (C.M.A. 1983). For reasons discussed above, sentencing 
proceedings in courts-martial are adversarial. Within the limits 
prescribed in the Manual, each side should have the opportunity 
to present, or not present, evidence. Morgan encourages games- 
manship and may result in less information being presented in 
some case because of the lack of opportunity to rebut. 
1987Amendment: The words "all those records" were changed 
to "any records" to implement more clearly the drafters' original 
intent. According to the paragraph just above, the drafters "in- 
tended to avoid the result reached in United States v. Morgan," 
supra, by  allowing the trial counsel to offer only such records as 
he or she desired to offer. In Morgan, the court held that, when 
the trial counsel offered adverse documents from the accused's 
service record, the "rule of completeness" under Mil.R.Evid. 106 
required that all documents from that record be offered. 
Subsection (3) deletes the exclusion of convictions more than 6 
years old. No similar restriction applies to consideration of prior 
convictions at sentencing proceedings in  Federal civilian courts. 
There is no reason to forbid their consideration by courts-martial, 
subject to Mil.R.Evid. 403. 
Subsection (3) also eliminates the requirement that a convic- 
tion be final before it may be considered by  the court-martial on 
sentencing. No similar restriction  applies in Federal civilian 
courts. This subsection parallels Mil.R.Evid. 609. An exception is 
provided for summary courts-martial and special courts-martial 
without a military judge. See Analysis, Mil.R.Evid. 609. Whether 
the adjudication of guilt in a civilian forum is a conviction will de- 
pend on the law in that jurisdiction. 
1986 Amendment:  The reference to "Article  65(c)"  was 
changed toMArticle  64" to correct an error in MCM, 1984. 
Subsection (4) makes clear that evidence in aggravation may be 
introducted whether the accused pleaded guilty or not guilty, and 
whether or not it would be admissible on the merits. This is con- 
sistent with the interpretation of paragraph 75b(3) (later amended 
to be paragraph 75b(4) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) by Exec. Order No. 
12315 (July 29,  1981)) in  United States v.  Vickers, 13 M.J. 403 
(C.M.A. 1982).  See also U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General's 
Task Force on Violent Crime, Final Report Recommendation 14 
(1981); Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(2)(B) and (C). This subsection 
does not authorize introduction in general of evidence of bad 
character or uncharged misconduct. The evidence must be of cir- 
cumstances directly relating to or resulting from an offense of 
which the accused has been found guilty. See United States v. 
Rose, 6 M.J. 754(N.C.M.R. 1978),pet. denied, 7M.J. 56(C.M.A. 
1979); United States v.  Taliaferro, 2 M.J. 397 (A.C.M.R. 1975); 
United States v. Peace, 49 C.M.R. 172 (A.C.M.R. 1974). 
Subsection (5) is new.  (Paragraph 75b(5) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) 
is deleted here, as it is now covered in R.C.M. 701(a)(5). Cf:  Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3).) Subsection (5) authorizes the trial counsel 
to present, in the form of opinion testimony (see Mil.R.Evid., Sec- 
tion VII), evidence of the accused's character as a servicemember 
and rehabilitative potential. Note that inquiry into specific in- 
stances of conduct is not permitted on direct examination, but 
may be made on cross-examination. Subsection (5) will allow a 
more complete presentation of information about the accused to 
the court-martial. The accused's character is in issue as part of the 
sentencing decision, since the sentence must be tailored to the of- 
fender. Cf:  United States v.  Lania, 9 M.J. 100 (C.M.A. 1980). 
Therefore, introduction of evidence of this nature should not be 
contingent solely upon the election of the defense. Information of 
a similar nature, from the accused's  employer or neighbors,  is 
often included in civilian presentencing reports. See, e.g., Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 32(c)(2). Subsection (5) guards against unreliable infor- 
mation by  guaranteeing that the accused will have the right to 
confront and cross-examine such witnesses. 
(e)  Production of  witnesses. The language of subsection (2)(C) has 
been modified to clarify that only a stipulation of fact permits 
nonproduction.See United States v. Gonzalez, 16 M.J. 58 (C.M.A. 
1983). 
(f)  Additional matters to be considered. This subsection is based 
on the third and fourth sentences of paragraph  76a(2) of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.) and on the first sentence of  paragraph  123 of MCM 
1969 (Rev.). The discussion is based on the last two sentences of 
paragraph  123 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (c) 
(g) Argument. The last paragraph is new. See Analysis, R.C.M. 
919(c). As to the second sentence, see United States v. Grady, 15 
M.J. 275 (C.M.A. 1983). 
Rule 1002. Sentence determination 
This rule is based on the first sentence in paragraph  76a(l) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Rule 1003.  Punishments 
Introduction. This rule lists the punishments a court-martial is 
authorized to impose, and presents general limitations on punish- 
ments not provided in specific rules elsewhere. Limitations based 
on jurisdiction (see R.C.M. 201(f);  rehearings, other and new tri- 
als (see R.C.M. 810(d)); and on referral instructions (see R.C.M. 
601(e)(l)) are contained elsewhere, but are referred to this rule. 
See subsection (c)(3) and discussion. The maximum punishments 
for each offense are listed in Part IV. The automatic suspension of 
limitations at paragraph of paragraph  127c(5) of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.) is deleted since the maximum punishments now include 
appropriate adjustments in the maximum authorized punishment 
in time of war or under other circumstances. 
(a)  In general. This subsection provides express authority for ad- 
judging any authorized punishment in the case of any person tried 
by  court-martial, subject only to specific limitations prescribed 
elsewhere. It does not change current law. 
(b) Authorized punishments. This subsection lists those punish- 
ments which are authorized, rather than some which are prohi- 
bited. This approach is simpler and should eliminate questions 
about what punishments a court-martial may adjudge. 
Subsection (1) is based  on paragraph  126f  of MCM,  1969 
(Rev.). Admonition has been deleted as unnecessary. 
Subsection (2) is based on paragraphs 126h(l) and (2) of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). 
1990 Amendment: Subsection (b)(2) was amended to incorpo- 
rate the statutory expansion of jurisdiction over inactive-duty re- 
serve component personnel  provided in the Military Justice 
Amendments of 1986, tit. VIII, 5 804, National Defense Authori- 
zation Act for Fiscal Year  1987, Pub. L. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3905 
(1986). 
Subsection (3) is based on paragraph  126h(3) of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). See R.C.M.  11 13(d)(4) and Analysis concerning possible 
issues raised by enforcing a fine through confinement. 
Detention of pay (paragraph 126h(4) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.)) 
has been deleted. This punishment has been used very seldom and 
is administratively cumbersome. 
Subsection (4) is based on paragraph 126i of MCM,  1969 
(Rev.). 
Subsection (5) is based on the second paragraph of paragraph 
126e of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The first sentence in the discussion is 
based on the same paragraph. The second sentence in the discus- 
sion is based on the last sentence in the first paragraph of para- 
graph 126e of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (6) is based on paragraph  126gand on the ninth sen- 
tence of the second paragraph  127c(2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The 
equivalency of restriction and confinement has been incorporated 
here and is based on the table of equivalencies at paragraph 
127c(2) of MCM, 1969 (rev.). See also Article 20. 
Subsection (7) and the discussion are based on paragraph 126k 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The last sentence in the rule is new and is 
based on the table of equivalent punishments at paragraph 
127c(2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) See also Article 20. 
Subsection (8) is based  on paragraph  126j of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). Matters in the second paragraph of paragraph  126j of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.) are now covered in R.C.M. 11 13(d)(2)(A). 
Subsection (9) is based on the last paragraph of paragraph  125 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The last sentence is new and is based on 
the table of equivalent punishments at paragraph  127c(2) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (10)(A) is based on the second paragraph of para- 
graph 126d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsections (10)(B) and (C) 
are based on paragraphs 76a(3) and (4) and  127c(4) of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). 
1986 Amendment: Under R.C.M. 1003(c)(2)(A)(iv),  a warrant 
officer who is not commissioned can be punished by a dishonora- 
ble discharge when convicted at general court-martial of any of- 
fense. This continued the rule of paragraph 126d of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). The second sentence of subsection (10)(B), added in 1985, 
does not make any substantive change, but merely restates the 
provision in subsection (10)(B) to maintain the parallelism with 
subsection (10)(A), which governs dismissal of commissioned of- 
ficers, commissioned warrant officers, cadets, and midshipmen. 
As to subsection (1 I), see R.C.M. 1004. 
Subsection (12) is basedon Article 18. 
Subsections (6), (7), and (9) incorporate equivalencies for re- 
striction, hard labor withopt confinement, confinement, and con- 
finement on bread and water or diminished rations. This makes 
the table of equivalent punishments at paragraph  127c(2) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.) unnecessary and it had been deleted. That ta- 
ble was confusing and subject to different interpretations. For ex- 
ample, the table and the accompanying discussion suggested that 
if the maximum punishment for an offense was confinement for 3 
months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month, for 3 months, 
a court-martial could elect to adjudge confinement for 6 months 
and no forfeitures. The deletion of the table and inclusion of spe- 
cific equivalencies where they apply eliminates the possibility of 
such a result. 
(c) Limits on punishments. Subsections (l)(A) and (B) are based 
on paragraph  127c(l) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (l)(C) is 
based on the first 3 sentences and the last sentence of paragraph 
76a(5) of MCM,  1969 (Rev.). See Blockburger v.  United States, 
284 U.S. 299 (1932); United States v.  Washington, 1 M.J. 473 
(C.M.A. (1976). See also Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983); 
United States v.  Baker,  14 M.J. 361 (C.M.A. 1983). The discus- 
sion is based on paragraph 76a(5) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). As to the 
third paragraph in the discussion, see e.g.,  United States v.  Pos- 
nick, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 201,24 C.M.R. 11 (1957). Cf:United States v. 
Stegall, 6 M.J. 176 (C.M.A. 1979). As to the fourth paragraph in 
the discussion, see United States v.  Harrison, 4 M.J. 332 (C.M.A. 
1978); United States v.  Irving, 3 M.J. 6 (C.M.A. 1977);United 
States v.  Hughes, 1 M.J. 346 (C.M.A. 1976); United States v. Bur-
ney, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 71,44C.M.R. 125 (1971). 
Subsection (2)(A) is based on paragraph  126d of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). Paragraph 127a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) provided that the 
maximum  punishments were "not binding"  in cases of officers, 
but could "be  used as a guide." Read in conjunction with para- 
graph 126d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) these provisions had the practi- 
cal effect of prescribing no limits on forfeitures when the accused APP. 2%  (c)  APPE 
is an officer.  This  distinction has now been deleted. The  maximum 
limits on forfeitures are the same for officers  and enlisted persons. 
Subsection (3)  is based  on paragraph  127b of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.).  It serves as a reminder that the limits on punishments may 
be affected  by other rules, which are referred to  in the discussion. 
The last sentence in subsections (1)  and  (2)  is new. Under 
R.C.M. 1001(b)(3),  a court-martial conviction may now be con- 
sidered by the sentencing body whether or not it is final. Allowing 
such a conviction to affect  the maximum punishment  may cause 
later problems, however. The  subsequent reversal of  a conviction 
would seldom affect  a sentence of  another court-martial  where 
that conviction was merely a factor which was considered, espe- 
cially when the pendency of  an appeal may also have been consid- 
ered. However, reversal would always affect the validity of  any 
later discharge or confinement for which it provided the basis. 
1986 Amendment: Subsection (c)(3)  was redesignated  as sub- 
section (c)(4)  and  new subsection (c)(3)  was added to reflect the 
legislative restrictions placed  upon punishment of  reserve compo- 
nent personnel  in certain circumstances in the amendment to  Ar- 
ticle 2, UCMJ,  contained in the "Military Justice Amendments of 
1986,"  tit. VIII,  § 804, National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1987, Pub.L. No. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3905 (1986). 
(d) Circumstances permitting  increased punishments.  This sub- 
section is based on Section B of  the Table of  Maximum Punish- 
ments, paragraph  127c of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also  United 
States v.  Timmons, 13  M.J.  431 (G<.M.A. 1982). The  last two 
sentences in the discussion are based on United States v.  Mack, 9 
M.J. 300 (C.M.A. 1980); United States v.  Booker, 5 M.J. 238 
(C.M.A. 1977),vacated  in part,  5 M.J. 246 (C.M.A. 1978). C' 
United States v.  Cofield, 11 M.J. 422 (C.M.A. 1981). 
Rule 1004.  Capital cases 
Introduction. This  rule is new. It provides additional standards 
and procedures governing  determination of  a sentence in capital 
cases. It is based on the President's  authority under Articles  18, 
36, and 56. See also U.S. Const. Art. 11, sec. 2, cl. 1. 
This  rule and the analysis were drafted before  the  Court of  Mil- 
itary Appeals issued its decision in United States v.  Matthews, 16 
M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1983) on October 11, 1983. There the court re- 
versed the sentence of  death because of  the absence of  a require- 
ment for the members to specifically find  aggravating circum- 
stances on which the sentence was based. When  this rule was 
drafted,  the procedures for capital cases were the subject of  litiga- 
tion in Matthews and  other cases. See e.g.,  United States v.  Mat- 
thews, 13  M.J.  501 (A.C.M.R. 1982), rev'd, United States v.  Mat- 
thews, supra;  United States v.  Rojas, 15  M.J. 902 (N.M.C.M.R. 
1983). See also United States v.  Gay, 16  M.J.  586 (A.F.C.M.R. 
1982), a'ffd  18  MJ  104 (1984) (decided after draft MCM was cir- 
culated for comment).  The  rule was drafted in recognition that, as 
a matter of  policy,  procedures  for the sentence determination in 
capital cases should be revised, regardless of  the outcome of  such 
litigation, in order to  better protect the rights of  servicemembers. 
While the draft Manual  was under review following public 
comment on it (see 48 Fed. Reg. 23688 (1983)),  the Matthews de- 
cision was issued. The holding inMatthews generated a necessity 
to revise procedures in capital cases. However, Matthews did not 
require substantive revision of  the proposed  R.C.M.  1004. The 
several modifications made in the rule since it was circulated  for 
comment were based on suggestions from other sources. They are 
unrelated to  any of  the issues involved in Matthews. 
Capital punishment  is not unconstitutional per  se.  Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); United States v.  Matthews, supra. 
Capital punishment  does not violate Article 55. Compare Article 
55  with Articles 85, 90, 94, 99-102, 104, 106, 110, 113, 118, and 
120. See  United States v.  Matthews, supra.  Butcf: id, at  382 
(Fletcher, J., concurring in result) (absent additional  procedural 
requirements, sentence of  death violated  Article 55). The Su- 
preme Court has established that capital punishment  does not vi- 
olate the Eighth Amendment (U.S. Const. amend. VIII)  unless it: 
"makes no measurable contribution to  acceptable goals of  punish- 
ment and  hence is nothing more than a purposeless and  needless 
imposition of  pain and suffering";  "is grossly out of  proportion  to 
the crime"  (Coker v.  Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977));  or is ad- 
judged under procedures which do not adequately protect against 
the arbitrary or capricious exercise of  discretion in determining a 
sentence.Furman v.  Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Cf: Barclay v. 
Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983); Zant v.  Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 
(1  983); Godfrey v.  Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1  980); Jurek  v.  Texas, 
428 U.S. 262 (1976);  Profitt v.  Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); 
Gregg v.  Georgia, supra.  See  United States v.  Matthews, supra. 
Furthermore, while the procedures under which death may be ad- 
judged  must adequately protect against the unrestrained  exercise 
of  discretion, they may not completely foreclose discretion (at 
least in most cases, see subsection (e), infra) or the consideration of 
extenuating or  mitigating circumstances.  See Eddings v. 
Oklahoma. 455  U.S.  104 (1982); Lockett v.  Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 
(1978);  Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977);Roberts 
(Stanislaus) v.  Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v.  North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). In Matthews the Court of Military 
Appeals suggested that similar considerations apply with respect to 
Article 55's prohibitions  against cruel and unusual punishment. 
United States v.  Matthews, supra at 36669,  379-80. 
The Court of Military Appeals listed several requirements for ad- 
judication  of the death penalty,  based on Supreme Court decisions: 
(I)a separate sentencingprocedure must follow thefinding of guilt 
of a potential  capital offense; (2)  specific  aggravating circum- 
stances must be identified  to the sentencing authority; (3)  the sen- 
tencing authority must select and make  findings  on the particular 
aggravating circumstances  used as a basis for  imposing the death 
sentence; (4)  the defendant must have an unrestricted opportunity 
topresent mitigating and extenuating evidence; and (5)  mandatory 
appellate review must be required to consider the propriety of the 
sentence as to the individual offense and individual defendant and 
to compare the sentence to similar cases within the  jurisdiction.  See 
Unitedstates  v. Matthews, supra at 369-77and  cases cited therein. 
The Supreme Court has not decided whether Furman v.  Geor- 
gia, supra, and subsequent decisions concerning capital punish- 
ment apply to courts-martial.See  Schick v.  Reed, 419 U.S. 256 
(1974). But see Furman v.  Georgia, supra at 412 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting); id. at 417-18  (Powell, J.,  dissenting). See generally 
Pfau and Milhizer, The Military Death Penalty and  the Constitu- 
tion: There is Life After Furman, 97 Mil.L.Rev.  35 (1982);  Pav- 
lick, The Constitutionality of the U.C.M.J.  Death Penalty Provi- 
sions, 97 Mil.L.Rev.  81 (1982); Comment, The Death Penalty in 
Military Courts: Constitutionally Imposed? 30 UCLA L. Rev. 366 
(1982); Dawson. Is the Death  Penalty in the Military Cruel and 
Unusual? 31 JAG J.  (Navy) 53 (1980);  English, The Constitution- ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (b) 
ality of the Court-Martial Death Sentence, 21 A.F.L.  Rev.  552 
(1  979). 
The Court of Military Appeals  held  in United States v.  Mat- 
thews, supra, that the requirements established  by  the Supreme 
Court for  civilian cases apply in courts-martial, at least in the ab- 
sence of circumstances calling for  different rules, such as combat 
conditions or wartime spying.  United States v.  Matthews, supra at 
368. The court added that current military capital sentencingpro- 
cedures are constitutionally adequate in the following  respects: (1) 
there is a separate sentencingprocess in which the members are in- 
structed  by the military judge  as to their duties; (2) certain aggra- 
vating factors  (e.g., premeditation) must be found  by the members 
duringfindings, and evidence of other aggravating circumstances 
may be submitted duringsentencing; (3)  the accused has an unlim- 
ited  opportunity to present  relevant evidence in extenuation and 
mitigation; and (4)  mandatory review is required by a Court of Mil- 
itary Review, and the Court of Military Appeals, with further con- 
sideration by the President.  United States v.  Matthews, supra at 
377-78.  The court held, that the procedure  is defective, however, in 
that the members are not required to "specifically identify the ag- 
gravating factors  upon which they have relied in choosing to impose 
the death penalty,"  id. at 379, at least with respect to a peacetime 
murder case. See id. at 368. 
The Court of Military Appeals stated in Matthews that constitu- 
tionally adequate procedures for capital cases may be promulgated 
by the President. Id. at 380-81.  The President's unique authority 
over military justice, particularly its procedure  and punishments is 
well established. See U.S.  Const. Art. 11, § 2, cl, 1; Articles  18, 36, 
and 56. Congress recently reaffirmed the broad scope of this Presi- 
dential authority. See Pub.L.  No. 96-107, Title VIII,  § 801 (b), 93 
Stat. 811 (Nov. 9, 1979); S.Rep.  No.  107, 96th Cong.,  1st Sess. 
123-125  (1979); Hearings on S.428 Before the Military Personnel 
Subcomm. of the House  Comm. on Armed  Services,  96th Cong., 
1st Sess. 5-6,  14, 17-18,  20-21.  52, 106 (1979). See also United 
States v.  Ezell, 6 M.J.  307, 31617 (C.M.A.  1978); W. Winthrop, 
Military Law and Precedents 27-33  (2d ed.  1920 reprint). Cf: 
Jurek v.  Texas, supra (judicial construction may save an otherwise 
defective death penalty provision).  The changes made in this rule 
areprocedural. See Dobbert v.  Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977). 
R. C. M. 1004 is based on the recognition that, in courts-martial, 
as in civilian prosecution,  death should  be adjudged only under 
carefully tailored procedures designed to ensure that all relevant 
matters are thoroughly considered and that such punishment is ap- 
propriate. 
At the same time, R.C.M.  1004 rests on the conclusion that the 
death penalty  remains a necessary sanction in courts-martial and 
that it is an appropriate punishment  under a broader range of cir- 
cumstances than may be the case in civilian jurisdictions.  This is 
because of the unique purpose  and organization  of the military, 
and its composition and the circumstances in which it operates. Cf: 
Parker v.  Levy, 41  7 U.S.  733 (1974). See alsounited States v.  Mat- 
thews, supra at 368. 
1986 Amendment: The Rule was amended to substitute the 
word'tfactor" for  the word  "circumstance"  with respect to the ag- 
gravating  factors  under R. C.M. 1004(c). This will more clearly dis- 
tinguish such factors from  the aggravating circumstances applica- 
ble to any sentencing proceeding  under R.C. M. 1001 (b)(4),  which 
may be considered in the balancing process  in capital cases under 
R. C.M.  1004(b)(4)(B). 
(a)  In general. Subsection (1) is based on the code and reflects the 
first of two "thresholds"  before death may be adjudged; the ac- 
cused must have been found guilty of an offense for which death is 
authorized. 
1986 Amendment: Subsection (2), referred to below in the orig- 
inal Analysis, was redesignated as subsection (3), and a new sub- 
section (2) was added. The new subsection requires a unanimous 
verdict on findings before the death penalty may be considered. 
Nothing in this provision changes existing law under which a 
finding of guilty may be based upon a vote of two-thirds of the 
members, and a finding based upon a two-thirds vote will con- 
tinue to provide the basis for sentencing proceedings in which any 
sentence other than death may be imposed. This is an exercise of 
the President's  powers as commander-in-chief, and is not in- 
tended to cast doubt upon the validity of the sentence in any capi- 
tal case tried before the effective date of the amendments. 
Subsection (2) refers to the remaining tests in subsections (b) 
and (c) of the rule; the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasona- 
ble doubt, the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances 
listed in subsection (c) of the rule. Only if this second threshold is 
passed  may the members consider death. If the members reach 
this point, their sentencing deliberations and procedures would be 
like those in any other case, except that the members must apply 
an additional specific standard before they may adjudge death. 
See subsection @)(3) of this rule. 
This rule thus combines~two  preliminary  tests which must be 
met before death may be aajudged with a standard which must be 
applied before death may- be adjudged. Cf: Barclay v. Florida and 
ant v.  Stephens, both supra. The Working Group considered the 
capital punishment provisions of those states which now author- 
ize capital punishment, as well as the ALI Model Penal Code § 
201.6(3), (4) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) (quoted at Gregg. v.  Geor- 
gia,supra  at 193 11.44). The ABA Standards do not include spe- 
cific provisions for capital punishment. See ABA Standards, Sen- 
tencing Alternatives and Procedures § 18-1.1  (1979). This rule is 
not based  on any specific state statue. It should be noted, how- 
ever, that this rule provides a greater measure of guidance for 
members than does the Georgia procedure which has been upheld 
by the Supreme Court. In Georgia, once a statutory aggravating 
factor has been proved, the statute leaves the decision whether to 
adjudge death entirely to the jury. See Ga. Code Ann. $5 
17-10-30,  17-10-31  (1982). (In Georgia, once an aggravating 
factor has been proved, the burden may effectively be on the de- 
fendant to show why death should not be adjudged. See Coker v. 
Georgia, supra at 590-91.) Subsection (b)(4)(B) of this rule sup- 
plies a standard for that decision. Many state statutes adopt a sim- 
ilar balancing test, although the specific standard to be applied 
varies. See e.g..  Ark. Stat. Ann.  41-1302  (1977). Cf: Barclay  v. 
Florida, supra. See also Analysis, subsection (b)(4)(B), infra. 
(b)  Procedure.  Subsection (1) is intended to avoid surprise and 
trial delays. Cf: Ga. Code Ann.  17-10  2(a)(1982). Consistent 
with R.C.M. 701, its purpose is to put the defense on notice of is- 
sues in the case. This permits thorough preparation, and makes 
possible early submission of requests to produce witnesses or evi- 
dence. At the same time, this subsection affords some latitude to 
the prosecution to provide later notice, recognizing that the exi- 
gencies of proof may prevent early notice in some cases. This is 
permissible as long as the defense is not harmed; ordinarily a con- 
tinuance or recess will prevent such prejudice. APP. 21, !l(b)  APPENDIX 21 
There is no requirement to plead the aggravating circum- 
stances under subsection (c). (Statutory aggravating circum- 
stances are elements of the offense, and must be pleaded and 
proved; see e.g., Article 85 (time of war); Article 118(1) (premedi- 
tation)). Notice of the aggravating circumstances under this sub- 
section may be accomplished like any other notice in these rules. 
Note that under R.C.M. 701(a)(5) trial counsel is required to in- 
form the defense of evidence the prosecution intends to introduce 
at sentencing. 
Subsection (2) makes clear that the prosecution may introduce 
evidence in aggravation under R.C.M. 1001(b)(4). Note that dep- 
ositions are not admissible for this purpose. See Article 49(d). 
Subsection (3) is based on Eddings v. Oklahoma and Lockett v. 
Ohio, bothsupra, Cf: Jurek v. Texas, supra. The accused in courts- 
martial generally has broad latitude to introduce matters in exten- 
uation and mitigation (see R.C.M.  1001(c)) although the form in 
which they are introduced may depend on several circumstances 
(see R.C.M. 1001(e)). This subsection reemphasizes that latitude. 
The rule is not intended to strip the military judge of authority to 
control the proceedings. Eddings and Lockett should not be read 
so broadly as to divest the military judge of the power to deter- 
mine what is relevant (see Mil.R.Evid. 401, 403) or so decide 
when a witness must be produced (see R.C.M.  1001(e)). Those 
cases, and this subsection, stand for the proposition that the de- 
fense may not be prevented from presenting any relevant circum- 
stances in extenuation or mitigation. ,,,,, 
Subsection(4)(A) establishes the second "threshold"  which 
must be passed before death may be adjudged. The requirement 
that at least one specific aggravating circumstance be found be- 
yond a reasonable doubt is common to many state statutory 
schemes for capital punishment. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 
$4209(d)(1977); Ark. Stat. Ann. $41-1302(1977);  111.  Ann. Stat. 
Ch. 38, $9-l(f)(Smith-Hurd  1979), La. Code Crim. Proc. $905.3 
(West Supp 1982); Md. Ann. Code Art. 27 $ 413(d)(1982);  Ind. 
Code Ann. $35-50-2-9(a)(Burns  1979). See generally  United 
States v. Matthews, supra. 
Subsection (4)(B) establishes guidance for the members in de- 
termining whether to adjudge death, once one or more aggravat- 
ing factors have been found. 
Note that under this subsection any aggravating matter may be 
considered in determining whether death or some other punish- 
ment is appropriate. Thus, while some factors may alone not be 
sufficient to authorize death they may be relevant considerations 
to weigh against extenuating or mitigating evidence. See Barclay 
v. Florida and Zant v. Stephens, both supra. See generally R.C.M. 
1001(b)(4). 
The rule does not list extenuating or mitigating circumstances 
as do some states. Some mitigating circumstances are listed in 
R.C.M. 1001(c)(l) and (f)(l). See also R.C.M. 1001(f)(2)(B). No 
list of extenuating or mitigating circumstances can safely be con- 
sidered exhaustive. See Eddings v. Oklahoma and Lockett v. Ohio, 
both supra; cf. Jurek v. Texas, supra. Moreover, in many cases, 
whether a matter is either extenuating or mitigating depends on 
other factors. For example, the fact that the accused was under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the offense could be 
viewed  as an aggravating or an extenuating circumstance. 
Whether a matter is extenuating or mitigating is to be determined 
by each member, unless the military judge finds that a matter is 
extenuating or mitigating as a matter of law (see e.g.. R.C.M. 
1001(c)(l) and (f)(l)) and so instructs the members. In contrast to 
subsection (b)(4)(A)  there is no requirement that the members 
agree on all aggravating, extenuating, and mitigating circum- 
stances under subsection (4)(B) in order to adjudge death. Each 
member must be satisfied that any aggravating circumstances, in- 
cluding those found under subsection (4)(A)  substantially out- 
weigh any extenuating or mitigating circumstances, before voting 
to adjudge death. 
The test is not a mechanical one. Cf: Zant v. Stephens, supra. 
The latitude to introduce evidence in extenuation and mitigation, 
the requirement that the military judge direct the members' atten- 
tion to evidence in extenuating and mitigation and instruct them 
that they must consider it, and the freedom of each member to in- 
dependently find and weigh extenuating and mitigating circum- 
stances all ensure that the members treat the accused "with  that 
degree of uniqueness of the individual" necessary in a capital case. 
See Lockett v. Ohio, supra at 605. Thus each member may place 
on the scales any circumstance "  'which  in fairness and mercy, 
may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree'  of 
moral culpabilty or punishment."  Coker v. Georgia, supra at 591 
(1977) (quoting instructions by the trial judge).  See also Wither- 
spoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (concerning disqualifications 
ofjurors in capital cases based on attitude toward the death pen- 
alty). 
1986 Amendment: The following stylistic changes were made 
in R.C.M.  1004(b)(4): first, subparagraph (a) was rewritten to 
provide that the members must find "at  least"  one factor under 
subsection (c); second, a new subparagraph (b) was added to un- 
derscore the notice and unanimity requirements with respect to 
the aggravating factors and to clarify that all members concur in 
the same factor or factors; and third, former subparagraph (B) 
was redesignated as subparagraph (C), with an express cross-ref- 
erence to R.C.M. 1001(b)(4), the general rule governing aggravat- 
ing circumstances in sentencing proceedings. 
Subsection (5) makes clear the evidence introduced on the mer- 
its, as well as during sentencing proceedings,  may be considered 
in determining the sentence. 
Subsection (6) requires additional instructions in capital cases. 
See also R.C.M. 1005. In determining which aggravating circum- 
stances on which to instruct, the military judge would refer to 
those of which the trial counsel provided notice. Even if such no- 
tice had been given, a failure to introduce some evidence from 
which the members could find an aggravating circumstance 
would result in no instruction being given on that circumstance. 
Cf:R.C.M. 917 The last sentence in this subsection is based on 
Eddings v. Oklahoma and Lockett v. Ohio, both supra. 
Subsection (7) is based on Article 52(b)(l). The  requirement for 
a separate specific finding of one or more aggravating circum- 
stances is new, and is designed to help ensure that death will not 
be adjudged in an inappropriate case. Subsection (8) operates as a 
check on this procedure. 
(c)  Aggravating circumstances. The lists of aggravating circum- 
stances under the laws of the states retaining capital punishment 
were examined and used as guidance for formulating the aggra- 
vating circumstances listed here. Those jurisdictions do not in- 
clude certain military capital offenses, of course, such as deser- 
tion, mutiny, misbehavior as a guard, nor do  they address some of 
the unique concerns or problems of military life. Therefore, sev- 
eral circumstances here are unique to the military. These circum- ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (c) 
stances, which apply to rape and murder, except as specifically 
noted, are based  on the determination that death is not grossly 
disproportionate for a capital offense under the code when such 
circumstances exist, and that the death penalty contributes to ac- 
cepted goals of punishment in such cases. As to proportionality, 
the aggravating circumstances together ensure that death will not 
be adjudged except in the most serious capital offenses against 
other individuals or against the nation or the military order which 
protects it. As to goals of punishment, in addition to specifically 
preventing the most dangerous offenders from posing a continu- 
ing danger to society, the aggravating circumstances recognize 
the role of general deterrence, especially in combat setting. See 
United States v.  Matthews, supra at 368,;  United States v. Gay, 
supra at 60546  (Hodgson, C.J., concurring). 
In a combat setting, the potentiality of the death penalty may 
be the only effective deterrent to offenses such as disobedience, de- 
sertion, or misbehavior. The threat of even very lengthy confine- 
ment may be insufficient to induce some persons to undergo the 
substantial risk of death in combat. At the same time, the rule en- 
sures that even a servicemember convicted of such very serious of- 
fenses in wartime will not be sentenced to death in the absence of 
one or  more of the aggravating circumstances. 
In some cases proof of the offense will also prove an aggravat- 
ing circumstance. See e.g., Article 99 and subsection(c)(l) of this 
rule. Note, however, that the members would have to return a 
specific finding under this rule of such an aggravating circum- 
stance before a sentence of death could be based on it. This en- 
sures a unanimous finding as to that circumstance. A finding of 
not guilty does not ensure such unanimity. See  Article 
52(a)(2);United States v. Matthews, supra at 379-80;  United States 
v.  Gay, supra at 600. The prosecution is not precluded from 
presenting evidence of additional aggravating circumstances. 
Subsection (1) reflects the serious effect of a capital offense 
committed before or in the presence of the enemy. "Before or in 
the presence of the enemy"  is defined in paragraph 23, Part IV. 
Note that one may be "before  or in the presence of the enemy" 
even when in friendly territory. This distinguishes this subsection 
from subsection (6). 
Subsection (2) and (3) are based on the military's  purpose: pro- 
tection of national security. That this interest may be basis for the 
death penalty is well established. See e.g., United States v. Rosen-
berg,  195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 
(1952). The definition of national security, which appears at the 
end of subsection (c), is based on Exec. Order No. 12065 5  6104 
(June 28, 1978), 43 Fed.Reg. 28949, as amended by  Exec. Order 
No. 12148 (July 19, 1979), 44 Fed.Reg. 43239, and Exec. Order 
No. 12163 (Sept. 29,  1979), 44 Fed.Reg. 56673, reprinted at 50 
U.S.C.A. 5 401 (West Supp 1982). The second ("includes") 
phrase is based on Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication  1. Dictionary 
of Military and Associated Terms 228 (1 July 79). Note that not 
all harm to national security will authorize death. Virtually  all 
military activities affect national security in some way. C'  Cole v. 
Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); United States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337 
(C.M.A. 1980). Substantial damage is required to authorize 
death. The discussion provides examples of substantial damage. 
Rape and murder may be aggravated under subsection (2) be- 
cause the offender intended to harm national security or a mis- 
sion, system, or function affecting national security, by the capital 
offense. Intent to harm the mission, system, or function will suf- 
fice. It must be shown, however, that regardless of whether the ac- 
cused intended to affect national security, the mission, system, or 
function must have been such that had the intended damage been 
effected, substantial damage to national security would have re- 
sulted. 
1986 Amendment: R.C.M. 1004(c)(2) was changed in conjunc- 
tion with the enactment of the new Article 106a. 
Subsection (4) is similar to an aggravating circumstance in 
many states.See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. 9 29-2523(1)(f)(1979); Miss. 
Code. Ann. 9 99-19-101(5)(c)(1981  Supp.); Ga. Code Ann. 5 
17-10-30(b)(1982).  This circumstance applies to all capital of- 
fenses (except rape) under the code; rape is excluded based on 
Coker v.  Georgia, supra. 
1986 Amendment: R.C.M. 1004(c)(4) was amended by adding 
a reference to Article 106a to distinguish this factor from the new 
aggravating factor in R.C.M. 1004(c)(12). It was also considered 
appropriate to exclude  104 from this aggravating factor. See 
R.C.M. 1004(c)(Il). 
Subsection (5) reflects the special need to deter the offender 
who would desert or commit any other capital offense to avoid 
hazardous duty. Moreover, the effect such conduct has on the 
safety of others (including the offender's  replacement) and the 
success of the mission justified authorizing death. Note that this 
circumstance applies to all capital offenses, including rape and 
murder. The person who murders or rapes in order to avoid haz- 
ardous duty is hardly less culpable than one who "only"  runs 
away.  :13¶r 
Subsection (6) is basedan the special needs and unique difficul- 
ties for maintaining discipline in combat zones and occupied ter- 
ritories. History has demonstrated that in such an environment 
rape and murder become more tempting. At the same time the 
need for order in the force, in order not to encourage resistance by 
the enemy and to pacify the populace, dictates that the sanctions 
for such offenses be severe. Once again, in a combat environment,  -
confinement, even of a prolonged nature, may be an inadequate 
deterrent. 
Subsections (7) and (8) are based generally on examination of 
the aggravating circumstances for murder in various states. Sub- 
section (7)(A) is intended to apply whether the sentence is ad- 
judged, approved, or ordered executed, as long as, at the time of 
the offense, the term of confinement is at least 30 years or for life. 
The possibility of parole or early release because of "good  time" 
or similar reasons does not affect the determination. Subsection 
(7)(F) is based on 18 U.S.C. 99 351, 11 14, and 11751. Subsection 
(7)(G) is modified to include certain categories of military per- 
sons. Subsection (7)(1) uses a more objective standard that the 
Georgia provision found wanting in Godfrey v.  Georgia, supra. 
1986 Amendment: Three changes were made in  R.C.M. 
1004(c)(7)(F); first, the provision involving Members of Congress 
was expanded to include Delegates and Resident commissioners; 
second, the word "justice"  was added to ensure that justices of the 
Supreme Court were covered; and third, the provision was ex- 
tended to include foreign leaders in specified circumstances. 
These changes are  similar to legislation approved by the Senate in 
S. 1765, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
1991 Amendment: Subsection (c)(8) was based on the Supreme 
Court's decision in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982), 
that the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits imposition of the death penalty on a defen- APP. 21, Il (c)  APPENDIX 21 
dant convicted of felony-murder  'who d[id] not himself kill, at- 
tempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force 
...be employed.'  The amendment to subsection (c)(8) is based on 
the Supreme Court's decision in Tison v.  Arizona, 481 U.S.  137 
(1987) distinguishing Enmund. In Tison, the Court held that the 
Enmund culpability requirement is satisfied when a defendant 
convicted of felony-murder was a major participant in the felony 
committed and manifested a reckless indifference to human life. 
Subsection (9) is based on the holding in Coker v.  Georgia, 
supra, that the death penalty is unconstitutional for the rape of an 
adult woman, at least where she is not otherwise harmed. 
Subsection (10) is based on Article 18. See also Trial of  the Ma- 
jor War Criminals Before  the International Military Tribunal (In- 
ternational Military Tribunal, Nurenberg,  1974); Trials of  War 
Criminals Before  the Nurenberg Military Tribunals, (U.S. Gov't 
Printing Off.,  1950-51);  In re Yamashita,  327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
1986 Amendment: R.C.M. loo4(c)(l  l) was added to im~le- 
ment thestatutory aggravating factors found in new Article 106~. 
The aggravating factors in R.CM. l004(~)(l  were also consid- 
ered appropriate for violations of Article 104. It is intended that 
the phrase "imprisonment  for life was authorized by  statute" in 
Article 106a(c)(l) include offenses for which the President has 
authorized confinement for life in this Manual as authorized in 
Articles 18 and 55 (10 U.S.C.  §§ 818 and 855). 
(d)  Spying. This subsection is based on Article 106. Congress rec- 
ognized that in case of spying, no separate sentencing determina- 
tion is required. See Article 52(a)(l)flhe rule provides for sen- 
tencing proceedings to take place, so that reviewing authorities 
will have the benefit of any additional relevant information. 
The Supreme Court has held a mandatory death penalty to be 
unconstitutional for murder.  Woodson  v.  North  Carolina, supra; 
Roberts (Stanislaus) v.  Louisiana,  supra.  It has not held that a 
mandatory death penalty is unconstitutional for any offense. See 
Roberts (Harry) v.  Louisiana, supra at 637 n. 5. 
In holding a mandatory death sentence for murder to be un- 
constitutional, the plurality in Woodson emphasized that the pre- 
vailing view before Furman v.  Georgia, supra, was decidedly 
against mandatory death for murder. Contrarily, death has con- 
sistently been  the sole penalty for spying in wartime since 
1806.See W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 765-66  (2d 
ed. 1920 reprint). Before 1920 the statue  making spying in time of 
war triable by court-martial and punishable by death was not part 
of the Articles of War. Id. See A.W. 82 (Act of 4 June 1920, Ch. 
227, 41 Stat. 804). 
(e)  Otherpenalties. The second sentence of this subsection is 
based on the second sentence of the third paragraph of paragraph 
126a of MCM,  1969 (Rev.),  which was in turn based on JAGA 
1946/10582;  SPJGA 1945/9511;  United States v.  Brewster, CM 
238138, 24 B.R. 173 (1943). As to the third sentence of this sub- 
section, see also United States v.  Bigger, 2 U.S.C.M.A.  297,  8 
C.M.R. 97 (1953); W. Winthrop, supra at 428, 434. 
Rule 1005.  Instructions on sentence 
Introduction. Except as noted below, this rule and the discus- 
sion are taken from paragraph 76b(1) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(a)  In general. Regarding the discussion see generally United 
States v.  Mamaluy, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 102, 106-07, 27 C.M.R. 176, 
180-81 (1959).  See also United States v.  Lania, 9 M.J. 100 
(C.M.A. 1980)(use of general deterrence); United States v.  Smalls, 
6 M.J. 346 (C.M.A.  1979); United States v.  Slaton, 6 M.J. 254 
(C.M.A.  1979) (mental impairment as matter in mitigation); 
United States v.  Keith, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 59, 46 C.M.R. 59 (1972) 
(recommendation for clemency);  United States v.  Condon, 42 
C.M.R. 421 (A.C.M.R.  1970) (effect of accused's  absence); 
United States v.  Larochelle, 41 C.M.R. 915 (A.F.C.M.R.  1969) 
(Vietnam service). 
@)  When given. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 30 and paragraph 74e of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(c)  Requests for instructions. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 30 and United 
States v.  Neal,  17 U.S.C.M.A.  363, 38 C.M.R.  161 (1968). The 
discussion is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 30 and paragraph 73d of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(d)  H,,  given,see ~  ~  ~ R,C,M. 921(d),  l  ~  ~  i  ~  , 
(e)  Required instructions. The reference in the fourth sentence of 
the discussion of subsection (1) to rehearing or new or other trial 
is based on paragraph 81d(l) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The second 
sentence of the first paragraph and the second paragraph of the 
discussion to (1) are based onunited States v.  Henderson, 11 M.J. 
395 (c.M.A.  1981). The last clause of subsection  (3) is based on 
United States v.  Givens, 11 M.J. 694, 696 (N.M.C.M.R.  1981). 
The discussion under subsection (4) is based on the third sentence 
of paragraph 76b(1) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and on United States v. 
Davidson, 14 M.J. 81 (C.M.A.  1982). 
(f)  Waived. This subsection is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 30. 
Rule 1006.  Deliberations and voting on sentence 
Introduction.  Except as noted below, this rule and the discus- 
sion are based on Articles 5  1 and 52 and on paragraphs 76b(2) 
and (3) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(a)  In general. The first sentence is based on the first sentence of 
paragraph 76b(1) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(b) Deliberations.  SeeAnalysis, R.C.M.  921(b) concerning the 
second, third, and fourth sentences of this subsection. See also 
United States v.  Lampani, 14 M.J. 22 (C.M.A. 1982). 
(c)  Proposal of  sentences. The second clause of the second sen- 
tence of this subsection is new and recognizes the unitary sentence 
concept. See United  States v.  Gutierrez,  11 M.J.  122,  123 
(C.M.A.1981).  See gene,rally Jackson v.  Taylor, 353 U.S.  569 
(1957). 
(d)  Voting. As to subsection (3)(A) see United States v.  Hendon, 6 
M.J.  171, 172-73  (C.M.A. 1979); United States v.  Cates, 39 
C.M.R. 474(A.B.R. 1968). 
As to subsection (d)(5), the second sentence of the third para- 
graph of paragraph 76b(2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) has been limited 
to Article 118 offenses because, unlike Article 106, findings on an 
Article 118 offense do not automatically determine the sentence 
and do not require a unanimous vote. See Articles 52(a)(l) and 
(2). Thus a separate vote on sentence for an Article 105 offense is 
unnecessary. 
As to subsection (d)(6)  see  United States v.  Jones,  14 
U.S.C.M.A. 177,33 C.M.R. 389 (1963). The  reference to no pun- 
ishment was added to recognize this added alternative. 
(e)  Action after sentence is reached. See United States v.  Justice, 3 
M.J. 451, 453 (C.M.A. 1977). The second paragraph of the dis- 
cussion is based on the second sentence of paragraph 76c. Rule 1007. Announcement of sentence 
Introduction. Except as noted below, this rule and  the discussion 
are based on paragraph 76c of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(a) In general. The discussion is based on United States v.  Hen- 
derson, 11 M.J. 395 (C.M.A. 1981); United States v.  Crawford, 12 
U.S.C.M.A. 203,30 C.M.R.  203 (1961). 
The  requirement that the sentence announcement include a ref- 
erence to the percentage of  agreement or an affirmation  that vot- 
ing was by secret written ballot has been deleted. Article 53 does 
not require such an announcement, and when instructions incor- 
porating such matters are given, the court-martialC'is  presumed  to 
have complied  with the instructions given them by the judge." 
United States v.  Ricketts,  1  M.J.. 78, 82 (C.M.A. 1975). See 
United States v.  Jenkins, 12  M.J. 222 (C.M.A. 1982). Cf: United 
States v.  Hendon, 6 M.J.  171, 173-74 (C.M.A. 1979). 
(c) Pollingprohibited.  See Analysis, Rule 923(e). 
Rule 1008.  Impeachment of sentence 
This rule is based  on Mil.R.Evid.  606(b)  and  United States v. 
West,  23 U.S.C.M.A. 77,48 C.M.R. 548 (1974).  See United States 
v.  Bishop,  11 M.J. 7 (C.M.A. 1981). 
Rule 1009.  Reconsideration  of sentence 
Introduction. Except as noted  below, this rule and  discussion 
are based on Articles  52(c) and  62 and  paragraphs 76c and  d of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(c) Initiation  of reconsideration. Subsection (2)(A)  was added to 
remedy the situation addressed in United States v.  Taylor, 9 M.J. 
848 (N.C.M.R. 1980). It is intended that the military judge  have 
the authority to  reduce a sentence imposed by that judge based on 
changed  circumstances, as long as the case remained  under that 
judge's jurisdiction.  Since this action "undercuts the review pow- 
ers"  (Id. at 850) only to  the extent that it reduces the upper limits 
available to reviewing authorities, there is no reason to prevent 
the military judge  from considering  additional  matters before fi-
nalizing the sentence with authentication. Furthermore, granting 
the military judge  power  to reconsider an announced  sentence 
recognizes that when sitting without members, the judge  per- 
forms the same functions as the members. See Article 16. 
The  proccdures in subsection (2)(B)  are necessary corollaries of 
those set out in the fifth and  sixth sentences of  paragraph  76c, 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  adapted to the rules for reconsideration. This 
clarifies that a formal vote to  reconsider is necessary when recon- 
sideration is initiated  by the military judge.  MCM, 1969 (Rev.) 
was unclear in this regard. See United States v.  King,  13 M.J. 838 
(A.C.M.R.), pet. denied, 14 M.J. 232 (1982). 
Subsection (3)  is based on Article 62(b)  and  United States v. 
Jones, 3 M.J. 348 (C.M.A. 1977). 
(d) Procedure with members. Subsection (1)  is based on the gen- 
eral requirement for instructions on voting procedure. See United 
States v.  Johnson, 18  U.S.C.M.A. 436, 40 C.M.R. 148 (1969). It 
applies whether reconsideration  is initiated by the military judge 
or a member, since R.C.M. 1006(d)(3)(A)  does not permit further 
voting after  a sentence is adopted and there is no authority for the 
military judge  to suspend that provision. 
LYSlS  App. 21, R.C.M. (B) 
Rule 1010. Advice concerning post-trial and 
appellate rights 
This rule is based  on S.Rep. No. 53, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.  18 
(1983).  See also Articles 60, 61, 64, 66, 67, and 69. It is similar to 
Fed.R.Crim.  P. 32(a)(2),  but is broader in that it applies whether 
or not the accused pleaded  guilty. This is because the accused's 
post-trial  and  appellate rights are the same, regardless of  the 
pleas, and because the powers of  the convening authority and the 
Court of  Military Review to reduce the sentence are important 
even if  the accused has pleaded  guilty. 
1986 Amendment: This rule was changed to delete subsec- 
tion(b)  which required an inquiry by the military judge. The Sen- 
ate Report addresses only advice; inquiry to determine the ac- 
cused's  understanding is deemed  unnecessary  in view of  the 
defense counsel's responsibility in this area. 
1991 Amendment: This rule was changed to  place the responsi- 
bility for informing the accused of  post-trial and appellate rights 
on the defense counsel rather than the military judge.  Counsel is 
better suited  to give this advisement in an atmosphere in which 
the accused is more likely to  comprehend the complexities of  the 
rights. 
Rule 101  1.  Adjournment 
This  rule is based on paragraph 77b  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
CHAPTER XI.  POST-TRIAL PROCEDURE 

Rule 1101.  Report of result of trial; post-trial 

restraint; deferment of confinement 

(A)  Report of the result of trial. This subsection is based on the 
first two  sentences of  paragraph 44e of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(B) Post-trial  confinement. Subsection (1)  is based  on Article 
57(b) and  on the last sentence of  paragraph 44e of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). Subsection (1)  makes clear that confinement is authorized 
when death is adjudged, even if  confinement is not also adjudged. 
See United States v.  Matthews, 13 M.J. 501 (A.C.M.R.), rev'd on 
other grounds,  16  M.J.  354 (C.M.A. 1983). See also R.C.M. 
1004(e) and Analysis. 
Subsection (2)  is based on Article 57  and  on paragraph 21d of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  The  person who orders the accused into con- 
finement  need  not be the convening authority. See Reed  v. 
Omaha, 19U.S.C.M.A. llO(1969);Levy  v. Resor, 17U.S.C.M.A. 
135, 37  C.M.R. 399 (1967). The convening authority may with- 
hold such authority from subordinates. 
Article 57@) provides that a sentence to  confinement begins to 
run as soon as the sentence is adjudged. The  mechanism for an ac- 
cused to seek release from confinement pending appellate review 
is to request deferment of  confinement under Article 57(d).See 
S.Rep. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d  Sess.  13-14 (1968);  Pearson  v. 
Cox, 10 M.J. 317 (C.M.A. 1981). See subsection (c)  of  this rule. 
The purpose of  subsection (2)  is to provide  a prompt, conve- 
nient means for the command to  exercise its prerogative whether 
to confine an accused when the sentence of  the court-martial au- 
thorizes it. The  commander may decide that, despite the sentence 
of  the court-martial, the accused should not be immediately con- 
fined because of  operational requirements or other reasons. A de- 
cision not to confine is for the convenience of  the command and 
does not constitute deferment of  confinement. SeeArticle 57(d). APP. 21, f(B)  APPENDIX 21 
An accused dissatisfied with the decision of the commander may 
request deferment in accordance with subsection (c) of this rule. 
The  first sentence of the second paragraph of paragraph 20d(l) 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) has been deleted. That sentence provided 
for post-trial "arrest,  restriction, or confinement to insure the 
presence of an accused for impending execution of a punitive dis- 
charge." The authority for such restraint was based on Article 13 
which authorized arrest or confinement for persons awaiting the 
result of trial. See Reed v.  Ohman, supra; United States v. Teague, 
3 U.S.C.M.A.  317, 12 C.M.R. 73 (1953).  The Military Justice 
Amendments of  1981 Pub. L. No. 97-81,  9 3, 95 Stat. 1087 
(1981), deleted the language concerning such detention pending 
the result of trial. 
(c) Deferment of  conjnement. Subsection (1) is based on the first 
sentence of paragraph 88f  of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The discussion 
is based on the second and third sentences of paragraph  88f  of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (2) is based on the first sentence in Article 57(d) and 
the third sentence of paragraph 88f  of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The  re- 
quirement that the request be written is based on the third para- 
graph of paragraph 88f  of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (3) 1s based on Article 57(d) and United States v. 
Brownd, 6 M.J. 338 (C.M.A. 1978). See also ABA  Standards, 
Criminal Appeals, 5 21-2.5  (1978); Trotman v. Haebel,  12 M.J. 27 
(C.M.A.  1981); Pearson v.  Cox, supra; Stokes v.  United States, 8 
M.J. 819 (A.F.C.M.R.  1979), pet. deLt&ef(.  9 M.J. 33 (1980). See 
also the first paragraph of paragraph~@&of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
The  penultimate sentence recognized the standard of review exer- 
cised by the Courts of Military Review, the Court of Military Ap- 
peals, and other reviewing authorities. See United States v. 
Brownd, supra. Because the decision to deny a request for defer- 
ment is subject to  judicial review, the basis for denial should be in- 
cluded in the record. 
Subsection (4) is based on the fourth paragraph of paragraph 
88f  of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (5) is based on the fifth paragraph of paragraph 88f 
of MCM, 1969 (rev.) and on Pearson  v.  Cox, supra. 
Subsection  (6) modifies the last two paragraphs of paragraph 
88f  of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) to conform to the amendment of Arti- 
cle 71(c), see Pub. L. No. 98-209,g  5(e), 97 Stat. 1393 (1983). The 
amendment of Article 71(c) permits confinement to be ordered 
executed in the convening authority's initial action in all cases. 
Article 57(d) is intended to permit deferment after this point, 
however. See S. Rep. No.  1601, 90th Cong.,  2d Sess.  13-14 
(1968). Therefore subsection (6) specifically describes four ways 
in which deferment may be terminated. The result is consistent 
with paragraph 88fof  MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and with  Collier v. 
United States, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 51 l,42  C.M.R. 113 (1970). Under 
subsection (A) the convening authority must specify in the initial 
action whether approved confinement is ordered executed, sus- 
pended, or deferred. See R.C.M. 1107(f)(4)(B), (E). Under sub- 
section  (B), deferment may be terminated at any time by sus- 
pending the confinement. This is because suspension is more 
favorable to the accused than deferment. Subsections (C) and (D) 
provide other specific points at which deferment may be termi- 
nated. Deferment may be granted for a specified period (e.g., to 
permit the accused to take care of personal matters), or for an in- 
definite period (e.g., completion of appellate review). Even if con- 
finement is deferred for an indefinite period, it may be rescinded 
under subsection (D). When deferment is terminated after the ini- 
tial action, it will be either suspended or executed. See subsection 
(7). The first sentence in the discussion is based on Article 57(d). 
The  second, third, and fourth sentences are based on the last two 
paragraphs of paragraph 88f  of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (7) is based on the last sentence of Article 57(d) and 
on Collier  v.  United States, supra. Note that the information on 
which the rescission is based need not be new information, but 
only information which was not earlier presented to the authority 
granting deferment. C.f:  Collier v.  United States, supra. Note also 
that the deferment may be rescinded and the accused confined 
before the accused has an opportunity to submit matters to the re- 
scinding authority. See United States v.  Daniels,  19 U.S.C.M.A. 
518,42 C.M.R. 120 (1970). 
Subsection (7)(C) is added based on the amendment of Article 
71(c). Confinement after the initial action is not "served."  It is de- 
ferred, suspended, or executed. Therefore, after deferment is re- 
scinded, it is ordered executed (if  not suspended). Subsection 
(7)(C)  permits the accused an opportunity to submit matters 
before the order of execution, which precludes deferment under 
Article 57(d), is issued. 
1991Amendment:  The Discussion accompanying this subsec- 
tion was amended to provide for the inclusion of the written basis 
for any denial of deferment in the record of trial. Although writ- 
ten reasons for denials are not mandatory, and their absence from 
the record of trial will not per se invalidate a denial decision, their 
use is strongly encouraged. See Longhofer v.  Hilbert, 23 M.J. 755 
(A.C.M.R.  1986). 
Rule 1102. 
Introduction. This rule is psed on Article 60(e) and on 
paragraphs 80c and 86d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), all of which con- 
cern proceedings in revision. This rule also expressly authorizes 
post-trial Article 39(a) sessions to address matters not subject to 
proceedings in revision which may affect legality of findings of 
guilty or the sentence. See United States v.  Mead,  16 M.J.  270 
(C.M.A.  1983);  United States v.  Brickey,  16 M.J.  258 (C.M.A. 
1983); United States v.  Witherspoon, 16 M.J. 252 (C.M.A.  1983). 
Cf:  United States v.  DuBay, 17 U.S.C.M.A.  147, 37 C.M.R. 41 1 
(1967). 
(a)  In general. This subsection is based on Article 60(e), on the 
first sentence of paragraph 80c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), which indi- 
cated that a court-martial could conduct proceedings in revision 
on its own motion, and on paragraph 86d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(b)  Purpose.  Subsection (1) is based on the second sentence of 
paragraph 86d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The discussion of subsec- 
tion (1) is based on the last paragraph of paragraph 80d of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.) and on United States v.  Steck, 10 M.J. 412 (C.M.A. 
1981); United States v.  Barnes, 21 U.S.C.M.A.  169, 44 C.M.R. 
223 (1972);  United States v.  Hollis,  11 U.S.C.M.A.  235, 29 
C.M.R. 51 (1960).  As to subsection (2), see the Introduction, 
Analysis, this rule. The discussion of subsection 21 is based on 
United States v.  Anderson, supra. 
(c)  Matters not subject to post-trial sessions. This subsection is 
taken from Article 60(e)(2). 
(d)  When directed. This subsection is based on paragraph 86d of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also Article 60(e); United States v.  Wil-
liamson, 4 M.J. 708 (N.C.M.R.  1977), pet. denied, 5 M.J. 219 
(1978).  Paragraph 86d indicated that a proceeding in revision ANArLYSlS  App. 21, R.C.M. (g) 
could be used to "make the record show the true proceedings."  A 
certificate  of  correction is the appropriate mechanism for this, so 
the former provision is deleted. Note that a trial session may be 
directed, when authorized by an appropriate reviewing authority 
(e.g., the supervisory authority, or the Judge Advocate General), 
even if  some or all of  the sentence has been executed. 
(e) Procedure. Subsection (1)  is based on paragraph 806 of  MCM, 
1969 (Rev.).See also R.C.M.  505 and  805 and  Analysis. Good 
cause for detailing a different  military judge includes unavailabil- 
ity due to physical disability or transfer, and  circumstances in 
which inquiry into misconduct by a military judge is necessary. 
Subsection (2)  is based on paragraph 80c of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (2)  is more concise than its predecessor; it leaves to  the 
military judge  responsibility to determine what specific action to 
take. 
Subsection (3)  is based  on paragraph  80d  of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). 
Rule 1103.  Preparation of record of trial 
(a) In general. This subsection is based  on Article 54(c) and  on 
the first sentence of  paragraph 82a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(b) General courts-martial. Subsection (l)(A)  is based on Article 
38(a). In Federal  civilian courts the reporter is responsible for 
preparing the record of  trial. 28 U.  S. C. 8 753;  Fed. R. App.P.  11 
(b).  The responsibility of  the trial counsel for preparation of  the 
record is established by Article 38(a),  however. Subsection (l)(B) 
is based on the second paragraph of  paragraph 82a of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). See also United States v.  Anderson, 12 M.J.  195 (C.M.A. 
1982). 
Subsection (2)(A)  is based  on Article  54(a) and  the first sen- 
tence of  paragraph 82b(l)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Cf: Article  19. 
Subsection (2)(B)  is based on Article 54(c)  and on the third sen- 
tence of  paragraph 8241)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See Rep. No. 53, 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 26(1983); H.R. Rep. No.491, 81st Cong., 1st 
Sess. 27(1949); S. Rep. No.486,  81st Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 
(1949). See also Articles  19  and  66;United States v.  Whitman, 23 
U.S.C.M.A. 48, 48 C.M.R. 519 (1974); United States v.  Thomp- 
son, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 448, 47 C.M.R. 489 (1973); United States v. 
Whitman, 3 U.S.C.M.A.  179, 11 C.M.R.  179(1953).  Theexcep- 
tion in the stem of  subsection (2)(B)  is based on Article l(14).  See 
Analysis, subsection (i)of  this rule. 
The  first paragraph of  the discussion under subsection (2)(B)  is 
based on the third sentence of  paragraph 826(1), and paragraphs 
826(2) and  (3)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See Analysis, R.C.M. 802 
concerning the second paragraph in the discussion. The  last para- 
graph in the discussion is based on the sixth sentence of  para- 
graph 82b(l)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (2)(C)  is based on the fourth sentence of  paragraph 
826(1) of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See Article 54(c)(2).  In Federal ci- 
vilian courts a verbatim record is generally required in all cases 
(although not all  portions of  the record are necessarily tran- 
scribed). See 28 U.S.C. § 753@);  Fed. R. Crim. P. 1 l(g)  and  12(g); 
and  Fed. R. App. P.  10. See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.l(c). The 
Constitution requires a record of  sufficient completeness to allow 
consideration of  what occurred at trial, but not necessarily a ver- 
batim transcript. Mayer v.  Chicago,  404U.S. 189 (1971);  Draper v. 
Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963);  Coppedge v.  United States, 369 
U.S. 438 (1962);  United States v.  Thompson, supra. A summarized 
record is adequate for the less severe sentences for which it is au- 
thorized. 
Subsection (2)(D)  is new. It lists items which are, in addition to 
a transcript of  the proceedings, required for a complete record. 
See United States v. McCullah, 11 M.J. 234 (C.M.A. 1981). 
Failure to comply with subsection (b)(2)  does not necessarily 
require reversal. Rather, an incomplete or nonverbatim record 
(when  required) raises a presumption of  prejudice which the Gov- 
ernment may rebut. See United States v.  Eichenlaub,  11 M.J. 239 
(C.  M.A.  1981); United States v. McCullah, supra;United States v. 
Boxdale, 22 U.  S.C.M.A. 414, 47 C. M.R. 35  (1973). As to 
whether an omission is sufficiently substantial  to raise the pre- 
sumption, see  United States v.  Gray, 7 M.J.  296 (C.M.A. 1979); 
United States v.  Sturdivant,  1  M.J. 256  (C.M.A. 1976); United 
Statesv. Webb,23U.S.C.M.A. 333,49C.M.R.667(1975); United 
States v.  Boxdale, supra;  United States v.  Richardson, 21 
U.S.C.M.A.  383,45 C.M.R.  157  (1972); United States v.  Weber, 
20 U.S.C.M.A, 82,42 C.M.R. 274 (1970); United States v. Donati, 
14 U.S.C.M.A. 235,34 C.M.R. 15 (1963); Unitedstates v. Nelson, 
3 U.S.C.M.A. 482, 13  C.M.R, 38  (1953). 
1991 Amendment: Subsection @)(2)(D)(iv)  was redesignated as 
subsection (b)(Z)(D)(v),  and  new subsection (b)(Z)(D)(iv)  was 
added. The 1984 rules omitted  any requirement that the conven- 
ing authority's action be included in the record of  trial. This 
amendment corrects that omission. 
Subsection (3)  is basedrJ&  paragraph 82b(5), the last sentence 
of  paragraph 84c, parag;i$h  85d, the third sentence of  the third 
paragraph of  paragraph 88J  the penultimate sentence of  para- 
graph 88g, and  the last sentence of  paragraph 91c of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev. ). See also S. Rep. No. 53, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 26  (1983); 
R.C.M.  1106(f)  and  Analysis; and  United States v.  Lott, 9 M.J. 70 
(C.M.A. 1980). 
(c) Special courts-martial. This subsection is based on Articles 19 
and  54(c) and paragraph 83 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(e) Acquittal; termination prior  to findings.  This subsection is 
based on the fifth  sentence of  paragraph 826(1) and the third sen- 
tence of  paragraph  836 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  The language of 
paragraph 82b(l)  which referred to termination "with prejudice 
to the Government" has been modified.  If  the court-martial ter- 
minates by reason of  mistrial, withdrawal, or dismissal of  charges, 
a limited record is authorized, whether or not the proceedings 
could be reinstituted at another court-martial. 
(f)  Loss of notes or recordings of the proceedings. This subsection 
is based on paragraph 82i of  MCM, 1969 (Rev. ).  See also United 
States v.  Lashley, 14  M.J. 7 (C.M.A. 1982); United States v. 
Boxdale. supra. 
(g) Copies of the record of trial. Subsection (1)  is based on the first 
paragraph of  paragraph 49b(2) of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The trial 
counsel is responsible for preparation of  the record (see Article 
38(a)),  although, as paragraph 496(2) of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  indi- 
cated, ordinarily the court reporter actually prepares the record. 
In subsection (A),  the number of  copies required has been in- 
creased from two to four to  conform  to  current practice. 
1993 Amendment: Subsection (g)(l)(A)  was amended  by ad- 
ding the phrase  "and are subject to review by a Court of  Milltary 
Review under Article 66" to  elim~nate  the need to make four cop- 
ies of  verbatim records of  trial for courts-martial  which are not 
subject to review by a Court of  Military Review. These cases are - - 
APP. 21, n (g) 	 APPENDIX 21 
reviewed in the Office  of  the Judge Advocate General under Arti- 
cle 69 and four copies are not ordinarily necessary. 
(h) Security classification. This subsection is based on the first 
sentence of  paragraph 82d of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  The remainder 
of  that paragraph is deleted as unnecessary. 
(i) Examination of the record. Subsection (l)(A)  and the first par- 
agraph of  the discussion are based on the first paragraph of  para- 
graph 82e of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
, 	 Subsection (l)(B)  is based on the first sentence of  the second 
paragraph of  paragraph 82e of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The  first para- 
graph of  the discussion is based on United States v.  Anderson, 
supra at 197. Examination before authentication will improve the 
accuracy of  the record, reduce the possibility of  the necessity for a 
certificate of  correction, and  obviate the problems discussed  in 
Anderson. The  first paragraph of  the discussion is based on the 
fourth and  fifth sentences of  the second paragraph of  paragraph 
82e of  MCM, 1969 (rev.).See also United States v. Anderson, supra 
at 197. The second paragraph of  the discussion is based on United 
v.  Anderson, supra. See also  United States v.  Everett, 3 M.J. 201, 
202 (C.M.A. 1977). The third paragraph  of  the discussion is 
based on the second  sentence of  the second  paragraph  of  para- 
graph 82e of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Q) Videotape and similar records. This subsection is new and  1s 
based on Article 1(14),  which is also new. See Military Justice Act 
of  1983, Pub.L. No. 98-209,g 6(a),  97 Stat. 1393 (1983).  This  sub- 
section implements Article l(14)  In  accordance with guidance in 
S.Rep. No. 53, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. hu26 (1983). The  concerns 
expressed in United States v.  Barton, 6 M.J  16  (C.M.A. 1978) 
were also considered. 
Subsection (1)  provides for recording courts-martial  by video- 
tape, audiotape, or similar means, if  authorized by regulation of 
the Secretary concerned. Such Secretarial authorization is neces- 
sary to  ensure that this procedure will be used only when appro- 
priate equipment is available to permit  its effective  use, in accor- 
dance with the requirements for this rule. Such equipment 
includes not only devices capable of  recording the proceedings ac- 
curately, but playback  equipment adequate to permit  transcrip- 
tion by trained personnel or examination by counsel and  review- 
ing authorities. In addition, if  transcription is not contemplated, 
the recording  method used  must be subject  to production  of 
duplicates for compliance with subsection (i)(5)  of  this rule. 
Subsection (2)  requires that, ordinarily, the record will be re- 
duced to writing, even if  recorded as described in subsection (1). 
This preference for a written record is based on the fact that such 
a record is easier to  use by counsel, reviewing authorities, and the 
accused, and  is often easier to produce  in multiple copies. Cf: 
United States v.  Barton, supra. Note, however, that the rule per- 
mits recording proceedings  and  transcribing them later without 
using a court reporter. This adds a measure of  flexibility in the 
face of  a possible shortage of  court reporters. This subsection is 
consistent with the already common practice of  using "back-up" 
recordings to prepare a record when the court reporter's equip- 
ment has failed. 
Subsection (3)  recognizes that military exigencies may prevent 
transcription of  the record, especially at or near the situs of  the 
trial. In such instances, where an accurate record already exists, 
the convening authority's action should not be postponed  for lack 
of  transcription, subject to  the provisions in subsection (3).  Thus, 
the convening authority may take action, and  transcription for 
appellate or other reviewing authorities may occur later. See sub- 
section (4).  Note that additional copies of  the record  need not be 
prepared  in such case, except as required in subsection (i)(5)(A). 
Note also, however, that facilities must be reasonably available 
for use by the defense counsel (and when appropriate the staff 
judge  advocate or legal officer,  see R.C.M.  1106) to listen to or 
view and listen to  the recordings to use this subsection. 
Subsection (4)(A)  is based on the recognition that it is impracti- 
cable for appellate courts and  counsel not to  have a written re- 
cord. See S.Rep. No. 53,supra at 26; United States v.  Barton, 
supra. Note that the transcript need  not be authenticated under 
R,C.M. 1104. Instead, under regulations of  the Secretary con- 
c;;ned  the accuracy of  the transcript can be certified by a person 
who has viewed and/or heard the authenticated recording. 
Subsection (4)(B)  provides  flexibility in cases not reviewed by 
the Court of  Military  Review. Depending  on regulations of  the 
Secretary, a written record may never be prepared  in some cases. 
Many cases not reviewed by a Court of  Military Review will be re- 
viewed only locally. See R.C.M. 11  12. The  same exigencies which 
weigh against preparation  of  a written record  may also exist 
before such review. If  a written record in not prepared, the review 
will have to  be conducted by listening to or viewing and listening 
to the authenticated recording. 
Subsection (5)  provides  alternative means for the government 
to comply with the requirement to serve a copy of  the record  of 
trial on the accused. Article 54(d). Note that if  a recording is 
used, the Government must ensure that it can provide the accused 
reasonable opportunity to listen to or view and  listen to the re- 
cording. 
Rule 1104.  Records of trial: authentication; 
service; correction;  forwarding 
(a) Authentication. Subsection (1)  is new and is self-explanatory. 
Subsection (2)  is based on Article 54(a) and  (b)  and paragraph 
82f of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The former rule has been changed to 
require that the record, or even a portion of  it, may be authenti- 
cated only be a person who was present at the proceedings there- 
cord of  which that person is authenticating. This means that in 
some cases (e.g.,  when more than one military judge presided  in a 
case) the record may be authenticated by more than one person. 
See United States v.  Credit, 4 M.J. 118 (C.M.A. 1977);  S.Rep. No. 
1601, 90th Cong., 2d  Sess.  12-13 (1968);  H.R. Rep. No. 1481, 
90th Cong., 2d  Sess. 10 (1968).  See also United States v.  Galloway, 
2 U.S.C.M.A. 433, 9 C.M.R. 63 (1953). This subsection also 
changes the former rule in that it authorizes the Secretary  con- 
cerned  to prescribe  who will authenticate the record  in special 
courts-martial at which no bad-conduct discharge is adjudged. 
See Article 54(b). In some services, the travel schedules of  mili- 
tary judges  often result in delays in authenticating the record. 
Such delays are substantial, considering the relatively less severe 
nature of  the sentences involved  in such cases. This subsection al- 
lows greater flexibility to achieve prompt  authentication and  ac- 
tion in such cases. The second  paragraph  of  the discussion is 
based on United States v.  Credit, supra;  United States v.  Cruz-
Rijos,  1  M.J. 429 (C.M.A. 1976). See also United States v. Lott, 9 
M.J. 70 (C.M.A. 1980); Unites States v.  Green, 7 M.J. 687 
(N.C.M.R. 1979); United States v.  Lowery,  1  M.J.  1165 
(N.C.M.R. 1977). The  third paragraph of  the discussion is based 
on United States v.  Lott, supra; United States v.  Credit, supra. ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (b) 
(b) Service. Subsection (l)(A)  is based on Article 54(d) and the 
first sentence of  paragraph 82g(l)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  See also 
H.R. Rep. No. 2498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1048 (1949). 
Subsection (l)(B)  is based on the third through fifth sentences 
of  the first paragraph of  paragraph 82g(l)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection  (l)(C)  is based on H.R. Rep. No. 549, 98th Cong., 
1st Sess. 15  (1983); United States v.  Cruz-Rijos, supra. Service of 
the record  of  trial is now effectively  a prerequisite to further dis- 
position  of  the case. See Article 60(b)  and  (c)(2).  As a result, in- 
ability to serve the accused could bring the proceeding to a halt. 
Such a result cannot have been intended by Congress. Article 
60(b)  and (c)(2)  are intended to  ensure that the accused and de- 
fense counsel have an adequate opportunity to  present matters to 
the convening authority, and that they will have access to the re- 
cord  in order to do so. Cong. Rec. § 5612 (daily ed. April 28, 
1983) (statement of  Sen. Jepsen). As a practical matter, defense 
counsel, rather than the accused, will perform this function in 
most cases. See Article 38(c).  Consequently, service of  the record 
on defense  counsel, as provided in this subsection, fulfills this pur- 
pose  without unduly delaying further disposition. See  United 
States v.  Cruz-Rijos, supra. Note that if  the accused had no coun- 
sel, or if  the accused's counsel could not be served, the convening 
authority could take action without serving the accused only if 
the accused was absent without authority. See R.C.M. 1105(d)(4) 
and Analysis. 
Subsection (l)(D)  is based on the third and fourth paragraphs 
of  paragraph  82g(l)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(c) Loss of record. This subsection is based on paragraph 82h of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Note that if  more than one copy of  the record 
is authenticated then each may serve as the record of  trial, even if 
the original is lost. 
(d) Correction of record after authentication; certificate of correc- 
tion. Subsection (I)  and the discussion are based on paragraph 86c 
of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also the first paragraph of  paragraph 
95 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  Subsection (2)  is new and is based on 
United States  v.  Anderson,  12 M.J.  195 (C.M.A. 1982). See also 
ABA Standards, Special Functions of the Trial Judge  6-1.6 
(1978). The discussion is based  on United States v.  Anderson, 
supra. Subsection (3)  is based on the second  paragraph of  para- 
graph 82g(l)  and paragraph 86c of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(e) Forwarding. This  subsection is based on Article 60. The  code 
no longer requires the convening authority to review the record. 
However, a record of  trial must be prepared  before the convening 
authority takes action. See Article 60(b)(2)  and  (3), and  (d). 
Therefore, it is appropriate to forward  the record, along with 
other required matters, to the convening authority. This subsec- 
tion is consistent with the first two sentences of  paragraph 84a of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Rule 1105.  Matters submitted by the accused 
(a) In general. This subsection is based  on Articles  38(c)  and 
60(b).  See also paragraphs 48k(2)  and 77a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(b) Matters which may be submitted. This  subsection is based on 
Articles 38(c) and  60(b). The post-trial  procedure  as  revised by 
the Military Justice Act of  1983, Pub.L. No. 98-209,97 Stat. 1393 
(1983)  places a heavier responsibility on the defense to take steps 
to ensure that matters it wants considered  are presented  to the 
convening authority. Therefore  this subsection provides guidance 
as  to the types of  matters which may be submitted. See Article 
38(c). See also paragraph 48k(3)  and 77a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Note that the matters the accused submits must be forwarded  to 
the convening authority. See United States v.  Siders, 15  M.J. 272 
(C.M.A. 1983). As to  the last paragraph in the discussion, see also 
Mil.R.Evid. 606(b)  and Analysis; United States Bishop, 11 M.J. 7 
(C.M.A. 1981); United States v.  West, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 77, 48 
C.M.R. 458 (1974); Unitedstates v.  Bourchier, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 15, 
17  C.M.R. 15 (1954). 
(c) Time  periods. This subsection is based on Article 60(b). Sub- 
section (4)  clarifies the effect  of  post-trial  sessions. A  re-an-
nouncement of  the same sentence would not start the time period 
anew. Subsection (5)  is based on H.R. Rep. No. 549,98th Cong., 
1st Sess. 15  (1983). 
1986 Amendment: Subsection (c)  was revised to reflect amend- 
ments to  Article 60, UCMJ,  in  the "Military Justice Amendments 
of  1986," tit. VIII,  806, National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal  Year 1987, Pub.L. No. 99-661,  100 Stat, 3905, (1986). 
These amendments simplify post-trial  submissions by setting a 
simple baseline for calculating the time for submissions. 
(d) Waiver. Subsection (1)  is based on Article 60(c)(2).  Subsec- 
tion (2)  is based on Article 60(c)(2).  This subsection clarifies that 
the defense may submit matters in increments by reserving in 
writing its right to  submit additional  matters within the time pe- 
riod. In certain cases this may be advantageous to the defense as 
well as the Government, by permitting  early consideration of 
such matters. Otherwiscif  the defense contemplated  presenting 
additional matters, it wo!$4have  to  withhold all matters until the 
end of  the period. Subsectibn (3)  is based on Article 60(b)(4).  Sub- 
section (4)  ensures that the accused cannot, by an unauthorized 
absence, prevent further disposition of  the case. Cf.  United States 
v.  Schreck, 10 M.J. 226 (C.M.A. 1983). Note that if  the accused 
has counsel, counsel must be served  a copy of  the record  (see 
R.C.M.  1104(b)(l)(C))  and  that the defense will have at least 7 
days from such service to submit matters. Note also that the un- 
authorized absence of  the accused has no effect  on the 30,20, or 7 
day period  from announcement of  the sentence within which the 
accused  may submit matters (except insofar as it may weigh 
against any request to extend such a period). The  discussion notes 
that the accused is not required  to raise matters, such as  allega- 
tions of  legal error, in order to  preserve them for consideration on 
appellate review. 
Rule 1106.  Recommendation of the staff judge 
advocate or legal officer 
(a) In general.  This subsection  is based  on Article 60(d), as 
amended, see Military Justice Act of  1983, Pub.L. No. 98-209, 
5(a)(l),  97  Stat. 1393 (1983). The first paragraph  of  paragraph 
85a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  was similar. 
(b) Disqualification. This subsection is based on Article 6(c)  and 
on the second paragraph of  paragraph 85a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Legal officers  have been included in its application based on Arti- 
cle 60(d). The discussion notes additional circumstances  which 
have been held to  disqualify a staffjudge  advocate. The  first exam- 
ple  is based on United States v.  Thompson, 3 M.J. 966 (N.C.M.R. 
1977), rev'd on other grounds, 6 M.J. 106 (C.M.A. 1978);  petition 
dismissed, 7 M.J. 477  (C.M.A. 1979). The second  example is 
based on United States v.  Choice, 23  U.S.C.M.  A. 329, 49 C.M.  R. 
663 (1975).  See alsoUnitedStates  v. Cansdale, 7 M.J. 143 (C.M.A. 
1979); United States  v.  Conn, 6 M.J. 351 (C.M.A. 1979); United APP. 21,n (b)  APPEN 
States v.  Reed, 2 M.J.  64 (C.M.A. 1976). The third  example is 
based on United States v.  Conn and  United States v.  Choice, both 
supra. Cf: Articles  l(9);  6(c);  22(b); 23(b). The fourth example is 
based  on  United States  v.  Collins, 6  M.J.  256  (C.M.A. 
1979);United  States v.  Engle, 1 M.J. 387 (C.M.A. 1976). See also 
United States v.  Newman, 14 M.J. 474 (C.M.A. 1983) as to the 
disqualification of  a staff  judge  advocate or convening authority 
when immunity has been granted to  a witness in the case. 
1986 Amendment: The  phrase "or any reviewing officer" was 
changed to "to any reviewing officer" to correct an error in 
MCM, 1984. 
(c) When  the convening authority does not have a staffjudge advo- 

cate or legal officer or that person is disqualified. Subsection (1)  is 

based on the third  paragraph of  paragraph  85a of  MCM, 1969 

(Rev.). Legal  officers  have been included  in its application based 

on Article 60(d). Subsection (2)  is new. It recognizes the advan- 

tages of  having the recommendation prepared  by a staffjudge  ad- 

vocate. This flexibility should  also permit  more prompt disposi- 

tion in some cases as well. 

(d) Form and content of recommendation. This subsection is 
based on Article 60(d)  and on S.Rep. No. 53,98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
20 (1983).  As to  the subsection (I),  see also Article 60(c). Subsec- 
tions (3),  (4),  and  (5)  conform to the specific guidance in S.Rep. 
No. 53, supra. Subsection (6)  is based on %Rep. No. 53, 98th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1983).  The  recommendation should be a con- 
cise statement  of  required and other 'matters. Summarization of 
the evidence and review for legal erroi is not required. Therefore 
paragraph 85b of  MCM, 1969 (~ev.)'fi'deleted. 
Paragraph 85c of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  is also deleted. That para- 
graph stated that the convening authority should explain any de- 
cision not to follow the staff  judge  advocate's recommendation. 
See also United States v.  Harris,  10 M.J. 276  (C.M.A. 1981); 
United States v. Dixson, 9 M.J. 72  (C.M.A. 1980);United  States v. 
Keller,  1 M.J.  159 (C.M.A. 1976). The  convening authority is no 
longer required to examine the record for legal or factual suffi- 
ciency. The convening authority's action is solely a matter of 
command prerogative. Article 60(c).  Therefore  the convening au- 
thority is not obligated to  explain a decision not to  follow the rec- 
ommendation of  the staff  judge advocate or legal officer. 
(e) No findings  of guilty. This subsection is based on Article 60 
and  63. When no findings of  guilty are reached, no action by the 
convening authority is required. Consequently, no recommenda- 
tion by the staff  judge  advocate or legal officer  is necessary. The 
last paragraph  of  paragraph  85b of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.), which 
was based on Article 61 (before  it was amended), was similar. 
1990 Amendment: Subsection (e)  was amended  in conjunction 
with the implementation of  findings of  not guilty  only by reason 
of  lack of  mental responsibility  provided  for in Article 50a, 
UCMJ (Military Justice Amendments of  1986, tit. VIII,  4 802, 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. 
L. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3905 (1986)). 

(0  Service of recommendation on defense counsel; defense re- 

sponse. This subsection is based on Article 60(d). See also United 

States v.  Goode,  1  M.J. 3 (C.M.A. 1975). Subsection (1)  is based 

on Article 60(d).  See also United States v.  Hill, M.J. 295 (C.M.A. 

1977); United States v.  Goode, supra. 

1990 Amendment: Subsection (Q(1) was added  to make clear 
that the accused should  be provided  with a personal  copy of  the 
recommendation. 
Subsection (2)  makes clear who is to be served with the post- 
trial review.See United States v.  Robinson,  11 M.J. 218, 223 n.2 
(C.M.A. 1981). This issue has been a source of  appellate litiga- 
tion. See e.g.,  United States v.  Kincheloe, 14 M.J. 40 (C.M.A. 
1982); United States v.  Babcock, 14 M.J.  34 (C.M.A. 1982); 
United States v.  Robinson, supra; United States v.  Clark, 11 M.J. 
70 (C.M.A. 1981); United States v.  Elliot,  11 M.J.  1  (C.M.A. 
1981);United States v.  Marcoux, 8 M.J.  155 (C.M.A. 1980); 
United States v.  Brown, 5 M.J. 454 (C.M.A. 1978); United States 
v.  Davis, 5 M.J. 451 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v.  Iverson, 5 
M.J. 440 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v.  Annis, 5 M.J.  351 
(C.M.A. 1978). The last sentence in this subsection is based  on 
United States v.  Robinson,  United States v.  Brown, and  United 
States v.  Iverson, all supra.The  discussion is based  on United 
States v.  Robinson, supra. 
Subsection (3)  is based  on United States v.  Babcock, supra; 
United States v.  Cruz, 5 M.J. 286 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v. 
Cruz-Rijos, 1 M.J. 429 (C.M.A. 1976). Ordinarily the record will 
have been provided to  the accused under R.C.M.  1104(b). 
Subsections (4)  and  (5)  are based on Article 60(d).  See also 
United States v.  Goode, supra. See United States v.  McAdoo,  14 
M.J. 60 (C.M.A. 1982). 
1986 Amendment: Subsection (5)  was amended  to reflect 
amendments to Article 60, UCMJ,  in the "Military Justice 
Amendments of 1986,"  tit. VIII,  4  806, National  Defense Au- 
thorization Act for Fiscal  Year 1987, Pub.L. No. 99-661, 100 
Stat. 3905, (1986).  See Analysis to  R.C.M.  1105(c). 
Subsection (6)  is based  on Article 60(d). See also S. Rep. No. 
53, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 21  (1983); United States v.  Morrison, 
supra; United states v.  Barnes, 3 M.J. 406 (C.M.A. 1982); United 
States v.  Goode, supra. But see  United States v.  Burroughs, supra; 
United States v.  Moles,  10 M.J.  154 (C.M.A. 1981) (defects not 
waived by failure to  comment). 
Subsection (7)  is based on United States v.  Narine, 14 M.J.  55 
(C.M.A. 1982). 
Rule 1107.  Action by convening authority 
(a) Who may take action. This subsection is based on Article 
60(c). It is similar to the first sentence of  paragraph 84b and the 
first sentence of  paragraph 84c of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  except inso- 
far as the amendment of  Article 60 provides otherwise. See Mili- 
tary Justice Act of 1983, Pub.L. No. 98-209, 4  5(a)(l),  97  Stat. 
1393 (1983). The  first paragraph in the discussion is based on the 
last two sentences of  paragraph  84a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The 
second  paragraph  of  the discussion is based on the second  and 
third sentences of  paragraph  84c of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United 
States v.  Conn, 6 M.J. 351 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Reed, 2 
M.J. 64 (C.M.A. 1976); United States v.  Choice, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 
329, 49 C.M.R. 663 (1975). See also United States v.  James, 12 
M.J. 944 (N.M.C.M.R.), pet. granted, 14 M.J. 235 (1982)  rev'd  17 
M.J. 51. The reference in the third  sentence of  paragraph 84c of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  to disqualification of  a convening authority 
because the convening authority granted immunity to a witness 
has been deleted. See  United States v.  Newman, 14  M.J. 474 
(C.M.A. 1983). Note that although Newman held  that a conven- 
ing authority is not automatically disqualified from taking action 
by reason of  having granted immunity,  the Court indicated that a 
convening authority may be disqualified by granting  immunity 
under some circumstances. ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (f) 
(b) General considerations. Subsection (1)  and the discussion are 
based on Article 60(c).  See also S.Rep. No. 53, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 19 (1983). 
Subsection (2)  is based on Article 60(b)  and (c). 
Subsection (3)(A)(i)  is based  on Article 60(a). Subsection 
(3)(A)(ii)  is based on Article 60(d).  Subsection (3)(A)(iii)  is based 
on Article 60(b)  and (d).  Subsection (3)(B)  is based on Article 60 
and on S.Rep. No. 53, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20  (1983).  The 
second  sentence in subsection (3)(B)(iii)  is also based on the last 
sentence of  paragraph  85b of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See also United 
States v.  Vara, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 651, 25 C.M.R. 155 (1958); United 
States v.  Lanford, 6U.S.C.M.A. 371, 20 C.M.R. 87 (1955). 
Subsection (4)  is based  on Article 60(c)(3).  See also Article 
60(e)(3).  This subsection is consistent with paragraph 866(2) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  except that it does not refer to  examining the 
record for jurisdictional  error. 
1990 Amendment: Subsection (b)(4)  was amended  in conjunc- 
tion with the implementation of  findings of  not guilty only by rea- 
son of  lack of  mental responsibility provided  for in Article SOU, 
UCMJ (Military Justice Amendments of  1986, tit. VIII,  9 802, 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. 
L. 99-661,  100 Stat. 3905 (1986)). 
Subsection  (5)  is based on the second  paragraph of  paragraph 
124 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v.  Korzeniewski, 
7 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 22 C.M.R. 104 (1956); United States v.  Wash- 
ington, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 1 14, 19 C.M.R. 240 (1955);  United States v. 
Phillips, 13  M.J. 858 (N.M.C.M.R.  1982). 
1986 Amendment: The  fourth sentence of  subsection (b)(5)  was 
amended  to shift to the defense the burden of  showing  the ac- 
cused's lack of  mental capacity to  cooperate in post-trial proceed- 
ings. This  is consistent with amendments to  R.C.M. 909(c)(2)  and 
R.C.M.  916(k)(3)(A)  which also shifted to  the defense the burden 
of  showing  lack of  mental capacity to stand  trial and  lack of 
mental responsibility. The  second sentence was added to  establish 
a presumption of  capacity and the third sentence was amended to 
allow limitation of  the scope of  the sanity board's examination. 
The  word "substantial"  is used in the second and third sentences 
to  indicate that considerable more credible evidence than merely 
an allegation of  lack of  capacity is required before further inquiry 
need be made. Ford  V. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 
2610 (1986) (Powell,  J., concurring). 
(c) Action  of findings.  This subsection  is based  on Article 
60(c)(2).  Subsection (2)(B)  is also based on Article 60(e)(l)  and 
(3).  The first sentence in the discussion is based on Hearings on 
H.R. 2498 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Armed Ser- 
vices, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.  1182-85  (1949). The second sentence 
in the discussion  is based on Article 60(e)(3).  The remainder of 
the discussion is based on S.Rep. No. 53, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 
(1983). 
(d)  Action on  the sentence. Subsection (1)  is based  on Article 
60(c)  and is similar to the first paragraph  of  paragraph  88a of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The  first paragraph of  the discussion is based 
on paragraph 88a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  The  second paragraph of 
the discussion is based on Jones v.  Ignatius, 18  U.S.C.M.A. 7,  39 
C.M.R. 7 (1968); United States v.  Brown, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 333, 32 
C.M.R. 333 (1962);  United States v.  Prow, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 63, 32 
C.M.R. 63 (1962);  United States v.  Johnson, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 640, 
31  C.M.R. 226  (1962); United States v.  Christenson, 12 
U.S.C.M.A. 393, 30 C.M.R. 393 (1961);  United States v.  Wil- 
liams, 6 M.J. 803 (N.C.M.R.),  pet. dismissed, 7 M.J. 68 (C.M.A. 
1979); United States v.  Berg, 34 C.M.R. 684 (N.B.R. 1963).See 
also United States v.  McKnight, 20 C.M.R. 520 (N.B.R. 1955). 
Subsection (2)  is based on Article 60(c)  and  S. Rep. No. 53, 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1983).  The  second sentence is also based 
on United States v.  Russo,  11 U.S.C.M.A. 352, 29 C.M.R. 168 
(1960). The second  paragraph  of  the discussion is based on the 
third paragraph of  paragraph 886 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (3)  is based on Articles  19  and  54(c)(l)  and on the 
third sentence of  paragraph  82b(l)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(e) Ordering rehearing or other trial. Subsection (l)(A)  is based 
on Article 60(e),  and  on paragraph  92a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Note that the decision of  the convening authority to  order a re- 
hearing is discretionary. The convening authority is not required 
to review the record for legal errors. Authority to  order a rehear- 
ing is, therefore, "designed solely to  provide an expeditious means 
to  correct errors that are identified in the course of  exercising dis- 
cretion under Article 60(c)." S. Rep. No. 53,98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
21  (1983). Subsection (l)(B)  is based on Article 60(e).  As to sub- 
section (l)(B)(ii),  see  S. Rep. No. 53, supra at 22. Subsection 
(l)(B)(ii)  is based on the second sentence of  the second paragraph 
of  paragraph 92a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  The  discussion is based 
on the second sentence of  the fourth paragraph of  paragraph 92a 
of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  Subsection (l)(C)(i)  is based on Article 
62(e)(3)  and on the first sentence of  the third paragraph of  para- 
graph 92a of  MCM, 1968 (Rev.).  Subsection (l)(C)(ii)  and the 
discussion are based on 4gQcle 60(e)(3)  and on the first paragraph 
of  paragraph 92a of  MCW; 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (l)(C)(ii)  is 
based on the first sentence of  the tenth paragraph of  paragraph 
92a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  Subsection (l)(D)  is based on the sixth 
paragraph  of  paragraph  92a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection 
(l)(E)  is based  on the eighth paragraph  of  paragraph  92a  of 
MCM, 1969 (rev.). Because of  the modification of  Article 71 (see 
R.C.M.  11  13) and because the convening authority may direct a 
rehearing after action in some circumstances (see subsection 
(e)(l)(B)(ii) of  this rule), the language is modified. The  remaining 
parts of  paragraph  92a, concerning procedures  for a rehearing, 
are now covered in R.C.M. 810. 
Subsection (2)  is based  on paragraph  926  of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.).  See also paragraph 89c(l)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  If  the ac- 
cused was aquitted of  a specification which is later determined to 
have failed  to state an offense,  another trial for the same offense 
would be barred. United States v.  Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). It  is 
unclear whether an acquittal by a jurisdictionally  defective court- 
martial bars retrial. See United States v.  Culver, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 
141,46 C.M.R. 141 (1973). 
(f)  Contents of action and related matters. Subsection (I)  is based 
on paragraph 89a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
1991 Amendment: The 1984 rules omitted  any requirement 
that the convening authority's action be included  in the record of 
trial. This amendment corrects that omission. 
Subsection (2)  is based  on paragraph  896  of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.).  The second sentence is new. It is intended to simplify the 
procedure  when a defect in the action is discovered  in Article 
65(c)  review. There is no need for another authority to formally  . . 
act in such cases if  the convening authority can take corrective ac- 
tion. The  accused cannot be harmed by such action. A convening 
authority may still be directed to  take correctivs action when nec- 
essary, under the third  sentence. "Erroneous"  means clerical er- DIX 21 
ror only. See subsection (g) of this rule. This new sentence is not 
intended to allow a convening authority to change a proper action 
because of a change of mind. 
Subsection (3) is based  on paragraph 89c(2) of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). The provision in paragraph 89c(2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) 
that disapproval of the sentence also constitutes disapproval of 
the findings unless otherwise stated is deleted. The convening au- 
thority must expressly indicate which findings, if any, are disap- 
proved in any case. See Article 60(c)(3). The discussion is based 
on paragraph  89c(2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (4)(A) is 
based on paragraph 89c(3) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The first sen- 
tence of paragraph  89c(2) is no longer accurate. Since no action 
on the findings is required, any disapproval of findings must be ex- 
pressed. Subsection (4)(B)  is taken from paragraph 89c(4) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (4)(D) is based on paragraph 
89c(6) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  However, because that portion of 
the sentence which  extends to confinement may now be ordered 
executed when the convening authority takes action (see Article 
71(c)(2); R.C.M.  11 13(b)), temporary custody is unnecessary in 
such cases. Therefore, this subsection applies only when death has 
been adjudged and approved. Subsection (4)(E) is taken from par- 
agraph 89c(7) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (4)(F) is new. 
See Analysis, R.C.M. 305(k). See also United States v.  Suzuki, 14 
M.J. 491 (C.M.A. 1983). Subsection (4)(G) is taken from para- 
graph 89c(9) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (4)(H) is modified 
based on the amendment of Article 71 which permits a reprimand 
to be ordered executed from action, regardless of the other com- 
ponents of  the sentence. Admonition has been deleted. See 
R.C.M. 1003(b)(l). 
Subsection (5) is based on paragraph 89c(8) of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.).  See also R.C.M. 810(d) and Analysis. The provision in 
paragraph 89c(8) requiring that the accused be credited with time 
in confinement while awaiting a rehearing is deleted. Given the 
procedures for imposition and continuation of restraint while 
awaiting trial (see R.C.M. 304 and 305), there should not be a 
credit simply because the trial is a rehearing. 
(g)  Incomplete,  ambiguous, or erroneous action. This subsection 
is based  on paragraph 95 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See generally 
United States v.  Loft,  10 J M.J. 266 (C.M.A. 1981); United States 
v.  Lower,  10 M.J. 263 (C.M.A. 1981). 
(h)  Service on accused. This subsection is based on Article 61(a), 
as  amended, see Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub.L. No. 98-209, 
9 5(b)(l), 97 Stat. 1393 (1983). 
Rule 1108.  Suspension of execution of sentence 
This rule is based on Articles 71(d) and 74, and paragraphs 88e 
and 97a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also Fed.R.Crim. P. 32(e). The 
second paragraph  of the discussion to subsection (b) is based on 
United States v.  Stonesifer,  2 M.J. 212 (C.M.A. 1977); United 
States v.  Williams, 2 M.J. 74 (C.M.A.  1976); United States v. 
Occhi, 2 M.J. 60 (C.M.A. 1976). Subsection (c) is new and based 
on Article 71; United States v.  Lallande, 22 U.S.C.M.A.  170, 46 
C.M.R. 170 (1973); United State v.  May, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 258, 27 
C.M.R. 432 (1959). Cf:18 U.S.C. 9 3651 ("upon  such terms and 
conditions as the court deems best").  The notice provisions are 
designed to facilitate vacation  when that becomes necessary. See 
the Analysis, R.C.M. 1109. The language limiting the period of 
suspension to the accused's current enlistment has been deleted. 
See United States v.  Thomas, 45 C.M.R. 908 (N.C.M.R. 1972). 
Cf:  United States v.  Clardy, 13 M.J.  308 (C.M.A. 1982). See also 
subsection (e) of this rule. 
1990 Amendment: The third sentence was amended to delete 
the limitation of Secretarial designation to an "officer  exercising 
general court-martial jurisdiction over the command to which the 
accused is assigned" and to permit such designation to any "com- 
manding officer."  This comports with the language of Article 
74(a),  UCMJ and paragraphs 97a of MCM, 1951 and MCM, 
1969. The specific designation of inferior courts-martial conven- 
ing authorities to remit or suspend unexecuted portions was not 
intended to limit in any other respects the Secretarial designation 
power. Except for a sentence which has been approved by  the 
President, remission or suspension authority is otherwise left en- 
tirely to departmental regulations. 
The last sentence was added to clarify the authority of the offi- 
cials named in section (b) to grant clemency or mitigating action 
on those parts of the sentence that have been approved and or- 
dered executed but that have not actually been carried out. In the 
case of forfeiture the "carrying out" involves the actual collection 
after pay accrues on a daily basis. Thus, even when a sentence to 
total forfeiture has been approved and ordered executed, the 
named officials can still grant clemency or mitigating action. Al- 
though a prisoner may be administratively placed in a nonpay sta- 
tus when total forfeiture has been ordered executed, the total for- 
feiture is collected as it would otherwise accrue during the period 
that the prisoner is in a nonpay status. If clemency were granted, 
the prisoner could be returned administratively  to a pay status, 
pay would accrue, and any resulting partial forfeiture would be 
collected as it accrues. Likewise, that portion of confinement 
which has not been served is "unexecuted". 
Rule 1109. Vacation of suspension of sentence 
(a)  In general. This subsection is based on Article 72 and para- 
graph 97b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(b)  Timeliness. This subsection is based on the fourth paragraph 
of paragraph 97b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.);  United States v.  Pells, 5 
M.J. 380(C.M.A. 1978); Unitedstates v.  Rozycki, 3 M.J. 127, 129 
(C.M.A.  1977). 
(c)  Confinement of  probationer pending vacation proceedings. 
This subsection is new and based on Gagnon v.  Scarpelli, 41 1 U.S. 
778 (1973); Morrissey v.  Brewer, 408 U.S.  471 (1972);  United 
States v.  Bingham, 3 M.J. 119 (C.M.A. 1977). It is consistent with 
Fed.R.Crim. P. 32.l(a)(l). Note that if the actual hearing on va- 
cation under subsection (d)(l) or (e)(3) and (4) is completed 
within the specified time period, a separate probable cause hear- 
ing need not be held. 
(d)  Violation of  suspended general court-martial sentence or of  a 
suspended court-martial sentence including a bad-conduct dis- 
charge. This subsection is based on Article 72(a) and (b); the first 
two paragraphs of paragraph 97b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United 
States v.  Bingham, supra; United States v.  Rozycki, supra. See also 
Fed.R.Crim. P. 32.l(a)(2). 
(e)  Vacation of  suspended special court-martial sentence not in- 
cluding a bad-conduct  discharge or of  a suspended summary 
court-martial sentence. This subsection is based on Article 72(c); 
United States v.  Bingham, supra;  United States v.  Rozycki, supra. 
Fed.R.Crim. P. 32.l(b) is not adopted. That rule requires a 
hearing before conditions of probation may be modified. Modifi- 
cation is seldom used in the military. Because a probationer may ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. 
be transferred or change duty assignments as a normal incident of 
military life, a commander should have the flexibility to make ap- 
propriate changes in conditions of probation without having to 
conduct a hearing. This is no intended to permit conditions of 
probation to be made substantially more severe without due pro- 
cess. At a minimum, the probationer must be notified of the 
changes. 
1986 Amendment: Several amendments were made to R.C.M. 
1109 to specify that the notice to the probationer concerning the 
vacation proceedings must be in writing, and to specify that the 
recommendations concerning vacation of the suspension pro- 
vided by the hearing officer must also be in writing. Black v. Ro- 
mano, 471 U.S. 606, 105 S.Ct. 2254 (1985). Several references to 
"conditions of probation" were changed to "coilditions of suspen- 
sion" for consistency of terminology. 
Rule 11  10.  Waiver or withdrawal of appellate 

review 

Introduction. This rule is new and is based on Article 61, as 
amended, see Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub.L. No. 98-209, 
5(b)(l), 97 Stat. 1393 (1983). The rule provides procedures to en- 
sure that a waiver or withdrawal of appellate review is a voluntary 
and informed choice. See also Appendices  19 and 20 for forms. 
See S. Rep. No. 53, 98th Cong.,  1st Sess. 22-23 (1983). 
(a)  In general. This subsection is based on Article 61. The  discus- 
sion is also based on Articles 64 and 69(b). 
(b)  Right  to counsel. This subsection is based  on Article 61(a). 
Although Article 61@) does not expressly require the signature of 
defense counsel as does Article 61(a), the same requirements 
should apply. Preferably counsel who represented the accused at 
trial will advise the accused concerning waiver, the appellate 
counsel (if  one has been appointed) will do so concerning with- 
drawal. This subsection reflects this preference. It also recognizes, 
however, that this may not always be practicable; for example, the 
accused may be confined a substantial distance from counsel who 
represented the accused at trial when it is time to decide whether 
to waive or withdraw appeal. In such cases, associate counsel may 
be detailed upon request by the accused. See R.C.M. 502(d)(l) as 
to the qualification of defense counsel. Associate counsel is obli- 
gated to consult with at least one of the counsel who represented 
the accused at trial. In this way the accused can have the benefit of 
the opinion of the trial defense counsel even if the defense counsel 
is not immediately available. Subsection (2)(C)  provides for the 
appointment of substitute counsel when, for the limited reasons in 
R.C.M. 505(d)(2)(B), the accused is no longer represented by any 
trial defense counsel. Subsection (3) contains similar provisions 
concerning withdrawal of an appeal. Note that if the case is re-. 
viewed by the Judge Advocate General, there would be no appel- 
late counsel. In such cases, subsection (3)(C) would apply. Sub- 
section (6) clarifies that here, as in other circumstances, a face-to- 
face meeting between the accused and counsel is not required. 
When necessary, such communication may be by telephone, ra- 
dio, or similar means.See also Mil.R.Evid.  51 l(b). The rule, in- 
cluding the opportunity for appointment of associate counsel, is 
intended to permit face-to-face consultation with an attorney in 
all but the most unusual circumstances. Face-to-face consultation 
is strongly encouraged, especially if the accused wants to waive or 
withdraw appellate review. 
(c)  Compulsion, coercion, inducement prohibited. This subsection 
is intended to ensure that any waiver or withdrawal of appellate 
review is voluntary. See S. Rep. No. 53, supra at 22-23;  Hearings 
on S. 2521 Before the Subcomm. on Manpower and Personnel of 
the Senate Comm. on Armed Services.  97th Cong.,  1st Sess. 78, 
128 (1982); United States v. Mills, 12 M.J.  1 (C.M.A.  1981). See 
also R.C.M. 705(c)(l)(B). 
(d)  Form of waiver or withdrawal. This subsection is based on Ar- 
ticle 60(a) and on S. Rep. No. 53, supra at 23. Requiring not only 
the waiver but a statement, signed by the accused, that the ac- 
cused has received essential advice concerning the waiver and 
that it is voluntary should protect the Government and the de- 
fense counsel against later attacks on the adequacy of counsel and 
the validity of the waiver or withdrawal. 
(e)  To  whom submitted. Subsection (1) is based on Article 60(a). 
Article 60(b) does not establish where a withdrawal is filed. Sub- 
section (2) establishes a procedure which should be easy for the 
accused to use and which ensures the withdrawal will be for- 
warded to the proper authority. A waiver or withdrawal of appeal 
is filed with the convening authority or authority exercising gen- 
eral court-martial jurisdiction  for administrative convenience. 
See Hearings on S. 2521, supra at 31. 
(f)  Time limit. Subsection (1) is based on Article 60(a). Subsec- 
tion (2) is based on Article 60(b). See also subsection (g)(3) and 
Analysis, below. 
1991 Amendment: Language was added to clarify that, al- 
though the waiver must be filed within  10 days of receipt by the 
accused or defense counsel of the convening authority's  action, it 
may be signed at any time after trial up to the filing deadline. 
(g)  Effect  of waiver of withdrawal, substantial  compliance re- 
quired. Subsection (1) is based on Article 60(c). Subsections (2) 
and (3) are based on Article 64. Subsection (3) also recognizes 
that, once an appeal is filed (i.e., not waived in a timely manner) 
there may be a point at which it may not be withdrawn as of right. 
Cf: Sup. Ct. R. 53; Fed.R.App. P. 42; Hammett v. Texas,  448 U.S. 
725 (1974); Shellman v.  U.S. Lines, Inc., 528 F. 2d 675 (9th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976).  Subsection (4) is in- 
tended to protect the integrity of the waiver or withdrawal proce- 
dure by ensuring compliance with this rule. The accused should 
be notified promptly if a purported waiver or withdrawal is defec- 
tive. 
Rule 11  11.  Disposition of the record of trial after 
action 
This rule is based generally on paragraph 91 of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.), but is modified to conform to the accused's right to waive 
or withdraw appellate review and to the elimination of supervi- 
sory review and of automatic review of cases affecting general arid 
flag officers. See Articles 61, 64, 65, 66(b). Some matters in para- 
graph 9 1 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) are covered  in other rules.See 
R.C.M. 1103@)(3)(F); 1104(b)(l)(B). 
Rule 1112.  Review by a judge advocate 
This rule is based on Articles 64 and 65@), as amended, see Mili-
tary Justice Act of 1983, Pub.L. No. 98-209, §§ 6(d)(l), (7)(a)(l), 
97 Stat. 1393 (1983). 
1986 Amendment: The last paragraph of R.C.M. 11 12(d) was 
added to clarify the requirement that a copy of the judge advo- APP. 21, V  APPENDIX 21 
cate's review be attached to the original and each copy of the re- 
cord of trial. The last paragraph of R.C.M. 11  12(e), which previ- 
ously contained an equivalent but ambiguous requirement, was 
deleted. 
1990Amendment: Subsection (b)was amended in conjunction 
with the implementation of findings of not guilty only by reason 
of  lack of mental responsibility  provided  for in Article 50a, 
UCMJ (Military Justice Amendments of 1986, tit. VIII, 5 802, 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. 
L. 99-661,  100 Stat. 3905 (1986)). 
Rule 1113.  Execution of sentences 
Introduction, Fed,R,Crim, P, 38 is inapplicable, The execution of 
sentence in the military is governed by the code, See Articles  57 
and 71.See  also Articles 60, 61, 64, 65, 66, and 69. 
(a)  In general. This subsection is based on Article 71(~)(2)  and 
the first paragraph of paragraph  98 of MCM,  1969 (R~~,),  see 
also Articles 60, 61, 64, 65, 66, and 67. 
1991 Amendment: The discussion was amended by adding a 
reference to subsection (5) of R.C.M. 11 13(d). This brings the dis- 
cussion  into accord with  the general rule of R.C.M. 
11 13(d)(2)(A) that any court-martial sentence to confinement be- 
gins to run from the date it is adjudged. 
(b)  Punishments  which  the convening authority may order exe- 
(d)  Other considerations concerning execution of sentences. Sub-
section (1) is based on the third paragraph of paragraph 126a of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The  second paragraph of paragraph 88d(l) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.) is deleted as unnecessary. 
1986 Amendment: Subsection (d)(l)(B)  was added to incorpo- 
rate the holding in Ford V.  Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 
2595 (1986). The plurality in Ford held that the Constitution pre- 
cludes executing a person who lacks the mental capacity to under- 
stand either that he will be executed or why he will be executed, 
See also United States v.  Washington, 6 U.S.C.M.A.  114, 119, 19 
C.M.R. 240, 245 (1955). The Court also criticized the procedures 
specified by Florida law used to determine whether a person lacks 
such  because the accused was provided 
to submit matters on the issue of capacity, but the case is unclear 
as to what procedures would suffice. 
Because of this ambiguity, the drafters elected to ~rovide  for a 
judicial hearing, with representation for the government and the 
accused. This is more than adequate to meet the due process re- 
quirements of Ford v. Wainwright. 
The word "substantial"  is used in the third sentence to indicate 
that considerably more credible evidence than merely an allega- 
tion of lack of capacity is required before further inquiry need be 
made. Ford v. Wainwright.447 U.S. 399,426, 106 S.Ct. 2595,2610 
(1986) (Powell, J.9  concurring). The burden of showing the ac- 
cused's lack of capacity is on the defense when the issue is before  in the initial action,  hi^ subsection  is based  on ~~ti~l~ 
71(d). See a/so the first paragraph of paragraph  8841) of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). Note that under the amendment of Article 71 (see 
pub. L. No. 98-209, 5 5(e), 97 Stat. 1393 (1983)), the convening 
authority may order parts of a sentence executed in the initial ac- 
tion, even if the sentence includes other parts (e.g., a punitive dis- 
charge) which cannot be ordered executed until the conviction is 
final. 
(c)  Punishments which the convening authority may not order exe- 
cuted in the initial action. This subsection is based on the sources 
noted below. The structure has been revised to provide clearer 
guidance as to who may order the various types of punishments 
executed. Applicable service regulations should be consulted, be- 
cause the Secretary concerned may supplement this rule, and may 
under Article 74(a) designate certain officials who may remit un- 
executed portions of sentences. See also R.C.M. 1206. 
Subsection (1) is based on Article 71(c). See also Article 
64(c)(3). The last two sentences of this subsection are based on 
S.Rep. No. 53,98th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1983). 
1991Amendment: Language was added to the second sentence 
of the paragraph  following subsection (c)(l)(B)  to specify that a 
staff judge advocate's advice is required only when the ser- 
vicemember is not on appellate leave on the date of final judgment 
and more than six months have elapsed since the convening au- 
thority's approval of the sentence. The third sentence was modi- 
fied  to reflect this change. The subsection was not intended to 
grant an additional clemency entitlement to a servicemember. 
Significant duty performance since the initial approval is relevant 
to the convening authority's determination of the best interest of 
the service. Since a member on appellate leave is performing no 
military duty, an additional staff judge advocate's advice would 
serve no useful purpose. 
Subsection (2) is based on Article 71(b). 

Subsection (3) is based on Articles 66(b), 67(b)(l), and 71(a). 

the court for adjudication. This is consistent with amendments to 
R.C.M. 909(c)(2) and R.C.M. 916(k)(3)(A)  which shifted to the 
defense the burden of showing lack of mental capacity to stand 
trial and lack of mental responsibility. The rule also establishes a 
presumption of capacity and allows limits on the scope of the sari-
ity board's examination. 
Subsection (2)(A) is based on Articles  14 and 57@) and para- 
graph 97c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also paragraph 126j of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  Subsection (2)(B) is based on Article 58(b) 
and the third paragraph of paragraph 126j  of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (2)(C) is based on Article 58(a) and paragraph 93 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Note that if the Secretary concerned so 
prescribes, the convening authority need not designate the place 
of confinement. Because the place of confinement is determined 
by regulations in some services, the convening authority's desig- 
nation is a pro forma matter in such cases. The penultimate sen- 
tence in subsection (2)(C) is based on Article 12 and on paragraph 
125 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The last sentence in subsection (2)(C) 
is based  on 10 U.S.C.  5  951. See the second paragraph of Para- 
graph 18b(3)  1969 (Rev.). MCMl 
Subsection (3) is based on paragraph  126h(3) of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.), but it is modified to avoid constitutional problems. See 
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 
395 (1971);  Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.  235 (1970). See also 
United States v. Slubowski, 5 M.J. 882 (N.C.M.R.  1978); afd,  7 
M.J. 461 (1979); Unitedstates  v. Vinyard, 3 M.J. 551 (A.C.M.R.), 
pet. denied, 3 M.J. 207 (1977); United States v. Donaldson, 2 M.J. 
605 (N.C.M.R. 1977); affd, 5 M.J. 212 (1978);  United States v. 
Martinez, 2 M.J. 1123 (C.G. C.M.R. 1976); United States v. Keh-
rli, 44 C.M.R. 582 (A.F.C.M.R. 1971), pet.  denied, 44 C.M.R. 
940 (1972); ABA Standards, Sentencing Alternatives and Proce- 
dures 5 18-2.7 (1979). 
Subsection (4) is new. See Article 57(c). Subsection (5) is based on the last paragraph of paragraph 125 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Paragraph 88d(3) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) is deleted based on the 
amendment of Articles 57(a) and 71(c)(2) which eliminated the 
necessity for application or deferment of forfeitures. Forfeitures 
always may be ordered executed in the initial action. 
Rule 11  14.  Promulgating orders 
(a)  In  general. Subsections (I) and (2) are  based on the first para- 
graph of paragraph 90a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (3) is 
based on paragraph 90e of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). This rule is consis- 
tent in purpose with Fed.R.Crim. P. 32(b)(l). 
(b)  By whom issued. Subsection (1) is based on paragraph 90b(l) 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) except that the requirement that the super- 
visory authority, rather than the convening authority, issue the 
promulgating order in certain special courts-martial has been de- 
leted, since action by the supervisory authority is no longer re- 
quired. See Article 65. The convening authority now issues the 
promulgating order in all cases. See generally United States v. 
Schulthise,  14 U.S.C.M.A.  31, 33 C.M.R. 243 (1963) (actions 
equivalent to publication). Subsection (2) is based on paragraphs 
90b(2) and 107 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(c)  Contents. Subsection (1) is based on Appendix 15 of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.) but modifies it insofar as the only item which must be 
recited verbatim in the order is the convening authority's action. 
The charges and specifications should be summarized to ade- 
quately describe each offense, including allegations which affect 
the maximum authorized punishments. Cf:  Fed. R. Crim. P. 
32(b)(l).  See also Form 25, Appendix of Forms, Fed.R.Crim. P. 
Subsection (2) is based on the third, fourth, and fifth paragraph of 
paragraph 9Ga  of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) except that reference is no 
longer made to action by the supervisory authority. See Article 
65. See United States v.  Veilleux, 1 M.J. 811, 815 (A.F.C.M.R. 
1976); United States v.  Hurlburt, 1 M.J. 742, 744 (A.F.C.M.R. 
1975), rev'd on other grounds, 3 M.J. 387 (C.M.A.  1977). 
Subsection (3) is based on the first sentence of the second para- 
graph of paragraph 90a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
1986 Amendment:  Reference to "subsequent  actions"  was 
changed to to "subsequent orders"  to correct an error in MCM, 
I
1984. 
1990 Amendment:  Subsection (c)(2) was amended in conjunc- 
tion with the implementation of findings of not guilty only by rea- 
son of lack of mental responsibility provided for in Article 50a, 
UCMJ (Military Justice Amendments of 1986, tit. VIII, 802, Na- 
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. 
99-661, 100 Stat. 3905 (1986)). 
(d)  Orders containing classified information.  This subsection is 
based on the first two paragraphs of paragraph 90c of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). The second sentence of the first paragraph of paragraph 
90c is deleted as unnecessary. 
(e)  Authentication.  This subsection is based on forms at Appen- 
dix  15 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and clarifies the authentication of 
promulgating orders. See Mil.R.Evid. 902(10). Note that this 
subsection addresses authentication of the order, not authentica- 
tion of copies. 
(f) Distribution. This subsection is based on paragraph 90d of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The matters in paragraph 96 of McM,  1969 
(Rev.) are deleted. These are administrative matters better left to 
service regulations. 
'SIS  App. 21, R.C.M.  (a) 
1986 Amendment:  Subsection (b)(2)  was amended to clarify 
that actions taken subsequent to the initial action may also com- 
prise the supplementary order. Section (c) was amended to sim- 
plify and shorten court-martial orders.See revisions to Appendix 
17. 
CHAPTER XII.  APPEALS AND REVIEW 
Rule 1201.  Action by the Judge Advocate General 
(a)  Cases required to be  referred  to a Court of  Military Review. 
This subsection is based on Article 66(b). 
(b)  Cases reviewed by  the Judge Advocate General. Subsection (1) 
is based on Article 69(a).  Subsection (2) is based on Article 
64(b)(3) and Article 69(b).  Subsection (3) is based  on Article 
69(b). Subsection (4) is based on Article 69(c). Subsection (b) is 
similar to paragraph 103 and the first two paragraphs of para- 
graph 110A of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) except insofar as the amend- 
ments of Articles 61, 64, and 69 dictate otherwise. See Military 
Justice Act of 1983, Pub.L. No. 98-209, 55  4(b), 7(a), (e), 97 Stat. 
1393 (1983).  The last paragraph of paragraph  110A of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.) was deleted as unnecessary. 
1986 Amendment:  Subsection (b)(3)(A)  was changed to con- 
form to the language of Article 69(b), as enacted by the Military 
Justice Act of  1983, which precludes review of cases previously 
reviewed under Article 69(a). 
1990 Amendment: The discussion to subsection (b)(3)(A)  was 
amended in conjunction with the implementation of Article 50a, 
UCMJ (Military Justice Amendments of 1986, tit. VIII, 5 802, 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. 
L. 99-661,  100 Stat. 3905 (1986)). To find an accused not guilty 
only by reason of lack of mental responsibility, the fact-finder 
made a determination that the accused was guilty of the elements 
of the offense charged or of a lesser included offense but also de- 
termined that, because he lacked mental responsibility at the time 
of the offense, he could not be punished for his actions. See 
R.C.M. 921(c)(4). Although the finding does not subject the ac- 
cused to punishment by court-martial, the underlying finding of 
guilt is reviewable under this rule. Review, however, does not ex- 
tend to the determination of lack of mental responsibility. Since 
the accused voluntarily raised the issue and has the burden of 
proving lack of mental responsibility by clear and convincing evi- 
dence, he has waived any later review of the propriety of that de- 
termination. 
1990  Amendment:  The date from which the two year period to 
file an application under R.C.M.  1201(b)(3) begins to run was 
amended to account for cases resulting in a finding of not guilty 
only by reason of lack of mental responsibility. Such cases would 
not proceed to sentencing but could be the subject of an applica- 
tion under this rule. As amended, the accused would have two 
years from the date findings were announced in which to file an 
application for review. 
(c)  Remission and suspension. This subsection is based on Article 
74. See Unitedstates v.  Russo, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 352,29 C.M.R. 168 
(1960); United States v.  Sood, 42 C.M.R. 635 (A.C.M.R.), pet. de- 
nied, 42 C.M.R. 356 (1970). 
Rule 1202. Appellate counsel 
(a)  In  general. This subsection is based on Article 70(a) and para- 
graph 102a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). APP. 21,n (b)  APPE NDlX 21 
(b) Duties. This  subsection is based on Article 70(b)  and (c).  See 
also the first two  paragraphs  of  paragraph  102b of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.).  The  penultimate sentence in the rule is based on  the penul- 
timate sentence in the fourth paragraph  of  paragraph  102b of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The  last sentence in the fourth paragraph of 
paragraph  102b of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  is deleted as unnecessary. 
The  last sentence in  the rule is new. It is based on  practice in Fed- 
eral civilian courts. See Rapp. v.  Van  Dusen, 350 F. 2d  806 (3d 
Cir. 1965); Fed.R. App. P.21(b). See also Rule 27, Revised Rules 
of  the Supreme Court of  the United States (Supp. IV  1980); 
Unitedstatesv. Haldeman, 599 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. de- 
nied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977).  See generally 9 J. Moore, B. Ward,  and 
J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice Para. 221.03  (2d ed. 1982). 
The  first two  paragraphs in  the  discussion modify  the third and 
fourth paragraphs of  paragraph  102b of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The 
Court of  Military Appeals has held that appellate defense counsel 
is obligated to  assign as error before  the Court of  Military Review 
all arguable issues unless such issues are, in  counsel's professional 
opinion, clearly frivolous. In addition, appellate defense counsel 
must invite the attention of  the court to  issues specified by the ac- 
cused, unless the  accused expressly withdraws such issues, if  these 
are not otherwise assigned as errors. Also, in  a petition for review 
by  the Court of  Military Appeals, counsel must, in  addition to  er- 
rors counsel believes have merit, identify  issues which the accused 
wants raised. See United States v.  Hullum, 15  M.J. 261 (C.M.A. 
1983); United States v.  Knight, 15  M.J.  195 (C.M.A. 1982); 
United States v.  Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982). See also 
United States v.  Dupas, 14 M.J. 28 (C.M.A. 1982);United  States v. 
Rainey, 13  M.J. 462, 463 n. 1 (C.M.A. 1982) (Everett, C.J., dis- 
senting). But see Jones v.  Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983)  (no  consti- 
tutional requirement for appointed counsel to  raise every nonfriv- 
olous issue requested  by client). The  third paragraph in the 
discussion is based on  Article 70(d)  and paragraph  102 of  MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). The  fourth paragraph  in the discussion is based  on 
the establishment of  review by  the Supreme Court of  certain deci- 
sions of  the Court of  Military Appeals. See Article 67(h)  and  28 
U.S.C. 5 1259; Military Justice Act of  1983, Pub.L. No. 98-209,  5 
10, 97 Stat. 1393 (1983). The  fifth paragraph in the discussion is 
based  on United States v.  Patterson, 22 U.S.C.M.A.  157, 46 
C.M.R. 157  (1973). See also United States v.  Kelker, 4 M.J. 323 
(C.M.A. 1978); United States v.  Bell,  11 U.S.C.M.A.  306, 29 
C.M.R. 122 (1960). 
Rule 1203.  Review by a Court of Military Review 
(a) In general. This  subsection is based on  Article 66(a).  The  dis- 
cussion is based on  Article 66(a),  (f),  (g)  and  (h).  See also the first 
paragraph  of  paragraph  lOOa and paragraph  lOOd of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). 
(b) Cases reviewed by a Court of Military Review. This  subsection 
is based  on Article 66(b)  and the third sentence of  Article 69(a). 
Interlocutory appeals by the Government are treated in R.C.M. 
908. The  third  through the fifth paragraphs in the discussion are 
based on Articles 59 and 66(c)  and (d)  and are taken from the sec- 
ond and  third  paragraphs  of  paragraph  lOOa  and  the first para- 
graph of  paragraph  lOOb of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United 
States v. Darville, 5 M.J. 1 (C.M.A. 1978).  The  last sentence in the 
first paragraph  is based  on United States v.  Brownd, 6 M.J. 338 
(C.M.A.  1979);United States v.  Yoakum,  8 M.J. 763 (A.C.M.R.), 
affd,  9 M.J. 417 (C.M.A. 1980). See also Corley v.  Thurman, 3 
M.J. 192 (C.M.A. 1977). The  sixth paragraph in the discussion is 
based on  Dettinger v.  United States, 7 M.J. 216 (C.M.A. 1979);  28 
U.S.C. 5  1651(a).  See also United States v.  LaBella, 15  M.J. 228 
(C.M.A.  1983); United States v.  Caprio, 12 M.J. 30 (C.M.A. 
1981);United States v.  Redding,  11 M.J.  100 (C.M.A. 1981); 
United States v. Bogan, 13 M.J. 768 (A.C.M.R. 1982). The  estab- 
lishment of  a statutory right of  the Government to  appeal certain 
rulings at trial might affect  some of  these precedents. See United 
States v.  Weinstein,  41  1 F.2d 622 (2d.  Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422 
U.S. 1042 (1976). 
(c) Action on cases reviewed  by a Court of Military Review. Sub- 
section (1)  is based  on Article 67(b)(2).  See also paragraph 
lOOb(2) and  the first sentence of  paragraph  100c(l)(a)  of  MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. Leslie,  11 M.J.  131 (C.M.A. 
1981); United States v. Clay, 10 M.J. 269 (C.M.A. 1981). 
Subsection (2)  is based on Article 66(e). See also United States 
v. Best, 4 U.S.C.M.A.  581, 16  C.M.R. 155 (1954).  The  discussion 
is consistent with paragraph  lOOb(3) of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (3)  modifies paragraph  100c(l)(a)  of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). It allows each service to  prescribe specific procedures  for 
service of  Court of Military Review decisions appropriate to  its 
own organization and  needs, in accordance with the increased 
flexibility allowed under the amendment of  Article 67(c).See Mil- 
itary Justice Amendments of 1981, Pub.L. 97-81; 95 Stat. 1090. 
Subsection (4)  is based on the first paragraph  of  paragraph 
105b of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See also Article 74. 
Because R.C.M. 1203 is organized somewhat differently  than par- 
agraph 100 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.),  the actions described in  subsec- 
tion (c)  of  this rule apply to  cases referred by the Judge Advocate 
General to  the Court of  Military Review under Article 69 as well 
as Article 66. The  actions described are appropriate for both types 
of  cases, to  the extent that they are applicable. 
1986 Amendment: Subsection 5 is based on the second para- 
graph of  paragraph  124 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The  fourth sen- 
tence is based, in part, onunited States v.  Williams, 18 M.J. 533 
(A.F.C.M.R.  1984). See also United States v.  Korzeniewski, 7 
U.S.C.M.A.  314,22 C.M.R. 104 (1956); United States v. Bledsoe, 
16 M.J. 977 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983). The  provision assigning the bur- 
den of  proof is consistent with zmendments to R.C.M.  909(c)(2) 
and R.C.M. 916(k)(3)(A)  which shifted to  the defense the burden 
of  showing lack of  mental capacity to stand trial and  lack of 
mental responsibility. 
(d) Notifcation to accused.  This subsection is based on Article 
67(c) (as amended, see Military Justice Amendments of  1981, 
Pub.L. 97-81,  5 5,95 Stat. 1088-89) and on the first paragraph of 
paragraph  100c(l)(a)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  (see Exec. Order No. 
12340 (Jan. 20, 1982)). The  discussion is based  on Article 67(b) 
and  on the second  paragraph  of  paragraph  100c(l)(a)  of  MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). 
(e) Cases not reviewed  by the Court of Military Appeals. Subsec- 
tion (1)  is based  on the first sentence of  paragraph  100c(l)(b)  of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See Article 71(b).  Subsection (2)  is based  on 
the last sentence of  paragraph  100c(l)(a)  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
See Article 66(e). 
(f) Scope. This subsection clarifies that the procedures for Gov- 
ernment appeals of  interlocutory rulings at trial are governed  by 
R.C.M. 908. -  - - 
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Rule 1204.  Review by the Court of Military 
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(a)  Cases reviewed by the Court of Military Appeals. This subsec- 
tion is based on the ninth sentence of Article 67(a)(l), on Article 
67(b), and on the second sentence in Article 69. It generally re- 
peats the first paragraph of paragraph 101 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) 
except insofar as that paragraph provided for mandatory review 
by  the Court of Military Appeals of cases affecting general and 
flag officers. See Article 67(b)(l), as amended by the Military Jus- 
tice Act of  1983, Pub.L. No. 98-209,  4 7(d), 97 Stat. 1393 (1983). 
The first paragraph in the discussion is based on Article 67(a), (d), 
and (e), which were repeated in  the second and third paragraphs 
of paragraph 101 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The second paragraph in 
the discussion  is based  on  United States v. Frischholz,  16 
U.S.C.M.A. 150, 36 C.M.R. 306 (1966); 28 U.S.C. 4  1651(a). See 
also Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 695 n. 7 (1969); United States v. 
Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969); Dobzynski v. Green 16 M.J. 84 
(C.M.A. 1983); Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74 (C.M.A. 1983); 
United States v. Labella, 15 M.J. 228 (C.M.A. 1983);Cooke v. 
Orser, 12 M.J. 335 (C.M.A. 1982); Wickham v. Hall, 12 M.J. 145 
(C.M.A. 1981);Cooke v. Ellis, 12 M.J. 17 (C.M.A. 1981); Vorbeck 
v. Commanding Oficer, 11 M.J. 480 (C.M.A. 1981); United States 
v. Redding, 11 M.J. 100 (C.M.A. 1981); United States v. Strow, 11 
M.J. 75 (C.M.A. 1981); Stewart  v. Stevens, 5 M.J. 220 (C.M.A. 
1978); Corley v. Thurman, 3 M.J. 192 (C.M.A. 1977); McPhail v. 
United States, 1 M.J. 457 (C.M.A. 1976): Brookins v. Cullins, 23 
U.S.C.M.A. 216,49 C.M.R. 5 (1974); Chenoweth v. Van Arsdall, 
22 U.S.C.M.A. 183,46  C.M.R. 5 (1970); United States v. Snyder, 
18 U.S.C.M.A. 480,40 C.M.R. 192 (1969); United States v. Bevi- 
lacqua, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 10, 39 C.M.R. 10 (1968); Gale v.  United 
States, 17U.S.C.M.A.  40, 37 C.M.R. 304(1967). 
(b)  Petition by the accused for  review by the Court of Military Ap- 
peals. Subsection (1) is based on the last paragraph of paragraph 
102b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Note that if the case reached  the 
Court of Military Review by  an appeal by  the Government under 
R.C.M. 908, the accused  would already have detailed defense 
counsel. Subsection (2) is based on C.M.A.R. 19(a)(3). 
(c) Action on decision  by the Court of Military Appeals. Subsec-
tion (1) substantially repeats Article 670  as did its predecessor, 
the fourth paragraph of paragraph 101 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) ex- 
cept that paragraph did not address possible review by the Su- 
prime Court. See Article 67(h); 28 U.S.C. 4 1259. Subsections (2) 
and (3) are based on Article 71(a) and (b) and on  the last para- 
graph of paragraph 101 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (4) is 
new and reflects the possibility of review by the Supreme Court. 
See Article 67(h); 28 U.S.C. 4 1259. See also Article 71. 
Rule 1205.  Review by the Supreme Court 

This rule is new and is based on Article 67(h); 28 U.S.C. $5 1259, 

2101.See Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub.L. No. 98-209,  4  10, 

97 Stat. 1393 (1983). 

Rule 1206.  Powers and responsibilities of the 
Secretary 
(a)  Sentences requiring approval by the Secretary. This subsection 
is based on the first sentence of Article 71(b). 
(b)  Remission and suspension. Subsection (1) is based on Article 
74(a). Subsection (2) is based on Article 74(b). Subsection (3) is 
based on the second paragraph of paragraph 105b of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). See Exec. Order No. 10498 (Nov. 4, 1953), 18 Fed.Reg. 
7003. The reference in paragraph  105a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) to 
Secretarial authority to commute sentences in deleted here as un- 
necessary. See Article 7  1  (b). 
Rule 1207.  Sentences requiring approval by the 
President 
This rule is based on the first sentence of Article 71(a). Paragraph 
105a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), which stated the President's power to 
commute sentences, is deleted. Such a statement is unnecessary. 
See a1soU.S. Const. art. 11, 4 2, cl. 1; Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 
(1974). 
Rule 1208.  Restoration 
Introduction. This rule is based on Article 75. 
(a)  New  trial. This subsection is based on paragraph  110d of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). It has been modified based on the modifica- 
tion of the procedure for executing sentences in new trials. See 
Analysis, R.C.M. 1209. The last two paragraphs in paragraph 
110d are omitted here. They repeated Article 75(b) and (c), which 
are referred to in the discussion. 
(b)  Other cases. This subsection is based on paragraph  106 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Rule 1209.  Finality of courts-martial 
(a)  When a conviction isjnal. This subsection is based on Article 
71(c), as amended, see Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub.L. No. 
98-209,  4 5(e)(l), 97 Stat. 1393 (1983). See also Article 64. Note 
that subsection (2)(B) qualifies (2)(A) even if the officer exercising 
general court-martial jurisdiction over the accused (or that of- 
ficer's successor) approves the findings and sentence, the convic- 
tion is not final if  review by  the Judge Advocate General is re- 
quired. See Article 64(c)(3); R.C.M. 1201(b)(2). As to the finality 
of an acquittal or disposition not amounting to findings of guilty, 
see Article 44; R.C.M. 905(g). See also Grafton v.  United States, 
206 U.S. 333 (1907). 
(b)  Effect ofjnality. This subsection is taken from Article 76 and 
paragraph 108 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also Article 69(b). 
Rule 1210.  New trial 
This rule is based on Article 73 and is based on paragraphs 109 
and 110 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Some matters in those paragraphs 
(e.g.,paragraphs 1  lOa(2) and  109d) are covered in other rules. 
See R.C.M. 810; 1209. The second sentence of paragraph 109d(l) 
has been deleted as unnecessary and potentially confusing. Sub- 
sections (f)(2) and (3) adequately describe the standards for a new 
trial. The rule is generally consistent with Fed.R.Crim. P. 33, ex- 
cept insofar as Article 73 provides otherwise. As to subsection (f), 
see also United States v. Bacon,  12 M.J. 489 (C.M.A. 1982); 
United States v. Thomas, 11 M.J. 135 (C.M.A.  1981). With re- 
spect to the second example under subsection (f)(3) of this rule, it 
should be noted that if the information concealed by the prosecu- 
tion was specifically requested by  the defense, a different standard 
may apply. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also United States v. Horsey, 
6 M.J. 112 (C.M.A. 1979). The second sentence of paragraph APP. 21, n  APPENDIX 21 
110f  of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) has been  deleted. See Analysis, 
R.C.M.  1107(f)(3)(D)(i). 
Subsections (h)(3),  (4), and (5) have been modified to permit 
the convening authority of a new trial to take action in the same 
way as in a rehearing; i.e., the convening authority may, when 
otherwise authorized to do so (see R.C.M.  11 13), order the sen- 
tence executed. Forwarding a new trial to the Judge Advocate 
General is not required just because the case was a new trial. The 
special circumstances of a new trial do no necessitate such differ- 
ent treatment in post-trial action. 
CHAPTER XIII.  SUMMARY COURTS-MARTIAL 
Rule 1301. Summary courts-martial generally 
(a)  Composition. The first sentence is based on Article  16(3). In 
the second sentence the express authority for the Secretary con- 
cerned to provide for the summary court-martial to be from a dif- 
ferent service than the accused is new. Paragraph 4g(2) of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.) included this statement:"However, a summary  court- 
martial will be a member of the same armed force as  the accused." 
The fact that this statement was included in a subparagraph enti- 
tled "Joint  command or  joint  task force"  left unclear what rule 
applied in other commands. The Working Group elected to clar- 
ify the situation by stating a general prohibition against detailing 
a summary court-martial from a service different from that of the 
accused, but allowing the service Secretaries to provide excep- 
tions. This is based on the desirability of having the summary 
court-martial be from the same service as the accused, but recog- 
nizes that under some circumstances, as  where a small unit of one 
service is colocated with another service, greater flexibility is 
needed, especially in order to comply with the policy in the third 
sentence of this subsection. The expression of policy in the third 
sentence is based  on paragraph 4c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The 
fourth sentence is based on Article 240)  and the fifth sentence of 
the first paragraph of paragraph 5c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  The 
last sentence is based on the last sentence of the first paragraph of 
paragraph 5cof MCM, 1969 (Rev.), but has been modified to clar- 
ify that the summary court-martial may be from outside the com- 
mand of the summary court-martial convening authority. 
(b)  Function.  This subsection is based on paragraph 79a of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The rule does not restrict other lawful func- 
tions which a summary court-martial may perform under the 
Code. See, e.g.,  Article 136. A summary court-martial appointed 
to dispose of decendent's effects under 10 U.S.C.  5 4712 or 10 
U.S.C.  5  9712 is not affected by these rules. See also R.C.M. 101 
and 20 1  (a). 
(c)  Jurisdiction.  This subsection is based on the first sentence of 
Article 20 and the first sentence of paragraph 16a of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). The reference to Chapter I1  was added to bring attention 
to other jurisdictional  standards which may apply to summary 
courts-martial. 
(d)  Punishments. This subsection is based on paragraph  166 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.), and Article 20. 
(e)  Counsel. The code does not provide a right to counsel at a 
summary court-martial (Articles 27 and 38.). The Supreme Court 
of  the United  States held in Middendorf  v.  Henry, 425 U.S. 25 
(1976), that an accused is not entitled to counsel in summary 
courts-martial, and that confinement may be adjudged notwith- 
standing the failure to provide the accused with counsel. In so 
holding, the Court distinguished summary courts-martial from 
civilian criminal proceedings at which counsel is required. See 
Argersigner v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Although the issue in 
Middendorf  v.  Henry, supra, was whether counsel must be pro- 
vided to  an accused at a summary court-martial, the Court's opin- 
ion clearly indicates that there is no right to any counsel (includ- 
ing retained counsel) at summary courts-martial.  It is within the 
discretion of the convening authority to detail, or otherwise make 
available, a military attorney to represent the accused at a sum- 
mary court-martial. 
This rule does not provide a right to consult with counsel prior 
to a summary court-martial. There is no constitutional or statu- 
tory basis forsuch a right. United States v. Mack, 9 M.J. 300,320- 
21 (C.M.A.  1980). A requirement for such consultation, although 
desirable under some circumstances, is unfeasible under others 
wherein it impedes the purposes of summary courts-martial by 
significantly delaying the proceedings. At present, the admissibil- 
ity of a summary court-martial without a prior opportunity to 
consult with counsel in subsequent courts-martial has not been 
fully resolved.United  States v.  Mack, supra;  United States v. 
Booker, 5 M.J. 238 (C.M.A.  1977). See United States v.  Kuehl, 11 
M.J. 126 (C.M.A.  1981). 
(f)  Power to obtain witnesses and evidence.  This subsection is 
based on Article 46 and 47 and paragraphs 79b and 115 of the 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(g)  Secretarial limitations. This subsection is new and recognizes 
the implicit authority of the service secretaries to provide addi- 
tional rules, such as those governing the exercise of summary 
court-martial jurisdiction. 
Rule 1302.  Convening a summary court-martial 
(a)  Who may convene summary courts-martial. This subsection is 
based on Article 24(a) and paragraph 5c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(b)  When convening authority is the accuser. This subsection is 
based on the second paragraph of paragraph 5c of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). 
(c)  Procedure. This subsection clarifies that a separate written or- 
der is not necessary to convene a summary court-martial;  this 
may be done directly on the charge sheet. Because there is little 
difference between summary, special, and general courts-martial 
with respect to the initiation and forwarding of charges, these 
procedures are simply referred to in the rule. 
Rule 1303.  Right to object to trial by summary 
court-martial 
This rule is based on Article 20 and the second and third 
sentences of paragraph 16a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Arraignment 
ends the right to object because arraignment is the point at which 
the accused is "brought to trial" within the meaning of Article 20. 
Rule 1304. Trial procedure 
(a)  Pretrial duties. This subsection is based on paragraphs 79c 
and 33d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(b)  Summary court-martial procedure.  Paragraph 79a of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.), suggested that the summary court-martial use the 
general court-martial trial guide. However, the general court- 
martial trial guide is inadequate for the person who ordinarily 
conducts the summary court-martial. The  trial guide in Appendix 
9 of this Manual was drafted to assist the lay presiding officer at ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. 
summary courts-martial and incorporate the rules prescribed in 
this chapter. 
Subsection (1) is based on paragraph 79d(l) of MCM,  1969 
(Rev.). The requirement to inform the accused of the date of re- 
ferral was added to subsection (l)(B) to assist the accused in mak- 
ing motions to dismiss or for other relief. Subsection (l)(E) is in- 
tended to more fully inform the accused of the scope of the 
evidence (testimonial, documentary, and physical) expected to be 
introduced. Subsection (1)(F) is new and is designed to assist the 
accused in making motions and presenting evidence in defense 
and in extenuation and mitigation. Subsection (1)(G) is new and 
is designed to assure the accused that no evidence, including 
statements previously made to the officer detailed to conduct the 
summary court-martial, will be considered unless admitted in ac- 
cordance with the Military Rules of Evidence. Subsection (l)(H) 
is new.  Subsection (1)(L) is expanded to assure the accused that 
the exercise of rights guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment and 
Article 31 will not be held against the accused. 
Subsection (2)(A) is based on Article 20 and the second para- 
graph of paragraph 79d(l) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsection (2)(B) is based on paragraph 79d(2) of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). 
Subsection (2)(C) is new. MCM, 1969 (Rev.) did not clarify the 
timing of motions in summary courts-martial. 
Subsection (2)(D)(ii) is new and designed to standardize the 
guilty plea inquiry by  referring the summary court-martial to 
R.C.M. 909 which prescribed the inquiry for summary, special, 
and general courts-martial. Subsections (2)(D)(i) and (iii) 
through (v) are based on paragraph 79d(2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
The provision in paragraph 79d(2) which provided for hearing ev- 
idence on the offense(s) in a guilty plea case is omitted here be- 
cause this procedure is covered in R.C.M. 1001(b)(4). 
Subsection (2)(E)(i) is based on Mil.R.Evid. 101 and 1  101. Sub- 
sections (2)(E)(ii) through (iv) are based on paragraph 79d(3) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Subsections (2)(F)(i) through (iii) are based on paragraph 
79d(4) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Note that the summary court-mar- 
tial may consider otherwise admissible  records from the accused's 
personnel file under R.C.M.  1001(b)(2). This was not permitted 
under MCM, 1969 (Rev.) before the amendment of paragraph 75 
on  1 August  1981. See Exec. Order No. 12315 (July 29, 1981). 
Subsection (2)(F)(iv) is new and fulfills the summary court-mar- 
tial's  post-trial responsibility to protect the interests of the ac- 
cused by informing the accused of post-trial rights. 
Subsection (2)(F)(v) is new and designed to inform the conven- 
ing authority of any suspension recommendation and deferment 
request before receipt of the record of trial. Subsection (2)(F)(vi) 
modifies paragraph  79d(4) of MCM,  1969 (Rev.). It recognizes 
the custodial responsibility of the summary court-martial over an 
accused sentenced to confinement until the accused is delivered to 
the commander or the commander's designee. It does not address 
the subsequent disposition of the accused, as this is a prerogative 
of the commander. 
Rule 1305.  Record of trial 
(a)  In general. This rule is based on paragraphs  79e and 91c of 
MCM,  1969 (Rev.) insofar as they prescribed that the record of 
trial of a summary court-martial will consist of a notation of key 
events at trial and insofar as they permitted the convening or 
higher authority to require additional matters in the record. Ad- 
ditional requirements may be established by  the Secretary con- 
cerned, the convening authority, or other competent authority. 
The modification of the format of the charge sheet (see Appendix 
4) eliminated it as the form for the record of trial of a summary 
court-martial. A separate format is now provided at Appendix 15. 
(b)  Contents. This subsection is based on paragraphs 79e and 91c 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
1986 Amendment: R.C.M. 1305@)(2) was amended to delete 
the requirement that the record of trial in summary courts-mar- 
tial reflect the number of previous convictions considered. The 
Committee concluded that this requirement had only slight util- 
ity and also noted that DD  Form 2329, which serves as the record 
of trial in summary courts-martial, has no entry for this informa- 
tion. The Committee also noted that the Services each have re- 
quirements for retaining documents introduced at summary 
courts-martial with the record of trial. 
(c) Authentication. This subsection is based on paragraph 79e of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(d)  Medical Certificate. This subsection is based on paragraphs 
91c and 125 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(e)  Forwarding copies of  the record. Subsection (1) is based on Ar- 
ticle 60(b)(2). Subsection (2) is based on the third paragraph of 
paragraph 91c of MCM,  1969 (Rev.). Subsection (3) is self-ex- 
planatory. 
Rule 1306.  Post-trial procedure 
(a) Accused's post-trial petition. This subsection is based on Arti- 
cle 60(b). CJ:  Article 38(c). 
@)  Convening authority's action. Subsection (1) refers to the de- 
tailed provisions concerning the convening authority's initial re- 
view and action in R.C.M. 1107.  The time period is based on Arti- 
cle 60(b)(l). Subsections (2) through (4) are based on paragraph 
90e of the MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subsection (2) is modified to reflect 
that the accused ordinarily will receive a copy of the record before 
action is taken. See Article 60@)(2). 
(c) Review by  a judge advocate. This subsection is based on Arti- 
cle 64. 
(d) Review by  the Judge Advocate General. This subsection is 
based on Article 69 and refers to the detailed provisions gov- 
erning such requests for review in R.C.M. 1201. 
PART IV. PUNITIVE ARTICLES 
Introduction. Unless otherwise indicated, the elements, maxi- 
mum punishments and sample specifications in paragraphs 3 
through 113 are based on paragraphs 157 through 213, paragraph 
127c (Table of Maximum Punishments), and Appendix  6c of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
1986 Amendment: The next to last paragraph of the introduc- 
tion to Part IV was added to define the term "elements,"  as used 
in Part IV. In MCM, 1969 (Rev.), the equivalent term used  was 
"proof."  Both "proof' and "elements"  referred to the statutory 
elements of the offense and to any additional aggravating factors 
prescribed by  the President under Article 56, UCMJ, to increase 
the maximum permissible punishment above that allowed for the 
basic offense. These additional factors are commonly referred to 
as "elements,"  and judicial construction has approved this usage, 
as long as these "elements" are pled, proven, and instructed upon. 
United States v.  Flucas, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 274, 49 C.M.R. 449 ~ ~ 
APP. 21, n  APPENDIX 21 
(1975); United States v.  Nickaboine, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 152,  11 
C.M.R. 152 (1953); United States v.  Bernard,  10 C.M.R.  7 18 
(AFBR  1953). 
1.  Article 77-Principals 
b, Explanation, (1)  Purpose, Article 77 is based on 18  U,S,C,  5 
2.Hearings on H. R. 2498 Before a Subcomm.  of the H~~~~comm, 
graph of  paragraph  156 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.),  that presence  at 
the scene of  a crime is not sufficient to make one a principal.See 
Unitedstate  v.  Waluski, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 724,21 C.M.R.  46 (1956); 
UnitedStatesv. Johnson, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 20, 19 C.M.R. 146 (1955); 
United States v.  Guest, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 147, 11 C.M.R. 147 (1953). 
(4)  Parties  jntent  differsfrom the perpetrators' This sub-
paragraph is based  on the first  ~aragraph  in paragraph  156 of 
MCMp  1969  (Rev')' See United States v'  U'S'C'M'A' 
1931l9 C'M'R' 319  Wharton'sl "pra  at  35' 
(5)  for  other crimes. This  paragraph is based  on 
the first two paragraphs in paragraph  156 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
See UnitedStates  v.  Cowan, 12 C.M.R.  374 (A.B.R. 1953); United 
v. Self,  l3  C.M.R. 227 (A.B.R. 1953)' 
Principals independently liable. This subparagraph is new and 
on Armed Services, 81st Gong,, 1st Sess, 1240-1244 (1949). The 
paragraph of  subparagraph b(1)  reflects the purpose of  18 U.S.C. 
5 2 (see  Standefer v, United States, 447 U,S,  10 (1980))  and Article 
77 (see Hearings, supra at 1240). 
The common law definitionsin the second paragraph of  sub-
paragraph b(1)  are based  on R. Perkins, Criminal Law 643-666 
(2d ed, 1969); and  1 C,~  ~  ~  ~  i criminal L~~ and pro- 
cedure $5 29-38  (1978). several common law terms such as 
and abettor,, are now used  rather loosely and do not al-
ways retain their literal common law meanings, See United States 
v. Burroughs, 12 M.J.  380, 384 n.4. (C.M.A. 1982); United States 
v. Molina, 581 F.2d  56, 61 n.8 (2d Cir. 1978). To  eliminate confu-
sion, the explanation avoids the use of  such terms where possible, 
See United States v. Burroughs, supra at 382 n.3. 
(2) who may be liable for  an offense. subparagraph  (2)(a)  is 
based on paragraph  156 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See 18 U.S.C.A. 5 
2 Historical and  Revision Notes (West 1969). See also United 
States v.  Giles, 300 U.S.  41 (1937); Wharton's, supra at $5 30, 31, 
35. 
Subparagraph (2)(b)  Sets forth  the basic formulation of the re- 
quirements for liability as a principal. An  act (which  may be pas- 
sive, as discussed in this subparagraph) and intent are necessary 
to make one liable as a principal.See  United States v.  Burroughs, 
~ , ~ h ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
is based on Federal  decisions. See Standefer v.  United States, 
supra; United States v.  Chenaur, 552 F.2d  294 (9th Cir. 1977); 
United States v. Frye, 548 F.2d 765  (8th Cir. 1977). 
This subparagraph is new and is based on United 
States v.  Williams, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 334,41 C.M.R. 334 (1970).  see 
also United States v.  Miasel, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 374, 24 C.M.R. 184, 
188 (157); United States v.  Lowell, 649 f.2d 950 (3d. Cir., 1981); 
United States v. Killian, 639 F. 2d 206 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 45  1 
U.S. lo21 (1981). 
2.  Article 78-Accessory  after the fact 
c.  Explanation. (1)  In  general. This subparagraph is based  on 
paragraph  157 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See also United States v. 
Tamas, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 502,20 C,M.R, 218(1955). 
(2)Failure to report offense.  This  subparagraph  is based on  par- 
agraph 157  of^^^, 1969 (R~~,);  ,,, smith, 5 M,J, united states 
supra;UnitedStatesv.Jackson,6U.S.C.M.A.193,19C.M.R.319 129(~,~,~,1978), 
(1955);  united states v.  Wooten, 1  U.S.C.M.A.  358, 3 C.M.R. 92 
(1952); United States v.  Jacobs, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 209, 2 C.M.R.  11  5 
(1952).See also  United States v.  Walker,  621  163 (5th Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1000 (1981);  Morei v.  United States, 
127 F.2d  827 (6th Cir. 1942);UnitedStates  v. Peoni, 100F.2d 401, 
402 (2d Cir. 1938). The  terms "assist"  and  "encourage, advise, 
and instigate"  have been substituted for "aid"  and6'abet" respec- 
tively, since the latter terms are technical and may not be clear to 
the lay reader' See  Law  5, 63 (5th  ed., 1979). 
See  N~eand Nissen v'  Unitedstates, 336 U'S'  613,620 
Wharton's, supra at 246-47. 
The  last two sentences in subparagraph (2)(b)  are based on the 
third  paragraph  and  paragraph  156 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See 
United States v.  Ford,  12 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 30 C.M.R. 31 (1960); 
United States v. McCarthy,  11 U.S.C.M.A. 758, 29 C.M.R. 574 
(1960);  United States v. Lyons, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 68,28 C.M.R. 292 
(1959). 
(3)  Presence. This subparagraph clarifies, as paragraph  156 of 
MCM. 1969 (Rev.) did not, that presence at the scene is neither 
necessary nor  sufficient to  make one a principal.  "Aid"  and 
"abet"  as used  in 18  U.S.C. 5 2, and in Article 77,  are not used in 
the narrow common law sense of  an "aider and  abettor"  who 
must be present  at the scene to be guilty as such. United States v. 
Burroughs, supra; United States v.  Sampol. 636 F.2d  621 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980);  United States v. Molina, supra; United States v.  Carter, 
23 C.M.R. 872 (A.F.B.R. 1957). Cf: Milanovich v.  United States, 
365 U.S. 551 (1961).  See also Wharton's, supra at 231. Subpara- 
graph (b)  continues the admonition, contained in the third para- 
(3)  Offensepunishable  by the code. This  subparagraph is based 
on ~~ti~l~  3 M, J, 846 (A,c,M,R,  78; united states v, ~i~h~~/~, 

1977); united States v. ~  l  ~ 34 C.M.R. 967 (A.F.B.R.  1964).  i  ~  ~  ,
 ~ 
(4)Status  ofprincipal. This  subparagraph is based on Article 78 
andunited  States v.  Michaels,  M,~, 846 (A,C.M,R, 1977); 
United States v, Blevins, 34 C,M,R,967 (A,F,B,R, 1964). 
(5)  Conviction or acquittal of principal.  The  subparagraph is 
based on paragraph  157 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v. 
Marsh, 13 U,S,C,M,A,  252, 32 C,M,R.  252 ('962); and  United 
States v, Humble, 11 U,S,C,M,A,  38, 28 C,M.R,  262 (1959).  See 
also United States v. McConnico, 7 M.J. 302 (C.M.A. 1979). 
(6)  Accessory after the fact  not a lesser included offense. This 
subparagraph  is based  on United States v.  McFarland, 8 
U,S,C,M,A,  42, 23 C,M,R,  266 (1957), 
(7)Actual Knowledge. This  paragraph is based on  United States 
v. Marsh, supra. See United States v.  Foushee,  13  M.J. 833 
(A.C.M.R. 1982). MCM, 1984, APPENDIX 21, Part IV, ARTI- 
CLE  79 
3.  Article 79-Lesser  included offenses 
b. Explanation. (1)  In general. This subparagraph and  the three 
subparagraphs are based on  paragraph  158 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
See also UnitedStates  v.  Thacker, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 408, 37 C.M.R. 
28 (1966). 
(2) Multiple lesser included offenses. This subparagraph is based 
on paragraph  158 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See also United States v. 
Calhoun, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 18  C.M.R. 52 (1955). ~ ~ , 
ANALYSIS 	 App. 21, R.C.M. e. 
(3)  Findings of guilty to a lesser  included offense. This subpara- 
graph is taken from paragraph 158 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
4.  Article 80-Attempts 
c.  Explanation. (1) In general. This subparagraph is based on 
paragraph  159 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(2)  More than preparation. This subparagraph is based on para- 
graph  159 of MCM,  1969 (Rev.);  United States v. Johnson, 7 
U.S.C.M.A. 488,22 C.M.R. 278 (1957); United States v. cheat, 7 
U.S.C.M.A.  187, 21 C.M.R. 3 13 (1956); United States v. Gofl 5 
M.J. 817 (A.C.M.R. 1978); United States v. Emerson, 16 C.M.R. 
690 (A.F.B.R. 1954). 
(3)  Factual impossibility. This subparagraph is based on para- 
graph  159 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States  v.  Thomas, 13 
U.S.C.M.A. 278, 32 C.M.R. 278 (1962). See  United States v. 
Quijada, 588 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1978). 
(4)  Solicitation. This subparagraph is based on paragraph  159 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(5)  Attempts not under Article 80. This subparagraph is based on 
paragraph 159 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
1986 Amendment: In 4c(5), subparagraph (e) was redesignated 
as  (f)l  and a new  was added  re-
flect the offense of attempted espionage as established by the De- 
partment of Defense Authorization Act, 1986, Pub.L. No. 99- 
145, 9 534, 99 Stat. 583, 634-35 (1985) (art. 1062). 
(6)  Regulations. This subparagraph is new and is based on United 
States V.  Davis, 16 M.J. 225 (C.M.A.  1983); United States V. FOS-
ter, 14 M.J. 246 (C.M.A. 1983). 
e.  Maximum punishment 1991 Amendment: This paragraph was 
revised to allow for the imposition of confinement in excess of 20 
years for the offense of attempted murder. There are cases in 
which the aggravating factors surrounding commission of an at- 
tempted murder are so egregious that a 20 year limitation may be 
inappropriate. Although life imprisonment may be imposed by 
the sentencing authority, mandatory minimum punishment  pro- 
visions do not apply in the case of convictions under Article 80. 
5.  Article 81-Conspiracy 
c.  Explanation.  (1) Co-conspirators. This subparagraph is based 
on paragraph  160 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v. Kinder, 
14 C.M.R. 742 (A.F.B.R. 1953). The portion of paragraph  160 
which provided that acquittal of all alleged co-conspirators pre- 
cludes conviction  of the accused  has been deleted. See  United 
States v. Garcia 16 M.J. 52 (C.M.A. 1983). See also United States 
v. Standefer, 447 U.S. 10 (1980). 
(2)  Agreement. This subparagraph is taken from paragraph  160 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(3)  Object of the agreement. This subparagraph is taken from par- 
agraph 160 of MCM,  1969 (Rev.); United States v. Kidd, 13 
U.S.C.M.A. 184, 32 C.M.R. 184 (1962). The last three sentences 
reflect "Wharton's  Rule," 4 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law, 
9 731 (1981). See Iannelli v.  United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975); 
United States v.  Yarborough, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 678, 5 C.M.R. 106 
(1952); United States v. Osthoff, 8 M.J. 629 (A.C.M.R. 1979); 
United States v. McClelland, 49 C.M.R. 557 (A.C.M.R. 1974). 
(4)  Overt act. This subparagraph is taken from paragraph  160 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v. Rhodes, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 735, 
29 C.M.R. 551 (1960);United States v. Salisbury, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 
171,33 C.M.R. 383 (1963); United States v. Woodley, 13 M.J. 984 
(A.C.M.R. 1982). 
(5)  Liability for  offenses. This subparagraph is taken from para- 
graph  160 of MCM, 1969 (~ev.).  See ~inkerton  v.  united states, 
328 U.S. 640 (1946);United States v. Salisbury, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 
171,33 C.M.R. 383 (1963); United States v. Woodley, 13 M.J. 984 
(A.C.M.R. 1982). 
(6)  Withdrawal. This subparagraph is taken from paragraph  160 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v. ~iasel,  8 U.S.C.M.A.374, 
24 C.M.R.184 
(7)  Factual impossibility. This subparagraph is taken from para- 
graph 160  MCM~ 1969(Rev.). 
(8)  Conspiracy as a separate offense. This subparagraph is taken 
from paragraph 160 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States 
v. Washington, 1 M.J. 473 (C.M.A. 1976). 
(9)  Special conspiracies under Article 134. This subparagraph is 
taken from paragraph 160 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v. 
Chapman, 10 C.M.R. 306 (A.B.R. 1953). 
6.  Article 82-Solicitation 
b,  Elements, Solicitation under Article  82 has long been recog- 

nized as a specific intent offense, see paragraph  lbl of MCM, 

1969 (R~~,);  1951,seegenerally  United 
 paragraph 161 of~~M, 

States v. Mitchell, 15 M.J. 214 (C.M.A. 1983); United States v. 

Benton, 7 M.J. 606 (N.C.M.R. 1979). It has been added as an ele- 

ment for clarity, 

c.  Explanation. This paragraph is taken from paragraph  161 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.), United States v.  Wysong, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 248, 
26 C.M.R. 29 (1958); United States v.  Gentry, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 14, 
23 C,M,R,  238 (1957);  united states v.  B  ~ 7 M,J, ~  606 ~ 
(N.c.M.R.  1979). 
7. 	Article 83-Fraudulent  enlistment, 
Or separation 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based  on paragraph  162 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v. Danley, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 486, 
45 C.M.R. 260 (1972). See  Wickham v.  Hall,  12 M.J. 145 
(C.M.A. 1981). 
e.  Maximum Punishment. The reference to membership in, asso- 
ciation with, or activities in connection with organizations, as- 
sociations etc., found  in  the Table of Maximum Punishments, 
paragraph 127c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), for Article 83, was deleted 
as unnecessary. The maximum punishment for all fraudulent en- 
listment cases was then standardized. 
8.  Article 84--Effecting  unlawful enlistment, 
appointment, or separation 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is taken from paragraph  163 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. Hightower, 5 M.J. 
717 (A.C.M.R. 1978). 
e.  Maximum punishment. The reference to membership in, with, 
or activities in  connection with organizations, associations, etc., 
found in the Table of Maximum Punishments, paragraph 127c of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.), or Article 84, was deleted as unnecessary. 
The maximum punishment for all cases was then standardized. APP. 21, n  APPENDIX 21 
9.  Article 85-Desertion 
c.  Explanation. (1)  Desertion with intent to  remain away perma- 

nently. 

2  (a) In general. This subparagraph is taken from paragraph 

164a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 

(b) Absence without authority-inception, duration, termina- 
tion. See the Analysis, paragraph 10. 
(c) Intent  to remain away permanently. This subparagraph is 
taken from paragraph  164a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The last sen- 
tence is based on United States v. Cothern, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 158,23 
C.M.R. 382 (1957). 
(d) Effect  of  enlistment or appointment in the same or a differ- 
ent armed force. This subparagraph  is based on paragraph  164a 
of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.);United States v.  Huff, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 247, 
22 C.M.R. 37 (1956). 
(2) Quitting unit, organization, or place  of duty with  intent to 
avoid hazardous duty or to shirk important service. 
(a) Hazardous duty or important service. This subparagraph is 
taken from paragraph 164a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United 
States v.  Smith, 18  U.S.C.M.A. 46, 39 C.M.R. 46 (1968); United 
States v.  Deller, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 409, 12 C.M.R.  165 (1953). 
(b) Quits. This subparagraph is based  on United States v. 
Bondar, 2U.S.C.M.A. 357, 8 C.M.R. 157(1953). 
(c) Actual Knowledge.  This subparagraph is based  on United 
States v.  Stabler, 4 U.S.C.M.A.  125, 15 C.M.R.  125 (1954)  and re- 
jects the view of  paragraph 164a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  that con- 
structive knowledge would suffice.  To  avoid confusion,  the "con- 
structive knowledge"  language has been replaced  with the 
statement that actual knowledge may be proved  by circumstantial 
evidence. See  United States v.  Curtin, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 427, 26 
C.M.R. 207  (1958). 
(3) Attempting to  desert. This subparagraph is taken from par- 
agraph 164b of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(4) Prisoner with executed punitive discharge. This subpara- 
graph is taken from paragraphs  1640 and  165 of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). 
e. Maximum punishment.  As indicated  in the Analysis, para- 
graph 4, attempts, the punishment for attempted desertion was 
made uniform.  As a result, attempted desertion- "other cases of'- 
now conforms with the punishment  for"desertion- other cases 
of."  This amounts to an increase in the maximum punishment 
from confinement for one year  to either two or three years, de- 
pending on the nature of  termination. 
10.  Article 86-Absence  without leave 
c. Explanation. (1)  In general. This subparagraph is taken from 
paragraph 165 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(2) Actual  knowledge. This subparagraph clarifies that the ac- 
cused must have in fact known of  the time and place of  duty to  be 
guilty of  a violation of  Article 86(1) or (2). ~f. United States v. 
Chandler, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 193, 48 C.M.R. 945 (1974); United 
States v.  Stabler, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 125, 15  C.M.R. 125  (1954).  See 
also UnitedStates v.  Gilbert, 23 C.M.R. 914 (A.F.B.R. 1957).  The 
language in paragraph  165 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.) dealing with 
constructive knowledge has been eliminated. To  avoid confusion, 
this language has been replaced  with the statement that actual 
knowledge may be proved  by circumstantial evidence. See United 
States v.  Curtin, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 427,26 C.M.R. 207 (1958). 
(3) Intent. This subparagraph is based  on paragraph  165 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(4) Aggravated forms  of unauthorized absence. This subpara- 
graph is based on paragraphs 127c and  165 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(5) Civil authorities. This subparagraph is taken from para- 
graph  165f MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v.  Myhre, 9 
U.S.C.M.A.32, 25 C.M.R.  294 (1958);United States v.  Grover, 10 
U.S.C.M.A. 91, 27  C.M.R. 165 (1958). See also United States v. 
Dubry, 12 M.J. 36 (C.M.A. 1981). 
(6) Inability to return. This subparagraph is taken from para- 
graph  165 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(7) Determining  the unit or organization of an accused. This 
subparagraph is based on United States v.  Pounds, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 
153, 48  C.M.R. 769 (1974);United States v.  Mitchell, 7 
U.S.C.M.A. 238,22 C.M.R. 28 (1956). 
(8) Duration. This subparagraph is taken from paragraphs 
127c and  165 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v.  Lovell, 7 
U.S.C.M.A. 445,22 C.M.R. 235 (1956). 
(9) Computation of duration. This subsection is based on para- 
graph 127c(3) of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(10) Termination-methods  of return to military control. This 
subparagraph  is based on paragraph  165 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.); 
United States v.  Dubry, supra;United States v.  Raymo, 1 M.J.  3  1 
(C.M.A. 1975); United States v.  Garner, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 578, 23 
C.M.R. United States v.  Coates, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 625, 10 C.M.R. 
123 (1953); United States v. Jackson, 1 U.S.C.M.A.  190,2 C.M.R. 
96 (1952);United States v.  Petterson,  14 M.J. 608 (A.F.C.M.R. 
1982); United States v.  Coglin, 10 M.J. 670 (A.F.C.M.R.  1981). 
See also United States v.  Zammit, 14 M.J. 554 (N.M.C.M.R. 
1982). 
(1  1) Findings of more than one absence under one specification. 
This subsection is based on United States v.  Francis, 15  M.J. 424 
(C.M.A. 1983). 
(e) Maximum punishment. The  increased maximum punishment 
for unauthorized absence for more than 30 days terminated  by 
apprehension has been added to  parallel the effect  of  termination 
of  desertion by apprehension  and  to encourage absent ser- 
vicemembers to  voluntarily return. A bad-conduct discharge was 
added to  the permissible maximum punishment for unauthorized 
absence with intent to  avoid maneuvers of  field duty, because with 
sensitive, high value equipment used in exercises currently, the  ef- 
fect of  such absence is more costly and, because of  limited availa- 
ble training time, seriously disrupts training and  combat readi- 
ness. 
1990 Amendment: The Note in subsection b(4) was inserted 
and  a conforming change was made in subsection f(4) to clarify 
the distinction between 'unauthorized absence from a guard, 
watch, or duty section'  and  'unauthorized absence from guard, 
watch, or duty section with the intent to abandon it.'  See subsec- 
tions c(4)(c)  and c(4)(d). 
11.  Article 87-Missing  movement 
c. Explanation. (1)  Movement. This subparagraph is based on 
paragraph 166 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.);  United States v.  Kimply, 17 
C.M.R. 469 (N.B.R. 1954). 
(2) Mode of movement. This subparagraph is based on United 
States v.  Graham, 16  M.J. 460 (C.M.A. 1983); United States v. 
Johnson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 174, 11 C.M.R. 174 (1953); United States 
v. Burke, 6 C.M.R.  588 (A.B.R. 1952); UnitedStates v. Jackson, 5 ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. c. 
C.M.R. 429 (A.B.R. 1952). See also United States v. Graham, 12 
M.J. 1026 (A.C.M.R.), pet granted, 14 M.J. 223 (1982). 
(3)  Design. This subparagraph is based on United States v. Clif- 
ton, 5C.M.R. 342(N.B.R. 1952). 
(4)  Neglect. This subparagraph is taken from paragraph 166 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(5)  ~~~~~l  knowledge.  hi^ subparagraph is based  on  united 
States v. Chandler, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 193, 48 C.M.R. 945 (1974), 
United States v. Thompson, 2 U,S,C,M,A. 460,  9 C,M,R, 90 
(1953). and in part on paragraph  166 of MCM, 1969 (Rev,),  hi^ 
paragraph  rejects the language of paragraph  166 of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.), which has provided  for "constructive knowledge,"  and 
adopts theUactual  knowledgew  requirement set forth in chandler. 
(6)  Proof of absence. This subparagraph is taken from para- 
graph  166 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
e.  Maximum punishment. The maximum punishment for miss- 
ing movement was increased  to make these punishments more 
equivalent to aggravated offenses of unauthorized absences and 
violations of orders. The major reliance of the armed forces on 
rapid deployment and expeditious movement of personnel and 
equipment to deter or prevent the escalation of hostilities dictates 
that these offenses be viewed more seriously. 
12.  Article 88--Contempt  toward officials 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is taken from paragraph  167 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). For a discussion of the history of Article 88, 
see  United States v. Howe,  17 U.S.C.M.A.  165, 37 C.M.R. 429 
(1967). 
e.  Maximum punishment. This limitation is new and is based on 
the authority given the President in Article 56. Paragraph 127c of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.) does not mention Article 88. The maximum 
punishment is based on the maximum punishment for Article of 
War 62, which was analogous to Article 88, as prescribed in para- 
graph 117c of MCM (Army), 1949 and MCM (AF), 1949. 
13.  Article 89--Disrespect  toward a superior 
commissioned officer 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is taken from Article  Para-
graph  168 of MCM, 1969 (rev.); United States v.  7 
M.J. 320(C.M.A. 1979);United States v. Ferenczi, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 
3, 27 C.M.R. 77 (1958); United States v. Sorrells, 49 C.M.R. 44 
(A.C.M.R. 1974); United States v. Cheeks, 43 C.M.R. 1013 
(A.F.C.M.R. 1971); Unitedstates v. Montgomery,  11 C.M.R. 308 
(A.B.R. 1953). 
e.  Maximum punishment, The maximum punishment was in-
creased from confinement for 6 months to confinement for 1 year 
to more accurately reflect the serious nature of the offense and to 
distinguish it from disrespect toward warrant officers under Arti- 
cle 9 1. See paragraph 15c. 
14.  Article 9QAssaulting  Or willfully 
superior commissioned  officer 
c. Explanation. (1) Striking or assaulting superior commissioned 
officer.This subparagraph is based on paragraph 16% of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.) and other authorities as noted below. 
(a) Definitions. "Strikes" is clarified to include any intentional of- 
fensive touching. Other batteries, such as by  culpable negligence, 
are included in"offers  violence." As to "superior  commissioned 
officer," see Analysis, paragraph 13. 
(d) Defenses. This subparagraph modifies the former discussion 
of self-defense  since technically, because unlawfulness is not an el- 
ement expressly, the officer must be acting illegally or otherwise 
outside the role of an officer before self-defense may be in  issue. 
See  United States v. Struckman, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 493, 43 C.M.R. 
333 
(2)  Disobeying superior commissioned officer.  his subparagraph 
is based on paragraph  1696 of MCM, 1969 (~ev.)  and other au- 
thorities as noted 
(a)  'f the order. 
(i)  Inference  of lawfulness. See  united states v. ~eenan,  18 
U.S.C.M.A. 108, 39 C.M.R. 108 (1969); United States v. Schultz, 
18 U.S.C.M.A.  133, 39 C.M.R. 133 (1969);  United States v. 
Kinder, 14 C.M.R. 742 (A.B.R. 1954). 
(ii) Authority of issuing officer. See  United States v. Marsh, 3 
U.S.C.M.A. 48, 11 C.M.R. 48 (1953). 
(iii)  Relationship to military duty. See United States v. Martin, 
U,S,C,M,A,674,  C,M,R, 102 (1952);UnitedStates v. Wilson, 
12 U.S.C.M.A.  165, 30 C.M.R. 165 (1961) (restriction on drink- 
ing); United States v. Nation, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 724, 26 C.M.R. 504 
(1958) (overseas marriage);  United States v. Lenox, 21 
U.S.C.M.A.  314, 45 C.M.R. 88 (1972); United States v. Stewart, 
20 U.S.C.M.A.  272 43 C.M.R. 112 (1971); United States  V.  Wil-
son, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 100, 41 C.M.R. 100 (1969); United States v. 
Noyd, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 483,40 C.M.R. 195 (1969) (all dealing with 
matters that do not excuse the disobedience of an order). 
(iv)  Relationship to statutory or constitutional rights. This sub- 
paragraph is based  on Article 31;  United States  v. McCoy, 12 
U.S.C.M.A. 68,30 C.M.R. 68 (1960); United States v. A~cock,  15 
U.S.C.M.A.  158,35 C.M.R. 130 (1964). 
(b)  f'ersonal  nature of the order. See United States v. Wartsbaugh, 
21 U.S.C.M.A. 535,45 C.M.R. 309 (1972). 
(d) Specificity of  the order. See  United States v. Bratcher, 18 
U.S.C.M.A. 125,38 C.M.R. 125 (1969). 
(e)  Knowledge. See  United States v. Pettigrew,  19 U.S.C.M.A. 
191, 41 C.M.R.  191 (1970);  United States  v.  Oisten, 13 
u.s.C.M.A.  656,33 C.M.R. 188 (1963). 
(g)  Time for  compliance. See  United States v. Stout,  1 
U.S.C.M.A. 639, 5 C.M.R. 67 (1952); United States v. Squire, 47 
C,M,R, 214 (N,c,M,R,  1973);united states v, clowser, 16 
C,M.R, 543 (A,F,B,R, 1954). 
15.  Article 91-  Insubordinate conduct toward 
warrant officer, noncommissioned  officer, or 
petty 
C.  Explanation. (1) In general. This subparagraph is based on 
paragraph  170 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and paragraph  170 
MCM, 1951; a review of the legislative history of Article 91; 
United States v. Ransom, 1 M.J. 1005 (N.C.M.R. 1976); United 
States v. Balsarini, 36 C.M.R. 809 (C.G.B.R. 1965). Paragraph 
170 of MCM, 1951 and MCM, 1969 (Rev.) discussed Article 91 
as if Congress had reauired a su~erior-subordinate  relations hi^ in -
Article 91. See Legal and Legislative Basis, Manual for  Courts- 
Martial, United States, 1951, at 257. Analysis of Contents, Manual 
for  Courts-Martial, United States,  1969 (Revised edition), DA 
PAM 27-2,  at 28-6.  This was in  error and all references thereto 
have been removed. An amendment to Article 91 was suggested ~pp. 21,~  APPENDIX 21 C. 
by The Judge Advocate General of the Army (see Hearings on 
S.857 and H.R. 4080 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Armed 
Service Committee, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 274 (1949)) to conform 
Article 91 to Articles 89 and 90, which explicitly require superior- 
ity, and was later offered, but it was not acted on. See Congres-
sional Floor Debate on the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(amendment M. p. 170). See also Hearings Before a Subcommittee 
of the House Armed Services Committee on H.R. 2498, 8  1st Cong. 
1st Sess. 772, 814, 823 (1949); This present interpretation is con- 
sistent with the unambiguous language of Article 91 and its pred- 
ecessors. See Articles of War 65 and l(b) (1920); and paragraph 
135, MCM, 1928; paragraph  153, MCM, (Army),  1949 and 
MCM (AF),  1949. See also Act of Aug.  10, 1956, Pub.L. No. 
84-1028,  §49(e), 70A Stat. 640 (catchlines in U.C.M.J.  not rele- 
vant to congressional intent). 
The  remaining subparagraphs are all taken from paragraph 170 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and the discussion paragraphs of other arti- 
cles. 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Subparagraphs (2) and (7) are based 
on the aggravating circumstances that the victim is also superior 
to the accused. When this factor exists in a given case, the superi- 
ority of the victim must be alleged in the specification. The penal- 
ties for disobedience of noncommissioned and petty officers and 
for assault on and disrespect toward superior noncommissioned 
and petty officers were increased. In the case of the latter two of- 
fenses, this is done in part to distinguish assault on or disrespect 
toward a superior noncommissioned  or petty officer from other 
assaults or disrespectful behavior, in light of the expansive cover- 
age of the article. Moreover, increasing responsibility for training, 
complex and expensive equipment, and leadership in combat is 
placed on noncommissioned and petty officers in today's  armed 
forces. The law should reinforce the respect and obedience which 
is due them with meaningful sanctions. The maximum punish- 
ment for disrespect toward warrant officers was adjusted to con- 
form to these changes. 
16.  Article 92-  Failure to obey order or 
regulation 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is taken form paragraph  171 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The requirement that actual knowledge be an 
element of an Article 92(3) offense is based on  United States v. 
Curtin, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 427, 26 C.M.R. 207 (1958). 
As to publication under subparagraph c(l)(a), see United States 
v.  Tolkach, 14 M.J. 239 (C.M.A. 1982). 
Subparagraph (l)(e) Enforceability is new. This subparagraph 
is based on  United States v.  Nardell, 21 U.S.C.M.A.  327, 45 
C.M.R. 101 (1972);  United States v.  Hogsett, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 681, 
25 C.M.R. 185 (1958). The general order or regulation violated 
must, when examined as a whole, demonstrate that it is intended 
to regulate the conduct of individual servicemembers, and the di- 
rect application of sanctions for violations of the regulation must 
be self-evident. United States v.  Nardell, supra at 329,45 C.M.R. 
at 103. See  United States v.  Wheeler, 22 U.S.C.M.A.  149, 46 
C.M.R. 149(1973); United States v. Scott, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 25, 46 
C.M.R. 24 (1972);  United States  v.  Woodrum, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 
529, 43 C.M.R. 369 (1971);  United States  v.  Brooks, 20 
U.S.C.M.A. 42,42 C.M.R. 220 (1970); United States v. Baker, 18 
U.S.C.M.A. 504, 40 C.M.R. 216 (1969);  United States v. Tassos, 
18 U.S.C.M.A. 12, 39 C.M.R.  12 (1968); United States v. Farley, 
11 U.S.C.M.A. 730, 29 C.M.R. 546 (1960); DiChiara, Article 92; 
Judicial Guidelines for  Identifying Punitive Orders and Regula- 
tions, 17 A.F.L. Rev. Summer 1975 at 61. 
e.  Maximum punishment. The maximum punishment for willful 
dereliction of duty was increased from 3 months to 6 months con- 
finement and to include a bad-conduct discharge because such of- 
fenses involve a flaunting of authority and are  more closely analo- 
gous to disobedience offenses. 
February 1986 Amendment: The rule was revised to add con- 
structive knowledge as an alternative to the actual knowledge re- 
quirement in paragraph (b)(3)(b) and the related explanation in 
subparagraph c(3)(b). In reviewing these provisions, it was con- 
cluded that the reliance of the drafters of the 1984 revision on the 
Curtin case was misplaced because the portion of that case dealt 
with failure to obey under Article 92(2), not dereliction under Ar- 
ticle 92(3). As revised, the elements and the explanation add an 
objective standard appropriate for military personnel. 
17.  Article 93-  Cruelty and maltreatment 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph  172 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v.  Dickey, 20 C.M.R. 486 
(A.B.R. 1956). The  phrase"subject  to the Code or not" was added 
to reflect the fact that the victim could be someone other than a 
member of the military. The example of sexual harassment was 
added because some forms of such conduct are nonpyhsical mal- 
treatment. 
18.  Mutiny and sedition 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is taken from paragraph  173 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subparagraph (1) is also based on  United 
States v.  Woolbright, 12 U.S.C.M.A.  450, 31 C.M.R. 36 (1961); 
United States  v. Duggan, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 396 15 C.M.R. 396 
(1954). The reference in paragraph 173 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) to 
charging failure to report an impending mutiny or sedition under 
Article 134 has been deleted in subparagraph (4). This is because 
such an offense was not listed in the Table of Maximum Punish- 
ments or elsewhere under Article 134 in that Manual. Article of 
War 67 included this offense, but Article 94 excludes it. The  draft- 
ers of paragraph 173 of MCM, 195  1 noted the change. To  fill the 
gap they referred to Article 134. Instead, they should have re- 
ferred to Article 92(3) because dereliction is the gravamen of the 
offense. 
19.  Article 95-Resistance,  breach of arrest, and 
escape 
b.  Elements. The elements listed for breaking arrest and escape 
from custody or confinement have been modified.  Paragraph 
174b. c, and d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) provided that the accused by 
"duly"  placed in arrest, custody, or  confinement. "Duly"  was de- 
leted from the elements of these offenses. Instead, the elements 
specify that the restraint be imposed by one with authority to im- 
pose it. This was done to clarify the meaning of the word"du1y" 
and the burden of going forward on the issues of authority to or- 
der restraint and the legal basis for the decision to order restraint. 
"Duly"  means "in due or proper form or manner, according to 
legal requirements."  Black's  Law Dictionary 450(5th ed. 1979). 
See also United States  v.  Carson, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 407, 35 C.M.R. 
379 (1965). Thus the term includes a requirement that restraint be ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. c.(c) 
imposed by one with authority to do so, and  a requirement that 
such authority be exercised lawfully.  Until 1969, the Manual also 
provided  that arrest, confinement, or custody which is"officia1ly 
imposed is presumed to be legal." Paragraph 174 of  MCM, 195 1. 
See also paragraph  157  of  MCM, (Army), 1949, MCM (AF), 
1949; paragraph  139 of  MCM, 1928. In practical effect,  therefore, 
the prosecution had only to  present some evidence of  the author- 
ity of  the official imposing restraint to meet its burden.of proof, 
unless the presumption  of  legality was rebutted by some evidence. 
See  United States v.  Delagado,  12 C.M.R. 651 (C.G.B.R. 1953). 
Cf: United States v.  Clansey, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 230, 22 C.M.R. 20 
(1956); United States v.  Gray, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 615, 20 C.M.R. 331 
(1956). 
The  drafters  of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.),  deleted the presumption of 
legality. In their view the holding in United States v.  Carson, 
supra, that this is a question of  law to be decided by the military 
judge  made such a presumption  meaningless. Analysis of Con- 
tents, Manual for  Courts-Martial,  United States, 1969 (Revised 
edition), DA  PAM 27-2,  at  28-8.  The drafters considered delet- 
ing "duly"  as an element but did  not because the prosecution 
must show that restraint was"duly"  imposed. Id. The result left 
the implication that the prosecution  must produce  evidence of 
both the authority of  the person imposing or ordering restraint, 
and the legality of  that official's  decision in every case, whether or 
not the latter is contested. Given the dual meaning of  the 
word"du1y"  and the reason for deleting the presumption of  legal- 
ity, it is unclear whether the drafters intended this result. Cf: 
United States v.  Stinson, 43 C.M.R. 595 (A.C.M.R. 1970). 
"Duly" is replaced with the requirement that the person order- 
ing restraint be proved  to have authority to do so. This clarifies 
that proof of  arrest, custody, or confinement ordered by a person 
with authority to  do so is sufficient without proof of  the underly- 
ing basis for the restraint  (e.g., probable cause, legally sufficient 
nonjudicial punishment,  risk of  flight), unless the latter is put  in 
issue by the defense. This is consistent with Article 95 which on 
its face does not require the restraint to be lawful (compare Arti- 
cle 95 with Articles 9C-92  which prohibit violations of  "lawful or- 
ders"-which  orders are presumed  lawful in the absence of  evi- 
dence to  the contrary. United States v.  Smith, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 231, 
45 C.M.R. 5 (1972)).  This construction is also supported by judi- 
cial decisions. See United States v.  Wilson, 6 M.J. 214 (C.M.A. 
1979); United States v.  Clansey, supra; United States v.  Yerger,  1 
U.S.C.M.A. 288, 3 C.M.R. 22 (1952);  United States v.  Delgado, 
supra. Cf: UnitedStates v. Mackie, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 14, 36 C.M.R. 
170 (1966); United States v.  Gray, supra. But see  United States v. 
Rozier,  1 M.J. 469 (C.M.A. 1976). This construction also avoids 
unnecessary litigation of  a collateral issue and  eliminates the ne- 
cessity for the introduction of  uncharged misconduct, except 
when the door is opened by the defense. Cf: United States v.  Yer- 
ger, supra; United States v.  Mackie, supra. 
1991  Amendment: Subparagraph b(4)  was amended by adding 
an aggravating element of  post-trial  confinement to invoke in- 
creased punishment  for escapes from post-trial confinement. 
c. Explanation (I)Resisting apprehension. 
(a) Apprehension. This subparagraph is taken from Article 7. 
(b) Authority  to apprehend. See Analysis, R.C.M. 302(b). The 
last two sentences are based on paragraph  57a of  MCM, 1969 
(Rev.);  United States v. Carson, supra. 
(c) Nature of the resistance. This subparagraph  is taken from 
paragraph 174a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(d) Mistake. This  subparagraph is taken from paragraph 174a 
of  MCM, 1969  (Rev.). See also  United States v.  Nelson,  17 
U.S.C.M.A. 620, 38  C.M.R. 418 (1968). 
(e) Illegal apprehension. The first sentence of  this subpara- 
graph is taken from paragraph  174a of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Al- 
though such a rule is not without criticism, see  United States v. 
Lewis, 7 M.J.  348 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v.  Moore, 483 
F.2d  1361, 1364 (9th Cir.1973), it has long been recognized in 
military and  civilian courts. John Bad Elk v.  United States, 177 
U.S. 529 (1900);  paragraph  174a of  MCM, 1951. Cf: paragraph 
157 of  MCM (Army),  1949; MCM (AF),  1949; paragraph 139 of 
MCM, 1928; W.  Winthrop,  Military Law and Precedents 122 (2d 
ed. 1920 reprint). (Before 1951 resisting apprehension was not 
specifically prohibited  by the Articles of  War. Earlier references 
are to breaking arrest or escape from confinement.) 
The  second sentence has been added to make clear that the is- 
sue of  legality of  an apprehension (e.g., whether based on proba- 
ble cause or otherwise in accordance with requirements for legal 
sufficiency;  see R.C.M.  302(e))  is not in issue until raised by the 
defense. United States v.  Wilson, and  United States v.  Clansey, 
both supra.  Cf: United States v.  Smith, 21 U.S.C.M.A.  231, 45 
C.M.R. 5 (1972).  See also Analysis, paragraph 19b. The  presump- 
tion is a burden assigning device; it has no evidentiary weight 
once the issue is raised. Because the issue of  legality is not an ele- 
ment, and because the prosecution  bears the burden of  establish- 
ing legality when the issue is raised, the problems  of  Mullaney v. 
Wilbur,  421 U.S. 684 (1975)  and Turner v.  United States, 396 U.S. 
398 (1970)  are not encountered. Cf: Patterson v.  New  York, 432 
U.S. 197 (1977). 
The  third sentence is based on United States v.  Carson, supra. 
(2) Breaking arrest. 
(a) Arrest. This subparagraph has been added for clarity. 
(b) Authority  to order arrest. See Analysis, R.C.M. 304(b); 
R.C.M.  1101; and paragraph 2, Part V. 
(c) Nature of restraint imposed by arrest. This  subparagraph is 
based on paragraph 174b of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See also Analy- 
sis, paragraph 196. 
(d) Breaking. This subparagraph  is based on paragraph  174b 
of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(e) Illegal  arrest. The first sentence in this subparagraph  is 
based on paragraph  1746 of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  The  second sen- 
tence has been added to clarify that legality of  an arrest  (e.g., 
whether based on probable  cause or based on legally sufficient 
nonjudicial punishment  or court-martial sentence) is not in issue 
until raised  by the defense. See Analysis, paragraphs  196 and 
19c(l)(e).  The third sentence is based on United States v.  Carson, 
supra. 
(3) Escape from  custody. 
(a) Custody. This subparagraph is taken from paragraph 174d 
of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  As to the distinction between escape from 
custody and escape from confinement, see  United States v. Ellsey, 
16  U.S.C.M.A. 455,37 C.M.R. 75 (1966).  But see UnitedStates v. 
Felty, 12 M.J. 438 (C.M.A. 1982). 
(b) Authority to apprehend. See Analysis, paragraph 19c(l)(b). 
(c) Escape. This cross-reference is based on paragraph 174c of 
MCM, 1969 (rev.). APP. 21, n c.(d)  APPENDIX 21 
(d) Illegal custody. The first sentence in this subparagraph is 
based on paragraph 174b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The second sen- 
tence has been added  to clarify that legality of custody (e.g., 
whether based on probable cause) is not in issue until raised by 
the defense. See  Analysis, paragraphs  19b and 19c(l)(e). The 
third sentence is based on United States v.  Carson, supra. 
(4) Escape from  confinement. 
(a)  Confinement. See Article 9(a). See also Analysis, R.C.M. 
305; R.C.M. 1101; and paragraph 5c, Part v. 
1991 Amendment: Subparagraph c(4)(a) was amended to spec- 
ify that escape from post-trial confinement is subject to increased 
punishment. 
(b) Authority to order confinement. See  Analysis, R.C.M. 
304(b); R.C.M. 1101; and paragraph 2, Part V. 
(c)  Escape. This subparagraph is based on paragraph  174c of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. Maslanich, 13 M.J. 
61 1 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982). 
(d) Status when temporarily outside confinement facility.  This 
subparagraph is based  on  United States v.  Silk, 37 C.M.R.  523 
(A.B.r. 1966); United States v. Sines, 34 C.M.R. 716 (N.B.R. 
1964). 
(e)  Legality of confinement. This subparagraph is based  on 
174a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The second sentence has been added 
to clarify that legality of confinement (e.g., whether based on 
probable cause or otherwise in accordance with requirements for 
legal sufficiency) is not in  issue until raised by the defense. See 
Analysis, paragraphs 19b and  19c(l)(e). The third sentence is 
based on United States v. Carson, supra. 
1991 Amendment: Subparagraphs e and f  were amended to 
provide increased punishment for escape from post-trial confine- 
ment. The increased punishment reflects the seriousness of the of- 
fense and is consistent with other federal law. See  18 U.S.C. 
751(a). 
20.  Article 96-  Releasing prisoner without proper 
authority 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based  on paragraph  175 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v. Johnpier, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 90, 
30 C.M.R. 90 91961). Subparagraphs (l)(c) and (d) have been 
modified to conform to rules elsewhere in  this Manual and re- 
stated for clarity. 
21.  Article 97-  Unlawful detention 
c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph  176 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v. Johnson, 3 M.J. 361 (C.M.A. 
1977). The explanation of the scope of Article 97 is new and re- 
sults from Johnson and the legislative history of Article 97 cited 
therein. Id. at 363 n.6. 
22.  Article 98-  Noncompliance  with procedural 
rules 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is taken from paragraph  177 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
e.  Maximum punishment. The maximum punishment  for inten- 
tional failure to enforce or comply with provisions of the Code 
has been  increased from that specified  in  paragraph 127c of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.) to more accurately reflect the seriousness of 
this offense. See generally 18 U.S.C. $1505, the second paragraph 
of which prohibits acts analogous to those prohibited  in Article 
98(2). 
23.  Article 99-  Misbehavior before the enemy 
c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraphs  178 and 
183a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States  v. Sperland,  1 
U.S.C.M.A. 661, 5 C.M.R. 89 (1952) (discussion of "before or in 
the presence of  the enemy");  United States  v. Parker,  3 
U.S.C.M.A. 541, 13 C.M.R. 97 (1953) (discussion of "running 
away");  United States  v. Monday, 36 C.M.R. 71 1 (A.B.R. 1966), 
pet.  denied, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 659, 37 C.M.R. 471 (1966) (discus- 
sion of "the  enemy")  (see also United States v. Anderson,  17 
U.S.C.M.A. 588, 38 C.M.R. 386 (2968)); United States v. Yarbor- 
ough, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 678, 5 C.M.R. 106 (1952) (discussion of 
"fear");  United States v. Presley,  18 U.S.C.M.A. 474, 40 C.M.R. 
186 (1969);  United States v. King, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 17 C.M.R. 2 
(1954) (discussion of illness as a defense to a charge of cowardice); 
United States v.  Terry, 36 C.M.R. 756 (N.B.R. 1965), afd  16 
U.S.C.M.A.  192, 36 C.M.R. 348 (1966) (discussion  of "false 
alarm");  United States v. Payne, 40 C.M.R. 516 (A.B.R. 1969); 
pet. denied, 18 U.S.C.M.R. 327 (1969) (discussion of failure to do 
utmost). 
24.  Article 100-  Subordinate compelling 
surrender 
c.  Explanation.  This paragraph is taken from paragraph  179 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
25.  Article 101-  Improper use of countersign 
c.  Explanation.  This paragraph is based on paragraph  180 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
26.  Article 102-  Forcing a safeguard 
c.  Explanation.  This paragraph is taken from paragraph  181 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Note that a "time of war" need not exist for 
the commission of this offense. See Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before 
a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 
1st Sess.  1229 (1949). See  also  United States v. Anderson,  17 
U.S.C.M.A. 588, 38 C.M.R. 386 (1968) (concerning a state of bel- 
ligerency short of formal war). 
27.  Article 103-  Captured or abandoned property 
c.  Explanation.  This paragraph is taken from paragraph  182 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
e.  Maximum punishment. The maximum punishments based on 
value have been revised. Instead of three levels ($50 or less, $50 to 
$100, and over $loo), only two are used. This is simpler and con- 
forms more closely to the division between  felony and misde- 
meanor penalties contingent on value in property offenses in civil- 
ian jurisdictions. 
28.  Article 104-  Aiding the enemy 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based  on paragraph  183 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. Olson, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 
460, 22 C.M.R. 250 (1957);  United States  v. Batchelor, 7 
U.S.C.M.A. 354, 22 C.M.R. 144 (1956); United States v. Dicken- 
son, 6U.S.C.M.A. 438,20C.M.R. 154(1955). ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. e. 
29.  Article 10s  Misconduct as a prisoner 
c.  Explanation.  This paragraph is based on paragraph  184 of 
MCM,  1969 (Rev.). See  also  United States v.  Batchelor, 7 
U.S.C.M.A. 354, 22 C.M.R. 144 (1956); United States v. Dicken- 
son, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 438,20 C.M.R. 154(1955). 
30.  Article 106-  Spies 
c.  Explanation.  This paragraph is taken from paragraph  185 of 
MCM,  1969 (Rev.). See generally  W. Winthrop, Military Law 
and Precedents 766771 (2d ed. 1920 reprint). Subparagraphs (4) 
and (6)(b) are also based on Annex to Hague Convention No. IV, 
Respecting the law and customs of war on land, Oct. 18, 1907, 
Arts. XXIX and XXXI, 36 Stat. 2303, T.S. No. 539, at 33. 
30a.  Article 106a-  Espionage 
Article 106a was added to the UCMJ in the Department of De- 
fense Authorization Act, 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-145,  9534, 99 Stat. 
583, 63435  (1985). 
c.  Explanation. The explanation is based upon H.R. Rep. No. 
235,99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), containing the statement of con- 
ferees with respect to the legislation establishing Article 106a. See 
also 1985 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 472,577-79. 
31.  Article 107-  False official statements 
c.  Explanation. (1) Oficial documents and statements. This sub- 
paragraph is based on paragraph  186 of  MCM,  1969 (Rev.); 
United States  v. Cummings, 3 M.J. 246 (C.M.A. 1977). See also 
United States  v.  Collier, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 713, 48 C.M.R. 789 
(1974) regarding voluntary false statement to military police). 
(2)  Status of victim. The first sentence of this subparagraph is 
based on United States v. Cummings, supra. The second sentence 
is based on United States v. Ragins, 11 M.J. 42 (C.M.A. 1981). 
(3)  Intent to deceive. This subparagraph is based on paragraph 
186 of  MCM,  1969 (Rev.);  ~n\ted States v. Hutchins, 5 
U.S.C.M.A. 422, 18 C.M.R. 46(1955). 
4)  Material gain. This subparagraph is based on parzgraph 186 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(5)  Knowledge that the document or statement was false.  This 
subparagraph is based on the language of Article 107 and on 
United States  v.  Acosta,  19 U.S.C.M.A.  341, 41 C.M.R. 341 
(1970), and clarifies-  as paragraph  186 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), 
did not-  that actual knowledge of the falsity is necessary. See 
also United States v. De Wayne, 7 M.J. 755 (A.C.M.R. 1979); 
United States v.  Wright, 34 C.M.R. 518 (A.B.R. 1963); United 
States v. Hughes, 19 C.M.R. 631 (A.F.B.R. 1955). 
(6)  Statements  made during an interrogation. This subpara- 
graph is based on paragraph  186 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United 
States v. Davenport, 9 M.J. 364 (C.M.A. 1980); United States  v. 
Washington, 9 U.S.C.M.A.  131, 25 C.M.R. 393 (1958);  United 
States v. Aronson, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 525, 25 C.M.R. 29 (1957). 
d. Maximum punishment. The maximum penalty for all offenses 
under Article 107 has been increased to include confinement for 5 
years to correspond to 18 U.S.C. 9 1001, the Federal civilian coun- 
terpart of  Article  107. See  United States v. DeAngelo,  15 
U.S.C.M.A. 423, 35 C.M.R. 395 (1965). 
32.  Article 108-  Military property of the United 
States- sale, loss, damage, destruction, Or 
wrongful disposition 
c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph  187 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See  also  United States  v. Bernacki,  13 
U.S.C.M.A. 641, 33 C.M.R. 173 (1963); United States v. Harvey, 
6 M.J. 545 (N.C.M.R. 1978); United States v. Geisler, 37 C.M.R. 
530 (A.B.R.  1966). The last sentence in subparagraph (c)(l)  is 
based on United States v. Schelin, 15 M.J. 218 (C.M.A. 1983). 
1986 Amendment: Subparagraph c(1) was amended to correct 
an ambiguity in the definition of military property. The previous 
language "military  department"  is specifically defined in  10 
U.S.C. 101(7) as consisting of the Department of the Army, Navy 
and Air Force. Article 1(8), UCMJ, however, defines "military"  . . 
when used in the Code as referring to all the armed forces. Use of 
the term "military department" inadvertently excluded property 
owned or used by the Coast Guard. The subparagraph has been 
changed to return to the state of the law prior to 1984, as includ- 
ing the property of all the armed forces. See United States v. Gei- 
sler, 37 C.M.R. 530 (A.B.R. 1966); United States v. Schelin,  15 
M.J. 218, 220n.6 (C.M.A. 1983). 
d. Lesser included offense. See  United States  v. Mizner, 49 
C.M.R.  26(A.C.M.R. 1974). 
1986 Amendment: Subparagraph d(1) was amended to include 
a lesser included offense previously omitted. See  United States v. 
Rivers, 3 C.M.R. 564(A.F.B.R. 1952)and 18 U.S.C. 641. Subpar- 
agraphs d(2) and (4) were amended to include lesser included of- 
fenses recognizing that destruction and damage of property 
which is not proved to be military may be a violation of Article 
109.See United States v. Suthers, 22 C.M.R. 787 (A.F.B.R. 1956). 
e.  Maximum punishment. The maximum punishments have been 
revised. Instead of three levels ($50 or less, $50 to $100, and over 
$100) only two are used. This is simpler and conforms more 
closely to the division between felony and misdemeanor penalties 
contingent on value in property offenses in civilian jurisdictions. 
The punishments are based on 18 U.S.C. 9 1361. The maximum 
punishment for selling or wrongfully disposing of a firearm or ex- 
plosive and for willfully damaging, destroying, or losing such 
property or suffering it to be lost, damaged, destroyed, sold, or 
wrongfully disposed of includes 10 years confinement regardless 
of the value of the item. The harm to the military in such cases is 
not simply the intrinsic value of the item. Because of their nature, 
special accountability and protective measures are employed to 
protect firearms or explosives against loss, damage, destruction, 
sale, and wrongful disposition. Such property may be a target of 
theft or other offenses without regard to its value. Therefore, to 
protect the Government's  special interest in such property, and 
the community against improper disposition, such property is 
treated the same as property of a higher value. 
33.  Article 109-  Property other than military 
property of the United States-  waste, spoilage, 
or destruction 
c. Explanation.  This paragraph is based on paragraph  188 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See  also  United States v. Bernacki, 13 
U.S.C.M.A.641,33 C.M.R. 173 (1963). 
e.  Maximum punishment. The maximum punishments have been 
revised. Instead of three levels ($50 or less, $50 to $100, and over DIX 21 
$loo), only two are used. This is simpler and conforms more 
closely to the division between felony and misdemeanor penalties 
contingent on value in property offenses in civilian jurisdictions. 
f.  Sample specification. See  United States  v.  Collins, 16 
U.S.C.M.A. 167, 36 C.M.R. 323 (1966), concerning charging 
damage to different articles belonging to different owners, which 
occurred during a single transaction, as one offense. 
34.  Article 110-  Improper hazarding of vessel 
c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph  189 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. Adams, 42 C.M.R. 
91 1 (N.C.M.R. 1970), pet.  denied, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 628 (1970); 
United States v.  MacLane. 32 C.M.R. 732 (C.G.B.R.  1962); 
United States v. Day, 23 C.M.R. 651 (N.B.R. 1957). 
35.  Article 11  1-  Drunken or reckless driving 
b.  Elements. The aggravating element of injury is listed as sug- 
gested by sample specification number 75 and the Table of Maxi- 
mum Punishments at 25-13  and A6-13  of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
The wording leaves it possible to plead and prove that the accused 
was injured as a result of the accused's drunken driving and so 
make available the higher maximum punishment. This result rec- 
ognizes the interest of society in the accused's resulting unavaila- 
bility or impairment for duty and the costs of medical treatment. 
Paragraph 190 (Proof, (c)) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) used "victim," 
the ambiguity of which might have implied that injury to the ac- 
cused would not aggravate the maximum punishment. Analysis of 
Contents, Manual for  Courts-Martial, United States,  1969 (Re- 
vised Edition) DA  PAM 27-2,  at 28-10,  does not suggest that the 
drafters intended such a result. 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is taken from paragraph  190 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. Bull, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 
635, 14 C.M.R. 53 (1954) (drunkenness);  United States v. Eagle- 
son, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 685, 14 C.M.R. 103 (1954) (reckless);  United 
States v. Grossman, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 406, 9 C.M.R. 36 (1953) (sepa- 
rate offenses). 
1991 Amendment: The order of the last and penultimate 
phrases was reversed to clarify that "so as to cause the particular 
vehicle to move" modifies only "the manipulation of its controls" 
and not the "setting of its motive power in action".  This change 
makes clear that merely starting the engine, without movement of 
the vehicle, is included within the definition of "operating". 
e.  Maximum Punishment. The maximum authorized confine- 
ment for drunk driving resulting in injury was increased from  1 
year to 18 months. This increase reflects the same concern for the 
seriousness of the misconduct as that which  has, by  current re- 
ports, motivated almost half the states to provide more stringent 
responses. 
1986 Amendment: Subparagraphs b(2),  c(3), and f were 
amended to implement the amendment to Article 11 1 contained 
in the ~nti-~r;~  Abuse Act of  1986, tit. 111, 8 3055, Pub.L. No. 
99-570,  Stat. 
(1986), enacted 27 October 1986, proscrib- 
ing driving while impaired by a substance described in Article 
112a(b). This amendment codifies prior interpretation of the 
scope of Article 11 1, as previously  implemented in paragraph 
35c(3). 
36.  Article 112-  Drunk on duty 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based  on paragraph  191 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The  discussion of defenses is based on United 
States v. Gossett, 14 U.S.C.M.A.  305, 34 C.M.R. 85 (1963); 
United States v. Burroughs, 37 C.M.R. 775 (C.G.B.R. 1966). 
37.  Article 112a-  Wrongful use, possession,  etc., 
of controlled substances 
Introduction. This paragraph is based on Article 112a (see Mili-
tary Justice Act of 1983, Pub.L. No. 98-209,  8 8, 97 Stat. 1393 
(1983)), and on paragraphs 127 and 213, and Appendix 6c of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.), as amended by  Exec. Order No. 12383 (Sep. 
23,  1982). Paragraphs 127 and 213 and Appendix 6c of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.) are consistent with Article 112a. See S.Rep. No. 53, 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1983). 
The only changes made by Article 112a in the former Manual 
paragraphs are: elimination of the third element under Article 
134; substitution of barbituric acid for phenobarbital  and 
secobarbital (these are still specifically listed in subparagraph c), 
and inclusion of importation and exportation of controlled sub- 
stances. The definition of "customs territory of the United States" 
is based on 21 U.S.C. 5  951(a)(2) and on general headnote 2 to the 
Tariff Schedules of the United States. See 21 U.S.C.  8 1202. See 
also H.R.Rep. No. 91-1444,  91st Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1970). The 
maximum punishments for importing or exporting a controlled 
substance are based generally on 21 U.S.C.  5 960. See also 21 
U.S.C. $8 951-53. 
The definition of "missile  launch facility"  has been added to 
clarify that the term includes not only the actual situs of the mis- 
sile, but those places directly integral to the launch of the missile. 
The following is an analysis of Exec. Order No. 12383 (Sep. 23, 
1982): 
Section  1 (now subparagraph e) amends paragraph  127c, Sec- 
tion A of the MCM, 1969 (Rev.). This amendment of the Table of 
Maximum Punishments provides a completely revised system of 
punishments for contraband drug offenses under Article 134. The 
punishments under 21 U.S.C.  $8 841 and 844 were used as a 
benchmark for punishments in  this paragraph. Thus, the maxi- 
mum penalty for distribution or possession with intent to dis- 
tribute certain Schedule I substances under 21 U.S.C. 8 841-15 
years imprisonment-  is the same as the highest maximum pun- 
ishment under paragraph 127c (except when the escalator clause 
is triggered, see analysis of section 2 infra.) 
Within the range under the 15 year maximum, the penalties 
under paragraph  127c are generally somewhat more severe than 
those under 21 U.S.C. $8 841 and 844. This is because in the mili- 
tary any drug offense is serious because of high potential for ad- 
versely affecting readiness and mission  performance.  See gener- 
ally Schlesinger  v.  Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 760 n.34 (1975); 
United States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1980). The availabil- 
ity of contraband drugs, especially in some overseas locations, the 
ambivalence toward and even acceptance of drug usage in some 
segments of society, especially among young people, and the in- 
sidious nature of drug offenses all require that deterrence play a 
substantial part in  the effort  to prevent drug abuse by  ser-
vicemembers. 
The following sentence enhancement provisions in the United 
States Code were not adopted: (1) the recidivism provisions in 21 
U.S.C. $8 841(b), 844(a), and 845(b), which either double or ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. (7) 
triple the otherwise prescribed  maximum penalty; and (2) the 
provision in 21 U.S.C. 5 845(a) which doubles the maximum pen- 
alty for distribution of a controlled substance to a person under 
the age of 21. (The latter provision would probably apply to a 
high percentage of distribution offenses in the armed forces, given 
the high proportion  of persons in this age group in the armed 
forces.) These special provisions were not adopted in favor of a 
simpler, more uniform punishment  system. The overall result is 
an absence of the higher punishment extremes of the Federal sys- 
tem, while some of the offenses treated more leniently in the lower 
end of the scale in the Federal system are subject to potentially 
higher punishments  in the military, for the reasons stated in the 
preceding  paragraph.  There are no mandatory minimum 
sentences for any drug offense. See Article 56. 
The expungement procedure in 21 U.S.C. 5 844(b) and (c) is 
unnecessary and inappropriate for military practice. Alternatives 
to prosecution for drug offenses already exist. See, e.g., Article 15. 
The use of such alternatives is properly a command prerogative. 
Section 2 (now the last paragraph  of subparagraph e) amends 
paragraph  127c Section B by adding an escalator clause to pro- 
vide for certain special situations, unique to the military, in which 
drug involvement presents an even greater danger than normal. 
See 37 U.S.C. 5 310 concerning hostile fire pay zones. 
Section 3 (now subparagraphs b and c) amends paragraph 213, 
dealing with certain offenses under Article  134. Paragraph 213g 
replaces the discussion of offenses involving some contraband 
drugs which was found in the last paragraph of paragraph 213b of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). It was considered necessary to treat drug of- 
fenses more extensively in the Manual for Court-Martial because 
of the significant incidence of drug offenses in the military and be- 
cause of the serious effect such offenses have in the military envi- 
ronment. It was also necessary to provide a comprehensive treat- 
ment of drugs, with a complete set of maximum punishments, in 
order to eliminate the confusion, disruption, and disparate treat- 
ment of some drug offenses among the services in the wake of 
United States v.  Courtney, 1 M.J. 438 (C.M.A.  1976); United 
States v. Jackson, 3 M.J. 101 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. 
Hoesing, 5 M.J. 355 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v. Guilbault, 6 
M.J. 20 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v. Thurman, 7 M.J. 26 
(C.M.A. 1979). (1) Controlled substance. The list of drugs specifi- 
cally punishable under Article 134 has been expanded to cover 
the substances which are, according to studies, most prevalent in 
the military community. See, e.g., M. Burt, et al. Highlights from 
the Worldwide Survey of Nonmedical Drug  Use and Alcohol  Use 
Among Military Personnel: 1980. In addition, the controlled sub- 
stances which are listed in Schedules I through V of the Compre- 
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of  1970 (codi- 
fied at 21 U.S.C. 5 801 et seq.) as amended are incorporated. The 
most commonly abused drugs are listed separately so that it will 
be unnecessary to refer to the controlled substances list, as modi- 
fied by  the Attorney General in the Code of Federal Regulations, 
in most cases. Most commanders and some legal offices do not 
have ready access to such authorities. 
(2)  Possers. The definition of possession is based  upon  United 
States v. Aloyian, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 333, 36 C.M.R. 489 (1966) and 
paragraph 4-144,  Military Judges' Benchbook, DA PAM 27-9 
(May 1982). See also United States v.  Wilson, 7 M.J. 290 (C.M.A. 
1979) and cases cited therein concerning the concept of construc- 
tive possession. With respect to the inferences described in this 
subparagraph and subparagraph (5)  Wrongfulness, see  United 
States v. Alvarez,  10 U.S.C.M.A. 24, 27 C.M.R. 98 (1958); United 
States v. Nabors, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 27, 27 C.M.R. 101 (1958). It is 
important to bear in mind that distinction between inferences and 
presumptions.  See  United States v. Mahan, 1 M.J. 303 (C.M.R. 
1976). See also  United States v. Baylor,  16 U.S.C.M.A. 502, 37 
C.M.R. 122 (1967). 
(3)  Distribute. This subparagraph is based on 21 U.S.C. 5 802(8) 
and (1 1). See alsoE. Devitt and C. Blackmar, 2 Federal Jury Prac- 
tice and Instructions, 5 58.03 (3d ed. 1977). 
"Distribution"  replaces "sale"  and"transfer."  This conforms 
with Federal practice, see 21 U.S.C. 5 841(a), and will simplify 
military practice by reducing pleading, proof, and associated mul- 
tiplicity problems in drug offenses. See, e.&, United States v. Long, 
7 M.J. 342 (C.M.A.  1979); United States  v.  Maginley, 13 
U.S.C.M.A. 445, 32 C.M.R. 445 (1963). Evidence of sale is not 
necessary to prove the offense of distributing a controlled sub- 
stance. See  United States v. Snow, 537 F.2d 1166 (4th Cir. 1976); 
United States v. Johnson, 481 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1973). Thus! the 
defense of "agency"  see United States v. Fruscella, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 
26, 44 C.M.R. 80 (1971), no longer applies in the military.  Cf: 
United States v. Snow, supra; United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.2d 
1241 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Johnson, supra ("procuring 
agent" defense abolished under 21 U.S.C. 5 801 et seq.). Evidence 
of sale is admissible, of course, on the merits as "part and parcel" 
of the criminal transaction (see United States v. Stokes, 12 M.J. 
229 (C.M.A.  1982); cf:  United States v. Johnson, supra; see also 
Mil.R.Evid.  404(b)), or in aggravation  (see paragraph 75b(4) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.); see also United States v. Vickers, 13 M.J. 403 
(C.M.A. 1982)). 
(4)  Manufacture. This definition is taken from 21 U.S.C. 
5 802(14). The exception in 21 U.S.C. 5 802(14) is covered in sub- 
paragraph (5). 
(5)  Wrongfulness. This subparagraph is based on the last para- 
graph of paragraph 213b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  Cf: 21 U.S.C. 
5 822(c). See also United States v.  West, 15 U.S.C.M.A.  3, 34 
C.M.R. 449 (1964); paragraphs 4-144  and 145, Military Judges' 
Benchbook, DA  PAM 27-9  (May 1982). It is not intended to per- 
petuate the holding in United States v. Rowe, 11 M.J. 11 (C.M.A. 
1981). 
(6)  Intent  to distribute. This subparagraph parallels Federal law 
which allows for increased punishment for drug offenses with an 
intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(l). The discussion of cir- 
cumstances from which an inference of intent to distribute may be 
inferred is based  on numerous Federal cases. See,  e.g., United 
States v. Grayson, 625 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Hill, 589 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir.  1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 
(1979); United States v. Ramirez-Rodriquez, 552 F.2d 883 (9th 
Cir. 1977); United States v. Blake, 484 F.2d  50 (8th Cir. 1973); 
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 949 (1974). Cf: United States v. Mather, 465 
F.2d 1035 (5th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972). Pos- 
session of a large amount of drugs may permit an inference but 
does not create a presumption of intent to distribute. See  Turner 
v.  United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970);  United States v. Mahan,  1 
M.J. 303 (C.M.A. 1976). 
(7)  Certain amount. This subparagraph is based on United States 
v. Alvarez, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 24, 27 C.M.R. 98 (1958); United States 
v. Brown, 45 C.M.R. 416 (A.C.M.R.  1972); United States  v. APP. 21, y(7) 	 APPENDIX 21 
Burns, 37 C.M.R. 942 (A.F.B.R. 1967); United States v.  Owens, 
36 C.M.R. 909 (A.B.R. 1966). 
1993 Ameydment. Paragraph c was amended by  adding new 
paragraphs (10) and (1 1). Subparagraph (10) defines the term 
"use"  and delineates knowledge of the presence of the controlled 
substance as a required component of the offense. See  United 
States v.  Mance, 26 M.J. 244 (C.M.A. 1988). The validity of a per-  .  -
missive inference of knowledge is recognized. See United States v. 
Ford, 23 M.J. 331 (C.M.A. 1987); United States v. Harper, 22 
M.J. 157 (C.M.A. 1986). Subparagraph (1 1) precludes an accused 
from relying upon lack of actual knowledge when such accused 
has purposefully avoided knowledge of the presence or identity of 
controlled substances. See United States v. Mance, supra, (Cox, J., 
concurring). When an accused delibererately avoids knowing the 
truth concerning a crucial fact (i.e. presence or identity) and there 
is a high probability that the crucial fact does exist, the accused is 
held accountable to the same extent as one who has actual knowl- 
edge. See  United States v. Newman, 14 M.J. 474 (C.M.A. 1983). 
Subsection (1 1) follows federal authority which equates actual 
knowledge with deliberate ignorance. See  United States  v.  Ram-
sey, 785 F.2d  184 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S.  1186 
(1986). 
Section 4 (now subparagraph f) amends Appendix 6c. The new 
sample specifications are based  on sample specifications 144 
through  146 found in appendix 6c of the MCM, 1969 (Rev.), as 
modified to reflect the new comprehensive drug offense provision. 
Section 5 provides an effective date for the new amendments. 
Section 6 requires the Secretary of Defense to transmit these 
amendments to Congress 
38.  Article 113-  Misbehavior of sentinel or 
lookout 
c.  Explanation. Subparagraphs (I), (2), and (3) are based on par- 
agraph 192 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subparagraph (4) is based on 
United States v.  Seeser, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 472, 18 C.M.R. 96 (1955); 
paragraph  192 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.); paragraph  174 of MCM 
(Army), 1949; paragraph 174 of MCM (AF), 1949. Subparagraph 
(6) is based on United States v.  Williams, 4 U.S.C.M.A.  69, 15 
C.M.R. 69 (1954);  United States v.  Cook, 31 C.M.R. 550 
(A.F.B.R. 1961). See also  United States v.  Getman, 2 M.J. 279 
(A.F.C.M.R. 1976). 
39.  Article 114-  Duelling 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph  193 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The explanation of conniving at fighting a 
duel was modified to reflect the requirement for actual knowledge 
and to more correctly reflect the term connive. 
f.  Sample specification. The sample specification for conniving at 
fighting a duel was redrafted to more accurately reflect the nature 
of the offense. 
40.  Article 115-  Malingering 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph  194 of 
MCM,  1969 (Rev.). See  also  United States  v.  Kisner,  15 
U.S.C.M.A.  153, 35 C.M.R.  125 (1964);  United States v. 
Mamaluy, 10 U.S.C.M.A.  102, 27 C.M.R. 176 (1959);  United 
States v.  Kersten, 4 M.J. 657 (A.C.M.R. 1977). 
d. Lesser included offenses. See  United States  v.  Taylor, 17 
U.S.C.M.A. 595,38 C.M.R. 393 (1968). 
e.  Maximum punishment. The maximum  punishments were 
changed to reflect the greater seriousness of malingering in war or 
other combat situations and to add a greater measure of  deter- 
rence in such cases. 
41.  Article 116-  Riot or breach of peace 
c.  Explanation.  This paragraph is based on paragraph 195 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and  United States v. Metcalf, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 
153, 36 C.M.R. 309 (1966). The reference to "use of vile or abu- 
sive words to another in a public place" contained in paragraph 
195b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) has been replaced by  the language 
contained in the fourth sentence of subparagraph (2) since the for- 
mer language was subject to an overly broad application. See 
Gooding v.  Wilson,405 U.S. 518 (1972). 
f.  Sample specifications. Riot-see  United States v.  Randolf, 49 
C.M.R. 336 (N.C.M.R.  1974); United States v. Brice, 48 C.M.R. 
368 (N.C.M.R. 1973). 
42.  Article 117-  Provoking speeches or gestures 
c.  Explanation. subparagraph (1) is based on paragraph 196 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.); United States v.  Thompson, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 
88, 46 C.M.R. 88 (1972). See generally  Gooding v.  Wilson, 405 
U.S.  518 (1972);  United States v.  Hughens,  14 C.M.R.  509 
(N.B.R. 1954). Subparagraph (2) is based on the language of Arti- 
cle 117 and  United States v.  Bowden, 24 C.M.R. 540 (A.F.B.R. 
1957),pet. denied, 24 C.M.R. 31 1 (1957). See also United States v. 
Lacy, 10U.S.C.M.A. 164,27 C.M.R. 238 (1959). 
1986 Amendment: The listing of "Article  134-  indecent lan- 
guage" as a lesser included offense of provoking speeches was de- 
leted. United States v. Linyear, 3 M.J.  1027 (N.M.C.M.R.  1977), 
held that provoking speeches is actually a lesser included offense 
of indecent language. Also, indecent language carries a greater 
maximum punishment than provoking speeches, which would be 
unusual for a lesser offense. 
e.  Maximum punishment.  The maximum punishment was in- 
creased from that set forth in paragraph  127c of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.) to more accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense. 
43.  Article 118-  Murder 
b.  Elements. Element (b) in (3), Act  inherently dangerous to 
others, has been modified based on  United States v.  Hartley, 16 
U.S.C.M.A. 249, 36 C.M.R. 405 (1966). 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 197 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subparagraphs c(2)(b) is based on United 
States v. Sechler, 3 U.S.C.M.A.  363, 12 C.M.R. 119 (1953). As to 
subparagraph (c)(4)(A), see  United States v.  Vandenack, 15 M.J. 
428 (C.M.A.  1983). Subparagraph c(4)(b) is based on  United 
States v.  Stokes, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 65, 19 C.M.R.  191 (1955). 
d. Lesser included offenses. As to Article 1 18(3),see United States 
v. 	Roa, 12 M.J. 210(C.M.A. 1982). 
1993 Amendment. The listed lesser included offenses of murder 
under Article 118(3) were changed to conform to the rationale of 
United States v.  Roa, 12 M.J. 210 (C.M.A. 1982). Inasmuch as 
Article 118(3) does not require specific intent, attempted murder, 
voluntary manslaughter, assault with intent to murder and as- ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. c. 
sault with intent to commit voluntary manslaughter are not lesser  contingent on value in property offenses in civilian jurisdictions. 
included offenses of murder under Article 118(3).  The maximum punishment for larceny or wrongful appropriation 
of a firearm or explosive includes 5 or 2 years' confinement re- 
44.  Article 1  IS--  Manslaughter 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph  is based on paragraph 198 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. Moglia, 3 M.J. 216 
(C.M.A. 1977); United States v.  Harrison, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 484,37 
C.M.R. 104 (1967); United States v.  Redding, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 242, 
34 C.M.R. 22 (1963); United States v. Fox, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 465, 9 
C.M.R. 95 (1953). 
45.  Article 12&  Rape and carnal knowledge 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph  199 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The third paragraph of paragraph  199(a)  was 
deleted as unnecessary. The third paragraph of paragraph  199(b) 
was deleted based on the preemption doctrine. See  United States 
v.  Wright, 5 M.J.  106 (C.M.A.  1978); United States v. Norris,  2 
U.S.C.M.A.  236, 8 C.M.R. 36 (1953). Cf: Williams v.  United 
States, 327 U.S. 71 1 (1946) (scope of preemption doctrine). The 
Military Rules of Evidence deleted the requirement for corrobo- 
ration of the victim's testimony in rape and similar cases under 
former paragraph 153a of MCM, 1969. See Analysis, Mil.R.Evid. 
412. 
d.  Lesser included offenses. Carnal knowledge was deleted as a 
lesser included offense of rape in view of the separate elements in 
each offense. Both should be separately pleaded in a proper case. 
Seegenerally UnitedStates  v. Smith, 7 M.J. 842 (A.C.M.R. 1979). 
1993Amendment. The amendment to para 45d(l) represents 
an administrative change to conform the Manual with case au- 
thority. Carnal knowledge is a lesser included offense of rape 
where the pleading alleges that the victim has not attained the age 
of  16 years. See  United States v.  Baker, 28 M.J. 900 (A.C.M.R. 
1989); United States v. Stratton, 12 M.J. 998 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982), 
pet. denied, 15 M.J. 107 (C.M.A.  1983); United States v. Smith, 7 
M.J. 842 (A.C.M.R. 1979). 
46.  Article 121-  Larceny and wrongful 
appropriation 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 200 of 
MCM,  1969 (Rev.). The discussion in  the fourth and fifth 
sentences of paragraph 200a(4) was deleted as ambiguous and 
overbroad. The penultimate sentence in subparagraph c(l)(d) ad- 
equately covers the point. C. Torcia, 2 Wharton's Criminal Law 
and Procedure $393 (1980); Hall  v.  United States, 277 Fed. 19 
(8th Cir. 1921). As to subparagraph c(l)(c) see also United States 
v. Leslie, 13 M.J. 170 (C.M.A. 1982). As to subparagraph c(l)(d) 
see also United States v. Smith, 14 M.J. 68 (C.M.A. 1982); United 
States v.  Cunningham, 14 M.J. 539 (A.C.M.R. 1981). As to sub- 
paragraph c(l)(f),  see also  United States v.  Kastner, 17 M.J.  11 
(C.M.A. 1983); United States v. Eggleton, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 504,47 
C.M.R. 920 (1973); United states v.  O'Hara, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 167, 
33 C.M.R. 379 (1963); United States v. Hayes, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 627, 
25 C.M.R. 131 (1958). As to subparagraph c(l)(h)(i) see also 
United States v. Malone, 14 M.J. 563 (N.M.C.M.R. 1982). 
e.  Maximum punishment. The maximum punishments have been 
revised. Instead of three levels ($50 or less, $50 to $100, and over 
$100) only two are used. This is simpler and conforms more 
closely to the division between felony and misdemeanor penalties 
spectively. This is because, regardless of the intrinsic value of 
such items, the threat to the community and disruption of mili- 
tary activities is substantial when  such items are wrongfully 
taken. Special accountability and protective measures are taken 
with firearms and explosives, and they may be the target of theft 
regardless of value. 
1986 Amendment: The maximum punishments for larceny 
were revised as they relate to larceny of military property to make 
them consistent with the punishments under Article 108 and par- 
agraph 32e, Part IV, MCM, 1984. Before this amendment, a per- 
son who stole military property faced less punishment than a per- 
son who willfully damaged, destroyed, or disposed of military 
property. The revised punishments are also consistent with  18 
U.S.C. 641. 
47.  Article 122-  Robbery 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph  is based on paragraph 201 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States  v.  Chambers, 12 M.J. 
443 (C.M.A. 1982); United States v.  Washington, 12 M.J. 1036 
(A.C.M.R.  1982),pet. denied, 14 M.J. 170 (1982). Subparagraph 
(5) is based on  United States v. Parker, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 545, 38 
C.M.R. 343 (1968). 
d. Lesser included offenses. See  United States  v. Calhoun, 5 
U.S.C.M.A. 428, 18 C.M.R. 52 (1955). 
e.  Maximum punishment. The aggravating factor of use of a fire- 
arm in the commission of a robbery, and a higher maximum pun- 
ishment in such cases, have been added because of the increased 
danger when robbery is committed with a firearm whether or not 
loaded or operable. C'  18 U.S.C. $521 13 and 21 14; United States 
v. Shelton, 465 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v.  Thomas, 
455 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1972); Baker v.  United States, 412 F.2d 
1069 (5th Cir. 1969). See also U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney Gen- 
eral's Task Force on Violent Crime, Final Report 29-33  (Aug. 17, 
1981). The 15-year maximum is the same as that for robbery 
under 18 U.S.C. 5 2111. 
48.  Article 123-  Forgery 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 202 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
49.  Article 123a-  Making, drawing, or uttering 
check, draft, or order without sufficient funds 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 202A of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The language in paragraph 202A using an il- 
legal transaction such as an illegal gambling game as an example 
of "for  any other purpose"  was eliminated in subparagraph (7), 
based on United States v. Wallace, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 650,36 C.M.R. 
148 (1966). The statutory inference found in Article 123a and ex- 
plained in subparagraph (17) was not meant to preempt the usual 
methods of proof of knowledge and intent. See S.Rep. No. 659, 
87th Cong.  1st Sess. 2 (1961). Subparagraph (18) is based on 
United States  v.  Callaghan, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 23 1, 34 C.M.R. 11 
(1963). See  also  United States  v.  Webb, 46 C.M.R.  1083 
(A.C.M.R. 1972). As to share drafts see also  United States  v. ~pp. 21, nc.  APPENDIX 21 
Palmer, 14 M.J. 731 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982); United States v. Grubbs, 
13 M.J. 594(A.F.C.M.R. 1982). 
e.  Maximum punishment. The maximum punishment for subsec- 
tion (1) has been revised. Instead of three levels ($50 or less, $50 
to $100, and over $100) only two are used. This is simpler and 
conforms more closely to the division between felony and misde- 
meanor penalties contingent on value in property offenses in civil- 
ian jurisdiction. 
f.  Sample specification. See also United States v. Palmer and 
United States v.Gnrbbs, both supra (pleading share drafts; plead- 
ing more than one check or draft). 
50.  Article 124-  Maiming 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 203 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Subparagraph c(3) is based on United States 
v. Hicks, 6 U.S.C.M.A.  621, 20 C.M.R. 337 (1956). The discus- 
sion of intent has been modified to reflect that some specific intent 
to injure is necessary.  United States v. Hicks, supra. The third sen- 
tence of the third paragraph of paragraph 203 of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.), which was based on Hicks (see Analysis of Contents, Man- 
ual for  Courts-martial, United States, 1969 (Revised edition), DA 
PAM 27-2  at 28-15),  was misleading in this regard. Contra 
United States v. Tua, 4 M.J. 761 (A.C.M.R.  1977), pet.  denied, 5 
M.J. 91 (1978). 
51.  Article 125-  Sodomy 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based  on paragraph 204 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Fellatio and cunnilingus are within the scope 
of Article 125. See  United States v. Harris, 8 M.J. 52 (C.M.A. 
1979); United States v. Scoby, 5 M.J.  160 (C.M.A.  1978). For a 
discussion of the possible constitutional limitations on the appli- 
cation of Article 125 (for example, the sexual activity of a married 
couple), see  United States v. Scoby, supra. 
e.  Maximum punishment. The maximum punishment for forci- 
ble sodomy was raised in recognition of the severity of the offense 
which is similar to rape in its violation of personal privacy and 
dignity. 
52.  Article 126-  Arson 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 205 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See  United States v. Acevedo-Velez, 17 M.J. 1 
(C.M.A.1983);  United States  v. Duke, 16 U.S.C.M.A.  460, 37 
C.M.R. 80 (1966);  United States v. Scott, 8 M.J. 853 (N.C.M.R. 
1980); United States v. Jones, 2 M.J. 785 (A.C.M.R. 1976). 
e.  Maximum punishment.  The maximum period of confinement 
for simple arson of property of a value of more than $100 has been 
reduced from 10 to 5 years. This parallels 18 U.S.C.  81. The  sep- 
arate punishment for simple arson of property of a value of $100 
or less has been retained because 18 U.S.C. Sec. 8  1 does not cover 
most personal property. 
53.  Article 127-  Extortion 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 206 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See  also  United States v. Schmidt, 16 
U.S.C.M.A.  57,36 C.M.R. 213 (1966); R. Perkins, Criminal Law 
373-74  (2d ed. 1969). Subparagraph (4) is based on United States 
v. McCollum, 13 M.J. 127 (C.M.A. 1982). 
54.  Article 128-  Assault 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 207 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. Vigil, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 
474,  13 C.M.R. 30 (1953) (aggravated assault);  United States v. 
Spearman, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 48 C.M.R. 405 (1974) (grievous 
bbdily harm). 
e.  Maximum  punishment. The  maximum punishment for (2) As- 
sault consummated by a battery has been increased because of the 
range of types of harm which may be caused by  a battery. These 
may include serious injury, even though unintended or not caused 
by a means or force likely to produce grievous bodily harm. The 
maximum punishment for (6) Assault upon a sentinel or lookout 
in the execution of duty, or  upon any person who, in the execution 
of office, is performing security police, military police, shore pa- 
trol, master at arms, or other military or civilian law enforcement 
duties, has been increased based on 18 U.S.C.  11 1 and 18 U.S.C. 
11 14. The maximum punishment for aggravated assaults com- 
mitted with firearms has been increased  based on 18 U.S.C. 
924(c). See also U.S. Dep't  of Justice, Attorney General's Task 
Forceon Violent Crime, Final Report 29-33  (Aug. 17, 1981). Note 
that the higher maximum for assault with a dangerous weapon 
when the weapon is a firearm applies even if the firearm is used as 
a bludgeon. This is because the danger injected is significantly 
greater when a loaded firearm is used, even as a bludgeon. 
In certain situations, this punishment scheme may have the ef- 
fect of making intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm a 
lesser included offense of assault with a dangerous weapon. For 
example, if in the course of an assault with a loaded firearm the 
accused or a coacter stabs the victim with a knife, the assault with 
a dangerous weapon (the firearm) would carry an 8 year maxi- 
mum penalty, as opposed to 5 years for the assault intentionally 
inflicting grievous bodily harm. In such a case, the specification 
should be carefully tailored to describe each facet of the assault. 
55.  Article 129-  Burglary 
c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 208 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States v. Klutz, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 
20, 25 C.M.R. 282 (1958). Subparagraph c(2) and (3) have been 
revised based on R. Perkins, Criminal Law 192-193  and 199 (2d 
ed. 1969). As to subparagraph c(2), see also 13 AM.Jur. 2d Bur-
glary § 18 (1964); Annot., 70 A.L.R. 3d 881 (1976). 
f.  Sample specification.  See  United States v. Knight, 15 M.J. 202 
(C.M.A. 1983). 
56.  Article 130-  Housebreaking 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 209 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and United States v. Gillin, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 669, 
25 C.M.R. 173 (1958).  See  also United States v. Breen,  15 
U.S.C.M.A. 658, 36 C.M.R. 156 (1966); United States v. Hall, 12 
U.S.C.M.A. 374, 30 C.M.R. 374 (1961);  United States v. Taylor, 
12 U.S.C.M.A.  44, 30  C.M.R. 44 (1960) (all regarding "struc- 
ture");  United States v.  Weaver, 18 U.S.C.M.A.  173, 39 C.M.R. 
173 (1969) ("separate  offense");  United States v.  Williams, 4 
U.S.C.M.A. 241, 15 C.M.R. 241 (1954) ("entry"). 
57.  Article 131-  Perjury 
c.  Explanation. Subparagraph (1) and (2) are based on paragraph 
210 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). In the last sentence of subparagraph ANALYSIS  App. 21,R.C.M. (I) 
(2)(a), the phrase"un1ess the witness was forced to answer over a 
valid claim of privilegeWwhich  appeared at the end of the fourth 
paragraph of paragraph 210 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) has been de- 
leted based on United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); 
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See also United States v. 
Armstrong, 9 M.J. 374 (C.M.A. 1980). Subparagraph (3) is new 
and is based on Public Law 94-550  of 1976 which amended Arti- 
cle 13 1  by adding a second clause based on section 1746 of title 28 
United States Code, which was also enacted as part of Pub.L. No. 
94-550. 
Text of section 1746 of title 28, United States Code 
5 1746. Unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury. 
Whenever, under any law of the United States or under any 
rule, regulation, order, or requirement made pursuant to law, any 
matter is required or permitted to be supported, evidenced, estab-  .  . 
lished, or proved by the sworn declaration, verification, certifi- 
cate, statement, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the person making 
the same (other than a deposition, or an oath of office, or an oath 
required to be taken before a specified official other than a notary 
public), such matter may, with like force and effect, be supported, 
evidenced, established, or proved by the unsworn declaration, 
certificate, verification, or statement, in  writing of such person 
which is subscribed by him, as true under penalty of perjury, and 
dated, in substantially the following form: 
(1)  If executed without the United States: "I  declare (or cer- 
tify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury under the laws of 
the United States of America that the foregoing is true and cor- 
rect. Executed on (date). 
(Signature)" 
(2)  If executed within the United States, its territories, posses- 
sions, or commonwealths: "I  declare (or certify, verify, or state) 
under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Executed on (date). 
(Signature)" 
If someone signs a statement under penalty of perjury outside a 
judicial proceeding or course ofjustice, and Article 107 (false offi- 
cial statement) is not applicable, it may be possible to use Article 
134 (clause  3) (see paragraph 60) to charge a violation of  18 
U.S.C. 5 1621. 
Text of section 1621 of title 18, United States Code 
5 1621. Perjury generally 
Whoever-
(1)  having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, 
or person, in any case in which a law of the United States autho- 
rizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, de- 
pose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, 
deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and 
contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material which he 
does not believe to be true; or 
(2)  in any declaration, certificate,  verification, or statement 
under penalty of perjury as permitted under section  1746 of title 
28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as true any material 
matter which he does not believe to be true; is guilty of perjury 
and shall, except or otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined 
not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both. This section is applicable whether the statement or sub- 
scription is made within or without the United States. 
d.  Lesser included offenses. 
1991 Amendment: Subparagraph d was amended by deleting 
false swearing as a lesser included offense of perjury. See  United 
States v. Smith, 26 C.M.R.  16 (C.M.A. 1958); MCM 1984, Part 
IV, para. 79c(l). Although closely related to perjury, the offense 
of false swearing may be charged separately. 
58.  Article 132-  Frauds against the United States 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based  on paragraph 21 1 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
e.  Maximum punishment. The  maximum punishments have been 
revised. Instead of three levels ($50 or less, $50 to $100, and over 
$100) only two are used. This is simpler and conforms more 
closely to the division between felony and misdemeanor penalties 
contingent on value in property offenses in civilian jurisdictions. 
59.  Article 133-  Conduct unbecoming an officer 
and gentleman 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based  on paragraph 212 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (con- 
stitutionality of Article 133). For a discussion of Article 133, see 
United States v.  Giordano, 15 U.S.C.M.A.  163, 35 C.M.R. 135 
(1964); Nelson, Conduct Expected of an Ojjicer and a Gentleman: 
Ambiguity, 12 A.F.JAG L.Rev. 124 (Spring 1970). As to subpara- 
graph (I), see  1 U.S.C.  5 1; Pub.L. No. 94-106,  5 803, 89 Stat. 
537-38  (Oct. 7, 1975). 
e.  Maximum punishment. A maximum punishment is estab- 
lished for the first time in order to provide guidance and uniform- 
ity for Article 133 offenses. 
f.  Sample specifications. Some sample specifications for Article 
133 in MCM, 1969 (Rev.) were deleted solely to economize on 
space. 
60.  Article 134-  General article 
Introduction.  Paragraph 60 introduces the General Article. 
Paragraph 61-1  13 describe and list the maximum punishments 
for many offenses under Article 134. These paragraphs are not ex- 
clusive. See generally Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); United 
States v. Sadinsky, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 563,34 C.M.R. 343 (1964). 
Except as otherwise noted in the Analyses of paragraphs 
61-1  13, the offenses listed below are based  on paragraph 127c 
(Table of Maximum Punishments),  paragraph 213f; and Appen- 
dix 6 (sample specifications  126-187)  of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Eight offenses previously listed (allowing prisoner to do unautho- 
rized acts, criminal libel, criminal nuisance, par01 violation, statu- 
tory perjury, transporting stolen vehicle in interstate commerce, 
unclean accoutrements, and unclean uniform) are not listed here 
because they occur so infrequently or because the gravamen of the 
misconduct is such that it is more appropriately charged under 
another provision. 
c.  Explanation. Except as noted below, this paragraph is based 
on paragraph 213a through e of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(1)  In general. See Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 
(1974); Parker v. Levy, supra (constitutionality of Article 134 up- 
held). 
(4)(c)(ii) Federal Assimilative Crimes Act. See  United States v. 
Wright, 5 M.J.  106 (C.M.A.  1978); United States v. Rowe,  13 
U.S.C.M.A. 302, 32 C.M.R. 302 (1962). APP. 219  !l(l)  APPENDIX 21 
(5)(a) Preemption doctrine. See United States v. McCormick, 12 
U.S.C.M.A. 26, 30 C.M.R. 26 (1960) (assault on child under 16); 
United States v.  Hallet, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 378, 15 C.M.R. 378 (1954) 
(misbehavior  before the enemy);  United States v.  Deller,  3 
U.S.C.M.A.409, 12 C.M.R. 165 (1953) (absence offenses); United 
States v.  Norris, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 236, 8 C.M.R. 36 (1953) (larceny). 
But see the following cases for examples of where offenses not pre- 
empted:  United States v.  Wright, supra (burglary of automobile); 
United States v.  Bonavita, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 407, 45 C.M.R. 181 
(1972) (concealing stolen property);  United States v.  Maze, 21 
U.S.C.M.A. 260,45 C.M.R. 34 (1972) (unlawfully altering public 
records); United States v.  Taylor, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 595, 38 C.M.R. 
393 (1968) (self-inflicted injury with no intent to avoid service; 
United States v.  Gaudet, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 672, 29 C.M.R. 488 
(1960) (stealing from mail); United States v.  Fuller, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 
143, 25 C.M.R. 405 (1958) (fraudulent burning);  United States v. 
Holt, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 617, 23 C.M.R. 81 (1957) (graft, fraudulent 
misrepresentation). 
(5)(b) Capital offense. See  United States v.  French, 10 
U.S.C.M.A.  171,27 C.M.R. 245 (1959). 
(6)(b) Specifications under clause 3. See  United States v.  Mayo, 
12 M.J. 286 (C.M.A. 1982); United States v.  Perry,  12 M.J. 112 
(C.M.A. 1981); United States v.  Rowe, supra;  United States v. 
Hogsett, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 681,25 C.M.R. 185 (1958). 
(6)(c) Specifications for  clause 1 or 2 offenses not listed. See 
United States v.  Sadinsky, supra;  United States v.  Mardis, 6 
U.S.C.M.A. 624,20 C.M.R. 340 (1956). 
61.  Article 134-  (Abusing a public animal) 
c.  Explanation. This new paragraph defines "public animal." 
62.  Article 134-  (Adultery) 
c. Explanation.  This paragraph is based on United States v. 
Ambalada, 1 M.J.  11  32 (N.C.M.R.), pet.  denied, 3 M.J. 164 
(1977). For a discussion of the offense of adultery, see  United 
States v.  Butler, 5 C.M.R. 213 (A.B.R. 1952). 
63.  Article 134-  (Assault- indecent) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 213fl2) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See  United States v.  Caillouette,  12 
U.S.C.M.A. 149, 30 C.M.R. 149 (1961) regarding specific intent. 
See also United States v.  Headspeth, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 635,  10 
C.M.R. 133 (1953). 
Gender-neutral language has been used in this paragraph, as 
well as throughout this Manual. This will eliminate any question 
about the intended scope of certain offenses, such as indecent as- 
sault such as may have been raised by  the use of the masculine 
pronoun in MCM, 1969 (Rev.). It is, however, consistent with the 
construction given to the former Manual. See, e.g.,  United States 
v. Respess, 7 M.J. 566 (A.C.M.R. 1979). See generally 1  U.S.C. 5 1 
("unless the context indicates otherwise . . . words importing the 
masculine gender include the feminine as well . . .."). 
d. Lesser included  offenses. See  United States v.  Thacker, 16 
U.S.C.M.A.408, 37 C.M.R. 28 (1966); United States v.  Jackson, 
31 C.M.R. 738 (A.F.B.R. 1962). 
64.  Article 134-  (Assault- with intent to commit 
murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, robbery, 
sodomy, arson, burglary, or housebreaking) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 213fll) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
65.  Article 134-  (Bigamy) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 213fl9) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also  United States v.  Pruitt, 17 
U.S.C.M.A. 438, 38 C.M.R. 236 (1968), concerning the defense 
of mistake. 
66. Article 134-  (Bribery and graft) 
c.  Explanation.  This paragraph is new and is based on  United 
States v.  Marshall,  18 U.S.C.M.A. 426, 40 C.M.R. 138 (1969); 
United States v.  Alexander, 3 U.S.C.M.A.  346, 12 C.M.R. 102 
(1953). See also United States v.  Eslow,  1 M.J. 620 (A.C.M.R. 
1975). - - '-,-
d. Lesser included offenses. Graft is listed as a lesser included of- 
fense of bribery. See  United States v.  Raborn, 575 F.2d 688 (9th 
Cir. 1978); United States v.  Crutchfield, 547 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
e.  Maximum  punishment. The maximum punishment for bribery 
has been revised to reflect  the greater seriousness of bribery, 
which requires a specific intent to influence. See also 18 U.S.C. 
g 201. 
61.  Article 134-  (Burning with intent to defraud) 
c. Explanation. This paragraph is new and is self-explanatory. 
For a discussion of  this offense see  United States v.  Fuller, 9 
U.S.C.M.A. 143,25 C.M.R. 405 (1958). 
68.  Article 134-  (Check, worthless, making and 
uttering- by dishonorably failing to maintain 
funds) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 213fl8) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also  United States v.  Groom, 12 
U.S.C.M.A. 11, 30C.M.R. 11 (1960). 
d. Lesser  included offense.  See United States v.  Downard,  6 
U.S.C.M.A. 538,20 C.M.R. 254 (1955). 
69.  Article 134-  (Cohabitation, wrongful) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is new and is based on United 
States v.  Acosta,  19 U.S.C.M.A. 341, 41 C.M.R.  341 (1970); 
United States v.  Melville, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 597, 25 C.M.R. 101 
(1958); United States v.  Leach, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 388,22 C.M.R. 178 
(1956); and  United States v.  Boswell, 35 C.M.R. 491 (A.B.R. 
1964),pet. denied, 35 C.M.R. 478 (1964). 
70.  Article 134-  (Correctional custody-offenses 
against) 
Introduction. The elements and sample specifications have been 
modified by replacing "duly", with "by a person authorized to do 
so." See Analysis, paragraph 19. 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is taken from paragraph 213fl13) 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also  United States v.  Mackie, 16 ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. d. 
U.S.C.M.A. 14, 36 C.M.R. 170 (1966) (proof of the offense for 
which correctional custody imposed not required). 
71.  Article 134-  (Debt, dishonorably failing to 
pay) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 213f(7) of 
MCM,  1969 (Rev,), See  also  United States  v.  Kirksey, 6 
U.S.C.M.A. 556,20 C.M.R. 272 (1955). 
72.  Article 134-  (Disloyal statements) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 213f(5) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); United 
States v. Priest, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 564,45 C.M.R. 338 (1972); United 
States v. Gray, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 63, 42 C.M.R.  255 (1970); United 
States v. Harvey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 539,42 C.M.R. 141 (1970). 
73.  Article 134-  (Disorderly conduct, 
drunkenness) 
c. Explanation. (2) Disorderly. This subparagraph is based on 
United States v.  Manos, 24 C.M.R. 626 (A.F.B.R. 1957). See also 
United States v. Haywood, 41 C.M.R. 939 (A.F.C.M.R. 1969) and 
United States v. Burrow, 26 C.M.R. 761 (N.B.R. 1958), for a dis- 
cussion of disorderly conduct in relation to the offense of breach 
of the peace 40c). 
74.  Article 134-  (Drinking liquor with prisoner) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is new. 
75.  Article 134-  (Drunk Prisoner) 
c.  Explanation. See Analysis, paragraph 35. 
76.  Article 134-  (Drunkenness- incapacitation 
for performance of duties through prior wrongful 
overindulgence in intoxicating liquor or drugs) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on United States v. Roe- 
buck, 8 C.M.R. 786 (A.F.B.R. 1953); United States v. Jones, 7 
C.M.R. 97 (A.B.R. 1952); United States v. Nichols, 6 C.M.R. 239 
(A.B.R.  1952). 
77.  Article 134-  (False or unauthorized pass 
offenses) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 213f(11) of 
MCM,  1969 (Rev.). See also  United States  v.  Burton,  13 
U.S.C.M.A.  645, 33 C.M.R.  177 (1963);  United States v. 
Warthen, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 93,28 C.M.R. 317 (1959). 
78.  Article 134-  (False pretenses, obtaining 
services under) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on  United States v. 
Herndon, 15 U.S.C.M.A.  510, 36 C.M.R. 8 (1965); United States 
v. Abeyta, 12 M.J. 507 (A.C.M.R. 1981); United States v. Case, 37 
C.M.R. 606 (A.B.R. 1966). 
e.  Maximum punishment. The maximum punishments have been 
revised. Instead of three levels ($50 or less, $50 to $100, and over 
$100) only two are used. This is simpler and conforms more 
closely to the division between felony and misdemeanor penalties 
contingent on value in similar offenses in civilian jurisdictions. 
79.  Article 134-  (False swearing) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 213A4) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). See also United States  v.  Whitaker, 13 
U.S.C.M.A. 341, 32 C.M.R. 341 (1962); United States V. McCar-
thy, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 758, 29 C.M.R. 574 (1960). 
80.  Article 134-  (Firearm, discharging-through 
negligence) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based  on  United States v. 
Darisse, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 29, 37 C.M.R. 293 (1967); United States 
v. Barrientes, 38 C.M.R. 612 (A.B.R. 1967). The term "careless- 
ness" was changed to "neg1igence"because  the latter is defined in 
paragraph 85c(2). 
81.  Article 134-  (Firearm, discharging-  willfully, 
under such circumstances as to endanger human 
life) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on  United States v. Pot- 
ter, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 271, 35 C.M.R. 243 (1965). 
82.  Article 134-  (Fleeing scene of accident) 
c.  Explanation. (1) Nature or offense. This paragraph is based on 
United States v. Seeger, 2 M.J. 249 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976). 
(2)  Knowledge. This paragraph is based on  United States v. 
Eagleson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 685, 14 C.M.R. 103 (1954) (Latimer, J., 
concurring in the result). Actual knowledge is an essential ele- 
ment of the offense rather than an affirmative defense as is current 
practice. This is because actual knowledge that an accident has 
occurred is the point at which the driver's or passenger's responsi- 
bilities begin. See  United States v.  Waluski,6 U.S.C.M.A. 724, 21 
C.M.R. 46 (1956). 
(3)  Passengers. See  United States v. Waluski, supra. 
83.  Article 134-  (Fraternization) 
Introduction. This paragraph is new to the Manual for Courts- 
Martial, although the offense of fraternization is based on long- 
standing custom of the services, as recognized in the sources be- 
low. Relationships between senior officers and junior officers and 
between noncommissioned or petty officers and their subordi- 
nates may, under some circumstances, be prejudicial to good or- 
der and discipline. This paragraph is not intended to preclude 
prosecution for such offenses. 
c.  Explanation.  This paragraph is new and is based on  United 
States v. Pitasi, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 601,44 C.M.R. 31 (1971); United 
States v. Free, 14 C.M.R. 466 (N.B.R. 1953). See also W. Win- 
throp, Military Law and Precedents 41, 716 n.44 (2d ed. 1920 re- 
print); Staton v. Froehlke, 390 F.Supp. 503 (D.D.C. 1975); United 
States v. Lovejoy, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 18, 42 C.M.R. 2 10 (1 970); 
United States v. Rodriguez, ACM 23545 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982); 
United States v. Livingston, 8 C.M.R. 206 (A.B.R. 1952). See Nel-
son, Conduct Expected of an Oficer and a Gentleman: Ambiguity, 
12 A.F. JAG. L.R. 124 (1970). 
d. Maximum punishment. The maximum punishment for this of- 
fense is based on the maximum punishment  for violation of gen- ~pp. 21, n d.  APPENDlX 21 
era1 orders and regulations, since some forms of fraternization 
have also been punished  under Article 92. As to dismissal, see 
Nelson, supra at 129-1 30. 
f.  Sample specification. See United States v.  Free, supra. 
84.  Article 134-  (Gambling with subordinate) 
c. Explanation. This paragraph is new and is based on  United 
States v.  Burgin, 30 C.M.R. 525 (A.B.R. 1961). 
d. Maximum punishment. The maximum punishment  was in- 
creased from that provided  in  paragraph  127c of MCM,  1969 
(Rev.) to expressly authorize confinement, Cf: the second para- 
graph of paragraph 127c(2) of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
e.  Sample specification. Sample specification 153 in Appendix 6c 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) was revised to more correctly reflect the el- 
ements of the offense. 
85.  Article 134--  (Homicide, negligent) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 21 3fl12) of 
MCM, (Rev.); United States v.  Kick, 7 M.J. 82 (C.M.A. 1979). 
86.  Article 134-  (Impersonating a commissioned, 
warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer, or an 
agent or official) 
b.  Elements. The elements are based on United States v.  Yum, 10 
M.J. 1 (C.M.A. 1980). 
c. Explanation. This paragraph is new and is based on United 
States v.  Demetris, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 412, 26 C.M.R. 192 (1958); 
United States v.  Messenger, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 21,6 C.M.R. 21 (1952). 
87.  Article 134--  (lndecent acts or liberties  with a 
child) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 213fl3) of 
MCM,  1969 (Rev.). See  also United States v.  Knowles,  15 
U.S.C.M.A. 404,35 C.M.R. 376 (1965); United States v.  Brown, 3 
U.S.C.M.A. 454,  13 C.M.R. 454,  13 C.M.R.  10 (1953);  United 
States  v.  Riffe, 25 C.M.R. 650 (A.B.R.  1957), pet  denied, 9 
U.S.C.M.A. 813, 25 C.M.R. 486 (1958). "Lewd"  and "lascivi- 
ous" were deleted because they are synonymous with indecent. 
See id. See also paragraph 90c. 
88. Article 134-  (lndecent exposure) 
c. Explanation. This paragraph is new and is based on United 
States v.  Manos, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 734, 25 C.M.R. 238 (1958). See 
also United States v.  Caune, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 200, 46 C.M.R. 200 
(1973); United States v.  Conrad, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 439, 35 C.M.R. 
41 1 (1965). 
e.  Maximum punishment.  The maximum punishment has been 
increased to include a bad-conduct  discharge. Indecent exposure 
in some circumstances (e.g., in front of children, but without the 
intent to incite lust or gratify sexual desires necessary for indecent 
acts or liberties) is sufficiently serious to authorize a punitive dis- 
charge. 
89.  Article 134-  (lndecent language) 
Introduction. "Obscene"  was removed from the title because it 
is synonymous with "indecent."  See paragraph 90c and Analysis. 
"Insulting"  was removed from the title based on United States v. 
Prince, 14 M.J. 654 (A.C.M.R. 1982); United States v.  Linyear, 3 
M.J. 1027 (N.C.M.R. 1977). 
Gender-neutral language has been used in this paragraph,  as 
well as throughout this Manual. This will eliminate any question 
about the intended scope of certain offenses, such as indecent lan- 
guage, which may have been raised by  the use of the masculine 
pronoun in MCM, 1969 (Rev.). It is, however, consistent with the 
construction given to the former Manual. See e.g., United States v. 
Respess, 7 M.J. 566 (A.C.M.R. 1979). See generally  1 U.S.C. 
59 ("unless the context indicates otherwise . . . words importing 
the masculine gender include the feminine as well . . .."). 
c. Explanation. This paragraph is new and is based on United 
States  v.  Knowles,  15 U.S.C.M.A. 404, 35 C.M.R. 376 (1965); 
United States v.  Wainwright, 42 C.M.R. 997 (A.F.C.M.R. 1970). 
For a general discussion of this offense, see  United States  v. 
Linyear supra. 
1986 Amendment: "Provoking speeches and gestures"  was 
added as a lesser included offense. United States v.  Linyear, 3 M.J. 
1027 (N.M.C.M.R. 1977). 
e.  Maximum punishment. The maximum punishment  in cases 
other than communication to a child under the age of 16 has been 
reduced. It now parallels that for indecent exposure. 
90.  Article 134-  (Indecent acts with another) 
c. Explanation. This paragraph is new and is based on  United 
States v.  Holland, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 444,  31 C.M.R. 30 (1961); 
United States v.  Gaskin, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 419, 31 C.M.R. 5 (1962) 
United States v.  Sanchez, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 216, 29 C.M.R. 32 
(1960);  United States v.  Johnson, 4 M.J. 770 (A.C.M.R. 1978). 
"Lewd"  and "lascivious"  have been deleted as they are synony- 
mous with"indecent."  See id. 
91.  Article 134-  (Jumping from vessel into the 
water) 
Introduction. This offense is new to the Manual for Courts- 
Martial. It was added to the list of Article 134 offenses based on 
United States v.  Sadinsky, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 34 C.M.R. 343 
(1964). 
92.  Article 134-  (Kidnapping) 
Introduction. This offense is new to the Manual for Courts- 
Martial. It is based generally on 18 U.S.C. § 1201. See also Mili- 
tary Judges' Benchbook, DA PAM 27-9,  paragraph 3-190  (May 
1982). 
Kidnapping has been recognized  as an offense under Article 
134 under several different theories. Appellate courts in  the mili- 
tary have affirmed convictions for kidnapping in violation of State 
law, as applied through the third clause of Article  134 and  18 
U.S.C.  5 13 (see paragraph 60), e.g., United States v.  Picotte,  12 
U.S.C.M.A.  196, 30 C.M.R. 196 (1961); in  violation of Federal 
law (18 U.S.C. 5 1201) as applied through the third clause of Arti- 
cle  134, e.g., United States  v.  Perkins, 6 M.J. 602 (A.C.M.R. 
1978); and in violation of the first two clauses of Article 134, e.g., 
United States  v.  Jackson,  17 U.S.C.M.A. 580, 38 C.M.R. 378 
(1968). As a result, there has been  some confusion  concerning 
pleading and proving kidnapping in courts-martial. See, e.g., 
United States  v.  Smith, 8 M.J. 522 (A.C.M.R. 1979); United ANALYSIS 	 App. 21, R.C.M. c. 
States V. DiGiulio, 7 M.J. 848 (A.C.M.R. 1979); United States v. 
Perkins, supra. 
After United States v. Picotte, supra, was decided, 18 U.S.C. 
5 1201 was amended to include kidnapping within the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Pub.L. 
92-539,  5 201, 86 Stat. 1072 (1972). Consequently, reference to 
state law through  18 U.S.C. 5  13 is no longer necessary (or au- 
thorized) in most cases. See United States v. Perkins, supra. Nev-
ertheless, there remains some uncertainty concerning kidnapping 
as an offense in the armed forces, as noted above. This paragraph 
should eliminate such uncertainty, as well as any different treat- 
ment of kidnapping in different places. 
b.  Elements. The elements are based  on 18 U.S.C.  5  1201. The 
language in that statute "for ransom or reward or otherwise" has 
been deleted. This language has been construed to mean that no 
specific purpose is required for kidnapping.  United States v. 
Healy, 376 U.S. 75 (1964); Gooch v.  United States 297 U.S.  124 
(1936); Gawne v.  United States, 409 F.2d  1399 (9th Cir. 1969), 
cert. denied 397 U.S. 943 (1970). Instead it is required  that the 
holding be against the will of the victim. See Chatwin. United 
States, 326 U.S. 455 (1946); 2 E. Devitt and C. Blackmar, Federal 
Jury Practice and Instructions  5 43.09 (1977);  Military Judges' 
Benchbook, supra at paragraph 3-190.  See also Amsler  v. United 
States, 381 F.2d 37 (9thCir. 1967); Davidson v.  United States, 312 
F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1963). 
c.  Explanation. Subparagraph (1) is based on  United States v. 
Hoog, 504 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.  961 
(1975). See also 2 E. Devitt and C. Blackmar, supra at 5 43.05. 
Subparagraph (2) is based on United States v. DeLaMotte, 434 
F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 921 (1971); United 
States v. Perkins, supra. See generally 1 Am.Jur. 2d Abduction and 
Kidnapping 5 2 (1962). 
Subparagraph (3) is based on Chatwin v.  United States, supra; 2 
E. Devitt and C. Blackmar, supra at 5 43.09. See also Hall v. 
United States, 587 F.2d  177 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 
(1979); Military Judges' Benchbook, supra, paragraph 3-190. 
Subparagraphs (4) and (5) are based on 18 U.S.C. 5 1201; 2 E. 
Devitt and C. Blackmar, supra 5 5 43.05, 43.06, 43.10. See also 
United States v.  Hoog, supra. The second sentence in subpara- 
graph (4) is also based on  United States v. Healy, supra. See also 
United States v.  Smith, supra. The second sentence in subpara- 
graph (5) is based  on  United States v. Picotte, supra. See also 
United States v. Martin, 4 M.J. 852 (A.C.M.R.  1978). The last 
sentence in subsection (5) is based on 18 U.S.C. 5  1201. A parent 
taking a child in violation  of a custody decree may violate state 
law or 18 U.S.C. 5  1073. See  18 U.S.C.A.  5  1073 Historical and 
Revision Note (West Supp. 1982). See also paragraph 60c(4). 
e.  Maximumpunishment. The  maximum punishment is based on 
18 U.S.C. 5  1201. See also United States v. Jackson, supra. 
93.  Article 134-  (Mail: taking, opening, secreting, 
destroying, or stealing) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is new and is based  on  United 
States v.  Gaudet, 11 U.S.C.M.A.  672, 29 C.M.R. 488 (1960); 
United States v. Manausa,  12 U.S.C.M.A. 37, 30 C.M.R. 37 
(1960). This offense is not preempted by  Article 121. See  United 
States v. Gaudet, supra. See also paragraph 60. 
94.  Article 134-  (Mails: depositing or causing to 
be deposited obscene matters in) 
c. Explanation. This paragraph is new and is based on United 
States v. Holt, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 471, 31 C.M.R. 57 (1961);  United 
States v. Linyear, 3 M.J. 1027 (N.C.M.R. 1977). See also Hamling 
v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Miller v. Calqornia, 413 U.S. 
15 (1973). 
f.  Sample specifications. "Lewd"  and "lascivious"  were elimi- 
nated because they are synonymous with "obscene."  See Analy-
sis, paragraph 90c. 
95.  Article 134-  (Misprision of serious offense) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 213fi6) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The term "serious  offense"  is substituted for 
"felony"  to make clear that concealment of serious military of- 
fenses, as well a serious civilian offenses, is an offense. Subsection 
(1) is based on Black's Law Dictionary 902 (5th ed. 1979). See also 
United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 11  19 (7th Cir. 1970); United 
States v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d 789 (3d Cir.),  cert. denied, 316 U.S. 
678 (1942); 18 U.S.C. 5 4. 
96.  Article 134-  (Obstructing justice) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph  is new and is based  on  United 
States v. Favors, 48 C.M.R. 873 (A.C.M.R.  1974). see also  18 
U.S.C.  5 5  1503, 1505, 1510, 1512, 15 13; United States  v. 
Chodkowski, I1 M.J. 605 (A.F.C.M.A. 198 1). 
f. 	Sample specification. 
1991 Amendment: The form specification was amended by de- 
leting the parentheses encompassing "wrongfully"  as this lan- 
guage is not optional, but is a required component of a legally suf- 
ficient specification. 
96a.  Article 134-  (Wrongful interference with an 
adverse administrative proceeding) 
1993 Amendment. Paragraph 96a is new and proscribes con- 
duct that obstructs administrative proceedings. See generally  18 
U.S.C.  1505, Obstruction of proceedings before departments, 
agencies, and committees. This paragraph, patterned after para- 
graph 96, covers obstruction of certain administrative proceed- 
ings not currently covered by the definition of criminal proceed- 
ing found in paragraph 96c. This paragraph is necessary given the 
increased number of administrative actions initiated in each ser- 
vice. 
97.  Article 134-  (Pandering and prostitution) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is new and is based on  United 
States v. Adams, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 310,40 C.M.R. 22 (1966); United 
State v. Bohannon, 20 C.M.R. 870 (A.F.B.R. 1955). 
e.  Maximum punishment. The maximum punishment for prosti- 
tution is based on 18 U.S.C. 5  1384. 
98.  Article 134-  (Perjury: subornation of) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is new. It is based on 18 U.S.C. 
5  1622 which applies to any perjury. See  18 U.S.C. 5  1621. See 
generally R. Perkins, Criminal Law 46667  (2d ed. 1969). See also 
the Analysis, paragraph 57;  United States  v.  Doughty,  14 ~pp. 21,~  APPENDIX 21 C. 
U.S.C.M.A. 540, 34 C.M.R. 320 (1964)(res judicata);  United 
States v. Smith, 49 C.M.R. 325 (N.C.M.R. 1974) (pleading). 
99.  Article 134-  (Public record: altering, 

concealing, removing mutilating,  obliterating, or 

destroying) 

c. Explanation.  This paragraph is  new and is based on 
Mil.R.Evid. 803(8), but does not exclude certain types of records 
which  are inadmissible under Mil.R.Evid.  803(8) for policy rea- 
sons. See  United States  v. Maze, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 260, 45 C.M.R. 
34 (1972) for a discussion of one of these offenses in relation to the 
doctrine of preemption. See generally  18 U.S.C. 5 2071. 
f.  Sample specification. The specification contained in Appendix 
6c, no. 172, from MCM, 1969 (Rev.) was modified by deleting the 
word "steal"  because this would be covered by "remove." 
100.  Article 134-  (Quarantine: medical, breaking) 
b.  Elements. The word "duly"  has been  deleted from the ele- 
ments of  this offense for the same reasons explained in Analysis, 
paragraph 19. 
c.  Explanation.  Putting a person "on  quarters"  or other other- 
wise excusing a person from duty because of illness does not of it- 
self constitute a medical quarantine. 
f.  Sample specification. Sample specification  no.  173, Appendix 
6c of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) was modified based on the deletion of the 
word "duly,"  as explained in the analysis to paragraph  19. See 
subparagraph b, above. 
101. Article 134-  (Requesting commission of an 
offense) 
Introduction. This offense is new to the Manual for Courts- 
Martial, and is based  on United States  v. Benton, 7 M.J. 606 
(N.C.M.R. 1979),pet. denied, 8 M.J. 227 (1980). 
c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on United States v. Ben-
ton, supra. See also United States v. Oakley, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 733, 23 
C.M.R. 197 (1957). 
e.  Maximum punishment. The  maximum punishment is based on 
United States v. Oakley, supra. 
1990Amendment: The  offense of 'requesting the commission of 
an offense' was deleted. Solicitation of another to commit an of- 
fense, whether prosecuted  under Article 82 or 134, UCMJ, is a 
specific intent offense. See  United States v. Mitchell,  15 M.J. 214 
(C.M.A.  1983). The preemption  doctrine precludes the creation 
of a lesser included offense of solicitation which does not require 
specific intent. See  United States v. Taylor, 23 M.J. 314 (C.M.A. 
1987). 
102. Article 134-  (Restriction; breaking) 
Elements. The  word "duly"  has been deleted from the elements 
of this offense, for the same reasons explained in Analysis, para- 
graph 19. 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is new and is based on paragraph 
20b, 126g, 131c, and 174b of MCMt,)?69 (Rev.). See also United 
Statesv. Haynes, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 122,.$5 C.M.R. 94(1964). 
f.  Sample specification. Sample specification no. 175, appendix 6c 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) was modified based on the deletion of the 
word "duly,"  as explained in the analysis of paragraph  19. See 
subparagraph b, above. 
103.  Article 134-  (Seizure: destruction, removal, 
or disposal of property to prevent) 
Introduction. This offense is new. It is based on 18 U.S.C. 
5 2232. See generally  United States v. Gibbons, 463 F.2d 1201 (3d 
Cir. 1972); United States v. Bernstein, 287 F.Supp. 84 (S.D. Fla. 
1968); United States v. Fishel, 12 M.J. 602 (A.C.M.R. 1981), pet 
denied, 13 M.J. 20. See also the opinion in  United States v. Gib- 
bons, 331 F.Supp. 970 (D.De1. 1971). 
c.  Explanation. The second sentence is based on United States v. 
Gibbons, supra. Cf: United States v. Ferrone, 438 F.2d 381 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1008 (1971). 
e.  Maximum punishment. The maximum punishment is based on 
18 U.S.C. 5 2232. 
104.  Article 134-  (Sentinel or lookout: offenses 
against or by) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is new. See Analysis, paragraph 
13 and Analysis, paragraph 38. The  definition of "loiter"  is taken 
from  United States v. Muldrow, 48 C.M.R. 63, 65 n.  1 
(A.F.C.M.R.  1973). 
e.  Maximum punishment. The maximum punishment for loiter- 
ing or wrongfully sitting on post by a sentinel or lookout was in- 
creased because of the potentially  serious consequences of such 
misconduct. Cf: Article 11  3. 
105.  Article 134-  (Soliciting  another to commit 
an offense) 
b.  Elements. See  United States v. Mitchell, 15 M.J. 214 (C.M.A. 
1983); the Analysis, paragraph 6. See also paragraph 101. 
c.  Explanation. See the Analysis, paragraph 6. 
d. Lesser included  offenses. See  United States v. Benton, 7 M.J. 
606 (N.C.M.R. 1979), pet. denied, 8 M.J. 227 (1980). 
1990 Amendment: Listing of "Article  134 -Requesting an- 
other to commit an offense, wrongful communication of  lan- 
guage" as a lesser included offense of soliciting another to commit 
an offense was deleted in conjunction with the deletion of such a 
request as a substantive offense. See  United States v. Taylor, 23 
M.J. 314 (C.M.A. 1987);and, the Analysis, paragraph 101. 
e.  Maximum punishment. See  United States v. Benton, supra. 
February 1986 Amendment: The Committee considered maxi- 
mum imprisonment for 5 years inappropriate for the offense of so- 
licitation to commit espionage under new Article  106a. A maxi- 
mum punishment  authorizing imprisonment for life is more 
consistent with the serious nature of the offense of espionage. 
106.  Article 134-  (Stolen property: knowingly 
receiving, buying, concealing) 
c. Explanation. This paragraph is based on paragraph 213fl14) of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). and United States v. Cartwright, 13 M.J. 174 
(C.M.A. 1982); United States v. Ford, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 30 
C.M.R. 3 (1960). See  United States v. Rokoski, 30 C.M.R. 433 
(A.B.R.  1960) concerning knowledge. See also United States v. 
Bonavita, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 407,45 C.M.R. 181 (1972), concerning 
this offense in general. 
e.  Maximum punishment. The  maximum punishments have been 
revised.  Instead of three levels (less than $50, $50 to $100, and 
over $100) only two are used. This is simpler and conforms more ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. g. 
closely to the division between felony and misdemeanor penalties 
contingent on value in property offenses in civilian jurisdictions. 
107. Article 134-  (Straggling) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is new and is based on Military 
Judges' Benchbook, DA PAM 27-9,  paragraph 3-180  (May 
1982). 
108.  Article 134-  (Testify: wrongful refusal) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is new and is based on  United 
States v. Kirsch, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 84, 35 C.M.R. 56 (1964). See also 
United States v. Quarles, 50 C.M.R. 5  14 (N.C.M.R. 1975). 
f.  Sample specification. "Duly  appointed"  which appeared in 
front of the words "board of officers"  in sample specification no. 
174, Appendix 6 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.)  was deleted. This is be- 
cause all of the bodies under this paragraph must be properly con- 
vened or appointed. Summary courts-martial were expressly 
added to the sample specification to make clear that this offense 
may occur before a summary court-martial. 
109.  Article 134-  (Threat or hoax: bomb) 
Introduction. This offense is new to the Manual for Courts- 
Martial. It is based generally on 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) and on Mili-
tary Judges' Benchbook, DA PAM 27-9,  paragraph 3-189  (May 
1982). Bomb hoax has been recognized as an offense under clause 
1 of Article  134. United States v. Mayo, 12 M.J. 286 (C.M.R. 
1982). 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is based  on Military Judges' 
Benchbook, supra at paragraph 3-189. 
e.  Maximum punishment. The maximum punishment is based on 
18 U.S.C. 9 844(e). 
110. Article 134-  (Threat, communicating) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is taken from paragraph 213A10) 
of  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  See also United States v.  Gilluly, 13 
U.S.C.M.A. 458, 32 C.M.R. 458 (1963);  United States v. Frayer, 
11 U.S.C.M.A. 600,29 C.M.R. 416(1960). 
11 1.  Article 134-  (Unlawful entry) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is new and is based on  United 
States v.  Breen,  15 U.S.C.M.A.  658, 36 C.M.R. 156 (1966); 
United States v. Gillin, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 669, 25 C.M.R. 173 (1958); 
United States v. Love, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 260, 15 C.M.R. 260 (1954). 
See also United States v.  Wickersham, 14 M.J. 404 (C.M.A.  1983) 
(storage area); United States v.  Taylor, 12 U.S.C.M.A.  44, 30 
C.M.R.  44 (1960) (aircraft);  United States v.  Sutton, 21 
U.S.C.M.A. 344,45 C.M.R. 118 (1972) (tracked vehicle); United 
States v. Selke, 4 M.J. 293 (C.M.A. 1978) (summary disposition) 
(Cook, J., dissenting). 
112. Article 134-  (Weapon: concealed, carrying) 
c.  Explanation. This paragraph is new and is based on  United 
States v.  Tobin, 17 U.S.C.M.A.  625, 38 C.M.R. 423 (1968); 
United States v. Bluel, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 67,27 C.M.R. 141 (!958); 
United States v. Thompson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 620,  14 C.M.R. 38 
(1954). Subsection (3) is based on United States v. Bishop, 2 M.J. 
741 (A.F.C.M.R. 1977), pet. denied, 3 M.J. 184 (1977). 
113. Article 134-  (Wearing unauthorized insignia, 
decoration, badge, ribbon, device, or lapel 
button). 
e.  Maximum punishment.  The maximum punishment has been 
increased to include a bad-conduct discharge because this offense 
often involves deception. 
PART V.  NONJUDlClAL PUNISHMENT 

PROCEDURE 

1.  General 
c.  Purpose. This paragraph is based on the legislative history of 
Article 15, both as initially enacted and as modified in 1962. See 
generally H.R.Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1415  (1949); 
S.Rep. No. 19  11, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). 
d. Policy. Subparagraph (1) is based on paragraph 129a of MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). Subparagraph (2) is based on the last sentence of par- 
agraph 129a of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and on service regulations. 
See, e.g., AR 27-10,  para. 3-46  (1 Sep. 1982); JAGMAN sec. 
0101. Cf: Article 37. Subparagraph (3) is based on the second par- 
agraph 1296 of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
e.  Minor offenses. This paragraph is derived from paragraph  128b 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), service regulations concerning "minor of- 
fenses"  (see, e.g., AR 27-10,  para.  3-3d  (1 Sep. 1982); AFR 
11  1-9,  para. 3a(3) (31 Aug. 1979)); United States v. Fretwell  11 
U.S.C.M.A. 377, 29 C.M.R. 193 (1960). The intent of the para- 
graph is to provide the commander with enough latitude to ap- 
propriately resolve a disciplinary problem. Thus, in some in- 
stances, the commander may decide that nonjndicial punishment 
may be appropriate for an offense that could result in a dishonora- 
ble discharge or  confinement for more than 1 year if tried by gen- 
eral court-martial, e.g., failure to obey an order or regulation. On 
the other hand, the commander could refer a case to a court-mar- 
tial that would ordinarily be considered  at nonjudicial  punish- 
ment, e.g., a short unauthorized  absence, for a servicemember 
with a long history of short unauthorized absences, which nonju- 
dicial punishment has not been successful in correcting. 
f.  Limitations on nonjudicial punishment. (1) Double punishment 
prohibited. This subparagraph is taken from the first paragraph of 
paragraph  128d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  Note that what is prohi- 
bited is the service of punishment twice. Where nonjudicial pun- 
ishment is set aside, this does not necessarily prevent reimposition 
of punishment and service of punishment not previously served. 
(2)  Increase in punishmentprohibited. This paragraph is taken 
from the second paragraph  of paragraph  128d of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). 
(3)  Multiple punishment  prohibited.  This paragraph is based 
on the guidance for court-martial offenses, found in paragraph 
30g and 33h of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(4)  Statute of limitations. This paragraph restates the require- 
ments of Article 43(c) regarding nonjudicial punishment. 
(5)  Civilian courts. This paragraph is derived from service reg- 
ulations (see, e.g., AR 27-10,  chap. 4 (1 Sep. 1982) and is intended 
to preclude the possibilitt 'of a servicemember being punished by 
separate jurisdictions for the same offense, except in unusual 
cases. 
g.  Relationship of nonjudicial punishment  to administrative cor- 
rective measures. This paragraph is derived from paragraph  128c APP. 21, n s.  APPENDIX 21 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and service regulations. See e.g.,  AR 27-10, 
para. 34  (1 Sep. 1982). 
h.  Effect of errors. This paragraph is taken from paragraph  130 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
2.  Who may impose nonjudicial  punishment 
This paragraph is taken from paragraph  128a of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.) and service regulations. See, e.g., AR 27-10,  para. 3-7  (1 
Sep. 1982); JAGMAN sec. 0101; AFR 11 1-9,  para. 3 (31 Aug. 
1979). Additional guidance in this area is left to Secretarial regu- 
lation, in accordance with the provisions of Article 15(a). 
3.  Right to demand trial. 
This paragraph is taken from Article 15(a) and paragraph 132 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
4.  Procedure 
This paragraph is based on paragraph 133 of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.) and service regulations. It  provides a uniform basic proce- 
dure for nonjudicial punishment for all the services. Consistent 
with the purposes of nonjudicial  punishment (see S.Rep. No. 
191  1, 87th Cong. 2d Sess. 4 (1962)) it provides due process pro- 
tections and is intended to meet the concerns expressed in the 
Memorandum of Secretary of Defense Laird, 11 January 1973. 
See  also United States  v. Mack, 9 M.J. 300, 320-21  (C.M.A. 
1980). The Report of the Task Force on the Administration of 
Military Justice in the Armed Forces, 1972, and GAO  Report to 
the Secretary of Defense, Better Administration of Military Article 
15Punishments for Minor Offenses is Needed, September 2, 1980, 
were also considered. 
Note that there is no right to consult with counsel before decid- 
ing whether to demand trial by court-martial. Unless otherwise 
prescribed by the Secretary concerned, the decision whether to 
permit a member to consult with counsel is left to the com- 
mander. In United States v.  Mack, supra, records of punishments 
where such opportunity was not afforded (except when the mem- 
ber was attached to or embarked in a vessel) were held inadmissi- 
ble in courts-martial. 
1986Amendment: Subparagraph (c)(2) was amended to state 
clearly that a servicemember has no absolute right to refuse to ap- 
pear personally before the person administering the nonjudicial 
punishment proceeding. In addition, Part V  was amended 
throughout to use the term "nonjudicial  punishment authority" 
in circumstances where the proceeding could be administered by 
a commander, officer in charge, or a principal assistant to a gen- 
eral court-martial convening authority or general or flag officer. 
5.  Punishments. 
This paragraph is taken from paragraph  131 of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). Subparagraph b(2)(b)4 is also based on S.Rep. 191 1, 87th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1962). Subparagraph c(4) is also based on id. at 
6-7  and Hearings Before  a Subcomm. of the House  Comm. on 
Armed Services, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1962). Detention of pay 
was deleted as a punishment because under current centralized 
pay systems, detention of pay is cumbersome, ineffective, and sel- 
dom used. The concept of apportionment, authorized in Article 
15(b) and set forth in paragraph 131d of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), was 
eliminated as unnecessary and confusing. Accordingly, the Table 
of Equivalent Punishments is no longer necessary. 
Subparagraph d, in concert with the elimination of the appor- 
tionment concept, will ease the commanders burden of determin- 
ing an appropriate punishment and make the implementation of 
that punishment more efficient and understandable. 
1987Amendment: Subparagraph e was redesignated as subpar- 
agraph g and new subparagraphs e and f were added to implement 
the amendments to Articles 2 and 3, UCMJ, contained in the 
"Military Justice Amendments of  1986,"  tit. VIII, 9 804, Na- 
tional Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year  1987, Pub. L. 
No. 99-661,  100 Stat. 3905, (1986). 
1990 Amendment: Subsection (c)(8) was amended to incorpo- 
rate the statutory expansion of jurisdiction  over reserve compo- 
nent personnel provided in the Military Justice Amendments of 
1990, tit. XIII, 9 1303, National Defense  Authorization Act of 
Fiscal Year 1990, Pub. L. 101-189,  103 Stat. 1352 (1989). 
6.  Suspension, mitigation, remission, and setting 
aside 
This paragraph is taken from Article 15, paragraph  134 of 
MCM 1969 (Rev.),  and service regulations. See e.g., AR 27-10, 
paras. 3-23  through 3-28  (1 Sep. 1982); JAGMAN sec. 0101; 
AFR 11 1-9,  para 7 (31 Aug 1979). Subparagraph a dealing with 
suspension was expanded to: require a violation of the code dur- 
ing the period of suspension as a basis for vacation action, and to 
explain that vacation action is not in itself nonjudicial punish- 
ment and does not preclude the imposition of nonjudicial punish- 
ment for the offenses upon which the vacation action was based. 
Subparagraph a(4) provides a procedure for vacation of sus- 
pended nonjudicial punishment. This procedure parallels the pro- 
cedure found sufficient to make admissible in courts-martial 
records of vacation of suspended nonjudicial punishment. United 
States v.  Covington, 10 M.J. 64 (C.M.A.  1980). 
1990 Amendment: A new subsection a(4) was added to permit 
punishment imposed  under Article  15 to be suspended based on 
conditions in addition to violations of the UCMJ. This affords the 
same flexibility given to authorities who suspend punishment ad- 
judged  at court-martial under R.C.M.  1108(c). Experience has 
demonstrated the necessity and utility of such flexibility in the 
nonjudicial punishment context. 
7.  Appeals 
This paragraph is taken from paragraph  135 of MCM, 1969 
(Rev.) and service regulations dealing with appeals. See  AR 
27-10,  paras. 3-29  through 3-35  (1 Sep. 1982); JAGMAN 0101; 
AFR 11 1-9,  para. 8 (31 Aug. 198  1). Subparagraph (d) requires an 
appeal to be filed within 5 days or the right to appeal will be 
waived, absent unusual circumstances. This is a reduction from 
the 15 days provided for in paragraph 135 and is intended to expe- 
dite the appeal process. Subparagraph f(2) is intended to promote 
sound practice, that is, the superior authority should consider 
many factors when reviewing an appeal, and not be limited to 
matters submitted by  the appellant or the officer imposing the 
punishment. Subparagraph f(3) provides for "additional proceed- 
ings" should a punishment be set aside due to a procedural error. 
This is consistent with court-martial practice and intended to en- ANALYSIS  App. 21, R.C.M. 
sure that procedural errors do not prevent appropriate disposition  8.  Records of nonjudicial punishment 
of a disciplinary matter.  This paragraph is taken from Article 15(g) and paragraph 133c 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). APPENDIX 22 
ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE 
The Military Rules of Evidence, promulgated in 1980 as Chapter  21. Thus, it was intended that this Appendix would remain static. 
XXVII of the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969  In 1985, however, it was decided that changes in the analysis of 
(Rev. ed:),  were the product of a two year effort participated in by  the Military Rules of Evidence would be incorporated into this 
the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, the United  Appendix as those changes are made so that the reader need con- 
States Court of Military Appeals, the Military Departments, and  sult only one document to determine the drafters' intent regard- 
the Department of Transportation. The  Rules were drafted by the  ing the current rules. Changes are made to the Analysis only 
Evidence Working Group of the Joint Service Committee on Mil-  when a rule is amended. Changes to the Analysis are clearly 
itary Justice, which consisted of Commander James Pinnell,  marked, but the original Analysis is not changed. Consequently, 
JAGC, U.S.  Navy,  then Major John Bozeman, JAGC, U.S.  the Analysis of some rules contains analysis of language subse- 
Army (from April 1978 until July 1978), Major Fredric Lederer,  quently deleted or amended. 
JAGC, U.S. Army (from August 1978), Major James Potuk, U.S.  In addition, because this Analysis expresses the intent of the 
Air Force, Lieutenant Commander Tom Snook, U.S.  Coast  drafters, certain legal doctrines stated in this Analysis may have 
Guard, and Mr. Robert Mueller and Ms. Carol Wild Scott of the  been overturned by  subsequent case Jaw. This Analysis does not 
United States Court of Military Appeals. Mr. Andrew Effron rep-  substitute for research about current legal rules. 
resented the Office of the General Counsel of the Department of  Several changes were made for uniformity of style with the re- 
Defense on the Committee. The  draft rules were reviewed and, as  mainder of the Manual. Only the first word in the title of a rule is 
modified, approved by the Joint Service Committee on Military  capitalized. The word"ru1e"  when used in text to refer to another 
Justice. Aspects of the Rules were reviewed by the Code Commit-  rule, was changed to "Mil.R.Evid."  to avoid confusion with the 
tee as well. See Article 67(g). The Rules were approved by the  Rules for Courts-Martial. "Code"  is used  in place of Uniform 
General Counsel of the Department of Defense and forwarded to  Code of Military Justice. "Commander"  is substituted 
the White House via the Office of Management and Budget which  for"commanding  officer"  and "officer  in charge."  See R.C.M. 
circulated the Rules to the Departments of Justice and Transpor-  103(5). Citations to the United States Code were changed to con- 
tation.  form to the style used  elsewhere."Government"  is capitalized 
The  original Analysis was prepared primarily by Major Fredric  when used as a noun to refer to the United States Government. In 
Lederer, U.S. Army, of the Evidence Working Group  of the Joint  addition, several cross-references to paragraphs in MCM, 1969 

Service Committee on Military Justice and was approved by the  (Rev.) were changed to indicate appropriate provisions in this 

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice and reviewed in the  Manual. 

Office of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense. The  With these exceptions, however, the Military Rules of Evi- 

Analysis presents the intent of the drafting committee; seeks to in-  dence were not redrafted. Consequently, there are minor varia- 

dicate the source of the various changes to the Manual, and gener-  tions in style or terminology between the Military Rules of Evi- 

ally notes when substantial changes to military law result from  dence and other parts of the Manual. Where the same subject is 

the amendments. This Analysis is not, however, part of the Exec-  treated in similar but not identical terms in the Military Rules of 

utive Order modifying the present Manual nor does it constitute  Evidence and elsewhere, a different meaning or purpose should 

the official views of the Department of Defense, the Department  not be inferred in the absence of a clear indication in the text or 

of Transportation, the Military Departments, or of the United  the analysis that this was intended. 

States Court of Military Appeals. 

The  Analysis does not identify technical changes made to adapt 
the Federal Rules of Evidence to military use. Accordingly, the  SECTION I Analysis does not identify changes made to make the Rules gen- 
der neutral or to adapt the Federal Rules to military terminology  Genera' Provisions 
by substituting, for example, "court  members-for  "jury"  and 
"military  judge"  for "court".  References within the Analysis to  Rule 101.  Scope 
"the  1969 Manual"  and "MCM,  1969 (Rev.)"  refer to the Man-  (a)  Applicability. Rule 101(a) is taken generally from Federal 
ual for Courts-Martial, 1969 (Rev. ed.) (Executive Order 11,476,  Rule of Evidence 101. It emphasizes that these Rules are applica- 
as amended by  Executive Order 11,835 and Executive Order  ble to summary as well as to special and general courts-martial. 
12,018) as it existed prior to the effective date of the 1980 amend-  See "Rule of Construction."  Rule 101(c), infra. Rule 1101 ex- 
ments. References to "the prior law" and "the prior rule" refer to  pressly indicates that the rules of evidence are inapplicable to in- 
the state of the law as it existed prior to the effective date of the  vestigative hearings under Article 32, proceedings for pretrial ad- 
1980 amendments. References to the "Federal Rules of Evidence  vice, search authorization proceedings, vacation proceedings, and 
Advisory Committee"  refer to the Advisory Committee on the  certain other proceedings.  Although the Rules apply to sentenc- 
Rules of Evidence appointed by the Supreme Court, which pre-  ing, they may be "relaxed"  under Rule 1101(c) and R.C.M. 
pared the original draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  100  1  (c)(3). 
During the Manual revision project that culminated in promul-  The limitation in subdivision (a) applying the Rules to courts- 
gation of the Manual for Courts-Martial, 1984 (Executive Order  martial is intended expressly to recognize that these Rules are not 
12473), several changes were made in the Military Rules of Evi-  applicable to military commissions, provost courts, and courts of 
dence, and the analysis of those changes was placed in Appendix  inquiry unless otherwise required by competent authority. See App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENDIX 22 
Part I, Para. 2 of the Manual. The Rules, however, serve as a 
"guide"  for such tribunals. Id. 
The  Military Rules of Evidence are inapplicable to proceedings 
conducted pursuant to Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Mili- 
tary Justice. 
The decisions of the United States Court of Military Appeals 
and of the Courts of Military Review must be utilized in interpret- 
ing these Rules. While specific decisions of the Article 111 courts 
involving rules which are common both to the Military Rules and 
the Federal Rules should be considered very persuasive, they are 
not binding; see Article 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Jus- 
tice. It should be noted, however, that a significant policy consid- 
eration in adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence was to ensure, 
where possible, common evidentiary law. 
(b)  Secondary sources. Rule 101(b) is taken from Para.  137 of 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.) which had its origins in Article 36 of the Uni- 
form Code of Military Justice. Rule 101(a) makes it clear that the 
Military Rules of Evidence are the primary source of evidentiary 
law for military practice. Notwithstanding their wide scope, how- 
ever, Rule 101(b) recognizes that recourse to secondary sources 
may occasionally be necessary. Rule 101(b) prescribes the se- 
quence in which such sources shall be utilized. 
Rule 101(b)(l) requires that the first such source be the "rules 
of evidence generally recognized  in the trial of criminal cases in 
the United States District courts." To the extent that a Military 
Rule of Evidence reflects an express modification  of a Federal 
Rule of Evidence or a federal evidentiary procedure, the Presi- 
dent has determined that the unmodified Federal Rule or proce- 
dure is, within the meaning of Article 36(a), either not "practica- 
ble"  or is "contrary to or inconsistent with" the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice. Consequently, to the extent to which the Mili- 
tary Rules do not dispose of an issue, the Article 111 Federal prac- 
tice when practicable and not inconsistent or contrary to the Mili- 
tary Rules shall be applied. In determining whether there is a rule 
of evidence "generally recognized",  it is anticipated that ordinary 
legal research shall be involved  with primary emphasis being 
placed upon the published decisions of the three levels of the Arti- 
cle 111 courts. 
Under Rule 1102, which concerns amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, no amendment to the Federal Rules shall be 
applicable to courts-martial until 180 days after the amendment's 
effective date unless the President shall direct its earlier adoption. 
Thus, such an amendment cannot be utilized as a secondary 
source until 180 days has passed since its effective date or until the 
President had directed its adoption, whichever occurs first. An 
amendment will not be applicable at any time if the President so 
directs. 
It is the intent of the Committee that the expression, "common 
law"  found within  Rule  101(b)(2) be construed in its broadest 
possible sense. It should include the federal common law and 
what may be denominated military common law. Prior military 
cases may be cited as authority under Rule 101(b)(2) to the extent 
that they are based upon a present  Manual provision which has 
been retained in the Military Rules &'~vidence  or to the extent 
that they are not inconsistent with tha'rules of evidence generally 
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States Dis- 
trict courts," deal with matters "not  otherwise prescribed in this 
Manual or these rules," and are "practicable and not inconsistent 
with or contrary to the Uniform Code of Military justice or this 
Manual." 
(c)  Rule of construction. Rule 101(c) is intended to avoid unnec- 
essary repetition of the expressions, "president  of a special court- 
martial without a military judge"  and "summary  court-martial 
officer".  "Summary  court-martial officer"  is  used  instead of 
"summary  court-martial"  for purposes of clarity. A summary 
court-martial is considered to function in the same role as a mili- 
tary judge notwithstanding possible lack of legal training. As pre- 
viously  noted in Para. 137, MCM, 1969 (Rev.), "a  summary 
court-martial has the same discretionary power as a military 
judge concerning the reception of evidence."  Where the applica- 
tion of these Rules in a summary court-martial or a special court- 
martial without a military judge is different from the application 
of the Rules in a court-martial with a military judge, specific ref- 
erence has been made. 
Disposition of present  Manual. That part of Para. 137, MCM, 
1969 (Rev.), not reflected in Rule 101 is found in other rules, see, 
e.g., Rules 104, 401,403. The reference in Para. 137 to privileges 
arising out of treaty or executive agreement was deleted as being 
unnecessary. See generally Rule 501. 
Rule 102.  Purpose and construction 
Rule 102 is taken without change from Federal Rule of Evidence 
102 and is without counterpart in MCM, 1969 (Rev.). It provides 
a set of general guidelines to be used in construing the Military 
Rules of Evidence. It is, however, only a rule of construction and 
not a license to disregard the Rules in order to reach a desired re- 
sult. 
Rule 103.  Rulings on evidence 
(a)  Effect of erroneous ruling. Rule 103(a) is taken from the Fed- 
eral Rule with a number of changes. The first, the use of the lan- 
guage, "the ruling materially prejudices a substantial right of a 
party" in place of the Federal Rule's "a  substantial right of party 
is affected"  is required by Article 59(a) of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice. Rule 103(a) comports with present  military 
practice. 
The second significant change is the addition of material relat- 
ing to constitutional requirements and explicitly states that errors 
of constitutional magnitude may require a higher standard than 
the general one required by Rule 103(a). For example, the harm- 
less error rule, when applicable to an error of constitutional 
dimensions, prevails over the general  of 
Rule 103(a). Because Section 111 of these Rules embodies consti- 
tutional rights, two standards of error may be at issue; one involv- 
ing the Military Rules of Evidence, and one involving the under- 
lying constitutional rule. In such a case, the standard of error 
more advantageous to the accused will apply. 
Rule 103(a)(l) requires that a timely motion or objection gen- 
erally be made in order to preserve a claim of error. This is similar 
to but more specific than prior practice. In making such a motion 
or objection, the party has a right to state the specific grounds of 
the objection to the evidence. Failure to make a timely and suffi- 
ciently specific objection may waive the objection for purposes of 
both trial and appeal. In applying Federal Rule 103(a), the Arti- 
cle 111 courts have interpreted  the Rule strictly and held the de- 
fense to an extremely high level of specificity. See, e.g., United 
States v.  Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 61-63 (2d Cir. 1979) (objection to ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
form of witness's testimony did not raise or preserve an appropri- 
ate hearsay objection); United States v. O'Brien, 601 F.2d  1067 
(9th Cir. 1979) (objection that prosecution witness was testifying 
from material not in evidence held inadequate to raise or preserve 
an objection under Rule 1006). As indicated in the Analysis of 
Rule 802, Rule 103 significantly changed military law insofar as 
hearsay is concerned. Unlike present law under which hearsay is 
absolutely incompetent, the Military Rules of Evidence simply 
treat hearsay as being inadmissible upon adequate objection; see 
Rules 803, 103(a). Note in the context of Rule 103(a) that R.C.M. 
801(a)(3) (Discussion) states: "The parties are  entitled to reasona- 
ble opportunity to properly present and support their contentions 
on any relevant matter." 
An "offer  of proof' is a concise statement by counsel setting 
forth the substance of the expected testimony or other evidence. 
Rule 103(a) prescribes a standard by which errors will be tested 
on appeal. Although counsel at trial need not indicate how an al- 
leged error will"material1y prejudice a substantial right"  in order 
to preserve error, such a showing, during or after the objection or 
offer, may be advisable as a matter of trial practice to further illu- 
minate the issue for both the trial and appellate bench. 
(b)  Record of offer, and (c) Hearing of members-  Rule 103(b) 
and (c) are taken from the Federal Rules with minor changes in 
terminology to adapt them to military procedure. 
(d)  Plain error-Rule  103(d) is taken from the Federal Rule with 
a minor change of terminology to adapt it to military practice and 
the substitution of "materially  prejudices"  substantial rights of 
"affecting" substantial rights to conform it to Article 59(a) of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
Rule 104.  Preliminary questions 
(a)  Questions of admissibility generally. Rule 104(a) is taken gen- 
erally from the Federal Rule. Language in the Federal Rule re- 
quiring that admissibility shall be determined by the "court,  sub- 
ject to the provisions of subdivision (b)" has been struck to ensure 
that, subject to Rule 1008, questions of admissibility are  solely for 
the military judge and not for the court-members. The deletion of 
the language is not intended, however,.to negate the general inter- 
relationship between subdivisions (a) and (b). When relevancy is 
conditioned on the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the military 
judge shall "admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evi- 
dence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condi- 
tion." 
Pursuant to language taken from Federal Rule of Evidence 
104(a), the rules of evidence, other than those with respect  to 
privileges, are inapplicable to"pre1iminary  questions concerning 
the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a 
privilege, the admissibility of evidence  ... ." These exceptions are 
new to military law and may substantially change military prac- 
tice. The Federal Rule has been modified, however, by inserting 
language relating to applications for continuances and determina- 
tions of witness availability. The change, taken from MCM, 1969 
(Rev.), Para. 137, is required by the worldwide disposition of the 
armed forces which makes matters relating to continuances and 
witness availability particularly difficult, if not impossible, to re- 
solve under the normal rules of evidence-  particularly the hear- 
say rule. 
A significant and unresolved issue stemming from the language 
of Rule 104(a) is whether the rules of evidence shall be applicable 
to evidentiary questions involving constitutional or statutory is- 
sues such as those arising under Article 31. Thus it is unclear, for 
example, whether the rules of evidence are applicable to a deter- 
mination of the voluntariness of an accused's statement. While 
the Rule strongly suggests that rules of evidence are not applica- 
ble to admissibility  determinations involving constitutional  is- 
sues, the issue is unresolved at present. 
(b)  Relevancy conditioned on fact.  Rule 104(b) is taken from the 
Federal Rule except that the following language had been added: 
"A ruling on the sufficiency of evidence to support a finding of ful- 
fillment of a condition of fact is the sole responsibility of the mili- 
tary judge."  This material was added in order to clarify the rule 
and to explicitly preserve contemporary military procedure, Para. 
57, MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Under the Federal Rule, it is unclear 
whether and to what extent evidentiary questions are to be sub- 
mitted to the jury as questions of admissibility. Rule 104(b) has 
thus been clarified to eliminate any possibility, except as required 
by Rule 1008, that the court members will make an admissibility 
determination. Failure to clarify the  rule would produce unneces- 
sary confusion in the minds of the court members and unnecessa- 
rily prolong trials. Accordingly, adoption of the language of the 
Federal Rules without modification is impracticable in the armed 
forces. 
(c)  Hearing of members. Rule 104(c) is taken generally from the 
Federal Rule. Introductory material has been added because of 
the impossibility of conducting a hearing out of the presence of 
the members in a special court-martial without a military judge. 
"Statements of an accused" has been used in lieu of "confessions" 
because of the phrasing of Article 3  1 of the Uniform Code of Mili- 
tary Justice, which has been followed in Rules 301-306. 
(d)  Testimony by accused. Rule 104(d) is taken without change 
from the Federal Rule. Application of this rule in specific circum- 
stances is set forth in Rule 304(f), 3  l l(f) and 32 l(e). 
(e)  Weight and credibility. Rule 104(e) is taken without change 
from the Federal Rule. 
Rule 105.  Limited admissibility 
Rule 105 is taken without change from the Federal Rule. In view 
of its requirement that the military judge restrict evidence to its 
proper scope"upon  request,"  it overrules  United States v. 
Grunden, 2 M.J.  116 (C.M.A.  1977) (holding that the military 
judge must sua sponte instruct the members as to use of evidence 
of uncharged misconduct) and related cases insofar as theyrequire 
the military judge to sua sponte instruct the members. See e.g., S. 
SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVI-
DENCE MANUAL 50 (2d ed. 1977); United States v. Sangrey, 
586 F.2d  13  15 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Barnes, 586 F.2d 
1052 (5th Cir.  1978); United States v. Bridwell, 583 F.2d 1135 
(10th Cir. 1978); but see  United States v. Ragghianti, 560 F.2d 
1376 (9th Cir. 1977). This is compatible with the general intent of 
both the Federal and Military Rules in that they place primary if 
not full responsibility upon counsel for objecting to or limiting ev- 
idence. Note that the Rule,AO6, dealing with statements of co-ac- 
cused, is more restrictive qd,protective than Rule 105. The mili- 
tary judge may, of course;,~hoose  to instruct sua sponte but need 
not do so. Failure to instruct sua sponte could potentially require 
a reversal only if such failure could be considered "plain  error" 
within the meaning of Rule 103(d). Most failures to instruct sua App. 22, M.R.E.  APPEN 
sponte, or to instruct, cannot be so considered in light of current 

case law. 

Rule 106.  Remainder of or related writings or 

recorded statements 

Rule 106 is taken from the Federal Rule without change. In view 
of the tendency of fact-finders to give considerable evidentiary 
weight to written matters, the Rule is intended to preclude the 
misleading situation that can occur if a party presents only part of 
a writing or recorded statement. In contract to Para. 140a, MCM, 
1969 (Rev.), which applies only to statements by  an accused, the 
new Rule is far more expansive and permits a party to require the 
opposing party  to introduce evidence. That aspect of  Para. 
140a(b) survives as Rule 304(h)(2) and allows the defense to com- 
plete an alleged confession or admission offered by  the prosecu- 
tion. When a confession or admission is involved, the defense may 
employ both Rules 106 and 304(h)(2), as appropriate. 
SECTION II 
Judicial Notice 
Rule 201.  Judicial notice of adjudicative facts 
(a)  Scope of  Rule. Rule 201(a) provides that Rule 201 governs ju- 
dicial notice of adjudicative facts. In so doing, the Rule replaced 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.), Para. 147a. The Federal Rules of Evidence 
Advisory Committee defined  adjudicative facts as "simply  the 
facts of the particular case" and distinguished them from legisla- 
tive facts which it defined as "those which have relevance to legal 
reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation 
of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enact- 
ment of a legislative body,"  reprinted in S. SALTZBURG & K. 
REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF  EVIDENCE MANUAL 63 
(2d  ed. 1977). The distinction between the two types of facts, 
originated by Professor Kenneth Davis, can on occasion be highly 
confusing in practice and resort to any of the usual treatises may 
be helpful. 
(b)  Kinds of  facts.  Rule 201(b) was taken generally from the Fed- 
eral Rule. The limitation with FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(l) to facts 
known "within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court" was 
replaced, however, by  the expression, "generally  known univer- 
sally, locally, or in the area, pertinent to the event."  The world- 
wide disposition of the armed forces rendered the original lan- 
guage inapplicable and impracticable within the military 
environment. Notice of signatures, appropriate under Para. 147a, 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.), will normally be inappropriate under this 
Rule. Rule 902(4) & (10) will, however, usually yield the same re- 
sult as under Para. 147a. 
When they qualify as adjudicative facts under Rule 201, the fol- 
lowing are examples of matters of which judicial  notice may be 
taken: 
The ordinary division  of time into years, months, weeks and 
other periods; general facts and laws of nature, including their or- 
dinary operations and effects; general facts of history; gener:-llly 
known geographical facts; such sped  7 facts and propositions of  >f
generalized knowledge as are so universally known that they can- 
not reasonably be the subject of dispute; such facts as are so gener- 
ally known or are of such common notoriety in the area in which 
the trial is held that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dis- 
pute; and specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge 
which are capable of immediate and accurate determination by 
resort to easiiy accessible sources of reasonable indisputable accu- 
racy. 
(c)  When discretionary.  While the first sentence of the subdivi- 
sion is taken from the Federal Rule, the second sentence is new 
and is included as a result of the clear implication of subdivision 
(e) and of the holding inGarner v.  Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 173-74 
(1961). In Garner, the Supreme Court rejected the contention of 
the State of Louisiana that the trial judge had taken judicial notice 
of certain evidence stating that: 
There is nothing in the records to indicate that the trial judge 
did in fact take judicial notice of anything. To  extend the doctrine 
of judicial notice ...wculd require us to allow the prosecution to 
do through argument to this Court what it is required by  due pro- 
cess to do at the trial, and would be to turn the doctrine into a pre- 
text for dispensing with a trial of the facts of which the court is 
taking judicial notice, not only does he not know upon what evi- 
dence he is being convicted, but, in addition, he is deprived of any 
opportunity to challenge the deductions drawn from such notice 
or to dispute the notoriety or truth of the facts allegedly relied 
upon. 
368 U.S. at 173 
(d)  When  mandatory.  Rule 201(d) provides that the military 
judge shall take notice when requested to do so by a party who 
supplies the military judge with the necessary information. The 
military judge must take judicial notice only when the evidence is 
properly within this Rule, is relevant under Rule 401, and is not 
inadmissible under these Rules. 
(e)  Opportunity to be heard;  Time of  taking notice; Instructing 
Members. Subdivisions (e), (f)  and (g) of Rule 201 are taken from 
the Federal Rule without change. 
Rule 201A. Judicial notice of law 
In general. Rule 201A is new. Not addressed by the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, the subject matter of the Rule is treated as  a procedu- 
ral matter in the Article I11 courts; see e.g., FED R. CRIM. P. 
26.1. Adoption of a new evidentiary rule was thus required. Rule 
201A is generally consistent in principle with Para. 147a, MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). 
Domestic law. Rule 201A(a) recognizes that law may constitute 
the adjudicative fact within the meaning of Rule 201(a) and re- 
quires that when that is the case, i.e., insofar as a domestic law is a 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action, the 
procedural requirements of Rule 201 must be applied. When do- 
mestic law constitutes only a legislative fact, see the Analysis to 
Rule 20l(a), the procedural requirements of Rule 201 may be uti- 
lized as a matter of discretion. For purposes of this Rule, it is in- 
tended that "domestic law" include: treaties of the United States; 
executive agreements between the United States and any State 
thereof, foreign country or international organization or agency; 
the laws and regulations pursuant thereto of the United States, of 
the District of Columbia, and of a State, Commonwealth, or pos- 
session; international law, including the laws of war, general mar- 
itime law and the law of air and space; and the common law. This 
definition is taken without change from Para. 147a except that 
references to the law of space have been added. "Regulations"  of 
the United States include regulations of the armed forces. ANALYSIS OF THE MlLlTP  rRY RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
When a party requests that domestic law be noticed, or when 
the military judge sua sponte takes such notice, a copy of the ap- 
plicable law should be attached to the record of trial unless the 
law in question can reasonably be anticipated to be easily availa- 
ble to any possible reviewing authority. 
1984Amendment: Subsection (a) was modified in 1984 to clar- 
ify that the requirements of Mil.R.Evid.  201(g) do  not apply when 
judicial notice of domestic law is taken. Without this clarification, 
Mil.R.Evid.  201A could be construed to require the military 
judge to instruct the members that they could disregard a law 
which had been judicially  noticed. This problem was discussed in 
United States v.  Mead, 16 M.J. 270 (C.M.A. 1983). 
Foreign law. Rule 201A(b) is taken without significant change 
from FED  R. CRIM. P 26.1 and recognizes that notice of foreign 
law may require recourse to additional evidence including testi- 
mony of witnesses. For purposes of this Rule, it is intended that 
"foreign  law"  include the laws and regulations of foreign coun- 
tries and their political subdivisions and of international organi- 
zations and agencies. Any material or source received by the mili- 
tary judge for use in  determining foreign law, or pertinent 
extracts therefrom, should be included in the record of trial as an 
exhibit. 
SECTION Ill 
Exclusionary Rules and Related Matters 
Concerning Self-Incrimination, Search and 
Seizure, and Eyewitness Identification 
Military Rules of Evidence 301-306,  31 1-317,  and 321 were new 
in 1980 and have no equivalent in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
They represent a partial codification of the law relating to self-in- 
crimination, confessions and admissions, search and seizure, and 
eye-witness identification. They are often rules of criminal proce- 
dure as well as evidence and have been located in this section due 
to their evidentiary significance.  They replace Federal Rules of 
Evidence 301 and 302 which deal with civil matters exclusively. 
The Committee believed it imperative to codify the material 
treated in Section I11 because of the large numbers of lay person- 
nel who hold important roles within the military criminal legal 
system. Non-lawyer legal officers aboard ship, for example, do  not 
have access to attorneys and law libraries. In all cases, the Rules 
represent a judgement  that it would be impracticable to operate 
without them. See Article 36. The Rules represent a compromise 
between specificity, intended to ensure stability and uniformity 
with the armed forces, and generality, intended usually to allow 
change via case law. In some instances they significantly change 
present  procedure. See, e.g.,Rule  304(d) (procedure for suppres- 
sion motions relating to confessions and admissions). 
Rule 301.  Privilege concerning compulsory self- 
incrimination 
(a)  General rule. Rule 301(a) is consistent with the rule expressed 
in the first paragraph, Para. 150b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.), but omits 
the phrasing of the privileges and explicitly states that, as both 
variations apply, the accused or witness receives the protection of 
whichever privilege may be the more beneficial. The fact that the 
privilege extends to a witness as well as an accused is inherent 
within the new phrasing which does not distinguish between the 
two. 
The Rule states that the privileges are applicable only "to evi- 
dence of a testimonial or communicative nature,"  Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757,761 (1966). The meaning of "testimonial 
or communicative"  for the purpose of Article 31 of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice is not fully settled. Past decisions of the 
Court of Military Appeals have extended the Article 31 privilege 
against self-incrimination to voice and handwriting exemplars 
and perhaps under certain conditions to bodily fluids.  United 
States v.  Ruiz, 23 U.S.C.M.A.  181, 48 C.M.R. 797 (1974). Be- 
cause of the unsettled law in the area of bodily fluids, it is not the 
intent of the Committee to adopt any particular definition of "tes- 
timonial or communicative."  It is believed, however. that the de- 
cisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the Fifth 
Amendment, e.g.,  Schmerber v.  California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), 
should be persuasive in this area. Although the right against self- 
incrimination has a number of varied justifications,  its primary 
purposes are to shield the individual's thought processes from 
Government inquiry and to permit an individual to refuse to cre- 
ate evidence to be used against him. Taking a bodily fluid sample 
from the person of an individual fails to involve either concern. 
The  fluid in question already exists; the individual's actions are ir- 
relevant to its seizure except insofar as the health and privacy of 
the individual can be further protected through his or her cooper- 
ation. No persuasive reason exists for Article 3  1 to be extended to 
bodily fluids. To the extent that due process issues are involved in 
bodily fluid extractions, Rule 3  12 provides adequate protections. 
The privilege against self-incrimination does not protect a per- 
son from being compelled by an order or forced to exhibit his or 
her body or other physical characteristics as evidence. Similarly, 
the privilege is not violated by  taking the fingerprints of an indi- 
vidual, in exhibiting or requiring that a scar on the body be exhib- 
ited, in placing an individual's  feet in tracks, or by trying shoes or 
clothing on a person or in requiring the person to do so, or by 
compelling a person to place a hand, arm, or other part of the 
body under the ultra-violet light for identification or other pur- 
poses. 
The privilege is not violated by the use of compulsion in requir- 
ing a person to produce a record or writing under his or her con- 
trol containing or disclosing incriminating matter when the re- 
cord or writing is under control in a representative rather than a 
personal capacity as, for example, when it is in his or her control 
as  the custodian for a non-appropriated fund. See, e.g., Para. 150b 
of MCM, 1969 (Rev.);  United States v.  Sellers, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 
262,  30 C.M.R. 262 (1961); United States v.  Haskins, 11 
U.S.C.M.A. 365,29C.M.R. 181 (1960). 
(b) Standing. 
(1)  In general. Rule 301(b)(l) recites the first part of the third 
paragraph of Para. 150b, MCM, 1969 (Rev.) without change ex- 
cept that the present language indicating that neither counsel nor 
the court may object to a self-incriminating question put to the 
witness has been deleted as being unnecessary. 
(2)  Judicial advice. A clarified version of the military judge's 
responsibility under Parali!50b  of MCM, 1969 (Rev.) to warn an 
uninformed witness of ihe right against self-incrimination has 
been placed  in  Rule 30f(b)(2). The revised  procedure precludes 
counsel asking in open court that a witness be advised of his or her 
rights, a practice which the Committee deemed of doubtful pro- 
priety. App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENDIX 22 
(c)  Exercise of the privilege. The first sentence of Rule 301(c) re- 
states generally the first sentence of the second paragraph of Para. 
150b, MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The language "unless it clearly appears 
to the military judge"  was deleted. The test involved is purely ob- 
jective. 
The  second sentence of Rule 301(c) is similar to the second and 
third sentences of the second paragraph of Para. 150b but the lan- 
guage has been rephrased. The present Manual's language states 
that the witness can be required to answer if for "any  other rea- 
son, he can successfully object to being tried for any offense as to 
which the answer may supply information to incriminate him ..." 
Rule 301(c) provides:  "A  witness may not assert the privilege if 
the witness is not subject to criminal penalty as a result of an an- 
swer by reason of immunity, running of the statute of limitations, 
or similar reason."  It is believed that the new language is simpler 
and more accurate as the privilege is properly defined in terms of 
consequence rather than in terms of "being tried."  In the absence 
of a possible criminal penalty, to include the mere fact of convic- 
tion, there is no risk of self-incrimination. It is not the intent of 
the Committee to adopt any particular definition of "criminal 
penalty."  It should be noted, however, that the courts have occa- 
sionally found that certain consequences that are  technically non- 
criminal are so similar in effect that the privilege should be con- 
strued to apply. See e.g., Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 51 1 (1967); 
United States v. Ruiz, 23 U.S.C.M.A.  181,48 C.M.R. 797 (1974). 
Thus, the definition of "criminal  penalty"  may depend upon the 
facts of a eiven case as well as the a~olicable  case law. 
It should be emphasized that an accused, unlike a witness, need 
not take the stand to claim the privilege. 
(1)  Immunity generally. Rule 301(c)(l) recognizes that "testi- 
monial"  or "use  plus fruits"  immunity is sufficient to overcome 
the privilege against self-incrimination,  c&,  United States v. Ri- 
vera, 1 M.J.  107 (C.M.A.  1975),reversing on other grounds, 49 
C.M.R. 259 (A.C.M.R.  1974), and declares that such immunity is 
adequate for purposes of the Manual. The Rule recognizes that 
immunity may be granted under federal statutes as well as under 
provisions of the Manual. 
(2)  Notification of immunity or leniency. The basic disclosure 
provision of Rule 301(c)(2) is taken from United States v.  Web- 
ster, 1 M.J. 216 (C.M.A.  1975). Disclosure should take place 
prior to arraignment in order to conform with the timing require- 
ments of Rule 304 and to ensure efficient trial procedure. 
(d)  Waiver by a witness. The  first sentence of Rule 301(d) repeats 
without change the third sentence of the third paragraph of Para. 
150b of MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
The second sentence of the Rule restates the second section of 
the present subparagraph but with a minor change of wording. 
The present text reads:"The  witness may be considered to have 
waived the privilege to this extent by having made the answer, but 
such a waiver will not extend to a rehearing or new or other trial," 
while the new language is: "This limited waiver of the privilege 
applies only at the trial at which the answer is given, does not ex- 
tend to a rehearing or new or other trial, and is subject to Rule 
608(b)." 
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(e)  Waiver by  the accused. Except for the reference to Rule 
608(b), Rule 301 (e) generally restates the fourth sentence of the 
third subparagraph of Para. 149b(l), MCM, 1969 (Rev.). "Mat- 
ters" was substituted for "issues"  for purposes of clarity. 
The mere act of taking the stand does not waive the privilege. If 
an accused testifies on direct examination only as to matters not 
bearing upon the issue of guilt or innocence of any offense for 
which the accused is being tried, as in Rule 304 (f),  the accused 
may not be cross-examined on the issue of guilt or innocence at 
all. See Para. 149b(l), MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and Rule 608(b). 
The last sentence of the third subparagraph of Para. 149b(l), 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.) has been deleted as  unnecessary. The  Analysis 
statement above, "The mere act of taking the stand does not 
waive the privilege," reinforces the fact that waiver depends upon 
the actual content of the accused's testimony. 
The last sentence of Rule 301(e) restates without significant 
change the sixth sentence of the third subparagraph of Para. 
149b(l), MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(0 Effect of claiming the privilege. 
(1)  Generally. Rule 301(0(1) is taken without change from the 
fourth subparagraph of Para. 150b, MCM, 1969 (Rev.). It should 
be noted that it is ethically improper to call a witness with the in- 
tent of having the witness claim a valid privilege against self-in- 
crimination in open court, see, e.g., ABA STANDARDS RE- 
LATING TO  THE ADMINISTRATION OF  CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO  THE PROSECU- 
TION FUNCTION AND  THE  DEFENSE FUNCTION, Pros- 
ecution Standard 3-5.7(c);  Defense Standard 4-7.6(c)  (Approved 
draft 1979). 
Whether and to what extent a military judge may permit com- 
ment on the refusal of a witness to testify after his or her claimed 
reliance on the privilege against self-incrimination has been deter- 
mined by the  judge to  be invalid is a question not dealt with by the 
Rule and one which is left to future decisions for resolution. 
(2)  On cross-examination. This provision is new and is in- 
tended to clarify the situation in which a witness who has testified 
fully on direct examination asserts the privilege against self-in- 
crimination on cross-examination. It incorporates the prevailing 
civilian rule, which has also been discussed in military cases. See 
e.g.,  United States v. Colon-Atienza, 22 U.S.C.M.A.  399, 47 
C.M.R. 336 (1973);  United States v. Rivas, 3 M.J. 282 (C.M.A. 
1977). Where the assertion shields only"col1ateral"  matters-le., 
evidence of minimal importance (usually dealing with a rather 
distant fact solicited for impeachment purposestit  is not appro- 
priate to strike direct testimony. A matter is collateral when shel- 
tering it would create little danger of prejudice to the accused. 
Where the privilege reaches the core of the direct testimony or 
prevents a full inquiry into the credibility of the witness, however, 
striking of the direct testimony would appear mandated. Cross- 
examination includes for the purpose of Rule 301 the testimony of 
a hostile witness called as if on cross-examination. See Rule 607. 
Depending upon the circumstances of the case, a refusal to strike 
the testimony of a Government witness who refuses to answer de- 
fense questions calculated to impeach the credibility of the wit- 
ness may constitute prejudicial limitation of the accused's right to 
cross-examine the witness. 
(3)  Pretrial. Rule 301(f)(3) is taken generally from Para. 
140a(4), MCM, 1969 (Rev.) and follows the decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court in  United Stales v. Hale, 422 U.S. 
171 (1975) and Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). See also United 
States v. Brooks,  12 U.S.C.M.A. 423, 31 C.M.R. 9 (1961); United 
States v. McBride, 50 C.M.R.  126 (A.F.C.M.R.  1975). The prior ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
Manual provision has been expanded to include a request to ter- 
minate questioning. 
(g)  Instructions. Rule 301(g)  has no counterpart in the 1969 
Manual. It is designed to address the potential for prejudice that 
may occur when an accused exercises his or her right to remain si- 
lent. Traditionally, the court members have been instructed to 
disregard the accused's silence and not to draw any adverse infer- 
ence from it. However, counsel for the accused may determine 
that this very instruction may emphasize the accused's silence, 
creating a prejudicial effect. Although the Supreme Court has 
held that it is not unconstitutional for a judge to instruct a jury 
over the objection of the accused to disregard the accused's  si- 
lence, it has also stated: "It  may be wise for a trial judge not to 
give such a cautionary instruction over a defendant's objection." 
Lakeside v.  Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 340-41 (1978). Rule 301(g) rec- 
ognizes that the decision to ask for a cautionary instruction is one 
of great tactical importance for the defense and generally leaves 
that decision solely within the hands of the defense. Although the 
military judge may give the instruction when it is necessary in the 
interests of justice, the intent of the Committee is to leave the de- 
cision in the hands of the defense in all but the most unusual 
cases. See also Rule 105. The military judge may determine the 
content of any instruction that is requested to be given. 
(h)  Miscellaneous.  The last portion of paragraph  150b, MCM, 
1969 (Rev.), dealing with exclusion of evidence obtained in viola- 
tion of due process has been deleted and its content placed in the 
new Rules on search and seizure.See e.g., Rule 312, Bodily Views 
and Intrusions. The exclusionary rule previously found in the last 
subparagraph of Para. 150b was deleted as being unnecessary in 
view of the general exclusionary rule in Rule 304. 
Rule 302.  Privilege concerning mental 
examination of an accused 
Introduction. The difficulty giving rise to Rule 302 and its con- 
forming changes is a natural consequence of the tension between 
the right against self-incrimination and the favored position occu- 
pied by  the insanity defense. If an accused could place a defense 
expert on the stand to testify to his lack of mental responsibility 
and yet refuse to cooperate with a Government expert, it would 
place the prosecution in a disadvantageous position. The courts 
have attempted to balance the competing needs and have arrived 
at what is usually, although not always, an adequate compromise; 
when an accused has raised a defense of insanity through expert 
testimony, the prosecution may compel the accused to submit to 
Government psychiatric examination on pain of being prevented 
from presenting any defense expert testimony (or of striking what 
expert testimony has already presented). However, at trial the ex- 
pert may testify only as to his or her conclusions and their basis 
and not as to the contents of any statements made by the accused 
during the examination. See e.g.,  United States v.  Albright, 388 
F.2d 719 (4th Cir.  1968); United States v.  Babbidge,  18 
U.S.C.M.A. 327, 40 C.M.R. 39 (1969).  See generally, Lederer, 
Rights Warnings in the Armed Services, 72 Mil.L.Rev.  1 (1976); 
Holladay, Pretrial Mental Examinations Under Military Law: A 
Re-Examination,  16 A.F.L. Rev. 14 (1974). This compromise, 
which originally was a product of case law, is based on the pre- 
mise that raising an insanity defense is an implied partial waiver 
of the privilege against self-incrimination and has since been codi- 
fied in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 12-2, and MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  Para. 140a, 122b, 150b. The 
compromise, however, does not fully deal with the problem in the 
military. 
In contrast to the civilian accused who is more likely to have 
access to a civilian doctor as an expert witness for the defense-a 
witness with no governmental status-  the military accused nor- 
mally must rely upon the military doctors assigned to the local in- 
stallation. In the absence of a doctor-patient privilege, anything 
said can be expected to enter usual Government medical chan- 
nels. Once in those channels there is nothing in the present Man- 
ual that prevents the actual psychiatric report from reaching the 
prosecution and release of such information appears to be com- 
mon in contemporary practice. As a result, even when the actual 
communications made by the accused are not revealed by the ex- 
pert witness in open court, under the 1969 Manual they may be 
studied by the prosecution and could be used to discover other ev- 
idence later admitted against the accused. This raises significant 
derivative evidence problems, cf:  United States v.  Rivera, 23 
U.S.C.M.A. 430, 50 C.M.R. 389 (1975). One military judge's  at- 
tempt to deal with this problem by issuing a protective order was 
commended by the Court of Military Appeals in an opinion that 
contained a caveat from Judge Duncan that the trial judge may 
have exceeded his authority in issuing the order, United States v. 
Johnson, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 424,47 C.M.R. 401 (1973). 
Further complicating this picture is the literal language of Arti- 
cle 31(b) which states, in part, that "No person subject to this 
chapter may ...request a statement from, an accused or a person 
suspected of an offense without first informing him ..."  [of his 
rights]. Accordingly, a psychiatrist who complies with the literal 
meaning of Article 31(b) may effectively and inappropriately de- 
stroy the very protections created by Babbidge and related cases, 
while hindering the examination itself. At the same time, the va- 
lidity of warnings and any consequent "waiver"  under such cir- 
cumstances is most questionable because Babbidge never consid- 
ered the case of an accused forced to choose between a waiver and 
a prohibited or limited insanity defense. Also left open by the pre- 
sent compromise is the question of what circumstances, if any, 
will permit a prosecutor to solicit the actual statements made by 
the suspect during the mental examination. In  United States v. 
Frederick, 3 M.J. 230 (C.M.A. 1977), the Court of Military Ap- 
peals held that the defense counsel had opened the door via his 
questioning of the witness and thus allowed the prosecution a 
broader examination of the expert witness than would otherwise 
have been allowed. At present, what constitutes"opening  the 
door" is unclear. An informed defense counsel must proceed with 
the greatest of caution being always concerned that what may be 
an innocent question may be considered to be an "open sesame." 
Under the 1969 Manual interpretation of Babbidge, supra, the 
accused could refuse to submit to a Government examination un- 
til after the actual presentation of defense expert testimony on the 
insanity issue. Thus, trial might have to be adjourned for a sub- 
stantial period in the midst of the defense case. This was condu- 
cive to neither justice nor efficiency. 
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A twofold solution to these problems was developed. Rule 302 
provides a form of testimonial immunity intended to protect an 
accused from use of anyihing  he might say during a mental exam- 
ination ordered pursuant to Para. 121, MCM, 1969 (Rev.) (now 
R.C.M. 706, MCM, 1984). Paragraph 121 was modified  to 
sharply limit actual disclosure of information obtained from the App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENDIX 22 
accused  during the examination. Together, these provisions 
would adequately protect the accused from disclosure of any 
statements made during the examination. This would encourage 
the accused to cooperate fully in the examination while protecting 
the Fifth Amendment and Article 31 rights of the accused. 
Paragraph 12 1  was retitled to eliminate "Before Trial" and was 
thus made applicable before and during trial. Pursuant to para- 
graph 121, an individual's belief or observations, reflecting possi- 
ble need for a mental examination of the accused, should have 
been submitted to the convening authority with immediate re- 
sponsibility for the disposition of the charges or, after referral, to 
the military judge or president of a special court-martial without 
a military judge. The submission could, but needed not, be ac- 
companied by  a formal application for a mental examination. 
While the convening authority could act on a submission under 
paragraph 121 after referral, he or she might do so only when a 
military judge was not reasonably available. 
Paragraph  121 was revised to reflect the new test for insanity 
set forth inunited States v. Frederick, 3 M.J. 230 (C.M.A.  1977), 
and to require sufficient information for the fact finder to be able 
to make an intelligent decision rather than necessarily relying 
solely upon an expert's conclusion. Further questions, tailored to 
the individual case, could also be propounded. Thus, in an appro- 
priate case, the following might be asked: 
Did the accused, at the time of the alleged offense and as a re- 
sult of such mental disease or defect, lack substantial capacity to 
(possess actual knowledge), (entertain a specific intent), (premed- 
itate a design to kill)? 
What is the accused's intelligence level? 
Was the accused under the influence of alcohol or other drugs 
at the time of the offense? If so, what was the degree of intoxica- 
tion and was it voluntary? Does the diagnosis of alcoholism, alco- 
hol or drug induced organic brain syndrome or pathologic intoxi- 
cation apply? 
As the purpose of the revision of paragraph 121 and the crea- 
tion of Rule 302 was purely to protect the privilege against self-in- 
crimination of an accused undergoing a mental examination re- 
lated to a criminal case, both paragraph  121 and Rule 302 were 
inapplicable to proceedings not involving criminal consequences. 
The order to the sanity board required by paragraph 121 affects 
only members of the board and other medical personnel. Upon re- 
quest by a commanding officer of the accused, that officer shall be 
furnished a copy of the board's full report. The commander may 
then make such use of the report as may be appropriate (including 
consultation with a judge advocate) subject only to the restriction 
on release to the trial counsel and to Rule 302. The restriction is 
fully applicable to all persons subject to the Uniform Code of Mil- 
itary Justice. Thus, it is intended that the trial counsel receive 
only the board's conclusions unless the defense should choose to 
disclose specific matter. The report itself shall be released to the 
trial counsel, minus any statements made by  the accused, when 
the defense raises a sanity issue at trial and utilizes an expert wit- 
ness in its presentation. Rule 302(c). 
Although Rule 302(c) does not applyJ,to determ~nations  of the 
competency of the accused to stand trial, paragraph 121 did pro- 
hibit access to the sanity board report by  the trial counsel except 
as specifically authorized. In the event that the competency of an 
accused to stand trial was at issue, the trial counsel could request, 
pursuant to paragraph  121, that the military judge disclose the 
sanity board report to the prosecution.  In such a case, the trial 
counsel who had read the report would be disqualified from pros- 
ecuting the case in chief if Rule 302(a) were applicable. 
As indicated above, paragraph  121 required that the sanity 
board report be kept within medical channels except insofar as it 
would be released to the defense and, upon request, to the com- 
manding officer of the accused. The paragraph expressly prohi- 
bited any person from supplying the trial counsel with informa- 
tion relating to the contents of the report. Care should be taken 
not to misconstrue the intent of the provision. The trial counsel is 
dealt with specifically because in the normal case it is only the 
trial counsel who is involved in the preparation of the case at the 
stage at which a sanity inquiry is likely to take place. Exclusion of 
evidence will result, however, even if the information is provided 
to persons other than trial counsel if such information is the 
source of derivative evidence. Rule 302 explicitly allows suppres- 
sion of any evidence resulting from the accused's statement to the 
sanity board, and evidence derivative thereof, with limited excep- 
tions as found in Rule 302. This is consistent with the theory be- 
hind the revisions which  treats the accused's communication to 
the sanity board as a form of coerced statement required under a 
form of testimonial immunity. For example, a commander who 
has obtained the sanity board's report may obtain legal advice 
from a judge advocate, including the staff judge advocate, con- 
cerning the content of the sanity board's report. If the judge advo- 
cate uses the information in order to obtain evidence against the 
accused or provides it to another person who used it to obtain evi- 
dence to be used in the case, Rule 302 authorizes exclusion. Com- 
manders must take great care when discussing the sanity board 
report with others, and judge advocates exposed to the report 
must also take great care to operate within the Rule. 
(a)  General Rule. Rule 302(a) provides that, absent defense offer, 
neither a statement made by the accused at a mental examination 
ordered under paragraph  121 nor derivative evidence thereof 
shall be received into evidence against the accused at trial on the 
merits or during sentencing when the Rule is applicable. This 
should be treated as a question of testimonial immunity for the 
purpose of determining the applicability of the exclusionary rule 
in the area. The Committee does not express an opinion as to 
whether statements made at such a mental examination or deriva- 
tive evidence thereof may be used in making an adverse determi- 
nation as to the disposition of the charges against the accused. 
Subject to Rule 302(b), Rule 302(a) makes statements made by 
an accused  at a paragraph  121 examination (now in R.C.M. 
706(c), MCM 1984) inadmissible even if Article 31 (b) and coun- 
sel warnings have been given. This is intended to resolve problems 
arising from the literal interpretation of Article 3 1 discussed 
above. It protects the accused and enhances the validity of the ex- 
amination. 
(b)  Exceptions.  Rule 301(b)  is taken from prior law; see Para. 
1226, MCM 1969 (Rev.). The waiver provision of Rule 302(b)(l) 
applies only when the defense makes explicit use of statements 
made by  the accused to a sanity board or derivative evidence 
thereof. The use of lay testimony to present an insanity defense is 
not derivative evidence when the witness has not read the report. 
(c)  Release of  evidence. Rule 302(c) is new and is intended to pro- 
vide the trial counsel with sufficient information to reply to an in- 
sanity defense raised via expert testimony. The Rule is so struc- 
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will be available to the prosecution by  determining the nature of 
the defense to be made. If the accused fails to present an insanity 
defense or does so only through lay testimony, for example, the 
trial counsel will not receive access to the report. If the accused 
presents a defense, however, which includes specific incriminat- 
ing statements made by the accused to the sanity board, the mili- 
tary judge may order disclosure to the trial counsel of "such state- 
ment ...as may be necessary in the interest of justice." 
Inasmuch as the revision of paragraph 121 and the creation of 
Rule 302 were intended primarily, to deal with the situation in 
which the accused denies committing an offense and only raises 
an insanity defense as an alternative defense, the defense may con- 
sider that it is appropriate to disclose the entire sanity report to 
the trial counsel in a case in which the defense concedes the com- 
mission of the offense but is raising as its sole defense the mental 
state of the accused. 
(d)  Non-compliance by the accused. Rule 302(d) restates prior 
law and is in addition to any other lawful sanctions. As Rule 302 
and the revised paragraph  121 adequately protect the accused's 
right against self-incrimination at a sanity board, sanctions other 
than that found in Rule 302(d) should be statutorily and constitu- 
tionally possible. In an unusual case these sanctions might include 
prosecution of an accused for disobedience of a lawful order to co- 
operate with the sanity board. 
(e)  Procedure. Rule 302(e) recognizes that a violation of para- 
graph 121 or Rule 302 is in effect a misuse of immunized testi- 
mony- the coerced testimony  of the accused at the sanity 
board- and thus results in an involuntary statement which may 
be challenged under Rule 304. 
Rule 303.  Degrading questions 
Rule 303 restates Article 31(c). The  content of Para. IjOa, MCM, 
1969 (Rev.) has been omitted. 
A specific application of Rule 303 is in the area of sexual of- 
fenses. Under prior law, the victims of such offenses were often 
subjected to a probing and degrading cross-examination  related 
to past sexual history-  an examination usually of limited rele- 
vance at best. Rule 412 of the Military Rules of Evidence now 
prohibits such questioning, but Rule 412 is, however, not applica- 
ble to Article 32 hearings as it is only a rule of evidence; see Rule 
1101. Rule 303 and Article 31(c) on the other hand, are rules of 
privilege applicable to all persons, military or civilian, and are 
thus fully applicable to Article 32 proceedings. Although Rule 
303 (Article 31(c)) applies only to "military  tribunals,"  it is ap- 
parent that Article 31(c) was intended to apply to courts-of-in- 
quiry, and implicitly to Article 32 hearings.The Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before a Subcomm. of the 
House  Comm. on Armed Services,  81st Cong., 1st Sess. 975 
(1949). The Committee intends that the expression "military 
tribunals" in Rule 303 includes Article 32 hearings. 
Congress found the information now safeguarded by  Rule 412 
to be degrading. See e.g., Cong.Rec. H119944-45 (Daily ed. Oct. 
10, 1978) (Remarks of Rep.Mann). As the material within the 
constitutional scope of Rule 412 is inadmissible at trial, it is thus 
not relevant  let alone"materia1."  Consequently that data within 
the lawful coverage of Rule 412 is both immaterial and degrading 
and thus is within the ambit of Rule 303 (Article 31(c)). 
Rule 303 is therefore the means by which the substance of Rule 
412 applies to Article 32 proceedings, and no person may be com- 
pelled to answer a question that would be prohibited by Rule 412. 
As Rule 412 permits a victim to refuse to supply irrelevant and 
misleading sexual information at trial, so too does the substance 
of Rule 412 through Rule 303 permit the victim to refuse to sup- 
ply such degrading information at an Article 32 for use by the de- 
fense or the convening authority. See generally  Rule 412 and the  -
Analysis thereto. It should also be noted that it would clearly be 
unreasonable to suggest that Congress in protecting the victims of 
sexual offenses from the degrading and irrelevant cross-examina- 
tion formerly typical of sexual cases would have intended to per- 
mit the identical examination at a military preliminary hearing 
that is not even presided over by a legally trained individual. Thus 
public policy fully supports the application of Article 31(c) in this 
case. 
1993 Amendment: R.C.M. 405(i) and Mil. R. Evid. 1101(d) 
were amended to make the provisions of Mil. R. Evid. 412  appli- 
cable at pretrial investigations. These changes ensure that the 
same protections afforded victims of nonconsensual sex offenses 
at trial are available at pretrial hearings. See Criminal Justice 
Subcommittee of House Judiciary Committee Report, 94th 
Cong., 2d Session, July 29, 1976. Pursuant to these amendments, 
Mil.R.Evid. 412 should be applied in conjunction with Mil. R. 
Evid. 303. As such, no witness may be compelled to answer a 
question calling for a personally degrading response prohibited by 
Rule 303. Mil. R. Evid. 412, however, protects the victim even if 
the victim  does not testify. Accordingly, Rule 412 will prevent 
questioning of the victim or other witness if the questions call for 
responses prohibited by Rule 412. 
Rule 304.  Confessions and admissions 
(a)  General rule. The exclusionary rule found in Rule 304(a) is 
applicable to Rules 301-305,  and basically restates prior law 
which appeared in paragraphs 140a(6) and  150b, MCM, 1969 
(Rev.). Rule 304(b) does permit, however, limited impeachment 
use of evidence that is excludable on the merits. A statement that 
is not involuntary within the meaning of Rule 304(c)(3), Rule 
305(a) or Rule 302(a) is voluntary and will not be excluded under 
this Rule. 
The seventh paragraph of Para. 1506 of the 1969 Manual at- 
tempts to limit the derivative evidence rule to statements obtained 
through compulsion that is"app1ied  by, or at the instigation or 
with the participation of, an oficial or agent of the United States, 
or any State thereof or political  subdivision of either, who was act- 
ing in a governmental  capacity ..." (emphasis added). Rule 304, 
however, makes all derivative evidence inadmissible. Although 
some support for the 1969 Manual limitations can be found in the 
literal phrasing of Article 3 l(d), the intent of the Article as indi- 
cated in the commentary presented  during the House hearings, 
The Uniform Code of Military Justice, Hearing on H.  R. 2498 
Before a Subcomm. of  the House Comm. on Armed  Services,Slst 
Cong., 1st Sess. 984(1949), was to exclude "evidence"  rather than 
just"statements."  Attempting to allow admission of evidence ob- 
tained from statements which  were the product of coercion, un- 
lawful influence, or unlaw?<l inducement would appear to be both 
against public policy an-&'hnnecessarily  complicated. Similarly, 
the 1969 Manual's attempt to limit the exclusion of derivative evi- 
dence to that obtained through compulsion caused 
by"Government  agents" has been deleted in favor of the simpler 
exclusion of all derivative evidence. This change, however, does App. 22, M.R.E.  APPEl 
not affect the limitation, as expressed in current case law, that the 
warning requirements apply only when the interrogating individ- 
ual is either a civilian law enforcement officer or an individual 
subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice acting in an offi- 
cial disciplinary capacit.~  or in a position of authority over a sus- 
pect or accused. The  House hearings indicate that all evidence ob- 
tained in violation  of Article 31 was to be excluded and all 
persons subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice may vio- 
late Article 31(a). Consequently, the attempted 1969 Manual re- 
striction could affect at most only derivative evidence obtained 
from involuntary statements compelled by private citizens. Public 
policy demands that private citizens not be encouraged to take the 
law into their own hands and that law enforcement agents not be 
encouraged  to attempt to circumvent an accused's  rights via 
proxy interrogation. 
It is clear that truly spontaneous statements are admissible as 
they are not "obtained"  from an accused or suspect. An appar- 
ently volunteered  statement which is actually the result of coer- 
cive circumstances intentionally created or used by interrogators 
will be involuntary. Cf:  Brewer v.  Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), 
Rule 305(b)(2). Manual language dealing with this area has been 
deleted as being unnecessary. 
(b)  Exceptions.  Rule 304(b)(l)  adopts Harris v.  New  York, 401 
U.S. 222 (1971) insofar as it would allow use for impeachment or 
at a later trial for perjury, false swearing or the making of a false 
official statement, or statements taken in violation of the counsel 
warnings required under Rule 305(d)-(e). Under Paras. 140a(2) 
and 153b, MCM, 1969 (Rev.), use of such statements was not per- 
missible. United States v.  Girard, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 263, 49 C.M.R. 
438 (1975);  United States v.  Jordan, 20 U.S.C.M.A.  614, 44 
C.M.R. 44 (1971). The Court of Military Appeals has recognized 
expressly the authority of the President to adopt the holding in 
Harris on impeachment. Jordan, supra, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 614,617, 
44 C.M.R. 44,47, and Rule 304(b) adopts Harris to military law. 
A statement obtained in violation  of Article 3 1(b), however, re- 
mains inadmissible for all purposes, as is a statement that is other- 
wise involuntary under Rules 302, 304(b)(3) or 305(a). It was the 
intent of the Committee to permit use of a statement which is in- 
voluntary because thewaiver of  counsel rights under Rule 305(g) 
was absent or improper which is implicit in Rule 304(b)'s refer- 
ence to Rule 305(d). 
February 1986 Amendment: Rule 304(b)(2) was added to incor- 
porate the"inevitab1e  discovery"  exception to the exclusionary 
rule based  on Nix.  v.  Williams, 467 U.S. 431,  104 S.Ct. 2501 
(1984); see also United States v.  Kozak,  12 M.J.  389 (C.M.A. 
1982); Analysis of Rule 31 1(b)(2). 
1990 ~mendment:  Subsection (b)(l) was amended by adding 
"the  requirements of Mil. R. Evid. 305(c) and 305(f), or."  This 
language expands the scope of the exception and thereby permits 
statements obtained in violation of Article 31(b), UCMJ, and Mil. 
R. Evid. 305(c) and (f)to be used for impeachment purposes or at 
a later trial for perjury, false swearing or the making of a false offi- 
cial statement. See Harris v.  New  Yoi-k,  401 U.S. 222 (1971); cf: 
United States v.  Williams, 23 M.J. 36z,(C.M.A. 1987). An ac- 
cused cannot pervert the procedural safeguards of Article 31(b) 
into a license to testify perjuriously in reliance on the Govern- 
ment's disability to challenge credibility utilizing the traditional 
truth-testing devices of the adversary process. See Walder v. 
United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954); United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 
77 (1969). Similarly, when the procedural protections of Mil. R. 
Evid. 305(f) and Edwards v.  Arizona, 45 1 U.S. 477 (1981), are vio- 
lated, the deterrent effect of excluding the unlawfully obtained ev- 
idence is fully vindicated by preventing its use in the Govern- 
ment's case-in-chief, but permitting its collateral use to impeach 
an accused who testifies inconsistently or perjuriously. See Ore- 
gon  v.  Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). Statements which are not the 
product of free and rational choice, Greenwald v.  Wisconsin, 390 
U.S. 519 (1968), or are the result of coercion, unlawful influence, 
or unlawful inducements are involuntary and thus inadmissible, 
because of their untrustworthiness, even as impeachment evi- 
dence. See Mincey v.  Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
(c)  Definitions. 
(1)  Confession  and admission. Rules 304(c)(l) and (2) express 
without change the definitions found in Para. 140a(l), MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). Silence may constitute an admission when it does not 
involve a reliance on the privilege against self-incrimination or re- 
lated rights. Rule 301(f)(3). For example, if an imputation against 
a person comes to his or her attention under circumstances that 
would reasonably call for a denial of its accuracy if the imputation 
were not true, a failure to utter such a denial could possibly con- 
stitute an admission by silence. Note, however, in this regard, 
Rule 304(h)(3), and Rule 801(a)(2). 
(2)  Involuntary.  The definition of "involuntary"  in  Rule 
304(c)(3) summarizes the prior definition of "not  voluntary"  as 
found in Para.  140a(2), MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  The examples in 
Para. 140a(2) are set forth in this paragraph. A statement ob- 
tained in violation of the warning and waiver requirements of 
Rule 305 is "involuntary."  Rule 305(a). 
The language governing statements obtained through the use 
of  'coercion,  unlawful influence,  and unlawful inducement," 
found in Article 3  1(d) makes it clear that a statement obtained by 
any person, regardless of status, that is the product of such con- 
duct is involuntary. Although it is unlikely that a private citizen 
may run afoul of the prohibition of unlawful influence or induce- 
ment, such a person clearly may coerce a statement and such co- 
ercion will yield an involuntary statement. 
A statement made by the accused during a mental examination 
ordered under Para. 121, MCM, 1969 (Rev.) (now R.C.M.  706, 
MCM, 1984) is treated as an involuntary statement under Rule 
304. See Rule 302(a). The  basis for this rule is that Para. 121 and 
Rule 302 compel the accused to participate in the Government 
examination or face a judicial order prohibiting the accused from 
presenting any expert testimony on the issue of mental responsi- 
bility. 
Insofar as Rule 304(c)(3) is concerned, some examples which 
may by themselves or in conjunction with others constitute coer- 
cion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement in obtaining a 
confession or admission are: 
Infliction of bodily harm including questioning accompanied 
by deprivation of the necessities of life such as food, sleep, or ade- 
quate clothing; 
Threats of bodily harm; 
Imposition of confinement or deprivation of privileges or neces- 
sities because a statement was not made by the accused, or threats 
thereof if a statement is not made; 
Promises of immunity or clemency as to any offense allegedly 
committed by the accused; ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
Promises of reward or benefit, or threats of disadvantage likely 
to induce the accused to make the confession or admission. 
There is no change in the principle,  set forth in the fifth para- 
graph of Para. 140a(2), MCM, 1969 (Rev.), that a statement ob- 
tained "in  an interrogation conducted in accordance with all ap- 
plicable rules is not involuntary because the interrogation was 
preceded  by  one that was not so conducted, if it clearly appears 
that all improper influences of the preceding interrogations had 
ceased to operate on the mind  of the accused or suspect at the 
time that he or she made the statement."  In such a case, the effect 
of the involuntary statement is sufficiently attenuated to permit a 
determination that the latter statement was not "obtained  in vio- 
lation of' the rights and privileges found in Rule 304(c)(3) and 
305(a) (emphasis added). 
(d)  Procedure. Rule 304(d) makes a significant change in prior 
procedure. Under Para. 140a(2), MCM, 1969 (Rev.), the prosecu- 
tion was required to prove a statement to be voluntary before it 
could be admitted in evidence absent explicit defense waiver. Rule 
304(d) is intended to reduce the number of unnecessary objec- 
tions to evidence on voluntariness grounds and to narrow what 
litigation remains by requiring the defense to move to suppress or 
to object to evidence covered by this Rule. Failure to so move or 
object constitutes a waiver of the motion or objection. This fol- 
lows civilian procedure in which the accused is provided an op- 
portunity to assert privilege against self-incrimination and related 
rights but may waive any objection to evidence obtained in viola- 
tion of the privilege through failure to object. 
(1)  Disclosure.  Prior procedure (Para. 121, MCM, 1969 
(Rev.)) is changed to assist the defense in formulating its chal- 
lenges. The prosecution is required to disclose prior to arraign- 
ment all statements by the accused known to the prosecution 
which are relevant to the case (including matters likely to be rele- 
vant in rebuttal and sentencing) and within military control. Dis- 
closure should be made in writing in order to prove compliance 
with the Rule and to prevent misunderstandings. As a general 
matter, the trial counsel is not authorized to obtain statements 
made by the accused at a sanity board, with limited exceptions. If 
the trial counsel has knowledge of such statements, they must be 
disclosed. Regardless of trial counsel's  knowledge, the defense is 
entitled to receive the full report of the sanity board. 
(2)  Motions and objections. The defense is required under Rule 
304(d)(2)  to challenge evidence disclosed prior to arraignment 
under Rule 304(d)(l) prior to submission of plea. In the absence 
of a motion  or objection  prior to plea, the defense may not raise 
the issue at a later time except as permitted by  the military judge 
for good cause shown. Failure to challenge disclosed evidence 
waives the objection. This is a change from prior law under which 
objection traditionally has been made after plea but may be made, 
at the discretion of the military judge, prior to plea. This change 
brings military law into line with civilian federal procedure and 
resolves what is presently a variable and uncertain procedure. 
Litigation of a defense motion to suppress or an objection to a 
statement made by  the accused or to any derivative evidence 
should take place at a hearing held  outside the presence of the 
court members. See, e.g., Rule 104(c). 
(3)  Specificity. Rule 304(d)(3) permits the military judge to re- 
quire the defense to specify the grounds for an objection under 
Rule 304, but if the defense has not had adequate opportunity to 
interview those persons present at the taking of a statement, the 
military judge may issue an appropriate order including granting 
a continuance for purposes of interview or pel..litting  a general 
objection. In view of the waiver that results in the event of failure 
to object, defense counsel must have sufficient information in or- 
der to decide whether to object to the admissibility of a statement 
by the accused. Although telephone or other long distance com- 
munications may be sufficient to allow a counsel to make an in- 
formed decision, counsel may consider a personal interview to be 
essential in this area and in such a case counsel is entitled to per- 
sonally interview the witnesses to the taking of a statement before 
specificity can be required. When such an interview is desired but 
despite due diligence counsel has been unable to interview ade- 
quately those persons included in the taking of a statement, the 
military judge has authority to resolve the situation. Normally 
this would include the granting of a continuance for interviews, or 
other appropriate relief. If an adequate opportunity to interview 
is absent, even if this results solely from the witness' unwillingness 
to speak to the defense, then the specificity requirement does not 
apply. Lacking adequate opportunity to interview, the defense 
may be authorized to enter a general objection to the evidence. If 
a general objection has been authorized, the prosecution must 
present evidence to show affirmatively that the statement was vol- 
untary in the same manner as it would  be required  to do under 
prior law. Defense counsel is not required to meet the require- 
ments of Para. 115, MCM, 1969 (Rev.), in order to demonstrate 
"due diligence" under the Rule. Nor shall the defense be required 
to present evidence to raise a matter under the Rule. The defense 
shall present its motion by offer of proof, but it may be required to 
present evidence in support of the motion should the prosecution 
first present evidence in opposition to the motion. 
If a general objection to the prosecution evidence is not author- 
ized, the defense may be required by Rule 304(d)(3) to make spe- 
cific objection to prosecution evidence. It  is not the intent of the 
Committee to require extremely technical pleading, but enough 
specificity to reasonably narrow the issue is desirable. Examples 
of defense objections include but are not limited to one or more of 
the following non-exclusive examples: 
That the accused was a suspect but not given Article 31(b) or 
Rule 305(c) warnings prior to interrogation. 
That although 31(b) or Rule 305(c) warnings were given, 
counsel warnings under Rule 305(d) were necessary and not given 
(or given improperly). (Rule 305(d); United States v.  Templa,  16 
U.S.C.M.A.  629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).) 
That despite the accused's express refusal to make a statement, 
she was questioned and made an admission. (See e.g., Rule 305(f), 
Michigan  v.  Mosely, 423 U.S. 96 (1975);  United States v.  West-
more, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 406, 38 C.M.R. 204 (1968).) 
That the accused requested counsel but was interrogated by 
the military police without having seen counsel. (See e.g., Rule 
305(a) and (d), United States v.  Gaines, 21 U.S.C.M.A.  236, 45 
C.M.R. 10 (1972).) 
That the accused was induced to make a statement by  a 
promise of leniency by  his squadron commander. (See e.g., Rule 
304(b)(3), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Rev. 
ed.), Para 140a(2); ~eo~li?('h.  Pineda, 182 Colo. 388, 513 P2d 452 
iL:,'
(1973).) 
That an accused was threatened with prosecution of her hus- 
band if she failed to make a statement. (See e.g..  Rule 304(b)(3), 
Jarriel v. State, 317 So. 2d  141 (Fla. App. 1975).) App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENDIX 22 
That the accused was held incommunicado and beaten until 
she confessed. (See e.g.,  Rule 304(b)(3), Payne v.  Arkansas, 356 
U.S. 560 (1958)) 
That the accused made the statement in question only be- 
cause he had previously given a statement to his division officer 
which was involuntary because he was improperly warned. (See 
e.g., Rule 304(b)(3),  United States v. Seay, 1 M.J. 201 (C.M.A. 
1978).) 
Although the prosecution retains at all times the burden of 
proof  in this area, a specific defense objection under this Rule 
must include enough facts to enable the military judge to deter- 
mine whether the objection is appropriate. These facts will be 
brought before the court via recital by counsel; the defense will 
not be required to offer evidence in order to raise the issue. If the 
prosecution concurs with the defense recital, the facts involved 
will be taken as true for purposes of the motion and evidence need 
not be presented. If the prosecution does not concur and the de- 
fense facts would justify relief if taken as true, the prosecution will 
present its evidence and the defense will then present its evidence. 
The general intent of this provision is to narrow the litigation as 
much as may be possible without affecting the prosecution's bur- 
den. 
In view of the Committee's  intent to narrow litigation in this 
area, it has adopted a basic structure in which the defense, when 
required by  the military judge to object with specificity, has total 
responsibility in terms of what objection, if any, to raise under 
this Rule. 
(4)  Rulings. Rule 304(d)(4) is taken without significant change 
form Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(e). As a plea of  . . 
guilty waives all self-incrimination  or voluntariness objections, 
Rule 304(d)(5), it is contemplated that litigation of confession is- 
sues raised before the plea will be fully concluded prior to plea. 
Cases involving trials by military judge alone in which the ac- 
cused will enter a plea of not guilty are likely to be the  only ones in 
which deferral of ruling is even theoretically possible. If the prose- 
cution does not intend to use against the accused a statement 
challenged  by the accused under this Rule but is unwilling to 
abandon any potential use of such statement, two options exist. 
First, the matter can be litigated before plea, or second, if the ac- 
cused clearly intends to plead not guilty regardless of the military 
judge's  ruling as to the admissibility of the statements in question, 
the matter may be deferred until such time as the prosecution in- 
dicates a desire to use the statements. 
(5)  Effect of  guilty plea. Rule 304(d)(5) restates prior law; see, 
e.g.,  United States v. Dusenberry, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 287, 49 C.M.R. 
536 (1975). 
(e)  Burden of  proof:  Rule 304(e) substantially changes military 
law. Under the prior system, the armed forces did not follow the 
rule applied in the civilian federal courts. Instead, MCM, 1969 
(Rev.) utilized the minority"Massachusetts  Rule,"  sometimes 
known as the "Two Bite Rule." Under this procedure the defense 
first raises a confession or admission issue before the military 
judge who determines it on a preponderance basis: if the judge de- 
termines the issue adversely to the ac&$&I,  the defense may raise 
the issue again before the members. l#§&ch  a case, the members 
must be instructed not to consider the &idence  in question unless 
they find it  to have been voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Committee determined that this bifurcated system unneces- 
sarily complicated the final instructions to the members to such 
an extent as to substantially confuse the important matters before 
them. In view of the preference expressed in Article 36 for the 
procedure used in the trial of criminal cases in the United States 
district courts, the Committee adopted the majority "Orthodox 
Rule"  as used in Article I11 courts. Pursuant to this procedure, 
the military judge determines the admissibility of confessions or 
admissions using a preponderance basis. No recourse exists to the 
court members on the question of admissibility. In the event of a 
ruling on admissibility adverse to the accused, the accused may 
present evidence to the members as to voluntariness for their con- 
sideration in determining what weight to give to the statements in 
question. 
It should be noted that under the Rules the prosecution's bur- 
den extends only to the specific issue raised by the defense under 
Rule 304(d), should specificity have been required pursuant to 
Rule 304(d)(3). 
(1)  In general.  Rule 304(e)(l) requires that the military judge 
find by  a preponderance that a statement challenged under this 
rule was made voluntarily. When a trial is before a special court- 
martial without a military judge, the ruling of the President of the 
court is subject to objection by any member. The President's deci- 
sion may be overruled. The  Committee authorized use of this pro- 
cedure in view of the importance of the issue and the absence of a 
legally trained presiding officer. 
(2)  Weight of  the evidence.Rule 304(e)(2) allows the defense to 
present evidence with respect to voluntariness to the members for 
the purpose of determining what weight to give the statement. 
When trial is by judge alone, the evidence received by the military 
judge on the question of admissibility also shall be considered by 
the military judge on the question of weight without the necessity 
of a formal request to do so by counsel. Additional evidence may, 
however, be presented  to the military judge on the matter of 
weight if counsel chooses to do  so. 
(3)  Derivative evidence. Rule 304(e)(3) recognizes that deriva- 
tive evidence is distinct from the primary evidence dealt with by 
Rule 304, i.e.,statements.  The prosecution may prove that not- 
withstanding an involuntary statement, the evidence in question 
was not "obtained  by use of' it and is not derivative. 
February 1986Amendment:  Because of the 1986 addition of 
Rule 304(b)(2), the prosecution may prove that, notwithstanding 
an involuntary statement, derivative evidence is admissible under 
the "inevitable discovery"  exception. The standard of proof is a 
preponderance of the evidence (Nix v.  Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 
104 S.Ct. 2501 (1984)). 
(0 Defense  evidence. Rule 304(0 generally restates prior law as 
found in Para. 140a(3) & (6),  MCM, 1969 (Rev.).  Under this 
Rule, the defense must specify that the accused plans to take the 
stand under this subdivision. This is already normal practice and 
is intended to prevent confusion. Testimony given under this sub- 
division may not be used at the same trial at which it is given for 
any other purpose to include impeachment. The language,"the 
accused may be cross-examined only as to matter on which he or 
she so testifies" permits otherwise proper and relevant impeach- 
ment of the accused. See, e.g..  Rule 607-609;  613. 
(g)  Corroboration. Rule 304(g) restates the prior law of corrobo- 
ration with one major procedural change. Previously, no instruc- 
tion on the requirement of corroboration was required unless the 
evidence was substantially conflicting, self-contradictory,  uncer- 
tain, or improbable and there was a defense request for such an in- ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
struction. United States v.  Seigle, 22 U.S.C.M.A.  403, 47 C.M.R. 
340 (1973). The holding in Seigle in consistent with  the 1969 
Manual's view that the issue of admissibility may be  decided by 
the members, but it is inconsistent with the position taken in Rule 
304(d) that admissibility is the sole responsibility of the military 
judge. Inasmuch as the Rule requires corroborating evidence as a 
condition precedent to admission of the statement, submission of 
the issue to the members would seem to be both unnecessary and 
confusing. Consequently, the Rule does not followSeigle insofar 
as the case allows the issue to be submitted to the members. The 
members must still weigh the evidence when determining the 
guilt or innocence of the accused, and the nature of any cor- 
roborating evidence is an appropriate matter for the members to 
consider when weighing the statement before them. 
The corroboration rule requires only that evidence be admitted 
which would support an inference that the essential facts admit- 
ted in the statement are true. For example, presume that an ac- 
cused charged with premeditated murder has voluntarily con- 
fessed that, intending to kill the alleged victim, she concealed 
herself so that she might surprise the victim at a certain place and 
that when the victim passed by, she plunged a knife in his back. 
At trial, the prosecution introduces independent evidence that the 
victim was found dead as a result of a knife wound in his back at 
the place where, according to the confession, the incident oc- 
curred. This fact would corroborate the confession because it 
would support an inference of the truth of the essential facts ad- 
mitted in the confession. 
(h) Miscellaneous. 
(1)  Oral statements.  Rule 304(h)(l) is taken verbatim  from 
1969 Manual paragraph  140a(6). It recognizes that although an 
oral statement may be transcribed, the oral statement is separate 
and distinct from the transcription and that accordingly the oral 
statement may be received into evidence without violation of the 
best evidence rule unless the specific writing is in question, see 
Rule 1002. So long as the oral statement is complete, no specific 
rule would require the prosecution to offer the transcription. The 
defense could of course offer the writing when it would constitute 
impeachment. 
(2)  Completeness. Rule 304(h)(2) is taken without significant 
change from  1969 Manual paragraph  140a(6). Although Rule 
106 allows a party to require an adverse party to complete and 
otherwise incomplete written statement in an appropriate case, 
Rule 304(h)(2) allows the defense to complete an incomplete 
statement regardless of whether the statement is oral or in writ- 
ing. As Rule 304(h)(2) does not by  its terms deal only with oral 
statements, it provides the defense in this area with the option of 
using Rule 106 or 304(h)(2) to complete a written statement. 
(3)  Certain admission by  silence. Rule 304(h)(3) is taken from 
Para. 140a(4) of the 1969 Manual. That part of the remainder of 
Para. 140a(4) dealing with the existence of the privilege against 
self-incrimination is now set forth in Rule 301(f)(3). The remain- 
der of Para. 140a(4) has been set forth in the Analysis to subdivi- 
sion (d)(2), dealing with  an admission  by  silence, or has been 
omitted as being unnecessary. 
1986Amendment: Mil. R. Evid. 304(h)(4) was added to make 
clear that evidence of a refusal to obey a lawful order to submit to 
a chemical analysis of body substances is admissible evidence 
when relevant either to a violation of such order or an offense 
which the test results would have been offered to prove. The Su- 
preme Court in South Dakota v.  Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) held 
that where the government may compel an individual to submit 
to a test of a body substance, evidence of a refusal to submit to the 
test is constitutionally admissible. Since the results of tests of 
body substances are non-testimonial, a servicemember has no 
Fifth Amendment or Article 3 1 right to refuse to submit to such a 
test.  United States v.  Armstrong, 9 M.J. 374 (C.M.A.  1980); 
Schmerber v.  State of  California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). A test of 
body substances in various circumstances, such as search incident 
to arrest, probable cause and exigent circumstances, and inspec- 
tion or random testing programs, among others, is a reasonable 
search and seizure in the military. Murray v.  Haldeman, 16 M.J. 
74 (C.M.A.  1983); Mil. R. Evid. 312; Mil. R. Evid. 313. Under 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, a military order is a valid 
means to compel a servicemember to submit to a test of a body 
substance. Murray v.  Haldeman, supra. Evidence of a refusal to 
obey such an order may be relevant as evidence of consciousness 
of guilt. People v.  Ellis, 65 Cal.2d 529, 421 P.2d 393 (1966). See 
also State v.  Anderson, Or.App., 631 P.2d 822 (1981); Newhouse v. 
Misterly, 415 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S.  966 
(1  970). 
This Rule creates no right  to refuse  a lawful order. A ser- 
vicemember may still be compelled to submit to the test. See, e.g., 
Mil. R. Evid. 3 12. Any such refusal may be prosecuted separately 
for violation of an order. 
Rule 305.  Warnings About Rights 
(a)  General Rule. Rule 305(a) makes statements obtained in vio- 
lation of Rule 305, e.g., statements obtained in violation of Article 
31(b) and the right to counsel, involuntary within the meaning of 
Rule 304. This approach eliminates any distinction between state- 
ments obtained in violation of the common law voluntariness doc- 
trine (which is, in any event, included within Article 31(d) and 
those statements obtained in violation, for example, of Miranda 
(Miranda v.  Arizona, 384 U.S. 435 (1966) warning requirements. 
This is consistent with the approach taken in  the 1969 Manual, 
e.g..  Para. 140a(2). 
(b) Definitions. 
(1) Persons subject to the Uniform  Code of  Military Justice. 
Rule 305(b)(l) makes it clear that under certain conditions a ci- 
vilian may be a"person  subject to the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice" for purposes of warning requiremerats, and would be re- 
quired to give Article 31(b) (Rule 305(c)) warnings. See, gener- 
ally, United States v.  Penn,  18 U.S.C.M.A.  194, 39 C.M.R.  194 
(1969). Consequently civilian members of the law enforcement 
agencies of the Armed Forces, e.g., the Naval Investigative Ser- 
vice and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, will have 
to give Article 3 1 (Rule 305(c)) warnings. This provision is taken 
in substance from Para. 140a(2) of the 1969 Manual. 
(2) Interrogation.  Rule 305(b)(2) defines interrogation to in- 
clude the situation in which an incriminating response is either 
sought or is a reasonable consequence of such questioning. The 
definition is expressly not a limited one and Interrogation thus in- 
cludes more than the putting of questions to an indlv~dual.  See 
e.g.,  Brewer v.  Williams,,4,3O  U.S. 387 (1977). 
The Rule does not specifically deal with the situation in which 
an"innocentn question is addressed to a suspect and results unex- 
pectedly in an incriminating response which could not have been 
foreseen. This legislative history and the cases are unclear as to App. 22, M.R.E.  APPE 
whether Article 3 1 allows nonincriminating questioning. See 
Lederer, Rights, Warnings in the Armed Services, 72 Mil. L. Rev. 
1,32-33  (1976), and the issue is left open for further development. 
(c)  Warnings concerning the accusation, right  to remain silent, 
and use of statement. Rule 305(c) basically requires that those 
persons who are required by statute to give Article 3  l(b) warnings 
give such warnings. The Rule refrains from specifying who must 
give such warnings in view of the unsettled nature of the case law 
in the area. 
It was not the intent of the Committee to adopt any particular 
interpretation of Article 3  l(b) insofar as who must give warnings 
except as provided in Rule 305@)(1) and the Rule explicitly de- 
fers to Article 3 1 for the purpose of determining who must give 
warnings. The  Committee recognized that numerous decisions of 
the Court of Military Appeals and its subordinate courts have 
dealt with this issue. These courts have rejected literal application 
of Article 3  I@), but have not arrived at a conclusive rule. See e.g., 
United States v.  Dohle, 1 M.J. 223 (C.M.A. 1975). The  Committee 
was of the opinion, however, that both Rule 305(c) and Article 
31@) should be construed at a minimum, and in compliance with 
numerous cases, as requiring warnings by those personnel acting 
in an official disciplinary or law enforcement capacity. Decisions 
such as United States v. French, 25 C.M.R. 851 (A.F.B.R.  1958), 
afd  in relevant part,  10 U.S.C.M.A.  171, 27 C.M.R. 245 (1959) 
(undercover agent) are not affected by the Rule. 
Spontaneous or volunteered  statements do not require warn- 
ings under Rule 305. The fact that a person may have known of 
his or her rights under the Rule is of no importance if warnings 
were required but not given. 
Normally, neither a witness nor an accused need to be warned 
under any part of this Rule when taking the stand to testify at a 
trial by court-martial. See, however, Rule 801(b)(2). 
The  Rule requires in Rule 305(c)(2) that the accused or suspect 
be advised that he or she has the "right  to remain silent"  rather 
than the statutory Article 31(b) warning which is limited to si- 
lence on matters relevant to the underlying offense. The new lan- 
guage was inserted upon the suggestion of the Department of Jus- 
tice in order to provi'de clear advice to the accused as to the 
absolute right to remain silent. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966). 
(d)  Counsel rights and warnings. Rule 305(d) provides the basic 
right to counsel at interrogations and requires that an accused or 
suspect entitled to counsel at an interrogation be warned of that 
fact. The  Rule restates the basic counsel entitlement for custodial 
interrogations found in both Para. 140c(2), MCM, 1969 (Rev.), 
and United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 
(1967), and recognizes that the right to counsel attaches after cer- 
tain procedural steps have taken place. 
(1)  General rule. Rule 305(d)(l) makes it clear that the right to 
counsel only attaches to an interrogation in which an individual's 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is involved. 
This is a direct result of the different coverages of the statutory 
and constitutional privileges. The Fifth Amendment to the Con- 
stitution of the United States is the und~rpinning  of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Miranda  v.  Ari~cna, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
which is in turn the origin of the military right to counsel at an in- 
terrogation.United States v.  Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 
C.M.R. 249 (1967). Article 31, on the other hand, does not pro- 
vide any right to counsel at an interrogation; but see United States 
v. McOmber, 1 M.J. 380 (C.M.A. 1976). Consequently, interroga- 
tions which involve only the Article 3 1 privilege against self-in- 
crimination do not include a right to counsel. Under present law 
such interrogations include requests for voice and handwriting 
samples and perhaps request for bodily fluids. Compare United 
States  v.  Dionivio, 410 U.S.  1 (1973); United States v.  Mara, 410 
U.S. 19 (1973); and Schmerber v.  California, 384 U.S. 757 (1967) 
with  United States v.  White, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 211, 38 C.M.R. 9 
(1967); United States v. Greer, 3 U.S.C.M.A.  576, 13 C.M.R. 132 
(1953); and United States v. Ruiz, 23 U.S.C.M.A.  181,48 C.M.R. 
797 (1974). Rule 305(d)(l) requires that an individual who is enti- 
tled to counsel under the Rule be advised of the nature of that 
right before an interrogation involving evidence of a testimonial 
or  communicative nature within the meaning of the Fifth Amend- 
ment (an interrogation as defined in Rule 305(d)(2) and modified 
in this case by Rule 305(d)(l)) may lawfully proceed. Although 
the Rule does not specifically require any particular wording or 
format for the right to counsel warning, reasonable specificity is 
required. At a minimum, the right to counsel warning must in- 
clude the following substantive matter: 
(1)  That the accused or suspect has the right to be represented 
by a lawyer at the interrogation if he or she so desires; 
(2)  That the right to have counsel at the interrogation includes 
the right to consult with counsel and to have counsel at the inter- 
rogation; 
(3)  That if the accused or suspect so desires, he or she will have 
a military lawyer appointed to represent the accused or  suspect at 
the interrogation at no expense to the individual, and the accused 
or  suspect may obtain civilian counsel at no expense to the Gov- 
ernment in addition to or instead of free military counsel. 
It is important to note that those warnings are in addition to 
such other warnings and waiver questions as may be required by 
Rule 305. 
Rule 305(d)(l)(A) follows the plurality of civilian jurisdiction 
by utilizing an objective test in defining "custodial"  interrogation. 
See also  United States v. Temperley, 22 U.S.C.M.A.  383, 47 
C.M.R. 235 (1978). Unfortunately, there is no national consensus 
as  to the exact nature of the test that should be used. The  language 
used in the Rule results from an analysis of Miranda v.  Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966) which leads to the conclusion that Miranda is 
predominately a voluntariness decision concerned with the effects 
of the psychological coercion inherent in official questioning. See 
e.g.. Lederer, Miranda v. Arizona-The  Law Today, 78 Mil. L. 
Rev. 107, 130 (1977). 
The variant chosen adopts an objective test that complies with 
Miranda's intent by using the viewpoint of the suspect. The objec- 
tive nature of the test, however, makes it improbable that a sus- 
pect would be able to claim a custodial status not recognized  by 
the interrogator. The test makes the actual belief of the suspect ir- 
relevant because of the belief that it adds nothing in practice and 
would unnecessarily lengthen trial. 
Rule 305(d)(l)(B) codifies the Supreme Court's decisions in 
Brewer v.  Williams, 480 U.S.  387 (1977) and Massiah  v.  United 
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). As modified by Brewer, Massiah re-
quires that an accused or suspect be advised of his or her right to 
counsel prior to interrogation, whether open or surreptitious, if 
that interrogation takes place after either arraignment or indict- 
ment. As the Armed Forces lack any equivalent to those civilian 
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process has been  utilized as the functional equivalent. Accord- 
ingly, the right to counsel attaches if an individual is interrogated 
after preferral of charges or imposition of pretrial arrest, restric- 
tion, or confinement. The right is not triggered by apprehension 
or temporary detention. Undercover investigation  prior to the 
formal beginning of the criminal process will not be affected by 
this, but jailhouse interrogations will generally be prohibited. 
Compare Rule 305(d)(l)(B)  with  United States v. Hinkson,  17 
U.S.C.M.A.  126, 37 C.M.R. 390 (1967) and United States v. Gib-
son, 3 U.S.C.M.A.  746, 14C.M.R. 164(1954). 
(2)  Counsel. Rule 305(d)(2) sets forth the basic right to counsel 
at interrogations required under 1969 Manual Para. 140a(2). The 
Rule rejects the interpretation of Para. 140a(2) set forth in United 
States v. Hofbauer, 5 M.J. 409 (C.M.A.  1978) and United States v. 
Clark, 22 U.S.C.M.A.  570,48 C.M.R. 77 (1974) which held that 
the Manual only provided a right to military counsel at an inter- 
rogation in the event of financial indigency-  minimum Miranda 
rule. 
Rule 305(d)(2) clarifies prior practice insofar as it explicitly in- 
dicates that no right to individual military counsel of the suspect's 
or accused's choice exists. See e.g.,  United States v.  Wilcox, 3 M.J. 
803 (A.C.M.R.  1977). 
(e)  Notice to Counsel. Rule 305(e) is taken from United States v. 
McOmber, 1 M.J. 380 (C.M.A. 1976). The holding of that case 
bas been expanded slightly to clarify the situation in which an in- 
terrogator does not have actual knowledge that an attorney has 
been appointed for or retained by the accused or suspect with re- 
spect to the offenses, but reasonably should be so aware. In the ab- 
sence of the expansion, present law places a premium on law en- 
forcement ignorance and has the potential for encouraging 
perjury. The change rejects the view expressed in United States v. 
Roy, 4 M.J. 840 (A.C.M.R.  1978) which held that in the absence 
of bad faith a criminal investigator who interviewed the accused 
one day before the scheduled Article 32 investigation was not in 
violation of McOmber because he was unaware of the appoint- 
ment of counsel. 
Factors which may be considered in determining whether an 
interrogator should have reasonably known that an individual 
had counsel for purposes of this Rule include: 
Whether the interrogator knew that the person to be ques- 
tioned had requested counsel; 
Whether the interrogator knew that the person to be ques- 
tioned had already been involved in a pretrial proceeding at 
which he would ordinarily be represented by counsel; 
Any regulations governing the appointment of counsel; 
Local standard operating procedures; 
The interrogator's military assignment and training; and 
The interrogator's experience in the area of military criminal 
procedure. 
The standard involved is purely an objective one. 
(0 Exercise of  rights. Rule 305(0 restates prior law in that it re- 
quires all questioning to cease immediately upon the exercise of 
either the privilege against self-incrimination or the right to coun- 
sel. See Michigan  v.  Mosely, 423 U.S.  96 (1975). The Rule ex- 
pressly does not deal with the question of whether or when ques- 
tioning may be resumed following an exercise of a suspect's rights 
and does not necessarily prohibit it. The Committee notes that 
both the Supreme Court, see e.g., Brewer  v.  Williams, 480 U.S. 
387 (1977); Michigan v.  Mosely, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), and the Court 
of Military Appeals, see, e.g.,  United States v.  Hill, 5 M.J. 114 
(C.M.A. 1978hUnited States v. Collier, 1 M.J. 358 (C.M.A. 1976) 
have yet to fully resolve this matter. 
(g)  Waiver. The waiver provision of Rule 305(g) restates current 
military practice and is taken in part from Para. 140a(2) of the 
1969 Manual. 
Rule 305(g)(l) sets forth the general rule for waiver and follows 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,475 (1966). The Rule requires 
that an affirmative acknowledgment of the right be made before 
an adequate waiver may be found. Thus, three waiver questions 
are required under Rule 305(g): 
(1)  Do  you understand your rights? 
(2)  Do  you want a lawyer? 
(3)  Are you willing to make a statement? The  specific wording 
ofthe questions is not detailed by the Rule and any format may be 
used so long as the substantive content is present. 
Notwithstanding the above, Rule 305(g)(2),  following North 
Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979), recognizes that the right 
to counsel, and only the right to counsel, may be waived even ab- 
sent an affirmative declination. The burden of proof is on the 
prosecution in such a case to prove by  a preponderance that the 
accused waived the right to counsel. 
The second portion of Rule 305(g)(2) dealing with notice to 
counsel is new. The  intent behind the basic notice provision, Rule 
305(e), is to give meaning to the right to counsel by preventing in- 
terrogators who know or reasonably should know an individual 
has counsel from circumventing the right to counsel by obtaining 
a waiver from that person without counsel present. Permitting a 
Miranda type waiver in such a situation clearly would defeat the 
purpose of the Rule. Rule 305(g)(2) thus permits a waiver of the 
right to counsel when notice to counsel is required only if it can be 
demonstrated either that the counsel, after reasonable efforts, 
could not be notified, or that the counsel did not attend the inter- 
rogation which was scheduled within a reasonable period of time 
after notice was given. 
A statement given by an accused or suspect who can be shown 
to have his rights as set forth in this Rule and who intentionally 
frustrated the diligent attempt of the interrogator to comply with 
this Rule shall not be involuntary solely for failure to comply with 
the rights warning requirements of this Rule or of the waiver re- 
quirements.  United States v. Sikorski, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 345, 45 
C.M.R. 119 (1972). 
(h)  Non-military interrogations.  Para. 140a(2) of the 1969 Man- 
ual, which governed civilian interrogations of military personnel 
basically restated the holding of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966). Recognizing that the Supreme Court may modify the Mi- 
randa rule, the Committee has used the language in Rule 
305(h)(l) to make practice in this area dependent upon the way 
the Federal district courts would handle such interrogations. See 
Article 36. 
Rule 305(h)(2) clarifies the law of interrogations as it relates to 
interrogations conducted abroad by  officials of a foreign govern- 
ment or their agents w&k1the interrogation 1s not conducted, in- 
stigated, or participateii'PJby  military personnel or their agents. 
Such an interrogation ddJ?not require rights warnings under sub- 
divisions (c) or (d) or notice to counsel under subdivision (e). The 
only test to be applied in such a case is that of common law volun- 
tariness: whether a statement obtained during such an interroga- App. 22, M.R.E.  APPE 
tion was obtained through the use of "coercion, unlawful influ- 
ence, or unlawful inducement." Article 31(d). 
Whether an interrogation has been "conducted,  instigated, or 
participated in by military personnel or their agents" is a question 
of fact depending on the circumstances of the case. The Rule 
makes it clear that a United States personnel do not participate in 
an interrogation merely by being present at the scene of the inter- 
rogation, see United States v. Jones, 6 M.J. 226 (C.M.A. 1979) and 
the Analysis to Rule 3 1  l(c), or by taking steps which are in the 
best interests of the accused. Also, an interrogation is not "partic- 
ipated in" by  military personnel or their agents who act as inter- 
preters during the interrogation if there is no other participation. 
See Rule 3 1  l(c). The omission of express reference to interpreters 
in Rule 305(h)(2) was inadvertent. 
Rule 306.  Statements by one of several accused 
Rule 306 is taken from the fifth subparagraph Para. 1406 of the 
1969 Manual and states the holding of Bruton v.  United States, 
391 U.S. '123 (1968). The remainder of the associated material in 
the Manual is primarily concerned with the co-conspirator's  ex- 
ception to the hearsay rule and has been superseded by  adoption 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Rule 801. 
When it is impossible to effectively delete all references to a co- 
accused, alternative steps must be taken to protect the co-ac- 
cused. This may include the granting of a severance. 
The Committee was aware of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979) dealing with interlocking 
confessions. In view of the lack of a consensus in Parker, however, 
the Committee determined that the case did not provide a suffi- 
ciently precise basis for drafting a rule, and decided instead to ap- 
ply Bruton to interlocking confessions. 
Rule 311.  Evidence obtained from unlawful 
searches and seizures 
Rules 311-317  express the manner in  which  the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States applies to 
trials by court-martial, Cf: Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). 
(a)  Geneml rule. Rule 31 l(a) restates the basic exclusionary rule 
for evidence obtained from an  unlawful  search or seizure and is 
taken generally from Para.  152 of the 1969 Manual although 
much of the language of Para. 152 has been deleted for purposes 
of both clarity and brevity. The Rule requires suppression of de- 
rivative as well as primary evidence and follows the 1969 Manual 
rule by expressly limiting exclusion of evidence to that resulting 
from unlawful searches and seizures involving governmental ac- 
tivity. Those persons whose actions may thus give rise to exclu- 
sion are listed in Rule 3 11(c) and are taken generally from Para. 
152 with some expansion for purposes of clarity. Rule 31 1 recog- 
nizes that discovery of evidence may be so unrelated to an unlaw- 
ful search or seizure as to escape exclusion because it was not "ob- 
tained as a result"  of that search or seizure. 
The Rule recognizes that searches and seizures are distinct acts 
the legality of which  must be deter$ned  independently. Al- 
though a seizure will usually be unlawfuj if it follows an unlawful 
search, a seizure may be unlawful even if preceded by a lawful 
search. Thus, adequate cause to seize may be distinct from legal- 
ity of the search or observations which preceded it. Note in  this 
respect Rule 3 16(d)(4)(C), Plain View. 
(1)  Objection. Rule 311(a)(l) requires that a motion to sup- 
press or, as appropriate, an objection be made before evidence can 
be suppressed. Absent such motion or objection, the issue is 
waived. Rule 3  1  1(i). 
(2)  Adequate interest. Rule 31 1(a)(2) represents a complete re- 
drafting of the standing requirements found in  Para. 152 of the 
1969 Manual. The Committee viewed the Supreme Court deci- 
sion in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.  128 (1978), as substantially 
modifying the Manual language. Indeed, the very use of the term 
"standing"  was considered obsolete by a majority of the Commit- 
tee. The Rule distinguishes between searches and seizure. To have 
sufficient interest to challenge a search, a person must have "a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the person, place, or prop- 
erty searched."  "Reasonable expectation of privacy"  was used in 
lieu of "legitimate expectation of privacy,"  often used in Rakas, 
supra, as the Committee believed the two expressions to be identi- 
cal. The  Committee also considered that the expression "reasona- 
ble expectation" has a more settled meaning. Unlike the case of a 
search, an individual must have an interest distinct from an ex- 
pectation of privacy to challenge a seizure. When a seizure is in- 
volved rather than a search the only invasion of one's rights is the 
removal of the property in question. Thus, there must be some 
recognizable right to the property seized. Consequently, the Rule 
requires a "legitimate interest in the property or evidence seized." 
This will normally mean some form of possessory interest. Ade- 
quate interest to challenge a seizure does not per se give adequate 
interest to challenge a prior search that may have resulted in the 
seizure. 
The Rule also recognizes an accused's rights to challenge a 
search or seizure when the right to do so would  exist under the 
Constitution. Among other reasons, this provision  was included 
because of the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. United States, 
302 U.S. 257 (1960), which created what has been  termed the 
"automatic standing rule."  The viability of Jones after Rakas and 
other cases is unclear, and the Rule will apply Jones only to the 
extent that Jones is constitutionally mandated. 
February 1986 Amendment: The words "including seizures of 
the person"  were added to expressly apply the exclusionary rule 
to unlawful apprehensions and arrests, that is, seizures of the per- 
son. Procedures governing apprehensions and arrests are con- 
tained in R.C.M. 302. See also Mil.R.Evid. 316(c). 
(b) Exceptions:  Rule 31 1(b) states the holding of  Walder v. 
United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), and restates with minor change 
the rule as found in Para. 152 of the 1969 Manual. 
February 1986Amendment: Rule 31 l(b)(2) was added to incor- 
porate the "inevitable discovery"  exception to the exclusionary 
rule of Nix v.  Williams,  467 U.S. 431 (1984). There is authority 
for the proposition that this exception applies to the primary evi- 
dence tainted by an illegal search or seizure, as well as to evidence 
derived secondarily from a prior illegal search or seizure. United 
States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1982), cited with ap- 
proval  in Nix v. Williams, supra, 467 U.S. 431, n.2. See also United 
States v. Kozak, 12 M.J. 389 (C.M.A. 1982); United States v. Yan- 
dell, 13 M.J. 616 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982). Contra,  United States v. 
Ward, 19 M.J. 505 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984). There is also authority for 
the proposition  that the prosecution  must demonstrate that the 
lawful means which made discovery inevitable were possessed by 
the investigative authority and were being actively pursued prior 
to the occurrence of the illegal conduct which results in discovery - - 
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of the evidence (United States  v.  Satterjield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 
(I lth Cir. 1984)). 
As a logical extension of the holdings in Nix and United States 
v.  Kozak, supra, the leading military case, the inevitable discovery 
exception should also apply to evidence derived from apprehen- 
sions and arrests determined to be illegal under R.C.M. 302 (State 
v.  Nagel, 308 N.W.2d 539 (N.D. 1981) (alternative holding)). The 
prosecution may prove that, notwithstanding the illegality of the 
apprehension or arrest, evidence derived therefrom is admissible 
under the inevitable discovery exception. 
Rule 31 1(b)(3) was added in  1986 to incorporate the "good 
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule based on United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) and Massachusetts v.  Sheppard, 468 
U.S. 981 (1984). The  exception applies to search warrants and au- 
thorizations to search or seize issued by  competent civilian au- 
thority, military judges, military magistrates, and commanders. 
The test for determining whether the applicant acted in good faith 
is whether a reasonably  well-trained  law enforcement officer 
would have known the search or seizure was illegal despite the au- 
thorization. In Leon and Sheppard, the applicant's good faith was 
enhanced by their prior consultation with attorneys. 
The rationale articulated in Leon and Sheppard that the deter- 
rence basis of the exclusionary rule does not apply to magistrates 
,extends with equal force to search or seizure authorizations is- 
sued by commanders who are neutral and detached, as defined in 
United States v.  Ezell, 6 M.J. 307 (C.M.A. 1979). The United 
States Court of Military Appeals demonstrated in United States v. 
Stuckey, 10 M.J. 347 (C.M.A. 1981), that commanders cannot be 
equated constitutionally to magistrates. As a result, commanders' 
authorizations may be closely scrutinized for evidence of neutral- 
ity in deciding whether this exception will apply. In a particular 
case, evidence that the commander received the advice of a judge 
advocate prior to authorizing the search or seizure may be an im- 
portant consideration. Other considerations may include those 
enumerated in Ezell and: the level of command of the authorizing 
commander; whether the commander had training in the rules re- 
lating to search and seizure; whether the rule governing the 
search or seizure being litigated  was clear; whether the evidence 
supporting the authorization was given under oath; whether the 
authorization was reduced to writing; and whether the defect in 
the authorization was one of form or substance. 
As a logical extension of the holdings in Leon and Sheppard, 
the good faith exception also applies to evidence derived from ap- 
prehensions and arrests which are effected pursuant to an author- 
ization or warrant, but which are subsequently determined to 
have been defective under R.C.M. 302 (United States v.  Mahoney, 
712 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v.  Beck, 729 F.2d 1329 
(11th Cir. 1984)). The authorization or warrant must, however, 
meet the conditions set forth in Rule 31 l(b)(3). 
It is intended that the good faith exception will apply to both 
primary and derivative evidence. 
(c)  Nature of search or seizure. Rule 31 l(c) defines "unlawful" 
searches and seizures and makes it clear that the treatment of a 
search or seizure varies depending on the status of the individual 
or group conducting the search or seizure. 
(1)  Military personnel.  Rule 3 1  l(c)(l) generally restates prior 
law. A violation of a military regulation alone will not require ex- 
clusion of any resulting evidence. However, a violation of such a 
regulation that gives rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy 
may require exclusion. Compare United States v.  Dillard, 8 M.J. 
213 (C.M.A. 1980), with  United States v.  Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 
(1979). 
(2)  Other officials. Rule 31 l(c)(2) requires that the legality of a 
search or seizure performed by officials of the United States, of 
the District of Columbia, or of a state, commonwealth, or posses- 
sion or political subdivision thereof, be determined by  the princi- 
ples of law applied by  the United States district courts when 
resolving the legality of such a search or seizure. 
(3)  Officials of a  foreign  government or their agents. This provi- 
sion is taken in part from  United States v.  Jordan, 1 M.J. 334 
(C.M.A. 1976). After careful analysis, a majority of the Commit- 
' tee concluded that that portion of the Jordan opinion which pur- 
ported to require that such foreign searches be  shown to have 
complied with foreign law is dicta and lacks any specific legal au- 
thority to support it. Further the Committee noted  the fact that 
most foreign nations lack any law of search and seizure and that 
in some cases, e.g., Germany, such law as may exist is purely the- 
oretical and not subject to determination. The Jordan require-
ment thus unduly complicates trial without supplying any protec- 
tion  to the accused. Consequently, the Rule omits the 
requirement  in favor of a basic due process test. In determining 
which  version  of the various due process phrasings to utilize,  a 
majority of the Committee chose to use the language found in 
Para. l5Ob of the 1969 Manual rather than the language found in 
Jordan (which requires that the evidence not shock the con- 
science of the court) believing the Manual language is more ap- 
propriate to the circumstances involved. 
Rule 31 1(c) also indicates that persons who are present at a for- 
eign search or seizure conducted in a foreign nation have "not 
participated in"  that search or seizure due either to their mere 
presence or because of any actions taken to mitigate possible dam- 
age to property or person. The  Rule thus clarifies United States v. 
Jordan, 1 M.J. 334 (C.M.A.  1976) which stated that the Fourth 
Amendment would be applicable to searches and seizures con- 
ducted abroad by  foreign police when United States personnel 
participate in them. The Court's intent in Jordan was to prevent 
American authorities from sidestepping Constitutional protec- 
tions by using foreign personnel to conduct a search or seizure 
that would have been unlawful if conducted by Americans. This 
intention is safeguarded by the Rule, which applies the Rules and 
the Fourth Amendment when military personnel or their agents 
conduct, instigate, or participate in a search or seizure. The Rule 
only clarifies the circumstances in which a United States official 
will be deemed to have participated in a foreign search or seizure. 
This follows dicta in  United States v.  Jones, 6 M.J. 226, 230 
(C.M.A.  1979), which would require an "element  of causation," 
rather than mere presence.  It seems apparent that an American 
servicemember is far more likely to be well served by  United 
States presence-which  might mitigate foreign conduct-  than 
by  its absence. Further, international treaties frequently require 
United States cooperation with foreign law enforcement. Thus, 
the Rule serves all purposes by  prohibiting conduct by  United 
States officials which  might improperly support a search or 
seizure which would be',u~nlawful  if conducted in the United 
States while protecting b8ih the accused and international rela- 
tions. 
The Rule also permits use of United States personnel as inter- 
preters viewing such action as a neutral activity normally of po- App. 22, M.R.E.  APPE 
tential advantage to the accused. Similarly the Rule permits per- 
sonnel to take steps to protect the person or property of the 
accused because such actions are clearly in the best interests of 
the accused. 
(d)  Motion to suppress and objections. Rule 3  11(d) provides for 
challenging evidence obtained as a result of an allegedly unlawful 
search or seizure. The procedure, normally that of a motion to 
suppress, is intended with a small difference in the disclosure re- 
quirements to duplicate that required by Rule 304(d) for confes- 
sions and admissions, the Analysis of which is equally applicable 
here. 
Rule 31 l(d)(l) differs from Rule 304(c)(l) in that it is applica- 
ble only to evidence that the prosecution intends to offer against 
the accused. The broader disclosure provision  for statements by 
the accused was considered unnecessary. Like Rule 304(d)(2)(C), 
Rule 3  11(d)(2)(C) provides expressly for derivative evidence dis- 
closure of which is not mandatory as it may be unclear to the 
prosecution exactly what is derivative of a search or seizure. The 
Rule thus clarifies the situation. 
(e)  Burden ofproof: Rule 31 1(ej requires that a preponderance of 
the evidence standard be used in determining search and seizure 
questions. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972). Where the valid- 
ity of a consent to search or seize is involved, a higher standard of 
"clear  and convincing," is applied by Rule 314(e). This restates 
prior law. 
February 1986 Amendment: Subparagraphs (e)(l) and (2) were 
amended to state the burden of proof for the inevitable discovery 
and good faith exceptions to the exclusionary rule, as prescribed 
in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) and United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897 (1984), respectively. 
1993 Amendment: The amendment to Mil. R. Evid. 31 1(e)(2) 
was made to conform Rule 3  11 to the rule of New  York v. Harris, 
495 U.S. 14 (1990). The purpose behind the exclusion of deriva- 
tive evidence found during the course of an unlawful apprehen- 
sion in a dwelling is to protect the physical integrity of the dwell- 
ing not to protect suspects from subsequent lawful police 
interrogation.  See id. A suspect's subsequent statement made at 
another location that is the product of lawful police interrogation 
is not the fruit of the unlawful apprehension. The amendment 
also contains language added to reflect the "good faith" exception 
to the exclusionary role set forth in  United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S.  897 (1984), and the "inevitable discovery"  exception set 
forth in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
(f)  Defense evidence. Rule 31 l(f) restates prior law and makes it 
clear that although an accused is sheltered from any use at trial of 
a statement made while challenging a search or seizure, such 
statement may be used in a subsequent "prosecution for perjury, 
false swearing or the making of a false official statement." 
(g)  Scope of motions and objections challenging probable  cause. 
Rule 31 1(g)(2) follows the Supreme Court decision in Franks v. 
Delaware, 422 U.S. 928 (1978), see also United States v. Turck,  49 
C.M.R.  49, 53 (A.F.C.M.R.  1974), with minor modifications 
made to adopt the decision  to military procedures. Although 
Franks involved perjured affidavits by police, Rule 3  11 (a) is made 
applicable to information given by  government agents because of 
the governmental status of members of the armed services. The 
Rule is not intended to reach misrepresentations  made by infor- 
mants without any official connection. 
(h)  Objections to evidence seized  unlawfully. Rule 31 1(h) is new 
and is included for reasons of clarity. 
(i)  Effect of guilty plea. Rule 311(i) restates prior law. See, e.g., 
United States v. Hamil, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 110, 35 C.M.R. 82 (1964). 
Rule 312.  Body views and intrusions 
1984 Amendment: "Body"  was substituted for "bodily"  in the 
title and where appropriate in text. See  United States v. Arm- 
strong, 9 M.J. 374, 378 n.5 (C.M.A.  1980). 
(a)  General rule. Rule 312(a) limits all nonconsensual inspec- 
tions, searches, or seizures by providing standards for examina- 
tions of the naked body and bodily intrusions. An inspection, 
search, or seizure that would be lawful but for noncompliance 
with this Rule is unlawful within the meaning of Rule 31 1. 
(b)  Visual examination of the body. Rule 3  12(b) governs searches 
and examinations of the naked body and thus controls what has 
often been loosely termed "strip searches." Rule 312(b) permits 
visual examination of the naked body in a wide but finite range of 
circumstances. In doing so, the Rule strictly distinguishes be- 
tween visual examination of body cavities and actual intrusion 
into them. Intrusion is governed by Rule 312(c) and (e). Visual 
examination of the male genitals is permitted when a visual exam- 
ination is permissible under this subdivision. Examination of cavi- 
ties may include, when otherwise proper under the Rule, requir- 
ing the individual being viewed to assist in the examination. 
Examination of body cavities within the prison setting has been 
vexatious. See, e.g., Hanley v. Ward, 584 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1978); 
Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d  118, 131 (2d Cir. 1978), reversed sub 
nom Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.  520 (1979); Daughtry v. Harris, 476 
F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872 (1973); Fra-
zier v.  Ward, 426 F.Supp.  1354, 1362-67  (N.D.N.Y.  1977); 
Hodges v. Klein, 412 F.Supp. 896 (D.N.J. 1976). Institutional se- 
curity must be protected while at the same time only privacy in- 
trusions necessary should be imposed on the individual. The 
problem is particularly acute in this area of inspection of body 
cavities as such strong social taboos are involved. Rule 312(b)(2) 
allows examination of body cavities when reasonably necessary to 
maintain the security of the institution or its personnel. See, Bell 
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Examinations likely to be reason- 
ably necessary include examination upon entry or exit from the 
institution, examination subsequent to a personal visit, or exami- 
nation pursuant to a reasonably clear indication that the individ- 
ual is concealing property within a body cavity. Frazier v.  Ward, 
426 F.Supp. 1354 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Hodges v. Klein, 412 F.Supp. 
896 (D.N.J.  1976). Great deference should be given to the deci- 
sions of the commanders and staff of military confinement facili- 
ties. The concerns voiced by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit in Daughtry v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1973) about 
escape and related risks are likely to be particularly applicable to 
military prisoners because of their training in weapons and escape 
and evasion tactics. 
As required throughout Rule 3  12, examination of body cavities 
must be accomplished in a reasonable fashion. This incorporates 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), and recognizes soci- 
ety's  particularly sensitive attitude in this area. Where possible, 
examination should be made in private and by members of the 
same sex as the person being examined. 
1984 Amendment: In subsection (b)(2) and (c), "reasonable" 
replaced "rea1"before  "suspicion."  A majority of Circuit Courts ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
of Appeal have adopted a "reasonable suspicion" test over a "real 
suspicion"  test. See United States v. Klein, 592 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 
1979);  United States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1978); 
United States v.  Wardlaw, 576 F.2d 932 (1st Cir.  1978); United 
States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 902 (1977). But see United States v. Aman, 624 F.2d 91 1 (9th 
Cir. 1980). In practice, the distinction may be minimal. But see 
Perel v. Vanderford, 547 F.2d 278, 280 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977). How- 
ever, the real suspicion formulation has been criticized as poten- 
tially confusing. United States v. Asbury, supra at 976. 
(c)  Intrusion into body cavities. Actual intrusion into body cavi- 
ties, e.g.,the anus and vagina, may represent both a significant in- 
vasion of the individual's privacy and a possible risk to the health 
of the individual. Rule 312(c) allows seizure of property discov- 
ered in accordance with Rules 312(b), 312(c)(2), or 316(d)(4)(C) 
but requires that intrusion into such cavities be accomplished by 
personnel with appropriate medical qualifications. The Rule thus 
does not specifically require that the intrusion be made by a doc- 
tor, nurse, or other similar medical personnel although Rule 
312(g) allows the Secretary concerned to prescribe who may per- 
form such procedures. It is presumed that an object easily located 
by sight can normally be easily extracted. The requirements for 
appropriate medical qualifications, however, recognize that cir- 
cumstances may require more qualified personnel. This may be 
particularly true, for example, for extraction of foreign matter 
from a pregnant woman's  vagina. Intrusion should normally be 
made either by medical personnel or by persons with appropriate 
medical qualifications who are members of the same sex as the 
person involved. 
The Rule distinguishes between seizure of property previously 
located and intrusive searches of body cavities by requiring in 
Rule 312(c)(2)  that such searches be made only pursuant to a 
search warrant or authorization, based upon probable cause, and 
conducted by persons with appropriate medical qualifications. 
Exigencies do not permit such searches without warrant or au- 
thorization unless Rule 312(f) is applicable. In the absence of ex- 
press regulations issued by  the Secretary concerned pursuant to 
Rule 312(g), the determination as to which  personnel are quali- 
fied to conduct an intrusion should be made in accordance with 
normal procedures of the applicable medical facility. 
Recognizing the peculiar needs of confinement facilities and re- 
lated institutions, see, e.g., Bell  v.  Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), 
Rule 312(c) authorizes body cavity searches without prior search 
warrant or authorization when there is a "real suspicion that the 
individual is concealing weapons, contraband, or evidence of 
crime." 
(d)  Extraction of bodyjuids. Seizure of fluids from the body may 
involve self-incrimination questions pursuant to Article 31 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, and appropriate case law 
should be consulted prior to involuntary seizure. See generally 
Rule 301(a) and its Analysis. The Committee does not intend an 
individual's expelled breath to be within the definition  of "body 
fluids." 
The 1969 Manual Para. 152 authorization for seizure of bodily 
fluids when there has been inadequate time to obtain a warrant or 
authorization has been slightly modified. The prior language that 
there be "clear indication that evidence of crime will be found and 
that there is reason to believe that delay will threaten the destruc- 
tion of evidence" has been modified to authorize such a seizure if 
there is reason to believe that the delay "could  result in the de- 
struction of the evidence."  Personnel involuntarily extracting 
bodily fluids must have appropriate medical qualifications. 
Rule 312 does not prohibit compulsory urinalysis, whether 
random or not, made for appropriate medical purposes, see Rule 
312(f), and the product of such a procedure if otherwise admissi- 
ble may be used in evidence at a court-martial. 
1984 Amendment: The first word in the caption of subsection 
(d) was changed from "Seizure" to "Extraction." This is consis- 
tent with the text of subsection (d) and should avoid possible con- 
fusion about the scope of the subsection. Subsection (d) does not 
apply to compulsory production  of body fluids (e.g., being or- 
dered to void urine), but rather to physical extraction of body 
fluids (e.g., catheterization or withdrawal ofblood). See Murray v. 
Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74 (C.M.A.  1983). See also Analysis, 
Mil.R.Evid. 313(b). 
(e)  Other intrusive searches. The intrusive searches governed by 
Rule 3 12(e) will normally involve significant medical procedures 
including surgery and include any intrusion into the body includ- 
ing x-rays. Applicable civilian cases lack a unified approach to 
surgical intrusions, see, e.g.. United States v.  Crowder, 513 F.2d 
395 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Adams v. State, 299 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. 1973); 
Creamer v.  State, 299 Ga. 511,  192 S.E.2d  350 (1972), Note, 
Search and Seizure: Compelled Surgical Intrusion, 27 Baylor 
L.Rev. 305 (1975), and cases cited therein, other than to rule out 
those intrusions which are  clearly health threatening. Rule 31 2(e) 
balances the Government's  need for evidence with the individ- 
ual's privacy interest by allowing intrusion into the body of an ac- 
cused or suspect upon search authorization or warrant when con- 
ducted by person with "appropriate medical qualification," and 
by prohibiting intrusion when it will endanger the health of the 
individual.  This allows, however, considerable flexibility and 
leaves the ultimate issue to be determined under a due process 
standard of reasonableness. As the public's  interest in obtaining 
evidence from an individual other than an accused or suspect is 
substantially less than the person's  right to privacy in his or her 
body, the Rule prohibits the involuntary intrusion altogether if its 
purpose is to obtain evidence of crime. 
(f)  Intrusions for  valid medical purposes.  Rule 312(f) makes it 
clear that the Armed Forces retain their power to ensure the 
health of their members. A procedure conducted for valid medi- 
cal purposes may yield admissible evidence. Similarly, Rule 312 
does not affect in any way any procedure necessary for diagnostic 
or treatment purposes. 
(g)  Medical qualifications. Rule 312(g) permits but does not re- 
quire the Secretaries concerned to prescribe the medical qualifica- 
tions necessary for persons to conduct the procedures and exami- 
nations specified in the Rule. 
Rule 313.  Inspections and inventories in the 
armed forces 
Although inspections have long been recognized  as being nec- 
essary and legitimate exercises of a commander's powers and re- 
sponsibilities, see, e.g., United States v. Gebhart, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 
606,610 n.2,28 C.M.R. 172, 176 n.2 (1959), the 1969 Manual for 
Courts-Martial omitted discussion of inspections except to note 
that the Para. 152 restrictions on seizures were not applicable to 
"administrative  inspections."  The reason for the omission is 
likely that military inspections per se have traditionally been con- App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENDIX 22 
sidered administrative in nature and free of probable cause re- 
quirements. Cf: Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). Inspec- 
tions that have been utilized as subterfuge searches have been 
condemned. See, e.g., United States v. Lange, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 486, 
35 C.M.R. 458 (1965). Recent decisions of the United States 
Court of Military Appeals have attempted, generally without suc- 
cess, to define "inspection"  for Fourth Amendment evidentiary 
purposes, see, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 1 M.J. 397 (C.M.A. 
1976) (three separate opinions), and have been concerned with the 
intent, scope, and method of conducting inspections. See  e.g., 
United States v. Harris, 5 M.J. 44 (C.M.A. 1978). 
(a)  General rule. 
Rule 3  13 codifies the law of military inspections and invento- 
ries. Traditional terms used to describe various inspections, e.g. 
"shakedown  inspection"  or "gate search,"  have been abandoned 
as being conducive to confusion. 
Rule 3  13 does not govern inspections or inventories not con- 
ducted within  the armed forces. These civilian procedures must 
be evaluated under Rule 31 1(c)(2). In general, this means that 
such inspections and inventories need only be permissible under 
the Fourth Amendment in order to yield evidence admissible at a 
court-martial. 
Seizure of property located pursuant to a proper inspection or 
inventory must meet the requirements of Rule 316. 
(b)  Inspections. Rule 3  13(b) defines "inspection"  as an "examina- 
tion . . . conducted as an incident of command the primary pur- 
pose of which is to determine and to ensure the security, military 
fitness, or good order and discipline of the unit, organization, in- 
stallation, vessel, aircraft, or vehicle." Thus, an inspection is con- 
ducted for the primary function of ensuring mission readiness, 
and is a function of the inherent duties and responsibilities  of 
those in the military chain of command. Because inspections are 
intended to discover, correct, and deter conditions detrimental to 
military efficiency and safety, they must be considered as a condi- 
tion precedent to the existence of any effective armed force and in- 
herent in the very concept of a military unit. Inspections as a gen- 
eral legal concept have their constitutional origins in the very 
provisions of the Constitution which authorize the armed forces 
of the United States. Explicit authorization for inspections has 
thus been viewed in the past as unnecessary, but in light of the 
present ambiguous state of  the law; see, e.g. United States v. 
Thomas, supra;  United States v. Roberts, 2 M.J. 31 (C.M.A. 
1976), such authorization appears desirable. Rule 313 is thus, in 
addition to its status as a rule of evidence authorized by Congress 
under Article 36, an express Presidential authorization for inspec- 
tions with such authorization being grounded in the President's 
powers as Commander-in-Chief. 
The interrelationship of inspections and the Fourth Amend- 
ment is complex. The constitutionality of inspections is apparent 
and has been well recognized; see e.g., Unitedstates  v. Gebhart, 10 
C.M.A. 606, 610 n.2, 28 C.M.R. 172, 176 n.2. (1959). There are 
three distinct rationales which support the constitutionality of in- 
spections. 
The first such rationale is that inspections are not technically 
"searches"within  the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Cf: Air 
Pollution  Variance Board  v. Western Alfalfa Corps, 416 U.S. 861 
(1974); Hester v.  United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). The intent of 
the framers, the language of the amendment itself, and the nature 
of military life render the application of the Fourth Amendment 
to a normal inspection questionable. As the Supreme Court has 
often recognized, the "Military  is, 'by  necessity, a specialized so- 
ciety separate from civilian society."'  Brown  v. Glines, 444 U.S. 
348,354 (1980) citingparker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,734 (1974). As 
the Supreme Court noted in Glines, supra, Military personnel 
must be ready to perform their duty whenever the occasion arises. 
To ensure that they always are capable of performing their mis- 
sion promptly and reliably, the military services "must  insist 
upon a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in ci- 
vilian life."  444 U.S.  at 354 (citations omitted). An effective 
armed force without inspections is impossible-  a fact amply il- 
lustrated by the unfettered right to inspect vested in commanders 
throughout the armed forces of the world. As recognized  in 
Glines, supra, and Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), the way 
that the Bill of Rights applies to military personnel may be differ- 
ent from the way it applies to civilians. Consequently, although 
the Fourth Amendment is applicable to members of the armed 
forces, inspections may well not be"searches"  within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment by reason of history, necessity, and 
constitutional interpretation. If they are "searches,"  they are 
surely reasonable ones, and are constitutional on either or both of 
two rationales. 
As recognized by the Supreme Court, highly regulated indus- 
tries are subject to inspection without warrant, United States v. 
Biswell, 406 U.S. 31  1 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), both because of the necessity for such 
inspections and because of the "limited threats to ...j ustifiable ex- 
pectation of privacy."  United States v. Biswell, supra, at 316. The 
court in Biswell, supra, found that regulations of firearms traffic 
involved "large interests," that "inspection  is a crucial part of the 
regulatory scheme,"  and that when a firearms dealer enters the 
business "he does so with the  knowledge that his business records, 
firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection," 
406 U.S. 315, 316. It is clear that inspections within the armed 
forces are at least as important as regulation of firearms; that 
without such inspections effective regulation of the armed forces 
is impossible; and that all personnel entering the armed forces can 
be presumed to know that the reasonable expectation of privacy 
within the armed forces is exceedingly limited by comparison 
with civilian expectations. See e.g.,  Committee  for  G.I. Rights v. 
Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Under Colonnade Ca- 
tering, supra, and Bisell, supra, inspections are thus reasonable 
searches and may be made without warrant. 
An additional rationale for military inspection is found within 
the Supreme Court's other administrative inspection cases. See 
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 397 (1978); Camara v. Munic- 
ipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 
(1967). Under these precedents anadministrative inspection is 
constitutionally acceptable for health and safety purposes so long 
as such an inspection is first authorized by warrant. The warrant 
involved, however, need not be upon probable cause in the tradi- 
tional sense, rather the warrant may be issued "if reasonable legis- 
lative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspec- 
tion are satisfied . . ."  Camara, supra, 387 U.S. at 538. Military 
inspections are intended for health and safety reasons in a twofold 
sense: they protect the health and safety of the personnel in peace- 
time in a fashion somewhat analogous to that which protects the 
health of those in a civilian environment, and, by ensuring the 
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ment, and environment, they protect those personnel  from be- 
coming unnecessary casualties in the event of combat. Although 
Marshall  v.  Barlow's Inc., Camara, and See, supra, require war- 
rants, the intent behind the warrant requirement is to ensure that 
the person whose property is inspected is adequately notified that 
local law requires inspection, that the person is notified of the lim- 
its of the inspection, and that the person is adequately notified 
that the inspector is acting with proper authority. Camara v.  Mu-
nicipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967). Within the armed forces, 
the warrant requirement is met automatically if  an inspection is 
ordered by a commander, as commanders are empowered to 
grant warrants.  United States v.  Ezell, 6 M.J. 307 (C.M.A.  1979). 
More importantly, the concerns voiced by the court are met auto- 
matically within the military environment in any event as the 
rank and assignment of those inspecting and their right to do so 
are known to all. To  the extent that the search warrant require- 
ments are intended to prohibit inspectors from utilizing inspec- 
tions as subterfuge searches, a normal inspection fully meets the 
concern, and Rule 31 3(b) expressly prevents such subterfuges. 
The fact that an inspection that is primarily administrative in na- 
ture may result in a criminal prosecution is unimportant. Camara 
v. Municipal  Court, 387 U.S. 523,530-531  (1967). Indeed, admin- 
istrative inspections may inherently result in prosecutions be- 
cause such inspections are often intended to discover health and 
safety defects the presence of which are criminal offenses. Id. at 
531. What is important, to the extent that the Fourth Amend- 
ment is applicable, is protection from unreasonable violations of 
privacy. Consequently, Rule 313(b) makes it clear that an other- 
wise valid inspection is not rendered invalid solely because the in- 
spector has as his or her purpose a secondary "purpose of ob- 
taining evidence for use in a trial by court-martial or in other 
disciplinary proceedings . . ." An examination made, however, 
with a primary  purpose of prosecution is no longer an administra- 
tive inspection. Inspections are, as has been previously discussed, 
lawful acceptable measures to ensure the survival of the Ameri- 
can armed forces and the accomplishment of their mission. They 
do not infringe upon the limited reasonable expectation of privacy 
held by service personnel. It should be noted, however, that it is 
possible for military personnel to be granted a reasonable expecta- 
tion of privacy greater than the minimum inherently recognized 
by the Constitution. An installation commander might, for exam- 
ple, declare a BOQ sacrosanct and off limits to inspections. In 
such a rare case the reasonable expectation of privacy held by the 
relevant personnel could prevent or substantially limit the power 
to inspect under the Rule. See Rule 3  1  l(c). Such extended expec- 
tations of privacy may, however, be negated with adequate notice. 
An inspection "may be made 'of the whole or part' of a unit, or- 
ganization, installation, vessel, aircraft, or vehicle ...(and is) con- 
ducted as an incident of command."  Inspections are usually 
quantitative examinations insofar as they do not normally single 
out specific individuals or small groups of individuals. There is, 
however, no requirement that the entirety of a unit or organiza- 
tion be inspected. Unless authority to do so has been withheld by 
competent superior authority, any individual  placed  in a com- 
mand or  appropriate supervisory position may inspect the person- 
nel and property within his or her control. 
Inspections for contraband such as drugs have posed a major 
problem. Initially, such inspections were viewed simply as a form 
of health and welfare inspection, see, e.g., United States  v.  Unrue, 
22 C.M.A. 466, 47 C.M.R. 556 (1973). More recently, however, 
the Court of Military Appeals has tended to view them solely as 
searches for evidence of crime. See e.g. United States v. Roberts, 2 
M.J. 31 (C.M.A. 1976); but see United States v. Harris, 5 M.J. 44, 
58 (C.M.A. 1978). Illicit drugs, like unlawful weapons, represent, 
however, a potential threat to military efficiency of disastrous 
proportions. Consequently, it is entirely appropriate to treat in- 
spections intended to rid  units of contraband that would ad- 
versely affect military fitness as being health and welfare inspec- 
tions, see, e.g., Committee for  G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 
466 (D.C. Cir. 1975), and the Rule does so. 
A careful analysis of the applicable case law, military and civil- 
ian, easily supports this conclusion. Military cases have long rec- 
ognized the legitimacy of "health and welfare"  inspections and 
have defined those inspections as examinations intended to ascer- 
tain and ensure the readiness of personnel and equipment. See, 
e.g., United States v.  Gebhart, 10 C.M.A. 606,610 n.2, 28 C.M.R. 
172, 176 n.2 (1959); "(these)  types of searches are not to be con- 
fused with inspections of military personnel . . . conducted by  a 
commander in furtherance of the security of his command"; 
United States v. Brashears, 45 C.M.R. 438 (A.C.M.R. 1972), rev'd 
on other grounds, 21 C.M.A. 522,45 C.M.R. 326 (1972). Among 
the legitimate intents of a proper inspection is the location and 
confiscation  of unauthorized weapons. See, e.g., United States v. 
Grace, 19C.M.A. 409,410, 42C.M.R. 11, 12(1970).Thejustifi- 
cation for this conclusion is clear: unauthorized weapons are a se- 
rious danger to the health of military personnel and therefore to 
mission readiness. Contraband that "would  affect adversely the 
security, military fitness, or good order and discipline"  is thus 
identical with unauthorized weapons insofar as their effects can 
be predicted. Rule 3  13(b) authorizes inspections for contraband, 
and is expressly intended to authorize inspections for unlawful 
drugs. As recognized by the Court of Military Appeals in  United 
States v. Unrue, 22 C.M.A. 466, 469-70,  47 C.M.R. 556, 559-60 
(1973), unlawful drugs pose unique problems. If uncontrolled, 
they may create anUepidemic," 47 C.M.R. at 559. Their use is not 
only contagious as peer pressure in barracks, aboard ship, and in 
units, tends to impel the spread of improper drug use, but the ef- 
fects are known to render units unfit to accomplish their missions. 
Viewed in this light, it is apparent that inspection for those drugs 
which would "affect  adversely the security, military fitness, or 
good order and discipline of the command" is a proper adminis- 
trative intent well within the decisions of the United States Su- 
preme Court. See, e.g., Camara v.  Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 
(1967);  United States v.  Unrue, 22 C.M.A. 446, 471, 47 C.M.R. 
556, 561 (1973) (Judge Duncan dissenting). This conclusion is 
buttressed by the fact that members of the military have a dimin- 
ished expectation of privacy, and that inspections for such contra- 
band are "reasonable"  within the meaning of the Fourth Amend- 
ment. See, e.g., Committee  for  G.I. Rights  v.  Callaway, 518 F.2d 
466 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Although there are a number of decisions of 
the Court of Military Appeals that have called the legality of in- 
spections for unlawful drugs into question, see  United States v. 
Thomus, supra; United States  v.  Roberts, 2 M.J. 31 (C.M.A. 
1977), those decisions with their multiple opinions are not dispos- 
itive. Particularly important to this conclusion is the opinion of 
Judge Perry in  United States  v.  Roberts, supra. Three significant 
themes are present in the opinion: lack of express authority for 
such inspections, the perception  that unlawful drugs are merely App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENDIX 22 
evidence of crime, and the high risk that inspections may be used 
for subterfuge searches. The  new Rule is intended to resolve these 
matters fully. The Rule, as part of an express Executive Order, 
supplies the explicit authorization for inspections then lacking. 
Secondly, the Rule is intended to make plain the fact that an in- 
spection  that has as its object  the prevention  and correction of 
harmful to readiness  is far more than a hunt for evi-
dence. Indeed, it is the express judgment of the Committee that 
the uncontrolled use of unlawful drugs within the armed forces 
creates  a readiness crisis and that continued use of such drugs is 
totally incompatible with the possibility of effectively fielding mil- 
itary forces capable of accomplishing their assigned  mission. 
Thirdly, Rule 313(b) specifically deals with the subterfuge ques- 
tion in order to prevent improper use of inspections. 
Rule  13(b) requires that before an inspection intended  lo-
cate and confiscate unlawful weapons or other contraband, that 
would affect adversely the ... command"  may take place, there 
must be either "a  reasonable suspicion that such property is pre- 
sent in the command"  or the inspection must be "a  previously 
scheduled examination of the command."  The former require- 
ment requires that an inspection not previously scheduled be jus- 
tified  that such property is present in the 
command." This standard is intentionally minimal and requires 
that the person ordering the  have a  that 
is, under the circumstances, reasonable in nature. Probable cause 
is not required. Under the latter requirement, an inspection shall 
be scheduled sufficiently  far enough in advance as to eliminate 
any reasonable  roba ability that the inspection is being used as a 
subterfuge, i.e., that it is being used to search a given individual 
for evidence of crime when probable cause is lacking. Such sched- 
uling  be made as a matter  date Or event. In 
ins~ections  may be scheduled to take place on any specific date, 
e.g., a commander may decide on the first of a month to inspect on 
the 7th, 9th, and 21st, or on the occurrence of a specific event be- 
yond the usual control of the commander, e.g.9 whenever an alert 
is ordered, forces are deployed, a ship sails, the stock market 
reaches a certain level of activity, etc. It should be noted that 
"previously  scheduled" inspections that vest discretion in the in- 
spector are permissible when otherwise lawful. So long as the ex- 
amination, e.g., an entrance gate inspection, has been previously 
scheduled, the fact that reasonable exercise of discretion is in- 
volved in singling out individuals to be inspected is not improper; 
such inspection must not be in violation of the Equal Protection 
clause of the 5th Amendment or be used as a subterfuge intended 
to allow search of certain specific individuals. 
The Rule applies special restrictions to contraband inspections 
because of the inherent possibility that such inspection may be 
used as subterfuge searches. Although a lawful inspection may be 
conducted with a secondary motive to prosecute those found in 
possession of contraband, the primary motive must be adminis- 
trative in nature. The Rule recognizes the fact that commanders 
are ordinarily more concerned with removal of contraband from 
units- thereby eliminating its negative effects on unit readi- 
ness- than with prosecution of those found in possession of it. 
The fact that possession of contraband is itself unlawful renders 
the probability that an inspection may be a subterfuge somewhat 
higher than that for an inspection not intended to locate such ma- 
terial. 
An inspection which has as its intent, or one of its intents, in 
whole or in part, the discovery of contraband, however slight, 
must comply with the specific requirements set out in the Rule for 
inspections for contraband. An inspection which does not have 
Such an intent need not SO comply and will yield admissible evi- 
dence if contraband is found incidentally by the inspection. Con- 
traband is defined as material the possession of which is by its 
Very nature unlawful. Material may be declared to be unlawful by 
appropriate statute, regulation, or order. For example, if liquor is 
prohibited aboard ship, a shipboard inspection  for liquor must 
with the  for  for contraband. 
Before unlawful weapons or other contraband may be the sub- 
ject of an inspection under Rule 313(b), there must be a determi- 
nation  that "such property would affect adversely the security, 
military fitness, or good order and discipline of the command."  In 
the event of an adequate defense challenge under Rule 31 1 to an 
inspection for contraband, the prosecution must establish by a 
preponderance that such property would in fact so adversely af- 
fect the command. Although the question is an objective one, its 
resolution depends heavily on factors unique to the personnel or 
location inspected. If such contraband would adversely affect the 
ability of the command to complete its assigned mission  in any 
significant way, the burden is met. The nature of the assigned mis- 
sion is unimportant, for that is a matter within the prerogative of 
the chain of command  only, The expert testimony of those within 
the chain of command of a given unit is worthy of great weight as 
the only purpose for permitting such an inspection is to ensure 
military readiness, The physio]ogical or psychological effects  of a 
given drug on an individual are normally irrelevant except insofar 
as such evidence is relevant to the question ofthe user's ability to 
perform duties without impaired  efficiency.  inspections are 
generally quantitative examinations, the nature and amount of 
contraband sought is relevant to the question of the government's 
burden. The existence of five unlawful drug users in an Amy  di- 
vision, for example, is unlikely  to meet the Rule's  test involving 
adverse effect, but five users in an Army platoon may well do  so. 
~h~ Rule does not require that personnel to be inspected be 
given preliminary notice ofthe inspection  such advance 
notice may well be desirable as a matter of policy or in the inter- 
ests, as perhaps in gate inspections, of establishing an alternative 
basis, such as consent, for the examination, 
~~l~ 313(b) requires that inspections be conducted in a urea-
sonable fashion,"  ~h~ timing ofan  inspection and its nature may 
be of importance,  ti^^^ conducted at a highly unusual time 
are not inherently  especially when a legitimate 
reason of such timing is present. However, a 0200 inspection, for 
example, may be unreasonable depending upon the surrounding 
circumstances. 
The Rule expressly permits the use of "any  reasonable or natu- 
ral technological aid."  Thus, dogs may be used to detect contra- 
band in an otherwise valid inspection for contraband. This con- 
clusion follows directly from the fact that inspections for 
contraband conducted in compliance with Rule 313 are lawful. 
Consequently, the technique of inspection is generally unimpor- 
tant under the new rules. The Committee did, however, as a mat- 
ter of policy require that the natural or technological aid 
beMreasonable." 
Rule 313(b) recognizes and affirms the commander's power to 
conduct administrative examinations which are primarily  non- ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
prosecutorial in purpose. Personnel directing inspections for con- 
traband must take special care to ensure that such inspections 
comply with Rule 313(b) and thus do not constitute improper 
general searches or subterfuges. 
1984 Amendment: Much of the foregoing Analysis was ren- 
dered obsolete by amendments made in 1984. The third sentence 
of Rule 313(b) was modified and the fourth and sixth sentences 
are new. 
The fourth sentence is new. The Military Rule of Evidence did 
not previously expressly address production  of body fluids, per- 
haps because of United States  v. Ruiz, 23 U.S.C.M.A.  181, 48 
C.M.R. 797 (1974).  Ruiz was implicitly  overruled in  United 
States v. Armstrong, 9 M.J. 374 (C.M.A. 1980). Uncertainty con- 
cerning the course of the law of inspections may also have con- 
tributed to the drafter's silence on the matter. See United States v. 
Roberts, 2 M.J. 31 (C.M.A.  1976); United States v. Thomas, 1 
M.J. 397 (C.M.A. 1976). Much of the uncertainty in this area was 
dispelled in  United States  v. Middleton,  10 M.J.  123 (C.M.A. 
1981). See also Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74 (C.M.A. 1983). 
Despite the absence in the rules of express authority for com- 
pulsory production of body fluids, it apparently was the intent of 
the drafters to permit such production as part of inspections, rely- 
ing at least in  part on the medical purpose exception in 
Mil.R.Evid.  312(f). Mil.R.Evid.  312(d) applies only to noncon- 
sensual extraction (e.g., catheterization, drawing blood) of body 
fluids. This was noted in the Analysis, Mil.R.Evid. 312(d), which 
went on to state that "compulsory urinalysis, whether random or 
not, made for appropriate medical purposes, see Rule 3  12(f), and 
the product of such a procedure if otherwise admissible may be 
used at  a court-martial." 
There is considerable overlap between production of body fluid 
for a medical purpose under Mil.R.Evid. 312(f) and for determin- 
ing and ensuring military fitness in a unit, organization, installa- 
tion, vessel, aircraft, or vehicle. Frequently the two purposes are 
coterminous. Ultimately, the overall health of members of the or- 
ganization is indivisible from the ability of the organization to 
perform the mission. To  the extent that a "medical purpose"  em- 
braces anything relating to the physical or mental state of a per- 
son and that person's ability to perform assigned duties, then the 
two purposes  may be identical. Such a construction of "medical 
purpose"  would seem to swallow up the specific rules and limita- 
tions in Mil.R.Evid.  312(f),  however. Therefore, a distinction 
may be drawn between a medical purpose-  at least to the extent 
that that term is construed to concern primarily the health of the 
individual- and the goal of ensuring the overall fitness of the or- 
ganization. For example, it may be appropriate to test-  by com- 
pulsory production of urine-  persons whose duties entail highly 
dangerous or sensitive duties. The primary purpose of such tests 
is to ensure that the mission will be performed safely and prop- 
erly. Preserving the health of the individual is an incident-  albeit 
a very important one--  of that purpose. A person whose urine is 
found to contain dangerous drugs is relieved from duty during 
gunnery practice, for example, not so much to preserve that per- 
son's health as to protect the safety of others. On the other hand, a 
soldier who is extremely ill may be compelled to produce urine 
(or even have it extracted) not so much so that that soldier can re- 
turn to duty-  although the military has an interest in this-  as 
for that soldier's immediate health needs. 
Therefore, Mil.R.Evid. 313(b) provides an independent, al- 
though often closely related basis for compulsory production of 
body fluids, with Mil.R.Evid. 312(f). By expressly providing for 
both, possible confusion or an unnecessarily narrow construction 
under Mil.R.Evid. 3 12(f) will be avoided. Note that all of the re- 
quirements of Mil.R.Evid.  313(b) apply to an order to produce 
body fluids under that rule. This includes the requirement that 
the inspection be done in a reasonable fashion. This rule does not 
prohibit, as part of an otherwise lawful inspection, compelling a 
person to drink a reasonable amount of water in order to facilitate 
production of a urine sample. See  United States v. Mitchell,  16 
M.J. 654 (N.M.C.M.R. 1983). 
The sixth sentence is based  on United States v. Middleton. 
supra. Middleton was not decided on the basis of Mi1.R. Evid. 
3  13, as the inspection in Middleton occurred before the effective 
date of the Military Rules of Evidence. The Court discussed 
Mil.R.Evid. 313(b), but "did not now decide on the legality of this 
Rule (or) bless its application."  United States v. Middleton, supra 
at 131. However, the reasoning and the holding in Middleton sug-
gest that the former language in Mil.R.Evid. 313(b) may have es- 
tablished unnecessary burdens for the prosecution, yet still have 
been inadequate to protect against subterfuge inspections, under 
some circumstances. 
The former language allowed an inspection for "unlawful 
weapons and other contraband when such property would affect 
adversely the security, military fitness, or good order and disci- 
pline of the command and when (1) there is a reasonable suspi- 
cion that such property is present in the command or (2) the ex- 
amination is a  previously scheduled examination of  the 
command."  This required a case-by-case showing of the adverse 
effects of the weapons or contraband (including controlled sub- 
stances) in the particular unit, organization, installation, aircraft, 
or vehicle examined. See Analysis, Mil.R.Evid. 313(b). In addi- 
tion, the examination had to be based on a reasonable suspicion 
such items were present, or be previously scheduled. 
Middleton upheld an inspection which had as one of its pur- 
poses the discovery of contraband-  i.e., drugs. Significantly, 
there is no indication in Middleton that a specific showing of the 
adverse effects of such contraband in the unit or organization is 
necessary. The court expressly recognized (see United States v. 
Middleton, supra at 129; cf. United States v.  Trottier, 9 M.J. 337 
(C.M.A. 1980)) the adverse effect of drugs on the ability of the 
armed services to perform the mission without requiring evidence 
on the point. Indeed, it may generally be assumed that if it is ille- 
gal to possess an item under a statute or lawful regulation, the ad- 
verse effect of such item on security, military fitness, or good or- 
der and discipline is established by  such illegality,  without 
requiring the commander to personally analyze its effects on a 
case-by-case basis and the submission of evidence at trial. The  de- 
fense may challenge the constitutionality  of the statute or the le- 
gality of the regulation (cf. United States  v.  Wilson, 12 
U.S.C.M.A. 165,30  C.M.R. 165 (1961); United States v. Nation, 9 
U.S.C.M.A. 724, 26 C.M.R. 504 (1958)) but this burden falls on 
the defense. Thus, this part of the former test is deleted as unnec- 
essary. Note, however, that it may be necessary to demonstrate a 
valid military purpose to inspect for some noncontraband items. 
See  United States v. Brown, 12 M.J. 420 (C.M.A. 1982). 
Middleton upheld broad authority in the commander to inspect 
for contraband, as well as other things, "when  adequate safe- App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENDIX 22 
guards are present which assure that the 'inspection'  was really 
intended to determine and assure the readiness of the unit in- 
spected, rather than merely to provide a subterfuge for avoiding 
limitations that apply to a search and seizure in a criminal investi- 
gation."  As noted above, the Court in Middleton expressly re- 
served judgment whether Mil.R.Evid. 313(b) as then written sat- 
isfied this test. 
The two prongs of the second part of the former test were in- 
tended to prevent subterfuge. However, they did not necessarily 
do so. Indeed, theUreasonable  suspicion"  test could be read to ex- 
pressly authorize a subterfuge search. See, e.g., United States v. 
Lange, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 486, 35 C.M.R. 458 (1965). The "previ- 
ously scheduled" test is an excellent way to prove that an inspec- 
tion was not directed as the result of a reported offense, and the 
new formulation so retains it. However, it alone does not ensure 
absence of prosecutorial motive when specific individuals are sin- 
gled out, albeit well in advance, for special treatment. 
At the same time, the former test could invalidate a genuine in- 
spection which had no prosecutorial  purpose. For example, a 
commander whose unit was suddenly alerted for a special mission 
might find it necessary, even though the commander had no ac- 
tual suspicion contraband is present, to promptly inspect for con- 
traband, just  to be certain none was present. A commander in 
such a position should not be prohibited from inspecting. 
The new language removes these problems and is more com- 
patible with Middleton. It does not establish unnecessary hurdles 
for the prosecution.  A commander may inspect for contraband 
just as for any other deficiencies, problems, or conditions, without 
having to show any particular justification for doing so. As the 
fifth sentence in the rule indicates, any examination made prima- 
rily for the purpose of prosecution is not a valid inspection under 
the rule. The sixth sentence identifies those situations which, ob- 
jectively, raise a strong likelihood of subterfuge. These situations 
are based  on  United States v. Lange, supra and United States v. 
Hay, 3 M.J. 654, 655-56  (A.C.M.R.  1977) (quoted in  United 
States v. Middleton, supra at 127-28  n.7; see also United States v. 
Brown, supra). "Specific  individuals"  means persons named or 
identified on the basis of individual characteristics, rather than by 
duty assignment or membership in a subdivision of the unit, or- 
ganization, installation, vessel, aircraft, or vehicle, such as a pla- 
toon or squad, or on  a random basis. See United States v. Harris, 5 
M.J. 44 (C.M.A. 1978). The  first sentence of subsection (b) makes 
clear that a part of one of the listed categories may be inspected. 
Cf:United States v. King, 2 M.J. 4 (C.M.A. 1976). 
The  existence of one or more of the three circumstances identi- 
fied in the fifth sentence does not mean that the examination is, 
perse, not an inspection. The prosecution may still prove, by clear 
and convincing evidence, that the purpose of the examination was 
to determine and ensure security, military fitness, and good order 
and discipline, and not for the primary purpose of prosecution. 
For example, when an examination is ordered immediately fol- 
lowing a report of a specific offense in the unit, the prosecution 
might prove the absence of subterfuge by showing that the evi- 
dence of the particular offense had already been recovered  when 
the inspection was ordered and that general concern about the 
welfare of the unit was the motivation for the inspection. Also, if a 
commander received a report that a highly dangerous item (e.g., 
an explosive) was present in the command, it might be proved 
that the commander's concern about safety was the primary pur- 
pose for the examination, not prosecution.  In the case in which 
specific individuals are examined, or subjected to more intrusive 
examinations than others, these indicia of subterfuge might be 
overcome by proof that these persons were not chosen with a view 
of prosecution, but on neutral ground or for an independent pur- 
pose- e.g., individuals were selected because they were new to 
the unit and had not been thoroughly examined previously. These 
examples are not exclusive. 
The absence of any of the three circumstances in the fifth sen- 
tence, while indicative of a proper inspection, does not necessarily 
preclude a finding of subterfuge. However, the prosecution need 
not meet the higher burden of persuasion when the issue is 
whether the commander's purpose was prosecutorial,  in the ab- 
sence of these circumstances. 
The new language provides objective criteria by which to mea- 
sure a subjective standard, i.e., the commander's purpose. Be- 
cause the standard is ultimately subjective, however, the objective 
criteria are not conclusive. Rather they provide concrete and real- 
istic guidance for commanders to use in the exercise of their in- 
spection power, and for judicial authorities to apply in reviewing 
the exercise of that power. 
(c)  Inventories.  Rule 313(c) codifies prior law by recognizing the 
admissibility of evidence seized via bona fide inventory. The  ratio- 
nale behind this exception to the usual probable cause require- 
ment is that such an inventory is not prosecutorial in nature and is 
a reasonable intrusion. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364 (1976). 
An inventory may not be used as subterfuge search,  United 
States v. Mossbauer, 20 C.M.A. 584,44 C.M.R.  14 (1971), and the 
basis for an inventory and the procedure utilized may be subject 
to challenge in any specific case. Inventories of the property of de- 
tained individuals have usually been sustained. See, e.g., United 
States v. Brashears, 21 C.M.A. 552,45 C.M.R. 326 (1972). 
The committee does not, however, express an opinion as to the 
lawful scope of an inventory. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opper- 
man, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), in which the court did not determine 
the propriety of opening the locked trunk or  glovebox during the 
inventory of a properly impounded automobile. 
Inventories will often be governed by regulation. 
Rule 314.  Searches not requiring probable cause 
The list of non-probable cause searches contained within Rule 
314 is intended to encompass most of the non-probable cause 
searches common in  the military  environment. The term 
"search"  is used in Rule 314 in its broadest non-technical sense. 
Consequently, a "search"  for purposes of Rule 314 may include 
examinations that are not "searches"  within the narrow technical 
sense of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Rule 3146). 
Insofar as Rule 314 expressly deals with a given type of search, 
the Rule pre-empts the area in that the Rule must be followed 
even should the Supreme Court issue a decision more favorable to 
the Government. If such a decision involves a non-probable cause 
search of a type not addressed in Rule 314, it will be fully applica- 
ble to the Armed Forces under Rule 3 14(k) unless other authority 
prohibits such application. 
(a)  General Rule. Rule 314(a) provides that evidence obtained 
from a search conducted pursuant to Rule 314 and not in viola- 
tion of another Rule, e.g.,Rule 312, Bodily Views and Intrusions, 
is admissible when relevant and not otherwise inadmissible. ANALYSIS OF THE MlLlTP  rRY RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
(b)  Border Searches. Rule 314(b) recognizes that military person- 
nel may perform border searches when authorized to do so by 
Congress. 
(c)  Searches upon entry to  United States installations, aircraft, 
and vessels abroad. Rule 3  14(c) follows the opinion of Chief Judge 
Fletcher in United States v. Rivera, 4 M.J. 215 (C.M.A. 1978), in 
which he applied 4 M.J. 215, 216 n.2, the border search doctrine, 
to entry searches of United States installations or enclaves on for- 
eign soil. The  search must be reasonable and its intent, in line with 
all border searches, must be primarily prophylactic. This author- 
ity is additional to any other powers to search or inspect that a 
commander may hold. 
Although Rule 314(c) is similar to Rule 313(b), it is distinct in 
terms of its legal basis. Consequently, a search performed pursu- 
ant to Rule 314(c) need not comply with the burden of proof re- 
quirement found in Rule 313(b) for contraband inspections even 
though the purpose of the 314(c) examination is to prevent intro- 
duction of contraband into the installation, aircraft or vessel. 
A Rule 3  14(c) examination must, however, be for a purpose de- 
nominated in the rule and must be rationally related to such pur- 
pose. A search pursuant to Rule 314(c) is possible only upon en- 
try to the installation, aircraft or vessel, and an individual who 
chooses not to enter removes any basis for search pursuant to 
Rule 314(c). The Rule does not indicate whether discretion may 
be vested in the person conducting a properly authorized Rule 
314(c) search. It was the opinion of members of the Committee, 
however, that such discretion is proper considering the Rule's un- 
derlying basis. 
1984 Amendment: Subsection (c) was amended by adding "or 
exit from" based on United States v. Alleyne, 13 M.J. 331 (C.M.A. 
1982). 
(d)  Searches of government property. Rule 314(d) restates prior 
law, see, e.g.,  United States v.  Weshenfelder, 20 C.M.A. 416, 43 
C.M.R. 256 (1971), and recognizes that personnel normally do 
not have sufficient interest in government property to have a rea- 
sonable expectation of privacy in it. Although the rule could be 
equally well denominated as a lack of adequate interest, see, Rule 
31  1(a)(2), it is more usually expressed as a non-probable cause 
search. The Rule recognizes that certain government property 
may take on aspects of private property allowing an individual to 
develop a reasonable expectation of privacy surrounding it. Wall 
or floor lockers in living quarters issued for the purpose of storing 
personal property will normally, although not necessarily,  in- 
volve a reasonable expectation of privacy. It was the intent of the 
Committee that such lockers give rise to a rebuttable presumption 
that they do have an expectation of privacy, and that insofar as 
other government property is concerned such property gives rise 
to a rebuttable presumption that such an expectation is absent. 
Public property, such as streets, parade grounds, parks, and of- 
fice buildings rarely if ever involves any limitations upon the abil- 
ity to search. 
(e)  Consent Searches. 
(1)  General rule. The rule in force before 1980 was found in 
Para. 152, MCM, 1969 (Rev.), the relevant sections of which 
state: 
A search of one's person with his freely given consent, or of 
property with the freely given consent of a person entitled in the 
situation involved to waive the right to immunity from an unrea- 
sonable search, such as an owner, bailee, tenant, or occupant as 
the case may be under the circumstances [is lawful]. 
If the justification for using evidence obtained as a result of a 
search is that there was a freely given consent to the search, that 
consent must be shown by clear and positive evidence. 
Although Rule 314(e) generally restates prior law without sub- 
stantive change, the language has been recast. The basic rule for 
consent searches is taken from Schneckloth  v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 21 8 (1973). 
(2)  Who may consent. The Manual language illustrating when 
third parties may consent to searches has been omitted as being 
insufficient and potentially misleading and has been replaced by 
Rule 3  14(e)(2). The  Rule emphasizes the degree of control that an 
individual has over property and is intended to deal with circum- 
stances in which third parties may be asked to grant consent. See, 
e.g.,  Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); Stoner v. California, 376 
U.S. 483 (1964);  United States v. Mathis,  16 C.M.A. 511, 37 
C.M.R. 142 (1967). It was the Committee's intent to restate prior 
law in this provision and not to modify it in any degree. Conse- 
quently, whether an individual may grant consent to a search of 
property not his own is a matter to be determined on a case by 
case basis. 
(3)  Scope  of consent. Rule 314(e)(3)  restates prior law. See, 
e.g., United States v. Castro, 23 C.M.A. 166, 48 C.M.R. 782 
(1974);  United States v.  Cady, 22 C.M.A. 408, 47 C.M.R. 345 
(1973). 
(4)  Voluntariness. Rule 314(e)(3) requires that consent be vol- 
untary to be valid. The  second sentence is taken in substance from 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 24849  (1973). 
The specific inapplicability  of Article 3 l(b) warnings follows 
Schneckloth and complies with United States v. Morris, 1 M.J. 352 
(C.M.A. 1976) (opinion by Chief Judge Fletcher with Judge Cook 
concurring in the result).  Although not required, such warnings 
are, however, a valuable indication  of a voluntary consent. The 
Committee does not express an opinion as to whether rights 
warnings are required prior to obtaining an admissible statement 
as to ownership or possession  of property from a suspect when 
that admission is obtained via a request for consent to search. 
(5)  Burden of proof: Although not constitutionally required, 
the burden of proof in Para. 152 of the 1969 Manual for consent 
searches has been retained in a slightly different form-  "clear 
and convincing"  in  place of  'clear and positiveu-  on the pre- 
sumption that the basic nature of the military structure renders 
consent more suspect than in the civilian community. "Clear and 
convincing evidence"  is intended to create a burden of proof be- 
tween the preponderance and beyond a reasonable doubt stan- 
dards. The Rule expressly rejects a different burden for custodial 
consents. The law is this area evidences substantial confusion 
stemming initially from language used in United States v. Justice, 
13 C.M.A. 31, 34, 32 C.M.R. 31, 34 (1962):"It  [the burden of 
proof] is an especially heavy obligation if the accused was in cus- 
tody ...", which was taken in turn from a number of civilian fed- 
eral court decisions. While custody should be a factor resulting in 
an especially careful scrutiny of the circumstances surrounding a 
possible consent, there appears to be no legal or policy reason to 
require a higher burden of proof. 
(0 Frisks incident  to a lawful stop. Rule 314(f) recognizes a frisk 
as a lawful search when performed pursuant to a lawful stop. The 
primary authority for the stop and frisk doctrine is Terry v. Ohio, App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENIDIX 22 
392 U.S. 1 (1968), and the present Manual lacks any reference to 
either stops or frisks. Hearsay may be used in deciding to stop and 
frisk. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). 
The  Rule recognizes the necessity for assisting police or law en- 
forcement personnel in their investigations but specifically does 
not address the issue of the lawful duration of a stop nor of the na- 
ture of the questioning,  if any, that may be involuntarily ad- 
dressed to the individual stopped. See Brown v. Texas, 440 U.S. 
903 (1979), generally prohibiting such questioning in civilian life. 
Generally, it would appear that any individual who can be law- 
fully stopped is likely to be a suspect for the purposes of Article 
31(b). Whether identification can be demanded of a military sus- 
pect withont Article 31(b) warnings is an open question and may 
be dependent upon whether the identification of the suspect is rel- 
evant to the offense possibly involved. See Lederer, Rights Warn- 
ings in the Armed Services, 72 Mil.L.Rev. 1,4@41  (1976). 
1984 Amendment: Subsection (f)(3) was added based on Michi-
gan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
(g)  Searches incident to a lawful apprehension. The 1969 Manual 
rule was found in Para. 152 and stated: 
A search conducted as an incident of lawfully apprehending a 
person, which may include a search of his person, of the clothing 
he is wearing, and of property which, at time of apprehension, is 
in his immediate possession or control, or of an area from within 
which he might gain possession  of weapons or destructible evi- 
dence; and a search of the place where the apprehension is made 
[is lawful]. 
Rule 314(g) restates the principle found within the Manual text 
but utilizes new and clarifying language. The Rule expressly re- 
quires that an apprehension be lawful. 
(I) General Rule. Rule 314(g)(l) expressly authorizes the 
search of a person of a lawfully apprehended individual without 
further justification. 
(2)  Search for  weapons and destructible evidence. Rule 
314(g)(2) delimits the area that can be searched pursuant to an 
apprehension and specifies that the purpose of the search is only 
to locate weapons and destructible evidence. This is a variation of 
the authority presently in the Manual and is based upon the Su- 
preme Court's decision  in  Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 
(1969). It is clear from the Court's decision in  United States v. 
Chadwick, 438 U.S. 1 (1977), that the scope of a search pursuant 
to a lawful apprehension must be limited to those areas which an 
individual could reasonably reach and utilize. The search of the 
area within the immediate control of the person apprehended is 
thus properly viewed as a search based upon necessity-  whether 
one based upon the safety of those persons apprehending or upon 
the necessity to safeguard evidence. Chadwick, holding that po- 
lice could not search a sealed footlocker pursuant to an arrest, 
stands for the proposition that the Chimel search must be limited 
by its rationale. 
That portion of the 1969 Manual subparagraph dealing with 
intrusive body searches has been incorporated into Rule 312. Sim- 
ilarly that portion of the Manual dealing with search incident to 
hot pursuit of a person has been incorporated into that portion of 
Rule 315 dealing with exceptions to the need for search warrants 
or authorizations. 
1984 Amendment: Subsection (g)(2) was amended by adding 
language to clarify the permissible scope of a search incident to 
apprehension of  the occupant of an automobile based on New 
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).  The holding of the Court 
used the term "automobile"  so that word is used in the rule. It is 
intended that the term "automobile"  have the broadest possible 
meaning. 
(3)  Examination for other persons.  Rule 314(g)(3) is intended 
to protect personnel performing apprehensions. Consequently, it 
is extremely limited in scope and requires a good faith and reason- 
able belief that persons may be present who might interfere with 
the apprehension of individuals. Any search must be directed to- 
wards the finding of such persons and not evidence. 
An unlawful apprehension of the accused may make any subse- 
quent statement by the accused inadmissible,  Dunaway v. New 
York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). 
(h)  Searches within jails,  confinement facilities,  or similar facili- 
ties. Personnel confined in a military confinement facility or 
housed in a facility serving a generally similar purpose will nor- 
mally yield any normal Fourth Amendment protections to the 
reasonable needs of the facility. See,  United States v. Maglito, 20 
C.M.A. 456,43 C.M.R. 296 (1971). See also Rule 312. 
(i)  Emergency searches  to save  life or for  related purpose.  This 
type of search is not found within the 1969 Manual provision but 
is in accord with prevailing civilian and military case law. See, 
United States v.  Yarborough, 50 C.M.R.  149, 155 (A.F.C.M.R. 
1975). Such a search must be conducted in good faith and may 
not be a subterfuge in order to circumvent an individual's Fourth 
Amendment protections. 
(i) Searches of open fields or woodlands. This type of search is 
taken from 1969 Manual paragraph 152. Originally recognized in 
Hester v.  United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), this doctrine was re- 
vived by the Supreme Court in Air Pollution  Variance Board  v. 
Western Alfalfa  Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974). Arguably, such a 
search is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend- 
ment. In Hester, Mr. Justice Holmes simply concluded that "the 
special protection accorded by the 4th Amendment to the people 
in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects' is not extended to 
the open fields."  265 U.S. at 59. In relying on Hester, the Court in 
Air Pollution  Variance Board noted that it was "not  advised that 
he [the air pollution investigator] was on premises from which the 
public was excluded." 416 U.S. at 865. This suggests that the doc- 
trine of open fields is subject to the caveat that a reasonable expec- 
tation of privacy may result in application of the Fourth Amend- 
ment to open fields. 
(k)  Othersearches. Rule 314(k) recognizes that searches of a type 
not specified within the Rule but proper under the Constitution 
are also lawful. 
Rule 315.  Probable cause searches 
(a)  General Rule-  Rule 315 states that evidence obtained pursu- 
ant to the Rule is admissible when relevant and not otherwise ad- 
missible under the Rules. 
(b)  Definitions. 
(1)  Authorization to search. Rule 3  15(b)(l) defines an "authori- 
zation to search"  as an express permission  to search issued by 
proper military authority whether commander or judge. As such, 
it replaces the term "search warrant"which is used in the Rules 
only when referring to a permission to search given by proper ci- 
vilian authority. The change in terminology  reflects the unique 
nature of the armed forces and of the role played by commanders. ANALYSIS OF  THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
(2)  Search warrant. The expression "search  warrant"  refers 
only to the authority to search issued by proper civilian authority. 
(c)  Scope of authorization.-  Rule 315(c) is taken generally from 
Para. 152(1>-(3) of the 1969 Manual except that military jurisdic- 
tion to search upon military installations or in military aircraft, 
vessels, or vehicles has been clarified. Although civilians and ci- 
vilian institutions on military installations are subject to search 
pursuant to a proper search authorization, the effect of any appli- 
cable federal statute or regulation must be considered. E.g., the 
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. $9 3401-3422, 
and DOD Directive 5400.12 (Obtaining Information From Fi- 
nancial Institutions). 
Rule 31 5(c)(4)  is a modification  of prior law. Subdivision 
(c)(4)(A) is intended to ensure cooperation between Department 
of Defense agencies and other government agencies by requiring 
prior consent to DOD searches involving such other agencies. Al- 
though Rule 315(c)(4)(B) follows the 1969 Manual in permitting 
searches of "other property in a foreign country" to be authorized 
pursuant to subdivision (d), subdivision (c) requires that all appli- 
cable treaties be complied with or that prior concurrence with an 
appropriate representative of the foreign nation be obtained if no 
treaty or agreement exists. The Rule is intended to foster coopera- 
tion with host nations and compliance with all existing interna- 
tional agreements. The rule does not require specific approval by 
foreign authority of each search (unless,  of course, applicable 
treaty requires such approval); rather the Rule permits prior 
blanket or categorical approvals. Because Rule 315(c)(4)  is de- 
signed to govern intragovernmental and international relation- 
ships rather than relationships between the United States and its 
citizens, a violation of these provisions does not render a search 
unlawful. 
(d)  Power to authorize-Rule  315(d) grants power to authorize 
searches to impartial individuals of the included classifications. 
The  closing portion of the subdivision clarifies the decision of the 
Court of Military Appeals in  United States v.  Ezell, 6 M.J. 307 
(C.M.A. 1979), by  stating that the mere presence of an authoriz- 
ing officer at a search does not deprive the individual of an other- 
wise neutral character. This is in conformity with the decision of 
the United States Supreme Court in Lo-Ji Sales v. New  York, 442 
U.S. 319 (1979), from which the first portion of the language has 
been  taken. The subdivision also recognizes the propriety of a 
commander granting a search authorization after taking a pretrial 
action equivalent to that which may be taken by a federal district 
judge. For example, a commander might authorize use of a drug 
detector dog, an action arguably similar to the granting of wiretap 
order by a federal judge, without necessarily depriving himself or 
herself of the ability to later issue a search authorization. The 
question would be whether the commander has acted in the first 
instance in an impartial judicial capacity. 
(1)  Commander- Rule 315(d)(l)  restates the prior rule by 
recognizing the power of commanders to issue search authoriza- 
tions upon probable cause. The  Rule explicitly allows non-officers 
serving in  a position designated by the Secretary concerned as a 
position of command to issue search authorizations. If a non-of- 
ficer assumes command of a unit, vessel, or aircraft, and the com- 
mand position is one rgcognized by regulations issued by the Sec- 
retary concerned, e.g., command of a company, squadron, vessel, 
or aircraft, the non-officer  commander is empowered to grant 
search authorizations under this subdivision whether the assump- 
tion of command is pursuant to express appointment or devolu- 
tion of command. The power to do so is thus a function of posi- 
tion rather than rank. 
The Rule also allows a person serving as officer-in-charge or in 
a position designated by the Secretary as a position analogous to 
an officer-in-charge to grant search authorizations. The term "of- 
ficer-in-charge"  is statutorily defined, Article 1(4), as pertaining 
only to the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps, and the 
change will allow the Army and Air Force to establish an analo- 
gous position should they desire to do so in which case the power 
to authorize searches would exist although such individuals 
would not beC'officers-in-charge" as that term is used  in the 
U.C.M.J. 
(2)  Delegee- Former subsection (2), which purported to al- 
low delegation of the authority to authorize searches, was deleted 
in  1984, based on  United States  v. Kalscheuer, 11 M.J. 373 
(C.M.A.  1981). Subsection (3) was renumbered as subsection (2). 
(3)  Military judge-  Rule 315(d)(2) permits military judges to 
issue search authorizations when authorized to do so by the Sec- 
retary concerned. MILITARY MAGISTRATES MAY ALSO 
BE EMPOWERED TO  GRANT SEARCH AUTHORIZA- 
TIONS. This recognizes the practice now in use in the Army but 
makes such practice discretionary with the specific Service in- 
volved. 
(e)  Power to search. Rule 315(e) specifically denominates those 
persons who may conduct or authorize a search upon probable 
cause either pursuant to a search authorization or when such an 
authorization is not required for reasons of exigencies. The Rule 
recognizes, for example, that all officers and non-commissioned 
officers have inherent power to perform a probable cause search 
without obtaining of a search authorization under the circum- 
stances set forth in Rule 3  15(g). The  expression "criminal  investi- 
gator" within Rule 315(e) includes members of the Army Crimi- 
nal Investigation Command, the Marine Corps Criminal 
Investigation Division, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, 
the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and Coast Guard 
special agents. 
(f)  Basis for search authorizations. Rule 3  15(f) requires that prob- 
able cause be present before a search can be conducted under the 
Rule and utilizes the basic definition of probable cause found in 
1969 Manual Para. 152. 
For reasons of clarity the Rule sets forth a simple and general 
test to be used in all probable cause determinations: probable 
cause can exist only if the authorizing individual has a "reasona- 
ble belief that the information giving rise to the intent to search is 
believable and has a factual basis."  This test is taken from the 
"two prong test"  of Aguilar  v.  Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), which 
was incorporated in Para. 152 of the 1969 Manual. The Rule ex- 
pands the test beyond the hearsay and informant area. The "fac- 
tual basisWrequirement  is satisfied when an individual reasonably 
concludes that the information, if reliable, adequately apprises 
the individual that the property in question is what it is alleged to 
be and is where it is alleged to be. Information is "believable" 
when an individual reasonably concludes that it is sufficiently reli- 
able to be believed. 
The  twin test of "believability"  and "basis in fact" must be met 
in all probable cause situations. The method of application of the 
test will differ, however, depending upon circumstances. The fol- 
lowing examples are illustrative: App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENDIX 22 
(1)  An individual making a probable cause determination who 
observes an incident first hand is only required to determine if the 
observation is reliable and that the property is likely to be what it 
appears to be. 
For example, an officer who believes that she sees an individual 
in possession of heroin must first conclude that the observation 
was reliable (i.e., if her eyesight was adequate-should  glasses 
have been worn-and  if there was sufficient time for adequate ob- 
servation) and that she has sufficient knowledge and experience to 
be able to reasonably believe that the substance in question was in 
fact heroin. 
(2)  An individual making a probable cause determination who 
relies upon the in person report of an informant must determine 
both that the informant is believable  and that the property ob- 
served is likely to be what the observer believes it to be. The  deter- 
mining individual may rely upon the demeanor of the informant 
in order to determine whether the observer is believable. An indi- 
vidual known to have a "clean record" and no bias against the in- 
dividual to be affected by the search is likely to be credible. 
(3)  An individual making a probable cause determination who 
relies upon the report of an informant not present before the au- 
thorizing individual must determine both that the informant is 
credible and that the property observed is likely to be what the in- 
formant believed it to be. The determining individual may utilize 
one or  more of the following factors, among others, in order to de- 
termine whether the informant is believable: 
(A)  Prior record as  a reliable informant-  Has the informant 
given information in the past which proved to be accurate? 
(B)  Corroborating detail-  Has enough detail of the inform- 
ant's information been verified to imply that the remainder can 
reasonably be presumed to be accurate? 
(C) Statement against interest-Is  the information given by 
the informant sufficiently adverse to the fiscal or penal interest of 
the informant to imply that the information may reasonably be 
presumed to be accurate? 
(D) Good citizen-  Is the character of the informant, as 
known by the individual making the probable cause determina- 
tion, such as to make it reasonable to presume that the informa- 
tion is accurate? 
Mere allegations may not be relied upon. For example, an indi- 
vidual may not reasonably conclude that an informant is reliable 
simply because the informant is so named by a law enforcement 
agent. The individual making the probable cause determination 
must be supplied with specific details of the informant's  past ac- 
tions to allow that individual to personally and reasonably con- 
clude that the informant is reliable. 
Information transmitted through law enforcement or com- 
mand channels is presumed to have been reliably transmitted. 
This presumption may be rebutted by an affirmative showing that 
the information was transmitted with intentional error. 
The Rule permits a search authorization to be issued based 
upon information transmitted by telephone or other means of 
communication. 
The Rule also permits the Secretaries concerned to impose ad- 
ditional procedural requirements for the issuance of search autho- 
rizations. 
1984 Amendment: The second sentence of subsection (f)(l) was 
deleted based on Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.213 (1983), which over- 
turned the mandatory two-prong test of Aguilar v.  Texas, supra. 
Although the second sentence may be technically compatible 
with Gates, it could be construed as requiring strict application of 
the standards of Aguilar. The former language remains good ad- 
vice for those deciding the existence of probable cause, especially 
for uncorroborated tips, but is not an exclusive test. See also Mas- 
sachusetts v.  Upton, 466 U.S. 767 (1984). 
(g)  Exigencies. Rule 315(g) restates prior law and delimits those 
circumstances in which a search warrant or authorization is un- 
necessary despite the ordinary requirement for one. In all such 
cases probable cause is required. 
Rule 315(g)(l) deals with the case in which the time necessary 
to obtain a proper authorization would threaten the destruction 
or concealment of the property or evidence sought. 
Rule 315(g)(2) recognizes that military necessity may make it 
tactically  impossible to attempt to communicate with a person 
who could grant a search authorization. Should a nuclear subma- 
rine on radio silence, for example, lack a proper authorizing indi- 
vidual, (perhaps for reasons of disqualification), no search could 
be conducted if the Rule were otherwise unless the ship broke ra- 
dio silence and imperiled the vessel or its mission. Under the Rule 
this would constitute an "exigency."  "Military operational neces- 
sity" includes similar necessity incident to the Coast Guard's per- 
formance of its maritime police mission. 
The Rule also recognizes in subdivision (g)(3) the "automobile 
exception" created by the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,  United States 
v.  Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); South Dakota v.  Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364 (1976); Texas v.  White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975), and, subject 
to the constraints of the Constitution, the Manual, or the Rules, 
applies it to all vehicles. While the exception will thus apply to 
vessels and aircraft as well as to automobiles, trucks, et al, it must 
be applied with great care. In view of the Supreme Court's reason- 
ing that vehicles are both mobile and involve a diminished expec- 
tation of privacy, the larger a vehicle is, the more unlikely it is 
that the exception will apply. The  exception has no application to 
government vehicles as they may be searched  without formal 
warrant or authorization under Rule 314(d). 
1984 Amendment:  The last sentence of subsection  (g) was 
amended by deleting "presumed  to be."  The former language 
could be construed to permit the accused to prove that the vehicle 
was in fact inoperable (that is, to rebut the presumption of oper- 
ability) thereby negating the exception, even though a reasonable 
person would have believed the vehicle inoperable. The  fact of in- 
operability is irrelevant; the test is whether the official(s) search- 
ing knew or should have known that the vehicle was inoperable. 
(h)  Execution.  Rule 314(h)(l) provides for service of a search 
warrant or search authorization upon a person whose property is 
to be searched when possible. Noncompliance with the Rule does 
not, however, result in exclusion of the evidence. Similarly, Rule 
3  14(h)(2) provides for the inventory of seized property and provi- 
sions of a copy of the inventory to the person from whom the 
property was seized. Noncompliance with the subdivision does 
not, however, make the search or seizure unlawful. Under Rule 
3 15(h)(3) compliance with foreign law is required when executing 
a search authorization outside the United States, but noncom~li- 
ance does not trigger the exclusionary rule. 
Rule 316.  Seizures 
(a)  General Rule. Rule 316(a) provides that evidence obtained 
pursuant to the Rule is admissible when relevant and not other- ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
wise inadmissible under the Rules. Rule 316 recognizes that 
searches are distinct from seizures. Although rare, a seizure need 
not be proceeded by a search. Property may, for example, be 
seized after being located pursuant to plain view, see subdivision 
(d)(4)(C).  Consequently, the propriety of a seizure must be con- 
sidered independently of any preceding search. 
(b)  Seizures ofproperty. Rule 3  16(b) defines probable cause in the 
same fashion as defined by Rule 315 for probable cause searches. 
See the Analysis of Rule 3 15(f)(2). The  justifications for seizing 
property  are taken from 1969 Manual Para. 152. Their number 
has, however, been reduced for reasons of brevity. No distinction 
is made between "evidence of crime"  and"instrumenta1ities  or 
fruits of crime."  Similarly, the proceeds of crime are also "evi- 
dence of crime." 
1984 Amendment: The second sentence of subsection (b) was 
deleted based on Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). See Analy-
sis, Mil.R.Evid. 3  15(f)(l), supra. 
(c)  Apprehension.  Apprehensions are, of course, seizures of the 
person and unlawful apprehensions may be challenged as an un- 
lawful seizure. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New  York, 442 U.S. 200 
(1979);  United States v. Texidor-Perez, 7 M.J. 356 (C.M.A. 1979). 
(d)  Seizure of property  or evidence. 
(1)  Abandonedproperty. Rule 316(d) restates prior law, not ad- 
dressed specifically by the 1969 Manual chapter, by  providing 
that abandoned property may be seized by anyone at any time. 
(2)  Consent. Rule 316(d)(2) permits seizure of property with 
appropriate consent pursuant to Rule 3 14(e). The prosecution 
must demonstrate a voluntary consent by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
(3)  Government property.  Rule 316(d)(3) permits seizure of 
government property without probable cause unless the person to 
whom the property is issued or assigned has a reasonable expecta- 
tion of privacy therein at the time of seizure. In this regard note 
Rule 314(d) and its analysis. 
(4)  Otherproperty. Rule 316(d)(4) provides for seizure of prop- 
erty or evidence not otherwise addressed by the Rule. There must 
be justification to exercise control over the property. Although 
property may have been lawfully located, it may not be seized for 
use at trial unless there is a reasonable belief that the property is of 
a type discussed in Rule 3 16(b). Because the Rule is inapplicable 
to seizures unconnected  with law enforcement, it does not limit 
the seizure of property for a valid administrative purpose such as 
safety. 
Property or evidence may be seized upon probable cause when 
seizure is authorized or directed by a search warrant or authoriza- 
tion, Rule 316(d)(4)(A); when exigent circumstances pursuant to 
Rule 315(g) permit proceeding without such a warrant or author- 
ization; or when the property or evidence is in plain view or smell, 
Rule 3  16(d)(4)(C). 
Although most plain view seizures are inadvertent, there is no 
necessity that a plain view discovery be inadvertent-  notwith-
standing dicta, in some court cases; see, Coolidge v. New Hamp- 
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The Rule allows a seizure pursuant to 
probable cause when made as a result of plain view. The  language 
used in Rule 3  16(d)(4)(C) is taken from the ALI MODEL CODE 
OF  PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURES 5 260.6 (1975). 
The Rule requires that the observation making up the alleged 
plain view be"reasonab1e." Whether intentional observation from 
outside a window, via flashlight or binocular, for example, is ob- 
servation in a "reasonable fashionnis a question to be considered 
on a case by case basis.  Whether a person may properly enter 
upon private property in order to effect a seizure of matter located 
via plain view is not resolved by the Rule and is left to future case 
development. 
1984 Amendment: Subsection (d)(5)  was added based  on 
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
(e)  Power to seize. Rule 3  16(e) conforms with Rule 3  15(e) and has 
its origin in Para. 19, MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Rule 317.  Interception of wire and oral 

communication 

(a)  General Rule. The area of interception of wire and oral com- 
munications is unusually complex and fluid. At present, the area 
is governed by the Fourth Amendment, applicable federal statute, 
DOD directive, and regulations prescribed by  the Service Secre- 
taries. In view of this situation, it is preferable to refrain from cod- 
ification and to vest authority for the area primarily in the De- 
partment of Defense or Secretary concerned. Rule 317(c) thus 
prohibits interception  of wire and oral communications for law 
enforcement purposes by  members of the armed forces except as 
authorized by  18 U.S.C. 5  2516, Rule 317(b), and when applica- 
ble, by regulations issued by the Secretary of Defense or the Secre- 
tary concerned. Rule 317(a), however, specifically requires exclu- 
sion of evidence resulting form noncompliance with Rule 317(c) 
only when exclusion is required by the Constitution or by an ap- 
plicable statute. Insofar as a violation of a regulation  is con- 
cerned, compare  United States v. Dillard, 8 M.J. 213 (C.M.A. 
1980) with United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979). 
(b)  Authorization for  Judicial Applications in the United States. 
Rule 317(b) is intended to clarify the scope of 18 U.S.C. 5  2516 by 
expressly recognizing the Attorney General's authority to au- 
thorize applications to a federal court by  the Department of De- 
fense, Department of Transportation, or the military departments 
for authority to intercept wire or oral communications. 
(c)  Regulations. Rule 317(c) requires interception of wire or oral 
communications in the United States be first authorized by  stat- 
ute, see Rule 317(b), and interceptions abroad by appropriate reg- 
ulations. See the Analysis to Rule 317(a), supra. The Committee 
intends 317(c) to limit only in interceptions that are non consen- 
sual under Chapter 119 of Title 18 of the United States Code. 
Rule 321.  Eyewitness identification 
(a)  General Rule 
(1)  Admissibility. The  first sentence of Rule 321(a)(l) is the ba- 
sic rule of admissibility of eyewitness identification and provides 
that evidence of a relevant out-of-court identification is admissi- 
ble when otherwise admissible under the Rules. The intent of the 
provision is to allow any relevant out-of-court identification with- 
out any need to comply with the condition precedent such as in- 
court identification, significant  change from the prior rule as 
found in Para. 153a, MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
The language "if such testimony is otherwise admissible under 
these rules"  is primarily intended to ensure compliance with the 
hearsay rule. Rule 802. It should be noted that Rule 801(d)(l)(C) 
states that a statement of'identification  of a person made after 
perceiving the person"  is not hearsay when "the declarant testifies 
at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination con- App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENDIX 22 
cerning the statement."  An eyewitness identification normally 
will be admissible if the declarant testifies. The Rule's statement, 
"the  witness making the identification and any person who has 
observed the previous identification  may testify concerning it,"  is 
not an express exception authorizing the witness to testify to an 
out-of-court identification notwithstanding the hearsay rule, 
rather it is simply an indication that in appropriate circum- 
stances, see Rules 803 and 804, a witness to an out-of-court identi- 
fication may testify concerning it. 
The last sentence of subdivision (a)(l) is intended to clarify 
procedure by emphasizing that an in-court identification may be 
bolstered by an out-of-court identification notwithstanding the 
fact that the in-court identification has not been attacked. 
(2)  Exclusionary rule. Rule 321(a)(2) provides the basic exclu- 
sionary rule for eyewitness identification testimony. The sub- 
stance of the Rule is taken from prior Manual paragraph 153a as 
modified by  the new procedure for suppression  motions. See 
Rules 304 and 31 1. Subdivision (a)(2)(A)  provides that evidence 
of an identification will be excluded if it was obtained as a result of 
an "unlawful  identification process conducted by the United 
States or other domestic authorities"  while subdivision (a)(2)(B) 
excludes evidence of an identification if exclusion would be re- 
quired by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution. Under the burden of proof, subdivision (d)(2), an 
identification is not inadmissible if the prosecution proves by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the identification process was 
not so unnecessarily suggestive, in light of the totality of the cir- 
cumstances, as to create a very substantial likelihood of irrepara- 
ble mistaken identity. It is the unreliability of the evidence which 
is determinative. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S.  98 (1977). 
"United  States or other domestic authorities"  includes military 
personnel. 
Although it is clear that an unlawful identification may taint a 
later identification, it is unclear at present whether an unlawful 
identification requires suppression of evidence other than identifi- 
cation of the accused. Consequently, the Rule requires exclusion 
of nonidentification derivative evidence only when the Constitu- 
tion would so require. 
@)  Definition of "unlawful." 
(1)  Lineups and other identification processes  Rule 321(b) de- 
fines "unlawful lineup or other identification processes."  When 
such a procedure is conducted by persons subject to the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice or their agents, it will be unlawful if it is 
"unnecessarily  suggestive or  otherwise in violation of the  due pro- 
cess clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States as applied to members of the armed forces." The  ex- 
pression, "unnecessarily suggestive"  itself is a technical one and 
refers to an identification that is in violation of the due process 
clause because it is unreliable. See Manson v. Brathwaite, supra; 
Stovall  v. Denno, 338 U.S. 292 (1967); Neil  v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 
188 (1972). See also Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969). An 
identification is not unnecessarily suggestive in violation of the 
due process clause if the identification process was not so unnec- 
essarily suggestive, in light of the totality of the circumstances, as 
to create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable mistaken 
identity. See Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, and subdivision (d)(2). 
Subdivision (l)(A) differs from subdivision (l)(B) only in that 
it recognizes that the Constitution may apply differently to mem- 
bers of the armed forces than it does to civilians. 
Rule 321(b)(l) is applicable to all forms of identification 
processes including showups and lineups. 
1984 Amendment: Subsections (b)(l) and (d)(2) were modified 
to make clear that the test for admissibility  of an out-of-court 
identification is reliability. See Manson v. Brathwaite, supra. This 
was apparently the intent of the drafters of the former rule. See 
Analysis, Mil.R.Evid. 321. The language actually used in subsec- 
tion (b)(l) and (d)(2) was subject to a different interpretation, 
however.  See S. SALZBURG, L. SCHINASI, AND D. 
SCHLUETER, MILITARY RULES OF  EVIDENCE MAN- 
UAL at 165-167  (1981); Gasperini, Eyewitness  Identification 
Under the Military Rules of Evidence, The Army Lawyer at 42 
(May 1980). 
In determining whether an identification is reliable, the mili- 
tary judge should weigh all the circumstances, including: the op- 
portunity of the witness to view the accused at the time of the of- 
fense; the degree of attention paid by the witness; the accuracy of 
any prior descriptions of the accused by  the witness; the level of 
certainty shown by the witness in the identification; and the time 
between  the crime and the confrontation. Against these factors 
should be weighed  the corrupting effect of a suggestive and un- 
necessary identification. See Manson v. Brathwaite, supra; Neil v. 
Biggers, supra. 
Note that the modification of subsection (b)(l) eliminates the 
distinction between identification processes conducted by persons 
subject to the code and other officials. Because the test is the relia- 
bility of the identification, and not a prophylactic standard, there 
is no basis to distinguish between identification processes con- 
ducted by each group. See Manson v. Brathwaite, supra. 
(2)  Lineups: right to counsel. Rule 321(b)(2) deals only with 
lineups. The ~ule  does declare that a lineup is "unlawful"  if it is 
conducted in violation of the right to counsel. Like Rule 305 and 
31 1, Rule 321(b)(2) distinguishes between lineups conducted by 
persons subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice or their 
agents and those conducted by others. 
Subdivision (b)(2)(A) is the basic right to counsel for personnel 
participating in military lineups. A lineup participant  is entitled 
to counsel only if that participant is in pretrial restraint (pretrial 
arrest, restriction, or confinement) under paragraph 20 of the 
Manual or has had charges preferred against him or her. Mere ap- 
prehension or temporary detention does not trigger the right to 
counsel under the Rule. This portion of the Rule substantially 
changes military law and adapts the Supreme Court's decision in 
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (holding that the right 
to counsel attached only when "adversary judicial criminal pro- 
ceedingsVhave  been initiated or "the government has committed 
itself to prosecute")  to unique military criminal procedure. See 
also Rule 305(d)(l)(B). 
Note that interrogation of a suspect will require rights warn- 
ings, perhaps including a warning of a right to counsel, even if 
counsel is unnecessary under Rule 321. See Rule 305. 
As previously noted, the Rule does not define "lineup"  and re- 
course to case law is necessary.  Intentional exposure of the sus- 
pect to one or more individuals for purpose of identification is 
likely to be a lineup. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967), 
although in rare cases of emergency (e.g.,  a dying victim) such an 
identification may be considered a permissible"showup"  rather 
than a "lineup."  Truly accidental confrontations between victims 
and suspects leading to an identification by the victim are not gen- ANALYSIS OF  THE MILITARY RULES OF  EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
erally considered "lineups";  cf: United State ex re1 Ragazzin v.  makes it clear that the prosecution must show, when the defense 
Brierley, 321 F.Supp. 440 (W.D. Pa. 1970). Photographic identifi-  has raised the issue, that the identification in question was not 
cations are not"lineups"  for purposes of the right to counsel.  based upon a preponderance of the evidence, "so  unnecessarily 
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 301 n.2 (1973). If a photo-  suggestive in light of the totality of the circumstances, as to create 
graphic identification is used, however, the photographs em-  a very substantial likelihood of irreparable mistaken identity." 
ployed should be preserved for use at trial in the event that the de-  This rule is taken from the Supreme Court's decisions of Neil  v. 
fense should claim that the identification was "unnecessarily  Biggers, 409 U.S.  188 (1972) and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 
suggestive." See subdivision (b)(l) supra.  (1967), and unlike subdivision (d)(l), applies to all identification 
A lineup participant who is entitled to counsel is entitled  to  processes whether lineups or not. The Rule recognizes that the 
only one lawyer under the ~~l~ and is specifically entitled to free  nature of the identification process itself may well be critical to 
military counsel without regard to the indigency or lack thereofof  the reliability of the identification and provides for exclusion of 
the participant. N~ right to civilian counsel or military counsel of  unreliable evidence regardless of its source. If the prosecution 
the participant,s  own selection  exists under the ~  ~united  ~  meets its burden, the mere fact that the identification process was  l , 
States v.  Wade, 388 U.S. 218, n.27 (1967). A lineup participant  unnecessary or suggestive does not require exclusion of the evi- 
may waive any applicable right to counsel so long as the partici-  dence, Manson v. Brathwaite, supra. 
pant is aware of the right to counsel and the waiver is made  If the identification in question is subsequent to an earlier, un- 
"freely, knowingly, and intelligently."  Normally a warning of the  necessarily suggestive identification, the later identification is ad- 
right to counsel will be necessary for the prosecution to prove an  missible if the prosecution can show by clear and convincing evi- 
adequate waiver should the defense adequately challenge the  dence that the later identification is not the result of the earlier 
waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Avers, 426 F.2d 524 (2d Cir.  improper examination. This portion of the Rule is consistent both 
1970). See also Model Rules for Law Enforcement, Eye Witness  with 1969 Manual Para. 153a and Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 
Identification, Rule 404 (1974) cited in E. IMWINKELRIED, P.  (1972). 
F.  & F.  LEDERER,  (e)  Defense evidence. Rule 321(e) is identical with the analogous 
EVIDENCE 366 (1979).  provisions in Rules 304 and 3  1  1 and generally restates prior law. 
1984 ~mendment: In subsection @)@)(A), the words "or  law  (0 Rulings. Rule 321(0 is identical with the analogous provisions 
specialist within the meaning of Article 1"  were deleted as unnec-  in Rules 304 and 321 and  changes prior law. see the 
essary. See R.C.M.  103(26).  Analysis to Rule 304(d)(4). 
Subdivision (b)(2)(B) grants a right to counsel at non-military  (g)  Effect  of guilty plea.  Rule 321(g) is identical with the analo- 
lineups within the United States only when such a right to counsel  gous provisions in ~~l~~ 304 and 31 1  restates prior law, 
is recognized by"the  principles of law generally recognized in the 
trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts involv- 
ing similar lineups." The Rule presumes that an individual partic-  SECTION IV 
ipating in a foreign lineup conducted by officials of a foreign na-  Relevancyand its Limits 
tion without American participation has no right to counsel at 
such a lineup. 
Rule 401.  Definition of "relevant evidence" 
(c)  Motions to suppress and objections. Rule 321(c) is identical in 
application to Rule 3  1  l(d). See the Analysis to Rules 304 and 31 1.  The definition of "relevant  evidence"  found within Rule 401 is 
taken without change from the Federal Rule and is substantially 
(d)  Burden ofproof: Rule 321(d) makes it clear that when an eye-  similar in effect to that used by Para. 137, MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
witness identification is challenged by  the defense, the prosecu-  The Rule's definition may be somewhat broader than the 1969 
tion need reply only to the specific cognizable defense complaint.  Manual's,  as the Rule defines as relevant any evidence that has 
See also Rules 304 and 31 1.  The subdivision distinguishes be-  "any tendency to make the existence of any fact ... more probable 
tween defense challenges involving alleged violation of the right  or less probable than it would be without the evidence"  while the 
to counsel and those involving the alleged unnecessarily sugges-  1969 Manual defines as "not  relevant"  evidence "too remote to 
tive identifications.  have any appreciable probative value ..." To  the extent that the 
(1)  Right  to counsel. Subdivision  (d)(l) requires that when an  1969 Manual's  definition includes considerations of "legal  rele- 
alleged violation of the right to counsel has been raised the prose-  vance,"  those considerations are adequately addressed by such 
cution must either demonstrate by preponderance of the evidence  other Rules as Rules 403 and 609. See, E. IMWINKELRIED,  P. 
that counsel was present or that the right to counsel was waived  GIANNELLI, F. GILLIGAN & F. LEDERER, CRIMINAL 
voluntarily and intelligently. The Rule also declares that if the  EVIDENCE 62-65  (1979) (which, after defining "logical  rele- 
right to counsel is violated at a lineup that results in an identifica-  vance"  as involving only probative value, states at 63 that "under 
tion of the accused any later identification is considered a result of  the rubric of 'legal relevance,'  the courts have imposed  an addi- 
the prior lineup as a matter of law unless the military judge deter-  tional requirement that the item's probative value outweighs any 
mines by  clear and convincing evidence that the latter identifica-  attendant probative dangers.")  The Rule is similar to the 1969 
tion is not the result of the first lineup. Subdivision (d)(l) is taken  Manual in that it abandons any reference to "materia1ity"in  favor 
in substance from 1969 Manual Para. 153a.  of a single standard of "relevance."  Notwithstanding the specific 
(2)  Unnecessarily suggestive identification.  Rule 321(d)(2)  terminology used, however, the concept of materiality survives in 
deals with an alleged unnecessarily suggestive identification or  the Rule's condition that to be relevant evidence must involve a 
with any other alleged violation  of due process. The subdivision  fact "which is of consequence to the determination of the action." App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENDIX 22 
Rule 402.  Relevant evidence generally admissible; 
irrelevant evidence inadmissible. 
Rule 402 is taken without significant change from the Federal 
Rule. The Federal Rule's  language relating to limitations im- 
posed by "the Constitution of the United States, by  Act of Con- 
gress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme 
Court pursuant to statutory authority" has been replaced by ma- 
terial tailored to the unique nature of the Military Rules of Evi- 
dence. Rule 402 recognizes that the Constitution may apply 
somewhat differently to members of the armed forces than to ci- 
vilians, and the Rule deletes the Federal Rule's  reference to 
"other  rules prescribed by the Supreme Court"  because such 
Rules do not apply directly in courts-martial. See Rule 101(b)(2). 
Rule 402 provides a general standard by which irrelevant evi- 
dence is always inadmissible and by  which relevant evidence is 
generally admissible. Qualified admissibility of relevant evidence 
is required by the limitations in Sections 111 and V and by such 
other Rules as 403 and 609 which intentionally utilize matters 
such as degree of probative value and judicial efficiency in deter- 
mining whether relevant evidence should be admitted. 
Rule 402 is not significantly different in its effect from Para. 137 
of the 1969 Manual which it replaces, and procedures used under 
the 1969 Manual in determining relevance generally remain valid. 
Offers of proof are encouraged when items of doubtful relevance 
are proffered, and it remains possible, subject to the discretion of 
the military judge, to offer evidence "subject to later connection." 
Use of the latter technique, however, must be made with great 
care to avoid  the possibility of bringing inadmissible evidence 
before the members of the court. 
It should be noted that Rule 402 is potentially the most impor- 
tant of the new rules. Neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor 
the Military Rules of Evidence resolve all evidentiary matters; see 
Rule 101(b). When specific authority to resolve an evidentiary is- 
sue is absent, Rule 402's clear result is to make relevant evidence 
admissible 
Rule 403.  Exclusion of relevant evidence on 
grounds of prejudice, confusion or waste of time 
Rule 403 is taken without change from the Federal Rule of Evi- 
dence. The Rule incorporates the concept often known as "legal 
relevance",  see the Analysis to Rule 401, and provides that evi- 
dence may be excluded for the reasons stated notwithstanding its 
character as relevant evidence. The Rule vests the military judge 
with wide discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence 
that comes within the Rule. 
If a party views specific evidence as being highly prejudicial, it 
may be possible to stipulate to the evidence and thus avoid its 
presentation  to the court members. United States v. Grassi, 602 
F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1979), a prosecution for interstate transporta- 
tion of obscene materials, illustrates this point. The defense of- 
fered to stipulate that certain films were obscene in order to pre- 
vent the jury from viewing the films, but the prosecution declined 
to join  in the stipulation. The trial judge sustained the prosecu- 
tion's rejection of the stipulation and the Fifth Circuit upheld the 
judge's  decision. In its opinion, however, the Court of Appeals 
adopted a case by case balancing approach recognizing both the 
importance of allowing probative evidence to be presented and 
the use of stipulations as a tool to implement the policies inherent 
in Rule 403. Insofar as the latter is concerned, the court expressly 
recognized the power of a Federal district judge to compel the 
prosecution to accept a defense tendered stipulation. 
Rule 404.  Character evidence not admissible to 
prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes 
(a)  Character evidence generally. Rule 404(a) replaces 1969 Man- 
ual Para. 138f  and is taken without substantial change from the 
Federal Rule. Rule 404(a) provides, subject to three exceptions, 
that character evidence is not admissible to show that a person ac- 
ted in conformity therewith. 
Rule 404(a)(l) allows only evidence of a pertinent trait of char- 
acter of the accused to be offered in evidence by the defense. This 
is a significant change from Para. 138f of the 1969 Manual which 
also allows evidence of  'general good character" of the accused to 
be received in order to demonstrate that the accused is less likely 
to have committed a criminal act. Under the new rule, evidence of 
general good character is inadmissible because only evidence of a 
specific trait is acceptable. It is the intention of the Committee, 
however, to allow the defense to introduce evidence of good mili- 
tary character when that specific trait is pertinent. Evidence of 
good military character would be admissible, for example, in a 
prosecution for disobedience of orders. The prosecution may pre- 
sent evidence of a character trait only in rebuttal to receipt in evi- 
dence of defense character evidence. This is consistent with prior 
military law. 
Rule 404(a)(2)  is taken from the Federal Rule with  minor 
changes. The Federal Rule allows the prosecution to present evi- 
dence of the character trait of peacefulness of the victim "in  a 
homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first ag- 
gressor." Thus, the Federal Rule allows prosecutorial use of char- 
acter evidence in a homicide case in which self-defense has been 
raised. The limitation to homicide cases appeared to be inappro- 
priate and impracticable in the military environment. All too 
often, assaults involving claims of self-defense take place in the 
densely populated living quarters common to military life. 
Whether aboard ship or within barracks, it is considered essential 
to allow evidence of the character trait of peacefulness of the vic- 
tim. Otherwise, a substantial risk would exist of allowing unlaw- 
ful assaults to go undeterred. The Federal Rule's  use of the ex- 
pression "first aggressor" was modified to read "an aggressor,"  as 
substantive military law recognizes that even an individual who is 
properly exercising the right of self-defense may overstep and be- 
come an aggressor. The remainder of Rule 404(a)(2)  allows the 
defense to offer evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
victim of a crime and restricts the prosecution to rebuttal of that 
trait. 
Rule 404(a)(3) allows character evidence to be used to impeach 
or support the credibility of a witness pursuant to Rules 607-609. 
(b)  Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Rule 404(b) is taken without 
change from the Federal Rule, and is substantially similar to the 
1969 Manual rule found in Para. 138g. While providing that evi- 
dence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a 
predisposition to commit a crime, the Rule expressly permits use 
of such evidence on the merits when relevant  to another specific 
purpose. Rule 404(b) provides examples rather than a list ofjusti- 
fications for admission of evidence of other misconduct. Other 
justifications, such as the tendency of such evidence to show the 
accused's consciousness of guilty of the offense charged, expressly 
permitted in Manual Para. 138g(4), remain effective. Such a pur- ANALYSIS OF THE MILIT  'ARY  RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
pose would, for example, be an acceptable one. Rule 404(b), like 
Manual Para. 138g, expressly allows use of evidence of miscon- 
duct not amounting to conviction. Like Para. 138g, the Rule does 
not, however, deal with use of evidence of other misconduct for 
purposes of impeachment. See Rules 608-609. Evidence offered 
under Rule 404(b) is subject to Rule 403. 
Rule 405.  Methods of proving character 
(a)  Reputation or opinion. Rule 405(a) is taken without change 
from the Federal Rule. The  first portion of the Rule is identical in 
effect with the prior military rule found in Para. 138 f(1) of the 
1969 Manual. An individual testifying under the Rule must have 
an adequate relationship with the community (see Rule 405(c)), 
in the case of reputation, or with the given individual in the case 
of opinion, in order to testify. The remainder of Rule 405(a) ex- 
pressly permits inquiry or cross-examination "into relevant spe- 
cific instances of conduct." This is at variance with prior military 
practice under which such an inquiry was prohibited. See, Para. 
138f(2), MCM, 1969 (Rev.) (character of the accused).  Reputa- 
tion evidence is exempted from the hearsay rule, Rule 803(21). 
(b)  Specific instances ofconduct Rule 405(b) is taken without sig- 
nificant change from the Federal Rule. Reference to "charge, 
claim, or defense" has been replaced with "offense or defense" in 
order to adapt the rule to military procedure and terminology. 
(c)  Afidavits.  Rule 405(c) is not found within the Federal Rules 
and is taken verbatim from material found in Para. 146b of the 
1969 Manual. Use of affidavits or other written statements is re- 
quired due to the world wide disposition of the armed forces 
which makes it difficult if  not impossible  to obtain wit- 
nesses-particularly  when the sole testimony of a witness is to be 
a brief statement relating to the character of the accused. This is 
particularly important for offenses committed abroad or in a com- 
bat zone, in which case the only witnesses likely to be necessary 
from the United-States  are those likely to be character witnesses. 
The Rule exempts statements used under it from the hearsay rule 
insofar as the mere use of an affidavit or other written statement is 
subject to that rule. 
(d)  Definitions. Rule 405(d) is not found within the Federal Rules 
of Evidence and has been included because of the unique nature of 
the armed forces. The definition of "reputation"  is taken gener- 
ally from 1969 Manual Para. 138f(l) and the definition of "com- 
munity"  is an expansion of that now found in the same para- 
graph. The definition of "community"  has been broadened to add 
"regardless  of size" to indicate that a party may proffer evidence 
of reputation within any specific military organization, whether a 
squad, company, division, ship, fleet, group, or wing, branch, or 
staff corps, for example. Rule 405(d) makes it clear that evidence 
may be offered of an individual's reputation in either the civilian 
or military community or both. 
Rule 406.  Habit; routine practice 
Rule 406 is taken without change from the Federal Rule. It is sim- 
ilar in effect to Para. 138h of the 1969 Manual. It is the intent of 
the Committee to include within Rule 406's use of the word, "or- 
ganization,"  military organizations regardless of size. See Rule 
405 and the Analysis to that Rule. 
Rule 407.  Subsequent remedial measures 
Rule 407 is taken from the Federal Rules without change, and has 
no express equivalent in the 1969 Manual. 
Rule 408.  Compromise and offer to compromise 
Rule 408 is taken from the Federal Rules without change, and has 
no express equivalent in the 1969 Manual. 
Rule 409.  Payment of medical and similar 
expenses 
Rule 409 is taken from the Federal Rules without change. It has 
no present military equivalent and is intended to be applicable to 
courts-martial to the same extent that is applicable to civilian 
criminal cases. Unlike Rules 407 and 408 which although prima- 
rily applicable to civil cases are clearly applicable to criminal 
cases, it is arguable that Rule 409 may not apply to criminal cases 
as it deals only with questions of "liabilityM-normally  only a 
civil matter. The Rule has been included in the Military Rules to 
ensure its availability should it, in fact, apply to criminal cases. 
Rule 410.  Inadmissibility of pleas, discussions, 
and related statements 
Rule 410 as-modified  effective 1 August 1981 is generally taken 
from the Federal Rule as modified on 1 December  1980. It ex- 
tends to plea bargaining as well as to statements made during a 
providency inquiry, civilian  or mi1itary.E.g..  United States v. 
Care, 18 C.M.A. 535 (1969). Subsection (b) was added to the Rule 
in recognition of the unique possibility of administrative disposi- 
tion, usually separation, in lieu of court-martial. Denominated 
differently within the various armed forces, this administrative 
procedure often requires a confession as a prerequisite. As modi- 
fied, Rule 410 protects an individual against later use of a state- 
ment submitted in furtherance of such a request for administra- 
tive disposition. The definition of "on  the record"  was required 
because no "record"  in the judicial sense exists insofar as request 
for administrative disposition is concerned. It is the belief of the 
Committee that a copy of the written statement of the accused in 
such a case is, however, the functional equivalent of such a re- 
cord. 
Although the expression "false statement" was retained in the 
Rule, it is the Committee's intent that it be construed to include 
all related or similar military offenses. 
Rule 41  1.  Liability Insurance 
Rule 41 1 is taken from the Federal Rule without change. Al- 
though it would appear to have potential impact upon some crim- 
inal cases, e.g., some negligent homicide cases, its actual applica- 
tion to criminal cases is uncertain. It is the Committee's intent 
that Rule 41 1 be applicable to courts-martial only to the extent 
that it is applicable to criminal cases. 
Rule 412.  Nonconsensual sexual offenses; 
relevance of victim's past behavior 
Rule 412 is taken from the Federal Rules. Although substantially 
similar in substantive scope to Federal Rule of Evidence 412, the 
application of the Rule has been  somewhat broadened and the App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENDIX 22 
procedural aspects of the Federal Rule have been modified to 
adapt them to military practice. 
Rule 412 is intended to shield victims of sexual assaults from 
the often embarrassing and degrading cross-examination and evi- 
dence presentations common to prosecutions of such offenses. In 
so doing, it recognizes that the prior rule, which it replaces, often 
yields evidence of at best minimal probative value with great po- 
tential for distraction and incidentally discourages both the re- 
porting and prosecution of many sexual assaults. In replacing the 
unusually extensive rule found in Para. 153b(2)(b), MCM, 1969 
(Rev.), which permits evidence of the victim's "unchaste" charac- 
ter regardless of whether he or she has testified, the Rule will sig- 
nificantly change prior military practice and will restrict defense 
evidence. The Rule recognizes, however, in Rule 412(b)(l), the 
fundamental right of the defense under the Fifth Amendment of 
the Constitution of the United States to present relevant defense 
evidence by admitting evidence that is "constitutionally required 
to be admitted."Further,  it is the Committee's  intent that the 
Rule not be interpreted as a rule of absolute privilege. Evidence 
that is constitutionally required to be admitted on behalf of the 
defense remains admissible notwithstanding the absence of ex- 
press authorization in Rule 412(a). It is unclear whether reputa- 
tion or opinion evidence in this area will rise to a level of constitu- 
tional magnitude, and great care should be taken with respect to 
such evidence. 
Rule 412 applies to a "nonconsensual  sexual offense"  rather 
than only to6'rape or assault with intent to commit rape"  as pre- 
scribed by the Federal Rule. The definition of "nonconsensual 
sexual offense" is set forth in Rule 412(e) and "includes  rape, for- 
cible sodomy, assault with intent to commit rape or forcible sod- 
omy, indecent assault, and attempts to commit such offenses." 
This modification to the Federal Rule resulted from a desire to 
apply the social policies behind the Federal Rule to the unique 
military environment. Military life requires that large numbers of 
young men and women live and work together in close quarters 
which are often highly isolated. The deterrence of sexual offenses 
in such circumstances is critical to military efficiency. There is 
thus no  justification for limiting the scope of the Rule, intended to 
protect human dignity and to ultimately encourage the reporting 
and prosecution of sexual offenses, only to rape and/or  assault 
with intent to commit rape. 
Rule 412(a) generally prohibits reputation or opinion evidence 
of an alleged victim of a nonconsensual sexual offense. 
Rule 412(b)(l) recognizes that evidence of a victim's  past sex- 
ual behavior may be constitutionally required to be admitted. Al- 
though there are a number of circumstances in which this lan- 
guage may be applicable, see, S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, 
FEDERAL RULES OF  EVIDENCE MANUAL 92-93  (2d ed. 
Supp. 1979) (giving example of potential constitutional problems 
offered by the American Civil Liberties Union during the House 
hearings on Rule 412), one may be of particular interest. If an in- 
dividual has contracted for the sexual services of a prostitute and 
subsequent to the performance of the act the prostitute demands 
increased payment on pain of claiming rape, for example, the past 
history of that person will likely be constitutionally required to be 
admitted in a subsequent prosecution in which the defense claims 
consent to the extent that such history is relevant and otherwise 
admissible to corroborate the defense position. Absent such pecu- 
liar circumstances, however, the past  sexual behavior of the al- 
leged victim, not within the scope of Rule 412(b)(2), is unlikely to 
be admissible regardless of the past sexual history. The  mere fact 
that an individual is a prostitute is not normally admissible under 
Rule 4 12. 
Evidence of past false complaints of sexual offenses by an al- 
leged victim of a sexual offense is not within the scope of this rule 
and is not objectionable when otherwise admissible. 
Rule 412(c) provides the procedural mechanism by which evi- 
dence of past sexual behavior of a victim may be offered. The  Rule 
has been substantially modified from the Federal Rule in order to 
adapt it to military practice. The  requirement that notice be given 
not later than fifteen days before trial has been deleted as being 
impracticable in view of the necessity for speedy disposition of 
military cases. For similar reasons, the requirement for a written 
motion has been omitted in favor of an offer of proof, which 
could, of course, be made in writing, at the discretion of the mili- 
tary judge. Reference to heaings in chambers has been deleted as 
inapplicable; a hearing  under Article 39(a), which may be without 
spectators, has been substituted. The  propriety of holding a hear- 
ing without spectators is dependent upon its constitutionality 
which is in turn dependent upon the facts of any specific case. 
Although Rule 412 is not per se applicable to such pretrial pro- 
cedures as Article 32 and Court of Inquiry hearings, it may be ap- 
plicable via Rule 303 and Article 31(c). See the Analysis to Rule 
303. 
It should be noted as a matter related to Rule 412 that the 1969 
Manual's  prohibition in Para. 153a of convictions for sexual of- 
fenses that rest on the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged 
victim has been deleted. Similarly, an express hearsay exception 
for fresh complaint has been deleted as  being unnecessary. Conse- 
quently, evidence of fresh complaint will be admissible under the 
Military Rule only to the extent that it is either nonhearsay, see, 
Rule 801(d)(l)(B), or fits within an exception to the hearsay rule. 
See, subdivisions (I), (2), (3), (4), and (24) of Rule 803. 
1993 Amendment. R.C.M. 405(i) and Mil. R. Evid. 1101(d) 
were amended to make the provisions of Rule 412 applicable at 
pretrial investigations. Congress intended to protect the victims 
of nonconsensual sex crimes at preliminary hearings as well as at 
trial when it passed Fed. R. Evid. 412.See Criminal Justice Sub- 
committee of the House Judiciary  committee Report, 94th 
Cong., 2d Session, July 1976. 
SECTION V 
PRIVILEGES 
Rule 501.  General rule 
Section V contains all of the privileges applicable to military 
criminal law except for those privileges which are found within 
Rules 301, Privilege Concerning Compulsory Self-Incrimination; 
Rule 302, Privilege Concerning Mental Examination of an Ac- 
cused; and Rule 303, Degrading Questions. Privilege rules, unlike 
other Military Rules of Evidence, apply inUinvestigative  hearings 
pursuant to Article 32; proceedings for vacation of suspension of 
sentence under Article 72; proceedings for search authorization; 
proceedings involving pretrial restraint; and in other proceedings 
authorized under the Uniform Code of Military Justice of this 
Manual and not listed in rule 1101(a)." See Rule 1101(c); see also 
Rule 1101(b). ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
In contrast to the general acceptance of the proposed Federal 
Rules of Evidence by Congress, Congress did not accept the pro- 
posed privilege rules because a consensus as to the desirability of a 
number of specific privileges could not be achieved. See generally, 
S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF  EV- 
IDENCE MANUAL 200-201 (2d ed. 1977). In an effort to expe- 
dite the Federal Rules generally, Congress adopted a general rule, 
Rule 501, which basically provides for the continuation of com- 
mon law in  the privilege area. The Committee deemed the ap- 
proach  taken by Congress in the Federal Rules impracticable 
within the armed forces. Unlike the Article I11 court system, 
which is conducted almost entirely by attorneys functioning in 
conjunction with permanent courts in fixed locations, the military 
criminal legal system is characterized by its dependence upon 
large numbers of laymen, temporary courts, and inherent geo- 
graphical and personnel instability due to the worldwide deploy- 
ment of military  personnel. Consequently, military law requires 
far more stability than civilian law. This is particularly true be- 
cause of the significant number of non-lawyers involved in the 
military criminal legal system. Commanders, convening authori- 
ties, non-lawyers investigating officers, summary court-martial 
officers, or law enforcement personnel need specific guidance as to 
what material is privileged and what is not. 
Section V combines the flexible approach taken by Congress 
with respect to privileges with that provided in the 1969 Manual. 
Rules 502-509  set forth specific rules of privilege to provide the 
certainty and stability necessary for military justice. Rule 501, on 
the other hand, adopts those privileges recognized in common 
law pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 501 with some limita- 
tions. Specific privileges are generally taken from those proposed 
Federal Rules of Evidence which although not adopted by Con- 
gress were non-controversial, or from the 1969 Manual. 
Rule 501 is the basic rule of privilege. In addition to recogniz- 
ing privileges required by  or provided for in the Constitution, an 
applicable Act of Congress, the Military Rules of Evidence, and 
the Manual for Courts-Martial, Rule 501(a) also recognizes privi- 
leges "generally  recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the 
United States district courts pursuant to Rule 501 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence insofar as the application of such principles in 
trials by court-martial is practicable and not contrary to or incon- 
sistent with the Uniform Code of Military Justice, these rules, or 
this Manual."  The latter language is taken from 1969 Manual 
Para. 137. As a result of Rule 501(a)(4), the common law of privi- 
leges as recognized in the Article I11 courts will be applicable to 
the armed forces except as otherwise provided  by the limitation 
indicated above. Rule 501(d) prevents the application of a doctor- 
patient privilege. Such a privilege was considered to be totally in- 
compatible with the clear interest of the armed forces in ensuring 
the health and fitness for duty of personnel. See  1969 Manual 
Para. 151c. The privilege expressed in Rule 302 and its con- 
forming Manual change in Para. 121, is not a doctor-patient priv- 
ilege and is not affected by Rule 501(d). 
It should be noted that the law of the forum determines the ap- 
plication of  privilege. Consequently, even if a service member 
should consult with a doctor in a jurisdiction  with a doctor-pa- 
tient privilege for example, such a privilege is inapplicable should 
the doctor be called as a witness before the court-martial. 
Subdivision (b) is a non-exhaustive list of actions which consti- 
tute an invocation of a privilege. The subdivision is derived from 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 as originally proposed by the Su- 
preme Court, and the four specific actions listed are also found in 
the Uniform Rules of Evidence. The list is intentionally  non-ex- 
clusive as a privilege might be claimed in a fashion distinct from 
those listed. 
Subdivision (c) is derived from Federal Rule of Evidence 501 
and makes it clear that an appropriate representative of a political 
jurisdiction  or other organizational entity may claim an applica- 
ble privilege. The definition is intentionally non-exhaustive. 
Rule 502.  Lawyer-client privilege 
(a)  General rule of  privilege. Rule 502(a) continues the substance 
of the attorney-client privilege found in Para. 151  b(2) of the 1969 
Manual. The Rule does, however, provide additional detail. Sub- 
division (a) is taken verbatim from subdivision (a) of Federal Rule 
of Evidence 503 as proposed by the Supreme Court. The privilege 
is only applicable when there are"confidentia1  communications 
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional 
legal services to the client."  A mere discussion with an attorney 
does not invoke the privilege when the discussion is not made for 
the purpose of obtaining professional legal services. 
(b)  Definitions-
(1)  Client. Rule 502(b)(l) defines a "client"  as an individual or 
entity who receives professional legal services from a lawyer or 
consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining such services. The defi- 
nition is taken from proposed Federal Rule 503(a)(l) as Para. 
15  1  b(2) of the 1969 Manual lacked any general definition of a cli- 
ent. 
(2)  Lawyer. Rule 502(b)(2) defines a "lawyer."  The first por- 
tion of the paragraph is taken from proposed Federal Rule of Evi- 
dence 503(a)(2)  and explicitly includes any person "reasonably 
believed by the client to be authorized" to practice law. The sec- 
ond clause is taken from 1969 Manual Para. 151b(2) and recog- 
nizes that a "lawyer"  includes "a member of the armed forces de- 
tailed, assigned, or otherwise provided to represent a person in a 
court-martial case or in any military investigation or proceeding" 
regardless of whether that person is in fact a lawyer. See Article 
27. Thus an accused is fully protected by  the privilege even if de- 
fense counsel is not an attorney. 
The second sentence of the subdivision recognizes the fact, par- 
ticularly true during times of mobilization, that attorneys may 
serve in the armed forces in a nonlegal capacity. In such a case, 
the individual is not treated as an attorney under the Rule unless 
the individual fits within one of the three specific categories recog- 
nized by the subdivision. Subdivision (b)(2)(B) recognizes that a 
servicemember who knows that an individual is a lawyer in civil- 
ian life may not know that the lawyer is not functioning as such in 
the armed forces and may seek professional legal assistance. In 
such a case the privilege will be applicable so long as the individ- 
ual was"reasonab1y  believed by  the client to be authorized to 
render professional  legal services to members of the armed 
forces." 
(3)  Representative of  a lawyer. Rule 502(b)(3)  is taken from 
proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503(a)(3) but has been modi- 
fied to recognize that personnel are "assigned"  within the armed 
forces as well as employed. Depending upon the particular situa- 
tion, a paraprofessional or secretary may be a "representative of a 
lawyer."  See Para. lSlb(2) of the 1969 Manual. App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENDIX 22 
(4)  Confidential  communication. Rule 502(b)(4) defines a 
"confidential"  communication in terms of the intention of the 
party making the communication. The Rule is similar to the sub- 
stance of 1969 Manual Para. 151b(2) which omitted certain com- 
munications from privileged  status. The new Rule is somewhat 
broader than the 1969 Manual's provision in that it protects infor- 
mation which is obtained by a third party through accident or de- 
sign when the  claiming the privilege was not aware that a 
third party had access to the communication. Compare Rule 
Para.  151a of the 1969 Manual. The broader rule has been 
adopted for the reasons set forth in the ~  d  ~ 
notes on proposed Federal Rule 504(a)(4). The provision permit- 
ting disclosure to persons in furtherance of legal services or rea- 
sonably necessary for the transmission of the communication is 
similar to the provision in the 1969 Manual for communications 
through agents. 
Although Para. l5lc  of the 1969 Manual precluded a claim of 
the privilege when there is transmission through wire or radio 
communications, the new Rules protect statements made via tele- 
phone, or, "if  use of such means of communication is necessary 
and in furtherance of the communication,"  by other "electronic 
means of communication."  Rule 51 l(b). 
(c)  Who may claim the privilege.  Rule 502(c) is taken from pro- 
posed ~  ~~~l~ 503(b) and  ~  expresses~ who may l  claim the law-  d ~ 
yer-client privilege, The Rule is similar to but slightly broader 
than Para, 151b(2) of the 1969 Manual, The last sentence of the 
subdivision states that  authority of the lawyer to claim the 
privilege is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary." 
The lawyer may claim the privilege on behalf of the client un- 
less authority to do so has been withheld from the lawyer or evi- 
dence otherwise exists to show that the lawyer lacks the authority 
to claim the privilege. 
(d)  Exceptions. Rule 502(d) sets forth the circumstances in which 
the lawyer-client privilege will not apply notwithstanding the 
general application of the privilege. 
Subdivision (d)(l) excludes statements  the fu- 
ture  of crime or fraud and combines the substance of 
1969 Manual Para. 151b(2) with proposed Federal Rule of Evi- 
dence 503(d). Under the exception a lawyer may disclose infor- 
mation given by  a client when it was part of a "communication 
(which) clearly contemplated the future commission of a crime of 
fraud," and a lawyer may also disclose information when it can be 
objectively said that the  services  sought or ob-
tained to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or rea-
sonably should have known to be a crime or fraud,,, The latter 
portion of the exception is likely to be applicable only after the 
commission of the ofense while the former is applicable when the 
communication is made. 
Subdivisions (d)(2) through (d)(5) provide exceptions with re- 
SPect to claims through the same deceased client, breach of duty 
by  lawyer of client, documents attested by lawyers, and commu- 
nications to an attorney in a matter of common interest among 
joint  clients. There were no parallel provisions in the 1969 Man- 
ual for these rules which are taken from proposed Federal Rule 
503(d). The provisions are included in the event that the circum- 
stances described therein arise in the military practice. 
Rule 503.  Communications  to clergy 
(a)  General rule of  privilege. Rule 503(a) states the basic rule of 
privilege for communications to clergy and is taken from pro- 
posed Federal Rule of Evidence 506(b) and  1969 Manual Para. 
151b(2). Like the 1969 Manual, the Rule protects communica- 
tions to a clergyman's assistant in specific recognition of the na- 
ture of the military chaplaincy, and deals only with communica- 
tions "made  either as a formal act of religion or as a matter of 
conscience." 
(b)  Definitions. 
i  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~ederal (1)  Clergyman. Rule 503(b)(l) is taken from ~ro~osed 
of Evidence 506(a)(1) but has been  include spe- 
cific reference to a chaplain. The Rule does not define "a  religious 
organization"  and leaves resolution of that question to precedent 
and the circumstances of the case."Clergyman"  includes individ- 
uals of either sex. 
(2)  Confidential.  Rule 503(b)(2) is taken generally from pro- 
posed Federal Rule of Evidence 506(a)(2) but has been expanded 
to include communications to a  assistant  and to ex-
plicitly protect disclosure of a privileged communication when 
"disclosure is in furtherance of the purpose of the communication 
or to those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the com- 
munication."  The Rule is thus consiAtent with the definition of 
"confidential"  used in the lawyer-client privilege, ~ule  502(b)(4), 
and recognizes that military life often requires transmission of 
third parties.  The proposed  Federal 
Rule's  limitation of the privilege to communications made "pri- 
vately"  was deleted in favor of the language used in the actual 
Military Rule for the reasons indicated. The Rule is somewhat 
more protective than the 1969 Manual because of its application 
to statements which although intended to be confidential are 
overheard by others. See Rule 502(b)(4) and 510(a) and the Anal- 
ysis thereto, 
(c)  Who may claim the privilege. Rule 503(c) is derived from pro- 
posed Federal Rule of Evidence 506(c) and includes the substance 
of  1969 Manual Para. 151b(2) which provided that the privilege 
may be claimed by theNpenitent." The Rule supplies additional 
guidance as to who may actually claim the ~rivile~e  and is consis- 
tent with the other Military Rules of Evidence relating to privi- 
leges' See  502(c);  504(b)(3);  505(c); 506(c)' 
Rule 504.  Husband-wife privilege 
(a)  Spousal incapacity. Rule 504(a) is taken generally from Tram- 
mel v.  United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) and significantly changes 
military law in this area. Under prior law, see 1969 Manual Para. 
148e. each spouse had a privilege to prevent the use of the other 
spouse as an adverse witness. Under the new rule, the witness' 
'POuSe  is the  of the privilege and may  or 
"Ot  to  as the witness'  'POuse  sees fit' But see  504(c) 
(exceptions to the privilege). Implicit in the rule is the presump- 
tion that when a spouse chooses to testify against the other spouse 
the marriage no longer needs the protection  of the privilege. Rule 
504(a) must be distinguished from Rule 504(b), Confidential ,-om- 
munication made during marriage, which deals with communica- 
tions rather than the ability to testify generally at trial. 
~ltho~~h the witness'  spouse ordinarily has a privilege to re-

fuse to testify against the accused spouse, under certain circum- 

stances no privilege may exists, and the spouse may be compelled 

to testify. See Rule 504(c). 
ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
(b)  Confidential communication made during marriage. Rule 
504(b) deals with communications made during a marriage and is 
distinct from a spouse's privilege to refuse to testify pursuant to 
Rule 504(a). See 1969 Manual Para. 151  b(2). 
(1)  General rule ofprivilege. Rule 504(b)(l) sets forth the gen- 
eral rule of privilege for confidential spousal communications and 
provides that a spouse may prevent disclosure of any confidential 
spousal communication made during marriage even though the 
parties are no longer married at the time that disclosure is desired. 
The accused may always require that the confidential spousal 
communication be disclosed. Rule 504(b)(3). 
No privilege exists under subdivision (b) if the communication 
was made when the spouses were legally separated. 
(2)  Definition. Rule 504(b)(2) defines "confidential"  in a fash- 
ion similar to the definition utilized  in Rules 502(b)(4)  and 
503(b)(2). The word"private1y"  has been added to emphasize that 
the presence of third parties is not consistent with the spousal 
privilege, and the reference to third parties found in Rules 502 
and 503 has been omitted for the same reason. Rule 504(b)(2) ex- 
tends the definition of "confidential"  to statements disclosed to 
third parties who are "reasonably  necessary for transmission of 
the communication."  This recognizes that circumstances may 
arise, especially in military life, where spouses may be separated 
by great distances or by operational activities, in which transmis- 
sion of a communication via third parties may be reasonably nec- 
essary. 
(3)  Who  may claim the privilege. Rule 504(b)(3) is consistent with 
1969 Manual Para. 151b(2) and gives the privilege to the spouse 
who made the communication. The accused may, however,  dis- 
close the communication even though the communication was 
made to the accused. 
(c)  Exceptions. 
(1)  Spouse incapacity only. Rule 504(c)(l) provides exceptions to 
the spousal incapacity rule of Rule 504(a). The  rule is taken from 
1969 Manual Para. 148e and declares that a spouse may not re- 
fuse to testify against the other spouse when the marriage has 
been terminated  by divorce or annulment. Annulment has been 
added to the present military rule as being consistent with its pur- 
pose. Separation of spouses via legal separation or otherwise does 
not affect the privilege of a spouse to refuse to testify against the 
other spouse. For other circumstances in which a spouse may be 
compelled to testify against the other spouse, see Rule 504(c)(2). 
Confidential communications are not affected by the termina- 
tion of a marriage. 
(2)  Spousal incapacity and confidential communications. Rule 
504(c)(2) prohibits application of the spousal privilege, whether 
in the form of spousal incapacity or in the form of a confidential 
communication, when the circumstances specified in paragraph 
(2) are applicable. Subparagraphs (A) and (C) deal with anti-mar- 
ital acts, e.g., acts which are against the spouse and thus the mar- 
riage. The Rule expressly provides that when such an act is in- 
volved a spouse may not refuse to testify. This provision is taken 
from proposed Federal Rule 505(c)(l) and reflects in part the Su- 
preme Court's decision in  Wyatt v.  United States, 362 U.S. 525 
(1960). See also  Trammel v.  United States, 445 U.S.  40 at n.7 
(1980). The Rule thus recognizes society's  overriding interest in 
prosecution of anti-marital offenses and the probability that a 
spouse may exercise sufficient control, psychological  or other- 
wise, to be able to prevent the other spouse from testifying volun- 
tarily. The Rule is similar to 1969 Manual Para. 148e but has de- 
leted the Manual's limitation of the exceptions to the privilege to 
matters occurring after marriage or otherwise unknown to the 
spouse as being inconsistent with the intent of the exceptions. 
Rule 504(c)(2)(B) is derived from Para. 148e and 15 1  b(2)'of the 
1969 Manual. The  provision prevents application of the privileges 
as to privileged communications if the marriage was a sham at the 
time of the communication,  and prohibits application of the 
spousal incapacity privilege if the marriage was begun as a sham 
and is a sham at the time the testimony of the witness is to be of- 
fered. Consequently, the Rule recognizes for purposes of subdivi- 
sion (a) that a marriage that began as a sham may have ripened 
into a valid marriage at a later time. The intent of the provision is 
to prevent individuals from marrying witnesses in order to effec- 
tively silence them. 
Rule 505.  Classified information 
Rule 505 is based  upon H.R. 4745, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), 
which was proposed by the Executive Branch as a response to 
what is known as the"graymai1"  problem in which the defendant 
in a criminal case seeks disclosure of sensitive national security in- 
formation, the release of which may force the government to dis- 
continue the prosecution. The Rule is also based upon  the Su- 
preme Court's discussion of executive privilege in United States v. 
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 
683 (1974). The rule attempts to balance the interests of an ac- 
cused who desires classified information for his or her defense and 
the interests of the government in protecting that information. 
(a)  General rule of privilege.  Rule 505(a) is derived from United 
States v. Reynolds, supra and 1969 Manual Para. 151. Classified 
information is only privileged when its "disclosure would be det- 
rimental to the national security." 
1993 Amendment: The second sentence was added to clarify 
that this rule, like other rules of privilege, applies at all stages of 
all actions and is not relaxed during the sentencing hearing under 
M.R.E. 1101(c). 
(b)  Definitions. 
(1)  Classified information. Rule 505(b)(l) is derived from sec- 
tion 2 of H.R. 4745. The definition of "classified information" is a 
limited one and includes only that information protected "pursu- 
ant to an executive order, statute, or regulation," and that mate- 
rial which constitutes restricted data pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
2014(y) (1976). 
(2)  National security. Rule 505(b)(2) is derived from section 2 
of H.R. 4745. 
(c)  Who may claim the privilege.  Rule 505(c) is derived from 
Para. 151 of the 1969 Manual and is consistent with similar provi- 
sions in the other privilege rules. See Rule 501(c). The privilege 
may be claimed on1y"by  the head of the executive or military de- 
partment or government agency concerned" and then only upon 
"a finding that the information is properly classified and that dis- 
closure would be detrimental to the national security." Although 
the authority of a witness or trial counsel to claim the privilege is 
presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary, neither a 
witness nor a trial counsel may claim the privilege without prior 
direction to do so by the appropriate department or agency head. 
Consequently, expedited coordination with senior headquarters is 
advised in any situation in which Rule 505 appears to be applica- 
ble. App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENDIX 22 
(d)  Action prior  to referral of charges. Rule 505(d) is taken from 
section 4(b)(l) of H.R. 4745. The provision has been modified to 
reflect the fact that pretrial discovery in the armed forces, prior to 
referral, is officially conducted through the convening authority. 
The convening authority should disclose the maximum amount 
of requested information as appears reasonable under the circum- 
stances. 
(e)  Pretrial session. Rule 505(e) is derived from section 3 of H.R. 
4745. 
(f)  Action after referral of charges. Rule 505(f) provides the basic 
procedure under which the government should respond to a de- 
termination by the military judge that classified information "ap- 
parently contains evidence that is relevant and material to an ele- 
ment of the offense or a  legally cognizable defense and is 
otherwise admissible in evidence."  See generally the Analysis to 
Rule 507(d). 
It should be noted that the government may submit informa- 
tion to the military judge for in camera inspection pursuant to 
subdivision (i). If the defense requests classified information that 
it alleges is "relevant and material ...," and the government ref- 
uses to disclose the information to the military judge for inspec- 
tion, the military judge may presume that the information is in 
fact "relevant  and material. ..." 
(g)  Disclosure of classified information to the accused. Paragraphs 
(1) and (2) of Rule 505(g) are derived from section 4 of H.R. 4745. 
Paragraph (3) is taken from section 10 of H.R. 4745 but has been 
modified in view of the different application of the Jencks Act, 18 
U.S.C. 5 3500 (1976) in the armed forces. Paragraph (4) is taken 
from sections 4(b)(2) and 10 of H.R. 4745. The reference in H.R. 
4745 to a recess has been deleted as being unnecessary in view of 
the military judge's  inherent authority to call a recess. 
1993 Amendment: Subsection (g)(l)(D) was amended to make 
clear that the military judge's  authority to require security clear- 
ances extends to persons involved in the conduct of the trial as 
well as pretrial preparation for it. The amendment requires per- 
sons needing security clearances to submit to investigations nec- 
essary to obtain the clearance. 
(h)  Notice of the accused's intention to disclose classified informa- 
tion. Rule 505(h) is derived from section 5 of H.R. 4745. The in- 
tent of the provision is to prevent disclosure of classified informa- 
tion by  the defense until the government has had an opportunity 
to determine what position to take concerning the possible disclo- 
sure of that information. Pursuant to Rule 505(h)(5), failure to 
comply with subdivision (h) may result in a prohibition on the use 
of the information involved. 
1993 Amendment: Subsection (h)(3) was amended to require 
specificity in detailing the items of classified information expected 
to be introduced. The amendment is based on United States v. 
Collins, 720 F.2d. 1195 (1 lth Cir. 1983). 
(i)  In camera proceedings for  cases involving classified  informa- 
tion. Rule 505(i) is derived generally from section 5 of H.R. 4745. 
The "in camera" procedure utilized in subdivision (i) is generally 
new to military law. Neither the accused nor defense counsel may 
be excluded from the in camera proceeding. However, nothing 
within the Rule requires that the defense be provided with a copy 
of the classified material in question when the government sub- 
mits such information to the military judge pursuant to Rule 
~- -. 
505(i)(3) in an effort to obtain an in camera proceeding under this 
Rule. If such information has not been disclosed  previously, the 
government may describe the information by generic category, 
rather than by identifying the information. Such description is 
subject to approval by the military judge, and if not sufficiently 
specific to enable the defense to proceed during thein camera ses-
sion, the military judge may order the government to release the 
information for use during the proceeding or fact the sanctions 
under subdivision (i)(4)(E). 
1993 Amendment: Subsection (i)(3) was amended to clarify that 
the classified material and the government's affidavit are submit- 
ted only to the military judge. The word "only"  was placed at the 
end of the sentence to make it clear that it refers to "military 
judge"  rather than to "examination."  The military judge is to ex- 
amine the affidavit and the classified information without disclos- 
ing it before determining to hold an in camera proceeding as de- 
fined in subsection(i)(l). 
The second sentence of subsection (i)(4)(B) was added to pro- 
vide a standard for admission of classified information in sentenc- 
ing proceedings. 
(j) Introduction  of classified information. Rule 505(j) is derived 

from section 8 of H.R. 4745 and United States v. Grunden, 2 M.J. 

116 (C.M.A.  1977). 

1993Amendment: Subsection (j)(5) was amended to provide that 

the military judge's  authority to exclude the public extends to the 

presentation of any evidence that discloses classified information, 

and not merely to the testimony of witnesses. See generally, 

United States v. Hershey, 20 M.J. 433 (C.M.A. 1985),cert. denied, 

474 U.S.  1062 (1986), (specifies factors to be considered  in the 

trial judge's  determination to close the proceedings). 

(k) Security procedures  to safeguard against compromise of classi- 
fied  information disclosed  to courts-martial.  Rule 505(k) is de- 
rived from section 9 of H.R. 4745. 
Rule 506.  Government information  other than 
classified information 
(a) General rule ofprivilege. Rule 506(a) states the general rule of 
privilege for nonclassified government information. The Rule rec- 
ognizes that in certain extraordinary cases the government should 
be able to prohibit release of government information which is 
detrimental to the public interest. The Rule is modeled on Rule 
505 but is more limited in its scope in view of the greater limita- 
tions applicable to nonclassified information. Compare United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) with United States v. Reyn- 
olds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). Rule 506 addresses those similar matters 
found in  1969 Manual Para. 151  b(1) and  151  b(3). Under Rule 
506(a) information is privileged only if  its disclosure would be 
"detrimental  to the public interest."  It is important to note that 
pursuant to Rule 506(c) the privilege may be claimed only "by the 
head of the executive or military department or government 
agency concerned" unless investigations of the Inspectors Gen- 
eral are concerned. 
Under Rule 506(a) there is no privilege if disclosure of the in- 
formation concerned is required  by  an Act of Congress such as 
the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 5 552 (1976). Disclo- 
sure of information will  thus be broader under the Rule than 
under the 1969 Manual. See United States v. Nixon, supra. 
(b) Scope. Rule 506(b) defines "Government  information" in  a 
nonexclusive fashion, and expressly states that classified informa- 
tion and information relating to the identity of informants are 
solely within the scope of other Rules. ANALYSIS OF THE MILIT  'ARY RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
(c)  Who may claim the privilege. Rule 506(c) distinguishes be- 
tween government information in general and investigations of 
the Inspectors General. While the privilege for the latter may be 
claimed "by  the authority ordering the investigation or any supe- 
rior authority," the privilege for other government information 
may be claimed only "by  the head of the executive or military de- 
partment or government agency concerned."  See generally the 
Analysis to Rule 505(c). 
1990Amendment: Subsection (c) was amended by substituting 
the words"records  and information"  for "investigations",  which 
is a term of art vis-a-vis Inspector General functions. Inspectors 
General also conduct "inspections"  and "inquiries,"  and use of 
the word "records and information" is intended to cover all docu- 
ments and information generated by or related to the activities of 
Inspectors General. "Records"  includes reports of inspection, in- 
quiry, and investigation conducted by an Inspector General and 
extracts, summaries, exhibits, memoranda, notes, internal corre- 
spondence, handwritten working materials, untranscribed  short- 
hand or stenotype notes of unrecorded testimony, tape recordings 
and other supportive records such as automated data extracts. In 
conjunction with this change, the language identifying the official 
entitled to claim the privilege for Inspector General records was 
changed to maintain the previous provision which allowed the 
superiors of Inspector General officers, rather than the officers 
themselves, to claim the privilege. 
(d) Action prior to referral of  charges. Rule 506(d) specifies action 
to be taken prior to referral of charges in the event of a claim of 
privilege under the Rule. See generally Rule 505(d) and its Analy- 
sis. Note that disclosures can be withheld only if action under par- 
agraph (1)-(4)  of subdivision (d) cannot be made "without caus- 
ing identifiable damage to the public interest." (Emphasis added). 
(e)  Action after referral of  charges. See generally Rule 505(f) and 
its Analysis. Note that unlike Rule 505(f), however, Rule 506(e) 
does not require a finding that failure to disclose the information 
in question "would  materially prejudice a substantial right of the 
accused."  Dismissal is required when the relevant information is 
not disclosed in a "reasonable period of time." 
(f) Pretrialsession. Rule 506(f) is taken from Rule 505(e). It is the 
intent of the Committee that if classified information arises dur- 
ing a proceeding under Rule 506, the procedures of Rule 505 will 
be used. 
(g)  Disclosure of  government information  to the accused. Rule 
506(g) is taken from Rule 505(g) but deletes references to classi- 
fied information and clearances due to their inapplicability. 
(h)  Prohibition against disclosure.  Rule 506(h) is derived from 
Rule 505(h)(4). The remainder of Rule 505(h)(4) and Rule 505(h) 
generally has been omitted as being unnecessary. No  sanction for 
violation of the requirement has been included. 
(i)  In camera proceedings.  Rule 506(i) is taken generally from 
Rule 505(i), but the standard involved reflects 1969 Manual Para. 
15 1 and the Supreme Court's decision in  United States v.  Nixon, 
supra. In line with Nixon, the burden is on the party claiming the 
privilege to demonstrate why the information involved should not 
be disclosed. References to classified material have been deleted 
as being inapplicable. 
6) Introduction of  government  information  subject to a claim of 
privilege. Rule 5066) is derived from Rule 5056) with appropriate 
modifications being made to reflect the nonclassified nature of the 
information involved. 
(k)  Procedures to safeguard against compromise of  government in- 
formation disclosed to courts-martial. Rule 506(k) is derived from 
Rule 505(k). Such procedures should reflect the fact that material 
privileged under Rule 506 is not classified. 
Rule 507.  Identity of informant 
(a)  Rule ofprivilege. Rule 507(a) sets forth the basic rule of privi- 
lege for informants and contains the substance of 1969 Manual 
Para. 151  b(1). The new Rule, however, provides greater detail as 
to the application of the privilege than did the 1969 manual. 
The privilege is that of the United States or political subdivi- 
sion thereof and applies only to information relevant to the iden- 
tity of an informant. An"informant"  is simply an individual who 
has supplied "information resulting in an investigation of a possi- 
ble violation of law"  to a proper person and thus includes good 
citizen reports to command or police as well as the tradi- 
tional"confidentia1 informants" who may be consistent sources of 
information. 
(b)  Who may claim theprivilege. Rule 507(b) provides for claim- 
ing the privilege and distinguishes between representatives of the 
United States and representatives of a state or subdivision thereof. 
Although an appropriate representative of the United States may 
always claim the privilege when applicable, a representative of a 
state or subdivision may do so only if the information in question 
was supplied to an officer of the state or subdivision. The Rule is 
taken from proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 510(b), with ap- 
propriate modifications, and is similar in substances to Para. 
151b(1) of the 1969 Manual which permitted "appropriate gov- 
ernmental authorities"  to claim the privilege. 
The Rule does not specify who an "appropriate representative" 
is. Normally, the trial counsel is an appropriate representative of 
the United States. The Rule leaves the question open, however, 
for case by case resolution. Regulations could be promulgated 
which could specify who could be an appropriate representative. 
(c)  Exceptions. Rule 507(c) sets forth the circumstances in which 
the privilege is inapplicable. 
(1)  Voluntary disclosures; informant  as witness. Rule 507(c)(l) 
makes it  clear that the privilege is inapplicable if circumstances 
have nullified its justification  for existence. Thus, there is no rea- 
son for the privilege, and the privilege is consequently inapplica- 
ble, if the individual who would have cause to resent the inform- 
ant has been made aware of the informant's identity by a holder of 
the privilege or  by the informant's own action or when the witness 
testifies for the prosecution thus allowing that person to ascertain 
the informant's identity. This is in accord with the intent of the 
privilege which is to protect informants from reprisals. The Rule 
is taken from Para. 151  b(l) of the 1969 Manual. 
(2)  Testimony on the issue of  guilt or innocence. Rule 507(c)(2) 
is taken from 1969 Manual Para. 151b(1) and recognizes that in 
certain circumstances the accused may have a due process right 
under the Fifth Amendment, as well as a similar right under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, to call the informant as a wit- 
ness. The subdivision intentionally does not specify what circum- 
stances would require calling the informant and leaves resolution 
of the issue to each individual case. 
(3)  Legality of  obtaining evidence. Rule 507(c)(3) is new. The 
Rule recognizes that circumstances may exist in which the Con- 
stitution may require disclosure of the identity of an informant in 
the context of determining the legality  of obtaining evidence App. 22, M.R.E.  APPEND 
under Rule 311; see, e.g., Franks v.  Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 170 
(1978); McCray v.  Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1976) (both cases indi- 
cate that disclosure may be required  in certain unspecified cir- 
cumstances but do not in fact require such disclosure). In view of 
the highly unsettled nature of the issue, the Rule does not specify 
whether or when such disclosure is mandated and leaves the de- 
termination to the military judge in light of prevailing case law 
utilized in the trial of criminal cases in the Federal district courts. 
(d)  Procedures.  Rule 507(d) sets forth the procedures to be fol- 
lowed in the event of a claim of privilege under Rule 507. If the 
prosecution elects not to disclose the identity of an informant 
when the judge has determined that disclosure is required, that 
matter shall be reported to the convening authority. Such a report 
is required so that the convening authority may determine what 
action, if any, should be taken. Such actions could include disclo- 
sure of the informant's identity, withdrawal of charges, or some 
appropriate appellate action. 
Rule 508.  Political vote 
Rule 508 is taken from proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 507 
and expresses the substance of 18 U.S.C.  596 (1976) which is ap- 
plicable to the armed forces. The privilege is considered essential 
for the armed forces because of the unique nature of military life. 
Rule 509.  Deliberation of courts and juries 
Rule 509 is taken from 1969 Manual Para. 15 1  but has been modi- 
fied to ensure conformity with Rule 606(b) which deals specifi- 
cally with disclosure of deliberations in certain cases. 
Rule 510.  Waiver of privilege by voluntary 
disclosure 
Rule 5 10 is derived from proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 5 11 
and is similar in substance to 1969 Manual Para. 151a which 
notes that privileges may be waived. Rule 510(a) simply provides 
that "disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communi- 
cation under such circumstances that it would be inappropriate to 
claim the privilege"  will defeat and waive the privilege.  Disclo- 
sure of privileged matter may be, however, itself privileged;  see 
Rules 502(b)(4);  503(b)(2);  504(b)(2).  Information disclosed in 
the form of an otherwise privileged telephone call (e.g..  informa- 
tion overheard by an operator) is privileged, Rule 5 1  l(b), and in- 
formation disclosed  via transmission using other forms of com- 
munication  may be privileged; Rule 51 1(b). Disclosure under 
certain circumstances may not beUinappropriate" and the infor- 
mation will retain its privileged character. Thus, disclosure of an 
informant's identity by  one law enforcement  agency to another 
may well be appropriate and not render Rule 507 inapplicable. 
Rule 510(b) is taken from Para. 1516(1) of the 1969 Manual 
and makes it clear that testimony pursuant to a grant of immunity 
does not waive the privilege. Similarly, an accused who testifies in 
his or her own behalf does not waive the privilege unless the ac- 
cused testifies voluntarily to the privileged matter of communica- 
tion. 
Rule 51  1.  Privileged matter disclosed under 
compulsion or without opportunity to claim 
privilege 
Rule 51 ](a) is similar to proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 512. 
Placed in the context of the definition of "confidential"  utilized in 
the privilege rules, see, Rule 502(b)(4), the Rule is substantially 
different from prior military law inasmuch as prior law permitted 
utilization of privileged information  which had been gained by a 
third party through accident or design. See Para. 151b(l), MCM, 
1969 (Rev.). Such disclosures are generally safeguarded against 
via the definition "confidential"  used in the new Rules. Generally, 
the Rules are more protective of privileged information than was 
the 1969 Manual. 
Rule 51 1(b) is new and deals with electronic transmission of in- 
formation. It recognizes that the nature of the armed forces today 
often requires such information transmission. Like 1969 Manual 
Para. 1516(1), the new Rule does not make a nonprivileged com- 
munication privileged; rather, it simply safeguards already privi- 
leged information under certain circumstances. 
The first portion of subdivision @)  expressly provides that oth- 
erwise privileged  information transmitted by telephone remains 
privileged. This is in recognition of the role played by the tele- 
phone in modern life and particularly in the armed forces where 
geographical separations are common. The Committee was of the 
opinion that legal business cannot be transacted in the 20th cen- 
tury without customary use of the telephone. Consequently, privi- 
leged communications transmitted  by telephone are protected 
even though those telephone conversations are  known to be moni- 
tored for whatever purpose. 
Unlike telephonic communications, Rule 5  11(b) protects other 
forms of electronic communication  only when such means "is 
necessary and in furtherance of the communication."  It is irrele- 
vant under the Rule as to whether the communication in question 
was in fact necessary. The only relevant question is whether, once 
the individual decided to communicate, the means of communi- 
cation was necessary and in furtherance of the communication. 
Transmission of information by  radio is a means of communica- 
tion that must be tested under this standard. 
Rule 512.  Comment upon or inference from claim 
of privilege; instruction 
(a)  Comment or inference  not permitted.  Rule 512(a) is derived 
from proposed Federal Rule 51 3. The Rule is new to military law 
but is generally in accord with the Analysis of Contents of the 
1969 Manual; United States Department of the Army, Pamphlet 
No. 27-2,  Analysis of Contents, Manual for Courts-Martial 1969, 
Revised Edition, 27-33,  27-38  (1970). 
Rule 512(a)(l) prohibits any inference or comment upon the 
exercise of a privilege by the accused and is taken generally from 
proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 5 13(a). 
Rule 5 12(a)(2) creates a qualified  prohibition with respect to 
any inference or comment upon the exercise of a privilege by a 
person not the accused. The Rule recognizes that in certain cir- 
cumstances the interests of justice may require such an inference 
and comment. Such a situation could result, for example, when 
the government's  exercise of a privilege has been sustained, and 
an inference adverse to the government is necessary to preserve 
the fairness of the proceeding. ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
(b)  Claiming privilege  without knowledge of  members.  Rule 
5 12(b) is intended to implement subdivision (a). Where possible, 
claims of privilege should be raised at an Article 39(a) session or, 
if practicable, at sidebar. 
(c)  Instruction. Rule 5 12(c) requires that relevant instructions be 
given "upon  request."  Cf:  Rule 105. The military judge does not 
have a duty to instruct sua sponte. 
SECTION VI 

WITNESSES 

Rule 601.  General rule of competency 
Rule 601 is taken without change from the first portion of Federal 
Rule of Evidence 601. The remainder of the Federal Rule was de- 
leted due to its sole application to civil cases. 
In declaring that subject to any other Rule, all persons are  com- 
petent to be witnesses, Rule 601 supersedes Para. 148 of the 1969 
Manual which required, among other factors, that an individual 
know the difference between truth and falsehood and understand 
the moral importance of telling the truth in order to testify. 
Under Rule 601 such matters will go only to the weight of the tes- 
timony and not to its competency. The Rule's  reference to other 
rules includes Rules 603 (Oath or Affirmation), 605 (Competency 
of Military Judge as Witness); 606 (Competency of Court Mem- 
ber as Witness), and the rules of privilege. 
The plain meaning of the Rule appears to deprive the trial 
judge of any discretion whatsoever to exclude testimony on 
of competency unless the testimony is incompetent 
under those specific rules already cited supra, see, United States v. 
Fowler, 605 F.2d  181 (5th Cir. 1979), a conclusion bolstered by 
the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee's Note. S. 
SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF  EVI- 
DENCE  MANUAL 270 (2d ed. 1977). Whether this conclusion 
is accurate, especially in the light of Rule 403, is unclear. Id. at 
269; see also United States v.  Calahan, 442 F.Supp.  1213 (D. 
Minn. 1978). 
Rule 602.  Lack of personal knowledge 
Rule 602 is taken without significant change from the Federal 
Rule and is similar in content to Para. 138d, MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Although the 1969 Manual expressly allowed an individual to tes- 
tify to his or her own age or date of birth, the Rule is silent of the 
issue. 
Notwithstanding that silence, however, it appears that it is 
within the meaning of the Rule to allow such testimony. Rule 
804(b)(4) (Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavaila-
ble-Statement  of Personal or Family History) expressly permits 
a hearsay statement "concerning the declarant's  own birth ... or 
other similar fact of personal or family history, even though de- 
clarant had no means of acquiring personal knowledge of the 
matter stated." It seems evident that if such a hearsay statement is 
admissible, in-court testimony by the declarant should be no less 
admissible. It is probable that the expression "personal  knowl- 
edge"  in Rule 804(b)(4) is being used in the sense of "first hand 
knowledge"  while the expression is being used in Rule 602 in a 
somewhat broader sense to include those matters which an indi- 
vidual could be considered to reliably know about his or her per- 
sonal history. 
Rule 603.  Oath or affirmation 
Rule 603 is taken from the Federal Rule without change. The 
oaths found within Chapter XXII of the Manual satisfy the re- 
quirements of Rule603. Pursuant to Rule 110l(c), this Rule is in- 
applicable to the accused when he or she makes an unsworn state- 
ment. 
Rule 604.  Interpreters 
Rule 604 is taken from the Federal Rule without change and is 
consistent with Para. 141, MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The oath found in 
Paras. 114e, MCM, 1969 (Rev.) (now R.C.M. 807(b)(2) (Discus- 
sion), MCM, 1984), satisfies the oath requirements of Rule 604. 
Rule 685.  Competency of military judge as 
witness 
Rule 605(a) restates the Federal Rule without significant change. 
Although Article 26(d) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
states in relevant  part that "no  person is eligible to act as a mili- 
tary judge if he is a witness for the prosecution ..." and is silent on 
whether a witness for the defense is eligible to sit, the Committee 
believes that the specific reference in the code was not intended to 
create a right and was the result only of an attempt to highlight 
the more grievous case. In any event, Rule 605, unlike Article 
26(d), does not deal with the question of eligibility to sit as a mili- 
tary judge, but deals solely with the military judge's  competency 
as a witness. The rule does not affect voir dire. 
Rule 605(b) is new and is not found within the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. It was added because of the unique nature of the mili- 
tary judiciary  in which military judges often control their own 
dockets without clerical assistance. In view of the military's strin- 
gent speedy trial roles, see, United States v. Burton, 21 U.S.C.M.A 
112,44  C.M.R. 166 (1971), it was necessary to preclude expressly 
any interpretation of Rule 605 that would  prohibit  the military 
judge from placing on the record details relating to docketing in 
order to avoid prejudice to a party. Rule 605(b) is consistent with 
present military law. 
Rule 606.  Competency of court member as 
witness 
(a)  At the court-martial. Rule 606(a) is taken from the Federal 
Rule without substantive change. The Rule alters prior military 
law only to the extent that a member of the court could testify as a 
defense witness under prior precedent. Rule 606(a) deals only 
with the competency of court members as witnesses and does not 
affect other Manual provisions governing the eligibility of the in- 
dividuals to sit as members due to their potential status as wit- 
nesses. See, e.g., Paras. 62f  and 63, MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The Rule 
does not affect voir dire. 
(b)  Inquiry into validity offindings or sentence.  Rule 606(b) is 
taken from the Federal Rule with only one significant change. 
The rule, retitled to reflect the sentencing function of members, 
recognizes unlawful command influence as a legitimate subject of 
inquiry and permits testimony by a member on that subject. The 
addition is required by the need to keep proceedings free from any 
taint of unlawful command influence and further implements Ar- 
ticle 37(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Use of supe- 
rior rank or grade by one member of a court to sway other mem- 
bers would constitute unlawful command influence for purposes App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENDIX 22 
of this Rule under Para. 74d(l), MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Rule 606 
does not itself prevent otherwise lawful polling of members of the 
court, see generally,  United States v. Hendon, 6 M.J.  171, 174 
(C.M.A.  1979) and does not prohibit attempted lawful clarifica- 
tion of an ambiguous or inconsistent verdict. Rule 606(b) is in 
general accord with prior military law. 
Rule 607.  Who may impeach 
Rule 607 is taken  without significant change from the Federal 
Rule. It supersedes Para. 153b(l), MCM, 1969 (Rev.), which re- 
stricted impeachment of one's own witness to those situations in 
which the witness is indispensable or the testimony of the witness 
proves to be unexpectedly adverse. 
Rule 607 thus allows a party to impeach its own witness.  In- 
deed, when relevant, it permits a party to call a witness for the 
sole purpose of impeachment. It should be noted, however, that 
an apparent inconsistency exists when Rule 607 is compared with 
Rules 608(b) and 609(a). Although Rule 607 allows impeachment 
on direct examination, Rules 608(b) and 609(a) would by their ex- 
plicit language restrict the methods of impeachment to cross-ex- 
amination. The use of the expression "cross-examination"  in 
these rules appears to be accidental and to have been intended to 
be synonymous with impeachment while on direct examination. 
See generally,  S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL 
RULES OF  EVIDENCE MANUAL 298-99  (2d ed. 1977). It is 
the intent of the Committee that the Rules be so interpreted un- 
less the Article 111 courts should interpret the Rules in a different 
fashion. 
Rule 608.  Evidence of character, conduct, and 
bias of witness 
(a)  Opinion and reputation evidence of character. Rule 608(a) is 
taken verbatim from the Federal Rule. The Rule, which is consis- 
tent with the philosophy behind Rule 404(a), limits use of charac- 
ter evidence in the form of opinion or reputation evidence on the 
issue of credibility by restricting such evidence to matters relating 
to the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of the witness. 
General good character is not admissible under the Rule. Rule 
608(a) prohibits presenting evidence of good character until the 
character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked. The 
Rule is similar to Para. 153b of the 1969 Manual except that the 
Rule, unlike Para. 153b, applies to all witnesses and does not dis- 
tinguish between the accused and other witnesses. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Rule 608(b) is taken from the 
Federal Rule without significant change. The Rule is somewhat 
similar in effect to the military practice found in Para. 153b(2) of 
the 1969 Manual in that it allows use of specific instances of con- 
duct of a witness to be brought out on cross-examination but pro- 
hibits use of extrinsic evidence. Unlike Para. 153b(2), Rule 608(b) 
does not distinguish between an accused and other witnesses. 
The fact that the accused is subject to impeachment by  prior 
acts of misconduct is a significant factor to be considered by the 
military judge when he or she is determining whether to exercise 
the discretion granted by the Rule. Although the Rule expressly 
limits this form of impeachment to inquiry on cross-examination, 
it is likely that the intent of the Federal Rule was to permit in- 
quiry on direct as well, see  Rule 607, and the use of the 
term"cross-examination"  was an accidental substitute for "im- 
peachment." See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL 
RULES OF  EVIDENCE MANUAL 312-13  (2d ed. 1977). It is 
the intent of the Committee to allow use of this form of evidence 
on direct examination to the same extent, if any, it is so permitted 
in the Article I11 courts. 
The Rule does not prohibit receipt of extrinsic evidence in the 
form of prior convictions, Rule 609, or to show bias. Rule 608(c). 
See also Rule 613 (Prior statements of witnesses). When the wit- 
ness has testified as to the character of another witness, the wit- 
ness may be cross-examined as to the character of that witness. 
The remainder of Rule 608(b) indicates that testimony relating 
only to credibility does not waive the privilege against self-incrim- 
ination. See generally Rule 301. 
Although 608(b) allows examination into specific acts, counsel 
should not, as a matter of ethics, attempt to elicit evidence of mis- 
conduct unless there is a reasonable basis for the question. See 
generally ABA PROJECT ON  STANDARDS FOR CRIMI- 
NAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING  TO  THE  PROSE- 
CUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, 
Prosecution Function 5.7(d);  Defense Functions 7.6(d)  (Ap- 
proved draft 1971). 
(c)  Evidence of bias. Rule 608(c) is taken from 1969 Manual 
Para. 153d and is not found within the Federal Rule. Impeach- 
ment by bias was apparently accidentally omitted from the Fed- 
eral Rule, see, S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL 
RULES OF  EVIDENCE MANUAL 313 14(2d ed. 1977), but is 
acceptable under the Federal Rules; see, e.g., United States v. 
Leja, 568 F.2d 493 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Alvarez-Lopez, 
559 F.2d  1155 (9th Cir. 1977). Because of the critical nature of 
this form of impeachment and the fact that extrinsic evidence 
may be used to show it, the Committee believed that its omission 
would be impracticable. 
It should be noted that the Federal Rules are not exhaustive, 
and that a number of different types of techniques of impeach- 
ment are not explicitly codified. 
The failure to so codify them does not mean that they are no 
longer permissible. See, e.g., United states v. Alvarez-Lopez, supra 
155; Rule 412. Thus, impeachment by  contradiction, see also 
Rule 304(a)(2); 31 1(j), and impeachment via prior inconsistent 
statements, Rule 613, remain appropriate. To the extent that the 
Military Rules do not acknowledge a particular form of irnpeach- 
ment, it is the intent of the Committee to allow that method to the 
same extent it is permissible in the Article I11 courts. See, e.g., 
Rules 402; 403. 
Impeachment of an alleged victim of a sexual offense through 
evidence of the victim's  past sexual history and character is dealt 
with in Rule 412, and evidence of fresh complaint is admissible to 
the extent permitted by Rules 801 and 803. 
Rule 609.  Impeachment by evidence of conviction 
of crime 
(a)  General Rules. Rule 609(a) is taken  from the Federal Rule 
but has been slightly modified to adopt it to military law. For ex- 
ample, an offense for which a dishonorable discharge may be ad- 
judged may be used for impeachment. This continues the rule as 
found in Para. 153b(2)(b)(l) of the 1969 Manual. In determining 
whether a military offense may be used for purposes of irnpeach- 
ment under Rule 609(a)(l),  recourse must be made to the rnaxi- ANALYSIS OF THE MIL11  'ARY RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
mum punishment imposable if the offense had been tried by gen- 
eral court-martial. 
Rule 609(a) differs slightly from the prior military rule. Under 
Rule 609(a)(l), a civilian conviction's  availability for impeach- 
ment is solely a function of its maximum punishment under "the 
law in which  the witness was convicted."  This is different from 
Para.  153b(2)(b)(3) of the 1969 Manual which allowed use of a 
non-federal conviction analogous to a federal felony or character- 
ized by the  jurisdiction as a felony or "as an offense of comparable 
gravity."  Under the new rule, comparisons and determinations of 
relative gravity will be unnecessary and improper. 
Convictions that "involve moral turpitude or otherwise affect 
... credibility"  were admissible for impeachment under Para. 
153b(2)(b) of the 1969 Manual. The list of potential convictions 
expressed in Para. 153b(2)(b) was illustrative only and non-ex- 
haustive. Unlike the 1969 Manual rule, Rule 609(a) is exhaustive. 
Although a conviction technically fits within Rule 609(a)(l), its 
admissibility remains subject to finding by the military judge that 
its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused. 
Rule 609(a)(2) makes admissible convictions involving "dis- 
honesty or false statement, regardless of punishment."  This is 
similar to intent in Para. 153b(2)@)(4) of the 1969 Manual which 
makes admissible "a conviction of any offense involving fraud, de- 
ceit, larceny, wrongful appropriation, or the making of false state- 
ment." The exact meaning of "dishonesty''  within the meaning of 
Rule 609 is unclear and has already been the subject of substantial 
litigation. The Congressional intent appears, however, to have 
been extremely restrictive with "dishonesty"  being used in the 
sense of untruthfulness.  See generally S. SALTZBURG & K. 
REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF  EVIDENCE MANUAL 
336-45 (2d ed. 1977). Thus, a conviction for fraud, perjury, or 
embezzlement would come within the definition, but a conviction 
for simple larceny would not. Pending further case development 
in the Article 111courts, caution would suggest close adherence to 
this highly limited definition. 
It should be  noted that admissibility of evidence within the 
scope of Rule 609(a)(2) is not explicitly subject to the discretion of 
the military judge. The application of Rule 403 is unclear. 
While the language of Rule 609(a) refers only to cross-exami- 
nation, it would appear that the Rule does refer to direct examina- 
tion as well. See the Analysis to Rules 607 and 608@). 
As defined in Rule 609(f), a court-martial conviction occurs 
when a sentence has been adjudged. 
1993 Amendment. The amendment to Mil. R. Evid. 609(a) is 
based on the 1990 amendment to Fed. R. Evid. 609(a). The previ- 
ous version of Mil. R. Evid. 609(a) was based on the now super- 
seded version of the Federal Rule. This amendment removes from 
the rule the limitation  that the conviction may only be elicited 
during cross-examination. Additionally, the amendment clarifies 
the relationship between Rules 403 and 609. The amendment 
clarifies that the special balancing test found in Mil. R. Evid. 
609(a)(l) applies to the accused's convictions. The convictions of 
all other witnesses are only subject to the Mil. R. Evid. 403 bal- 
ancing test. See Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,  490 U.S. 504 
(1989). 
(b)  Time limit. Rule 609(b) is taken verbatim from the Federal 
Rule. As it has already been made applicable to the armed forces, 
UnitedStates v.  Weaver, 1 M.J. 11 1  (C.M.A. 1975), it is consistent 
with the present military practice. 
(c)  Effect  of pardon, annulment or certificate of rehabilitation. 
Rule 609(c) is taken verbatim from the Federal Rule except that 
convictions punishable by  dishonorable discharge have been 
added. Rule 609(c) has no equivalent in present military practice 
and represents a substantial change as it will prohibit use of con- 
victions due to evidence of rehabilitation. In the absence of a cer- 
tificate of rehabilitation,  the extent to which the various Armed 
Forces post-conviction programs, such as the Air Force's 3320th 
Correction and Rehabilitation Squadron and the Army's Retrain- 
ing Brigade, come within Rule 609(c) is unclear, although it is 
probable that successful completion of such a program is "an 
equivalent procedure based on the finding of the rehabilitation of 
the persons convicted" within the meaning of the Rule. 
(d)  Juvenile adjudications. Rule 609(d) is taken from the Federal 
Rule without significant change. The general prohibition in the 
Rule is substantially different from Para. 153b(2)(b) of the 1969 
Manual which allowed use of juvenile adjudications other than 
those involving an accused. The  discretionary authority vested in 
the military judge to admit such evidence comports with the ac- 
cused's  constitutional right to a fair trial, Davis v. Alaska, 415 
U.S. 308 (1974). 
(e)  Pendency of appeal. The first portion of Rule 609(e) is taken 
from the Federal Rule and is substantially different from Para. 
153b(2)(b) of the 1969 Manual which prohibited  use of convic- 
tions for impeachment purposes while they were undergoing ap- 
pellate review. Under the Rule, the fact of review may be shown 
but does not affect admissibility. A different rule applies, how- 
ever, for convictions by  summary court-martial or by special 
court-martial without a military judge. The Committee believed 
that because a legally trained presiding officer is not required in 
these proceedings, a conviction should not be used for impeach- 
ment until review has been completed. 
February  1986 Amendment: The reference in subsection (e) to 
"Article 65(c)" was changed to "Article 64" to correct an error in 
MCM, 1984. 
(f) Definition. This definition of conviction has been added be- 
cause of the unique nature of the court-martial. Because of its rec- 
ognition that a conviction cannot result until at least sentencing, 
cf:  Lederer, Reappraising the Legality of Post-trial Interviews, The 
Army Lawyer, July  1977, at 12, the Rule may modify  United 
States v. Mathews, 6 M.J. 357 (C.M.A.  1979). 
Rule 610.  Religious beliefs or opinions 
Rule 610 is taken without significant change from the Federal 
Rules and had no equivalent in the 1969 Manual for Courts-Mar- 
tial. The Rule makes religious beliefs or opinions inadmissible for 
the purpose of impeaching or bolstering credibility. To the extent 
that such opinions may be critical to the defense of a case, how- 
ever, there may be constitutional justification  for overcoming the 
Rule's exclusion. Cf: Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
Rule 61  1.  Mode and order of interrogation and 
presentation 
(a)  Control by  the military judge.  Rule 61 1(a) is taken from the 
Federal Rule without change. It is a basic source of the military 
judge's  power to control proceedings and replaces 1969 Manual 
Para. 149a and that part of Para. 137 dealing with cumulativeevi- 
dence. It is within the military judge's  discretion to control meth- App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENDIX 22 
ods of interrogation of witnesses. The Rule does not change prior 
law. Although a witness may be required to limit an answer to the 
question asked, it will normally be improper to require that a 
"yes"  or"noW answer be given unless it is clear that such an an- 
swer will be a complete response to the question. A witness will 
ordinarily be entitled to explain his or her testimony at some time 
before completing this testimony. The Manual requirement that 
questions be asked through the military judge is now found in 
Rule 614. 
Although the military judge has the discretion to alter the se- 
quence of proof to the extent that the burden of proof is not af- 
fected, the usual sequence for examination of witnesses is: prose-' 
cution witnesses, defense witnesses,  prosecution rebuttal 
witnesses, defense rebuttal witnesses, and witnesses for the court. 
The usual order of examination of a witness is: direct examina- 
tion, cross-examination, redirect examination, recross-examina- 
tion, and examination by  the court, Para. 54a, MCM, 1969 
/D-..\ 
\'\Z;*.,. 
(b)  Scope of  cross-examination.  Rule 61 1(b) is taken from the 
Federal Rule without change and replaces Para. 149b(l) of the 
1969 Manual which was similar in scope. Under the Rule the mil- 
itary judge may allow a party to adopt a witness and proceed as if 
on direct examination. See Rule 301(b)(2) (judicial advice as to 
the privilege against self-incrimination for an apparently unin- 
formed witness); Rule 301(f)(2)  (effect of claiming the privilege 
against self-incrimination on cross-examination); Rule 303 (De- 
grading Questions); and Rule 608(b) (Evidence of Character, 
Conduct, and Bias of Witness). 
(c)  Leading questions. Rule 61  1(c) is taken from the Federal Rule 
without significant change and is similar to Para. 149c of the 1969 
Manual. The reference in the third sentence of the Federal Rule 
to an "adverse partyWhas  been deleted as being applicable to civil 
cases only. 
A leading question is one which suggests the answer it is de- 
sired that the witness give. Generally, a question that is suscepti- 
ble to being answered by"yes"  or "no"  is a leading question. 
The use of leading questions is discretionary with the military 
judge.  Use of leading questions may be appropriate with respect 
to the following witnesses, among others: children, persons with 
mental or physical disabilities, the extremely elderly, hostile wit- 
nesses, and witnesses identified with the adverse party. 
It is also appropriate with the military judge's consent to utilize 
leading questions to direct a witness's attention to a relevant area 
of inquiry. 
Rule 612.  Writing used to refresh memory 
Rule 612 is taken generally from the Federal Rule but a number 
of modifications have been made to adapt the Rule to military 
practice. Language in the Federal Rule relating to the Jencks Act, 
18 U.S.C. 9 3500, which would have shielded material from dis- 
closure to the defense under Rule 612 was discarded. Such shield- 
ing was considered to be inappropriate in view of the general mili- 
tary practice and policy which utilizes and encourages broad 
discovery on behalf of the defense. 
The  decision of the president of a special court-martial without 
a military judge under this rule is an interlocutory ruling not sub- 
ject to objection by  the members, Para. 57a, MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
Rule 612 codifies the doctrine of past recollection refreshed and 
replaces that portion of Para.  146a of the 1969 Manual which 
dealt with the issue. Although the 1969 Manual rule was similar, 
in that it authorized inspection by the opposing party of a memo- 
randum used to refresh recollection and permitted it to be offered 
into evidence by that party to show the improbability of it refresh- 
ing recollection, the Rule is somewhat more extensive as it also 
deals with writings used before testifying. 
Rule 612 does not affect in any way information required to be 
disclosed under any other rule or portion of the Manual. See, 
Rule 304(c)(l). 
Rule 613.  Prior statements of witnesses 
(a)  Examining witness concerning prior statement. Rule 613(a) is 
taken from the Federal Rule without change. It alters military 
practice inasmuch as it eliminates the foundation requirements 
found in Para. 153b(2)(c) of the 1969 Manual. While it will no 
longer be a condition precedent to admissibility to acquaint a wit- 
ness with the prior statement and to give the witness an opportu- 
nity to either change his or her testimony or to reaffirm it, such a 
procedure may be appropriate as a matter of trial tactics. 
It appears that the drafters of Federal Rule 613 may have inad- 
vertently omitted the word "inconsistent"  from both its caption 
and the text of Rule 613(a). The effect of that omission, if any, is 
unclear. 
(b)  Extrinsic evidence of  prior inconsistent statement of  witness. 
Rule 613(b) is taken from the Federal Rule without change. It re- 
quires that the witness be given an opportunity to explain or deny 
a prior inconsistent statement when the party proffers extrinsic 
evidence of the statement. Although this foundation is not re- 
quired under Rule 613(a), it is required under Rule 613(b) if a 
party wishes to utilize more than the witness'own  testimony as 
brought out on cross-examination. The Rule does not specify any 
particular timing for the opportunity for the witness to explain or 
deny the statement nor does it specify any particular method. The 
Rule is inapplicable to introduction of prior inconsistent state- 
ments on the ments under Rule 801. 
Rule 614.  Calling and interrogation of witnesses 
by the court-martial 
(a)  Calling by the court-martial. The  first sentence of Rule 614(a) 
is taken from the Federal Rule but has been modified to recognize 
the power of the court members to call and examine witnesses. 
The second sentence of the subdivision is new and reflects the 
members' power to call or recall witnesses. Although recognizing 
that power, the Rule makes it clear that the calling of such wit- 
nesses is contingent upon compliance with these Rules and this 
Manual. Consequently, the testimony of such witnesses must be 
relevant and not barred by any Rule or Manual provision. 
(b)  Interrogation by  the court-martial. The first sentence of Rule 
614(b) is taken from the Federal Rule but modified to reflect the 
power under these Rules and Manual of the court-members to in- 
terrogate witnesses. The  second sentence of the subdivision is new 
and modifies Para. 54a and Para. 149a of the present manual by 
requiring that questions of members be submitted to the military 
judge in writing. This change in current practice was made in or- 
der to improve efficiency and to prevent prejudice to either party. 
Although the Rule states that its intent is to ensure that the ques- 
tions will"be  in a form acceptable to the military judge,"  it is not 
the intent of the Committee to grant carte blanche to the military ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
judge in this matter. It is the Committee's intent that the presi- 
dent will utilize the same procedure. 
(c)  Objections. Rule 614(c) is taken from the Federal Rule but 
modified to reflect the powers of the members to call and interro- 
gate witnesses. This provision generally restates prior law but rec- 
ognizes counsel's right to request an Article 39(a) session to enter 
an objection. 
Rule 615.  Exclusion of witnesses 
Rule 615 is taken from the Federal Rule with only minor changes 
of terminology. The first portion of the Rule is in conformity with 
prior practice, e.g.,  Para. 53f, MCM, 1969 (Rev.). The second 
portion, consisting of subdivisions (2) and (3), represents a sub- 
stantial departure from prior practice and will authorize the pros- 
ecution to designate another individual to sit with the trial coun- 
sel. Rule 615 thus modifies  Para. 53f.  Under the Rule, the 
military judge lacks any discretion to exclude potential witnesses 
who come within the scope of Rule 615(2) and (3) unless the ac- 
cused's constitutional right to a fair trial would be violated.  De- 
veloping Article 111 practice recognizes the defense right, upon 
request, to have a prosecution witness, not excluded because of 
Rule 615, testify before other prosecution witnesses. 
Rule 615 does not prohibit exclusion of either accused or coun- 
sel due to misbehavior when such exclusion is not prohibited by 
the Constitution of the United States, the Uniform Code of Mili- 
tary Justice, this Manual or these Rules. 
SECTION VII 
OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Rule 701. Opinion testimony by lay witnesses 
Rule 701 is taken from the Federal Rule without change and su- 
persedes that portion of Para. 138e, MCM, 1969 (Rev.), which 
dealt with opinion evidence by lay witnesses. Unlike the prior 
Manual rule which prohibited lay opinion testimony except when 
the opinion was of a "kind  which is commonly drawn and which 
cannot, or ordinarily cannot, be conveyed to the court by a mere 
recitation of the observed facts,"  the Rule permits opinions or in- 
ferences whenever rationally based on the perception of the wit- 
ness and helpful to either a clear understanding of the testimony 
or the determination of a fact in issue. Consequently, the Rule is 
broader in scope than the Manual provision it replaces. The spe- 
cific examples listed in the Manual, "the speed of an automobile, 
whether a voice heard  was that of a man, woman or child, and 
whether or not a person was drunk" are all within the potential 
scope of Rule 701. 
Rule 702.  Testimony by experts 
Rule 702 is taken from the Federal Rule verbatim, and replaces 
that portion of Para. 138e, MCM, 1969 (Rev.), dealing with ex- 
pert testimony. Although the Rule is similar to the prior Manual 
rule, it may be  broader and may supersedeFrye v.  United States, 
293 F.1013 (C.D. Cir. 1923), an issue now being extensively liti- 
gated in  the Article 111 courts. The Rule's  sole explicit  test is 
whether the evidence in question "will  assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Whether 
any particular piece of evidence comes within the test is normally 
a matter within the military judge's  discretion. 
Under Rule 103(a) any objection to an expert on the basis that 
the individual is not in fact adequately qualified under the Rule 
will be waived by a failure to so object. 
Para.  142e of the 1969 Manual, "Polygraph  tests and drug-in- 
duced or hypnosis-induced interviews," has been deleted as a re- 
sult of the adoption of Rule 702. Para. 142e states, "The conclu- 
sions based upon or graphically represented by  a polygraph test 
and conclusions based upon, and the statements of the person in- 
terviewed made during a drug-induced or hypnosis-induced inter- 
view are inadmissible in evidence."  The deletion of the explicit 
prohibition on such evidence is not intended  to make such evi- 
dence per se admissible, and is not an express authorization for 
such procedures. Clearly, such evidence must be approached with 
great care. Considerations surrounding the nature of such evi- 
dence, any possible prejudicial effect on a fact finder, and the de- 
gree of acceptance of such evidence in the Article 111 courts are 
factors to consider in determining whether it can in fact "assist 
the trier of fact."  As of late 1979, the Committee was unaware of 
any significant decision by a United States Court of Appeals sus- 
taining the admissibility of polygraph evidence in a criminal case, 
see e.g.,  United States v.  Masri, 547 F.2d  932 (5th Cir. 1977); 
United States v.  Cardarella, 570 F.2d 264 (8th Cir. 1978), al- 
though the Seventh Circuit, see e.g., United States v.  Bursten, 560 
F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that polygraph admissibility is 
within the sound discretion  of the trial judge) and perhaps the 
Ninth Circuit, United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 339 n.3 
(9th Cir. 1977), at least recognize the possible admissibility of 
such evidence. There is reason to believe that evidence obtained 
via hypnosis may be treated somewhat more liberally than is poly- 
graph evidence. See, e.g., Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067 
(9th Cir. 1975). 
Rule 703.  Bases of opinion testimony of experts 
Rule 703 is taken  from the Federal Rule without change. The 
Rule is similar in scope to Para. 138e of the 1969 Manual, but is 
potentially broader as it allows reliance upon  "facts  or data" 
whereas the 1969 Manual's limitation was phrased in terms of the 
personal observation, personal examination or study, or examina- 
tion or study "of  reports of others of a kind customarily consid- 
ered in the practice of the expert's specialty."  Hypothetical ques- 
tions of the expert are not required by the Rule. 
A limiting instruction may be appropriate if the expert while 
expressing the basis for an opinion states facts or data that are not 
themselves admissible. See Rule 105. 
Whether Rule 703 has modified or superseded the Frye test for 
scientific evidence, Frye v.  United States, 293 F.1013 (D.C. Cir. 
1923), is unclear and is now being litigated within the Article 111 
courts. 
Rule 704.  Opinion on ultimate issue 
Rule 704 is taken from the Federal Rule verbatim. The 1969 
Manual for Courts-Martial was silent on the issue. The Rule does 
not permit the witness to testify as to his or her opinion as to the 
guilt or innocence of the accused or to state legal opinions. Rather 
it simply allows testimony involving an issue which  must be de- 
cided by the trier of fact. Although the two may be closely related, 
they are distinct as a matter of law. 
February 1986 Amendment:  Fed.R.Evid. 704(b), by  operation 
of Mil.R.Evid.  1102, became effective in  the military as App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENDlX 22 
Mil.R.Evid. 704(b) on 10 April 1985. The Joint-Service Commit- 
tee on Military Justice considers Fed.R.Evid. 704(b) an integral 
part of the Insanity Defense Reform Act, ch.IV, Pub.L. No. 
98-473,  98 Stat. 2067-68  (1984), (hereafter the Act). Because 
proposed legislation to implement these provisions of the Act re- 
lating to insanity as an affirmative defense had not yet been en- 
acted in the UCMJ by the date of this Executive Order, the Com- 
mittee recommended that the President rescind the application of 
Fed.R.Evid. 704(b) to the military. Even though in effect since 10 
April 1985, this change was never published in the Manual. 
1986Amendment: While writing the Manual provisions to im- 
plement the enactment of  Article 50a, UCMJ ("Military Justice 
Amendments of  1986," National Defense Authorization Act for 
fiscal year 1987, Pub.L. No. 99-661,  100 Stat. 3905, (1986)), the 
drafters rejected adoption of Fed.R.Evid. 704(b). The statutory 
qualifications for military court members reduce the risk that mil- 
itary court members will be unduly influenced by the presentation 
of ultimate opinion testimony from psychiatric experts. 
Rule 705.  Disclosure of facts or data underlying 
expert opinion 
Rule 705 is taken from the Federal Rule without change and is 
similar in result to the requirement in Para. 138e of the 1969 
Manual that the "expert may be required, on direct or cross-ex- 
amination, to specify the data upon which his opinion was based 
and to relate the details of his observation, examination, or 
study." Unlike the 1969 Manual, Rule 705 requires disclosure on 
direct examination only when the military judge so requires. 
Rule 706.  Court appointed experts 
(a) Appointment and compensation. Rule 706(a) is the result of a 
complete redraft of subdivision (a) of the Federal Rule that was 
required to be consistent with Article 46 of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice which was implemented in Paras. 115 and 116, 
MCM, 1969 (Rev.). Rule 706(a) states the basic rule that prosecu- 
tion, defense, military judge,  and the court members all have 
equal opportunity under Article 46 to obtain expert witnesses. 
The second sentence of the subdivision replaces subdivision (b) of 
the Federal Rule which is inapplicable to the armed forces in light 
of Para. 116, MCM, 1969 (Rev.). 
(b) Disclosure  of employment. Rule 706(b) is taken from 
Fed.R.Evid. 706(c) without change. The 1969 Manual was silent 
on the issue, but the subdivision should not change military prac- 
tice. 
(c) Accused's expert of own selection. Rule 706(c) is similar in in- 
tent to subdivision (d) of the Federal Rule and adapts that Rule to 
military practice. The subdivision makes it clear that the defense 
may call its own expert witnesses at its own expense without the 
necessity of recourse to Para. 116. 
Rule 707  Polygraph Examinations. 
Rule 707 is new and is similar to Cal. Evid. Code 351.1 (West 
1988 Supp.). The Rule prohibits the use of polygraph evidence in 
courts-martial and is based on several policy grounds. There is a 
real danger that court members will be misled by  polygraph evi- 
dence that "is likely to be shrouded with an aura of near infallibil- 
ity".  United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d  161, 168-169 (8th Cir. 
1975). To the extent that the members accept polygraph evidence 
as unimpeachable or conclusive, despite cautionary instructions 
from the military judge, the members' "traditional  responsibility 
to collectively ascertain the facts and adjudge guilt or innocence is 
preempted". Id. There is also a danger of confusion of the issues, 
especially when conflicting polygraph evidence diverts the mem- 
bers'  attention from a determination of guilt or innocence to a 
judgment of the validity and limitations of polygraphs. This could 
result in the court-martial degenerating into a trial of the poly- 
graph machine. State v. Grier, 300 S.E.2d 351 (N.C.  1983). Poly- 
graph evidence also can result in a substantial waste of time when 
the collateral issues regarding the reliability of the particular test 
and qualifications of the specific polygraph examiner must be liti- 
gated in every case. Polygraph evidence places a burden on the 
administration ofjustice that outweighs the probative value of the 
evidence. The reliability of polygraph evidence has not been suffi- 
ciently established and its use at trial impinges upon the integrity 
of the judicial system. See People  v. Kegler, 242 Cal. Rptr. 897 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987). Thus, this amendment adopts a bright-line 
rule that polygraph evidence is not admissible by  any party to a 
court-martial even if stipulated to by the parties. This amendment 
is not intended to accept or reject United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 
343 (C.M.A. 1987), concerning the standard for admissibility of 
other scientific evidence under Mil. R. Evid. 702 or the continued 
vitality of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Fi- 
nally, subsection (b) of the rule ensures that any statements which 
are otherwise admissible are not rendered inadmissible solely be- 
cause the statements were made during a polygraph examination. 
SECTION Vlll 
HEARSAY 
Rule 801.  Definitions 
(a)  Statement. Rule 801(a) is taken from the Federal Rule with- 
out change and is similar to Para. 139a of the 1969 Manual. 
@)  Declarant. Rule Sol@) is taken from the Federal Rule verba- 
tim and is the same definition used in prior military practice. 
(c)  Hearsay. Rule 801(c) is taken from the Federal Rule verba- 
tim. It is similar to the 1969 Manual definition, found in Para. 
139a, which stated: "A statement which is offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matters stated therein, but which was not 
made by the author when a witness before the court at a hearing 
in which it is so offered, is hearsay." Although the two definitions 
are basically identical, they actually differ sharply as a result of 
the Rule's exceptions which are discussed infra. 
(d) Statements which are not  hearsay. Rule 801(d) is taken from 
the Federal Rule without change and removes certain categories 
of evidence from the definition of hearsay. In all cases, those cate- 
gories represent hearsay within the meaning of the 1969 Manual 
definition. 
(1)  Prior statement by witness. Rule 801(d)(l) is taken from the 
Federal Rule without change and removes certain prior state- 
ments by  the witness from the definition of  hearsay. Under the 
1969 Manual rule, an out-of-court statement not within an excep- 
tion to the hearsay rule and unadopted by the testifying witness, is 
inadmissible hearsay notwithstanding the fact that the declarant 
is now on the stand and able to be cross-examined, Para. 139a; 
United States v. Burge, 1 M.J. 408 (C.M.A. 1976) (Cook, J., con- 
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the traditional view that out-of-court statements cannot be ade- 
quately tested by cross-examination because of the time differen- 
tial between the making of the statement and the giving of the in- 
court testimony. The Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Com- 
mittee rejected this view in part believing both that later cross-ex- 
amination is sufficient to ensure reliability and that earlier state- 
ments are usually  preferable to later ones because of the 
possibility of memory loss. See generally, 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. 
BERGER,  WEINSTEIN'S  EVIDENCE  Para. 
801(d)(1)(01)(1978).  Rule 801(d)(l) thus not only makes an im- 
portant shift in the military theory of hearsay, but also makes an 
important change in law by making admissible a number of types 
of statements that were either inadmissible or likely to be inad- 
missible under prior military law. 
Rule 801(d)(l)(A) makes admissible on the merits a statement 
inconsistent with the in-court testimony of the witness when the 
prior statement "was given under oath subject to the penalty of 
perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposi- 
tion." The Rule does not require that the witness have been sub- 
ject to cross-examination at the earlier proceeding, but requires 
that the witness must have been under oath and subject to penalty 
of perjury. Although the definition of "trial,  hearing, or other 
proceeding" is uncertain, it is apparent that the Rule was in- 
tended to include grand jury testimony and may be extremely 
broad in scope. See, United States v.  Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d  1055 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.  983 (1976) (tape recorded state- 
ments given under oath at a Border Patrol station found to be 
within the Rule). It should clearly apply to Article 32 hearings. 
The Rule does not require as a prerequisite a statement "given 
under oath subject to the penalty of perjury."  The mere fact that a 
statement was given under oath may not be sufficient. No founda- 
tion other than that indicated as  a condition precedent in the Rule 
is apparently necessary to admit the statement under the Rule. 
But see WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 801-74  (1978). 
Rule 801(d)(l)(B) makes admissible on the merits a statement 
consistent with the in-court testimony of the witness and "offered 
to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of re- 
cent fabrication or improper influence or motive."  Unlike Rule 
801(d)(l)(A), the earlier consistent statement need not have been 
made under oath or at any type of proceeding. On its face, the 
Rule does not require that the consistent statement offered have 
been made prior to the time the improper influence or motive 
arose or prior to the alleged recent fabrication. Notwithstanding 
this, at least two circuits have read such a requirement into the 
rule. United States v.  Quinto, 582 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1978); United 
States v.  Scholle, 553 F.2d  1109 (8th Cir. 1977). See also United 
States v.  Dominquez, 604 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1979). 
The propriety of this limitation is clearly open to question. See 
generally United States v.  Rubin, 609 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1979). The 
limitation does not, however, prevent admission of consistent 
statements made after the inconsistent statement but before the 
improper influence or motive arose.  United States v.  Scholle, 
supra. Rule 801(d)(l)(B) provides a possible means to admit evi- 
dence of fresh complaint in prosecution of sexual offenses. Al- 
though limited to circumstances in which there is a charge, for ex- 
ample, of recent fabrication, the Rule, when applicable, would 
permit not only fact of fresh complaint, as is presently possible, 
but also the entire portion of the consistent statement. 
Under Rule 801(d)(l)(C) a statement of identification  is not 
hearsay. The  content of the statement as well as the fact of identi- 
fication is admissible. The Rule must be read in conjunction with 
Rule 321 which governs the admissibility of statements of pretrial 
identification. 
(2)  Admission  by  party opponent. Rule 801(d)(2) eliminates a 
number of categories of statements from the scope of the hearsay 
rule. Unlike those statements within the purview  of Rule 
802(d)(l), these statements would have come within the excep- 
tions to the hearsay rule as recognized in the 1969 Manual. Con- 
sequently, their "reclassification"  is a matter of academic interest 
only. No practical differences result. The reclassification  results 
from a belief that the adversary system impels admissibility and 
that reliability is not a significant factor. 
Rule 801(d)(2)(A)  makes admissible against a party a state- 
ment made in either the party's  individual or representative ca- 
pacity. This was treated as an admission or confession under 
Para. 140a of the 1969 Manual, and is an exception of the prior 
hearsay rule. 
Rule 801(d)(2)(B) makes admissible "a statement of which the 
party has manifested the party's adoption or belief in its truth." 
This is an adoptive admission and was an exception to the prior 
hearsay rule. Cf:  Para. 140a(4) of the 1969 Manual. While silence 
may be treated as an admission on the facts of a given case, see, 
Rule 304(h)(3) and the analysis thereto, under Rule 801(d)(2) 
that silence must have been intended by the declarant to have 
been an assertion. Otherwise, the statement will not be hearsay 
within the meaning of Rule 801(d)(2) and will presumably be ad- 
missible, if at all, as circumstantial evidence. 
Rule 801(d)(2)(C) makes admissible "a  statement by a person 
authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the sub- 
ject."  While this was not expressly dealt with by the 1969 Man- 
ual, it would be admissible under prior law as an admission; C' 
Para. 140b, utilizing agency theory. 
Rule 801(d)(2)(D) makes admissible "a  statement by  the 
party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of 
the agency or employment of the agent or servant, made during 
the existence of the relationship." These statements would appear 
to be admissible under prior law. Statements made by  interpret- 
ers, as by an individual serving as a translator for a service mem- 
ber in a foreign nation who is, for example, attempting to consum- 
mate a drug transaction with a nowEnglish speaking person, 
should be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(D)  or Rule 
801(d)(2)(C). 
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) makes admissible "a statement by a co-con- 
spirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy."  This is similar to the military hearsay exception 
found in Para. 140b of the 1969 Manual. Whether a conspiracy 
existed for purposes of this Rule is solely a matter for the military 
judge. Although this is the prevailing Article 111 rule, it is also the 
consequence of the Military Rules' modification  to Federal Rule 
of Evidence 104(b). Rule 801(d)(2)(E)  does not address many 
critical procedural matters associated with the use of co-conspira- 
tor evidence. See generally, Comment, Restructuring the Inde- 
pendent Evidence Requirement of the Coconspirator Hearsay 
Exception,  127 U.Pa.L.Rev.  1439 (1979). For example, the'bur- 
den of proof placed on the proponent is unclear although a pre- 
ponderance appears to be the developing Article I11 trend. Simi- 
larly, there is substantial confusion surrounding the question of App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENDIX 22 
whether statements of an alleged co-conspirator may themselves 
be considered by  the military judge when determining whether 
the declarant was in fact a co-conspirator. This process, known as 
bootstrapping, was not permitted under prior military law. See 
e.g., United States v. Duffy, 49 C.M.R. 208, 210 (A.F.C.M.R. 
1974); United States  v. LaBossiere, 13 C.M.A.  337,  339, 32 
C.M.R. 337,339 (1962). A number of circuits have suggested that 
Rule 104(a) allows the use of such statements, but at least two cir- 
cuits have held that other factors prohibit bootstrapping. United 
States v. James, 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 
442 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v.  Valencia, 609 F.2d 603 (2d 
Cir. 1979). Until such time as the Article 111 practice is settled, 
discretion would dictate that prior military law be followed and 
that bootstrapping not be allowed. Other procedural factors may 
also prove troublesome although not to the same extent as boot- 
strapping. For example, it appears to be appropriate for the mili- 
tary judge to determine the co-conspirator question in a prelimi- 
nary Article 39(a) session. Although receipt of evidence "subject 
to later connection" or proof is legally possible, the probability of 
serious error, likely requiring a mistrial, is apparent. 
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) does not appear to change what may be 
termed the"substantive law" relating to statements made by co- 
conspirators. Thus, whether a statement was made by a co-con- 
spirator in furtherance of a conspiracy is a question for the mili- 
tary judge, and a statement made by an individual after he or she 
was withdrawn from a conspiracy is not made "in  furtherance of 
the conspiracy." 
Official statements made by an officer-as  by the commanding 
officer of a battalion, squadron, or ship, or by a staff officer, in an 
endorsement of other communication-are  not excepted from the 
operation of the hearsay rule merely by reason of the official char- 
acter of the communication or the rank or position of the officer 
making it. 
The following examples  of admissibility  under this Rule may be 
helpful: 
(1) A is being tried for assaulting B. The defense presents the 
testimony of C that just before the assault C heard B say to A that 
B was about to kill A with B's  knife. The testimony of  C is not 
hearsay, for it is offered to show that A acted in self-defense be- 
cause B made the statement and not to prove the truth of B's 
statement. 
(2)  A is being tried for rape of B.  If B testifies at trial, the testi- 
mony of B that she had previously identified A as her attacker at 
an identification  lineup would be  admissible under Rule 
801(d)(l)(C) to prove that it was A who raped B. 
(3) Private A is being tried for disobedience of a certain order 
given him orally by Lieutenant B. Cis  able to testify that he heard 
Lieutenant B give the order to A. This testimony, including testi- 
mony of C as to the terms of the order, would not be hearsay. 
(4) The accused is being tried for the larceny of clothes from a 
locker. A is able to testify that B told A that B saw the accused 
leave the quarters in which the locker was located with a bundle 
resembling clothes about the same time the clothes were stolen. 
This testimony from A would not be admissible to prove that 
facts stated by B. 
(5) The accused is being tried for wrongfully selling govern- 
ment clothing. A policeman is able to testify that while on duty he 
saw the accused go into a shop with a bundle under his arm; that 
he entered the shop and the accused ran away; that he was unable 
to catch the accused; and that thereafter the policeman asked the 
proprietor of the shop what the accused was doing there; and that 
the proprietor replied that the accused sold him some uniforms 
for which he paid the accused $30. Testimony by the policeman as 
to the reply of the proprietor would be hearsay if it was offered to 
prove the facts stated by  the proprietor. The fact that the police- 
man was acting in the line of duty at the time the proprietor made 
the statement would not render the evidence admissible to prove 
the truth of the statement. 
(6) A defense witness in an assault case testifies on direct ex- 
amination that the accused did not strike the alleged victim. On 
cross-examination by the prosecution, the witness admits that at  a 
preliminary investigation he stated that the accused had struck 
the alleged victim. The testimony of the witness as to this state- 
ment will be admissible if he was under oath at the time and sub- 
ject to a prosecution for perjury. 
Rule 802.  Hearsay rule 
Rule 802 is taken generally from the Federal Rule but has been 
modified to recognize the application  of any applicable Act of 
Congress. 
Although the basic rule of inadmissibility for hearsay is identi- 
cal with that found in Para. 139a of the 1969 Manual, there is a 
substantial change in military practice as a result of Rule 103(a). 
Under the 1969 Manual, hearsay was incompetent evidence and 
did not require an objection to be inadmissible. Under the new 
Rules, however, admission of hearsay will not be error unless 
there is an objection to the hearsay. See Rule 103(a). 
Rule 803.  Hearsay exceptions; availability of 
declarant Immaterial 
Rule 803 is taken generally from the Federal Rule with modifi- 
cations as needed for adaptation to military practice. Overall, the 
Rule is similar to practice under Mariual Paras.  142 and 144 of 
the 1969 Manual. The Rule is, however, substantially more de- 
tailed and broader in scope than the 1969 Manual. 
(1)  Present sense impression. Rule 803(1) is taken from the Fed- 
eral Rule verbatim. The exception it establishes was not recog- 
nized in the 1969 Manual for Courts-Martial. It is somewhat sim- 
ilar to a spontaneous exclamation, but does not require a startling 
event. A fresh complaint by a victim of a sexual offense may come 
within this exception depending upon the circumstances. 
(2)  Excited utterance. Rule 803(2) is taken from the Federal Rule 
verbatim. Although similar to Para. 142b of  the 1969 Manual 
with respect to spontaneous exclamations, the Rule would appear 
to be more lenient as it does not seem to require independent evi- 
dence that the startling event occurred. An examination of  the 
Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee Note indicates 
some uncertainty, however. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 540 (2d ed. 
1977). A fresh complaint of a sexual offense may come within this 
exception depending on the circumstances. 
(3)  Then existing mental, emotional, or physical  condition. Rule 
803(3) is taken from the Federal Rule verbatim. The Rule is simi- 
lar to that found in  1969 Manual Para.  142d but may be slightly 
more limited in that it may not permit statements by an individual 
to be offered to disclose the intent of another person. Fresh com- ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
plaint by a victim of a sexual offense may come within this excep- 
tion. 
(4)  Statements  for purposes of  medical diagnosis or treatment. 
Rule 803(4) is taken from the Federal Rule verbatim. It is sub- 
stantially broader than the state of mind or body exception found 
in Para. 142dof  the 1969 Manual. It allows, among other matters, 
statements as to the cause of the medical problem presented for 
diagnosis or treatment. Potentially, the Rule is extremely broad 
and will permit statements made even to nonmedical personnel 
(e.g.,  members of one's family) and on behalf of others so long as 
the statements are made for the purpose of diagnosis or treat- 
ment. The  basis for the exception is the presumption that an indi- 
vidual seeking relief from a medical problem has incentive to 
make accurate statements. See generally, 4 J WEINSTEIN & M. 
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE Para.  804(4)(01) 
(1978). The  admissibility under this exception of those portions of 
a statement not relevant to diagnosis or treatment is uncertain. 
Although statements made to a physician, for example, merely to 
enable the physician to testify, do not appear to come within the 
Rule, statements solicited in good faith by others in order to en- 
sure the health of the declarant would appear to come within the 
Rule. Rule 803(4) may be used in an appropriate case to present 
evidence of fresh complaint in a sexual case. 
(5)  Recorded recollection. Rule 803(5) is taken from the Federal 
Rule without change, and is similar to the present exception for 
past recollection recorded found in Paras. 146a and 149c(l)(b) of 
the 1969 Manual except that under the Rule the memorandum 
may be read but not presented to the fact finder unless offered by 
the adverse party. 
(6)  Record of  regularly conducted activity. Rule 803(6) is taken 
generally from the Federal Rule. Two modifications have been 
made, however, to adapt the rule to military practice. The  defini- 
tion of  'business"  has been expanded to explicitly include the 
armed forces to ensure the continued application of this hearsay 
exception, and a descriptive list of documents, taken generally 
from  1969 Manual Para. 144d, has been included. Although the 
activities of the armed forces do not constitute a profit making 
business, they do constitute a business within the meaning of the 
hearsay exception, see Para. 144c, of the 1969 Manual, as well as  a 
"regularly  conducted activity." 
The specific types of records included within the Rule are those 
which are normally records of regularly conducted activity 
within the armed forces. They are included because of their im- 
portance and because their omission from the Rule would be im- 
practicable. The fact that a record is of a type described within 
subdivision does not eliminate the need for its proponent to show 
that theparticular record comes within the Rule when the record 
is challenged; the Rule does establish that the types of records 
listed are normally business records. 
Chain of custody receipts or documents have been included to 
emphasize their administrative nature. Such documents perform 
the critical function of accounting for property obtained by the 
United States Government. Although they may be used as prose- 
cution evidence, their primary purpose is simply one of property 
accountability. In view of the primary administrative purpose of 
these matters, it was necessary to provide expressly for their ad- 
missibility as an exception to the hearsay rule in order to clearly 
reject the interpretation of Para. 144d of the 1969 Manual with 
respect to chain of custody forms as set forth in United States v. 
Porter, 7 M.J. 32 (C.M.A. 1979) and United States v.  Nault, 4 
M.J. 318 (C.M.A. 1978) insofar as they concerned chain of cus- 
tody forms. 
Laboratory reports have been included in recognition of the 
function of forensic laboratories as impartial examining centers. 
The report is simply a record of "regularly  conducted" activity of 
the laboratory. See, e.g.,  United States v.  Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225 
(C.M.A.  1979); United States v.  Evans, 21 U.S.C.M.A.  579, 45 
C.M.R. 353 (1972). 
Paragraph 144d prevented a record "made principally with a 
view to prosecution, or other disciplinary or legal action . . ." 
from being admitted as a business record. The  limitation has been 
deleted, but see Rule 803(8)(B)  and its Analysis. It should be 
noted that a record of "regularly  conducted activity" is unlikely 
to have a prosecutorial intent in any event 
The fact that a record may fit within another exception, e.g., 
Rule 803(8), does not generally prevent it from being admissible 
under this subdivision although it would appear that the exclu- 
sion found in Rule 803(8)(B) forG'matters  observed by police of- 
ficers and other personnel acting in a law enforcement capacity" 
prevent any such record from being admissible as a record of reg- 
ularly conducted activity. Otherwise the limitation in subdivision 
(8) would serve no useful purpose. Seealso Analysis to Rule 
803(8)(B). 
Rule 803(6) is generally similar to the 1969 Manual rule but is 
potentially broader because of its use of the expression "regularly 
conducted"  activity in addition to "business".  It also permits 
records of opinion which were prohibited by Para. 144d of the 
1969 Manual. Offsetting these factors is the fact that the Rule re- 
quires that the memorandum was "made at or near the time by, 
or from information  transmitted by a person with knowledge . . 
.",  but Para. 144c of the 1969 Manual rule expressly did not re- 
quire such knowledge as a condition of admissibility. 
(7)  Absence of  entry in records kept in accordance with the provi- 
sions of  paragraph (6).  Rule 803(7) is taken verbatim from the 
Federal Rule. The Rule is similar to Paras.  143a(2)(h) and 
143b(3) of the 1969 Manual. 
(8)  Public records and reports. Rule 803(8) has been taken gener- 
ally from the Federal Rule but has been slightly modified to adapt 
it to the military environment. Rule 803(8)(B) has been redrafted 
to apply to "police officers and other personnel acting in a law en- 
forcement capacity" rather the Federal Rule's "police officers and 
other law enforcement personnel".  The change was necessitated 
by the fact that all military personnel may act in a disciplinary ca- 
pacity. Any officer, for example, regardless of assignment, may 
potentially act as a military policeman. The capacity within 
which a member of the armed forces acts may be critical. 
The Federal Rule was also modified to include a list of records 
that, when made pursuant to a duty required by  law, will bead- 
missible notwithstanding the fact that they may have been made 
as "matters observed by  police officers and other personnel acting 
in a law enforcement capacity." Their inclusion is a direct result 
of the fact, discussed above, that military personnel may all func- 
tion within a law enforcement capacity. The Committee deter- 
mined it would be impracticable and contrary to the intent of the 
Rule to allow the admissibility of records which are truly admin- 
istrative in nature and unrelated to the problems inherent in 
records prepared only for purposes of prosecution to depend upon 
whether the maker was at that given instant acting in a law en- App. 22, M.R.E.  APPE 
forcement capacity. The language involved is taken generally 
from Para. 1446of the 1969 Manual. Admissibility depends upon 
whether the record is "a record of a fact or event if made by a per- 
son within the scope of his official duties and those duties in- 
cluded a duty to know or ascertain through appropriate and trust- 
worthy channels of information the truth of the fact or event. . ." 
Whether any given record was obtained in such a trustworthy 
fashion is a question for the military judge. The explicit limitation 
on admissibility of records made "principally with a view to pros- 
ecution" found in Para. 144d has been deleted. 
The fact that a document may be admissible under another ex- 
ception to the hearsay rule, e.g., Rule 803(6), does not make it 
inadmissible under this subdivision. 
Military Rule of Evidence 803(8) raises numerous significant 
questions. Rule 803(8)(A) extends to "records,  reports, state- 
ments, or data compilations" of public offices or agencies, setting 
forth (A) the activities of the office or agency." The term "public 
office or agency" within this subdivision is defined to include any 
government office or agency including those of the armed forces. 
Within the civilian context, the definition of "public  offices or 
agencies" is fairly clear and the line of demarcation between gov- 
ernmental and private action can be clearly drawn in most cases. 
The same may not be true within the armed forces. It is unlikely 
that every action taken by a servicemember is an "activity"  of the 
department of which he or she is a member. Presumably, Rule 
803(8) should be restricted to activities of formally sanctioned in- 
strumentalities roughly similar to civilian entities. For example, 
the activities of a squadron headquarters or a staff section would 
come within the definition of "office or agency."  Pursuant to this 
rationale, there is no need to have a military regulation or direc- 
tive to make a statement of a "public office or  agency" under Rule 
803(8)(A). However, such regulations or directives might well be 
highly useful in establishing that a given administrative mecha- 
nism was indeed an "office or agency"  within the meaning of the 
Rule. 
Rule 803(8)(B) encompasses "matters  observed pursuant to 
duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to re- 
port. . .."This portion of Rule 803(8) is broader than subdivision 
(8)(A) as  it extends to far more than just the normal procedures of 
an office or agency. Perhaps because of this extent, it requires that 
there be a specific duty to observe and report. This duty could 
take the form of a statement, general order, regulation, or any 
competent order 
The  exclusion in the Federal Rule for "matters observed by  po- 
lice officersmwas  intended to prevent use of the exception for eval- 
uative reports as the House Committee believed them to be unre- 
liable. Because of the explicit language of the exclusion, normal 
statutory construction leads to the conclusion that reports which 
would be within Federal or Military Rule 803(8) but for the ex- 
clusion in (8)(B) are not otherwise admissible under Rule 803(6). 
Otherwise the inclusion of the limitation would serve virtually no 
purpose whatsoever. There is no contradiction between the exclu- 
sion in Rule 803(8)(B) and the specific documents made admissi- 
ble in Rule 803(8) (and Rule 803(6)) because those documents are 
not matters "observed  by police officers and other personnel act- 
ing in a law enforcement capacity." To  the extent that they might 
be so  considered, the specific language included by the Committee 
is expressly intended to reject the subdivision (8)(B) limitation. 
Note, however, that all forms of evidence not within the specific 
item listing of the Rule but within the (8)(B) exclusion will be ad- 
missible insofar as Rule 803(8) is concerned, whether the evi- 
dence is military or civilian in origin. 
A question not answered by Rule 803(8) is the extent to which 
a regulation or directive may circumscribe Rule 803(8). Thus, if a 
regulation establishes a given format or procedure for a report 
which is not followed, is an otherwise admissible piece of evidence 
inadmissible for lack of conformity with the regulation or direc- 
tive? The Committee did not address this issue in the context of 
adopting the Rule. However, it would be at least logical to argue 
that a record not made in substantial conformity with an imple- 
menting directive is not sufficiently reliable to be admissible. See, 
Rule 403. Certainly, military case law predating the Military 
Rules may resolve this matter to the extent to which it is not 
based purely on now obsolete Manual provisions. As the modifi- 
cations to subdivision (8) dealing with specific records retains the 
present Manual language, it is particularly likely that present case 
law will survive in this area. 
Rule 803(8)(C) makes admissible, but only against the Govern- 
ment, "factual findings resulting from an investigation made pur- 
suant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of informa- 
tion or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness." 
This provision  will make factual findings made, for example, by 
an Article 32 Investigatingofficer or by a Court of Inquiry admis- 
sible on behalf of an accused. Because the provision applies only 
to"factua1 findings,"  great care must be taken to distinguish such 
factual determinations from opinions, recommendations, and in- 
cidental inferences. 
(9)  Records of vital statistics. Rule 803(9) is taken verbatim from 
the Federal Rule and had no express equivalent in the 1969 Man- 
ual. 
(10)  .Absence of public  record or entry. Rule 803(10) is taken ver- 
batim from the Federal Rules and is similar to 1969 Manual Para. 

143a(2)(g). 

(1 1-1  3)  Records of religious organizations: Marriage, baptismal, 

and similar certificates: Family records. Rule 802(11H13) are all 

taken verbatim from the Federal Rules and had no express 

equivalents in the 1969 Manual. 

(14-16)  Records of documents affecting an interest in property: 
Statements in documents affecting an interest in property; State- 
ments in ancient documents. Rules 803(14)416) are taken verba- 
tim from the Federal Rules and had no express equivalents in the 
1969 Manual. Although intended primarily for civil cases, they 
all have potential importance to courts-martial. 
(17)  Market reports, commercial publications.  Rule 803(17) is 
taken generally from the Federal Rule. Government price lists 
have been added because of the degree of reliance placed upon 
them in military life. Although included within the general Rule, 
the Committee believed it inappropriate and impracticable not to 
clarify the matter by specific reference.  The Rule is similar in 
scope and effect to the 1969 Manual Para. 144f except that it lacks 
the Manual's  specific reference to an absence of entries. The ef- 
fect, if any, of the difference is unclear. 
(18) Learned  treaties. Rule 803(18) is taken from the Federal 
Rule without change. Unlike Para. 138e of the 1969 Manual, 
which allowed use of such statements only for impeachment, this 
Rule allows substantive use on the merits of statements within 
treaties if relied upon in direct testimony or called to the expert's ANALYSIS OF THE MILIT'ARY RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
attention on cross-examination. Such statements may not, how- 

ever, be given to the fact finder as exhibits. 

(19-20)  Reputation concerningpersonal or family history; reputa- 

tion concerning boundaries or general history. Rules 803(19)-(20) 

are taken without change from the Federal Rules and had no ex- 

press equivalents in the 1969 Manual. 

(21)  Reputation as to character. Rule 803(21) is taken from the 
Federal Rule without change. It is similar to Para. 138f  of the 
1969 Manual in that it creates an exception to the hearsay rule for 
reputation evidence."Reputation"  and "community"  are defined 
in Rule 405(d), and "community"includes  a "military  organiza- 
tion regardless of sizes." Affidavits and other written statements 
are admissible to show character under Rule 405(c), and, when 
offered pursuant to that Rule, are an exception to the hearsay 
rule. 
(22)  Judgment orprevious conviction. Rule 803(22) is taken from 
the Federal Rule but has been modified to recognize convictions 
of a crime punishable by a dishonorable discharge, a unique pun- 
ishment not present in civilian life. See also Rule 609 and its Anal- 
ysis. 
There is no equivalent to this Rule in military law. Although 
the Federal Rule is clearly applicable to criminal case, its original 
intent was to allow use of a prior criminal conviction in a subse- 
quent civil action. To  the extent that it is used for criminal cases, 
significant constitutional issues are raised, especially if the prior 
conviction is a foreign one, a question almost certainly not antici- 
pated by the Federal Rules Advisory Committee. 
(23)  Judgment as topersonal,  family or general history, or bound- 
aries. Rule 803(23) is taken verbatim from the Federal Rule, and 
had no express equivalent in the 1969 Manual. Although in- 
tended for civil cases, it clearly has potential use in courts-martial 
for such matters aS proof ofjurisdiction. 
(24)  Other exceptions. Rule 803(24) is taken from the Federal 
Rule without change. It had no express equivalent in the 1969 
Manual as it establishes a general exception to the hearsay rule. 
The Rule implements the general policy behind the Rules of per- 
mitting admission of probative and reliable evidence. Not only 
must the evidence in question satisfy the three conditions listed in 
the Rule (materiality, more probative on the point than any other 
evidence which can be reasonably obtained, and admission would 
be in the interest of justice) but the procedural requirements of 
notice must be complied with. The extent to which this exception 
may be employed is unclear. The Article 111 courts have divided 
as to whether the exception may be used only in extraordinary 
cases or whether it may have more general application. It is the 
intent of the Committee that the Rule be employed in the same 
manner as it is generally applied in the Article 111 courts. Because 
the general exception found in Rule 803(24) is basically one in- 
tended to apply to highly reliable and necessary  evidence, re- 
course to the theory behind the hearsay rule itself may be helpful. 
In any given case, both trial and defense counsel may wish to ex- 
amine the hearsay evidence in question to determine how well it 
relates to the four traditional considerations usually invoked to 
exclude hearsay testimony: how truthful was the original declar- 
ant? to what extent were his or her powers of observation ade- 
quate? was the declaration truthful? was the original declarant 
able to adequately communicate the statement? Measuring evi- 
dence against this framework should assist in determining the re- 
liability of the evidence. Rule 803(24) itself requires the necessity 
which is the other usual justification  for hearsay exceptions. 
Rule 804.  Hearsay exception; declarant 
unavailable 
(a)  Definition of unavailability. Subdivisions (a)(l)-(a)(5)  of Rule 
804 are taken from the Federal Rule without change and are  gen- 
erally similar to the relevant portions of Paras. 145a and 1456 of 
the 1969 Manual, except that Rule 804(a)(3) provides that a wit- 
ness who "testifies as to a lack of memory of the subject matter of 
the declarant's statement" is unavailable. The Rule also does not 
distinguish between capital and non-capital cases. 
February 1986 Amendment: The  phrase "claim or lack of mem- 
ory" was changed to "claim of lack of memory"  to correct an er- 
ror in MCM, 1984. 
Rule 804(a)(6) is new and has been added in recognition of cer- 
tain problems, such as combat operations, that are unique to the 
armed forces. Thus, Rule 804(a)(6) will make unavailable a wit- 
ness who is unable to appear and testify in person for reason of 
military necessity within the meaning of Article 49(d)(2).  The 
meaning of "military necessity"  must be determined by reference 
to the cases construing Article 49. The expression is not intended 
to be a general escape clause, but must be restricted to the limited 
circumstances that would permit use of a deposition. 
@)  Hearsay exceptions 
(1)  Former testimony. The first portion of Rule 804(b)(l) is 
taken from the Federal Rule with omission of the language relat- 
ing to civil cases. The second portion is new and has been in- 
cluded to clarify the extent to which those military tribunals in 
which a verbatim record normally is not kept come within the 
Rule. 
The first portion of Rule 804(b)(l) makes admissible former 
testimony when6'the  party against whom the testimony is now of- 
fered had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testi- 
mony by direct, cross, or redirect examination."  Unlike Para. 
1456 of the 1969 Manual, the Rule does not explicitly require that 
the accused, when the evidence is offered against him or her, have 
been "afforded  at the former trial an opportunity, to be ade- 
quately represented by counsel."  Such a requirement should be 
read into the Rule's  condition that the party have had "opportu- 
nity and similar motive."  In contrast to the 1969 Manual, the 
Rule does not distinguish between capital and non-capital cases. 
The second portion of Rule 804(b)(l) has been included to en- 
sure that testimony from military tribunals, many of which ordi- 
narily do not have verbatim records, will not be admissible unless 
such testimony is presented in the form of a verbatim record. The 
Committee believed substantive use of former testimony to be too 
important to be presented in the form of an incomplete statement. 
Investigations under Article 32 of the Uniform Code of Mili- 
tary Justice present a special problem. Rule 804(b)(l) requires 
that "the party against whom the testimony is now offered had an 
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony" at the 
first hearing. The  "similar  motive" requirement was intended pri- 
marily to ensure sufficient identity of issues between the two pro- 
ceedings and thus to ensure an adequate interest in examination 
of the witness.  See, e.g., J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, 
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE Para. 804(b)(1)((04))  (1978).  Be- 
cause Article 32 hearings represent a unique hybrid of prelimi- 
nary hearings and grand juries with features dissimilar to both, it App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENDIX 22 
was particularly difficult for the Committee to determine exactly 
how subdivision @)(I) of the Federal Rule would apply to Article 
32 hearings. The  specific difficulty stems from the fact that Article 
32 hearings were intended by  Congress to function as discovery 
devices for the defense as well as to recommend an appropriate 
disposition of charges to the convening authority. Hutson  v. 
United States, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 437, 42 C.M.R. 39 (1970); United 
States  v. Samuels, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 206, 212, 27 C.M.R. 280, 286 
(1959). See generally, Hearing on H.R. 2498 Before a Subcomm. 
of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 997 
(1949). It is thus permissible, for example, for a defense counsel to 
limit cross-examination of an adverse witness at an Article 32 
hearing using the opportunity for discovery alone, for example, 
rather than impeachment. In such a case, the defense would not 
have the requisite "similar  motive" found within Rule 804(b)(l). 
Notwithstanding the inherent difficulty of determining the de- 
fense counsel's motive at an Article 32 hearing, the Rule is explic- 
itly intended to prohibit use of testimony given at an Article 32 
hearing unless the requisiteMsimilar  motive"  was present during 
that hearing. It is clear that some Article 32 testimony is admissi- 
ble under the Rule notwithstanding the Congressionally sanc- 
tioned discovery purpose of the Article 32 hearing. Consequently, 
one is left with the question of the extent to which the Rule actu- 
ally does apply to Article 32 testimony. The  only apparent practi- 
cal solution to what is otherwise an irresolvable dilemma is to 
read the Rule as permitting only Article 32 testimony preserved 
via a verbatim record that is not objected to as having been ob- 
tained without the requisite "similar  motive."  While defense 
counsel's assertion of his or her intent in not examining one or 
more witnesses or  in not fully examining a specific witness is not 
binding upon the military judge, clearly the burden of establish- 
ing admissibility under the Rule is on the prosecution and the 
burden so placed may be impossible to meet should the defense 
counsel adequately raise the issue. As a matter of good trial prac- 
tice, a defense counsel who is limiting cross-examination  at the 
Article 32 hearing because of discovery should announce that in- 
tent sometime during the Article 32 hearing so that the announce- 
ment may provide early notice to all concerned and hopefully 
avoid the necessity for counsel to testify at the later trial. 
The Federal Rule was modified by  the Committee to require 
that testimony offered under Rule 804(b)(l) which was originally 
"given before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military commis- 
sions, other military tribunals, and before proceedings pursuant 
to or  equivalent to those required by Article 32" and which is oth- 
erwise admissible under the Rule be offered in the form of a verba- 
tim record. The modification was intended to ensure accuracy in 
view of the fact that only summarized or minimal records are re- 
quired of some types of military proceedings. 
An Article 32 hearing is a "military tribunal." The  Rule distin- 
guishes between Article 32 hearings and other military tribunals 
in order to recognize that there are other proceedings which are 
considered the equivalent of Article 32 hearings for purposes of 
former testimony under Rule 804(b)(l). 
(2)  Statement  under belief of impending death. Rule 804(b)(2) 
is taken from the Federal Rule except that the language, "for any 
offense resulting in  the death of the alleged victim,"  has been 
added and reference to civil proceedings has been omitted. The 
new language has been added because there is no justification for 
limiting the exception only to those cases in which a homicide 
charge has actually been preferred. Due to the violent  nature of 
military operations, it may be appropriate to charge a lesser in- 
cluded offense rather than homicide. The same justifications for 
the exception are applicable to lesser included offenses which are 
also, of course, of lesser severity. The additional language, taken 
from Para. 142a, thus retains the 1969 Manual rule, modification 
of which was viewed as being impracticable. 
Rule 804(b)(2) is similar to the dying declaration exception 
found in Para. 142a of the 1969 Manual, except that the Military 
Rule does not require that the declarant be dead. So long as the 
declarant is unavailable and the offense is one for homicide or 
other offense resulting in the death of the alleged victim, the hear- 
say exception may be applicable. This could, for example, result 
from a situation in which the accused, intending to shoot A, 
shoots both A and B; uttering the hearsay statement, under a be- 
lief of impending death, B dies, and although A recovers, A is un- 
available to testify at trial. In a trial of the accused for killing B, 
A's statement will be admissible. 
There is no requirement that death immediately follow the dec- 
laration, but the declaration is not admissible under this excep- 
tion if the declarant had a hope of recovery. The declaration may 
be made by  spoken words or intelligible signs or may be in writ- 
ing. It may be spontaneous or in response to solicitation, includ- 
ing leading questions. The utmost care should be exercised  in 
weighing statements offered under this exception since they are 
often made under circumstances of mental and physical debility 
and are not subject to the usual tests of veracity. The military 
judge may exclude those declarations which are viewed as being 
unreliable. See, Rule 403. 
A dying declaration and its maker may be contradicted and im- 
peached in the same manner as other testimony and witnesses. 
Under the prior law, the fact that the deceased did not believe in a 
deity or in future rewards or punishments may be offered to affect 
the weight of a declaration offered under this Rule but does not 
defeat admissibility. Whether such evidence is now admissible in 
the light of Rule 610 is unclear. 
(3)  Statement against interest. Rule 804(b) is taken from the 
Federal Rule without change, and has no express equivalent in 
the 1969 Manual. It has, however, been made applicable by case 
law, United States v. Johnson, 3 M.J. 143 (C.M.A. 1977). It makes 
admissible statements against a declarant's  interest, whether pe- 
cuniary, proprietary, or penal when a reasonable person in the po- 
sition of the declarant would not have made the statement unless 
such a person would have believed it to be true. 
The Rule expressly recognizes the penal interest exception and 
permits a statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal li- 
ability. The penal interest exception is qualified, however, when 
the declaration is offered to exculpate the accused by requiring 
the "corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustwor- 
thiness of the statement." This requirement is applicable, for ex- 
ample, when a third party confesses to the offense the accused is 
being tried for and the accused offers the third party's statement 
in evidence to exculpate the accused. The basic penal interest ex- 
ception is established as a matter of constitutional law by the Su- 
preme Court's decision in  Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 
(1973), which may be broader than the Rule as the case may not 
require either corroborating evidence or an unavailable declarant. 
In its present form, the Rule fails to address a particularly vex- 
ing problem-  that of the declaration against penal interest which ANALYSIS OF THE MIL17  'ARY RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
implicates the accused as well as the declarant. On the face of the 
Rule, such a statement should be admissible, subject to the effects, 
if any, of Bruton v.  United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) and Rule 
306. Notwithstanding this, there is considerable doubt as to the 
applicability of the Rule to such a situation. See generally.  45. 
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 
804-93,  804-16  (1978). Although the legislative history reflects 
an early desire on the part of the Federal Rules of Evidence Advi- 
sory Committee to prohibit such testimony, a provision doing so 
was not included in the material reviewed by Congress. Although 
the House included such a provision, it did so apparently in large 
part based upon a view that Bruton, supra, prohibited such state- 
ments- arguably an erroneous view of Bruton, supra, see, 
Bruton, supra n.3 at 128, Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). The 
Conference Committee deleted the House provision, following 
the Senate's desires, because it believed it inappropriate to "codify 
constitutional evidentiary principles"  WEINSTEIN'S EVI- 
DENCE  at 804-16  (1978) citing C0NG.REC.H 11931-32 (daily 
ed. Dec. 14, 1974). Thus, applicability of the hearsay exception to 
individuals implicating the accused may well rest only on the ex- 
tent to which Bruton, supra, governs such statement. The Com- 
mittee intends that the Rule extend to such statements to the 
same extent that subdivision 804(b)(4) is held by the Article 111 
courts to apply to such statements. 
(4)  Statement of personal  or family  history. Rule 804(b)(4) of 
the Federal Rule is taken verbatim from the Federal Rule, and 
had no express equivalent in the 1969 Manual. The primary fea- 
ture of Rule 803(b)(4)(A) is its application even though the "de- 
clarant had no means of acquiring personal knowledge of the 
matter stated." 
(5)  Other exceptions. Rule 804(b)(5) is taken without change 
from the Federal Rule and is identical to Rule 803(24). As Rule 
803 applies to hearsay statements regardless of the declarant's 
availability or lack thereof, this subdivision is actually superflu- 
ous. As to its effect, see the Analysis to Rule 803(24). 
Rule 805.  Hearsay within hearsay 
Rule 805 is taken verbatim from the Federal Rule. Although 
the 1969 Manual did not exactly address the issue, the military 
rule is identical with the new rule. 
Rule 806.  Attacking and supporting credibility of 
declarant 
Rule 806 is taken from the Federal Rule without change. It re- 
states the prior military rule that a hearsay declarant or  statement 
may always be contradicted or impeached. The Rule eliminates 
any requirement that the declarant be given "an  opportunity to 
deny or explain"  an inconsistent statement or inconsistent con- 
duct when such statement or conduct is offered to attack the hear- 
say statement. As a result, Rule 806 supersedes Rule 613(b) 
which would require such an opportunity for a statement incon- 
sistent with in-court testimony. 
SECTION IX 
AUTHENTICATION AND INDENTIFICATION 
Rule 901.  Requirement of authentication or 

identification 

(a)  General provision.  Rule 901(a) is taken verbatim from the 
Federal Rule, and is similar to Para. 1436 of the 1969 Manual, 
which stated in pertinent part that: "A  writing may be authenti- 
cated by any competent proof that it is genuine-  is in fact what it 
purports or is claimed to be."  Unlike the 1969 Manual provision, 
however, Rule 901(a) is not limited to writings and consequently 
is broader in scope. The Rule supports the requirement for logical 
relevance. See Rule 401. 
There is substantial question as to the proper interpretation of 
the Federal Rule equivalent of Rule 901(a).  The Rule requires 
only "evidence  sufficient to support a finding that the matter in 
question is what its proponent claims."  It is possible that this 
phrasing supersedes any formulaic approach to authentication 
and that rigid  rules such as those that have been devised to au- 
thenticate taped recordings, for example, are no longer valid. On 
the other hand, it appears fully appropriate for a trial judge to re- 
quire such evidence as is needed "to support a finding that the 
matter in question is what its proponent claims,"  which evidence 
may echo in some cases the common law formulations. There ap- 
pears to be no reason to believe that the Rule will change the pre- 
sent law as it affects chains of custody for real evidence-  espe-
cially if fungible. Present case law would appear to be consistent 
with the new Rule because the chain of custody requirement has 
not been applied in a rigid fashion. A chain of custody will still be 
required when it is necessary to show that the evidence is what it 
is claimed to be and, when appropriate, that its condition is un- 
changed. Rule 901(a) may make authentication somewhat easier, 
but is unlikely to make a substantial change in most areas of mili- 
tary practice. 
As is generally the case, failure to object to evidence on the 
grounds of lack of authentication will waive the objection. See 
Rule 103(a). 
(b)  Illustration. Rule 901(b) is taken verbatim from the Federal 
Rule with the exception of a modification to Rule 901(b)(10). 
Rule901(b)(10) has been modified by the addition of "or by appli- 
cable regulations prescribed pursuant to statutory authority." 
The new language was added because it was viewed as impracti- 
cable in military practice to require statutory or Supreme Court 
action to add authentication methods. The world wide disposition 
of the armed forces with their frequent redeployments may re- 
quire rapid adjustments in authentication procedures to preclude 
substantial interference with personnel practices needed to ensure 
operational efficiency. The new  language does not require new 
statutory authority. Rather, the present authority that exists for 
the various Service and Departmental Secretaries to issue those 
regulations  necessary for the day to day operations of their de- 
partment is sufficient. 
Rule 901(b) is a non-exhaustive list of illustrative examples of 
authentication techniques. None of the examples are inconsistent 
with prior military law and many are found within the 1969 Man- 
ual, see, Para. 143b. Self-authentication is governed by Rule 902. App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENDIX 22 
Rule 902.  Self-authentication 
Rule 902 has been taken from the Federal Rule without signifi- 
cant change except that a new subdivision, 4a, has been added and 
subdivisions (4) and (10) have been modified. The Rule prescribes 
forms of self-authentication. 
(1)  Domestic public documents under seal. Rule 902(1) is taken 
verbatim from the Federal Rule, and is similar to aspects of Paras. 
143b(2)(c) and (d) of the 1969 Manual. The  Rule does not distin- 
guish between original document and copies. A seal is self-au- 
thenticating and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is 
presumed genuine. Judicial notice is not required. 
(2)  Domestic public documents not under seal. Rule 902(2)  is 
taken from the Federal Rule without change. It  is similar in scope 
to aspects of Paras. 143b(2)(c) and (d) of the 1969 Manual in that 
it authorizes use of a certification  under seal to authenticate a 
public document not itself under seal. This provision is not the 
only means of authenticating a domestic public record under this 
Rule. Compare Rule 902(4); 902(4a). 
(3)  Foreign public documents.  Rule 902(3) is taken without 
change from the Federal Rule. Although the Rule is similar to 
Paras.  143b(2)(e) and (f) of the 1969 Manual, the Rule is poten- 
tially narrower than the prior military one as the Rule does not 
permit "final  certification"  to be made by  military personnel as 
did the Manual rule nor does it permit authentication made by 
military personnel as did the Manual rule nor does it permit au- 
thentication  made solely pursuant to the laws of the foreign na- 
tion. On the other hand, the Rule expressly permits the military 
judge to order foreign documents to6'be treated as presumptively 
authentic without final certification or permit them to be evi- 
denced by  an attested summary with or without final certifica- 
tion." 
(4)  Certijied copies of  public records. Rule 902(4) is taken verba- 
tim from the Federal Rule except that it has been modified by ad- 
ding "or  applicable regulations prescribed pursuant to statutory 
authority." The  additional language is required by military neces- 
sity and includes the now existing statutory powers of the Presi- 
dent and various Secretaries to promulgate regulations. See, gen- 
erally, Analysis to Rule 901(b). 
Rule 902(4) expands upon prior forms of self-authentication to 
acknowledge the propriety of certified public records or reports 
and related materials domestic or foreign, the certification of 
which complies with subdivisions (I), (2), or (3) of the Rule. 
(4a)  Documents or records of  the  United States accompanied by 
attesting certijicates. This provision  is new and is taken from the 
third subparagraph of Para. 143b(2)(c) of the 1969 Manual. It has 
been inserted due to the necessity to facilitate records of the 
United States in general and military records in particular. Mili- 
tary records do not have seals and it would not be practicable to 
either issue them or require submission of documents to those of- 
ficials with them. In many cases, such a requirement would be im- 
possible to comply with due to geographical isolation or the un- 
warranted time such a requirement could demand. 
An "attesting  certificate" is a certificate or statement, signed by 
the custodian of the record or the deputy or assistant of the custo- 
dian, which in any form indicates that the writing to which the 
certificate or statement refers is a true copy of the record or an ac- 
curate "translation"  of a machine, electronic, or coded record, 
and the signer of the certificate or statement is acting in an official 
capacity as the person having custody of the record or as the dep- 
uty or assistant thereof. See Para. 143a(2)(a) of the 1969 Manual. 
An attesting certificate does not require further authentication 
and, absent proof to the contrary, the signature of the custodian 
or deputy or assistant thereof on the certificate is presumed to be 
genuine. 
(5-9)  Oficial  publications; Newspapers and periodicals; Trade in- 
scriptions and the like; Acknowledged documents; Commercialpa- 
per and related documents. Rules 902(5)-(9)  are taken verbatim 
from the Federal Rulesand have no equivalents in the 1969 Man- 
ual or in military law. 
(10)  Presumptions under Acts of  Congress and Regulations.  Rule 
902(10) was taken from the Federal Rule but was modified by ad- 
ding "and RegulationsWin  the caption and "or by applicable regu- 
lation prescribed pursuant to statutory authority."  See generally 
the Analysis to Rule 901(b)(10) for the reasons for the additional 
language. The statutory authority referred to includes the pres- 
ently existing authority for the President and various Secretaries 
to prescribe regulations. 
Rule 903.  Subscribing witness' testimony 
unnecessary 
Rule 903 is taken verbatim from the Federal Rule and has no 
express equivalent in the 1969 Manual. 
SECTION X 
CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS, 
AND PHOTOGRAPHS 
Rule 1001.  Definitions 
(1)  Writings and recordings. Rule 1001(1) is taken verbatim from 
the Federal Rule and is similar in scope to Para. 143d of the 1969 
Manual. Although the 1969 Manual was somewhat more de- 
tailed, the Manual was clearly intended to be expansive. The Rule 
adequately accomplishes the identical purpose through a more 
general reference. 
(2)  Photographs. Rule 1001(2) is taken verbatim from the Federal 
Rule and had no express equivalent in the 1969 Manual. It does, 
however, reflect current military law. 
(3)  Original. Rule 1001(3) is taken verbatim from the Federal 
Rule and is similar to Para. 143a(l) of the 1969 Manual. The 1969 
Manual, however, treated "duplicate originals," i.e., carbon and 
photographic copies made for use as an original, as an "original" 
while Rule 1001(4) treats such a document as a "doplicate." 
(4)  Duplicate. Rule 1004(4) is taken from the Federal Rule verba- 
tim and includes thosedocuments Para. 143a(l) of the 1969 Man- 
ual defined as"dup1icate originals."  In view of Rule 1003's rule of 
admissibility for "duplicate,"  no  appreciable negative result stems 
from the reclassification. 
Rule 1002. Requirement of the original 
Rule 1002 is taken verbatim from the Federal Rule except that 
"this  Manual-has  been added in recognition of the efficacy of 
other Manual provisions. The Rule is similar in scope to the best 
evidence rule found in Para. 143a(19) of the 1969 Manual except 
that specific reference is made in the rule to recordings and photo- 
graphs. Unlike the 1969 Manual, the Rule does not contain the ANALYSIS OF THE MlLlTA  LRY  RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
misleading reference to "best evidence"  and is plainly applicable 
to writings, recordings, or photographs. 
It should be noted that the various exceptions to Rule 1002 are 
similar to but not identical with those found in the 1969 Manual. 
Compare Rules 1005-1007 with Para. 143a(2)(f) of the 1969 Man- 
ual. For example, Paras. 143a(2)(e) and 144c of the 1969 Manual 
excepted banking records and business records from the rule as 
categories while the Rule does not. The actual difference in prac- 
tice, however, is not likely to be substantial as Rule 1003 allows 
admission of duplicates unless, for example, "a  genuine question 
is raised as to the authenticity of the original."  This is similar in 
result to the treatment of business records in Para. 144a of the 
1969 Manual. Omission of other 1969 Manual exceptions, e.g., 
certificates of fingerprint comparison and identity, see Rule 703, 
803, evidence of absence of official or business entries, and copies 
of telegrams and radiograms, do not appear substantial when 
viewed against the entirety of the Military Rules which are likely 
to allow admissibility in a number of ways. 
The Rule's reference to "Act  of Congress" will now incorpo- 
rate those statutes that specifically direct that the best evidence 
rule be inapplicable in one form or another. See, e.g.,  1 U.S.C. 
$209 (copies of District of Columbia Codes of Laws). As a rule, 
such statutes permit a form of authentication as an adequate sub- 
stitute for the original document. 
Rule 1003. Admissibility of duplicates 
Rule 1003 is taken verbatim from the Federal Rule. It is both 
similar to and distinct from the 1969 Manual. To the extent that 
the Rule deals with those copies which were intended at the time 
of their creation to be used as originals, it is similar to the 1969 
Manual's treatment of "duplicate  originals,"  Para. 143a(l), ex- 
cept that under the 1969 Manual there was no distinction to be 
made between originals and "duplicate  originals".  Accordingly, 
in this case the Rule would be narrower than the 1969 Manual. 
To  the extent that the Rule deals with copies not intended at their 
time of creation to serve as originals, however, e.g., when copies 
are made of pre-existing documents for the purpose of litigation, 
the Rule is broader than the 1969 Manual because that Manual 
prohibited such evidence unless an adequate justification for the 
non-production of the original existed. 
Rule 1004. Admissibility of other evidence of 
contents 
Rule 1004 is taken from the Federal Rule without change, and 
is similar in scope to the 1969 Manual. Once evidence comes 
within the scope of Rule 1004, secondary evidence is admissible 
without regard to whether "better"  forms of that evidence can be 
obtained. Thus, no priority is established once Rule 1002 is es- 
caped. Although the 1969 Manual stated in Para. 143a(2) that 
"the contents may be proved by an authenticated copy or by the 
testimony of a witness who has seen and can remember the sub- 
stance of the writing"  when the original need not be produced, 
that phrasing appears illustrative only and not exclusive. Accord- 
ingly, the Rule, the Manual, and common law are in agreement in 
not requiring categories of secondary evidence. 
(1)  Originals lost ordestroyed. Rule 1004(1) is similar to the 1969 
Manual except that the Rule explicitly exempts originals de- 
stroyed in "bad  faith."  Such an exemption was implicit in the 
1969 Manual. 
(2)  Original not obtained.  Rule 1004(2) is similar to the justifica- 
tion for nonproduction in Para. 143a(2) of the 1969 Manual, "an 
admissible writing . . . cannot feasibly be produced." 
(3)  Original in possession of  opponent. 
Rule 1004(3) is similar to the 1969 Manual provision in Para. 
143a(2) that when a document is in the possession of the accused 
the original need not be produced except that the 1969 Manual 
explicitly did not require notice to the accused, and the Rule may 
require such notice. Under the Rule, the accused must be "put on 
notice, by the pleadings or otherwise, that the contents would be 
subject of proof at the hearing."  Thus, under certain circum- 
stances, a formal notice to the accused may be required. Under no 
circumstances should such a request or notice be made in the 
presence of the court members. The only purpose of such notice is 
to  justify  use of secondary evidence and does not serve to compel 
the surrender of evidence from the accused. It should be noted 
that Rule 1004(3) acts in favor of the accused as well as the prose- 
cution and allows notice to the prosecution to  justify  defense use 
of secondary evidence. 
(4)  Collateral matters. Rule 1004 is not found within the Manual 
but restates prior military law. The intent behind the Rule is to 
avoid unnecessary delays and expense. It is important to note that 
important matters which may appear collateral may not be so in 
fact due to their weight. See, e.g.,  United States v.  Parker, 13 
U.S.C.M.A.  579, 33 C.M.R.  11  l (1963) (validity of divorce de- 
cree of critical prosecution witness not collateral when witness 
would be prevented from testifying due to spousal privilege if the 
divorce were not valid). The Rule incorporates this via its use of 
the expression "related  to a controlling issue." 
Rule 1005. Public records 
Rule 1005 is taken verbatim from the Federal Rule except that 
"or attested to"  has been added to conform the Rule to the new 
Rule 902(4a). The Rule is generally similar to Para. 143a(2)(c) of 
the 1969 Manual although some differences do exist. The Rule is 
somewhat broader in that it applies to more than just "official 
records." Further, although the 1969 Manual permitted "a  prop- 
erly authenticated" copy in lieu of the official record, the Rule al- 
lows secondary evidence of contents when a certified or attested 
copy cannot be obtained by the exercise of reasonable diligence. 
The Rule does, however, have a preference for a certified or at- 
tested copy. 
Rule 1006.  Summaries 
Rule 1006 is taken from the Federal Rule without change, and 
is similar to the exception to the best evidence rule now found in 
Para. 143a(2)(b) of the 1969 Manual. Some difference between 
the Rule and the 1969 Manual exists, however, because the Rule 
permits use of "a  chart, summary, or calculation"while the Man- 
ual permitted only "a  summarization."  Additionally, the Rule 
does not include the 1969 Manual requirement that the summari- 
zation be made by a "qualified  person or group of qualified per- 
sons," nor does the Rule require, as the Manual appeared to, that 
the preparer of the chart, summary, or calculation testify in order 
to authenticate the document. The nature of the authentication 
required is not clear although some form of authentication is re- 
quired under Rule 901(a). App. 22, M.R.E.  APPENDIX 22 
It is possible for a summary that is admissible under Rule 1006 
to include information that would not itself be admissible if that 
information is reasonably relied upon by an expert preparing the 
summary. See generally Rule 703 and S. SALTZBERG & K. 
REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF  EVIDENCE MANUAL 
694 (2d ed. 1977). 
Rule 1007. Testimony or written admission of 
party 
Rule 1007 is taken from the Federal Rule without change and 
had no express equivalent in the 1969 Manual. The Rule estab- 
lishes an exception to Rule 1002 by allowing the contents of a 
writing, recording or photograph to be proven by the testimony 
or deposition of the party against whom offered or by  the party's 
written admission. 
Rule 1008.  Functions of military judge and 
members 
Rule 1008 is taken from the Federal Rule without change, and 
had no formal equivalent in prior military practice. The Rule 
specifies three situations in which members must determine issues 
which have been conditionally determined by the military judge. 
The members have been given this responsibility in this narrow 
range of issues because the issues that are involved go to the very 
heart of a case and may prove totally dispositive. Perhaps the best 
example stems from the civil practice. Should the trial judge in a 
contract action determine that an exhibit is in fact the original of 
a contested contract, that admissibility decision could determine 
the ultimate result of trial if the jury were not given the opportu- 
nity to be the final arbiter of the issue. A similar situation could 
result in a criminal case, for example, in which the substance of a 
contested written confession is determinative (this would be rare 
because in most cases the fact that a written confession was made 
is unimportant, and the only relevant matter is the content of the 
oral statement that was later transcribed) or in acase  in which the 
accused is charged with communication of a written threat. A de- 
cision by the military judge that a given version is authentic could 
easily determine the trial. Rule 1008 would give the member the 
final decision as to accuracy. Although Rule 1008 will rarely be 
relevant to the usual court-martial, it will adequately protect the 
accused from having the case against him or her depend upon a 
single best evidence determination by the military judge. 
SECTION XI 
MISCELLANEOUS RULES 
Rule 1101. Applicability of rules 
The Federal Rules have been reveirsed extensively to adapt 
them to the military criminal legal system. Subdivision (a) of the 
Federal Rule specifies the types of courts to which the Federal 
Rules are applicable, and Subdivision (b) of the Federal Rule 
specifies the types of proceedings to be governed by the Federal 
Rules. These sections are inapplicable to the military criminal le- 
gal system and consequently were deleted. Similarly, most of Fed- 
eral Rule of Evidence 1101(d) is inapplicable to military law due 
to the vastly different jurisdictionsinvolved. 
(a)  Rules applicable. Rule 1  101(a) specifies that the Military 
Rules are applicable to all courts-martial including summary 
courts-martial, to Article 39(a) proceedings, limited factfinding 
proceedings ordered on review, revision proceedings and con- 
tempt proceedings. This limited application is a direct result of 
the limited jurisdiction available to courts-martial. 
(b)  Rules of privilege.  Rule 1  101(b) is taken from subdivision (c) 
of the Federal Rule and is similar to prior military law. Unlike the 
Federal Rules, the Military Rules contain detailed privileges 
rather than a general reference to common law. Compare Federal 
Rule of Evidence 501 with Military Rule of Evidence 501-512. 
(c)  Rules relaxed. Rule 1101(c) conforms the rules of evidence to 
military sentencing procedures as set forth in the 1969 Manual 
Para. 75c. Courts-martial are bifurcated proceedings with sen- 
tencing being an adversarial proceeding. Partial application of the 
rules of evidence is thus appropriate. The Rule also recognizes the 
possibility that other Manual provisions may now or later affect 
the application of the rules of evidence. 
(d)  Rules inapplicable. Rule 1101(d) is taken in concept from 
subdivision (d) of the Federal Rule. As the content of the Federal 
Rule is, however, generally inapplicable to military law, the 
equivalents of the Article I11 proceedings  listed in the Federal 
Rule have been listed here. They included Article 32 investigative 
hearings, the partial analog to grand jury proceedings, proceed- 
ings for search authorizations, and proceedings for pretrial re- 
lease. 
1993 Amendment. Mil. R. Evid. 1101(d) was amended to make 
the provisions of Mil. R. Evid. 412 applicable at pretrial investiga- 
tions. 
Rule 1102. Amendments. 
Rule 1102 has been substantially revised from the original Fed- 
eral Rule which sets forth a procedure by  which the Supreme 
Court promulgates amendments to the Federal Rules subject to 
Congressional objection. Although it is the Committee's intent 
that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to the armed forces to 
the extent practicable, see Article 36(a),  the Federal Rules are 
often in need of modification  to adapt them to military criminal 
legal system. Further, some rules may be impracticable. As Con- 
gress may make changes during the initial period following Su- 
preme Court publication, some period of time after an amend- 
ment's effective date was considered essential for the armed forces 
to review the final form of amendments and to propose any neces- 
sary modifications to the President. Six months was considered 
the minimally appropriate time period. 
Amendments to the Federal Rules are not applicable to the 
armed forces until 180 days after the effective date of such amend- 
ment, unless the President directs earlier application. In the ab- 
sence of any Presidential action, however, an amendment to the 
Federal Rule of Evidence will be automatically applicable on the 
180th day after its effective date. The President may, however, af- 
firmatively direct that any such amendment may not apply, in 
whole or in part, to the armed forces and that direction shall be 
binding upon courts-martial. 
Rule 1103. Title 
In choosing the title, Military Rules of Evidence, the Commit- 
tee intends that it be clear that military evidentiary  law should 
echo the civilian federal law to the extent practicable, but should ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE  App. 22, M.R.E. 
also ensure that the unique and critical reasons behind the sepa- 
rate military criminal legal system be adequately served. 
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HISTORICAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS 

*EXECUTIVE  ORDER 12473 
AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 12484 
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED 
STATES, 1984 
By  virtue of the authority vested in me as President 
by the Constitution of the United States and by 
Chapter 47 of Title 10 of the United States (Uniform 
Code of Military Justice), I hereby prescribe the fol- 
lowing Manual for Courts-Martial to be designated 
as "Manual  for Courts-Martial, United States, 
1984." 
This Manual shall take effect on August 1, 1984, 
with respect to all court-martial processes taken on 
and after that date: Provided, That nothing con- 
tained in this Manual shall be construed to invali- 
date any restraint, investigation, referral of charges, 
designation or detail of a military judge or counsel, 
trial in which arraignment had been had, or other 
action begun prior to that date, and any such re- 
straint, investigation, trial, or other action may be 
completed in accordance with applicable laws, Exec- 
utive orders, and regulations in the same manner 
and with the same effect as if this Manual had not 
been prescribed; Provided further,  That Rules for 
Courts-Martial 908, 1103(j), 1105-1  107, 11 10-1  114, 
1201, and 1203 shall not apply to any case in which 
the findings and sentence were adjudged by a court- 
martial before August 1, 1984, and the post-trial and 
appellate review of such cases shall be completed in 
accordance with applicable laws, Executive orders, 
and regulations in the same manner and with the 
same effect as if this Manual had not been pre- 
scribed; Provided further, That nothing contained in 
this Manual shall be construed to make punishable 
any act done or omitted prior to August  1,  1984, 
which was not punishable when done or omitted; 
Provided further, That nothing in part IV of this 
Manual shall be construed to invalidate the prosecu- 
tion of any offense committed before the effective 
date of this Manual; Provided further, That the max- 
imum punishment for an offense committed prior to 
August 1, 1984, shall not exceed the applicable limit 
in effect at the time of the commission of such of- 
fense; Provided further, That for offenses committed 
prior to August 1, 1984, for which a sentence is ad- 
judged on or after August 1, 1984, if  the maximum 
punishment authorized in this Manual is less than 
that previously authorized, the lesser maximum au- 
thorized punishment shall apply; And provided fur- 
ther, That Part V of this Manual shall not apply to 
nonjudicial punishment proceedings which were ini- 
tiated before August  1, 1984, and nonjudicial pun- 
ishment proceedings in  such cases shall be com- 
pleted in accordance with applicable laws, Executive 
orders, and regulations in the same manner and with 
the same effect as if this Manual had not been pre- 
scribed. 
The Manual for Courts-Martial,  1969, United 
States (Revised edition), prescribed by Executive 
Order No. 11476, as amended by Executive Order 
Nos.  11835, 12018, 12198, 12233, 12306, 12315, 
12340, 12383, and 12460 is hereby rescinded, effec- 
tive August 1, 1984. 
The Secretary of Defense shall cause this Manual 
to be reviewed annually and shall recommend to the 
President any appropriate amendments. 
The Secretary of Defense, on behalf of the Presi- 
dent, shall transmit a copy of this Order to the Con- 
gress of the United States in accord with Section 836 
of Title 10 of the United States Code. 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
13 July 1984 APPENDIX 23 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12550 
AMENDMENTS TO THE MANUAL FOR 
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1984 
By the authority vested in me as President by  the 
Constitution of the United States and by Chapter 47 
of Title 10 of the United States Code (Uniform Code 
of  Military Justice), in order to prescribe amend- 
ments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United 
States, 1984, prescribed by Executive Order No. 
12473, as amended by Executive Order No. 12484, it 
is hereby ordered as follows: 
Section 1. Part I1 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, 
United States, 1984, is amended as follows: 
a.  R.C.M. 707(a) is amended to read as follows: 
*b.  R.C.M. 805(b) is amended by 
kc. R.C.M. 903(c)(3) is amended by 
*d.  R.C.M. 909 is amended 
*e.  R.C.M. 916(e)(3) is amended by 
*f.  R.C.M. 920(e)(2) is amended by 
kg.  R.C.M. 921(d) is amended by 
*h.  R.C.M. 922(b) is amended 
*i.  R.C.M. 1001 is amended 
*j.  R.C.M. 1003(b)(lO)(B) is amended by 
*k.  R.C.M. 1004 is amended 
*I.  R.C.M. 1010 is amended 
*m.  R.C.M. 1106(b) is amended by 
*n.  R.C.M. 11 14(c) is amended by 
Section 2. Part I11 of the Manual for Courts-Mar- 
tial, United States, 1984, is amended as follows: 
*a.  Mil. R. Evid. 304 is amended as follows: 
*b.  Mil. R. Evid. 3  1  1 is amended as follows: 
A23-2 
kc. Mil. R. Evid. 609(e) is amended by 
*d.  Mil. R. Evid. 804(a) is amended by 
Section 3. Part IV of the Manual for Courts-Mar- 
tial, United States, 1984, is amended as follows: 
*a.  Paragraph 16 is amended 
*b.  Part IV is amended by  inserting the following 
new paragraph after paragraph 30: 
kc. Part IV is amended by  adding the following 
new sentence at the end of paragraph 105e: 
Section 4. Part V of the Manual for Courts-Martial, 
United States, 1984, is amended as follows: 
Section 5. The amendments to Mil. R. Evid. 704, 
which were implemented on 10 April 1985 pursuant 
to Mil. R. Evid. 1102, are hereby rescinded; Pro- 
vided, That this rescision shall not apply in the trial 
of any case in which arraignment occurred while 
such amendments were in effect. 
Section 6. These amendments shall take effect on  1 
March  1986, with  respect to all court-martial 
processes taken on and after that date: Provided, 
That nothing contained in these amendments shall 
be construed to invalidate any nonjudicial punish- 
ment proceeding, restraint, investigation, referral of 
charges, trial in which arraignment occurred, or 
other action begun prior to that date, and any such 
restraint, investigation, referral of charges, trial, or 
other action may proceed in the same manner and 
with the same effect as if these amendments had not 
been prescribed; Provided further, That the amend- 
ments made in Rule for Court-Martial 1004(c) shall 
apply in the trial of offenses committed on or after 1 
March 1986; Provided further, That nothing con- 
tained in these amendments shall be construed to in- 
validate any capital sentencing proceeding con- 
ducted prior to 1 March  1986, and any such 
proceeding shall be completed and reviewed in the 
same manner and with the same effect as if these 
amendments had not been prescribed; Provided fur- 
ther, That amendments to Rule for Court-Martial 
707(a) shall not apply to any condition on liberty im- HISTORICAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
posed before 1 March 1986, and the effect of such a 
condition on liberty shall be considered under Rule 
for Court-Martial 707(a)  as it existed before  1 
March  1986; Provided further, That the amend- 
ments made in paragraph  16 of Part IV shall apply 
in trials of offenses committed on or after 1 March 
1986; Provided further, That the amendments made 
in paragraph 30a of Part IV shall apply in the trials 
of offenses committed under Article 106a on or after 
1 March  1986; And provided further,  That the 
amendments made in paragraph 30a of Part IV au- 
thorizing capital punishment shall apply with re- 
spect to offenses under Article 106a committed on or 
after 1 March 1986. 
Section 7. The Secretary of Defense, on behalf of the 
President, shall transmit a copy of this Order to the 
Congress of the United States in accord with Section 
836 of Title 10 of the United States Code. 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
February 19, 1986. APPENDIX 23 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12586  *q.  R.C.M. 1105(c) is amended by- 
AMENDMENTS TO THE MANUAL FOR 
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1984  *r.  R.C.M. 1106(f)(5) is amended by 
By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution of the United States and by Chapter 47  *s.  R.C.M.  107(b)(5) is amended to read as fol-
of title 10 of the United States Code (Uniform Code  lows:
of Military Justice), in order to prescribe amend- 
ments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United 
States, 1984, prescribed by  Executive Order No.  *t.  R.C.M.  lo9 is amended-
12473, as amended by Executive Order Nos. 12484 
and 12550, it is hereby ordered as follows:  *u.  R.C.M. 11 12 is amended- 
Section 1. Part I1 of the Manual for Courts-Martial,  *v.  R.C.M. 11 13(d)(l) is amended to read as fol- 
United States, 1984, is amended as follows:  lows: 
*a.  R.C.M. 201(e) is amended as follows:  *w.  R.C.M. 11 14 is amended as follows: 
*b.  Chapter I1 is amended by inserting the follow-  *x.  R.C.M. 1201(b)(3)(A) is amended by 
ing new Rule following R.C.M. 203: 
kc. R.C.M. 503(a)(2) is amended by  *y.  R.C.M. 1203(c) is amended by 
*d.  R.C.M. 701(b)(2) is amended by  *z.  R.C.M. 1305(b)(2)  is amended by 
*e.  R.C.M. 706(c)(l) is amended to read as follows:  Section 2. Part I11 of the Manual for Courts-Mar- 
tial, United States, 1984, is amended as follows: 
*f.  R.C.M. 706(c)(2) is amended as follows: 
*a.  Mil. R. Evid. 304(h) is amended by 
*g.  R.C.M. 707 is amended- 
*b.  Mil. R. Evid. 613(a) is amended by 
*h.  R.C.M. 903 is amended- 
*c.  Mil. R. Evid. 902(1) is amended by 
*i.  R.C.M. 9 16 is amended as follows: 
Section 3. Part IV of the Manual for Courts-Mar- 
*j.  R.C.M. 918(a) is amended-  tial, United States, 1984, is amended as follows: 
*k.  R.C.M. 920(e)(5)(D) is amended by  *a.  Paragraph 4 is amended 
*1.  R.C.M. 921(c) is amended-  *b.  Paragraph 10 is amended 
*m.  R.C.M. 924(b) is amended by  *c.  Paragraph 32 is amended- 
*n.  R.C.M. 1001(b)(2)  is amended by  *d.  Paragraph 35 is amended- 
*o.  R.C.M. 1003(c) is amended-  *e.  Paragraph 42 is amended 
*p.  R.C.M. 1010(c) is amended to read as follows:  *f.  Paragraph 46 is amended HISTORICAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
kg. Paragraph 89 is amended 
Section 4. Part V of the Manual for Courts-Martial, 
United States, 1984, is amended by  paragraph 5 
by-
Section 5. These amendments shall take effect on 12 
March 1987, subject to the following: 
a. The addition of Rule for Courts-Martial 204, the 
amendments made to Rules for Courts-Martial 707 
and 1003(c), and the amendments made to para- 
graph 5 of Part V, shall apply to any offense commit- 
ted on or after 12 March 1987. 
b.  The amendments made to Rules for Courts-Mar- 
tial701(b), 706(c)(2), 91 6(b), 91 6(k), 9 18(a), 920(e), 
92 1  (c), and 924(b) shall apply to any offense com- 
mitted on or after November  14, 1986, the date of 
enactment of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for fiscal year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661. 
c.  The amendments made to Rules for Courts-Mar- 
tial 503 and 903 shall apply only in cases in which 
arraignment has been completed on or after 12 
March 1987. 
d. The amendments made to Rules for Courts-Mar- 
tial 1105 and 1106 shall apply only in cases in which 
the sentence is adjudged on or after 12 March 1987. 
e.  Except as provided in section 5.b, nothing con- 
tained in these amendments shall be construed to 
make punishable any act done or omitted prior to 12 
March 1987, which was not punishable when done 
or omitted. 
f.  The maximum punishment for an offense com- 
mitted prior to 12 March 1987 shall not exceed the 
applicable maximum in effect at the time of the com- 
mission of such offense. 
g.  Nothing in these amendments shall be construed 
to invalidate any nonjudicial punishment proceed- 
ing, restraint, investigation, referral of charges, trial 
in which arraignment occurred, or other action be- 
gun prior to 12 March 1987, and any such restraint, 
investigation, referral of charges, trial, or other ac- 
tion may proceed in the same manner and with the 
same effect as if these amendments had not been pre- 
scribed. 
Section 6. The Secretary of Defense, on behalf of the 
President, shall transmit a copy of this Order to the 
Congress of the United States in accord with Section 
836 of title 10 of the United States Code. 
THE  WHITE HOUSE 
March 3, 1987 APPENDIX 23 
*EXECUTIVE  ORDER 12708 
AMENDMENTS TO THE MANUAL FOR 
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1984 
By  the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution of the United States and by chapter 47 
of title 10 of the United States Code (Uniform Code 
of Military Justice), in order to prescribe amend- 
ments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United 
States, 1984, prescribed by Executive Order No. 
12473, as amended by Executive Order Nos. 12484, 
12550 and 12586, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
Section 1. Part I1 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, 
United States, 1984, is amended as follows: 
a. R.C.M. 302(b)(2) is amended to read as follows: 
*b.  R.C.M. 905(e) is amended to read as follows: 
kc. R.C.M. 9  1  3(a) is amended by 
*d.  R.C.M. 1003(b)(2)  is amended by 
*e.  R.C.M. 1103(b)(2)(B)(i)  is amended to read as 
follows: 
*f.  R.C.M. 1103(e) is amended to read as follows: 
kg. R.C.M. 1106(c) is amended to read as follows: 
*h.  R.C.M. 1  106(f) is amended- 
*i.  R.C.M. 1107(b)(4) is amended to read as fol- 
lows: 
*j.  R.C.M. 1108(b) is amended- 
*k.  R.C.M. 1  112(b) is amended to read as follows: 
*I.  R.C.M. 1  114(c)(2) is amended to read as fol- 
lows: 
*m.  R.C.M. 1201(b)(3)(C) is amended to read as 
follows: 
Section 2. Part I11 of  the Manual for Courts-Mar- 
tial, United States, 1984, is amended as follows: 
*a.  Mil. R. Evid. 304(b)(l) is amended to read as 
follows: 
*b.  Mil. R. Evid. 506(c) is amended to read as fol- 
lows: 
Section 3. Part IV of the Manual for Courts-Mar- 
tial, United States, 1984, is amended as follows: 
*a.  Paragraph 10 is amended- 
*b.  Paragraph 101 is deleted 
*c.  Paragraph 105 is amended by- 
Section 4. Part V of the Manual for Courts-Martial, 
United States, 1984, is amended as follows: 
*a.  Paragraph 5 is amended by- 
Irb. Paragraph 6a is amended by- 
Section 5. These amendments shall take effect on  1 
April 1990, subject to the following: 
*a.  The amendment made to paragraph 10 of Part 
IV, shall apply to any offense committed on or after 
1 April 1990. 
b.  The amendments made to Rule for Courts-Mar- 
tial 905 and to Military Rule of Evidence 304 shall 
apply only in cases in which arraignment has been 
completed on or after 1 April 1990. 
c.  The amendment made to Rule for Courts-Mar- 
tial 1106 shall apply only in cases in which the sen- 
tence is adjudged on or after 1 April 1990. 
d. Nothing contained in these amendments shall be 
construed to make punishable any act done or omit- 
ted prior to 1 April  1990 which was not punishable 
when done or omitted. 
e.  The maximum punishment for an offense com- 
mitted prior to 1 April 1990 shall not exceed the ap- 
plicable maximum in effect at the time of the com- 
mission of such offense. 
f.  Nothing in these amendments shall be construed 
to invalidate any nonjudicial  punishment proceed- 
ing, restraint, investigation, referral of charges, trial 
in which arraignment occurred, or other action be- 
gun prior to 1 April 1990, and any such restraint, in- 
vestigation, referral of charges, trial, or other action 
may proceed in the same manner and with the same HISTORICAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
effect as if these amendments had not been pre- 
scribed. 
Section6. The Secretary of Defense, on behalf of the 
President, shall transmit a copy of this Order to the 
Congress of the United States in accord with Section 
836 of title 10 of the United States Code. 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
23 March 1990 APPE 
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12767 
AMENDMENTS TO THE MANUAL FOR 
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1984 
By the authority vested in me as President by  the 
Constitution of the United States of America and,  by 
chapter 47 of title 10 of the United States Code (Uni- 
form Code of Military Justice), in order to prescribe 
amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, 
United States, 1984, prescribed by Executive Order 
No.  12473, as amended by  Executive Order No. 
12484, Executive Order No. 12550, Executive Order 
No.  12586, and Executive order No.  12708, it is 
hereby ordered as follows: 
Section 1. Part I1 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, 
United States, 1984, is amended as follows: 
a.  R.C.M. 405(g)(l)(A) is amended to read as fol- 
lows: 
"(A)  Witnesses. Except as provided in subsection 
(g)(4)(A) of this rule, any witness whose testimony 
would be relevant to the investigation and not cumu- 
lative shall be produced if reasonably available. This 
includes witnesses requested by the accused, if the 
request is timely. A witness is 'reasonably available' 
when the witness is located within  100 miles of the 
situs of the investigation and the significance of the 
testimony and personal appearance of the witness 
outweighs the difficulty, expense, delay, and effect 
on military operations of obtaining the witness' ap- 
pearance. A witness who is unavailable under Mil. 
R. Evid. 804(a) (1)-(6) is not 'reasonably  availa- 
ble.' " 
b.  R.C.M. 405(g)(4)(B) is amended- 
(1)  in clause (iii) to read as follows: 

"(iii) Prior testimony under oath;" 

(2) in clause (iv) to read as follows: 

"(iv) Depositions of that witness; and"; and 

(3) by  adding the following clause at the end 
thereof: 
"(v) In time of war, unsworn statements." 
c. R.C.M. 701(a)(3)(B) is amended to read as fol- 
lows: 
"(B)  To rebut a defense of alibi, innocent inges- 
tion, or lack of mental responsibility,  when trial 
counsel has received timely notice under subsection 
(b) (1) or (2) of this rule." 
d. R.C.M. 701(b) is amended- 
(1)  in  subparagraph (1) to read as follows: 

"(1) Names of witnesses and statements. 

(A) Before the beginning of trial on the merits, 
the defense shall notify the trial counsel of the names 
and addresses of  all witnesses, other than the ac- 
cused, whom the defense intends to call during the 
defense case in chief, and provide all sworn or signed 
statements known by the defense to have been made 
by such witnesses in connection with the case. 
(B)  Upon request of the trial counsel, the defense 
shall also 
(i) provide the trial counsel with the names and 
addresses of any witnesses whom the defense intends 
to call at the presentencing proceedings under 
R.C.M. 1001(c); and 
(ii) permit the trial counsel to inspect any writ- 
ten material that will be presented by the defense at 
the presentencing proceeding."; 
(2)  in subparagraph (2) to read as follows: 
"(2)  Notice of certain defenses. The defense 
shall notify the trial counsel before the beginning of 
trial on the merits of its intent to offer the defense of 
alibi, innocent ingestion, or lack of mental responsi- 
bility, or its intent to introduce expert testimony as 
to the accused's mental condition. Such notice by 
the defense shall disclose, in the case of an alibi de- 
fense, the place or places at which the defense claims 
the accused to have been at the time of the alleged 
offense, and, in the case of an innocent ingestion de- 
fense, the place or places where, and the circum- 
stances under which the defense claims the accused 
innocently ingested the substance in question, and 
the names and addresses of the witnesses upon 
whom the accused intends to rely to establish any 
such defenses."; and 
(3)  in subparagraph (5) to read as follows: 
"(5) Inadmissibility of withdrawn defense. If an 
intention to rely upon a defense under subsection 
(b)(2) of this rule is withdrawn, evidence of such in- 
tention and disclosures by the accused or defense 
counsel made in connection with such intention is 
not, in any court-martial, admissible against the ac- 
cused who gave notice of the intention." 
e.  R.C.M. 705(c)(2) is amended by deleting the first 
sentence and substituting therefor the following sen- 
tence: 
"(2)  Permissible terms or conditions. Subject to 
subsection (c)(l)(A) of this rule, subsection (c)(l)(B) 
of this rule does not prohibit either party from pro- 
posing the following additional conditions:". 
f.  R.C.M. 705(d) is amended- 
(1)  by deleting subparagraph (1); 
(2) by redesignating subparagraph (2) as subpar- 
agraph (1) and amending it to read as follows: HISTORICAL EXE(  XJTIVE ORDERS 
"(1)  Negotiation. Pretrial agreement negotia- 
tions may be initiated by the accused, defense coun- 
sel, trial counsel, the staff judge advocate, convening 
authority, or their duly authorized representatives. 
Either the defense or the government may propose 
any term or  condition not prohibited by law or pub- 
lic policy. Government representatives shall negoti- 
ate with defense counsel unless the accused has 
waived the right to counsel." 
(3)  by  redesignating subparagraph (3) as subpar- 
agraph (2) and amending it to read as follows: 
"(2)  Formal submission. After negotiation, if 
any, under subsection (d)(l) of this rule, if the ac- 
cused elects to propose a pretrial agreement, the de- 
fense shall submit a written offer. All terms, condi- 
tions, and promises between the parties shall be 
written. The proposed agreement shall be signed by 
the accused and defense counsel, if any. If the agree- 
ment contains any specified action on the adjudged 
sentence, such action shall be set forth on a page sep- 
arate from the other portions of the agreement." 
(4)  by  redesignating subparagraph (4) as subpar- 
agraph (3) and amending it to read as follows: 
"(3) Acceptance. The convening authority may 
either accept or reject an offer of the accused to enter 
into a pretrial agreement, or may propose by 
counteroffer any terms or conditions not prohibited 
by law or public policy. The decision whether to ac- 
cept or reject an offeris within the sole discretion of 
the convening authority. When the convening au- 
thority has accepted a pretrial agreement, the agree- 
ment shall be signed by the convening authority or 
by a person, such as the staff judge advocate or trial 
counsel, who has been authorized by the convening 
authority to sign." and 
(5)  by  redesignating subparagraph (5) as subpar- 
agraph (4). 
g.  R.C.M. 707 is amended to read as follows: 
"Rule 707. Speedy trial 
(a) In general. The accused shall be brought to trial 
within 120 days after the earlier of: 
(1)  Preferral of charges; 
(2)  The imposition of restraint under R.C.M. 
304(a) (2)-(4); or, 
(3)  Entry on active duty under R.C.M. 204. 
(b) Accountability. 
(1)  In general. The date of preferral of charges, 
the date on which pretrial restraint under R.C.M. 
304(a) (2)-(4) is imposed, or the date of entry on ac- 
tive duty under R.C.M. 204 shall not count for the 
purpose of computing time under subsection (a) of 
this rule. The date on which the accused is brought 
to trial shall count. The accused is brought to trial 
within the meaning of this rule at the time of ar- 
raignment under R.C.M. 904. 
(2)  Multiple charges. When charges are preferred 
at different times, accountability for each charge 
shall be determined from the appropriate date under 
subsection (a) of this rule for that charge. 
(3)  Events which affect time periods. 
(A)  Dismissal  or mistrial. If charges are dis- 
missed, or if  a mistrial is granted, a new  120-day 
time period under this rule shall begin on the date of 
dismissal or mistrial for cases in which there is no 
repreferral and cases in which the accused is in pre- 
trial restraint. In all other cases, a new 120-day time 
period under this rule shall begin on the earlier of 
(i) the date of repreferral; 
(ii) the date of imposition of restraint under 
R.C.M. 304(a) (2)-(4). 
(B) Release from  restraint. If the accused is re- 
leased from pretrial restraint for a significant period, 
the 120-day time period under this rule shall begin 
on the earlier of 
(i) the date of preferral of charges; 
(ii) the date on which restraint under R.C.M. 
304(a) (2)-(4) is reimposed; or 
(iii) the date of entry on active duty under 
R.C.M. 204. 
(C)  Government appeals. If notice of appeal under 
R.C.M. 908 is filed, a new  120-day time period 
under this rule shall begin, for all charges neither 
proceeded on nor severed under R.C.M. 908(b)(4), 
on the date of notice to the parties under R.C.M. 
908(b)(8) or 908(c)(3), unless it is determined that 
the appeal was filed solely for the purpose of delay 
with the knowledge that it was totally frivolous and 
without merit. After the decision of the Court of 
Military Review under R.C.M. 908, if there is a fur- 
ther appeal to the Court of Military Appeals or, sub- 
sequently, to the Supreme Court, a new  120-day 
time period under this rule shall begin on the date 
the parties are notified of the final decision of the 
Court of Military Appeals or, if appropriate, the Su- 
preme Court. 
(D)  Rehearings. If a rehearing is ordered or au- 
thorized by  an appellate court, a new  120-day time 
period under this rule shall begin on the date that the 
responsible convening authority receives the record 
of trial and the opinion authorizing or directing a re- 
hearing. APPENDIX 23 
(c) Excludable delay. All periods of time covered 
by stays issued by appellate courts and all other pre- 
trial delays approved by a military judge or the con- 
vening authority shall be excluded when determin- 
ing whether the period in subsection (a) of this rule 
has run. 
(1) Procedure. Prior to referral, all requests for 
pretrial delay, together with supporting reasons, will 
be  submitted to the convening authority or, if au- 
thorized under regulations prescribed by the Secre- 
tary concerned, to a military judge for resolution. 
After referral, such requests for pretrial delay will be 
submitted to the military judge for resolution. 
(2) Motions. Upon accused's  timely motion to a 
military judge under R.C.M. 905 for speedy trial re- 
lief, counsel should provide the court a chronology 
detailing the processing of the case. This chronology 
should be made part of the appellate record. 
(d) Remedy. A failure to comply with the right to 
a speedy trial will result in dismissal of the affected 
charges. This dismissal will be with or without 
prejudice to the government's right to reinstitute 
court-martial proceedings against the accused for 
the same offense at a later date. The charges must be 
dismissed with prejudice where the accused has been 
deprived of his or her constitutional right to a 
speedy trial. In determining whether to dismiss 
charges with or without prejudice, the court shall 
consider, among others, each of the following fac- 
tors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and cir- 
cumstances of the case that lead to dismissal; the im- 
pact of a reprosection on the administration of 
justice; and any prejudice to the accused resulting 
from the denial of a speedy trial. 
(e)  Waiver. Except as provided in  R.C.M. 
910(a)(2), a plea of guilty which results in a finding 
of guilty waives any speedy trial issue as to that of- 
fense." 
h.  R.C.M. 802(c) is amended to read as follows: 
"(c)  Rights of Parties. No party may be pre- 
vented under this rule from presenting evidence or 
from making any argument, objection, or motion at 
trial." 
i.  R.C.M. 908(b)(4) is amended to read as follows: 
"(4) Effect  on the court-martial. Upon written 
notice to the military judge under subsection (b)(3) 
of this rule, the ruling or order that is the subject of 
the appeal is automatically stayed and no session of 
the court-martial may proceed pending disposition 
by  the Court of Military Review of the appeal, ex- 
cept that solely as to charges and specifications not 
affected by the ruling or order." 
j.  R.C.M. 908@) is amended by inserting the follow- 
ing new subparagraph at the end thereof: 
"(9)  Pretrial confinement of accused pending 
appeal. If an accused is in pretrial confinement at the 
time the United States files notice of its intent to ap- 
peal under subsection (3) above, the commander, in 
determining whether the accused should be confined 
pending the outcome of an appeal by  the United 
States, should consider the same factors which 
would authorize the imposition of pretrial confine- 
ment under R.C.M. 305(h)(2)(B)." 
k.  R.C.M. 1004(c)(8)  is amended to read as follows: 
"(8) That, on1 y in the case of a violation of Arti- 
cle 11  8(4), the accused was the actual perpetrator of 
the killing or was a principal whose participation in 
the burglary, sodomy, rape, robbery, or aggravated 
arson was major and who manifested a reckless in- 
difference for human life;" 
1.  R.C.M. 1010 is amended to read as follows: 
"In each general and special court-martial, prior 
to adjournment, the military judge shall ensure that 
the defense counsel has informed the accused orally 
and in writing of; 
(a) The right to submit matters to the convening 
authority to consider before taking action; 
(b) The right to appellate review, as applicable, 
and the effect of waiver or withdrawal of such right; 
(c) The right to apply for relief from the Judge 
Advocate General if the case is neither reviewed by a 
Court of Military Review nor reviewed by the Judge 
Advocate General under R.C.M.  1201(b)(l); and 
(d) The right to the advice and assistance of coun- 
sel in the exercise of the foregoing rights or any deci- 
sion to waive them. 
The written advice to the accused concerning 
post-trial and appellate rights shall be signed by the 
accused and the defense counsel and inserted in the 
record of trial as an appellate exhibit." 
m.  R.C.M. 1103(b)(2)(D) is amended by- 
(1) redesignating clause (iv) as clause (v); and 
(2) inserting the following new clause (iv) after 
clause (iii): 
"(iv) the original dated, signed action by the con- 
vening authorit y  ." 
n.  R.C.M. 1107(f)(l) is amended to read as follows: 
"(1)  In general. The convening authority shall 
state in writing and insert in the record of trial the 
convening authority's decision as to the sentence, 
whether any findings of  guilty are disapproved, and HISTORICAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
orders as to further disposition. The action shall be 
signed personally by the convening authority. The 
convening authority's authority to sign shall appear 
below the signature." 
o.  R.C.M. 11 10(f)(l) is amended to read as follows: 
"(1)  Waiver. The accused may sign a waiver of ap- 
pellate review at any time after the sentence is an- 
nounced. The waiver must be filed within 10 days af- 
ter the accused or defense counsel is served with a 
copy of the action under R.C.M. 1107(h). Upon 
written application of the accused, the convening 
authority may extend this period for good cause, for 
not more than 30 days." 
p.  R.C.M.  11 13(c)(l) is amended in the final para- 
graph thereof to read as follows: 
"A  dishonorable or a bad-conduct discharge 
may be ordered executed only after a final judgment 
within the meaning of R.C.M.  1209 has been ren- 
dered in the case. If on the date of final judgment a 
servicemember is not on appellate leave and more 
than 6 months have elapsed  since approval of the 
sentence by the convening authority, before a dis- 
honorable or a bad-conduct discharge may be exe- 
cuted, the officer exercising general court-martial  ju- 
risdiction over the servicemember shall consider the 
advice of that officer's  staff judge  advocate as to 
whether retention of the servicemember would be in 
the best interest of the service. Such advice shall in- 
clude the findings and sentence as finally approved, 
the nature and character of duty since approval of 
the sentence by the convening authority, and a rec- 
ommendation whether the discharge should be exe- 
cuted." 
Section 2. Part I11 of the Manual for Courts-Mar- 
tial, United States, 1984, is amended by adding the 
following new rule at the end of Section VII thereof: 
"Rule 707. Polygraph examinations 
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion 
of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer 
to take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph ex- 
amination, shall not be admitted into evidence. 
(b) Nothing in this section is intended to exclude 
from evidence statements made during a polygraph 
examination which are otherwise admissible." 
Section 3. Part IV of the Manual for Courts-Mar- 
tial, United States, 1984, is amended as follows: 
a.  Paragraph 4e is amended to read as follows: 
"e. Maximum  punishment. Any person subject to 
the code who is found guilty of an attempt under Ar- 
ticle 80 to commit any offense punishable by  the 
code shall be subject to the same maximum punish- 
ment authorized for commission of the offense at- 
tempted, except that in no case shall the death pen- 
alty be adjudged, nor shall any mandatory minimum 
punishment provisions apply; and in no case, other 
than attempted murder, shall confinement exceed- 
ing 20 years be adjudged." 
b.  Paragraph 19 is amended- 
(1)  in subparagraph b(4) by adding the following 
thereto: 
"[Note: if  the escape was post-trial confinement, 
add the following element] 
(d) That the confinement was the result of a 
court-martial conviction." 
(2)  in subparagraph c(4)(a) by adding the follow- 
ing thereto: 
"For purposes of the aggravating element of post- 
trial confinement (subparagraph b(4)(d), above) and 
increased punishment therefor (subparagraph e(4), 
below), the confinement must have been imposed 
pursuant to an adjudged sentence of a court-martial 
and not as a result of pretrial restraint or nonjudicial 
punishment." 
(3)  in subparagraph e by- 
(a)  amending clause (3) to read as follows: 
"(3) Escape from custody, pretrial  confinement, 
or confinement on bread and water or diminished ra- 
tions imposed pursuant  to Article  15. Dishonorable 
discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinements for 1 year." 
(b)  adding the following new clause at the end 
thereof: 
"(4)  Escape from post-trial confinement. Dis-
honorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and al- 
lowances, and confinement for 5 years." 
(4)  in subparagraph f(4) to read as follows: 

"(4) Escape from confinement. 

In that  (personal jurisdiction data), 
having been placed in  (post-trial) confinement in 
(place of confinement), by a person authorized to or- 
der accused  into confinement did, (at/on  board 
location) (subject-matter jurisdiction 
data, if  required), on or about  19, 
escape from confinement." 
c.  Paragraph 35c(2) is amended to read as follows: 
"(2)  Operating. Operating a vehicle includes not 
only driving or guiding it while in motion, either in 
person or through the agency or another, but also 
the manipulation of its controls so as to cause the APPENDIX 23 
particular vehicle to move, or the setting of its mo- 
tive power in action." 
d.  Paragraph 57d is amended to read as follows: 
"d.  Lesser included offense. Article 80-at- 
tempts." 
e. 	Paragraph 96f is amended to read as follows: 
"f.  Sample specification. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction data), 
did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter juris- 
diction data, if required), on or about  , 
19,  wrongfully (endeavor to [impede (a trial by 
court-martial) (an investigation) (  >I [in-
fluence the actions of  ,(a trial counsel of 
the court-martial) (a defense counsel of the court- 
martial) (an officer responsible for making a recom- 
mendation concerning disposition  of charges) 
(  )I  [(influence) (alter) the testimony of 
as a witness before a (court-martial) (an 
investigating officer) (  )] in the case of 
by [(promising) (offering) (giving) to the 
said  , (the  sum  of  $  ) 
(  ,  of  a  value  of  about  $ 
)][communicating  to  the  said 
a threat to  1 [  1, 
(if) (unless) he/she, the said  ,would [rec- 
ommend dismissal of  the charges against said 
] [(wrongfully refuse to testify) (testify 
falsely concerning  > (  >I [(at 
such trial) (before such investigating officer)] 
r  1 39 
Section 4. These amendments shall take effect on 6 
July 1991, subject to the following: 
a.  The amendments made to Rule for Courts-Mar- 
tial 1004(c)(8) and paragraphs 4c, 19, and 35c(2) of 
Part IV shall apply to any offense committed on or 
after 6 July 199  1. 
b.  Military Rule of Evidence 707 shall apply only in 
cases in which arraignment has been completed on 
or after 6 July 199 1. 
c.  The amendments made to Rules for Courts-Mar- 
tial 701 and 705 shall apply only in cases in which 
charges are preferred on or after 6 July 199  1. 
d. The amendments made to Rules for Courts-Mar- 
tial 707 and 1010 shall apply only to cases in which 
arraignment occurs on or after 6 July 199  1. 
e.  The amendment made to Rule for Courts-Martial 
908@)(9) shall apply pnly to cases in which pretrial 
confinement is imposed on or after 6 July 199 1. 
f.  The amendment made to Rule for Courts-Martial 
11 13(c)(l) shall apply only in cases in which the sen- 
tence is adjudged on or after 6 July 199 1. 
g.  Nothing contained in these amendments shall be 
construed to make punishable any act done or omit- 
ted prior to 6 July 1991, which was not punishable 
when done or omitted. 
h.  The maximum punishment for an offense com- 
mitted prior to 6 July 1991 shall not exceed the ap- 
plicable maximum in effect at the time of the com- 
mission of such offense. 
i.  Nothing in these amendments shall be construed 
to invalidate any nonjudicial punishment proceed- 
ing, restraint, investigation, referral of charges, trial 
in which arraignment occurred, or other action be- 
gun prior to 6 July 1991, and any such restraint, in- 
vestigation, referral of charges, trial, or other action 
may proceed in the same manner and with the same 
effect as if these amendments had not been pre- 
scribed. 
Section 5. The Secretary of Defense, on behalf of the 
President, shall transmit a copy of this Order to the 
Congress of the United States in accord with section 
836 of title 10 of the United States Code. 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
June 27, 199 1 HISTORICAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS APPENDIX 23 
*EXECUTIVE  ORDER 12888 
AMENDMENTS TO THE MANUAL FOR 
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1984 
By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States of 
America, including chapter 47 of title 10, United 
States Code (Uniform Code of Military Justice,  10 
U.S.C. 801-946),  in order to prescribe amendments 
to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 
1984, prescribed by  Executive Order No. 12473, as 
amended by  Executive Order No. 12484, Executive 
Order No. 12550, Executive Order No. 12586, Exec- 
utive Order No. 12708, and Executive Order No. 
12767, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
Section 1. Part I1 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, 
United States, 1984, is amended as follows: 
a. R.C.M. 109 is amended as follows: 
"(a)  In general. Each Judge Advocate General is 
responsible for the professional supervision and dis- 
cipline of military trial and appellate military judges, 
judge advocates, and other lawyers who practice in 
proceedings governed by the code and this Manual. 
To discharge this responsibility each Judge Advo- 
cate General may prescribe rules of professional 
conduct not inconsistent with this rule or this Man- 
ual. Rules of professional conduct promulgated pur- 
suant to this rule may include sanctions for viola- 
tions of such rules. Sanctions may include but are 
not limited to indefinite suspension from practice in 
courts-martial and in the Courts of Military Review. 
Such suspensions may only be imposed by the Judge 
Advocate General of  the armed service of such 
courts. Prior to imposing any discipline under this 
rule, the subject of the proposed action must be pro- 
vided notice and an opportunity to be heard. The 
Judge Advocate General concerned may upon good 
cause shown modify or revoke suspension. Proce- 
dures to investigate complaints against military trial 
judges and appellate military judges are contained in 
subsection (c) of this rule. 
(b) Action after suspension or disbarment. When a 
Judge Advocate General suspends a person from 
practice or the Court of Military Appeals disbars a 
person, any Judge Advocate General may suspend 
that person from practice upon written notice and 
opportunity to be heard in writing. 
(c)  Investigation of judges. 
(1)  In general. These rules and procedures 
promulgated pursuant to Article 6a are established 
to investigate and dispose of charges, allegations, or 
information pertaining to the fitness of a military 
trial judge or appellate military judge to perform the 
duties of the judge's office. 
(2)  Policy. Allegations of judicial  misconduct 
or unfitness shall be investigated pursuant to the 
procedures of this rule and appropriate action shall 
be taken. Judicial misconduct includes any act or 
omission that may serve to demonstrate unfitness for 
further duty as a judge, including but not limited to 
violations of applicable ethical standards. 
(3)  Complaints. Complaints concerning a mili- 
tary trial judge or appellate military judge will be 
forwarded to the Judge Advocate General of the ser- 
vice concerned or to a person  designated by the 
Judge Advocate General concerned to receive such 
complaints. 
(4)  Initial action upon receipt of a  com-
plaint.Upon receipt, a complaint will be screened by 
the Judge Advocate General concerned or by the in- 
dividual designated in subsection (c)(3) of this rule 
to receive complaints. An initial inquiry is necessary 
if  the complaint, taken as true, would constitute ju- 
dicial misconduct or unfitness for further service as a 
judge. Prior to the commencement of an initial in- 
quiry, the Judge Advocate General concerned shall 
be notified that a complaint has been filed and that 
an initial inquiry will be conducted. The Judge Ad- 
vocate General concerned may temporarily suspend 
the subject of a complaint from performing judicial 
duties pending the outcome of any inquiry or inves- 
tigation conducted pursuant to this rule. Such in- 
quiries or investigations shall be conducted with rea- 
sonable promptness. 
(5)  Initial inquiry. 
(A)  In general. An initial inquiry is neces- 
sary to determine if the complaint is substantiated. 
A complaint is substantiated upon finding that it is 
more likely than not that the subject judge has en- 
gaged in judicial misconduct or is otherwise unfit for 
further service as a judge. 
(B)  Responsibility to conduct initial inquiry. 
The Judge Advocate General concerned, or the per- 
son designated to receive complaints under subsec- 
tion (c)(3) of this rule, will conduct or order an ini- 
tial inquiry. The individual designated to conduct 
the inquiry should, if practicable, be senior to the HISTORICAL EXEiCUTlVE ORDERS 
subject of the complaint. If the subject of the com- 
plaint is a military trial judge, the individual desig- 
nated to conduct the initial inquiry should, if practi- 
cable, be a military trial judge or an individual with 
experience as a military trial judge. If the subject of 
the complaint is an appellate military judge, the in- 
dividual designated to conduct the inquiry should, if 
practicable, have experience as an appellate military 
judge. 
(C)  Due process.  During the initial inquiry, 
the subject of the complaint will, at a minimum, be 
given notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
(D) Action following the initial inquiry. If the 
complaint is not substantiated pursuant to subsec- 
tion (c)(5)(A) of this rule, the complaint shall be dis- 
missed as unfounded. If the complaint is substanti- 
ated, minor professional disciplinary action may be 
taken or the complaint may be forwarded, with find- 
ings and recommendations, to the Judge Advocate 
General concerned. Minor professional disciplinary 
action is defined as counseling or the issuance of an 
oral or written admonition or reprimand. The Judge 
Advocate General concerned will be notified prior to 
taking minor professional disciplinary action or dis- 
missing a complaint as unfounded. 
(6) Action by the Judge Advocate General. 
(A)  In general. The Judge Advocates Gen- 
eral are responsible for the professional supervision 
and discipline of military trial and appellate military 
judges under their jurisdiction. Upon receipt of find- 
ings and recommendations required by subsection 
(c)(5)(D) of this rule the Judge Advocate General 
concerned will take appropriate action. 
(B) Appropriate Actions. The Judge Advo- 
cate General concerned may dismiss the complaint, 
order an additional inquiry, appoint an ethics com- 
mission to consider the complaint, refer the matter 
to another appropriate investigative agency or take 
appropriate professional disciplinary action pursu- 
ant to the rules of professional conduct prescribed 
by the Judge Advocate General under subsection (a) 
of this rule. Any decision of a Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral, under this rule, is final and is not subject to ap- 
peal. 
(C)  Standard of Pro05  Prior to taking pro- 
fessional disciplinary action, other than minor disci- 
plinary action is defined in subsection (c)(5)(D) of 
this rule, the Judge Advocate General concerned 
shall find, in writing, that the subject of  the com- 
plaint engaged in judicial misconduct or is otherwise 
unfit for continued service as a military judge, and 
that such misconduct or unfitness is established by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
(D) Due process.  Prior to taking final action 
on the complaint, the Judge Advocate General con- 
cerned will ensure that the subject of the complaint 
is, at a minimum, given notice and an opportunity to 
be heard. 
(7)  The Ethics Commission. 
(A)Membership. If appointed pursuant to 
subsection (c)(6)(B) of this rule, an ethics commis- 
sion shall consist of at least three members. If the 
subject of the complaint is a military trial judge, the 
commission should include one or more military 
trial judges or individuals with experience as a mili- 
tary trial judge. If the subject of the complaint is an 
appellate military judge, the commission should in- 
clude one or more individuals with experience as an 
appellate military judge.  Members of the commis- 
sion should, if practicable, be senior to the subject of 
the complaint. 
(B)  Duties. The commission will perform 
those duties assigned by the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral concerned. Normally, the commission will pro- 
vide an opinion as to whether the subject's acts or 
omissions constitute judicial misconduct or unfit- 
ness. If the commission determines that the affected 
judge engaged in judicial misconduct or is unfit for 
continued judicial  service, the commission may be 
required to recommend  an appropriate disposition 
to the Judge Advocate General concerned. 
(8)  Rules of procedure.  The Secretary of De- 
fense or the Secretary of the service concerned may 
establish additional procedures consistent with this 
rule and Article 6A." 
b.  R.C.M. 3050  is amended to read as follows: 
"Military Counsel. If requested by  the prisoner 
and such request is made known to military authori- 
ties, military counsel shall be provided to the pris- 
oner before the initial review under subsection (i) of 
this rule or within 72 hours of such request being 
first communicated to military authorities, which- 
ever occurs first. Counsel may be assigned for the 
limited purpose of representing the accused only 
during the pretrial confinement proceedings before 
charges are referred. If assignment is made for this 
limited purpose, the prisoner shall be so informed. 
Unless otherwise provided by regulations of the Sec- APPENDIX 23 
retary concerned, a prisoner does not have the right 
under this rule to have military counsel of the pris- 
oner's own selection.". 
c.  R.C.M. 305(h)(2)(A) is amended to read as fol- 
lows: 
"(A)  Decision. Not later than 72 hours after the 
commander's  ordering of a prisoner into pretrial 
confinement, or after receipt of a report that a mem- 
ber of the commander's  unit or organization has 
been confined, whichever situation is applicable, the 
commander shall decide whether pretrial confine- 
ment will continue.". 
d. R.C.M. 305(i)(l) is amended to read as follows: 
"(1)  In general. A review of the adequacy of 
probable cause to believe the prisoner has commit- 
ted an offense and of the necessity for continued pre- 
trial confinement shall be made within 7 days of the 
imposition of confinement under military control. If 
the prisoner was apprehended by civilian authorities 
and remains in civilian custody at the request of mil- 
itary authorities, reasonable efforts will be made to 
bring the prisoner under military control in a timely 
fashion. In calculating the number of days of con- 
finement for purposes of this rule, the initial date of 
confinement shall count as one day and the date of 
the review shall also count as one day.". 
e.  R.C.M. 405(i) is amended to read as follows: 
"(i)  Military Rules of Evidence. The Military 
Rules of  Evidence-other  than Mil. R. Evid. 301, 
302, 303, 305, 412, and Section V-shall  not apply 
in pretrial investigations under this rule.". 
f.  R.C.M. 701(g)(3)(C) is amended to read as fol- 
lows: 
"(C)  Prohibit the party from introducing evi- 
dence, calling a witness, or raising a defense not dis- 
closed; and". 
g.  R.C.M. 704(e) is amended to read as follows: 
"(e)  Decision  to grant  immunity. Unless limited 
by superior competent authority, the decision to 
grant immunity is a matter within the sole discretion 
of the appropriate general court-martial convening 
authority. However, if  a defense request to immu- 
nize a witness has been denied, the military judge 
may, upon motion of the defense, grant appropriate 
relief directing that either an appropriate general 
court-martial convening authority grant testimonial 
immunity to a defense witness or, as to the affected 
charges and specifications, the proceedings against 
the accused be abated, upon findings that: 
(1)  The witness intends to invoke the right 
against self-incrimination to the extent permitted by 
law if called to testify; and 
(2)  The Government has engaged in discrimi- 
natory use of immunity to obtain a tactical advan- 
tage, or the Government, through its own over- 
reaching, has forced the witness to invoke the 
privilege against self-incrimination; and 
(3)  The witness' testimony is material, clearly 
exculpatory, not cumulative, not obtainable from 
any other source and does more than merely affect 
the credibility of other witnesses.". 
h. R.C.M. 910(a)(l) is amended to read as follows: 
"(1)  In general. An accused may plead as follows: 
guilty; not guilty to an offense as charged, but guilty 
of a named lesser included offense; guilty with ex- 
ceptions, with or without substitutions, not guilty of 
the exceptions, but guilty of the substitutions, if any; 
or, not guilty. A plea of guilty may not be received as 
to an offense for which the death penalty may be ad- 
judged by the court-martial.". 
i.  R.C.M. 918(a)(l) is amended to read as follows: 
"(1)  As to a specification. General findings as to a 
specification may be: guilty; not guilty of an offense 
as charged, but guilty of a named lesser included of- 
fense; guilty with exceptions, with or without substi- 
tutions, not guilty of the exceptions, but guilty of the 
substitutions, if any; not guilty only by reason of 
lack of mental responsibility; or, not guilty. Excep- 
tions and substitutions may not be used to substan- 
tially change the nature of the offense or to increase 
the seriousness of the offense or the maximum pun- 
ishment for it.". 
j.  R.C.M. 920(b) is amended to read as follows: 
"(b)  When  given. Instructions on findings shall be 
given before or after arguments by counsel, or at 
both times, and before the members close to deliber- 
ate on findings, but the military judge may, upon re- 
quest of the members, any party, or sua sponte, give 
additional instructions at a later time.". 
k.  R.C.M. 1103(g)(l)(A) is amended to read as fol- 
lows: 
"In  general. In general and special courts-martial 
which require a verbatim transcript under subsec- 
tions (b) or (c) of this rule and are subject to review 
by a Court of Military Review under Article 66, the 
trial counsel shall cause to be prepared an original 
and four copies of the record of trial. In all other 
general and special courts-martial the trial counsel HISTORICAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
shall cause to be prepared an original and one copy 
of the record of trial.". 
Section 2.  Part I11 of the Manual for Courts-Mar- 
tial, United States, 1984, is amended as follows: 
a.  Mil. R. Evid. 31 1(e)(2) is amended to read as fol- 
lows: 
"(2)  Derivative Evidence. Evidence that is chal- 
lenged under this rule as derivative evidence may be 
admitted against the accused if the military judge 
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the ev- 
idence was not obtained as a result of an unlawful 
search or seizure, that the evidence ultimately would 
have been obtained by lawful means even if the un- 
lawful search or seizure had not been made, or that 
the evidence was obtained by officials who reasona- 
bly and with good faith relied on the issuance of an 
authorization to search, seize, or apprehend or a 
search warrant or an arrest warrant. Notwithstand- 
ing other provisions of this Rule, an apprehension 
made in a dwelling in a manner that violates R.C.M. 
302 (d)(2)&(e) does not preclude the admission into 
evidence of a statement of an individual appre- 
hended provided  (1) that the apprehension was 
based on probable cause, (2) that the statement was 
made subsequent to the apprehension at a location 
outside the dwelling, and (3) that the statement was 
otherwise in compliance with these rules.". 
b.  Mil. R. Evid. 505(a) is amended to read as fol- 
lows: 
"(a)  General rule of privilege.  Classified informa- 
tion is privileged from disclosure if disclosure would 
be detrimental to the national security. As with 
other rules of privilege this rule applies to all stages 
of the proceedings.". 
c.  Mil. R. Evid. 505(g)(l)(D) is amended by adding 
the following at the end: 
"All persons requiring security clearance shall co- 
operate with investigator~  personnel in any investi- 
gations which are necessary to obtain a security 
clearance.". 
d. Mil. R. Evid. 505(h)(3) is amended to read as fol- 
lows: 
"(3)  Content of notice. The notice required by this 
subdivision shall include a brief description of the 
classified information. The description, to be suffi- 
cient, must be more than a mere general statement of 
the areas about which evidence may be introduced. 
The accused must state, with particularity, which 
items of classified information he reasonably expects 
will be revealed by his defense.". 
e.  Mil. R. Evid. 505(i)(3) is amended to read as fol- 
lows: 
"(3)  Demonstration of national security nature of 
the information. In order to obtain an in camera pro- 
ceeding under this rule, the Government shall sub- 
mit the classified information and an affidavit ex 
parte for examination by the military judge only. 
The affidavit shall demonstrate that disclosure of the 
information reasonably could be expected to cause 
damage to the national security in  the degree re- 
quired to warrant classification under the applicable 
executive order, statute, or regulation.". 
f.  Mil. R. Evid. 505(i)(4)(B) is amended to read as 
follows: 
"Standard. Classified information is not subject to 
disclosure under this subdivision unless the informa- 
tion is relevant and necessary to an element of the of- 
fense or a legally cognizable defense and is otherwise 
admissible in evidence. In presentencing proceed- 
ings, relevant and material classified information 
pertaining to the appropriateness of, or the appro- 
priate degree of, punishment shall be admitted only 
if  no unclassified  version  of such information is 
available.". 
g.  Mil. R. Evid. 505(j)(5) is amended to read as fol- 
lows: 
"(5)  Closed session. The military judge may ex- 
clude the public during that portion of the presenta- 
tion of evidence that discloses classified informa- 
tion.". 
h.  Mil. R. Evid. 609(a) is amended to read as fol- 
lows: 
"(a)  General rule. For the purpose of attacking 
the credibility of a witness, (1) evidence that a wit- 
ness other than the accused has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted, subject to Mil. R. Evid. 403, 
if  the crime was punishable by death, dishonorable 
discharge, or imprisonment in  excess of one year 
under the law under which  the witness was con- 
victed, and evidence that an accused has been con- 
victed of such a crime shall be admitted if  the mili- 
tary judge determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial ef- 
fect to the accused; and (2) evidence that any witness 
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if  it 
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of 
the punishment. In determining whether a crime APPENDIX 23 
tried by court-martial was punishable by death, dis- 
honorable discharge, or imprisonment in  excess of 
one year, the maximum punishment prescribed by 
the President under Article 56 at the time of the con- 
viction applies without regard to whether the case 
was tried by general, special, or summary court- 
martial.". 
i.  Mil. R. Evid. 1101(d) is amended to read as fol- 
lows: 
"(d)  Rules inapplicable. These rules (other than 
with respect to privileges and Mil. R. Evid. 412) do 
not apply in investigative hearings pursuant to Arti- 
cle 32; proceedings for vacation of suspension of sen- 
tence pursuant to Article 72; proceedings for search 
authorizations; proceedings involving pretrial re- 
straint; and in other proceedings authorized under 
the code or this Manual and not listed in subdivision 
(a).". 
Section 3. Part IV of the Manual for Courts-Mar- 
tial, United States, 1984, is amended as follows: 
a. Paragraph 37c is amended by inserting the fol- 
lowing new subparagraphs (10) and (1 1) at the end 
thereof: 
"(10)  Use. 'Use'  means to inject, ingest, inhale, or 
otherwise introduce into the human body, any con- 
trolled substance. Knowledge of the presence of the 
controlled substance is a required component of use. 
Knowledge of the presence of the controlled sub- 
stance may be inferred from the presence of the con- 
trolled substance in the accused's body or from 
other circumstantial evidence. This permissive infer- 
ence may be legally sufficient to satisfy the govern- 
ment's burden of proof as to knowledge.". 
"(1 1) Deliberate ignorance. An accused who con- 
sciously avoids knowledge of the presence of a con- 
trolled substance or the contraband nature of the 
substance is subject to the same criminal liability as 
one who has actual knowledge.". 
b.  The last paragraph of paragraph 37e is amended 
to read as follows: 
"When an offense under paragraph 37 is commit- 
ted: while the accused is on duty as a sentinel or 
lookout; on board a vessel or aircraft used by  or 
under the control of the armed forces; in or at a mis- 
sile launch facility used by  or under the control of 
the armed forces; while receiving special pay under 
37 U.S.C. Section 310; in time of war; or in a confine- 
ment facility used by or under the control of the 
armed forces, the maximum period of confinement 
authorized for such an offense shall be increased by 5 
years.". 
c. 	Paragraph 43d is amended to read as follows: 
"(d)  Lesser included offenses. 
(1)  Premeditated  murder and murder during cer- 
tain offenses. Article 11  8(2) and (3)-murder 
(2) All murders under Article 118. 
(a)  Article 1  19-involuntary  manslaughter 
(b)  Article 128-assault;  assault consummated 
by a battery; aggravated assault 
(c)  Article 134-negligent  homicide 
(3)  Murder as defined in Article 118(1), (21,  and 
(4). 
(a) Article 80-attempts 
(b) Article 119-voluntary  manslaughter 
(c)  Article 134-assault  with intent to commit 
murder 
(d)  Article 134-assault  with intent to commit 
voluntary manslaughter". 
d. Para 45d(l) is amended by  adding the following 
at the end thereof: 
"(e)  Article 120(b)-carnal  knowledge". 
e.  Para 45f(l) is amended to read as follows: 
"(1)  Rape. 
In that  (personal jurisdiction 
data), did, (at/on  board-location)  (subject-matter 
jurisdiction  data, if  required) on or about 
19,  rape  (a 
person who had not attained the age of 16 years).". 
f.  The following new paragraph is inserted after par- 
agraph 96: 
"96a. Article 134 (Wrongful interference with an 
adverse administrative proceeding) 
a. 	Text. See paragraph 60. 
b. 	Elements. 
(1)  That the accused wrongfully did a cer- 
tain act; 
(2)  That the accused did so in the case of a 
certain person against whom the accused had reason 
to believe there were or would be adverse adminis- 
trative proceedings pending; 
(3) That the act was done with the intent to 
influence, impede, or obstruct the conduct of such 
adverse administrative proceeding, or otherwise ob- 
struct the due administration ofjustice; 
(4)  That under the circumstances, the con- 
duct of the accused was to the prejudice of good or- HISTORICALEXE(ZUTIVE ORDERS 
der and discipline in the armed forces or was of a na- 
ture to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
c.  Explanation. For purposes of this paragraph 
"adverse administrative proceeding"  includes any 
administrative proceeding or action, initiated 
against a servicemember, that could lead to dis- 
charge, loss of special or incentive pay, administra- 
tive reduction in grade, loss of a security clearance, 
bar to reenlistment, or reclassification. Examples of 
wrongful interference include wrongfully influenc- 
ing, intimidating, impeding, or injuring a witness, an 
investigator, or other person acting on an adverse 
administrative action; by means of bribery, intimida- 
tion, misrepresentation,  or force or threat of force 
delaying or preventing communication of informa- 
tion relating to such administrative proceeding; and, 
the wrongful destruction or concealment of informa- 
tion relevant to such adverse administrative pro- 
ceeding. 
d. Lesser included offenses. None. 
e.  Maximum punishment.  Dishonorable dis- 
charge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for 5 years. 
f. Sample  specification.  In  that 
(personal jurisdiction  data), did, 
(at/on board-location)  (subject-matter jurisdiction 
data, if required), on or about 
19,  wrongfully (endeavor to) [impede (an ad- 
verse administrative proceeding) (an investigation) 
(  )]  [influence the actions of 
,(an officer responsible for making 
a recommendation concerning the adverse adminis- 
trative proceeding) (an individual responsible for 
making a decision concerning an adverse adminis- 
trative proceeding) (an individual responsible for 
processing an adverse administrative proceeding) 
(  )][(influence) (alter) the testimony 
of  a witness before (a board estab- 
lished to consider an adverse administrative pro- 
ceeding or elimination) (an investigating officer) 
(  )] in the case of  , 
by  [(promising) (offering) (giving) to the said 
, (the sum of  $  ) 
( 
$ 
,  of  a  value 
)] [communicating 
a  threat to 
of 
to th
about 
e said 
1 
[  1,  (if)  (unless)  the  said 
,  would [recommend dismissal of 
the action against said  1 [(wrong-
fully refuse to testify) (testify falsely concerning 
) (  )] [(at such ad- 
ministrative proceeding) (before such investigating 
officer) (before  such administrative board)] 
[  I". 
Sec. 4. These amendments shall take effect on Janu- 
ary 21, 1994, subject to the following: 
a. The amendments made to paragraphs 37c, 37e, 
43d(2), 45d(l), and 96a of Part IV shall apply to any 
offense committed on or after January 2 1, 1994. 
b.  The amendments made to Section I11 shall ap- 
ply only in cases in which arraignment has been 
completed on or after January 2 1, 1994. 
c.  The amendment made to Rules for Courts- 
Martial 405(i), 70 1  (g)(3)(C), and 704(e) shall apply 
only in cases in which charges are preferred on or af- 
ter January 2 1, 1994. 
d. The amendments made to Rules for Courts- 
Martial 9 10,9  18, and 920 shall apply only to cases in 
which arraignment occurs on or after January 2 1, 
1994. 
e.  The amendments made to Rule for Courts- 
Martial 305 shall apply only to cases in which pre- 
trial confinement is imposed on or after January 2 1, 
1994. 
f.  The amendment to Rule for Courts-Martial 
1  103(g)(l)(A) shall apply only in cases in which the 
sentence is adjudged on or after January 21, 1994. 
g.  Nothing contained in these amendments shall 
be construed to make punishable any act done or 
omitted prior to January 21,  1994, which was not 
punishable when done or omitted. 
h.  The maximum punishment for an offense prior 
to January 2 1, 1994, shall not exceed the applicable 
maximum in effect at the time of the commission of 
such offense. 
i.  Nothing in these amendments shall be con- 
strued to invalidate any nonjudicial punishment pro- 
ceeding, restraint, investigation, referral of charges, 
trial in which arraignment occurred, or other action 
begun prior to January 2 1, 1994, and any such re- 
straint, investigation, referral of charges, trial, or 
other action may proceed in the same manner and APPENDIX 23 
with the same effect as if these amendments had not 
been prescribed. 
Sec. 5. The Secretary of Defense, on behalf of the 
President, shall transmit a copy of this order to the 
Congress of the United States in accord with section 
836 of title 10 of the United States Code. 
THE  WHITE HOUSE 
December 23, 1993. 
Changes to the Discussion Accompanying the 
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984 
A.  The following Discussion is inserted after 
R.C.M. 109(c)(2): 
"The  term 'unfitness'  should be construed 
broadly, including, for example, matters to the in- 
competence, impartiality, and misconduct of the 
judge. Erroneous decisions of a judge are not subject 
to investigation under this rule. Challenges to these 
decisions are more appropriately left to the appellate 
process.". 
B.  The following Discussion is inserted after 
R.C.M. 109(c)(3): 
"Complaints  need not be made in any specific 
form, but if possible complaints should be made 
under oath. Complaints may be made by judges, 
lawyers, a party, court personnel, members of the 
general public or members of the military commu- 
nity. Reports in the news media relating to the con- 
duct of a judge may also form the basis of a com- 
plaint. 
An individual designated to receive complaints 
under this subsection should have judicial experi- 
ence. The chief trial judge of a service may be desig- 
nated to receive complaints against military trial 
judges.". 
C. The following Discussion is inserted after 
R.C.M. 109(c)(4): 
"Complaints under this subsection will be treated 
with confidentiality. Confidentiality protects the 
subject judge and the judiciary when a complaint is 
not substantiated. Confidentiality also encourages 
the reporting of allegations ofjudicial misconduct or 
unfitness and permits complaints to be screened with 
the full cooperation of others. 
Complaints containing allegations of criminality 
should be referred to the appropriate criminal inves- 
tigative agency in accordance with Appendix 3 of 
this Manual.". 
D. The following Discussion is inserted after 
R.C.M. 109(c)(5)(B): 
"To avoid the type of conflict prohibited in Arti- 
cle 66(g), the Judge Advocate General's designee 
should ordinarily not be a member of  the same 
Court of Military Review as the subject of the com- 
plaint. If practicable, a former appellate military 
judge should be designated.". 
E. The following Discussion is inserted after 
R.C.M. 109(c)(6)(B): 
"The discretionary reassignment of  military trial 
judges or appellate military judges to meet the needs 
of the service is not professional disciplinary ac- 
tion.". 
F.  The following Discussion is inserted after 
R.C.M. 109(c)(7): 
"The Judge Advocate General concerned may ap- 
point an ad hoc or a standing commission.".  , 
G. The Discussion to R.C.M. 701(g)(3) is amended 
by adding the following after the first paragraph: 
"The sanction of excluding the testimony of a de- 
fense witness should be used only upon finding that 
the defense counsel's failure to comply with this rule 
was willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tac- 
tical advantage or to conceal a plan to present 
fabricated testimony. Moreover, the sanction of ex- 
cluding the testimony of a defense witness should 
only be used if  alternative sanctions could not have 
minimized the prejudice to the Government. Before 
imposing this sanction, the military judge  must 
weigh the defendant's  right to compulsory process 
against the countervailing public interests, including 
(1) the integrity of the adversary process; (2) the in- 
terest in the fair and efficient administration of mili- 
tary justice;  and (3) the potential prejudice to the 
truth-determining function of the trial process.". 
H. The Discussion  following R.C.M. 910(a)(l) is 
amended to read as follows: 
"See paragraph 2, Part IV, concerning lesser in- 
cluded offenses. When the plea is to a named lesser 
included offense without the use of exceptions and 
substitutions, the defense counsel should provide a 
written revised specification accurately reflecting the 
plea and request that the revised specification be in- 
cluded in the record as an appellate exhibit. A plea HISTORICAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
of guilty to a lesser included offense does not bar the 
prosecution  from proceeding on the offense  as 
charged. See also subsection (g) of this rule. 
A plea of guilty does not prevent the introduction 
of evidence, either in support of the factual basis for 
the plea, or, after findings are entered in aggrava- 
tion. See R.C.M. 100  1(b)(4).". 
I. The last two paragraphs of the Discussion accom- 
panying R.C.M. 918(a)(l) are amended to read as 
follows: 
"Lesser included offenses. If the evidence fails to 
prove the offense charged but does prove an offense 
necessarily included in the offense charged, the 
factfinder may find the accused not guilty of the of- 
fense charged but guilty of a named lesser offense, 
which is included in the offense charged, without the 
use of exceptions and substitutions. Ordinarily, an 
attempt is a lesser included offense even if the evi- 
dence establishes that the offense charged was con- 
summated. See Part IV concerning lesser included 
offenses. 
Offenses  arising from  the same act or transaction. 
The accused may be found guilty of two or more of- 
fenses arising from the same act or transaction, 
whether or not the offenses are separately punisha- 
ble.  But see  R.C.M.  906(b)(12); 907(b)(3)(B); 
1003(c)(l)(C).". 
J. The Discussion accompanying R.C.M. 920(b) is 
amended to read as follows: 
"After members have reached a finding on a spec- 
ification, instructions may not be given on an offense 
included therein which was not described in an ear- 
lier instruction unless the finding is illegal. This is 
true even if the finding has not been announced. 
When instructions are to be given is a matter within 
the sole discretion of the military trial judge.". 
Changes to the Analysis Accompanying the Manual 
for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984 
1.  Changes to Appendix 21, the Analysis accompa- 
nying the Rules for Courts-Martial (Part 11, MCM, 
1984). 
a. R.C.M. 109. The Analysis is amended by in- 
serting the following at the end thereof: 
"1993 Amendment:  Subsection (a) was amended 
to conform with subsection (c). The amendment to 
subsection (a) clarifies that the Judge Advocates 
General are responsible for the supervision and dis- 
cipline of judges and attorneys. The amendment to 
subsection (a) is not intended to limit the authority 
of a Judge Advocate General in any way. 
New subsection (c) is based on Article 6a, Uni- 
form Code of Military Justice. Article 6a was en- 
acted by the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year  1990. "Military  Appellate Procedures,"  title 
XIII, 5  1303, National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-189,  103 Stat. 
1352, 1576 (1989). The legislative history reveals 
Congressional intent that, to the extent consistent 
with the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the pro- 
cedures to investigate and dispose of allegations con- 
cerning judges in the military should emulate those 
procedures found in the civilian sector. See H.R. 
Con5 Rep. 331, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess.  656 (1989) 
[hereinafter Con5 Rep. No. 3311. The procedures es- 
tablished by  subsection (c) are largely patterned af- 
ter the pertinent sections of the ABA Model Stan- 
dards Relating to Judicial Discipline and Disability 
Retirement (1978) [hereinafter ABA Model Stan- 
dard] and the procedures dealing with the investiga- 
tion of complaints against federal judges in 28 
U.S.C. f 3 72 (1  988). The rule recognizes, however, 
the overall responsibility of the Judge Advocates 
General for the certification, assignment, profes- 
sional supervision and discipline of military trial and 
appellate military judges. See Articles 6, 26, & 66, 
Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
Subsection (c)(2) is based on the committee report 
accompanying the FY 90 Defense Authorization 
Act. See Con5 Rep. No. 331 at 658. This subsection 
is designed to increase public confidence in the mili- 
tary justice system while contributing to the integ- 
rity of the system. See Landmark Communications 
v. 	 Virginia,435 U.S. 829 (1978). 
The first sentence of the Discussion to subsection 
(c)(2) is based on the committee report accompany- 
ing the Defense Authorization Act. Conf. Rep. No. 
331, at 358. The second and third sentences of the 
discussion are based on the commentary to ABA 
Model Standard 3.4. See also Chandler v.  Judicial 
Council, 398 U.S. 74 (1970). 
Subsections (c)(3), (c)(5), and (c)(7) reflect, and 
adapt to the conditions of military practice, the gen- 
eral principle that judges should investigate judges. 
The first paragraph of the Discussion to subsec- 
tion (c)(3) is based on the commentary to ABA 
Model Standard 4.1. APPENDIX 23 
The discussion to subsection (c)(4) is based on the 
commentary to ABA Model Standard 4.6. 
The clear and convincing standard found in sub- 
section (c)(6)(c) is based onABA Model Standard 
7.10. 
Under subsection (c)(7), the principle purpose of 
the ommission is to advise the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral concerned as to whether the allegations con- 
tained in a complaint constitute a violation of appli- 
cable ethical standards. This subsection is not 
intended to preclude use of the commission for other 
functions such as rendering advisory opinions on 
ethical questions. See ABA Model Standard 9 on the 
establishment and role of an advisory committee. 
Subsection (c)(7)(A) is based on ABA Model Stan- 
dard 2.3, which provides that one-third of the mem- 
bers of a commission should be active or retired 
judges.". 
b.  R.C.M. 305(f). The Analysis accompanying 
R.C.M. 305(f) is amended by inserting the following 
at the end thereof: 
"1993Amendment: The amendment to subsection 
(f) provides a specific time period by which to mea- 
sure compliance. Because it is possible to obtain 
credit for violations of this section under subsection 
(k), a standard of compliance was thought neces- 
sary. See, e.g., United States v.  Chapman, 26 M.J. 
515 (A.C.M.R. 1988), pet.  denied 27 M.J. 404 
(C.M.A. 1989). This amendment, while protecting 
the rights of the prisoner, also gives reasonable pro- 
tection to the Government in those areas where the 
prisoner is confined in a civilian facility and the re- 
quest is never, or is belatedly, communicated to mili- 
tary authorities. While it is expected that military 
authorities will have procedures whereby civilian 
confinement authorities communicate such requests 
in a timely fashion, the failure to communicate such 
a request, or the failure to notify military authorities 
in a timely manner should be tested for prejudice 
under Article 59, and should not be considered as in- 
voking the credit provisions of subsection (k) of this 
rule.". 
c.  R.C.M. 305(h)(2)(A). The Analysis accompany- 
ing R.C.M. 305(h)(2)(A) is amended by inserting 
the following at the end thereof: 
"1993Amendment: The amendment to subsection 
(h)(2)(A) clarifies that the 72 hour period operates in 
two distinct situations: (a) if  the commander orders 
the prisoner into pretrial confinement,  the com- 
mander has 72 hours to decide whether pretrial con- 
finement will continue, and (b) if someone other 
than the prisoner's commander orders the prisoner 
into pretrial confinement, the prisoner's commander 
has 72 hours from receipt of a report that the pris- 
oner has been confined to decide whether pretrial 
confinement will continue.". 
d. R.C.M. 305(i)(l). The Analysis accompanying 
R.C.M. 305(i)(l) is amended by inserting the follow- 
ing at the end thereof: 
"1993 Amendment: The amendment to subsection 
(i)(l) provides that the required review only be- 
comes applicable whenever the accused is confined 
under military control. For example, if the prisoner 
was apprehended and is being held by  civilian au- 
thorities as a military deserter in another state from 
where the prisoner's unit is located and it takes three 
days to transfer the prisoner to an appropriate con- 
finement facility, the seven day period under this 
rule would not begin to run until the date of the pris- 
oner's transfer to military authorities. Any unrea- 
sonable period of time that it may take to bring a 
prisoner under military control should be tested for 
prejudice under Article 59, and should not be con- 
sidered as invoking the credit provisions of subsec- 
tion (k) of this rule absent evidence of bad faith by 
military authorities in utilizing civilian custody. But 
see United States v. Ballesteros, 29 M.J., 14 (C.M.A. 
1989). However, any time spent in civilian custody 
at the request of military authorities would be sub- 
ject  to pretrial confinement credit mandated by 
United States v. Allen,  17 M.J. 126 (C.M.A. 1984). 
The amendment further clarifies the method of 
calculation to determine if the rule has been vio- 
lated. See  United states v. DeLoatch, 25 M.J. 718 
(A.C.M.R. 1987); contra,  United States v. New, 23 
M.J. 889 (A.C.M.R. 1987).". 
e.  R.C.M. 405(i). The Analysis accompanying 
R.C.M. 405(i) is amended by inserting the following 
at the end thereof: 
"1993 Amendment: The amendment to R.C.M. 
405(i) makes the provisions of Mil. R. Evid. 412 ap- 
plicable at pretrial investigations.". 
f.  R.C.M. 701(g)(3)(C). The Analysis accompany- 
ing R.C.M. 701(g)(3)(C) is amended by inserting the 
following at the end thereof: 
"1993 Amendment: The amendment to R.C.M. 
70 1  (g)(3)(C), based on the decision of  Taylor v. Zlli-
nois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), recognizes that the Sixth HISTORICAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
Amendment compulsory process right does not pre- 
clude a discovery sanction that excludes the testi- 
mony of a material defense witness. This sanction, 
however, should be reserved to cases where the ac- 
cused has willfully and blatantly violated applicable 
discovery rules, and alternative sanctions could not 
have minimized the prejudice to the Government. 
See Chappee v.  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts, 
659 F.Supp. 1220 (D. Mass. 1988) The Discussion to 
R.C.M. 701(g)(3)(C) adopts the test, along with fac- 
tors the judge must consider, established by the Tay- 
lor decision.". 
g.  R.C.M. 704(e). The Analysis accompanying 
R.C.M. 704(e) is amended by inserting the following 
at the end thereof: 
"1993 Amendment. Subsection (e) to R.C.M. 704 
was amended to make the military practice for 
granting immunity for defense witnesses consistent 
with the majority rule within the Federal Courts. 
United States v.  Burns, 684 F.2d 1066 (2d Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 (1983); United States v. 
Shandell, 800 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1986); United States 
v.  Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
449 U.S.  1077 (1981);  United States v.  Thevis, 665 
F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 
(1982); United States v.  Pernell, 737 F.2d 521 (6th 
Cir. 1984); United States v.  Taylor, 728 F.2d 930 
(7th Cir. 1984); United States v.  Brutzman, 731 F.2d 
1449 (9th Cir. 1984);McGee v.  Crist, 739 F.2d 505 
(10th Cir. 1984); United States v.  Sawyer, 799 F.2d 
1494 (1  lth Cir. 1986). The amended rule conforms 
R.C.M. 704(e) with case law requiring the military 
judge to consider the Government's interest in not 
granting immunity to the defense witness. See 
United States v.  Smith, 17 M.J. 994, 996 (A.C.M.R. 
1984),pet. denied, 19 M.J. 71 (C.M.A. 1984); United 
States v.  O'Bryan,  16 M.J. 775 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983), 
pet. denied, 18 M.J. 16 (C.M.A. 1984).". 
The majority rule recognizes that an accused has 
no Sixth Amendment riglit to immunized testimony 
of defense witnesses and, absent prosecutorial  mis- 
conduct which  is intended to disrupt the judicial 
fact-finding process, an accused is not denied Fifth 
Amendment due process by  the Government's fail- 
ure to immunize a witness. If the military judge finds 
that the witness is a target for prosecution, there can 
be no claim o Government overreaching or discrimi- 
nation if a grant of immunity is denied. United States 
v.  Shandell, supra. 
The prior military rule was based on United States 
v.  Villines, supra, which had adopted the minority 
view espoused in Government of  Virgin Islands v. 
Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980). This view per- 
mitted the court to also immunize a defense witness 
when the witness'  testimony was clearly exculpa- 
tory, essential to the defense case and there was no 
strong Government interest in withholding testimo- 
nial immunity. This rule has been sharply criticized. 
See, e.g.,  United States v.  Turkish, supra;  United 
States v.  Taylor, supra;  United States v.  Pennel, 
supra;  United States v.  Zayas, 24 M.J.  132, 137 
(C.M.A. 1987) (dissenting opinion by Judge Cox). 
The current rule continues to recognize that a mil- 
itary judge is not empowered to immunize a witness. 
Upon a finding that all three prerequisites exist, a 
military judge may only abate the proceedings for 
the affected charges and specifications unless the 
convening authority grants immunity to the wit- 
ness.". 
h.  R.C.M. 910(a)(l). The Analysis accompanying 
R.C.M. 910(a)(l) is amended by inserting the fol- 
lowing at the end thereof: 
"1 993 Amendment:  The amendment to R.C.M. 
9 10(a)(l) removed the necessity of pleading guilty to 
a lesser included offense by exceptions and substitu- 
tions. This parallels the amendment to R.C.M. 
918(a)(l) ,allowing a finding of guilty to a named 
lesser included offense without mandating the use of 
exceptions and substitutions, made to more closely 
correspond to verdict practice in federal district 
courts. See Analysis comments for R.C.M. 
918(a)(l).". 
i.  R.C.M. 918(a)(l). The Analysis accompanying 
R.C.M. 918(a)(l) is amended by  inserting the fol- 
lowing at the end thereof: 
"1993 Amendment:  The amendment to R.C.M. 
918(a)(l) allows for a finding of guilty of a named 
lesser included offense of the charged offense, and 
eliminates the necessity of making findings by excep- 
tions and substitutions. This serves to conform mili- 
tary practice to that used in criminal trials before 
federal district courts. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c); E. 
Devitt and C. Blackman,Federal Jury Practice and 
Instructions, 18.07 (1977). The practice of using ex- 
ceptions and substitutions is retained for those cases 
in  which the military judge or court members must 
conform the findings to the evidence actually 
presented, e.g., a larceny case in which the finding is APPENDIX 23 
that the accused stole several of the items alleged in 
the specification but not others.". 
j.  R.C.M. 920(b). The Analysis accompanying 
R.C.M. 920(b) is amended by inserting the following 
at the end thereof: 
"1 993 Amendment: The amendment to R.C.M. 
920(b) is based on the 1987 amendments to Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 30. Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 30 was amended to permit in- 
structions either before or after arguments by coun- 
sel. The previous version of R.C.M. 920 was based 
on the now superseded version of the federal rule. 
The purpose of this amendment is to give the 
court discretion to instruct the members before or 
after closing arguments or at both times. The 
amendment will permit courts to continue in- 
structing the members after arguments as Rule 30 
and R.C.M. 920(b) had previously required. It will 
also permit courts to instruct before arguments in 
order to give the parties an opportunity to argue to 
the jury in light of the exact language used by the 
court. See  United States v.  Slubowski,  7 M.J. 461 
(C.M.A. 1979); United States v.  Pendry, 29 M.J. 694 
(A.C.M.R. 1989).". 
k. The  Analysis  accompanying  R.C.M. 
1103(g)(l)(A) is amended by inserting the following 
at the end thereof: 
"1 993 Amendment: Subsection (g)(l)(A) was 
amended by adding the phrase-and  are subject to re- 
view by a Court of Military Review under Article 
66" to eliminate the need to make four copies of ver- 
batim records of trial for courts-martial which are 
not subject to review by a Court of Military Review. 
These cases are reviewed in the Office of the Judge 
Advocate General under Article 69 and four copies 
are not ordinarily necessary.". 
2.  Changes to Appendix 22, the Analysis accompa- 
nying the Military Rules of Evidence (Part 111, 
MCM, 1984). 
a. The Analysis accompanying M.R.E. 303 is 
amended by  inserting the following at the end 
thereof: 
"1993 Amendment: R.C.M. 405(i) and Mil. R. 
Evid 1101(d) were amended to make the provisions 
of Mil. R. Evid. 412 applicable at pretrial investiga- 
tions. These changes ensure that the same protec- 
tions afforded victims of nonconsensual sex offenses 
at trial are available at pretrial hearings. See Crimi-
nal Justice Subcommittee of House Judiciary Com- 
mittee Report, 94th Cong., 2d Session, July 29, 
1976. Pursuant to these amendments, Mil. R. Evid. 
412 should be applied in conjunction with Mil. R. 
Evid. 303. As such, no witness may be compelled to 
answer a question calling for a personally degrading 
response prohibited by Rule 303. Mil. R. Evid. 412, 
however, protects the victim even if the victim does 
not testify. Accordingly, Rule 412 will prevent ques- 
tioning of the victim or other witness if the questions 
call for responses prohibited by Rule 412.". 
b.  The Analysis accompanying M.R.E. 3  11(e)(2) is 
amended by inserting the following at the end 
thereof: 
"1993 Amendment: The amendment to Mil. R. 
Evid. 311(e)(2) was made to conform Rule 31 1 to 
the rule of New  York v.  Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990). 
The purpose behind the exclusion of derivative evi- 
dence found during the course of an unlawful appre- 
hension in a dwelling is to protect the physical integ- 
rity of the dwelling, not to protect suspects from 
subsequent lawful police interrogation. See id. A 
suspect's subsequent statement made at another lo- 
cation that is the product of lawful police interroga- 
tion is not the fruit of the unlawful apprehension. 
The amendment also contains language added to re- 
flect the "good  faith" exception to the exclusionary 
rule set forth in United States v.  Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984), and the "inevitable discovery" exception set 
forth in Nix v.  Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).". 
c. The Analysis accompanying Mil. R. Evid. 412 is 
amended by  inserting the following at the end 
thereof: 
"1993 Amendment. R.C.M. 405(i) and Mil. R. 
Evid. 1  101(d) were amended to make the provisions 
of Rule 412 applicable at pretrial investigations. 
Congress intended to protect the victims of noncon- 
sensual sex crimes at preliminary hearings as well as 
at trial when it passed Fed. R. Evid. 412. See Crimi-
nal Justice Subcommittee of the House Judiciary 
Committee Report, 94th Cong., 2d Session, July 
1976.". 
d. The Analysis accompanying M.R.E. 505(a) is 
amended by  inserting the following at the end 
thereof: 
"1993  Amendment: The second sentence was 
added to clarify that this rule, like other rules of 
privilege, applies at all stages of all actions and is not 
relaxed during the sentencing hearing under M.R.E. 
1101(c).". HISTORICAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
e.  The Analysis accompanying M.R.E. 505(g) is 
amended by  inserting the following at the end 
thereof: 
"1993 Amendment: Subsection (g)(l)(D) was 
amended to make clear that the military judge's au- 
thority to require security clearances extends to per- 
sons involved in the conduct of the trial as well as 
pretrial preparation for it. The amendment requires 
persons needing security clearances to submit to in- 
vestigations necessary to obtain the clearance.". 
f.  The Analysis accompanying M.R.E. 505(h) is 
amended by  inserting the following at the end 
thereof: 
"1993 Amendment: Subsection (h)(3) was 
amended to require specificity in detailing the items 
of classified information expected to be introduced. 
The amendment is based on United States v.  Collins, 
720 F.2d 1195 (1 1th Cir. 1983).". 
g.  The Analysis accompanying M.R.E. 505(i) is 
amended by  inserting the following at the end 
thereof: 
"1993 Amendment: Subsection (i)(3) was 
amended to clarify that the classified material and 
the government's affidavit are submitted only to the 
military judge. The word "only"  was placed at the 
end of the sentence to make it clear that it refers to 
"military judge"  rather than to "examination."  The 
military judge  is to examine the affidavit and the 
classified information without disclosing it before 
determining to hold an in camera proceeding as de- 
fined in subsection (i)(l). The second sentence of 
subsection (i)(4)(B) was added to provide a standard 
for admission of classified information in sentencing  u 
proceedings.". 
h.  The Analysis accompanying M.R.E. 505(i) is 
amended by  inserting the following at the end 
thereof: 
"1993 Amendment: Subsection  (j)(5) was 
amended to provide that the military judge's author- 
ity to exclude the public extends to the presentation 
of any evidence that discloses classified information, 
and not merely to the testimony of witnesses. See 
generally  United States v.  Hershey, 20 M.J. 433 
(C.M.A. 1985),cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1062 (1986).". 
i.  The Analysis accompanying Mil. R. Evid. 609(a) 
is amended by  adding the following at the end 
thereof: 
"1  993 Amendment: The amendment to Mil. R. 
Evid. 609(a) is based on the 1990 amendment to 
Fed. R. Evid. 609(a). The previous version of Mil. R. 
Evid. 609(a) was based on the now superseded ver- 
sion of the Federal Rule. This amendment removes 
from the rule the limitation that the conviction may 
only be elicited during cross-examination. Addition- 
ally, the amendment clarifies the relationship be- 
tween Rules 403 and 609. The amendment clarifies 
that the special balancing test found in Mil. R.Evid. 
609(a)(l) applies to the accused's  convictions. The 
convictions of all other witnesses are only subject to 
the Mil. R. Evid. 403 balancing test. See Green v. 
Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989)". 
j.  The Analysis accompanying Mil. R. Evid. 
1101(d) is amended by inserting the following at the 
end thereof: 
"1993 Amendment. Mil. R. Evid. 1101(d) was 
amended to make the provisions of Mil. R. Evid. 4 12 
applicable at pretrial investigations.". 
3.  Changes to Appendix 21, the Analysis accompa- 
nying the punitive articles (Part IV, MCM, 1984). 
a. The Analysis accompanying paragraph 37c, Part 
IV, is amended by inserting the following at the end 
thereof: 
"1  993 Amendment. Paragraph c was amended by 
adding new paragraphs (10) and (1 1). Subparagraph 
(10) defines the term "use"  and delineates knowl- 
edge of the presence of the controlled substance as a 
required component of the offense. See United States 
v.  Mance, 26 M.J. 244 (C.M.A. 1988). The validity 
of a permissive inference of knowledge is recognized. 
See United States v.  Ford, 23 M.J. 331 (C.M.A. 
1987); United States v.  Harper, 22 M.J. 157 (C.M.A. 
1986). Subparagraph (1 1) precludes an accused 
from relying upon lack of actual knowledge when 
such accused has purposefully avoided knowledge of 
the presence or identity of controlled substances. See 
United States v.  Mance, supra (Cox, J., concurring). 
When an accused deliberately avoids knowing the 
truth concerning a crucial fact (i.e., presence or 
identity) and there is a high probability that the cru- 
cial fact does exist, the accused is held accountable 
to the same extent as one who has actual knowledge. 
See United States v.  Newman, 14 M.J. 474 (C.M.A. 
1983). Subsection (1 1) follows federal authority 
which equates actual knowledge with deliberate ig- 
norance. See United States v.  Ramsey, 785 F.2d  184 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986).". APPENDIX 23 
b.  The Analysis accompanying paragraph 43d(2), 
Part IV, is amended by inserting the following at the 
end thereof: 
"1  993 Amendment. The listed lesser included of- 
fenses of murder under Article 1  18(3) were changed 
to conform to the ration- 
ale of  United States v.  Roa,  12 M.J. 210 (C.M.A. 
1982). Inasmuch as Article 1  18(3) does not require 
specific intent, attempted murder, voluntary man- 
slaughter, assault with intent to murder and assault 
with intent to commit voluntary manslaughter are 
not lesser included offenses of murder under Article 
118(3).". 
c. The Analysis accompanying paragraph 45(d), 
Part IV, is amended by inserting the following at the 
end thereof: 
"1  993 Amendment.  The amendment to para 
45d(l) represents an administrative change to con- 
form the Manual with case authority. Carnal knowl- 
edge is a lesser included offense of rape where the 
pleading alleges that the victim has not attained the 
age of 16 years. See  United States  v.  Baker, 28 M.J. 
900 (A.C.M.R. 1989); United States v.  Stratton,  12 
M.J. 998 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982), pet.  denied, 15 M.J. 
107 (C.M.A. 1983); United States v.  Smith, 7 M.J. 
842 (A.C.M.R. 1979).". 
d. The Analysis accompanying paragraph 96a, Part 
IV, is amended by inserting the following after the 
analysis to paragraph 96: 
"1  993 Amendment. Paragraph 96a is new and 
proscribes conduct that obstructs administrative 
proceedings. See generally  18 U.S.C. 5  1505.06-
struction of proceedings before departments, agen- 
cies, and committees. This paragraph, patterned af- 
ter paragraph 96, covers obstruction of  certain 
administrative proceedings not currently covered by 
the definition of criminal proceeding found in para- 
graph 96c. This paragraph is necessary given the in- 
creased number of administrative actions initiated in 
each service.". 
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R.C.M. 1205(b)  ................ 

R.C.M. 1205(a)  ................ 

R.C.M. 1207  .................. 

R.C.M. 1110  .................. 

Appendix19  .................. 

IV.Para. 10e(2)(d)  ............. 

R.C.M. 202(c)(2) ............... 

R.C.M. 302(e)(2) ............... 

IV.Para. 19c(3)(a) .............. 

R.C.M. 302(a)  ................. 

R.C.M. 302(b)(3) ............... 

IV.Para. 9e(2)(a) ............... 

R.C.M. 302(d)(3) ............... 

R.C.M. 302(c)  ................. 

R.C.M. 302(d)  ................. 

IV.Para. 19  ................... 

Mil. R.Evid.314(g)  ............ 

IV.Para.21  ................... 

R.C.M. 302(d)(2), (e)(2)  ......... 

R.C.M. 302(e)  ................. 

R.C.M. 302(b)  ................. 

IV Para .46  ................... 

R.C.M. 801(a)(3) ............... 

R.C.M. 919  ................... 

R.C.M. 801(a)(3) ............... 

R.C.M. 1001(g)  ................ 

R.C.M.913(b)  ................. 

R.C.M. 103(20)  ................ 

IV.Para.23  ................... 
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Accused. presence required at .......................... 

Additional charges. effect on referral of  .................. 

Amending charges. effect on  ........................... 

Generally  .......................................... 

Arrest 
Attachment of jurisdiction. effecting  .................... 

Breaking ........................................... 

In quarters. as nonjudicial punishment ................... 

Members. disqualification while in  ...................... 

Pretrial 

See also Restraint. pretrial. 

Defined  ........................................ 

Duties inconsistent with  .......................... 

Groundsfor  .................................... 

Notice to persons in  .............................. 

Procedure  ...................................... 

Punishment prohibited  ........................... 

Release from 

Authority to grant  ............................. 

Whenrequired  ................................ 

Speedy trial. effect on ............................. 

Whomayorder  ................................. 

Unlawful. as offense .................................. 

Arson 
See also Burning with intent to defraud . 
Aggravated ......................................... 

Murder while committing  ......................... 

Assault with intent to commit .......................... 

Simplearson ........................................ 

Article 15.See Nonjudicial punishment . 

Article 32  .See Investigation. pretrial . 

Article 39(a) session  ..................................... 

Assault 

Aggravated ......................................... 

Attempts  .......................................... 

Battery  ............................................ 

Child. as victim  ..................................... 

Commissioned officer. as victim 

In execution of office  ............................. 

Not in execution of office .......................... 

Of a friendly foreign power  ........................ 

Defense of another ................................... 

Indecent  ........................................... 

Law enforcement official. as victim ...................... 

Maiming ........................................... 

Noncommissioned. petty. or warrant officer. as victim 

In execution of office  ............................. 

Not in execution of office  .......................... 

Self-defense  ........................................ 

Sentinel or lookout. as victim  .......................... 

Simple assault  ...................................... 

With intent to commit arson. burglary. housebreaking. 

Ref. 	 Page 
R.C.M. 804 	 ...................  11-79 
.  11-55 R.C.  M  60  1(e)(2) ............... 

R.C.M. 603(b), (c)  ..............  11-56;  56 

R.C.M.904  ...................  11-92 

R.C.M. 202(c)(2) ............... 

IV.Para. 19  .................. 

V.Para.5b(l)(B)(i), c(3) ......... 

R.C.M. 912(f)(l)(L)  ............ 

R.C.M. 304(a)(3) ............... 

R.C.M. 304(a)(3) ............... 

R.C.M. 304(c)  ................. 

R.C.M. 304(e)  ................. 

R.C.M. 304(d)  ................. 

R.C.M. 304(f)  ................. 

R.C.M. 304(g)  ................. 

R.C.M. 707(d)  ................. 

R.C.M. 707@)(1), (2)  ........... 

R.C.M. 304@) 	................. 

.  .  ..................
 IV  Para  21 
.  ...................
 IV  Para 52 
IV.Para.43  ................... 
.  . IV  Para  64  ................... 

IV.Para.52  .................. 

R.C.M. 803  ................ 

IV.Para.54  .................. 

IV.Paras.4c(5)(e); 54  ........... 

IV.Para. 54  ................... 

IV.Para. 54  ................... 

IV.Para. 14  ................... 

IV.Para.54  ................... 

IV. Para.54e(3) ................ 

R.C.M. 9 16(e)(5) ............... 

IV.Para.63  ................... 

IV.Para.54  ................... 

IV.Para.50  ................... 

IV.Para. 15  ................... 

IV.Para.54  ................... 

R.C.M. 916(e)  ................. 

IV.Para.54  ................... 

IV  Para .54  ...................
 . 
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murder. rape. robbery. sodomy. or voluntary 

manslaughter  ....................................... 

Assembly of court-martial 
Announcementof  ................................... 
Effect on 
Changing members  .............................. 

Changing military judge  .......................... 

Enlisted members. request for  ...................... 

Military judge alone. request for trial by  ............. 

Assistant counsel. See Counsel; Defense counsel; Trial counsel . 
Associate defense counsel .See Counsel; Defense counsel . 
Attachment. warrant of  ................................... 
Attempts 
Aiding the enemy (Art  . 104. UCMJ)  .................... 

Assault (Art  . 128. UCMJ) ............................. 

Desertion (Art  . 85. UCMJ)  ............................ 

Generally (Art .80. UCMJ) ............................ 

Mutiny (Art .94. UCMJ) .............................. 

Subordinate compelling surrender (Art  . 100. UCMJ)  ....... 

Attorney.See Counsel; Defense counsel; Trial counsel . 
Attorney-*  lient relationship 
See also Counsel; Defense counsel . 
Availability of individual military counsel. effect on  ........ 
Change of defense counsel. effect on  ..................... 
Privileged communications  ............................ 
Attorney General. grants of immunity  ....................... 
Authentication of 
Evidence ........................................... 
See also Evidence. Authentication and identification  . 
Promulgatingorders  ................................. 
Record of trial 
Certificate of correction  ........................... 

Examination preceding  ........................... 

Generally  ...................................... 

Summary courts-martial  .......................... 

Authorization to search. seize and apprehend .See Search and 
seizure. 
Automobile.See Search and seizure. Automobile; Vehicle . 
Aviation cadet 
Jurisdiction of courts.martial.  subject to  ................. 
Summary courts.martial.  not subject to trial by  ............ 
Bad checks  .See Checks. 
Bad-conduct discharge 
Multiple offenses. authorizing .......................... 
Prior convictions authorizing  .......................... 
Punishment. generally  ................................ 
Special courts.martia1.  power to adjudge  ................. 
Summary courts.martial.  power to adjudge  ............. 
Bailiff 
Detailing  .......................................... 
Disqualificationof  ................................... 
Duties ............................................. 
Ref.  Page 
IV.Para. 64  ........... 

R.C.M. 90l(b)  ................. 

R.C.M. 505(c)  ................. 

R.C.M. 505(e)  ................. 

R.C.M. 903(a)(l), (d)  ........... 

R.C.M. 903(b)(2), (d)  ........... 

R.C.M. 703(e)(2)(G)  ............ 

IV.Paras.4c(5)(d); 28  ........... 

IV.Paras.4c(5)(e); 54  ........... 

IV.Paras.4c(5)(a); 9  ............ 

IV.Para. 4  .................... 

IV.Paras. 4c(5)(b);  18  ........... 

IV.Paras.4c(5)(c); 24  ........... 

R.C.M. 506(b)(2)  ............... 

R.C.M. 505(d)(2)  ............... 

Mil. R.Evid. 502  ............... 

R.C.M. 704(c)(l), (2)  ........... 

Mil. R. Evid. 901; 902  ...... 
R.C.M. 1114(e)  ......... 

R.C.M. 1104(d)  ................ 

R.C.M. 1103(i)  ................ 

R.C.M. 1104  .................. 

R.C.M. 1305(c)  ................ 

Art.2(a)(2). UCMJ; R.C.M. 202(a) 
R.C.M.  1301(c)  ................ 

R.C.M. 1003(d)(3) .............. 

R.C.M. 1003(d)(2) .............. 

R.C.M. 1003(b)(lO)(C)  .......... 

R.C.M. 20 1  (F)(2)(B)  ............ 

R.C.M. 1301(d)  ................ 

R.C.M.501(c)  ................. 

R.C.M. 502(e)(2)  ............... 

R.C.M. 502(e)(3)(C)  ............ 
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Qualifications 
Generally  ...................................... 
Lackof. actionon  ............................... 
Battery.See Assault. 
Best evidence .See Evidence. Contents of writings. recordings. and 
photographs . 
Bias 
Ground for challenge of 
Member  ....................................... 
Military judge  .................................. 
Impeachment of witness  .............................. 
Bigamy  ................................................ 
Bill of particulars  ....................................... 
Blasting caps. included in explosives  ........................ 
Blood extraction. as evidence  .............................. 
Board. sanity .See Mental capacity; Mental responsibility . 
Boat.See Vessel. 
Bodily harm .See Assault. 
Body fluids. seizure of  .................................... 
See also Search and seizure. Body views and intrusions . 
Bomb 
Explosive. included in  ................................ 
Hoax .............................................. 
Threat ............................................. 
Breach of correctional custody  ............................. 
Breachofpeace  ......................................... 
Breaking and entering .See Burglary; Housebreaking;  Unlawful 
entry. 
Breakingarrest  ......................................... 
Breaking medical quarantine  .............................. 
Breaking restriction  ..................................... 
See also Restriction. 
Bribery  ................................................ 
Broadcasting of courts.martial.  prohibited  ................... 
Burden of proof . 
See also Search and seizure. Burden of  proof;  Self- 

Incrimination. Burden of proof . 

Challenges  ......................................... 

Defenses ........................................... 

Findings  ........................................... 

Motions 

Admissions and confessions  ....................... 

Eyewitness identification .......................... 

Generally  .......................................... 

Search and seizure  ................................... 

Burglary 

Assault with intent to commit .......................... 

Generally  .......................................... 

Housebreaking. distinguished from  ..................... 

Murder while committing  ............................. 

Burning with intent to defraud  ............................. 

Business records. admissibility  ............................. 

Ref. 
R.C.M. 502(e)(l) ............... 

R.C.M. 502(f)  ................. 

R.C.M. 912(f)(l)(N)  ............ 

R.C.M. 902(a), (b)(l)  ........... 

Mil.R.Evid.608(c) ............. 

IV.Para.65  ................... 

R.C.M. 906(b)(6) ............... 

R.C.M. 103(11)  ................ 

Mil.R.Evid.312(d)  ............ 

Mil.R.Evid.312(d)  ............ 

R.C.M. 103(11)  ................ 

IV.Para. 109  .................. 

IV.Para. 109  .................. 

IV.Para.70  ................... 

IV.Para.41  ................... 

IV.Para. 19  ................... 

IV.Para. 100  .................. 
.  . 102 IV  Para  .................. 

IV.Para.66  ................... 

R.C.M. 806(c)  ................. 

R.C.M. 9 12(f)(3) ............... 

R.C.M. 916(b)  ................. 

R.C.M. 920(e)(5) ............... 

Mil.R.Evid.304(e) ............. 

Mil.R.Evid.321(d)  ............ 

.  .................
 R.C.M  905(c) 

Mil.R.Evid.3  1  1(e) ............. 

IV.Para.64  ................... 

IV. Para.55  ................... 

IV.Para.56c(l) ................ 

IV.Para.43  ................... 

IV.Para.67  ................... 

Mil.R.Evid.803(6)  ............ 
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Subject 

Cadet 

Conduct unbecoming officer and gentlemen ............... 

Dismissal. punishment by  ............................. 

Jurisdiction of courts.martial.  subject to  ................. 

Summary courts.martia1.  not subject to trial by  ............ 

Capital case 

See also Capital offense; Death. as punishment . 

Defined  ............................................ 

Deposition. use in  ................................... 

Guilty plea prohibited in  .............................. 

Military judge alone. no jurisdiction to try  ................ 

Notice of aggravating circumstances required  ............. 

Proceduresin  ....................................... 

Capital offense 
Defined  ............................................ 

Referral 
Asnoncapital ................................... 
To special court-martial  .......................... 
To  summary court-martial  ............................ 

Captain's mast .See Nonjudicial punishment . 

Captured or abandoned property. offenses concerning  .......... 

Carnalknowledge  ....................................... 

Carrying concealed weapon  ........................... ... 

Casting away arms or ammunition  .......................... 

Causingfalsealarms  ..................................... 

Censure 

Court.martia1.  member. military judge.  or counsel. prohibited 
Provoking speech and gestures. distinguished  ............. 
Certificate. medical  ...................................... 
Certificate of correction  .................................. 
Challenges 
Control of. by  military judge  ........................... 

Members 

Forcause  ...................................... 

Generally  ...................................... 

Peremptory  .................................... 

Presence of members during  ....................... 

Special court-martial without military judge  .......... 

Militaryjudge  ...................................... 
Change of venue  ......................................... 
Chaplains, privileged communications  ....................... 
Character, evidence  . See  Evidence, Character evidence; 
Presentencing procedure . 
Charges and specifications 
See also specific offenses  . 

Additional charges ................................... 

Amendmentof  ...................................... 

Bill of particulars  .................................... 

Chargesheet  ....................................... 

Definitions 

Charge 
Ref  Page 
IV . Para.59  ................... 

R.C.M. 1003(b)(lO)(A)  .......... 

Art.2(a)(2), UCMJ; R.C.M. 202(a) 

R.C.M. 1301(c)  ................ 

R.C.M. 103(2)  ................. 

Art.49, UCMJ; Mil .R.Evid. 

804(b)(l)  ................... 

R.C.M. 910(a)  ................. 

R.C.M. 201(f)(l)(C)  ............ 

R.C.M. 1004(b)  ................ 

R.C.M.  1004  .................. 

R.C.M. 103(3)  ................. 

R.C.M. 2Ol(f)(l)(A)(iii)( b)  ...... 
R.C.M.  201(0(2)(~) ............ 

R.C.M. 1301(c)  ................ 

IV.Para.27  ................... 

IV. Para.45  ................... 

IV.Para. 112  .................. 

IV.Para.23  ................... 

IV. Para.23  ................... 

R.C.M. 104(a)(l) ............... 

IV. Para. 42c(l)  ................ 

R.C.M.  1  1  13(d)(5); 1305(d)  ...... 
R.C.M. 1104(d)  ................ 

R.C.M. 801(a)(3)  ............... 

R.C.M.912(f)  ................. 

R.C.M. 912  ................... 

R.C.M.912(g)  ................. 

R.C.M. 805(b)  ................. 

R.C.M. 912(h)  ................. 

R.C.M.902  ................... 

R.C.M. 906(b)(ll)  .............. 

Mil.R. Evid. 503 ............... 

R.C.M. 307(c)(2)(B)  ............ 

R.C.M. 603  ................... 

R.C.M. 906(bj(6) ............... 

Appendix 4  ................... 

R.C.M. 307(c)(2)  ....... 
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Specification  .................................... 

Dismissal of 
Bycommander  .................................. 
By  military judge  ................................ 
Speedytrial  .................................... 
Disposition of  ....................................... 

Duplicious  ......................................... 

Error in citation. effect of  ............................. 

Failure to state offense ................................ 

Findings  ........................................... 

Format  ............................................ 

Forwarding  ........................................ 

Investigation of .See Investigation. pretrial . 

Joinderof  .......................................... 

Jointoffenders  ...................................... 

Lesser included offenses  .See Findings; Lesser included 

offenses. 

Motions as to defects in  ............................... 

Multiple offenders  ................................... 

Multiple offenses  .................................... 

Multiplicious  ....................................... 

Notification to accused of  ............................. 

Papers. accompanying. discovery of  ..................... 

Preemption ......................................... 

Preferral.See Preferral of charges . 

Reading of. as part of arraignment  ...................... 

Referral.See Referral of charges . 

Serviceof  .......................................... 

Severance of  ........................................ 

Staff judge advocate. advice as to  ....................... 

Statute of limitations. tolling ........................... 

War. effect on disposition of  ........................... 

Withdrawal of  ...................................... 

Pursuant to pretrial agreement  ..................... 

Checks 
Dishonorable failure to maintain funds  .................. 
Forged  ............................................ 
Child 

Assault consummated by  battery on  ..................... 

Carnal knowledge with  ............................... 

Indecent acts or liberties with  .......................... 

Sodomyon  ......................................... 

Witness. competency  ................................. 

Civilian authorities and tribunals 

Authority to apprehend persons under code  .............. 

Control by. effect on absence without leave  ............... 

Delivery of military offenders to  ........................ 

Former jeopardy. effect of trial by  ...................... 

Martial law ......................................... 

Military occupation. superseding  ....................... 

Offenses subject to trial by  ............................. 

Civilian counsel .See Counsel; Defense counsel . 
Ref. 
R.C.M. 307(c)(3) ........... 
Page 
11-28 
R.C.M. 306(c)(l); 401(c)(l)  ...... 
................... R.C.M. 907 
R.C.M. 707(b)(2), (c)  ........... 
R.C.M. 401  ................... 
R.C.M. 906@)(5) ............... 
R.C.M. 307(d)  ................. 
............ R.C.M. 907(b)(l)(B) 
R.C.M.918(a)  ................. 
R.C.M. 307(c)(l); Appendix 4  .... 
R.C.M. 40 1  (c)(2) ............... 
R.C.M. 307(c)(4); 601(e)(2) 
R.C.M. 307(c)(5); 60 1  (e)(3) 
...... 
...... 
R.C.M. 905(b)(2); 906(b)(4), (5). (6) 
R.C.M. 307(c)(5) ............... 
R.C.M. 307(c)(4) ............... 
R.C.M. 307(c)(4); 1003(c)(l)(C) ... 
R.C.M. 308  ................... 
R.C.M. 701(a)(l)  ............... 
............ R.C.M. 307(c)(2)(C) 
R.C.M. 602  ................... 
R.C.M. 905(b)(5) ............... 
R.C.M.406  ................... 
R.C.M. 403(a)  ................. 
R.C.M. 40 1  (d); 407(b) ........... 
R.C.M. 604  ................... 
R.C.M. 705@)(2)(C) ............ 
IV.Para.68  ................... 
IV.Para.48  ................... 
IV.Para.54b(3)(c)  ............. 
IV.Para.45  ................... 
IV.Para.87  ................... 
.  ................... . IV  Para  5  1 
Mil. R.Evid.601 ............... 
R.C.M. 302(a)(2), @)(3)  ......... 
IV.Para. lOc(5) ................ 
R.C.M. 106  ................... 
R.C.M. 201(d); 907(b)(2)(C) ...... 
I.Para.2(a)(2)  ................. 
I.Para.2(a)(3) ................. 
R.C.M. 201(d)  ................. 
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Civilians 
Aiding the enemy. subject to trial for  .................... 
Authority to apprehend deserters  ....................... 
Contempt. punishment for  ............................ 
Jurisdiction of courts.martial.  subject to  ................. 
Orders. subject to .................................... 
Spying. subject to trial for  ............................. 
Witnesses 
Appear. neglect or refusal to  ....................... 
Subpoena of  .................................... 
Warrant of attachment  ........................... 
Claims. false  ........................................... 
Classified information 
Closure of court-martial  .............................. 
Privilege concerning  ..................... ........... 
Record of trial  ...................................... 
Clemency recommendation  ................................ 
Clergy. privileged communications to  ....................... 
Clerk 
Detailing  .......................................... 
Disqualification  ..................................... 
Duties ............................................. 
Lack of qualifications. action  .......................... 
Qualifications  ....................................... 
Co.accused .See Accomplices; Conspiracy; Principals . 
Code. defined  ........................................... 
Coercion 
Defense. asa  ...................................... 
Of court-martial ..................................... 
Of guilty plea  ....................................... 
Cohabitation. wrongful  ................................... 
Command 
Abandoning. surrendering. giving up  .................... 
Compelling surrender or abandonment of  ................ 
Detached or separate ................................. 
Endangering safety of  ................................ 
Influence 
Asanoffense  ................................... 
Unlawful 
Defined  ...................................... 
Exceptions  ................................... 
Over disposition of charges  ...................... 
Commander 
Appearance of accused at trial. responsibility for assistance  . . 
Authorization to search .See Search and seizure . 
Charges and specifications. authority to change ............ 
Charges. authority to dispose of  ........................ 
Confinement 
Post.trial. authority to order  ....................... 
Pretrial 
Actionby  .................................... 
Release. authority to order  ...................... 
Ref. 	 Page 
IV. Para.28(c)(l)  .............. 

R.C.M. 302(b)(3) ............... 

R.C.M. 809(a), (e)  .............. 

R.C.M. 202(a)  ................. 

IV. Para. 14c(3) ................ 

IV.Para.30c(3) ................ 

R.C.M. 703(e)(2)(G)  ............ 

R.C.M. 703(e)(2) ............... 

R.C.M. 703(e)(2)(G)  ............ 

IV.Para. 58  ................... 

R.C.M. 806(b)  ................. 

Mil.R.Evid.505  ............... 

R.C.M. 1  104(b)(l)(D), (2)  ....... 

R.C.M. 1105(b)(4) .............. 

Mil.R.Evid.503  ............... 

R.C.M. 501(c)  ................. 

R.C.M. 502(e)(2) ............... 

R.C.M. 502(e)(3)(C)  ............ 

R.C.M. 502(f)  ................. 

R.C.M. 502(e)(l)  ............... 

R.C.M. 103(4)  ........... 

R.C.M. 916(h) 	................. 

.  ...............
 R C.M. 104(a)(2) 
R.C.M. 910(d)  ................. 

IV.Para.69  ................... 

IV.Para. 23  ................... 

IV.Para.24 ................... 

R.C.M. 504(b)(2)(A), (B)  ........ 

IV.Para.23  ................... 

IV. Para. 22  ................... 

R.C.M. 104  ................... 

R.C.M. 104(a)(3) ............... 

R.C.M. 306(a)  ................. 

R.C.M. 804(c)(l) ............... 

R.C.M. 603(b)  ................. 

R.C.M.401  ................... 

R.C.M. 1101(b)(2) 
R.C.M. 305(h)  ................. 

R.C.M. 305(g)  ................. 
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Convening authority  .See Convening authority . 
Defined  ............................................ 

For authorization to search ........................ 

Dismissal of charges by  ............................... 

Disposition of charges by  ............................. 

Disposition of offenses  ................................ 

Forwarding charges by  ............................... 

Influence. unlawful command  .......................... 

Inquiry into reported offenses  .......................... 

Lack of mental capacity or responsibility action on  ......... 

Nonjudicial punishment. authority to administer  .......... 

Notification to accused of charges  ...................... 

Preliminary investigation  ............................. 

Relations with court.martial. members. military judge  ...... 

Report of offense. forwarded to ......................... 

Subordinate. relations with  ............................ 

Commissioned officer 

Assaulton  ......................................... 

Conductunbecoming ................................. 

Disobedienceof  ..................................... 

Disrespect towards  .................................. 

Preferral of charges. oath  ............................. 

Qualification as member of court-martial  ................. 

Summary court.martial.  power to try .................... 

Commission. military .See Military commission . 
Common trial .See Joint trial . 
Communicating  a threat  .................................. 

Communications. privileged .See Evidence. Privileges  . 
Company punishment .See Nonjudicial punishment . 
Competency of witness .See Evidence. Competency  . 
Composition of courts-martial 
Accused's elections  .................................. 

Capital case  ........................................ 

Changing  .......................................... 

General court-martial  ................................ 

Jurisdictional requisite ................................ 

Special court-martial  ................................. 

Empowered to adjudge a bad-conduct discharge  ....... 

Summary court-martial  ............................... 

Concealment of 

Evidence. as accessory after the fact ..................... 

Offender. as accessory after the fact  ..................... 

Stolenproperty  ..................................... 

Weapon  ........................................... 

Concurrent jurisdiction 
Civiliancourts  ...................................... 
Investigation of offenses. subject to ...................... 
Military tribunals .................................... 
Conditional guilty plea  ................................... 

Conditions 
In pretrial agreements  ................................ 
Ofsuspension  ....................................... 
Ref.  Page 
R.C.M.  103(5) ................. 
Mil.R.Evid.315(d)  ............ 
R.C.M.  401(c)(l) ............... 
............... R.C.M. 401; 402 
R.C.M. 306  ................... 
R.C.M. 401(c)(2); 402  ........... 
R.C.M.  104; IV .Para.22  ........ 
R.C.M. 303  ................... 
................. R.C.M. 706(a) 
V.Paras. Ic, d; 2a  .............. 
R.C.M. 308  ................... 
R.C.M. 303  ................... 
R.C.M.  104(a)(l) ............... 
R.C.M.  301(b)  ................. 
R.C.M. 306(a); 401(a); M)l(e) ..... 
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